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Swedish National Counter Terrorism Policy after 'Nine-Eleven': Problems and Challenges

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Report title Swedish National Counter Terrorism Policy after 'Nine-Eleven': Problems and Challenges		
Abstract (not more than 200 words) <p>The purpose of this study is to discuss the issue of Counter-Terrorism within a <i>Swedish</i> context, albeit in a comparative mode.</p> <p>The background is the rather new debate in Sweden as to what role various agencies should have in the area of CT. This debate took off after the findings of the Swedish Royal Commission investigating the 'nine-eleven' events from a Swedish perspective. In the report (SOU 2003:32) several recommendations are put forth, dealing with issues such as how various agencies can work better together and how the Security Police – who is still identified as the 'lead' agency in regard to CT operations – can bring in resources from other agencies, should the need arise.</p> <p>This study argues that the underlying premises for that report (and for the whole discussion about the CT-issue) is flawed in that it does not question the notion of the necessity of a 'lead' agency (who therefore also is the sole instance of deciding what help, if any, might be needed. Furthermore, this underlying basis (of the role of the Security Police as lead agency) does not take into account the fact that other agencies might have knowledge, unbeknownst to the Police, due to lack of coordination and the flow of necessary Intelligence, that can be of critical value to any CT operation. The study argues that as long as these structural flaws in the system are there, nothing fundamental will change in the way Sweden is trying to deal, at present theoretically, with the issue of CT-policy.</p>		
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Rapportens titel (i översättning) Swedish National Counter Terrorism Policy after 'Nine-Eleven': Problems and Challenges		
Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord) <p>Bakgrunden till studien är den diskussion som avser vilken roll olika myndigheter ska i kontraterrorism-sammanhang. Frågan gäller naturligtvis även för andra områden relaterade till terrorism och därmed sammanhängande områden. Denna diskussion, och debatt, tog fart på allvar efter terrorattackerna i USA den 11 september 2001. Speciellt efter den svenska 11-septemberkommisionens arbete som lades fram 2003 (SOU 2003:32). I rapporten lades flera rekommendationer fram. Rekommendationer som rör hur olika myndigheter och berörda organisationer kan samarbeta bättre och hur Säkerhetspolisen – som fortfarande ses som den myndighet som, med svenskt språkbruk "äger" terrorismfrågan – enklare ska kunna ta in resurser från andra myndigheter vid behov.</p> <p>Utgångspunkten för denna studie är dock att 11-septemberutredningen lider av en viktig brist i det att de inte tar upp ett grundläggande strukturellt problem; nämligen det att man i den svenska strukturen tenderar att utse <i>en</i> organisation/myndighet som den som "äger" frågan, och dels, inom samma struktur gör det mycket svårt att arbeta över myndighets- och organisationsgränserna. Vidare pekar studien på det faktum att genom att utse någon som äger frågan, och det i en struktur som samtidigt gör det så svårt att samarbeta, riskerar att viktig och relevant information och kunskap går förlorad eller aldrig kommer till nytta. I stället hävdas att en mer framkomlig väg vore att inrätta någon form av krishanteringscenter, uppbyggd kring specifika händelser med tillräckliga resurser och befogenheter att snabbt ta in relevant kunskap när den behövs.</p>		
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Swedish National Counter Terrorism Policy after 'Nine-Eleven': Problems and Challenges.

*'All it takes for evil to triumph is for
good Men to do nothing.'*
(Edmund Burke)

1. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to discuss the issue of Counter Terrorism (henceforth CT) from a *Swedish* perspective, albeit in a comparative context. Originally, the topic was presented as a paper at an international conference at the Centre for Security Studies in Zürich, Switzerland in March 2004. This report is an enhanced and expanded study of that paper.

The background is the rather new debate in Sweden as to what role various agencies should have in the area of CT. This debate took off after the findings of the Swedish Royal Commission investigating the impact of the 'nine-eleven' events on Sweden. In the report (SOU 2003:32) several recommendations are put forth, dealing with issues such as how various agencies can cooperate better and how the Security Police – who is still identified as the 'lead' agency in regard to CT operations, as well as *all* terrorism-related issues – can bring in resources from other agencies, should the need arise.

This study argues that the underlying premises of that report (and for the whole discussion about the CT-issue) is flawed in that it does not question the notion of the necessity of a 'lead' agency (who therefore also is the sole instance of deciding what help, if any, might be needed). Furthermore, this underlying basis (of the role of the Security Police as lead agency) does not take into account the fact that other agencies might have knowledge, unbeknownst to the Police, due to lack of coordination and the flow of necessary Intelligence, that can be of critical value to any CT operation. Finally, the Swedish 'nine-eleven' report, and subsequent commissions, does not critically examine the underlying structure in Sweden that both identify a 'lead' agency (as opposed to topic and/or event-centred crisis-management operational centres, based on a National Crisis Management Centre), and, at the same time – when that lead agency can't cope by itself – and wants to add resources on an 'ad-hoc' basis., makes that very difficult and sometimes almost impossible from a judicial point of view.

Furthermore, it is argued that as long as these structural flaws in the system are present, nothing fundamental will change in the way Sweden is trying to deal with, at present theoretically, the issue of CT-policy.

1.1 Notes on Methodology and limitations.

It is important to note that this study limits itself to the issue of CT. This does not mean that other issues related to CT will not be dealt with at all. But it does mean that the focus is on CT and, more specifically, on its policy implications for Sweden. Furthermore, the purpose from a methodological point of view, is first and foremost to shed light on the problems related to the issue of CT policy in Sweden today. I.e. the limitations on what can be done within the present policy structure (see below).

Another purpose, although of a more secondary nature, is to present opinion-makers and relevant authorities with a clear picture concerning the present CT policy structure and the problems and challenges that lies in the way for, as I believe, necessary changes to this structure in order to meet new and different threat perceptions. Threat perceptions that the present CT structure is not equipped to handle.

Finally, the study is intended to show that any changes to the structure can and should be made with the clear purpose of keeping to the Swedish tradition of separation of powers intact, so as not to endanger the very fundamentals of the Swedish democratic structure.

The structure of the study is intended to lead the reader through several stages. First, a discussion on a more general level concerning the terrorist threats that are of concern to Sweden (and other countries too of course). This includes a discussion of the roles of the Military versus the Police in matters of CT policy as well as Swedish experiences with international terrorism. This leads into the matter of the current CT structure in Sweden and how it came about; strengths and weaknesses and how the CT debate in Sweden got under way. Finally, the discussion turns to possible future implementations of changes to the current structure, and what those changes might mean. Included here are some proposals for changes. The concluding chapter looks to the future and includes a discussion about what might lie ahead.

The study includes an executive summary in English and in Swedish.

2. Introduction

Even if the terrorist attacks in USA on 11 September 2001 yet again did put focus on problems of finding the best ways to fight international terrorism, it is no exaggeration to say that those attacks made an impact on the discussion that will be felt for many years to come. These attacks did finally bring home the message (stated for several years, in vain, by researchers and counter- and antiterrorist operatives involved in the matter) that a 'new', more volatile and less selective terrorism was here; i.e. a religiously motivated terrorism more inclined to 'fight enemies'¹ than to selectively pick individual targets to make political statements. This does not, of course, exclude

¹ As an illustration see Osama bin Laden's *Fatwa*/statement '*Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders*'. Al-Quds al-Arabi, February 23, 1998.

that there might be political goals for the perpetrators involved, on the contrary, that is very often the case. But the basic motivational factors are religious ones.

Furthermore, that this kind of terrorist activity is here for the foreseeable future must be stated. It is entrenched since several years (long before 'nine-eleven'), and the slowness of western countries – even those that have been affected by terrorism – in responding to the threat, has meant that these networks have entrenched themselves in a multitude of countries. It is no small matter, and ought to be a matter of some concern, that the nineteen hijackers of 'nine-eleven' infamy got most of their radicalism and planning done in the West, *after* leaving their home countries.

In the 'novelty' of the matter is also included that this kind of terrorism is global to an extent never seen before. Compared to the 'modern'² terrorism that Europe saw some decades ago (and that still is a problem, albeit on a much smaller level now than when it occurred in the 60's), the agenda of the 'new' terrorists is more often than not global in its scope. This shows itself in two ways; first in the sense that the 'enemy' these perpetrators are seeing themselves as fighting is everywhere and can be found in every group outside their own constituency, meaning that their targets can be found everywhere. This is clearly the case with the groups and networks who can be defined as Islamist³. These groups, between them, kill more people in terrorism acts than all other terrorist groups together⁴. Secondly, and again this is true first and foremost for the Islamists, the political side of their agenda is also global, in that the goal is to spread Islam (in their version) throughout the world. This idea carries with it the logic of expanding the struggle to all four corners of the world. This last point underlies the fact that this brand of terrorism is a global threat (although obviously not to the same extent everywhere). This, in turn, demands that the problem is taken seriously by other countries than those directly targeted (like the US and Israel to take just two clear examples), and calls for a much better coordination, at an international level, than what we have witnessed until now. In this regard, Sweden, together with everybody else, must take part. Domestically, Sweden needs also to look over its internal coordination capacity.

