



Swedish experiences from Multinational Experiment 5

Cooperative Implementation Planning,

Management and Evaluation

Major Integrating Event

7-18 April 2008

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SUMMARY

The Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation (CIP/CIME) Major Integrating Event (MIE) was held at the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre (JCDEC) in Enköping, Sweden from 7 to 18 April 2008. The purpose of the experiment was to test a concept for multifunctional planning (CIP/CIME) and to evaluate how a number of supporting concepts can be integrated to support this process. Sweden had lead on one of the supporting concepts – Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (IEAT) – but had interest in other focus areas too, i.e. Comprehensive Approach, Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning (MNISP), CIP/CIME and Effect Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).

The experiment was conducted over the course of two weeks. The scenario was set in West Africa where three neighbouring countries were in need of assistance to create a secure, politically stable and economically sound environment. People from more than 10 different nations, representing a wide variety of government departments, military organizations, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), participated in the experiment. During the first week participants were gathered in an Interagency Implementation Forum (IIF) to develop a country-level framework plan. In the subsequent week two Activity Planning and Coordination (AP&C) Groups were tasked to complete their portion of the Framework Plan. An extensive experiment environment and organization was created for the experiment and over 20 analysts monitored and evaluated the experiment. The experiment resulted in a lot of valuable findings, for example; 1) the implementation planning process (i.e. CIP) harmonises well with the ideas underpinning the Comprehensive Approach; 2) when working in a multifunctional setting it is of great importance to conduct a joint analysis of the situation to establish a common view; 3) different actors work in different time-perspectives and it is important to have a balance between short-term and long-term planning and implementation; 4) it is necessary to have a well equipped team leading the multifunctional planning forum; 5) the Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (IEAT) supported the basic needs of the IIF and AP & C groups but the experiment audience only used the technology to a limited extent during the experiment; 6) the participants' attitudes, i.e., willingness to share information is a challenge that needs to be addressed; 7) the participants were more willing to share information with actors within the coalition than with actors outside of the coalition.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the experiment. The CIP-concept offers a process for implementation planning that harmonizes well with the ideas underpinning the CA. However, it is important to remember that limitations of the experiment environment may have affected results (such as time-constraints and dynamics in the IIF/AP&C groups), i.e. parts of the concept need to be explored further in a different setting. There is continued support for reducing complexity in the strategic process (i.e. both MNISP and CIP/CIME) in terms of fewer, clearer levels of output. It is also important to use methods and terminology that both civilian and military actors can relate to. Since EBAO was not sufficiently

played out during the MIE it is hard to draw any far reaching conclusions about the merit for CD&E. However, one major conclusion was that we need to find a dynamic and constructive process to facilitate the interaction between the Mil HQ and planning forums such as the IIF and the AP&C groups. From an information exchange perspective we can conclude that even though it is technically possible to distribute and share information in a secure way there are challenges such as rules and regulations, trust and willingness to share information that need to be addressed by the IEAT concept.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) is the fifth in a series of experiments that began in 2001 as an effort to develop better ways to plan and conduct coalition operations. It is designed to give the 12 partners and participant nations¹ opportunities to test concepts for multinational and interagency operations.

The central theme in MNE 5 is the exploration of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) to improve cooperation between military and non-military actors on a multinational basis. One goal is to improve cooperation between different agencies, nations and organizations to better support crisis planning and interventions. Thus, there is a need for a broader understanding of different aspects of pre-crisis planning, strategic policy development and operational planning and evaluation. MNE 5 has chosen to elaborate these challenges by developing the following three focus areas: Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning (MNISP) led by France, Cooperative Implementation Planning (CIP) led by the UK and Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation (CIME), led by the US. There is also a number of enabling focus areas led by MNE 5 partners that are developed to support the development of a CA. Sweden takes an active part in the improvement of all three focus areas and is lead nation for the enabling focus area Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (IEAT), which focuses on principles and recommendations for secure information exchange as well as architecture and possible technologies that support the use of CA as a means to conduct operations.

The CIP/CIME Major Integrating Event (MIE) was held at the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre in Enköping, Sweden from 7 to 18 April 2008. The planning and execution of the experiment was done primarily by three nations: the US (event lead nation), the UK (concept lead nation) and Sweden (host nation). The CIP concept was the prioritized concept during this event. However, as the event was a major integrating event one of the major challenges of the CIP/CIME MIE was to identify and define the boundaries and relationships between focus areas, i.e. since each focus area has been developed in different teams, the MIE was an opportunity to identify overlaps, gaps, clashes and different understandings between the developers and the focus areas. Thus, all participating nations played an important role in the completion of the experiment through their contribution of supporting concepts, highly qualified players and role-players and analysts.

Sweden had an extensive participation in MNE 5 MIE. As host nation for the event Sweden was responsible for setting up and giving support to a large scale experiment environment which included providing a functional infrastructure, managing registration and security, as well as providing food, lodging and transportation to all the participants. Sweden was also responsible for the IEAT concept. By means of IEAT a number of different software tools, distributed in different countries, could be used during the experiment. Sweden also supported

¹Partners include: Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Participant nations include: Austria, Australia, Denmark and Spain.

the experiment with a lot of personnel – players, role-players and analysts as well as tech and site support personnel.

The purpose of this report is to describe the experiment and to summarise the results and conclusions from a Swedish perspective. Personnel from both the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Defence College (FHS) have contributed to the content of this report. Swedish analysts have also contributed to the multinational experiment report, due to be published during the summer of 2008. The multinational experiment report covers results from all the participating concepts, with focus on CIP/CIME, and will draw heavily on the surveys conducted during the MIE.

