Strategy for Space - executive summary

FOI-R--1264--SE
September 2004
ISSN 1650-1942

Lars Höstbeck, Mattias Waldenvik, Mike Winnerstig

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Since their introduction some 40 years ago space systems have become increasingly important as e.g. intelligence systems and for enhancing military effect. From being a strategic asset, the goal for tomorrows space systems is to bring “space support to the warfighter” which implies an even greater dependence than before on space services for military operations.

If Sweden is to be able to use space systems for military effect, and rely on space systems in times of crisis or war, we need a national policy on the military use of space systems and a strategy for securing access to the systems deemed necessary.

Trends in technology as well as politico-military factors will affect the choice of strategy and the choice of strategy will determine the limits for our use of space-based systems, e.g. for intelligence and security critical purposes.

There exist three commonly used systems for describing space activities which together can be used to describe a nation’s space program and the purpose of a specific space system. The three typologies are:

Space activity sectors – Defines in broad terms areas of interest for space activities. The four sectors usually mentioned are Intelligence, Military, Civilian and Commercial.

Space missions – Describes what to do in space. Missions in the military activity sector are Space Support, Force Enhancement, Force Application and Space Control.

Military space doctrines – Describes a nation’s official policy towards the military use of space. A system of doctrines in common use is named Lupton’s military space doctrines after Lt Col David E. Lupton, USAF. The four different doctrines are called Sanctuary, Survivability, Space control and High ground.

A national policy on space that covers both military and civilian aspects should take into account which space missions, in each sector, the nation should be involved in, and form the policy accordingly. A space policy, in combination with the national security-policy, will point towards the strategy for securing access to space that Sweden should follow.

The Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) have started a transformation towards what has been called a Network-Based Defence. The transformation is a commitment to a defence structure that enhances military capabilities through a systematic use of modern technology.

This transformation to a network-based methodology coincides in time with a change in the mission for the SwAF. The traditional role of defending Swedish territory and counter an invasion has lost in importance relative to the role of taking part in international peace support operations.

The traditional role for SwAF defending Sweden does not necessarily demand support from military space systems. But the Network-Based Defence and new operation areas have changed the picture. The enhancement of military capabilities such as long-distance high capacity communications or precision positioning are no longer just nice features but necessary to have if a Network-Based Defence capable of international peace support operations is to be a reality. Space systems are one, if not the only, way to create those capabilities. From a Swedish perspective space systems have gone from systems that can enhance military operations to systems that will enable military operations. This means that SwAF will have to get involved in space systems.

If a nation commits to enhance military operations by the use of space-based services, the next step is to create new capabilities by exploring the potential of these space-based services. International examples of such space enabled capabilities are “Blue Force Tracking” and long range UAVoperations with near real-time data download.

Once such capabilities are an integral part of military operations, a heavy dependency on space has been created. This will put the space arena in focus for political and military policy discussions and drive the nations that depend on space towards a doctrine of space control. If such a dependency has been created, one topic for national debate should be what strategy to follow in securing access to space.

A number of possible space strategies to secure access to space can be identified for any given state actor. However, the actual selection, or formulation, of a national space strategy is affected by a number of important factors. These include technical factors, trends in today’s space technology and space markets, as well as trends and requirements stemming from the political and military spheres. Five possible space strategies for Sweden as a politico-military actor are briefly presented below:

• In something we could call the Zero Option, things may continue as they stand today: no national space policy and no national co-ordination of space demands and needs.
• A possible development of the zero option could entail a national effort and a national space policy, for both civilian and military purposes, based on the access to commercial space services.
• A third possibility would be a national space policy based on security-policy co-operation with others. The access to space services would then be assured through Swedish participation in international joint ventures.
• A fourth possibility would be a purely national space policy that consists of a national co-ordination system, national military space R&D efforts, and national control of the whole space service chain.
• A fifth possibility would be a purely multinational space policy according to which Sweden would take part in a multinational body.

A major challenge is to achieve integrity in the chain of tasking, or programming the satellites, as to avoid revealing our exact interests and intentions. Space-based reconnaissance and intelligence gathering thus seem to be the really difficult issues in terms of international co-operation.

A strategy of the third kind, based on multilateral securitypolicy co-ordination, would ensure access to space systems even though Swedish technological or industrial participation would be limited. It would also fit well in line with the technological and political trends of the day. However, this strategy would entail a large amount of trust in the multilateral frameworks. Current trends in Swedish defence policy, especially the interest in the EU security and defence policy (ESDP) – indicate that this is the likely way of the future for the Swedish Armed Forces.

In Europe today there are a number of national space initiatives that are being opened up for international co-operation. Sweden as a technologically and economically well developed country with traditional strong armed forces is an interesting potential partner.

There are actually quite a few options open for Swedish decision-makers on the issue of military space strategy. Some of these options are constrained either by military-security or by technological (or economical) factors.

Given these constraints, and the different factors pushing and pulling Swedish policy in different directions, the most likely option for Sweden would be to adopt a military space strategy together with other EU and NATO states in an international setting, i.e. the third kind of strategy as defined above.

As various space projects in Europe show, there are a wide variety of options available within the EU and/or NATO, and thus there are the possibilities to work along the line of the third strategy of international co-operation.

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