Even though this paper will not deal with the issue of how to define terrorism per se, a working definition of terrorism should be included. A definition based on the act, rather than the identity of the perpetrator, is the most useful for this paper. Whatever criteria put up, different countries perceive themselves as fighting terrorism. This brings about discussions on how to do this, regardless of what kind of motives are behind the terrorist acts, or what social and political context the 'terrorist' is in. Unfortunately, a definition of terrorism still depends very much on where one stands, politically and religiously. Of interest here, however, are the tactics and strategies being used to combat terrorism, as well as what these tactics and strategies mean for society at large. It is also of importance that terrorism, as defined in this study, is clearly distinguished from other types of low-intensity conflicts, such as guerrilla-

² 'Modern' should be understood here as a post WWII phenomenon, or more specifically the politically motivated terrorism that plagued the continent in the 1960's, 1970's and in the 1980's, and which began to make an impact in the 1960's.

³ With Islamists (the term is borrowed from the French *Islamistes*, and defines Moslem groups involved in terror activities) is meant those people involved in terrorist activities acting out from an understanding of Islam that commands them to fight enemies, who threaten Islamic societies. It is to be kept in mind that there is a clear distinction to be made between these Islamists and followers of the Islamic faith in general.

⁴ Patterns of Global Terrorism. US Department of State. 2001, 2002, 2003.

warfare and wars of national liberation. My working definition, for this specific study, could thus read:

The systematic use of illegitimate violence, by non-state, or sub-state actors, specifically aimed at non-combatants and/or civilians, to achieve specific objectives. These objectives could be political, social or religious depending on the groups in question. Terrorism becomes international when it is carried out beyond the borders that define the country of origin of specific groups, or when it is targeting foreign nationals within the country of origin of a specific group.

Obviously, this is not the only definition that can be used, but it will suffice for the purpose of this study, where the aim is to look at the combating of terrorism from a Counter Terrorism (CT) perspective, rather than defining the act or the perpetrator, itself.

3. International Developments and National Counter Terrorism Policy.

When the Soviet bloc collapsed in the late 1980's and early 1990's, it was widely assumed that a new era of heightened prosperity and peace would come about in the international system. Democracy had 'won' and this was seen as a starting point for a new world order, based on parliamentary democracy and an integrated, free-market economy. It was also assumed, as this new world order extended its influence, that disruptive elements to international stability would become increasingly marginalised. Since the collapsed Soviet Union had been a major contributor, financially and ideologically, to the various groups and organisations that had posed a terror-threat against the West, the prediction was for these groups to wither away. To a certain extent this did also happen. For the many leftwing, ideologically committed groups from all over the continent, the demise of the Soviet empire in effect dealt them a severe blow.

However, the initial Euphoria soon gave way to a growing sense of unease, and even despair, that conflicts over territory, economics, ethnic belonging and religious and political issues, occurred as a result of the lifting of the 'totalitarian lid' that had hitherto kept these sentiments capped. These concerns had been heightened by an increased fluidity in the international system. A fluidity that now characterises international politics, and in which it is much more difficult to attribute exactly who is doing what to whom. The establishment of a 'new security order' might have reduced the danger of interstate conflict, but at the same time it has raised the risks of increased sub-state, sub-national forces being used, thereby making low-intensity conflicts, and terrorism, much more common.

Since, at the same time, the underlying root-causes for many of the world's most protracted conflicts are still unresolved, either because they predated or remained unaffected by the East/West struggle, these conflicts remain as complex and irritating as ever. From the perspective of terrorism, this can be seen, in the fact that the number of terror-attacks has not gone down since the fall of the Iron-curtain. On the contrary, there was an increase during the 1990's (even before 'nine-eleven') of incidents of this particular mode of violence. The potential for the kind of violence that terrorism constitutes is obviously still present. It has, however, to a large extent taken

new roads by using religion as an imperative and bringing a globalised struggle to the fore to an extent not seen before.

Differences between the politically and socially motivated terror in the 1960's and 1970's and today's religiously motivated terrorism, are of many kinds. First, the motives behind religious terrorists are a mixture of, seemingly, inseparable political and religious desiderata. This is fuelled by a zealous and grave sense of doing God's work, or at least protecting His work. The people committing these crimes also see themselves as acting on God's command, thus making them immune against moral or ethical objections towards their acts. God's command is not to be questioned. Since the victims are seen as enemies, by just being where they are at the time of the terrorist act, the perpetrators can also justify their killings.

Another difference concerns the 'modus operandi' of the religious terrorists. Since the killing of 'enemies' is the main objective in the first place, the higher the death-toll the 'better' from the terrorist viewpoint⁵. This makes terror-acts carried out by religiously motivated terrorists potentially more lethal than the former, politically, motivated terror, in the context of which every act was calculated against a political goal, and where one aim was to gain public support for a cause, however twisted the reasoning behind that was. Violence, often leading to death, in the name of religion and sanctioned, even mandated, by God, thus has the hallmark of being lethal and indiscriminate at the same time.

A third difference concerns the mixture, conscious or not, of religious and socio-politically issues as a cause, or excuse, of the violence applied. They may also contain a nationalist/separatist agenda, in which the religious component is tied into a complex web of cultural and linguistic factors. This last issue is one that makes the combating of this kind of terror even more difficult. The lack of any clear-cut 'cause' is not only a break with the picture from earlier years. It also makes political remedies hard to come by. Attempts by Western European governments to follow a two-tiered track (the stick and the carrot) to fight terror, is of very little use, if the perpetrator in question is more interested in killing you than to reach a compromise aimed at changing a perceived political or social injustice. This is of course not to say that 'social and/or political grievances cannot be a cause for some of the religiously motivated terror. But this is not enough to explain it, or to remedy the causes behind the terror.

Finally, a fourth difference is the phenomenon of suicide terrorism (first used to a larger extent by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka during the civil war there in the 1980's). When people don't fear the (hitherto) ultimate deterrent society has to offer and, sometimes even want to die, the difficulties to prevent a terror act increases considerably.

These problems remain today, even though changes in the methodology of those who combat terror can be detected. The capture of some terrorists, both before and

⁵ It should be pointed out here that the fact that the 'killing of enemies', in no way means that other criteria does not matter. Behind the killing might lie, and very often does lie, social and political factors as well. But it must be underlined that the religious dimension and motivational factors are the main ones. Reaching the ultimate goals of 'cleansing one's society from enemies' or 'creating justice for one's people' means, in the context of the religiously motivated terrorists, death and destruction of one's enemies.

after 'nine-eleven', shows both the new and current trend in today's terrorism, as well as the attempts at inter-state combating of a threat that has become more and more global. Until the 1990's, the above-mentioned attempts to combat terror had been mostly intra-state affairs, with specific cases sometimes providing means for more international co-operation. With the new threat, it is apparent that this intra-state approach is no longer sufficient.

All these changes has affected the way terror is combated. This shift forced law-enforcement agencies to rethink some of their strategies and tactical procedures in dealing with the terrorist threat. As the insight started to sink in that enhanced co-operation, and one that transcended the 'specific-case kind', was a necessity to handle the 'new' kind of terrorism threat appearing, several initiatives were taken at both governmental and inter-governmental level.

At the beginning of the 1990's the major international tool that existed for this kind of law-enforcement were international treaties, concerning flight security (including airport control), extradition treaties and agendas of yearly conventions where various law-enforcement representatives assembled to, in theory at least, share information. For countries like the UK, Germany, Spain and Israel, who all had first-hand experience with various kinds of terrorism, these tools did not add much to what they already had, by necessity, been forced to develop. For years, the most affected governments, or at least their law-enforcement agencies, had built up channels for emergencies in specific cases. There was, however, no central body at the EU-level or any other transnational level, to co-ordinate the struggle against terror. Neither was there any attempt by countries more or less unaffected by terrorism, such as Sweden, to build up a capacity in this regard.

What the new kind of terrorism, religiously motivated and without any clear, discernible political goals, other than the destruction of one's enemies, (at least that was how it appeared to many in the West) brought with it, was an awareness that this threat was different in that it had its origins outside Europe, at the same time as many of it's perpetrators got their final orders (and sometimes ideological injections) in the west. This, of course, made it more difficult to combat. As is so often the case, this awareness did not really evolve into practical initiatives until it became politically impossible not to. The external event that tied the terror-threat, emanating from the Middle East, in with a European and American context, was the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), and the political changes this process brought with it. Because so many aspects of the conflict were included in the process, among them the threat of terrorism, it became possible to seriously engage in efforts to increase international co-operation. Several states now had a new interest in suppressing terrorism as a means to be used in the political struggle. In addition, this brought to the fore the possibility to use military forces and intelligence agencies in a struggle that so far, for the Europeans and the Americans, had been mainly a police domain. Countries in the region, like Israel, Egypt and Jordan had long reached the conclusion that without full intra-agency co-operation, it was not possible to be successful in fighting terror. In Israel, especially this has been honed to, on the face of it, a rather successful tactic in combating terrorism⁶. In various operations a certain 'job-sharing' practice has

⁶ The failed attempt to kill one of Hamas' leaders in Jordan in September 1997 (The Maashal-affair), points to the fact that no-one is completely immune to inter-agency rivalry. On the whole though, Israel still presents a picture where the intelligence agencies are careful to pool resources and information, if for no other reason than

developed, where undercover units from elite-forces within the army are employed when heavy fire-fights might erupt, or for hostage-rescue operations where their particular skill is needed. The police, or border-police, are in charge of overall security and have their own under-cover units to employ when a more low-key operation is asked for. When it comes to intelligence, there is constant information sharing.