1.1 Reading instructions

This report summarises the Swedish experiences from the experiment. It is composed of different sections that can be read either in sequence or independently. The results section focuses on experiences from the different focus areas, i.e., Comprehensive Approach (CIP/CIME), Effect Based Approach to Operations and Information Exchange Architecture and Technology. These focus areas are seen as the ones most important and relevant from a Swedish Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) perspective.

Report layout:

- Introduction: a brief introduction to Multinational Experimentation Series (MNE 5) and the CIP/CIME Major Integrating Event
- Experiment setup: overall aim, design and procedure
- Results: aims, results and ways forward are reported for each of the focus areas
- Conclusions: general conclusions from the experiment
- Appendix: acronyms

2 EXPERIMENT SETUP

This chapter describes the experiment setup - aims and objectives, participants, task, design, procedure, scenario and data collection.

2.1 Aim and objectives

The CIP/CIME MIE 2008 problem statement was: *Coalition partners require improved methods to conduct rapid interagency and multinational planning and coordination in order to create and carry out a unified comprehensive strategy.* The primary goal of the MIE was to test a concept for multifunctional interagency planning, i.e. CIP/CIME, and to evaluate how a number of supporting concepts can be integrated to support this process in the context of a Comprehensive Approach.

From a Swedish perspective the participation in the MIE had several purposes. First, as stated above Sweden was lead nation in the development of the IEAT concept, which was evaluated during the event. Second, Sweden is highly interested in the development of concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and the impact these concepts might have on civil-military relations. The Swedish Armed Force's development of EBAO is fundamentally dependent on evolving strategic concepts like the CA, without which military concepts like EBAO will not be relevant in future international operations. Third, Sweden was asked to be host nation for the event, which was a good opportunity to both show and test the capability of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre in Enköping in a multinational setting.

2.2 Design and procedure

More than 100 people participated actively in the experiment as participants in the Interagency Implementation Forum (IIF), Activity Planning and Coordination (AP&C) Groups, Military Headquarter (Mil HQ) or as role players in the Experiment Control Function. The participants represented a wide variety of governmental departments, military organizations, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from all of the partner and participant nations.

The experiment was conducted over the course of two weeks. The scenario for the event was set in the Mano River region of Sub-Saharan West Africa focusing on the countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The circumstances put forth required the full range of (civilian-led) interagency efforts to create a secure, politically stable and economically sound environment. The scenario set conditions through 2008-2009 for planning efforts to begin in early 2010 (in scenario time). The scenario was presented to the participants on the first day of the experiment (oral presentation and web cast) and they also got a written copy to read when they had time available. During the experiment the participants got scenario updates presented to them several times a day via web cast.

During the first week a forum of highly skilled functional experts and representatives from different nations, organizations and agencies were gathered in an Interagency Implementation Forum (IIF) to develop a country-level Framework Plan. During the second week two Activity Planning and Coordination (AP&C) Groups were tasked to complete their portion of the Framework Plan. The military component (Mil HQ) of the experiment audience was a single NATO, operational-level, military joint headquarters. The main body of personnel staffing the Mil HQ was from the German Rapid Forces Operational Command (RFOC). The rest of the staff consisted of a mix of nationalities. The Mil HQ was organised like a Joint Planning Group (JOPG). An Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) served as the Military Headquarters' process to develop a military plan to support all of the security-oriented requirements in the Framework Plan. The Mil HQ was using the Multinational EBAO CONOPS² version 1.46, i.e. the previous commonly spread version 1.0 had been developed into a newer one. The processes used were just about the same, but the descriptions were altered. It was more focussed on input/output and the working steps within each process part.

The Mil HQ focused Monday to Wednesday week one on their internal training (mostly tools oriented). Their active participation in the experiment started on Wednesday the first week and lasted until Friday the second week. There was an acting Commander in the IIF who was in charge of the Mil HQ. He did not lead the actual work, but he acted like a point of contact in the IIF.

The members of the IIF were asked to represent their normal departmental and operational perspectives as part of a planning team. The IIF was led by a core team consisting of a Coalition Special Representative (CSR), a Deputy (DCSR/IIF Chair), a Facilitator and a Scribe. The Facilitator's role was to run the planning process on behalf of the Chair. The role of the Scribe was to support the Facilitator by capturing the key elements of discussion within the IIF. The handling of information within the IIF (acquiring and sharing information from within and outside of the coalition network) was supported by an information advisory team and experts on Knowledge Support (KS) and Knowledge Development (KD). The participants had access to a technical system through which they could search for information within and outside of the coalition. They also had access to tools that enabled chat, document management, email, virtual meetings and video conferences.

During week two, participation more or less mirrored the player audience from the first week. Each AP&C group had a Lead, Deputy Lead, a Facilitator and an Executive Secretary with responsibilities similar to those of the IIF CSR, Deputy, Facilitator and Scribe.

² CONOPS is similar to a process description of what to do, but not specifically how to do things in an effects based way.

The teams were tasked to go through a planning process to generate a common set of planning outputs:

- A summary of the key issues that had fallen out of the analysis of the situation;
- The conditions that needed to be achieved to realize the situation described in the strategic guidance, i.e. the Decisive Conditions (DC) and Supporting Effects (SE);
- The identification of critical interdependencies between Supporting Effects ;
- The 'theory of change' that underlies the plan;
- A monitoring and evaluation plan including indicators that would be important determinants of progress and success for the intervention and additional indicators that would describe progress towards the realization of goals in the plan.

