

This report describes the decision-making process leading up to the military intervention in Libya in 2011. The analysis examines whether there are any implications to be drawn for international security, and NATO and the EU in particular.

Special attention is paid to the positions of some key NATO member states, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The period considered is that from the onset of the uprisings in Libya (February 17, 2011) until NATO decides to take full command of the military operations (March 31, 2011).

The report identifies both new and existing trends in international relations, for example, with regard to the cohesion of international defence collaborations and the role of European member states vis-à-vis the US in future crises.



Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya

Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO

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Titel	Uppstarten på den militära interventionen i Libyen - Besluten som togs och deras konsekvenser för EU och Nato
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Sammanfattning

Denna rapport fokuserar på beslutsprocessen som ledde fram till den militära interventionen i Libyen 2011. I rapporten analyseras Libyenkrigets påverkan på EU:s och Natos framtida förmåga att agera militärt. Särskild uppmärksamhet ägnas åt de positioner ett antal nyckelstater antog, däribland Frankrike, Tyskland, Storbritannien och USA. Tidsmässigt är analysen avgränsad till att omfatta perioden då upproren i Libyen började (17 februari 2011) fram till Natos beslut att ta kontroll över de militära operationerna (31 mars 2011). Rapporten identifierar både nya och befintliga trender i det internationella samfundet, till exempel gällande sammanhållningen i internationella försvarssamarbeten och europeiska medlemsstaters roll vis-à-vis USA i framtida kriser.

Nyckelord: Beslutsfattande, EU, Frankrike, Försvar, Libyen, Nato, Storbritannien, Säkerhet, Tyskland, USA.

Summary

This report focuses on the decision-making process leading up to the military intervention in Libya in 2011. The report analyses whether there are any implications to be drawn for the EU's and NATO's future abilities to act militarily. Special attention is paid to the positions of some key NATO member states, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The analysis considers the period from the onset of the uprisings in Libya (February 17, 2011) until NATO decides to take full command of the military operations (March 31, 2011). The report identifies both new and existing trends in international relations, for example, with regard to the cohesion of international defence collaborations and the role of European member states vis-à-vis the US in future crises.

Keywords: Decision Making, Defence, EU, France, Germany, Libya, NATO, Security, United Kingdom, USA.

Preface and Acknowledgements

This report is a product of the Swedish Defence Research Agency's (FOI's) research programme Atlantic Security – European Crisis Management. The programme supports the Swedish Ministry of Defence by providing applied research related to current issues. Areas studied include the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the development of NATO and US foreign and security policy.

The report was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. It deals with the political decision-making process leading up to the military intervention in Libya in March 2011, with the intent of drawing lessons for the future. The report seeks to answer the question of what implications the intervention in Libya will have for the EU's and NATO's ability to act militarily in the future.

The report has benefitted substantially from input by several government officials and analysts. The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the interviewees from the institutes and organisations listed in full on pp. 73-74. Their knowledge and expertise were invaluable to the study. Fredrik Lindvall of FOI reviewed the report and his insightful comments much improved the text. The authors would like to extend a special thank you to Professor Anand Menon of the University of Birmingham who kindly took the time to read the report and provide perceptive advice. It should be emphasised though that the views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors.

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Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFZ	No-Fly Zone
NSC	National Security Council (UK)
NSS	National Security Strategy (UK)
NTC	National Transitional Council
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States

Timeline

17 February 2011: Revolution in Libya begins.
23 February 2011: EU Council of Ministers meeting. Sarkozy calls for the EU to adopt economic sanctions against Gaddafi.
25 February 2011: Sarkozy says Gaddafi must go. ¹
26 February 2011: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1970.
28 February 2011: British Prime Minister David Cameron proposes the idea of a no-fly zone (NFZ) over Libya. ²
5 March 2011: The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) is established.
10 March 2011: France recognises NTC. NATO Defence Ministers meet in Brussels.
11 March 2011: Extraordinary European Council meeting discusses Libya. The summit ends without support for the British and French calls for a military intervention in Libya.
12 March 2011: The Arab League requests the UNSC to impose a NFZ in Libyan airspace. ³
17 March 2011: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. Five countries abstain – Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia.

¹ Reuters, "France's Sarkozy says Gaddafi must go", 25 February 2011.

² House of Commons Debate 28 February 2011 c25. See also Ben Smith, "The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya", House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011; Alistair Macdonald "Cameron Doesn't Rule Out Military Force for Libya", *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 February 2011; Stephen Flanagan "Libya: Managing a Fragile Coalition", Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 March 2011.

³ *Al-Jazeera*, "Arab states seek Libya no-fly zone", 12 March 2011.

18 March 2011: Libyan government announces a ceasefire but continues its attacks and government forces approach Benghazi.
19 March 2011: Paris Summit; world leaders discuss a response to the Libya crisis. The military response is launched. Airstrikes by the French Air Force initiate the campaign.
25 March 2011: NATO announces it will take over command of the NFZ operations.
29 March 2011: London Conference on Libya. The Libya Contact Group is created.
31 March 2011: US military withdrawal of its fighter jets. NATO takes command of military operations in Libya – <i>Operation Unified Protector</i> (OUP) is established.
31 October 2011: End of OUP.

1 Introduction – The Setting

The world watched with disbelief how the Libyan revolution unfolded in mid-February 2011, only weeks after uprisings in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. What came to be known as the Arab Spring was in full force. Protests against the Gaddafi-regime spread around the country after security forces had opened fire against demonstrators in Benghazi who were demanding the release of a human rights activist. The revolt soon became an armed conflict and as protests grew stronger, Gaddafi ordered airstrikes against rebels. In a widely broadcasted speech on February 22, Gaddafi vowed to fight to the last drop of his blood and threatened to cleanse Libya house by house, killing the protesters like rats.⁴

Images and accounts of developments in the country spread like wildfire through media and social media at the same time as a strong sense of solidarity was building across the world for the democratic wave sweeping across the region. The conflict in Libya was in many ways portrayed in media like a play where good fights evil. Gaddafi was also controversial in the Arab world⁵ and on March 12, the Arab League requested the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone (NFZ) in Libyan airspace.⁶ One week later, a coalition of the willing launched a military campaign to protect the civilian population of Libya under the mandate of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973.