For the Europeans, looking from the outside and getting increasingly drawn into the Middle East conundrum through the MEPP, this model became more feasible, as the political stakes in the MEPP were also raised back home. This was easier in countries like the UK and Spain, where there already existed a structure that could be used, with some modification. The so-called 'dirty war' between the British and the various groups in Northern Ireland, had given the forces employed in this 'war' a solid experience in this kind of combat. The new component was that the enemies of the MEPP, more often than not, basing themselves on religious imperatives, took the struggle to the countries seen as supporting the 'enemy'. This brought home the need to be more efficient in the co-operative efforts to fight terror and it also helped carry the discussion about CT measures over to a 'post nine-eleven' context.

For a country like Sweden, having been spared (so far at least) much of the carnage in other countries close at home, this new situation has been dealt with in various ways. New demands from the European Union to adapt to new and tougher legislation and an awareness of religiously motivated terrorism and the global threat it does actually pose, have put up challenges that the polity, as well as the general population, have been slow to react to. It is still very much a case of viewing ourselves as being shielded and not in 'the line of fire'. To a large extent this is of course true; there is as of today no serious terrorist threat facing Sweden⁷. Neither are we, currently at least, involved in any international operation that could make us such a target and we have been spared many of the ethnic clashes and civil disturbances witnessed in for example Britain and France.

Nevertheless, the problem does concern Sweden too. Not only due to the fact that we are part and parcel of the wider community of the European Union. Swedes, who are travelling frequently, run the same risks of getting hurt or killed as anybody else⁸. Furthermore, the 'globalisation' of terror, as well as globalisation in other, more peaceful ways, makes Sweden a potentially interesting country to use as a base for propaganda, fund-raising and as a resting place for violent groups. This last point is of some interest since it has actually happened once before that the country was used (to a very limited extent however) in such a way. In the middle of the 1970's, Sweden was used by various Palestinian groups as a 'resting place', where activists could be put out of harm's way for a limited time. The 'intelligence war' between

to dilute the blame if things should go wrong. The Maashal-affair will probably only bring this point home more forcefully.

⁷ This does not mean that there are no terrorist threats at all. There is, as of today, an increased risk towards facilities in Sweden (such as embassies and trade agencies for example) belonging to other countries. Most pronounced are threats against the US and Israel. Since the war in Iraq, Britain is also part of this group. The war in Chechnya has also made Russian targets more vulnerable; two attacks 2005 in Scandinavia occurred in January (Denmark) and in March (Sweden) respectively. In both cases Russian embassy cars were firebombed by people calling themselves 'Global Intifada' and linking their attacks to the Russian war in Chechnya.

⁸ A case in point is the bombings on Bali in 2002, where six Swedes got killed.

Israeli and Palestinian intelligence agencies that plagued France and Germany in particular during that time, never affected Sweden.

Sweden also had its share of politically motivated terror attacks against individuals of Kurdish and Iranian origin; attacks instigated and planned by the Iraqi and Iranian governments. That this never registered within the wider community, must be attributed partly to the fact that the issues and events were hushed up and partly to the fact that the affected populations have had a hard time integrating into Swedish society, a problem Sweden share with many other European countries. Among some immigrant populations this has been a sour point for many years, with an understandable resentment towards the alleged lame response on part of the authorities.

For several years therefore, Sweden could escape the wider repercussions of a slowly changing terror environment. The terrorist-attacks on September 11, 2001 changed that however, and various governmental bodies initiated commissions of inquiry and, at least rhetorically, promised an overhaul of the Swedish preparedness capacity⁹. An overhaul that included the preparedness of the Swedish public authorities, and other public bodies, to prevent, combat and generally deal with large-scale terrorist attacks. This also entailed an enhanced discussion on counter-terrorism (CT).

A major problem that the September 11th inquiry looked into was the lack of capacity for cooperation between the various agencies that might get involved in case of a major terrorist attack. The inquiry included a survey on the capacity of such agencies as well as other public bodies, to cooperate efficiently in case of an emergency.

In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind that even though a plan and model for cooperation may look good in theory, it may not work that well 'when push comes to shove'. Furthermore, according to the inquiry, the Swedish model with very clear lines between various agencies and authorities may not be entirely suitable and efficient enough to counter a serious terrorist threat, should it arise¹⁰. In peacetime it might work, and during a smaller crisis too, but the weaknesses and shortcomings have already showed themselves¹¹. Examples of this are lack of coordination and difficulties in cooperation between various agencies.

These domestic difficulties are borne out when compared with the visible trends concerning international CT-policy. During the seventies, when terrorism became more international through hijackings of planes and such, the need for international conventions and laws resulted in various initiatives.¹² At the national level, terrorism was (and still is mostly) a question for national police forces. This follows the general idea that terrorism is a crime and therefore a task for the Police. During the 1970s most western countries developed special units for combating terrorism. Not

⁹ The best known report in this regard was the so called 'September 11th inquiry' (11 september utredningen, SOU 2003:32)

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Some of the best-known conventions are: 'Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation' (1971), 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of crimes against Internationally Protected Persons' (1973), European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism' (1977) and 'Convention against the taking of Hostages' (1979).

surprisingly, this development went furthest in countries where terrorism became a real problem, like in the UK and West Germany¹³. Mainly, this development took place within the police and paramilitary units as well as a realisation that better intelligence was also called for. It was reactive rather than proactive.

Military units, on the other hand, have been used more sparingly in CT operations (with Israel as a notable exception) and Research & Development has been most marked within paramilitary and police forces. The changes in international terrorism (often branded as 'new') and the heightened perception of a threat, has accentuated the need to develop new tactics and strategies to combat this threat. This includes both a renewal of traditional methods, such as an emphasis on Human Intelligence sources (HUMINT), as well as using new technologies, such as newly developed listening and communication devices, in fighting these truly global terrorist threats¹⁴.

Internationally, attempts to classify some cases of terrorism as 'acts of war', will probably force changes to international law and, as a consequence, force changes in the national laws as well. In Sweden this has already happened to a certain extent with the demands that we adapt our own laws to the more stringent terrorist laws and regulations of the EU¹⁵.

In cases where military units have been used for CT operations in other countries, it has been based on some important principles that could possibly be relevant for Sweden as well in the future:

- 1) The clear and present trans-national profile of international terrorism demands a greater scope of international cooperation, from interoperability to intelligence cooperation on a scale we haven't seen so far in Sweden.
- 2) Of the few units adapted and available (in countries where they exist), various kinds of Special Forces (SF) are the most versatile and suitable to further develop for use in current and future operations against international terrorism¹⁶.
- 3) The need for enhanced intelligence gathering and analysis within a system that can combine various tools such as HUMINT and Technical Intelligence (TECHINT).
- 4) The understanding that all relevant political actors need to coordinate and cooperate more to reach a common threat perception, without leaving out 'the second opinion' of course. Combating terrorism is always, at the end of the day, a political decision. Active operations are and should be, the result of a political decision-making process.

The lessons to be learned from the last decade – when combating the type of international terrorism that dominates today – is that a 'honing of the tools' is

¹³ One of the first events to mark the beginning of this development, was the terror-attack against the Israeli Olympic team at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

¹⁴ A case in point is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles's (UAV) as a way of killing terrorist leaders. It's been used in Yemen as well as in Afghanistan.

¹⁵ Two agencies, EUropol and EUrojust – operational from 1999 and 2002 respectively – have been set up to help the member states to co-operate in matters of international crime, including terrorism. I.e. the so called 'third pillar' of the EU.

¹⁶ Taillon Paul, 'The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter Terrorism', Praeger Publishers, Westport CT 2001, p 141.

necessary for success. For this to work, it is also paramount that police and military operations, whether international or domestic, are tailor-made to suit the specific threat at hand. In this regard, it deserves to be underlined that the political and transnational dimension of CT today, as well as the current cross-border terrorism, demands an international cooperation that we are not equipped to handle, at least not yet. It is a dimension constantly mentioned in the political rhetoric, but one that is very difficult to translate into practical political steps. This is even more difficult when countries that are not used to cooperate in such sensitive areas as CT, are forced by circumstances to cooperate against a common threat. The risk for unilateral actions will be there as long as different perceptions, actions and policies are applied.

4. Fundamentals of National Counter Terrorism Policy.

4.1. Swedish experience with terrorism.

It's been several decades since Sweden saw international terrorist attacks on its soil. In 1971 Croat activists killed the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden and then, the year after, hijacked a domestic flight. That hijacking resulted in the release of the perpetrators of the embassy murder¹⁷.

In 1975, Japanese activists, tied to the Japanese Red Army, were expelled after allegations that they prepared attacks on the Libyan Embassy in Stockholm. And the same year, two members of the same group were also expelled after planning attacks against Japanese targets in West Germany¹⁸.

Also in 1975, members of the German Red Army Faction (*Rote Armee Fraktion*, RAF), occupied the West German Embassy in Stockholm and demanded the release of other RAF members imprisoned in West Germany. The occupation ended with two hostages being killed and several others, including the terrorists, being injured, when explosions placed by the terrorists, went off prematurely¹⁹. The terrorists were immediately expelled to West Germany. Later, in 1977, a plot to kidnap the Minister of justice in 1975, Anna Greta Leijon, was revealed. The operation (called operation Leo) was to have Leijon exchanged for the imprisoned RAF members taking part in the Embassy attack²⁰.

On some occasions, but not very often, over the years, Swedish citizens have been arrested and received prison sentences for terrorist related crimes. A well-known example is from 1980 when two Swedish citizens received prison sentences for trying to smuggle weapons into Sweden to use against Israeli targets in Denmark as well as planning to kill the King of Saudi-Arabia. Four foreigners connected to the plot were expelled.