To impose control on the experiment an experiment control function was created. The experiment control consisted of role players representing both the strategic level (to whom the IIF was required to give progress reports) and the in-theatre NGOs and UN Field Agencies who liaised with forum members in order to express their views and requirements on different issues throughout the experiment. The experiment control also included control personnel like concept developers, lead analysts, scenario experts and experiment directors.

More than 20 researchers/analysts from all the participating countries evaluated the experiment. Twelve cameras (recording both video and audio) had been set up throughout the facility so that the analysts, role players and control personnel could follow the course of events in the different parts of the experiment without interfering. A limited number of analysts were allowed to observe the experiment from within the IIF/AP&C groups and Mil HQ. However, they were not permitted to hinder or be part of the process in any way. Observations were logged in an observation tool that all analysts and control personnel could access. The analysts could communicate with each other and the control personnel via email, chat or a virtual meeting room. Everything that occurred in the technical system (e.g. chat, email, document management) was recorded and stored for later analysis. Data was also collected through electronic surveys and interviews.

3 RESULTS

This chapter begins with a discussion of the validity and reliability of the experiment. After that the Swedish experiences from the experiment and the results on Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (IEAT), Comprehensive Approach (CA) and Effect Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) are presented.

3.1 Validity and reliability

The experiment setting created a multinational environment where highly competent personnel from different governmental departments; military organizations; international organizations and non-governmental organizations; and different nations conducted implementation planning together. The experiment was planned and conducted so that the IIF and AP&C group participants could work through the planning process. However, there are a few issues that should be pointed out.

- Even though the participants were highly qualified and devoted to their task one can question if the experiment created enough tension. In a real life situation resources and national agendas would probably have affected the planning process more extensively than in this experiment. It is unclear if the role description for the IIF and AP&C group members was comprehensive enough to create desired dynamics within the forum and it may have affected the results accordingly.
- Furthermore; the strategic level was not played out sufficiently during the experiment. There was little communication between the forum and the strategic level which may have affected the planning process. It is assumed in the concepts that the implementation planning process needs to be iterative so that clarifications and changes can be made throughout the process; this was not explored enough.
- Like in most experiments of this kind, time-constraint was a limiting factor. It is difficult to fully evaluate a new method or process in an artificial environment with people who don't know each other and never have worked together. This should be considered when interpreting the results.

Still, the experiment setting created an environment where key issues for both the CIP/CIME concept and the supporting concepts could be explored. New knowledge, experiences and insights were gained that will be of importance in the continued development of CA, EBAO and IEAT. Some of the results and experiences from the MNE 5 MIE have already been incorporated into the Swedish EBAO concept development³. Additionally, CA related results and

³ For further information about the Swedish EBAO concept see Marklund, J. & Svanerholm, T. (2008). *An analytical concept for an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) within the Swedish Armed Forces*. HQ 21000:72174

remaining challenges are further elaborated in Nilsson, Derblom, Egnell and Hull (2008)⁴.

3.2 Information Exchange Architecture and Technology

The Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (IEAT) concept is one of the MNE 5 supporting concepts. The concept describes how exchange of information can be performed in a way that meets the operational requirements in a comprehensive response operation. It articulates principles and recommendations for information exchange as well as supporting architecture and possible technologies that supports the use of Comprehensive Approach (CA) as a means to conduct operations.

3.2.1 Objectives

During the MIE the main objective for IEAT was to improve and further expand the concept. This was done primarily by investigating following key areas:

- information exchange within the Coalition Network
- information exchange between different parties inside and outside of the coalition

Data regarding the technical infrastructure was also collected, i.e. data to get a better understanding of user appreciation and usability of the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) based technical support. However, the results presented in this report focuses on how IEAT can support information exchange within and outside of a coalition. Results regarding technical tools and user appreciation will be presented in a joint MNE 5 MIE experiment report which is due summer 2008.

3.2.2 Results

Data collection

The results with relevance to the IEAT concept are based on a wide range of empirical data - surveys, data loggings and workshop discussions, and, to some extent, observations and interviews. The participants' opinions were collected through surveys. The IEAT surveys were distributed once each week - 98 people answered the surveys the first week and 82 the second week. Everything that occurred in the experiment was recorded through data loggings. Observations were made continuously throughout the experiment. The observations were mainly collected from the common observation tool JOT in which all observers registered their observations. Two workshops were conducted with analysts and concept developers that were interested in the IEAT concept and/or worked with

⁴ Nilsson, C., Derblom, M., Egnell, R., & Hull, C. (2008), *Challenges in the implementation of multifunctional approaches*, FOI memo 2474, Stockholm.

related concepts or issues. Nine respectively ten people, representing a wide selection of competences and nations, participated in the workshops. Furthermore, two demonstrations were made that focused on showing the technical aspects of the IEAT concept during which discussions and feedback was obtained.

Information exchange within the Coalition Network

The technical support developed using Service Oriented Architecture supported the basic needs of the IIF and AP&C groups. However, the location of the tools needs to be taken into consideration when setting up a distributed network to minimize the risk of delays due to network limitations. The multinational architecture, design, and implementation efforts have resulted in an IT environment that supports a coalition. The main barriers when using the IEAT is mainly attitudes and willingness to share information rather than technical limitations.