France and the United Kingdom (UK) assumed the lead in pushing for the international community to intervene militarily to protect Libyan civilians and also, subsequently, accounted for a big part of the combat air sorties. The United States (US) initially took a more cautious approach, which sparked a debate whether Washington was ‘leading from behind’.⁷ At the end of the day, though, their political and military contribution was crucial for the mission to happen in the first place. The period leading up to the military campaign also offered a number of surprises. French President Sarkozy stood for some in his assertiveness, including a swift recognition of the Libyan opposition National Transitional Council. The biggest one, however, was probably that of Germany when Berlin chose to abstain on the vote on UNSCR 1973, siding with Russia and China.⁸

⁴ *You Tube*, “Muammar Gaddafi speech” (translation) 22 February 2011.

⁵ Michael Slackman, “Dislike for Qaddafi Gives Arabs a Point of Unity”, *The New York Times*, 21 March 2011.

⁶ *Al-Jazeera*, “Arab states seek Libya no-fly zone”, 12 March 2011

⁷ See for example Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Did Libya Vindicate ‘Leading From Behind?’”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 September 2011.

⁸ UNSCR 1973 was adopted by 10 votes in favor (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, UK, South Africa and the US) and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). United Nations Security Council, press release, 17 March 2011.

This report sets out to trace and analyse the factors that influenced the decision-making processes of some countries which, with the exception of Libya, arguably played the largest roles in the period leading up to the intervention; namely France, Germany, the UK and the US. What lay behind the various decisions taken? Why did the international community choose to intervene in Libya in March, 2011? And what, if any, implications will there be for the future of the EU and NATO? Can we expect the EU and NATO to be more or less proactive in future crises? Have experiences from Libya in any way affected the cohesiveness of the two organisations?

There are various theories in international relations as to what shapes foreign policy. Some focus on the system level. A classical realist would, for example, argue that states operate in an anarchical arena, seeking power in order to survive and maintain sovereignty. Given that the state's very survival will always ultimately determine state policy, domestic politics is seen to be of little importance. Conversely, others mean that it is impossible to understand the formation of foreign policy without looking at domestic structures and processes, and there is an abundance of writings on the role of factors such as political systems, bureaucracies and psychological aspects.

In this report, we look at factors which affected the decisions made by France, Germany, the UK and the US in the period leading up to the military intervention in Libya. Many of those factors relate to domestic structures and processes. Thus, we have chosen to embrace the theories that consider, for example, the role played by individual leaders.⁹ Similarly, the report touches on aspects such as political systems and the state of public opinion. However, it does not claim to be exhaustive or a scientific test of existing thinking on the formation of foreign and security policy. For example, it does not attempt to prove or disprove theories such as that whether centralised political systems, e.g. France, give less room for public opinion to influence policy than those which have weaker state structures.¹⁰ Rather, this report presents an overview of expressed views and experiences of government officials and analysts as well as accounts in media of developments during the period leading up to the Libya intervention. In so doing we hope to present some pointers on what this may mean to the EU, NATO and member states.

⁹ For some discussion on the role of leaders in shaping foreign policy, see for example Bruce Bueno de Mequita, "Domestic Politics and International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly* (2002) 46, 1-9.

¹⁰ See for example Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies", *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July 1991), pp. 479-512 and Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States", *International Organization*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter, 1976), pp. 1-45.

1.1 Purpose

The aim of this study is to describe and analyse the events leading up to the military campaign in Libya and elaborate on whether they have had any implications for the international security policy context. The analysis considers the decisions made by individual countries, and their motivations, during the period leading up to the intervention. While examining a period which already is a part of history, the intent of the study is to look forward and deliberate on how individual countries were affected as well as whether there are any implications for the future political capacity of the EU and NATO to act militarily.

1.2 Method and Material

The report is based on a thorough literature review, including analyses and media coverage, as well as interviews conducted with government officials and analysts. The authors met with officials and experts in Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels between March and May, 2012. In addition, interviews were conducted over the telephone with analysts based in the US. The interviewees were granted anonymity in order to ensure that they would feel comfortable to freely express their views and opinions.¹¹

The report considers key events and issues identified in the literature review and interviews. The period analysed is that from the onset of the uprisings in Libya (February 17, 2011) until NATO decides to take full command of the military operations (March 31, 2011). The report then discusses driving forces and limitations behind decisions made by some member states as well as developments at the time within the EU and NATO. The final chapter, based on the preceding analysis, proposes a number of trends in international security.

1.3 Structure of the Report

The report is divided into chapters considering the policy choices of France, Germany, the UK, and the US separately. Each chapter is divided into two parts; first, looking at the political decision-making process and, second, the motivating factors behind each country's chosen policies with regard to the intervention in Libya. The four chapters which analyse the individual countries are followed by a brief section on the political developments at the time within the EU and NATO. Finally, conclusions and possible implications to be drawn for the international system, the EU and NATO, as well as the individual states are discussed. The timeline provided on pp. 10-11 reflects the period analysed – that between the onset of the uprisings in Libya until NATO takes full command of the military intervention.

¹¹ For a comprehensive list of the organisations interviewed, please see pp. 66-67.