This last example points to a common feature of how Sweden has dealt with international terrorism. If the perpetrators are Swedish citizens, they get prison terms

¹⁷ SOU (State Official Report) 1989:104, p. 64.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 65.

¹⁹ Kumm, Björn. 'Terrorismens Historia', pp. 207-215. Lund, Historiska Media 1998.

²⁰ Ibid.

here (if the alleged crimes are relevant to Swedish criminal law). If they are non-Swedish citizens residing in Sweden, the perpetrators face extradition. In theory this cannot happen if the country demanding extradition has the death penalty, but in practice this has not stopped Sweden from extraditing people. An example of this is from December 2001, when two Egyptian citizens were expelled to Egypt. According to the Swedish authorities, Egypt had, beforehand, given assurances that the expelled men would be neither killed nor tortured, but in at least one of the cases, harsh treatment in connection with the interrogation in Egypt was administered. Of even more concern perhaps, was the fact that the Egyptians were handed over to US security personnel who administered interrogations while the two were still on Swedish soil.

The 1980's also saw a limited number of Palestinians using Sweden as a 'resting place', but no terrorist attacks, or attempted attacks, could be traced to this particular group of people.

Sweden follows the EU recommendations when it comes to listing terrorist organizations. This has meant, for example that members and activists of the Lebanese Hizb'allah have not been specifically targeted by the Security Service. Some Hizb'allah members were expelled in the 1990's due to alleged ties with terrorist attacks (either carried out or planned), but since then the few remaining members in Sweden have kept a low profile.

In addition to the above-mentioned examples, Sweden has had, and has at present, members and activists from all major terrorist groups residing in the country, including the Palestinian Hamas, the Egyptian Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya and the Algerian GIA, all put on both the UN and EU lists of terrorist groups. Their presence was never seen as a threat to the Swedish state, however, and since actual membership in an otherwise extremist or terrorist organisation was not (and still is not) considered a crime as long as you didn't do anything, they were largely left alone, although monitored by the Security Service. Furthermore, considering the fact that Sweden is not exactly seen as being at the centre of the World, none of these organisations placed any of their main offices or activities in Sweden. The Swedish Security Police has a policy of clearly pointing out, in their regular crime-preventing talks with people who are suspected to have connections to various terrorist organizations, that any attacks, or even activities to promote attacks, against any targets in Sweden, would mean the immediate loss of sanctuary, as well as the possibility of expulsion – including families – to country of origin²¹.

At the end of the 1990's, more people in Sweden, with ties to the Middle East and North Africa, were beginning to forge ties with, and work actively to promote, the global Islamist movement²². Never a large group, today some twenty people living in Sweden are claimed by the Security Police to have visited Islamist camps in Pakistan (and maybe also Afghanistan before the war that removed the Taliban regime in late 2001)²³. Some of these activists are also claimed by the Security Service to have ties with the 'hard core' of the Al Qaeda²⁴. As a consequence of this, there's been a

²¹ SÄPO (Säkerhetspolisen or *The Swedish Security Police*), *Verksamhetsåret* (Yearly Report) 1998, p. 29.

²² *Ibid*, p. 28-9.

²³ SÄPO, *Verksamhetsåret* 2001.

²⁴ *Ibid*.

growth of new, younger extreme Islamic activists living in Sweden. Many with Swedish citizenship and often well integrated in society, and with religious education from countries such as Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and Yemen²⁵.

Sweden also had conflicts of interest with the US on the wider 'war on terrorism' that came to the fore after 'nine-eleven'. Most famous in Sweden were the case with three Swedes of Somali origin that had their assets frozen in November 2001 due to the fact that they appeared on the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee list. The Security Police in Sweden claimed that the evidence was not sufficient to prosecute in a Swedish court. The ensuing debate in Sweden made the Swedish government to be the first to demand changes in the sanction list.

All in all, the Swedish structure in dealing with international terrorism went unchallenged until 'nine-eleven'. After that, however, and due to the fact that Sweden, being an active member of the European Union, decided to take part in cooperating with the larger international community in the struggle ('war' was never a suitable word to use in Swedish vocabulary), a debate on the pros and cons of the system has surfaced.

The widened debate that followed showed itself fairly quickly in the public domain as well: First, 'nine-eleven' triggered a debate that sometimes brought with it inflated risk scenarios and worst-case scenarios that did not fit the Swedish context at all. Second, complaints were heard from inside the security service, that outsiders (meaning people from outside the Service) stepped into their territory²⁶ and without the proper experience and knowledge, passed judgement on Sweden's performance. Furthermore, it was argued from the Security Service, that people outside the Service were not in a position to properly assess activists' motivations and capabilities.

The first complaint, with exaggerated threat assessments coming from some strange directions, certainly had some merit to it. Not the least, the Media showed some innovative scenarios in this regard²⁷.

The second complaint, however, is more serious, since it shows a clear unwillingness to realise the importance of a wider study of the phenomenon of terrorism. That is, studies conducted outside traditional Police channels. This is serious because it points also to the heart of the debate in Sweden about whose responsibility it is to look into the issue of terrorism, something that show an inability to understand that the problem is too big to be the sole responsibility of one agency, be it the Police or someone else. This complaint also overlooks the fact that the Police and the Security Service are just as free to ask these agencies, outside of the Police, to conduct studies on their behalf.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ As an example of this see 'Swedish Experiences: Countering Violent Networks', Rembe, pp. 170-1, in 'Confronting Terrorism', Ed. M.van LeUwen, Netherlands, 2003.

²⁷ As a case in point, one can look at the debate after the murder of then Foreign Secretary of State, Anna Lindh, in September 2003, when wild speculations about connections to terrorism were made in a case that evidently had nothing to do with any kind of terrorism.

To assess motivations and capabilities of activists and potential terrorists, it is more often than not, a clear advantage of being free of any Police or (even more important) Security Service connection, to get people to talk.

The argument has probably more to do with the domestic debate on whose main responsibility terrorism should be. As stated elsewhere in this study, 'nine-eleven' triggered a discussion in Sweden on whether other agencies than the Police (including the Security Services) should have a larger role to play in combating terrorism, and, if so, what kind of role.

Tied into this discussion is a very relevant argument about risk and threat analyses. When a broader discussion about terrorism, in itself a good thing in a democracy, occur, there is always a necessity to correctly assess what the stakes are. I.e. what are the relevant threats and risk (and their consequences for society) that terrorism can pose? In this regard it is paramount to remember that a threat of terrorism is a combination of factors: For it to be a threat, there has to be intent as well as an operational capability and motivation to activate an operation/attack. In addition, factors such as vulnerability and negative consequences need to be assessed. As has been pointed out before²⁸, there has sometimes been a tendency in Sweden to constantly change the emphasis on what constitute the most serious factors of a terrorist attack, sometimes focusing on the consequences (without looking at the stages preceding the attack) and sometimes doing it the other way around, leaving important features of the equation out of the picture.²⁹

Another issue that became part of this discussion, was the fact that some public research on terrorism was conducted by agencies formally under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence (such as the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI), and the fear that this was going to take resources away from research connected to the Police³⁰. Related to this discussion is the issue of the financing of research and studies on CT (and other, more general terrorist-related topics). Looking at examples from other countries such as Britain, Germany and, perhaps more relevant to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, it is clear that a lot of good and relevant research is received when and if several resources are made available. Experience from the countries mentioned above points to models where there is a combination of direct grants and research money being provided through normal application procedures. The key seems to be that several resources can provide for all kinds of different, but equally important needs. This means that research and studies geared towards academia as well as towards operational and policymaking institutions (i.e. the Police and various departmental authorities) can get useful and timely information. The Swedish 'model' with *one* agency (in this case, The Swedish Emergency Management Agency, SEMA) having been picked to be almost the sole provider of public research money, have been proved to be much more problematic. Since SEMA is poorly equipped to deal with this new role (with too little staff and not having the educational tools to be able to properly understand the topic), the result have been to stymie, neglect and limit research and studies towards CT (and other terrorist-related topics), at the very time when it's needed the most³¹. A far better

²⁸ M.van LeEUwen, Netherlands, 2003. P. 173.

²⁹ For an illustration to the discussion on risks and threats see: <http://www.algonet.se/~psand/risk.html>

³⁰ Ibid, p. 172-3.

³¹ For further details see: www.kbm.se/ research.

way seems to be to follow the examples mentioned above and make means available through a combination of sources, mixing grants with research and study money provided through already existing research funding bodies.

4.2. The basics of a National Counter Terrorism Policy.

The terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 brought to the fore the questions of when and how society's different tools for combating terrorism should be used. In Sweden there has never been a *national* CT policy as such; terrorism has always been regarded, if at all, as something exclusively for the Police to deal with, meaning that no one else needed to get involved. On the few occasions when terrorism at an international level has hit Sweden (and it has always been the case of a third country being attacked, albeit on Swedish soil) the Police have been well equipped to deal with the problem. This is of course very much because these events were never on a scale, comparable to terror-attacks in other European countries.

To some extent 'Nine-eleven' did change this. Questions started to be asked about the best way to combat international terrorism, and if Sweden, should something happen, was really sufficiently prepared. The very sensitive issue of whether, in extreme circumstances, military forces could be used domestically, was raised (however very cautiously). And in the most thorough report on 'nine-eleven', mentioned above, it was for the first time ever written down that in extreme cases Sweden ought to put mechanisms in place to deal with the matter of using military personnel domestically.