The Coalition Network was composed of a Portal tool (Liferay) with a calendar, collaboration tools (Sametime and Sametime Connect), a common file system (Alfresco) and e-mail (Squirrel mail). Overall the coalition network functioned well during the whole experiment. The participants mainly used the network to extract information from the common file system. Observations show that the different applications in the technical network worked to a satisfactory level.

Users (in Sweden) experienced delays when accessing the document management system (Alfresco) located in the US due to network problems. Survey responses show that many participants found that the tools were fairly easy to use and both robust and stable. According to open survey responses the distributed IT support organization, including helpdesk and back-office personnel etc., worked well.

Information exchange between different parties within and outside of the coalition

The coalition network was one element for enabling information exchange. Other means for cooperation were telephones and personal meetings. Telephones were used only to a limited extent, for example to schedule meetings. In the following section the results from the IIF forum and the experiment role players from the first week are presented⁵. They took active part in the task/mission and their views are therefore of importance from the IEAT perspective.

The results from the survey show that the IIF participants thought that they both shared information with and received information from actors *within* the coalition they perceived needed information to a moderate extent. There was less perceived information sharing with actors *outside* of the coalition (a slight extent). The experiment role players stated that they shared and received information to a moderate or great extent with actors *within* the coalition. They stated that they only shared information to a slight extent with actors *outside* of the coalition and that they received information from these actors to a slight or moderate extent.

⁵ 14 participants from the IIF and 4 of the role players answered the survey.

The following two sections present the views from the Activity Planning and Coordination (AP&C) groups, Mil HQ and experiment role players from the second week⁶.

AP&C group participants stated that they *shared* information with actors *within* the coalition that they perceived needed information to a great extent whereas they said that they *shared* information with actors *outside* the coalition only to a slight extent. Mil HQ participants said that they *shared* information with actors *within* the coalition to a slight extent, and, not at all or to a slight extent with actors *outside* of the coalition. There were however no real counterparts to the Mil HQ which made both inside and outside communication requirements difficult. Experiment role players *shared* information with actors *within* and *outside* of the coalition to a moderate extent.

When it comes to *receiving* information from actors *within* and *outside* of the coalition AP&C group participants stated that they received information to a slight or moderate extent. Mil HQ said that they *received* information from actors *within* the coalition to a slight or moderate extent. They were more negative when it came to *receiving* information from actors *outside* of the coalition; stating that they not at all or to a slight extent received information.

To summarise, the results showed that people tend to be more positive to handling information *within* the coalition than *outside* of the coalition (both with reference to sharing and receiving). These results are perhaps not surprising since people within a coalition are able to work together and refine their team processes, i.e. having opportunities to find ways to improve cooperation. Another possible explanation is that it is eventually possible to reach an understanding of what information is desirable by the different actors within the coalition whilst working together. However, the results underline the importance of creating desirable conditions for actors to share information with actors outside of the coalition since this often is an important source for intelligence.

The workshops and observations emphasised some of the barriers that needs to be overcome in order to enhance information exchange. Discussions showed that one of the main concerns to enable information exchange is related to peoples' attitudes rather than technological means. It is of vital importance that people are willing to share information. It is important to investigate what issues affect peoples' cognitive processes and their perception of *what* information is needed, *when* it is needed and *why* they need certain information at certain times in a mission. Correspondingly, it affects what information they provide to other people within and outside of a coalition. One aspect that affects peoples' willingness to share information is trust. There were some examples during the event where participants possessed information but did not know whether they could trust the accuracy of the information. Therefore trust needs to be handled from two perspectives; from a technical perspective e.g. enabling different users to access different information and from a methodological perspective (e.g. taking personal perception into account). There needs to be a traceability so that it is possible to

⁶ 18 participants from the AP&C groups, 16 participants from the Mil HQ and 6 experiment role players answered the survey questions.

validate the information (e.g. who created it and for what purpose). Furthermore, information needs to be updated and perhaps removed when it is not valid. These aspects raise the question of information assurance and security. Possible ways of handling these matters were discussed during the workshops. One plausible way that permeated the discussions were to create “use cases”, i.e. examples/situations where IEAT can be beneficial. Through the use cases the different solutions could be tested and in time validated and verified. Lastly, there is a need for the IEAT concept to further emphasize the advantages of the concept in a simple and comprehensible way.

3.2.3 Way forward

The next experiment involving IEAT will be held in December 2008. The intention is to finalize MNE 5 adding issues that have not been addressed adequately during previous experiments. Current planning focuses on federated search and use of a digital filter enabling data to be sent in a secure way and more rapidly between different security environments (Cross Domain Guard). Furthermore IEAT will constitute a chapter in a MNE 5 Handbook that is being produced.

3.3 Comprehensive Approach and EBAO

3.3.1 Objectives

The MNE series Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management, and Evaluation (CIP/CIME) concept is rooted in some of the core problems and short-falls experienced in recent international engagements in conflict and post-conflict settings. Specifically, it addresses three major themes⁷:

- a perceived ‘strategic deficit’, signified by limited strategic direction and agility, and insufficient coordination arrangements from any multifunctional ‘whole-of-government’ level;
- the shortage of multifunctional in-theatre coordination arrangements in the contemporary multi-actor security environments; and;
- the lack of mechanisms for multi-functional monitoring and evaluation of progress.