2 France – In the Limelight

France together with the UK assumed lead in pushing for the military intervention. President Nicolas Sarkozy himself was a key force behind the French drive. The operations became a test case both of France's full reintegration into NATO's military structure and of the recently signed defence cooperation treaty with the UK.

2.1 The Political Decision-Making Process

France was at the forefront of international efforts against Gaddafi with French actions largely driven from the top by President Nicolas Sarkozy and the Elysee presidential palace. President Sarkozy also had the final say given his role as Commander in Chief.

At the end of February Sarkozy led calls for a no-fly zone (NFZ) to be enforced over Libya,¹² and, on March 10, 2011, France became the first country to recognise the National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya. The unilateral recognition was made one day before an extraordinary meeting of the European Council which had been summoned to reach agreement on developments in Libya.¹³ The French move reportedly caused irritation among other member states.¹⁴

French fighter jets were also the first to fire shots against Gaddafi's troops. French airstrikes initiated the campaign on March 19. This was at the same time as an emergency meeting was being held in Paris, gathering several heads of state and government, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, General Secretary of the Arab League Amr Moussa and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. There was reportedly anger among some allies that the French attacks had started before the end of the meeting and had not been fully coordinated with other countries.¹⁵ According to one French interviewee, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Prime Minister David Cameron had instead been informed of the plans at their arrival in Paris. While denied by French officials, France was also accused of having held up military actions by insisting on holding the meeting in

¹² Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, "Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David Cameron's backing", *The Guardian*, 23 February 2011.

¹³ IISS Strategic Comments, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", Volume 17, Comment 18, April 2011.

¹⁴ See for example Josh Ward "Sarkozy's Libya Move 'Shows Testosterone Level, Not Logic'", *Spiegel Online International*, 11 March 2011.

¹⁵ See for example David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Erlanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi's Forces in Libya", *New York Times*, 19 March 2011.

Paris.¹⁶ Critics meant Sarkozy was trying to steal the limelight and some even meant that it was an attempt to promote France's badly-selling Rafale fighter.¹⁷ The US was annoyed with the fact that Turkey had not been invited to the summit, resulting in a lot of diplomatic work.¹⁸ Interviewed analysts and insiders, however, believed that while there was irritation among coalition allies of what some viewed as Sarkozy's grandstanding, there was also agreement among coalition allies that airstrikes were appropriate and that time was of the essence.¹⁹

Commentators meant that Paris only acted hastily as time was seen to be running out.²⁰ Gaddafi's tanks were advancing on and subsequently attacking Benghazi despite a declared ceasefire, and there were sincere fears the city would quickly fall. Not only was there believed to have been a real threat of a massacre, but Benghazi was also the base of the National Transitional Council and a symbolic stronghold of the revolution.

France was also an initiator of the Libya Contact Group. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe on March 22 proposed a political steering committee, gathering the foreign ministers of the countries involved in the military operation in Libya as well as the Arab League.²¹ The Contact Group was established at the London Conference of March 29 to coordinate international efforts and discuss post-conflict support.²² The forum brought together various governments and international organisations, including the UN, the EU, NATO, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States.

The initiative of the Contact Group, however, must also be seen in the light of preceding discussions on who would lead international efforts and French scepticism towards NATO. Ultimately, the French initiative to give political coordination of the mission to the Contact Group meant that it would not fall under NATO, nor be subject to the divisions within the alliance. Thus, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) ended up with a limited role and most of the decision

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Andrew Rettman, "Libya strikes showcase French warplane", *euobserver.com*, 28 March 2011.

¹⁸ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

¹⁹ Interview, London, 9 March 2012. See for example David Cameron's reply in House of Commons, 21 March 2011, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/debtext/110321-0001.htm>

²⁰ Interviews, Paris, 6 March, and three in London on 8 and 9 March 2012.

²¹ *Al Jazeera*, "Questions remain over NATO role in Libya", 23 March 2011, and Gregory Viscusi, "France's Juppe Proposes Political Committee for Libya Mission", *Bloomberg*, 22 March 2011.

²² Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Foreign Secretary statement following the London Conference on Libya", 29 March 2011.

making instead took place in the capitals of the participating powers, especially those contributing with strike missions.²³

The operation in Libya became something of a test case of French full reintegration into NATO's military command structure in 2009. According to interviewed experts and government officials in France and Brussels, the French walked away from the experience with positive sentiments. NATO had performed promptly and efficiently, and France had not been sidelined. Initially, however, Paris had opposed NATO taking over command of the operations and had preferred it to be led by a coalition with the UK, and possibly the US. Sarkozy viewed it as an opportunity for Paris and London to join forces after the signing of the bilateral defence treaty in November 2010.²⁴

France argued that NATO-leadership would alienate the Arab countries who view the alliance as a US instrument of power. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said, on March 21, that "the Arab League does not wish the operation to be entirely placed under NATO responsibility. It isn't NATO which has taken the initiative up to now".²⁵ While NATO was prepared to step in with support to the planning and execution of operations, France did not want the alliance to have the political control.

France's deeply-rooted policy of "EU-first" and a general distrust against NATO also made some French officials to first say no, albeit not Sarkozy. Moreover, the rejection of NATO was partly rooted in concerns about whether the alliance's bureaucratic processes would slow things down, and whether France's freedom of action would be restricted. There was some worry that Germany, following its abstention on SCR 1973, would act a stumbling block.²⁶ Paris was also worried that Turkey would hold things back in NATO.²⁷

Turkey initially took a cautious approach and vehemently opposed a NATO-intervention in Libya, partly due to concerns about its standing in the Muslim world and its considerable business interests in Libya with some 25,000 Turkish

²³ See for example Alistair Cameron, "The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO" in Adrian Johnson and Saeed Mueen (eds.), "Short War, Long Shadow – The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign", Whitehall Report 1-12, Royal United Services Institute, 2012.

²⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 17, Comment 18 – April 2011.

²⁵ Steven Erlanger, "Confusion Over Who Leads Libya Strikes, and for How Long", *The New York Times*, 21 March 2011.

²⁶ Leo G. Michel, "Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests", Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, *Strategic Perspectives* 10, April 2012.

²⁷ Leo Cendrowicz, "Libya: NATO Takes Charge, but Will Europe Take the Lead?", *TIME*, 25 March 2011.

workers in the country.²⁸ After the passage of SCR 1973, however, Ankara decided to back NATO's involvement in Libya. This U-turn has been interpreted by some commentators as having been a pragmatic decision made to maintain some control over the mission.²⁹

Strained relations between France and Turkey played a part, and when Paris objected to NATO taking command, Ankara veered the other direction.³⁰ French objections to a Turkish membership of the EU have caused a deep rift between the two countries, and that was only exacerbated when Sarkozy, in the role as president of the G20, stayed in Turkey only for some five hours when in February 2011 visiting Turkey for the first time in four years. Ankara was infuriated when Sarkozy then failed to invite Turkey to the summit meeting in Paris on March 19.³¹ This was also said to have irritated for example the US which made diplomatic efforts to bridge the rift.³² Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül accused those leading the intervention to be motivated only by economic interests.³³ In what appeared to be a swipe at France, Erdogan said, "I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines and underground treasures when they look in [Libya's] direction, would see the region through glasses of conscience from now on".³⁴

2.2 Motivating France

There are a number of reasons for why France took lead in advocating prompt action against Gaddafi. The weight of each reason differs depending on whom one asks.

One of the many explanations given for why Paris acted proactively was that there was a strong desire to set things right after having acted slowly in the beginning of the Arab Spring. France had dragged its feet in expressing support for the revolutionary waves against the former French allies in Tunisia and Egypt. Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie had even travelled to Tunisia for Christmas vacations during the uprising, and had offered to send France's "world

²⁸ See for example Jonathan Head, "Libya: Turkey's troubles with Nato and no-fly zone", *BBC*, 25 March 2011, and Pelin Turgut, "How Syria and Libya Got to Be Turkey's Headaches", *TIME*, 30 April 2011.

²⁹ See for example Jim Zanotti, "Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges", Congressional Research Service, 8 April 2011.

³⁰ See for example *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 17, Comment 18 – April 2011.

³¹ Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, "Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after France gives way to Turkey", *The Guardian*, 25 March 2011.

³² Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

³³ Ian Traynor, "Turkey and France clash over Libya air campaign", *The Guardian*, 24 March 2011.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

renowned” security forces to assist in quelling the uprising only three days before President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee the country.³⁵ Alliot-Marie resigned in February 2011 after strong criticism over close links with the Tunisian regime.

Furthermore, there was still a lingering sense of embarrassment after Gaddafi’s unpopular visit in December 2007. Gaddafi had then visited Paris for the first time in three decades and was granted a grand welcome by Sarkozy, even being allowed to pitch his Bedouin-style tent on the lawn across the street from the Élysée Palace. Already then the visit was sharply criticised in France, also from within the Government.³⁶

At the same time there was a sincere sense of moral obligation to support the Arab Spring. The memory of Srebrenica haunted many, and Sarkozy did not want to be connected to a new historical mistake, or for that matter anything connected to his predecessor Jacques Chirac. Relations between Sarkozy and former President Jacques Chirac have been notoriously troubled,³⁷ and Chirac in his 2011 memoirs described his former protégé as being “impetuous, nervous [and having] doubts about nothing, especially himself”.³⁸ One French analyst suggested that the drive to profile himself differently to Chirac was a constant factor for Sarkozy, ranging from not drinking Chirac’s favourite beer Corona to not allowing for another Srebrenica to happen again.

Sarkozy likely viewed the crisis as an opportunity to gain voters ahead of the upcoming Presidential elections in April 2012. The president suffered record low popularity at the time, with one poll on March 13 showing disapproval ratings at 71 per cent – making him the least popular right-wing president ever in France.³⁹ In February, an anonymous group of French diplomats – calling themselves the Marly Group – had openly criticised Sarkozy’s foreign policy in an article in *Le Monde*.⁴⁰ The diplomats described French foreign policy as unprofessional, improvised and impulsive, often directly reflecting domestic politics. This was just days after an opinion poll in the newspaper *Libération* had shown that 72 per

³⁵ Kim Willsher, “French minister shows regret after new revelations about Tunisian holiday”, *guardian.co.uk*, 7 February 2011, and *BBC News*, “French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie quits over Tunisia”, 27 February 2011.

³⁶ Elaine Sciolino, “Divided, France Welcomes and Condemns Qaddafi”, *New York Times*, 11 December 2007, and “Sarkozy’s moral test”, *The Economist*, 13 December 2007.

³⁷ See for example John Lichfield, “Chirac, Sarkozy and a very civil war”, *The Independent*, 25 November 2006.

³⁸ Bruce Crumley, “Jacques Chirac’s Presidential Memoir: A Sarkozy Smack-Down”, *TIME*, June 8, 2011.

³⁹ Albertina Torsoli, “Sarkozy Is Least Popular Right-Wing French President, Ifop Shows”, *Bloomberg*, 13 March 2011.

