Sweden and the NEGP

FOI-R-- 1984 --SE
June 2006
ISSN 1650-1942

Robert L. Larsson

Developments between 2004 and 2006 indicate that a North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) through the Baltic Sea, from Russia to Germany, may be realised in the coming decade. This would provide Europe with yet another opportunity to diversify its import channels of gas. It is however reasonable to assume that the NEGP also could change the strategic pattern and be a source of friction.

The NEGP may rock the regional stability and reduce the potential of the new EU members to become security providers in Europe’s northern dimension. It also gives increased leverage and influence to Russia, a state that has moved in an authoritarian direction under President Putin.

The aim of this pilot study is to elucidate on the NEGP pipeline and Sweden’s increasing dependence on Russian energy. A subsidiary aim is to outline a set of concerns that have bearing on the situation for the EU and Baltic Sea Region and that need to be further addressed.

In conclusion, the NEGP will enhance Russia’s direct leverage on Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus, as it will allow Russia to turn off gas supplies without affecting exports to other parts of Europe. Russia will also increase its leverage over the states that will or may be connected to the NEGP (Germany, and possibly Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK).

Even if Sweden is not embracing the NEGP, it is today highly sensitive as it imports most of its energy. It is increasingly dependent on Russian oil and is partly dependent on imports of electricity from Russia. Should the NEGP materialise and Sweden becomess connected in the future, it would likely be dependent also on natural gas.

It is of paramount importance for the energy security of the connected states how the pipeline is constructed and operated. If there will be technical possibilities for Russia to tamper with the flow of gas to individual states without affecting supply to others, there are tangible threats to the importing states.