The connection to the first theme builds on the fact that while the strategic process has a political primacy, with political decisions made at crucial stages of the process, an important integral element is the process of turning the political strategy into plans for action. Effective translation mechanisms and processes – though under development in both some nations and in international or regional organizations – are rarely found in multifunctional and multinational settings. With regards to the second theme, CIP explores the idea of creating a regional or field level focal forum for coordination, cooperative arrangements and information exchange, together with a multi-actor framework plan which codifies agreements and shared information on ends, ways and means in different

⁷ Also reflected in the challenges outlined in the MNE5 Comprehensive Approach Conceptual Framework.

functional areas. This is similar to evolutions in the UN and EU, where stronger offices and coordinating mandates for the organizations' special representatives are at the heart of the development. The monitoring and evaluation element of the joint CIP/CIME concept is specifically directed towards the third element, exploring both principles and tools for the planning and conduct of multifunctional evaluation.

One of the main reasons for the Swedish participation in MNE 5 is the focus on the development of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) and civil-military relations. The Swedish Armed Forces' development of EBAO is fundamentally dependent on evolving strategic concepts like the CA, without which military concepts like EBAO might not be relevant in future international operations.

The Swedish Integrated Project Team (the 'IPT Comprehensive Approach') has identified a number of areas in the CIP/CIME concept that are of great importance for the development of CA, subsequently impacting the development of the EBAO. Generally civil-military and interagency cooperation needs to be further explored and developed as contemporary peace operations continue to struggle with coherence, preventing maximum effect. These issues are at the core of the CIP/CIME concept and guided the Swedish analysis efforts during the Major Integrating Event (MIE).

Another objective was to study how shared political-strategic aims and desired effects, derived from the Strategic Forum, could be jointly (civil-military) interpreted, analysed and turned into concrete effects. From previous experimentation as well as from past and ongoing operations it is clear that this is a great challenge. Effective civil-military implementation planning has been identified as crucial by the IPT in transforming high-level aims into more tangible effects as well as fostering cooperation between different actors in later stages of planning and implementation.

There is also a great need to further explore issues relating to management and evaluation (CIME). Joint formulation of indicators and measures would be a great step towards coherence in operations but we are still in the early phases of learning how to implement the concept. During the MIE analysis focused on how or indeed if, the usage of generic assessment-tools would impact the development of the plan.

In the area of EBAO, the main objective was to see how the effects-based thinking and the processes applied by the Mil HQ contribute to and benefit from the multinational and multifunctional planning environment⁸. Of particular interest were the dialogue between the HQ and the Commander in the IIF and AP&C Groups and the transformation of strategic objectives into effects and activities.

⁸ the initial idea was to test the MN EBAO CONOPS. However, since EBAO was a supporting concept to CIP/CIME some adjustments had to be made, i.e. the CONOPS could not be followed completely.

3.3.2 Comprehensive Approach

Overall, the April MIE, together with other recent CD&E efforts represent important steps towards integration and cooperation in ends, ways and means in multifunctional environments. The promises of concepts such as CIP/CIME still hold, though elements of it warrant further investigation. One of the aims of multifunctional concepts is to promote mutual understanding of e.g. the various cultures, resources, approaches, tasks and time perspectives of the different actors potentially involved in contemporary crisis management and peace support operations. The April MIE was, through the inclusion of high-quality and high-level expertise and professional competences, indeed able to contribute to this.

One main finding from the MIE was that the **CIP-concept offers a process for implementation planning that harmonizes well with the ideas underpinning the CA**. There is a clear need for joint implementation planning in a comprehensive, multifunctional mission in order to create a culture of coordination for subsequent levels and actions, as well as turning strategic directions into coherent and achievable plans. The experiment results indicate that several of the difficulties associated with multifunctional operations and civil-military relations might be alleviated through a focused effort to conduct cooperative implementation planning. The structure of the IIF was deemed by the participants to be relevant and it seemed to offer a platform for multifunctional cooperation that is normally lacking in contemporary peace operations. A vast majority⁹ of the participants, both civilian and military, concluded in their surveys that their organizations would benefit from taking part in a planning forum like the one set up during the MIE.

In terms of process, some key issues can be highlighted. First, there seems to be continued support for the importance of shared analysis/assessment at every planning level. Without a reasonably shared understanding among key actors on the nature of the environment in which change is to occur, multifunctional planning may be very hard to conduct. The methodology applied in the IIF for promoting understanding of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy (CCS) assessment and to add granularity and information on recent changes, seemed quite adequate (National Defence College methodology), and it did also link very well with the central planning elements (i.e. Strategic Objectives and Decisive Conditions). In the first week of the MIE emphasis was put on analysing the situation and matching the output with the strategic direction before the Forum started with the planning. The AP&C groups did not set aside as much time for analysis. During feedback from both weeks the players expressed frustration with the time spent on the analysis and review phases. Still, some form of **joint analysis** to establish a common view on the conflict and its dynamics is probably **necessary when working in a multifunctional setting**. What has to be further explored is how to do this; the Swedish IPT will continue to develop the method used by the IIF during the first week of the MIE.

⁹ Out of 68 survey responses, 54 participants (79%) agreed that their organizations would benefit, 6 did not agree and 8 neither agreed nor disagreed.

In general, the core assertion of letting the IIF process be ‘an amalgam of existing processes’ seems to be valid, though this requires quite a lot of flexibility and multi-domain familiarity from the IIF leadership team.