⁴⁰ Le groupe “Marly”, “La voix de la France a disparu dans le monde”, *Le Monde*, 24 February 2011.

cent of the French thought that their country's image in the world had deteriorated since Sarkozy had become president.⁴¹

At the same time, domestic support for action in Libya was found across political blocs. Bernard-Henri Lévy – or BHL as he is called in France – played a role in securing broad backing for the intervention but is said to also have played an instrumental role in the French intervention. Lévy – a rather controversial and flamboyant left-wing French philosopher – has himself since depicted the unrolling of events in both a book and documentary, among other things describing how he persuaded Sarkozy to support the Libyan opposition.⁴² According to a French official at the Élysée the book essentially describes events correctly.⁴³

The public's approval for an intervention was subsequently reflected in polls. One conducted by Ipsos in the beginning of April 2011 showed that support for the military action was the strongest in France when comparing with Italy, the UK and the US. Some 64 per cent of the French supported the intervention, compared to around half of Britons and Americans (50 per cent and 55 per cent respectively) and 40 per cent of Italians.⁴⁴

It is nonetheless essential to underline the key role played by Sarkozy himself. His personality and image of being a man of action are seen to have been decisive in steering France's actions. This was an opportunity for Sarkozy to shine and show his country and the world that he could take leadership. The President is said to have delighted in what later became his French nickname "Sarkozy the Libyan", while the intervention in France was called "Sarkozy's war".⁴⁵ Indeed, experts and insiders interviewed for this report seemed to agree that Sarkozy revelled in crises and in having to make quick decisions. It was then Sarkozy was at his best. It is also possible that he wanted to make a mark in history. One of his personal advisers has been quoted as saying – Sarkozy was not going to enter the history books for increasing the retirement age.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Angelique Chrisafis, "Nicolas Sarkozy's foreign policies denounced by rebel diplomats", *guardian.co.uk*, 23 February 2011.

⁴² Bernard-Henri Lévy, "La Guerre sans l'aimer: Journal d'un écrivain au cœur du printemps libyen", Bernard Grasset, Paris, 2011. See for example Mathieu von Rohr, "New Film Depicts Bernard-Henri Lévy's Role in Libya", *Spiegel Online International*, 4 April 2012.

⁴³ Interview, Paris, 6 March 2012.

⁴⁴ Ipsos, "Military action in Libya – Ipsos polling in Great Britain, USA, France, Italy: Topline results 12th April 2011", <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Reuters-Libya-topline-Apr11.PDF>

⁴⁵ Angelique Chrisafis, "Sarkozy hopes Libya can boost France's reputation – as well as his own", *guardian.co.uk*, 1 September 2011.

⁴⁶ Philip Gourevitch, "No Exit: Can Nicolas Sarkozy – and France – survive the European crisis?", *The New Yorker*, 12 December 2011.

Libya was also “doable”. Libya’s geographical location was less complicated than, for example, Syria. International backing had been secured, most significantly from the Arab League. The operation thus provided France with an opportunity to show its sense of responsibility as a permanent UN Security Council member.⁴⁷ Libya’s limited military might also have made a military intervention less risky, and France’s aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was at the Mediterranean port of Toulon and could be quickly deployed to the Libyan coast.⁴⁸ In addition, France did not see any alternative – a political solution with Muammar Gaddafi was not believed to be viable. Moreover, Libya is regarded as being close to home, with close links to France both historically and geographically, and therefore of direct national interest to France.

Some commentators have argued that the intervention was driven purely by oil interests. France’s energy interests in Libya were at the time of the intervention not negligible. While Libya accounted for only about 2 per cent of the world’s oil production, the quality of that oil was high given its extremely low sulphur content, making it easier to refine.⁴⁹ Before the crisis, Europe received over 85 per cent of Libya’s crude exports.⁵⁰ In terms of volumes, Italy topped the list in 2010, importing about 29 per cent of Libya’s total oil exports, followed by France at 14 per cent, China at 13 per cent and Germany at 11 per cent. France’s imports from Libya represented 10 per cent of its total domestic oil consumption.

France had also benefited from military sales to Libya since 2004 when the EU lifted its arms embargo against Libya.⁵¹ One estimate put the value of French arms export licenses granted to Libya at 210 million euros in 2005-2009.⁵²

Energy and other economic interests were most likely considered in deliberations on and planning for a response in Libya. However, they are not believed to have been the most important drivers behind the intervention. It can be added that a military intervention would most likely not have been the quickest way to stabilise markets.⁵³ Pure realpolitik would rather have argued for countries with economic interests in Libya to allow Gaddafi to crush opposition forces. However, it is also plausible that countries decided that the winds of change were too strong to stop, and that it was now crucial to ensure that one was on the winning side at the end of the crisis.

⁴⁷ *Financial Times*, “French president’s military interventions are logical”, Editorial, 10 April 2011.

⁴⁸ *Reuters*, “Military assets in play in Libya crisis”, 18 March 2011.

⁴⁹ Andrew Leonard, “Libya. Oil. War. Is it that simple?”, *Salon*, 21 March 2011.

⁵⁰ International Energy Agency, “Facts on Libya: oil and gas”, 21 February 2011.

⁵¹ STRATFOR, “France, U.K. Have Differing Motives For Intervening In Libya”, *Forbes*, 29 March 2011.

⁵² *The Guardian*, “EU arms exports to Libya: who armed Gaddafi?”, 2 March 2011.

⁵³ See for example Andrew Leonard, “Libya. Oil. War. Is it that simple?”, *Salon*, 21 March 2011.

It is of interest to note that the European countries with the largest oil interests in Libya and biggest arms exports to Gaddafi took very different positions in the period leading up to the intervention. Italy, for example, which had the largest oil imports and arms exports, initially took a very cautious stance. Similarly, Germany – which was among the top importers of Libyan oil and EU exporters of arms, chose not to participate at all. Their positions clearly differed from France's more proactive stance.