These issues are of course not new. Since 'modern' terrorism was born in the 1960's and 1970's the role of the police, the military and the intelligence- and security services have been constantly debated. The major dividing line is between those who claim a continued clear 'division of labour' between what on one side the police, and on the other the military and the intelligence- and security services may and shall do, and those who argue for an extended role for the military and the intelligence- and security services, into 'traditional' police activities.

It should be emphasised that this discussion is more pronounced in countries with a constitutional democratic order and market-oriented economy, such as Sweden. In countries where problems of violent terrorism have been a constant for a prolonged time, and/or where democracy has been under pressure, or never gained a foothold, this discussion hardly exists. This is important because it touches upon the nature of the society that we claim to defend in this 'war' against terrorism now being fought on a global scale.

It is also possible to find distinct differences in how different countries in Western Europe have dealt with these problems. In countries where terrorism has not been a real problem, as for example Sweden, it has for obvious reasons been easier to implement the line that the police and the military have clear and separate tasks. In a democracy such as Sweden, it is clearly of great importance that these clear lines exist and are respected. Problems arise, however, when the threats (real or potential)

are to be found in the 'grey' zone between 'ordinary' criminality and full-scale war, or at least a war-like situation. International terrorism can very often be found in precisely this 'grey' zone.

In countries which have had serious problems with terrorism – like the UK, Italy and Spain – even if it hasn't been of the international, global type we saw in the US on 'nine-eleven', there has been a greater understanding that the armed forces – under certain specific circumstances – can be used within the country.

The 'divider' mentioned above is also mirrored in the ongoing debate within the EUropean Union where one is trying to find a common line in the fight against terrorism, something that certainly began before 'nine-eleven'. As there are considerable differences between various countries within the EUropean Union, this task will hardly be finished in the near future. Hence, the guidelines that have been produced are relatively general in character. Even if this doesn't have to be an insurmountable obstacle to finding a common policy (a less specific policy-outline can leave room for more unconventional solutions), it does pose a problem when one is trying to find more concrete policy recommendations on a wider scale. The new and enhanced information system introduced by EUropol is, if fully implemented, an important step towards a more comprehensive and common tool to deal with cross-border crime, such as terrorism³².

If one then looks at how different EUropean countries have been handling the challenge of terrorism, one can discern some patterns in those cases where this struggle have been successful – when the terrorist 'infrastructure' (organisation, training and modus operandi) has been destroyed – and some sort of solution to the underlying causes have been found. For example, in the cases of (then) West Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK – cases where the scope of the conflicts have been considerably reduced, if not entirely eliminated – the fight of the military and police were followed by some sort of political processes. Either after (Spain) or parallel to military and police actions (Northern Ireland). These strategies can work where there are underlying conflicts of a type that can be remedied by political means and where there is support for such actions by a large part of the general population concerned and affected. However, and this is the important part, in all these cases it was necessary to use a combination of tools to succeed; military, judicial and political. How these tools were used differed of course depending on the country in question. In France and Italy, just to take two examples, there was in fact a ready tool available already when the threat of terrorism appeared in the earlier mentioned 'grey' area between the civilian and military areas of responsibility. Namely in the form of paramilitary forces (the 'Gendarmérie' and the 'Carabinieri' respectively). A type of forces that we do not have in Sweden.

These EUropean conflicts – and these are the ones most relevant for comparative cases with Sweden – have also shown the stability of a liberal, constitutional and democratic society. In none of the cases mentioned was the democratic structure seriously threatened. In the case of Spain, on the contrary, a democratic development could contribute to solving the conflict successfully and through this leave room for a process of conflict-resolution. In the UK and in West Germany,

³² *Ny teknik*, No: 50, December 8, 2004.

limited restrictions in civil rights were periodically implemented, but they were not permanent and those measures were intensively and continuously discussed and debated. This is of course in itself no guarantee that such actions may not in the future lead to serious disturbances in the structures of democratic countries, including Sweden, were they to be implemented. Furthermore, there will always be a risk that limited changes can be made permanent. Nevertheless the outcome indicates that an open and democratic society can handle comparatively serious challenges during a rather extended period of time.

In this context it is also appropriate to clarify that the kind of international terrorism we witnessed at 'nine-eleven' is of another kind than the abovementioned terrorism in Europe. In these European cases the terrorists were politically and ideologically motivated. In the case of 'nine-eleven', it was a religiously motivated terror that showed its face. Moreover, it is this latter form of terror that has been dominating the scene for the last decade or so. Because the objectives for these groups or networks are considerably more diffuse in shape and the attackers view themselves as warriors at war, it becomes much more difficult to counter with traditional means.

5. The Dynamic of the Domestic Debate on Counter Terrorism.

This aspect of international terrorism, of the religiously motivated kind, ties in with another key feature of the Swedish discussion on terrorism, namely the difficulty in keeping the hitherto developed rules and regulations driving various agencies, capabilities and powers when it comes to domestic and international distinctions respectively. This distinction between what is domestic and international terrorism is becoming more and more difficult to uphold, with immediate consequences for the Swedish polity to combat this threat.

It is beyond doubt that we need to carry out this combat within the democratic and constitutional parameters that our societies have developed, but with the addition that these parameters must be defended. These last few years have yet again underlined the enhanced need for extended international cooperation. This is nothing new, but what is 'normal' and uncontroversial in peace-time, can become much more difficult in times of crises³³. For a western country like Sweden this carries with it the need for new and enlarged judicial tools (see as an example Sweden's new 'Terrorist Law'³⁴), as well as an understanding that when faced with a threat – even if it isn't of the 'clear and present kind' – that does not fit into the present structure, changes might be necessary. The challenge will be to do this without in any way endangering the democratic and liberal constitutional structure we're rightly proud of having developed.

³³ The 'war against terrorism' is of another kind and should be viewed more as a concept that must include all aspects of a long-time struggle. Every attempt to see this struggle as only a war, is bound to fail.

³⁴ The new Law (2003:148), *Lag om straff för terroristbrott* is a complement to existing laws applicable to terrorism. These are: *Utlänningslag* (1989:529) as well as *Lag om Särskild utlänningskontroll* (1991:572). Neither of these laws are specifically tailored to counter only terrorism, but also apply to espionage and sabotage.

The need to develop well-trained units with broad competences is clear and will not be any less needed in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the global threat presented by religiously motivated terrorists will most likely only demand a better and swifter 'rapid response mechanism' to counter. Furthermore, this heightened global dimension of international terrorism will also demand more in areas of interoperability and a more developed capacity to operate in different geographical and political contexts. To be able to do this, *should the need arise*, and as Swedish Police and Security agencies are set up today, they will not be able to meet all the new challenges identified above, at least not without considerably larger resources.

In this regard it is also important to point out that these new resources must be developed *before* 'push comes to shove'. When the need for these new resources appears, it is already too late to develop and construct them. Furthermore, in times of stability and peace, these resources are questioned. Not the least because they do carry costs the use of which is not clearly apparent during peacetime. In countries where the prevailing feeling is that they don't constitute primary targets (and Sweden is such a country) there is also a reluctance to divert or add new means to develop a capacity that there is no current need for. In addition, there is a need to develop, and perhaps change, certain legal parameters for military resources to be used in peacetime inside the country and within the legal framework of a constitutional democracy³⁵. These changes must not come easy and should be worked through the system properly to make them acceptable both to the population at large as well as to the polity. It is, again, necessary to point out that no changes should of course be instituted unless they are deemed necessary. This is especially true when it comes to legal changes. Changes ought only to be considered if there is a *de facto* threat (either at present or in the future), if current legislation is deemed ineffective, eventual restrictions on civil liberties are judged to be acceptable and necessary countermeasures, at present, are not deemed sufficient. The dilemma is of course to judge possible future threats against what is at present a very low threat level of international terrorism in Sweden³⁶.

To properly understand the current debate on CT in Sweden, it is necessary to look also at the present legal framework. Swedish response to terrorism is based on the criminal justice model. As is the case with most other Western democracies, Sweden regards terrorism as a crime and thus responsibilities for CT rests with the Ministry of Justice³⁷.

Crimes classified as being related to terrorism³⁸ are punishable by up to life imprisonment. Persons not regarded as actual perpetrators might still be sentenced for aiding or abetting such crimes. One legal restriction that could apply to terrorism is the unlawfulness of recruiting persons for military service without the consent of the government³⁹.

³⁵ Ibid, SOU 2003:32.

³⁶ SÄPO, *Verksamhetsåret 2003*.

³⁷ For a more comprehensive discussion on CT framework in democracies, see: 'Confronting the "Enemy Within"' . Chalk, Peter & Rosenau, William, RAND (Washington D.C.), 2004.

³⁸ *Lag om straff för terroristbrott* (2003:148), The new terrorism law.

³⁹ This law could, theoretically at least, be applicable for Swedish citizens who went to Afghanistan or Pakistan to train in camps run by various Islamic groups.

The above applies to Swedish citizens. For non-Swedish persons residing in Sweden, the situation is somewhat different. Two laws – ‘the Aliens Act’ and the ‘Act Concerning Special Control with Respect to Aliens’⁴⁰ – can be used in cases involving terrorism for Non-Swedes. The Aliens Act can be used to expel persons who has committed crimes and been residents of Sweden for less than two years, if it is suspected that the persons in question might commit terrorist acts or other forms of serious crimes. If the crimes concern matters of state security, the government decide the case.