One interesting observation from the MIE was that cooperation was at times more difficult between actors with differing time-perspectives than between civilian and military actors. Humanitarian actors put high pressure on the military to provide swift support, enabling the humanitarians to continue their activities. The military on the other hand were not keen on mixing the long-term planning with short-term activities, stating that such activities might do more harm than good. It seemed that several civilian actors, representing functions with more long-term focused activities, agreed with this latter view. The struggle between those advocating short-term action, and those underlining the importance of proper planning was perhaps the most recurrent during the two weeks. This aspect is missing in the CIP/CIME concept, which does not focus on the execution phase, and it was apparent that **there needs to be a greater balance between short-term and long-term planning and implementation**. Furthermore, it was clear that while the concept allowed for relatively effective cooperation inside the Coalition, there were few tools to help with cooperation and coordination with actors *outside* of the Coalition. If a Coalition is to launch a mission in an area it is extremely important that there are well established channels to other actors, especially if the Coalition relies on these actors to reach the desired objectives. This is also a crucial part of concepts like the CA or the IM concept of the UN. Since the functional representatives did not bring any pre-formulated plans this was more of an issue in the dialogue with outside actors. In an ‘real-world IIF’ this would however put tremendous pressure on the core team and the representatives in the Forum when trying to formulate a Framework plan that is of mutual benefit to all participating partners. Still, the scope of the operation planned for during the MIE was probably far too ambitious. When most countries and organizations are struggling to create coherence within their own entity, it seems that trying to coordinate a big number of countries and instruments as well as coordinating with organizations and actors outside of the Coalition is almost deemed to fail.

One of the main criticisms against the CIP concept has been that it has too many levels of output. This view has been advocated by the IPT before and it was also highlighted by the players during the MIE. In the IIF the players had to work with outputs such as Vision, End State, Strategic Objectives, Decisive Conditions and Supporting Effects as well as additional concepts like the Theory of Conflict and the Theory of Change. This brought on frustration and we do believe that **fewer, clearer levels of output in a multinational, multifunctional planning process is necessary**.

Related to this, as in most multi-actor/multi-organizational environments, terminology was a source of friction for the IIF. Central parts of the planning process stem from a military planning culture. The preparatory efforts should have included more references to existing non-military processes and planning languages (e.g. the Logical Framework Approach or equivalent) to provide understanding. In addition, more could have been done in terms of preparing illustrative examples of the different planning elements, to aid in the explanation of various planning steps. While terms such as ‘strategic vision’ or ‘strategic objectives’

were generally understood and accepted, one of the key discussions centred, once again, on the term 'end-state', which seems to have limited use in multifunctional planning processes. This showed tensions both between long-term development and short-term intervention perspectives, and between external (coalition) and internal (local ownership) perspectives.

The importance of a skilled and efficient core team was evident during the MIE. The concept in itself can only do so much in creating the circumstances under which civil-military or inter-agency cooperation is effective. **A well equipped core team is absolutely necessary in fostering a culture of cooperation, through dialogue and inclusion.** As described below the need for an active, knowledgeable and inclusive Facilitator was obvious when working in a multi-functional, multinational environment. Differing terminology, cultural backgrounds, language barriers etc can be overcome by a well trained Facilitator. Furthermore, to get buy-in from a diverse set of representatives, an inclusive Special Representative or a Chair with appropriate level of seniority and experience is needed. The need for a Special Representative in the mission-area would be great, not only to coordinate the Coalition efforts but also to coordinate with local and international stakeholders. It is also imperative that he or she is seen as neutral, not representing any specific interest outside the mandate given to him/her by the strategic level. This worked very well during the first week of the MIE, partly because the Coalition Special Representative had a Deputy (DCSR) who could run the daily task working in the Forum. During the second week, when the core team in at least one of the two planning-groups lacked several of these key characteristics, the planning suffered and disagreements were harder to resolve. The Chair in the security group struggled with dual responsibilities, also being the head of the Mil HQ. Though experiment design had foreseen a core of the IIF to stay in play during the second week, this was not done, since the DCSR, Facilitator and Scribe were subsumed into the groups or were unable to be present full-time. Hence, the AP&C Groups were left in a sequential mode of work, with only limited feedback into the IIF (on two or three occasions). The AP&C Group leads, both part of the IIF during the first week, had little choice but to act as AP&C Group only, working from the material handed to them post-week one. In week two, they ceased to view themselves as part of the IIF. The de facto dissolution of the IIF in week 2 had negative consequences, e.g. the important role of a framework plan top half as common ground for synergistic exploration or activity conflict resolution was not tried to the extent needed. Also, the arrangements for coordination between the two AP&C Groups were insufficient, and had to be developed *ad hoc*.

The difficulties in creating specific instructions and roles for the IIF members, together with some deficiencies in adaptation of the planning process, meant that *functional representation* did not fully come into play. The members were first and foremost experts in the different fields, utilised as such based on their experiences and current professions. IIF workflow, including sub-division into multi-functional groups, kept momentum and inclusiveness, but strayed from the idea that the IIF should be a 'forum for empowered representatives'. With a more functional perspective, the IIF process should have resembled much more of a negotiating setting, where each representative around the table would have

contributed his or her input, negotiating change or taking directions for their own plans on the basis of the dialogue. Agreements would have been codified in the Framework Plan. This would also imply that behind every representative, there would be functional – or, if devised so by the IIF leadership team multifunctional – workgroups (such as sector workgroups or the AP&C groups), to provide the necessary dynamic inputs to the IIF process. A similar argument can be made concerning the *national* perspective, which was almost totally absent in the IIF. These aspects will be crucial challenges in any real attempt to implement the CA and there is a great need to further explore the issues of functional and national representation in future experimentation.