* * *

The Libya intervention offered Paris an opportunity to evaluate France's return to NATO's Integrated Military Command Structure in 2009. The verdict was that it had been successful. The campaign showed Paris that NATO can serve French interests and be efficient in times of crisis. This speaks for a continued French commitment to the integration process into NATO. The lacklustre response of the EU, on the other hand, left an aftertaste of failure. The French view is still that both the EU and NATO have roles to play, but at the time of doing research for this report, there was a certain level of fatigue with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in Paris. Instead, analysts and officials pointed to the value of supplementary security collaborations, including NATO, and spoke highly of the bilateral cooperation with the UK during the Libya crisis. It is, however, plausible that President Sarkozy's successor François Hollande will try to inject new momentum into CSDP.

3 Germany – Stage Fright

Germany caused quite a stir and even angered some of its allies when choosing to abstain from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. This was the first time Berlin did not vote along with at least one of its NATO allies and, instead, it found itself in the somewhat awkward company of China and Russia.⁵⁴

3.1 The Political Decision-Making Process

On March 17, 2011, Germany decided to abstain from the vote on UNSCR 1973, catching most of its allies off guard and incensing some. In connection with the vote, Germany's UN Ambassador Peter Wittig said that while Germany thought it was crucial for sanctions to be tightened, the risks of implementing UNSCR 1973 were considerable. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life was not to be underestimated and those participating in an intervention could be "drawn into a protracted military conflict that could draw in the wider region".⁵⁵

France appeared to have been particularly disappointed with Berlin's move. The abstention, however, also drew considerable criticism at home, and consensus was not even found within party lines.⁵⁶ Among those joining in the criticism against the government was former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer who wrote in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* that, "Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East". Calling the abstention a "scandalous mistake", he said, "German hopes for a permanent seat on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of Europe's future".⁵⁷

Germany's response in the wake of the UNSCR vote was inconsistent, seemingly sending mixed signals. On the one hand, there were various statements by policy-makers on the inappropriateness of military action. Some assertions exacerbated tensions with allies more than others. Defence Minister de Maizière on a German television news show asked rhetorically "Could the fact that we are suddenly intervening now have something to do with oil?" adding, "We cannot remove all the dictators in the world with an international military mission".⁵⁸ German

⁵⁴ Andreas Rinke, "Srebrenica or Afghanistan?", DGAP, IP Journal, 14 June 2011; Stephan Vormann, "The end of 'normalization'?", *openDemocracy*, 11 April 2011.

⁵⁵ UN Department of Public Information, "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions", 17 March 2011.

⁵⁶ *Spiegel Online International*, "Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention", 21 March 2011.

⁵⁷ Helen Pidd, "Germans voice disquiet over absence from Libya military action", *guardian.co.uk*, 24 March 2011.

⁵⁸ Ralf Beste and Dirk Kurbjuweit, "SPIEGEL Interview with Defense Minister De Maizière 'We Will Not Get Involved' in Syria", *Spiegel Online International*, 20 June 2011, and YouTube "De

Development Minister Dirk Niebel commented, "It is notable that exactly those countries which are blithely dropping bombs in Libya are still drawing oil from Libya".⁵⁹

On March 22, Germany withdrew its Mediterranean fleet out of NATO patrols, putting two frigates and two support vessels with a total crew of 550 persons under its own command.⁶⁰ Berlin also pulled out 60-70 German troops that were participating in AWACS operations in the area.

On the other hand, Chancellor Merkel, at the Libya Summit that followed the UNSCR vote, stated that the resolution now was "also our resolution".⁶¹ Furthermore, Germany did not hold things up in the North Atlantic Council. Berlin also decided to send up to 300 German troops to man AWACS for surveillance of Afghan airspace, thus relieving pressure on NATO by freeing up NATO AWACS capacities for Libya.⁶² Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle explained to the German Parliament (*Bundestag*) that the decision to strengthen the AWACS capacities was made to ensure regulated air traffic over Afghanistan, but was also required in terms of alliance policy.

"We won't send German soldiers to take part in a military operation in Libya. But that does not mean that we are putting our allies in Libya in danger. Of course we do not want to suggest that we are neutral. We will ease the burden on our allies, even if we will not ourselves participate in military action in Libya."⁶³

Later on, in September, The Defence Ministry admitted that some 103 German military personnel had participated in the NATO operation, compared to the 11 German soldiers which had been previously thought.⁶⁴ The 103 officers had participated in selecting bombing targets against the Libyan Army and issuing orders to AWACS.

Maizière: "Wir sind nicht überzeugt", 18 March 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpDI7bK-uWo>, accessed on 19 June 2012.

⁵⁹ *Spiegel Online International*, "German Minister Hints at Libya Mission Hypocrisy", 25 March 2011.

⁶⁰ *DPA*, "Germany pulls out of NATO operations in Mediterranean", 22 March 2011 and *UPI*, "Germans pull out of sea patrol off Libya", 23 March 2011.

⁶¹ Wittrock, Philipp, "Paris and Berlin at Odds over Libya Operation", *Spiegel Online International*, 24 March 2011.

⁶² *DPA*, "Germany commits air force to Afghanistan, defends Libya vote", 23 March 2011.

⁶³ Speech by Foreign Minister Westerwelle to the German Bundestag on German participation in the AWACS mission in Afghanistan, 25 March 2011, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2011/110325-BM_BT_AWACS.html

⁶⁴ *DPA*, "Germany Participated in Libya War without Parliamentary Approval", *Global Research*, 11 September 2011, and *DPA/The Local*, "100 Germans involved in NATO Libya mission", 10 September 2011, *The Local*.

Some believe the contradictory signals that Germany sent after the vote in the Security Council indicate that Berlin regretted its abstention on the UNSCR vote; others see it as simply bad crisis management in an attempt to smooth relations with its allies. Crucially, Germany's policy-making process, based on dispersal of power and a system of checks and balances, tends to be slow. Most interviewed for this report emphasised that in the case of Libya, events simply unfolded too quickly for Germany's policy-making machine. The outcome thus was at times ad hoc decisions which had not moved through the normal system.