When these rules do not apply, the Act Concerning Special Control with Respect to Aliens does. That law can be used to expel persons only suspected of planning violent crimes (i.e. not only terrorism crimes) in Sweden or elsewhere. In essence, it can be used for preventive purposes.

Both laws can be appealed and with the application of the EU-framework against terrorism, the hitherto existing discrepancy in legal standing between Swedes and non-Swedes has been adjusted. As a rule, expulsions are not carried out if there are risks of capital punishment, torture or other physical punishment, a consistent Swedish policy that was reiterated after the ‘nine-eleven’ attacks⁴¹. As stated above, however, the changes brought about by ‘nine-eleven’, affected this policy too when two Egyptians (mentioned above), alleged to be members of a terrorist organization, were expelled to Egypt, who, of course, adheres to the death penalty⁴².

Criticism against both the former laws and the new terrorist law has also been focusing on the aspect of the laws that are, the critics say, violating basic human rights and lacking in parliamentary transparency⁴³. Criticism has also been levelled against international efforts to combat terrorism and it’s effect on Swedish legal proceedings, saying, in effect, that different legal and political cultures within the EU, for example, are being disregarded in favour of very broad and loose definitions of terrorism. Definitions (accepted by Sweden) that would mean that Sweden would loose its right to try evidence before responding to demands from other EU countries for extradition⁴⁴.

What all this adds up to is a picture whereby Sweden is trying to cope with a widening policy gap between taking part in the fight against international terrorism, along the lines of the EU and UN, and how this fight is being structured at the national level in Sweden.

⁴⁰ *Utlänningslagen* (1989:529) and *Lag om Särskild utlänningskontroll* (1991:572). Before the new law, 2003:148, these laws were collectively known as the Terrorist law.

⁴¹ Report by Sweden to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, December 20, 2001. Ref. S/2001/1233.

⁴² The Egyptians were Ahmed Husayn Aghiza and Mohammed Sulayman al-Dharri, both alleged leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

⁴³ As one example of such criticism see: Ribbing, Antonia, ‘Sveriges terroristbestämmelser: Brottsprevention och demokratiska rättsideal’, in: Flyghed, Jan, ‘Brottsbekämpning: mellan effektivitet och integritet’, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2000)

⁴⁴ Of special concern is the European arrest warrant, whereby the country asking for extradition also has the right to define the crime, meaning that activities not considered crimes in Sweden could mean expulsion to other EU members.

6. Aspects of Counter Terrorism Policy Implementation.

Today, nearly four years after 'nine-eleven', it is very likely that Sweden, pressed jointly by demands for changes concerning CT policy both by the wider international community and the EU membership, will have to adapt to an international development stressing offensive CT (as opposed to more defensive anti-terrorism mechanisms) capabilities. This adaptation should of course not be implemented due to pressure from abroad, and not if there is no visible need for Sweden to make these changes. On the other hand, if there is such a need, it is far better that these changes and adaptations come as a result of a planned, thorough and balanced debate inside the country, than as the result of imposed changes forced upon us through international pressure and/or through terrorist attacks.

Furthermore, it is strongly recommended that these changes are made bearing in mind that there are certain values and structures we will not accept losing. Therefore, Sweden needs to make its own threat assessments and develop a CT resource with the full use of the democratic mechanisms at our disposal.

Looking at the pace at the international scene concerning CT capacity building there are reasons to believe that the near future will, if anything, demand even more international cooperation in the 'war against terrorism'. On the face of it, there seems to be two main development channels internationally for CT, both with repercussions for Sweden.

- 1) An extreme multilateral approach with standing units including both police-paramilitary and military forces. This in combination with an international law evolving into a rather 'federal' system where terrorists can be both apprehended and put behind bars internationally.
- 2) A continued development of CT capacity at the national level with a political will to use developed resources on an ad-hoc basis. In this case, this would have to be combined with new judicial tools (where necessary), but with the emphasis at the national level.

Both of these alternatives will bring demands at the national, Swedish, level:

- 1) A clear and pertinent statement, across the political board and mirroring a wide consensus, that Sweden is prepared to make necessary reforms to be a full and active partner in a rapidly changing world.
- 2) A new and supplementary legislation where authorities are given the means to use, if necessary, military CT resources in peacetime. Through this, society would also show a willingness to stand up for the constitutional democratic system we have and also use our resources more economically.
- 3) Establishing a 'National Security & Crisis Council/Centre' that could have, in a democratic and acceptable way, powers to deal with extreme threats and/or extraordinary events. These regulations should be put in place during peacetime in the event that, in an emergency, time is not available to wait for a Government decision. One must also anticipate cases when communication with the Government breaks down.

- 4) Amendments to existing laws that make planning for and financing of terrorism punishable by prison (this point is addressed in the new 'Terrorism Law' that was incorporated last year).
- 5) Continued development of military and police resources to counter terrorism threats, both domestically and internationally.
- 6) Enhanced possibilities for the Police to cooperate more with other relevant agencies on the counterintelligence level.
- 7) Provide funding for research on CT (and other terrorist-related topics) from *several* sources, combining direct grants with research means from already existing research funding bodies, thus relieving SEMA of its present role.

In addition to the above proposal, there is of course a third path of development that might be more pronounced. Namely that the Great Powers (and not only the US) use unilateral means more frequently to deal with what might be viewed as clear and present threats. Such an evolution, however, will hardly diminish the need for smaller countries to develop their own capacity to act.

This need for enhanced capacity concerning CT competence becomes even clearer when one takes into account the importance of both the political and military component in combating international terrorism. To be successful, the whole toolbox has to be used. To develop such a toolbox is a priority for any serious attempt to formulate a comprehensive CT policy, domestically as well as internationally.

In Sweden law-enforcement (including terrorism) is organised under the National Board of Police. When it comes to terrorism and counter-terrorism, the Swedish Security Service (*Säkerhetspolisen* or SÄPO) has the prime, overall responsibility. As pointed out earlier, this structure might change as a result of proposed reforms suggested by the Swedish commission investigating Swedish response to 'nine-eleven'⁴⁵, but currently, this is the formal set-up.

In 1991, an elite, rapid reaction force (*Nationella Insatsstyrkan* or NI) was set up to deal with possible extreme terrorist-related incidents. This came about as a result of a perceived increase in international terrorism (with hostage-taking and hijackings as the preferred modus-operandi) pointing to a need for a special elite force to be used in Sweden. Since there were very few instances when this force could be used (and no terrorist-incidents at all), it was decided that the NI's mandate should be expanded to include other events not related to terrorism. After the violent disturbances in Gothenburg in June 2001 (in connection with the EU summit), when three demonstrators were shot by the police⁴⁶, it was decided that the NI should come under central authority instead of under local police authority.

The Security Service is primarily involved in prevention and 'early warning', but it also has executive powers⁴⁷. Sweden, of course, is a member of EUropol, but responsible for liaison with EUropol is the Swedish NCID (i.e. *Rikskriminalpolisen*). They, however, has no mandate to work with CT. In theory, and legally, most of EUropol's work overrides national legislation, but since SÄPO is bound by the National Secrecy

⁴⁵ Ibid, SOU 2003:32.

⁴⁶ That was the first time since 1931 that demonstrators had been shot at in Sweden.

⁴⁷ Being a Police organisation, it has executive powers.

Act it cannot share intelligence freely with the EUropol⁴⁸. This is of course problematic since EUropol do have a mandate to work on CT issues as well.

Suggestions to get around this dilemma includes proposals (again raised by the 'nine-eleven' commission) to merge the NCID and SÄPO, but no concrete reforms towards this goal is on the table. It would not solve the underlying problems of intelligence dissemination either, so a faster way might be to find ways to make the two organisations cooperate better.

In recent years the budget for SÄPO has grown, but the strains on the organisation since 'nine-eleven' (where a lot of work has been put into answering queries from the UN, EUropol and so forth) have hindered a real growth in analytical capacity and intelligence handling.

Another factor, and a key concept in this study, is the changing role of the Swedish military. A wider definition of national security (something that has been developing since the end of the cold war) and with Sweden sending soldiers on peace-keeping (and maybe also on peace-making) missions, the need for intelligence sharing will only increase. This means that the hitherto strict divisions between the Police and military regarding terrorism will be challenged.

One way to overcome this barrier was the creation of a national forum for coordination of intelligence (*Regeringskansliets samordningssektariat för säkerhetspolitiska underrättelsefrågor* or SUND). This new organisation is directly placed under the government, but is organisationally situated at the Ministry of Defence.

7. Counter Terrorism and International Cooperation.

Sweden, as should be clear from previous chapters, does not have a National Counter Terrorism Policy. Neither it is likely to get one in the foreseeable future. This is not because of a lack of interest in the matter (*au contraire*, terrorism and especially CT receives a large amount of interest throughout), or because Swedish police or law-enforcement agencies are less skilled or trained than their European colleagues. It is not even due to the fact that, today, Sweden does not face a serious terrorist threat. After all, being a 'good' member of the EU demands that Sweden build a capacity to deal with common EU problems, such as terrorism, even if it concerns the country in less troublesome ways than other EU members.