From the outset, the IIF Leadership team sought to include the major support and advisory functions into the core staff group, i.e. KS, KD and Information Manager. The underlying idea was that these were not functional representatives, and their expertise and output had a cross-cutting potential use for the other IIF members. It also served the purpose of strengthening the IIF core staff capacity, as it was clear that CSR, Deputy CSR, facilitator and scribe was a too limited core team for running the experiment, the planning process, and an office. This inclusion had positive effects, but also revealed some disconnects between the various concepts. While the sophisticated systems analysis products of KD reached a higher impact than in previous experimentation, there were still some troubles in matching supply and demand in the process. On the information side, media advisory worked well during week one, but the information strategy workgroup and their output had little or no influence on the IIF work or the framework plan itself. KS is a core function, exacerbated in this setting because it was an unfamiliar IT environment. Rather than focusing on formal knowledge requests, KS staff was used predominantly as general office support, technical advisors, and information managers.

The players were never exposed to an explicit set of planning steps, though such a process was indeed designed prior to the experiment. As a result, several players struggled with the different phases, voicing a lack of rationale behind them as well as how to achieve different outputs. Parts of the problem were perhaps due to differing terminology but both civilian and military players at time had difficulties understanding the tasks given to them. This put high pressure on the Facilitator to describe and exemplify phases and outputs. Outside the world of experiment the tolerance for complicated planning-processes would probably be even more limited which points to the need for simplicity in the process.

Regarding another main focus for the analysis during the CA, how political/strategic aims and objectives could be turned into concrete plans in lower levels, the MIE gave some insights as to what works and what does not. One lesson was that **the process needs to be iterative, allowing for adjustments and clarifications between the different levels**. This was not played out sufficiently during the experiment which meant that the planning groups struggled with what they had been given from the above level, expressing that they lacked both rationale and substance. Both weeks several players felt that the level above had gone in to too much detail in the plan that had been handed down to them. At the same time, some also deemed the directions to be too vague. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in-between, and one will have to accept that any group of planners

will regard a product or direction that is given to them as flawed in some way. As a means to overcome this issue we thus argue for a more iterative process with key actors in every level remaining throughout (at least) the planning phase.

The CIME concept was not fully explored during the MIE. Both weeks the players were handed generic indicators to help them when producing indicators for their planned effects and activities. However, this phase of the process was rushed and the players did not have enough time to explore the value of the concept. In the CIME concept, where the joint production of indicators and the subsequent management and improvement of the plan is central, was therefore not fully tested. Still, a majority of the players found the generic indicators helpful and this is an aspect that the IPT should continue to work with. The apparent links to effects-based assessment is also an aspect that should be further explored, in the wider approach to CA and EBAO.

3.3.3 EBAO - perspectives from the Mil HQ

The Mil HQ supported the Mil Commander in the IIF and the AP&C Groups. They produced Supporting Effects (week one) and Actions (week two) that the Mil Commander could later use in the planning in the IIF and the AP&C Group. The Mil HQ developed a set of Supporting Effects, before the direction from the IIF had been agreed, and these were presented to the Commander who used them as a proposal list to the IIF by the end of week one. The same process was used with actions week two. It is of course problematic if the military component of a Coalition plan for effects or activities is not in line with the overall Framework Plan. Still, the Mil HQ must be able to perform some form of ‘advance planning’ and provide input to the process. The key is to be able to adapt plans to what comes out of the strategic and operational planning processes.

Still, some interesting issues could be highlighted. Related to concept development and specifically to MNISP and CIP/CIME from an EBAO perspective, the question of how the military components are going to be represented most appropriately in these forums is highly interesting. There are necessary steps, e.g. forming the force, appointing an operational commander, following military command structure, time frames for planning, force generation etc. These things need to be considered and taken into account before arriving to a CIP forum. This was partly done as an experiment setting for the Mil HQ, but in reality these are important and will affect the interaction. In terms of CIP that would affect who will be in the IIF, and it would affect the possible resources that are/will be available, and eventually what actions that could be undertaken.

It has been concluded in MNE 4 and DEMO 06 Fall that the CONOPS was not sufficient as a stand alone document and that the ‘SOP level’ was missing. This was also the case in this experiment - the working process was invented along the way. The Mil HQ produced the required products on time, so the working process delivered, but the staff had difficulties in understanding what to do and how to do it.

Last, a few experiences should be mentioned; A) Knowledge Development (KD) support during the event was substantial and crucial to the planning and it proved to be a valuable ‘tool’; B) The interaction between the Mil HQ and the IIF needs to be further developed to ensure reliable information exchange, i.e. effects and actions were not validated before being passed on to the Commander and the forums; C) The Red and Green team were not used as ‘devils advocate’, they had a more integrated role. Having them as a separate team allows them to better question decisions’ and plans. Furthermore, the classification of red, green and blue forces were not done in the most obvious way and it may need to be handled differently in future work, i.e. simplified and clarified.

3.3.4 Way forward

The Comprehensive Approach IPT will continue to work with issues regarding implementation planning, management and evaluation in multifunctional operations, feeding insights into Swedish Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E). More attention will be paid to the evaluation aspects where analysis to date is weaker than in the field of implementation planning. Taking a wider approach, the team will also attempt to apply the underpinning thoughts of the Comprehensive Approach to a scenario as an effort to highlight the challenges and possibilities of the concept. This study will build on lessons from the MNE 5 concepts as well as other concept-development and ‘real world’ lessons learned.

Experiences have shown that the practising of a planning process is especially difficult if the planners are less experienced with the procedures. The CA Integrated Project Team will therefore further explore a methodical planning model that will help planners to better understand rationales behind the analysis and how it can support the development of aims and objectives, and at a later stage the evaluation process.