3.2 Motivating Germany

There are different views as to why Germany decided to abstain during the vote on UNSCR 1973. Each interpretation will lead to different inferences as to what, if any, implications there are to be drawn from Germany's abstention.

Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has, rightly or not, been widely blamed for the decision to refrain from voting. It should, however, be underlined that Westerwelle did not make a major decision such as this in isolation but, rather, in consultation with, for example, Angela Merkel, who is ultimately responsible for general foreign policy guidelines.⁶⁵ Consequently, this was also the Chancellor's decision.⁶⁶

Westerwelle did, however, most likely play a big part. It has been suggested that Merkel and her advisors at the time were preoccupied by other pressing issues, most notably the euro crisis.⁶⁷ The Defence Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, had only been on that post since 2 March 2011, something which possibly weakened his influence.

Foreign Minister Westerwelle had little foreign policy experience and his focus and strengths were seen to rather be domestic politics. It is plausible that Westerwelle saw Libya as an opportunity to carve out a stronger profile in his role as Foreign Minister. Being relatively inexperienced in the foreign policy field, it is also possible that he did not fully comprehend the potential implications of voting against allies. Rumours said Westerwelle had even

⁶⁵ Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (*Grundgesetz*), Article 65. For more on Germany's defence policy, see Anna Forsström and Madelene Lindström, "Ett stabilt ankare i Europa – tysk säkerhets- och försvarspolitik under Merkel", FOI, FOI-R--3016--SE, 2010.

⁶⁶ As highlighted by Felix Berenskoetter in "Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany's Abstention on Libya", Blog, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 21 April 2011, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/04/germany-libya/>

⁶⁷ Two interviews Berlin, 18 April 2012.

considered taking one step further by voting “no”, something which was, however, denied by the Foreign Office.⁶⁸

Westerwelle was a staunch advocate of military constraint, which, in turn, could have backed him into a corner, making it difficult for him to shift stance. However, playing the peace card was also very timely, and probably seen to be a prudent political choice. Germany’s deep reluctance to military action is a general contextual backdrop. This is due to the country’s history, but has also been intensified by experiences in Afghanistan – a war the people view as costly and questionable. According to a poll carried out by the German Marshall Fund of the US between 25 May - 20 June 2011, 51 per cent of respondents wanted Germany to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan, while 19 per cent thought Germany should reduce the number of its troops there.⁶⁹ Another poll by YouGov later in the year (October) showed 68 per cent of respondents were against the German military presence in Afghanistan, and 44.2 per cent called for an immediate withdrawal of the German troops.⁷⁰

This reluctance to use military means as a foreign policy instrument was also applicable in the case of Libya. A survey in the newspaper *Bild am Sonntag* found that while a majority of Germans supported intervention in Libya (62 per cent), only 29 per cent thought Germany should send its soldiers.⁷¹

Moreover, the peace movement had gained strength after the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear plant in the wake of the tsunami on March 11. The catastrophe prompted the chancellor to scrap a plan to extend Germany’s nuclear phase-out to 2036, reverting to the original date of 2022, but also to speed up the pace of closing down the 17 nuclear plants.⁷²

In the case of Libya, it was thus clear that broad political support for military intervention was questionable. This is of particular consequence given that Germany’s political system builds on a process of consultations, and that any decision for military action requires Parliamentary approval.

⁶⁸ Daniel Brössle, “Ja, Nein, Jein – Libyen: Westerwelle vor der UN”, *Süddeutsche.de*, 23 March 2011.

⁶⁹ The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends 2011”, Topline Data July 2011.

⁷⁰ *PressTV*, “Germany to cut Afghan force contingent”, 11 November 2011, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/209482.html>.

⁷¹ Kimball Spencer, “Berlin steadfast in Libya abstention despite political fallout”, *www.dw.de*, 25 March 2011.

⁷² *Reuters*, “Germany pledges nuclear shutdown by 2022”, *guardian.co.uk*, 30 May 2011, and Gerrit Wiesmann, “Berlin accelerates nuclear shutdowns”, *Financial Times*, 6 June, 2011.

Westerwelle, party leader of the liberal Free Democrat Party (FDP), was also keenly sensitive to public opinion with important regional elections looming. As stated by one analyst, “More than ever, voters’ sentiment dictated policy”.⁷³

However, interestingly, the restraint in the Security Council did not pay off. After a series of poor election results, Westerwelle, on April 3, announced his resignation as leader of FDP and then as deputy to Chancellor Merkel.⁷⁴ He was, however, allowed to remain foreign minister.

There were also genuine concerns over the feasibility of a military mission, e.g. whether a NFZ would be sufficient, and perceived intelligence gaps related to, for example, the rebels and their motives. The risk of mission creep was a major worry, and experiences from the protracted fighting in Afghanistan fuelled such fear of getting trapped in another drawn-out conflict. Westerwelle told *Der Spiegel* in an interview that he did not want Germany to “venture onto a slippery slope that would lead to German troops participating in a war in Libya”.⁷⁵

Germany was not alone in having doubts about a military mission. Importantly, Berlin did not think it was about to choose a separate path than its allies as it had received indications that the US would not support the resolution. When, on March 15, the US administration decided to vote yes, Berlin was caught off guard and there was little time for the political and diplomatic machinery to change track.⁷⁶

So why did not Germany opt for the “yes, but” option by supporting the adoption of UNSCR 1973, but with the restriction that Germany would not itself participate in any mission militarily? Berlin thought it was neither feasible nor morally correct to stay idle on the sidelines if it had given the operation the green light. Westerwelle was convinced that a German “yes” automatically would have to involve a commitment of German resources. This may have explained some of the mixed messages that came out in the aftermath of the vote. A case in point is when Merkel on March 18 defended the decision to abstain in the vote, but simultaneously appeared to embrace the resolution. “As everyone knows, Germany will not take part in military measures,” she said. “That is why we abstained in the vote. But we share the goals of the resolution unreservedly. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality”.⁷⁷ On March 23, Westerwelle told the German Bundestag that “After weighing up the risks, including the risk

⁷³ Wolfgang Ischinger, “Germany after Libya: Still a responsible power?” in Tomas Valasek (ed.), “All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO”, Centre for European Reform, 1 March 2012.