The reason that Sweden will not likely get a coherent CT policy, is first and foremost due to the structure of the Swedish state and the way this state and its agencies deal with unforeseen and serious problems. In short, it is a structure that got many of its defining features as early as the 17th century, making it possible for the King to wage wars and a very 'active' foreign policy abroad, without the danger of being removed

⁴⁸ According to the EUropol convention, a country is not obliged to hand over intelligence if it might harm national integrity or individual rights.

through *coup d'états* at home. To a surprising level many of these features are still around; most notably a system with rather small ministries and large, independent agencies under them. After the end of the Swedish 'empire days' (in the early 19th century) when the system found its peacetime parameters, a process began to mould this structure in a way that worked well for a country at peace⁴⁹. Basic features are independent agencies and a consensus-based decision-making process where as many 'actors' are involved as possible. This system works rather well in peacetime and when there is time to ponder and discuss, but it is not really adapted to situations that might demand faster and swifter action. This is borne out when something radical and unforeseen *is* happening. A case in point is the murder of former Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. In cases like that, the system couldn't cope, but instead evolved into a more ad-hoc, informal process. It needs to be pointed out that this in itself does not have to be bad; in a small country like Sweden, informality can work well enough, but lacking a more formal structure for major crises (with for example a National Security Council or a 'situation room', with pre-appointed personnel, close to the cabinet) it is uncertain how the system will cope in a major crisis.

The system today is also a consequence of 200 years of peace. There is nothing wrong or 'bad' with that of course; it is a blessing that helped the country achieve prosperity and, on the whole, well-functioning structures. But it needs to be taken into account when we have to deal with other countries and threats from very different political and structural contexts. In short, we need to acknowledge our shortcomings in understanding that not everybody has the same point of departure in their policies towards CT. And this needs to be admitted not only on the rhetoric level but also when it comes to practical policy steps.

In regard to a subject like terrorism and CT, a system built on either a bulky structure with many actors involved (i.e. 'relevant agencies') or an informal, ad-hoc system completely outside any oversight by parliament or the judiciary, the arbitrariness of the system is rather clear. Add to this that today terrorism is a 'hot' subject, CT-policy is often built up with little, or no consultation, and it is clear that coordination is even harder to achieve.

In late 2002 the Council of the European Union decided to put together a questionnaire with the intention of exchanging information related to (specifically mentioned) Islamic extremist terrorist groups and their activities within the Union. This was of course a consequence of 'nine-eleven' and the idea was to better coordinate work between those agencies specifically dealing with this threat, mainly law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. The results are, as of today anyway, classified, but looking at what have been possible to glean from press reports it is clear that the picture emerging is one of a EU with a diversified approach to terrorism in general and to CT in particular. There is nothing strange in that. The EU is not a monolith and as a consequence of the Continent's various experiences with terrorism, various approaches are both necessary and good. But what is needed today – with a terrorism that is far more global and trans-national than ever before – is a mechanism for better coordination and in order to achieve that, streamlining is probably necessary. For Sweden, with a system that is different from most other EU

⁴⁹ This should of course not be seen as a sign that no changes occurred after the early 19th century. Along with other western countries going through the industrialisation period and a process of democratisation, Sweden changed a lot. But the basic features held.

countries (in regard to crisis management, and more specifically to CT policy), this difference is to my mind more of an obstacle than a help in achieving this coordination.

Before the Council's initiative, Sweden had, as had many other EU countries, appointed a commission looking into the aftermath of 'nine-eleven' and possible repercussions for Sweden⁵⁰. The assignment given to the Commission was to survey and analyse the overall emergency preparedness capacity of the Swedish public authorities (and other public bodies) to prevent and combat large-scale terrorist attacks in the country. The assignment also required an investigation on whether current legislation and other legal rules provide the authorities, and their public bodies, with enough capacity to deal with such threats.

The findings, which are public⁵¹, says in essence that the Commission proposes that the resources of the Armed Forces could be used for countering terrorist attacks in certain specific circumstances; that the external (military) intelligence service should be mandated to include the collection of terrorist-related intelligence in its work; and, perhaps most controversial of all in Sweden, that the Security Service – which in Sweden is a police security service, i.e. Sweden does not have a civil internal security service – should be transformed into a civil, non-police domestic intelligence service and its law-enforcement related tasks transferred to the National CID.

These are interesting and sometimes radical and strategic proposals to reform the system. These are reforms that would go a long way to remedy some of the built-in obstacles to a more streamlined system that could deal with issues such as CT. Issues that are by nature anything but purely domestic and that demands cooperation and coordination across borders. However, many of these reforms will likely not be introduced, if the system at large is not changed. As stated above, some of these proposed changes are 'padded' with conditions that will make it very difficult to implement changes anyway, even if they are approved. But the major obstacle is still the insistence by the 'relevant' agencies' that no one is left out. This is a natural consequence of the Swedish system. To some extent the authors of the report have tried to counter this expected reaction from the 'turf-sensitive' agencies by dishing out tasks to all agencies and ministries involved in CT policies, however peripheral. But this only aggravates the problem and will make it harder to introduce necessary changes and to develop a system more adaptable to coordination and one in which by necessity fewer actors are involved. The post-modern adage 'less is more' does not have many takers within the Swedish state structure!

As a consequence, today, it is difficult to see any revolutionary and radical changes or reforms being introduced in the foreseeable future as a result of the Commission's report.

⁵⁰ Ibid note 6.

⁵¹ The government is currently studying the report and will decide on appropriate actions this coming Fall. The report has also been referred for consideration to 'relevant agencies' and organisations.

8. Conclusion.

It is probably safe to say that terrorism, in its various shapes and forms, will continue to be a feature of the 'brave new world' that evolved after the demise of the Soviet empire. Political violence is, as said in the beginning of this chapter, not a new phenomenon. Neither is there a lack of 'causes' for using indiscriminate violence. Either to underline a political, religious or social point of view, or to, kill infidels in the name of 'God', or enemies of the 'Faith', whoever they are.

Combating terrorism involves two sets of action: Anti-terrorism, which is taking defensive measures, and counter-terrorism, which deals with the offensive measures taken. Anti-terrorism is defined as defensive measures taken in order to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property, including limited responses and containment by local forces: Forces that can be both police and military forces. Counter-terrorism is defined as involving those offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism. For obvious reasons programs for counter-terrorism are classified, whatever country one is looking at, and therefore information about it is limited and difficult to assess. At the same time, the areas where the military and intelligence play an important role, sometimes the most important role, is precisely in the area of counter-terrorism.

Within countries that have gone through periods when terror, for different reasons, has been a real threat and a cause for concern, there has been progress in regard to the way terror is combated. In such cases, the conventional terror-fighting agency, the police, has sometimes borrowed the 'modus operandi' from the military. The creation of special anti- and counterterrorist squads or special assault teams bears this out. More often than not, these units are trained by the military, and very often the personnel recruited have a military background. In countries in the Middle East, Asia or Africa, these forces are grouped together under the heading 'security forces'. The certain lack of distinction that this term embodies, as well as a sometimes slightly derogatory taint, overshadows the fact that this is precisely what a number of western democracies have created, and very often for the same reasons; namely, to combat terrorism.

The creation of special forces within the police, backed up by resources from the military, are perhaps the most vivid expression of the seriousness with which the target of these forces, the terrorists and their organisations, are seen. As stated above, the internal conditions responsible for domestic initiatives like the creation of special forces, built up exclusively to combat terrorism, have been difficult to 'translate' onto other fields of operations. Again, the various national agendas, specifics and different areas of responsibility, are formidable obstacles to a more unified approach to fight terrorism.

One major trend in today's terrorism is with fewer⁵², but deadlier, attacks and with a shift to a tactic, on part of the terrorists, where the intent is not so much an attempt to use terror as a tool to bring home a 'political point', but rather to invoke as much

⁵² It is important to note that in the year after 'nine-eleven', international terror-attacks increased, and then slumped again, compared to the decade before 'nine-eleven'. It is too early to say whether this change is long-term or short-term.

damage, human or otherwise, as possible. This trend has also brought the question of who has the responsibility for combating various terror-attacks to the fore. One of the main problems in this regard is when various agencies, police and/or the military, have overlapping jurisdictions and charters. When this happens, friction is bound to occur.

Another trend, creating additional problems for law-enforcement agencies, in today's international terrorism is the raise in terror *networks*, as opposed to more 'classical' terrorist groups and organisations, with clear hierarchies. In their major work on networks and netwar, Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini⁵³ argue the following points:

- Hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks.
- It takes a network to fight another network.
- Whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages.
- As a consequence, it will take more effective and better inter-agency approaches in a more networked structure to fight radical and/or extremist networks⁵⁴.

An additional problem for the western democracies in this context is the different 'ethos' of the police on one hand, and of the military on the other. For the police, in theory at least, and in consequence with the liberal tradition which should guide the conduct of the police, they operate according the principle of 'minimum force'. In essence this means using only the minimum level of force necessary to deter, restrain or contain violence. It is a true defensive, anti-terrorist line of operation.

The military, on the other hand, are taught to apply the maximum level of force from the beginning to reach a stipulated goal as soon as possible. When these two roles are getting close, and perhaps overlap, problems and tensions occur. The concept of 'minimum force' is used for the protection of the individual and his/her rights within society. It is probably for this reason that in the cases where the police forces have undergone a certain 'militarisation' (in the shape of special paramilitary anti-terrorist units), it has been done with the goal that the operational fight against terrorism should continue to be shouldered mainly by the police, but with better tools. Tools that can be provided by the military⁵⁵.

These units occupy a position somewhere between the police and the military, and therefore help to blur the distinctions between the army and the police. Since terrorism is seen as a direct challenge to the state and its monopoly of coercive violence, the principle according to which they act has been extended from one of minimum use of force, to one of sufficient force. All this has had the effect of transforming the traditionally defensive, anti-terrorist-oriented role of the police to a force that has a more overt offensive capacity. And when that capacity is there, it is of course tempting to use it, even when it might not be necessary.