The Swedish participation in, and contribution to, the MNE 5 work has resulted in extensive new knowledge, experiences and insights on how national inter-agency cooperation might be improved. It is essential to consider how this knowledge should be used in future work. One option is to establish a Swedish cross agency working group that is tasked to develop a plan for national implementation of findings from the MNE 5 that are applicable to Sweden.

4 CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Experiment validity and reliability

The experiment construct created an environment where the CIP/CIME concept could be explored and evaluated. A wide range of highly skilled players, a well developed scenario, the experiment environment at the SwAF JCDEC and the possibilities for observation contributed to a MIE that took CA and CD&E important steps forward. A number of limiting factors may still have affected the results. First, it is unclear if enough tension was created in the forum to fully understand the difficulties that may arise during this kind of implementation planning. Second, it is assumed in the CIP concept that the implementation planning process needs to be iterative so that clarifications and changes can be made throughout the process, but since the strategic level was not played out sufficiently, this was not explored enough. Third, like in most experiments of this kind, time-constraint was a limiting factor and the participants had to complete their planning processes in unrealistically short time. This may have repressed both dialogue and conflicts thereby affecting validity and reliability of the results.

4.2 Information Exchange Architecture and Technology

The technical environment, developed using Service Oriented Architecture, supported the basic needs of the IIF and AP&C groups. However, the IIF and AP&C participants did not use the technology much during the experiment. The limited use of technology may be due to the limited time available or the character of the work in the coalition (a lot of time was spent discussing different issues *within* the coalition and the participants contacted their own organizations and nations to a limited extent). Thus, there is a need to evaluate what technology a coalition really needs to support their work.

It is important to emphasise that even though it is technically possible to distribute and share information in a secure way, both within and outside of the coalition, there may be factors that limit the information sharing. For example; different countries and organizations may have rules and regulations restricting them from sharing information; and; difficulties in handling information flow and information management (validating the information) may affect trust and consequently people's willingness to share information. These issues are of importance to the IEAT concept and need to be explored further.

Furthermore, the results show that the IEAT concept could benefit from a more distinct explanation of what key issues it handles, i.e. emphasise the advantages with the concept. In order to get people to believe in the concept and trust this kind of technical solution it is essential to describe the strengths of the concept in a clear and credible way, i.e. to explain why this information exchange concept is better than other existing concepts. One way to do this is by using different scenarios or "use cases" (examples/situations) where the advantages are emphasised.

4.3 Comprehensive Approach and EBAO

Overall, the April MIE, together with other recent CD&E efforts represent important steps towards integration and cooperation in ends, ways and means in multifunctional environments. One of the aims of multifunctional concepts is to promote mutual understanding of e.g. the various cultures, resources, approaches, tasks and time perspectives of the different actors potentially involved in contemporary crisis management and peace operations. The April MIE was, through the inclusion of high-quality and high-level expertise and professional competences, indeed able to contribute to this.

One conclusion from the MIE was that the CIP concept offers a process for implementation planning that harmonises well with the ideas underpinning the CA. Additional emphasis should be put on promoting its ‘overlay’ character (as a framework for multi-actor contributions and as an ‘amalgam of existing processes’) the importance of flexible application, similarities between different planning languages, and how it accommodates functional and national representation in its application.

Furthermore, when working in a multifunctional setting it is necessary to conduct some form of joint analysis to establish a common view on the conflict and its dynamics. This is important to create unity within the coalition. This joint analysis may be instrumental to subsequent stages of the planning process.

There is continued support for reducing complexity in the strategic process (both MNISP and CIP/CIME) in terms of fewer, clearer levels of output. Furthermore, the (military) term ‘End State’ does not seem to be applicable in a multifunctional planning-process. Since different actors will have different time-perspectives it will be extremely difficult to formulate a relevant End State that would be applicable for all involved actors in a mission.

Another conclusion from the MIE was the importance of keeping the CIP/CIME process iterative. To be able to turn political/strategic aims and objectives into concrete plans in lower levels the planning process needs to be more iterative, allowing for adjustments and clarifications between the different levels. There is a requirement for parallelism and active management of overlaps between political-strategic and implementing levels.

Since EBAO was not sufficiently played out during the MIE it is hard to draw any far reaching conclusions about the merit for CD&E. However, one major conclusion was that we need to find dynamic and constructive processes to facilitate the interaction between the Mil HQ and planning forums such as the IIF and the AP&C groups. The two-way flow of information as well as the formulation of overarching directions to the Mil HQ needs to be further explored and developed.

ANNEX A: ACRONYMS

AP&C	Activity Planning and Coordination
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CIP	Cooperative Implementation Planning
CIME	Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CCS	Coalition Comprehensive Strategy
CSR	Coalition Special Representative
DC	Decisive Conditions
DCSR	Deputy Coalition Special Representative
DEMO 06	Demonstrations
EBAO	Effects Based Approach to Operations
EU	European Union
IEAT	Information Exchange Architecture and Technology
IIF	Interagency Implementation Forum
IPT	Integrated Project Team
JCDEC	Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre
JOPG	Joint Operations Planning Group
KD	Knowledge Development
KS	Knowledge Support
MIE	Major Integrating Event
Mil	Military
Mil HQ	Military Headquarter
MNE 5	Multinational Experiment 5
MNISP	Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
RFOC	Rapid Forces Operational Command
SE	Supporting Effects
SOA	Service Oriented Architecture
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SwAF	Swedish Armed Forces
UN	United Nations