The NATO led operation in Afghanistan has reached something of a crossroads. After eight years the Taliban movement continues to appear successful while in the NATO countries there is much discussion as to what the future strategy in Afghanistan should be. What form a new strategy would take is still unclear but “counterinsurgency” has become a hot topic, particularly in the United States.

“The Taliban are part of the population. That is why they cannot be defeated by force of arms,” says Stefan Olsson, a security policy analyst at FOI.

In a new report Stefan Olsson summarises the research on military and strategic aspects of counterinsurgency and what this means for the war in Afghanistan. There is much to suggest that this concept will be at the focus of the United States’ future approach, and that Sweden will be involved in one way or another. Previous experience shows that this strategy can be successful but that it requires both patience and the necessary resources. Principal responsibility must rest with the Afghan forces themselves since only they are part of the population. Sooner or later the ISAF countries will be leaving Afghanistan.

“The main problem out in the provinces has always been the lack of an effective police force and judicial system. It is this that has obliged the local people to cooperate with the Taliban since the latter, despite their extreme views on Islam, can still offer some form of basic security.”

The methods used in counterinsurgency are actually not new at all. They have long been known but have been relegated to the background in favour of the more conventional warfare which has dominated military thinking both in the United States and in Europe. Counterinsurgency is all about creating stability in a way that is reminiscent of police work.

“Ideally the local population should be actively involved in their own security work. Without the goodwill of the local people the Taliban would be at a disadvantage because they would lose all the support they need to be able to mount military operations and to have access to food, shelter and concealment.”

In order to be able to match the Taliban, the Afghan government, with the support of NATO, needs to be able to offer the same basic security. But with the situation as it is at present there is a lack of effective policing. Moreover, in comparison with international operations elsewhere, the NATO forces are very small. In Kosovo alone, with a native population of just 2 million, the EU has deployed a force of 40,000. Afghanistan has a population of 32 million but the ISAF forces number just 65,000.

“It is still not obvious that the strategy for counterinsurgency should be the solution chosen, however, since Swedish troops are not used to this type of unconventional warfare. Even so, the strategy does offer one possible way out of the dilemma in which the ISAF countries now find themselves. The disadvantage would be that the operation could well drag out well into the future. The advantages, on the other hand, would be that this strategy is based on an in-country solution and on a reduced use of military force,” says Stefan Olsson.