⁵³ Arquilla, John, Ronfeldt, David & Zanini, Michele, 'Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism' in: Lesser, Ian et al. 'Countering the New Terrorism, RAND, Santa Monica, California, 1999.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 55-6.

⁵⁵ The one major exception to this rule of having the anti-terrorist units located within the police, is the UK, where the principal ant-terrorist commando unit is located within the military - the Counter Revolutionary Wing (CRW) of the Special Air Service (SAS).

It can hardly be overestimated how important solid, 'hard' intelligence is in the war against terrorism. This has been evident all along. The novelty is that it has been easier to use the whole gamut of resources, within the intelligence agencies, in the fight against terror. The necessity of using intelligence in its wider aspects (since the threat is truly international) is, on the other hand, quite evident. The challenge for the West here is similar to the challenge of integrating military components in police work: the danger to the individual and his/her rights within society.

Taken together, these changes in the way terrorism is combated, integrating tactics and strategies from the police, the military and the intelligence agencies in the light of the terrorist threat, show that there is an awareness of the fact that the threat posed by terrorism can be a very real one. This awareness, however, has not translated itself into a more general and truly trans-national approach to the problem. Without such an approach it is doubtful whether the countries concerned can develop successful strategies to combat terrorism on an international level. Not because the know-how is lacking, or the will. But because a more narrow, nationalist agenda, is still, 'when push comes to shove', the dominating factor in creating policies to face up to the threat of terrorism. And also, on the national level, a problem with intra- and inter-agency rivalry within concerned agencies, as well as lack of communication between law-enforcement agencies. Not a unique Swedish problem it should be noted.

It seems clear that for the fight against terror to be effective and successful, the various actors involved need to, in a sense, 'square the circle' in combining efficient trans-national co-operation (using 'all the necessary means at one's disposal') with a framework that is safeguarding the democratic structure and does not infringe, unnecessarily, on the civil liberties [of the citizens] that the struggle against terror is supposed to protect.

In order to do this properly, it is paramount to analyse carefully and plan ahead before changes (legal and other) to the structure are implemented. Debate and discussion about these changes must have a role and the fact the Swedish participation in the fight against terrorism, along with membership in the EU, have forced us to adapt to new international legislation faster than we otherwise would have, must, equally, not force us to abandon long-held perceptions of thinking through an issue before taking political decisions that might be hard to reverse.

Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to discuss the issue of Counter Terrorism (henceforth CT) from a *Swedish* perspective, albeit in a comparative context. Originally, the topic was presented as a paper at an international conference at the Centre for Security Studies in Zürich, Switzerland in March 2004. This report is an enhanced and expanded study of that paper.

The background is the rather new debate in Sweden as to what role various agencies should have in the area of CT. This debate took off after the findings of the Swedish Royal Commission investigating the impact of the 'nine-eleven' events on Sweden. In the report (SOU 2003:32) several recommendations are put forth, dealing with issues such as how various agencies can cooperate better and how the Security Police – who is still identified as the 'lead' agency in regard to CT operations, as well as *all* terrorism-related issues – can bring in resources from other agencies, should the need arise.

This study argues that the underlying premises of that report (and for the whole discussion about the CT-issue) is flawed in that it does not question the notion of the necessity of a lead agency (who therefore also is the sole instance of deciding what help, if any, might be needed). Furthermore, this underlying basis (of the role of the Security Police as lead agency) does not take into account the fact that other agencies might have knowledge, unbeknownst to the Police, due to lack of coordination and the flow of necessary Intelligence, that can be of critical value to any CT operation. Finally, the Swedish 'nine-eleven' report, and subsequent commissions, does not critically examine the underlying structure in Sweden that both identify a lead agency (as opposed to topic and/or event-centred crisis-management operational centres, based on a National Crisis Management Centre), and, at the same time – when that lead agency can't cope by itself – and wants to add resources on an 'ad-hoc' basis., makes that very difficult and sometimes almost impossible from a judicial point of view.

Furthermore, it is argued that as long as these structural flaws in the system are present, nothing fundamental will change in the way Sweden is trying to deal with, at present theoretically, the issue of CT-policy.

As a summary, the study makes seven recommendations that can be of value in countering these flaws in the structure.

- 8) A clear and pertinent statement, across the political board and mirroring a wide consensus, that Sweden is prepared to make necessary reforms to be a full and active partner in a rapidly changing world in the area of CT, especially within the context of the European Union.
- 9) A new and supplementary legislation where authorities are given the means to use, if necessary, military CT resources in peacetime. Through this, society would also show a willingness to stand up for the constitutional democratic system we have and also use our resources more economically.

- 10) Establishing a 'National Security & Crisis Council/Centre' that could have, in a democratic and acceptable way, powers to deal with extreme threats and/or extraordinary events. These regulations should be put in place during peacetime in the event that, in an emergency, time is not available to wait for a Government decision. One must also anticipate cases when communication with the Government breaks down.
- 11) Amendments to existing laws that make planning for and financing of terrorism punishable by prison (this point is addressed in the new 'Terrorism Law' that was incorporated last year).
- 12) Continued development of military and police resources to counter terrorism threats, both domestically and internationally.
- 13) Enhanced possibilities for the Police to cooperate more with other relevant agencies at the counterintelligence level.
- 14) Provide funding for research on CT (and other terrorist-related topics) from *several* sources, combining direct grants with research means from already existing research funding bodies.

Sammanfattning

Syftet med denna studie är att diskutera frågan om kontraterrorism från ett svenskt perspektiv.

Bakgrunden till studien – som först skrevs som ett bidrag till en internationell konferens i Schweiz i mars 2004 – är den diskussion, av relativt sent datum, som avser vilken roll olika myndigheter ska i kontraterrorismsammanhang. Frågan gäller naturligtvis även för andra områden relaterade till terrorism och därmed sammanhängande områden.

Denna diskussion, och debatt, tog fart på allvar efter terrorattackerna i USA den 11 september 2001. Speciellt efter den svenska 11-septemberkommisionens arbete som lades fram 2003 (SOU 2003:32). I rapporten lades flera rekommendationer fram (av vilka inga i skrivande stund, april 2005, har varit föremål för några konkreta åtgärder). Rekommendationer som rör hur olika myndigheter och berörda organisationer kan samarbeta bättre och hur Säkerhetspolisen – som fortfarande ses som den myndighet som, med svenskt språkbruk "äger" terrorismfrågan – enklare ska kunna ta in resurser från andra myndigheter vid behov.

Utgångspunkten för denna studie är dock att 11-septemberutredningen (och en del andra relaterade utredningar) lider av en viktig brist i det att de inte tar upp ett grundläggande problem i den svenska strukturen; nämligen en struktur som dels tenderar att utse *en* organisation/myndighet som den som "äger" frågan, och dels, inom samma struktur gör det mycket svårt att arbeta över myndighets- och organisationsgränserna. Vidare pekar studien på det faktum att genom att utse någon som äger frågan, och det i en struktur som samtidigt gör det så svårt att samarbeta, riskerar att viktig och relevant information och kunskap går förlorad eller aldrig kommer till nytta. I stället hävdas att en mer framkomlig väg vore att inrätta någon form av krishanteringscenter, uppbyggd kring specifika händelser med tillräckliga resurser att snabbt ta in relevant kunskap när den behövs.

I studien argumenteras för att så länge dessa grundläggande förhållanden råder, kommer inte något fundamentalt att förändras i det svenska förhållningssättet avseende kontraterrorism. Något som allvarligt försvårar Sveriges förmåga att anpassa sig till nya förhållanden och nya hotbilder.

Sammanfattningsvis ges några förslag på åtgärder för att kunna komma tillrätta med dessa strukturella problem.

- 1) Ett klart uttalande, omfattande så stor del av det politiska spektrat som möjligt, att Sverige är berett att ta sitt fulla ansvar, genom exempelvis nödvändiga reformer, för att kunna vara en aktör internationellt när det gäller att bemöta nya hot på kontraterrorismområdet. Inte minst gäller detta för arbete inom EU:s ram.
- 2) En utvidgad lagstiftning, inom ramen för nu gällande demokratiska struktur, som ger myndigheter rätt att använda militära resurser även i fredstid, *om så skulle behövas*. På så vis skulle man också kunna visa att man är beredd att

försvara demokratin samt att använda de resurser man har på ett mera ekonomiskt vis.

- 3) Skapa ett nationellt kriscenter som vid behov, *och på ett demokratiskt vis*, kunna hantera extrema hot i extrema situationer. Dessa regler borde inrättas i fredstid så det vid ett skarpt läge kan agera om/när exempelvis kommunikationerna med regeringen bryts.
- 4) Tillägg till nuvarande lagstiftning som gör det olagligt att planera och finansiera stöd till terrorverksamhet (den nya terroristlagen från 2003 hanterar dessa frågor).
- 5) Kontinuerligt utvecklande av militära och polisiära resurser för att hantera och bemöta terrorhot, både inrikes och, vid behov, internationellt.
- 6) Utökade möjligheter för polisen att samarbeta med andra aktörer när det gäller underrättelsebehov.
- 7) Försäkra sig om att medel till forskning och studier kring kontraterrorismfrågor (och andra relaterade områden) får tillräckliga resurser från *flera* håll, där man kombinerar direkta anslag med forskningsmedel som sökes via etablerade forskningsnämnder.

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