⁷⁴ *BBC News*, “German chancellor’s deputy Westerwelle quits”, 4 April 2011.

⁷⁵ Erich Follath, Georg Mascolo and Ralf Neukirch, “Gadhafi Must Go – There’s No Question” Spiegel Interview with German Foreign Minister”, *Spiegel International Online*, 21 March 2011.

⁷⁶ Interviews, Berlin; two on 17 April 2012 and one on 18 April 2012.

⁷⁷ Quentin Peel, “Merkel explains Berlin abstention”, *Financial Times*, 18 March 2011.

of escalation, a process not without its difficulties, we decided that no German soldiers will take part in this operation". He added that this was not the same as saying that Berlin was neutral, but still agreed with the aim of protecting the civilian population.⁷⁸

* * *

The Libya crisis shed light on Germany's continued reluctance to use force as a foreign policy tool. While Germany over the years has taken giant steps in terms of being willing both to speak more candidly about military action as a policy option and to act militarily abroad, the country's underlying disinclination to opt for military force remains. Libya also highlighted that Berlin's policy-making processes are not designed to move quickly, being based on consensus-building. All in all, this suggests Germany emerges from the Libya crisis as a slightly less attractive partner in defence collaborations, including, for example, pooling and sharing as well as military operations, as these rest on mutual trust and shared views on security and military action.

⁷⁸ "Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle to the German Bundestag on the AWACS mission", 23 March 2011, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2011/110323-BM-BT-Afghanistan.html

4 United Kingdom – Somewhat Cautious in the Lead

The UK, together with France, assumed the lead in pushing for and carrying out the military intervention in Libya. British Prime Minister David Cameron was first in proposing the idea of a NFZ over Libya.⁷⁹ The campaign also became a test case for the recently established National Security Council (NSC). The UK's activism over Libya surprised many who had ascribed Cameron as being isolationistic.

4.1 The Political Decision-Making Process

The UK decision to intervene in Libya was in large part made top-down by Prime Minister David Cameron.⁸⁰ In the words of one minister who attended the National Security Council (NSC) meetings on Libya, “The Prime Minister was always the biggest hawk in the NSC... pushing and saying ‘how can we get things moving in this way’”.⁸¹ Cameron's proactive stance came as a surprise to many who viewed him as being isolationistic.⁸²

Prime Minister Cameron was quick to put a NFZ over Libya as an alternative on the table.⁸³ On February 28, five days after Sarkozy had made the same move, Cameron instructed the British Ministry of Defence to plan for a military NFZ.⁸⁴ On March 1, US Secretary of State Clinton said nothing was off the table, but US Defence Secretary Robert Gates rejected the idea of a NFZ as “loose talk”.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ See for example Alistair Macdonald, “Cameron Doesn't Rule Out Military Force for Libya”. *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 February 2011.

⁸⁰ Michael Clarke, “The Making of Britain's Libya Strategy” in Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen (eds.), “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012. Two interviews; London, 8 and 9 March 2012.

⁸¹ Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron's Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped”, *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011.

⁸² Interview, London, 9 March 2012. Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron's Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped”, *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011.

⁸³ Cameron statement c25 at House of Commons Debate on 28 February 2011. See also Ben Smith, “The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011; Steven Flanagan, “Libya: Managing a Fragile Coalition”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 March 2011.

⁸⁴ Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron's Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped”, *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011.

⁸⁵ Nicholas Watt, “US defence secretary Robert Gates slams 'loose talk' about no-fly zones”, *The Guardian*, 3 March 2011.

Most other countries also opposed or questioned the idea.⁸⁶ Cameron, increasingly seen as being isolated even within his own government, continued to argue that it was crucial for the international community to consider all alternatives, including military ones.⁸⁷ On March 7, media reported for the first time that the French and British missions to the UN were drafting a Security Council Resolution proposing a NFZ over Libya.⁸⁸

The UK National Security Adviser's review of the Libya crisis describes how the UK was in the lead "from the beginning of the crisis to its end – from the initial press statement, to drafting and securing through negotiations UNSCRs 1970 and 1973".⁸⁹ However, while pushing for an intervention, Cameron is reported to have in many respects also shown caution. The Prime Minister arranged private meetings with Libyan experts and exiles to gain first-hand information on the setting (as did the French president Nicholas Sarkozy) and, in order to ensure that all actions were legally defensible, Cameron decided to have an attorney general present at the NSC meetings. He also put Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell in charge of drawing up the stabilisation plan for Libya based on lessons learned from Iraq. In theatre, the UK applied an extremely cautious targeting policy based on a zero-casualties criterion.⁹⁰

Moreover, while the UK and France were at the fore in calling for international military action in Libya, Cameron repeatedly found himself diplomatically one step behind the French President. Cases in point are Sarkozy's announcement that he was inviting Libyan rebel leaders for talks and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé's calls for a Contact Group meeting – neither coordinated with Downing Street.⁹¹

As in many other countries, the British government was first divided on how to respond to the events in Libya. In the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (the so called "Cobra Room"), discussions often ran high. David Cameron's Chief of staff, Ed Llewellyn, early on urged the government to take action against Gaddafi. So did Education Secretary Michael Gove – one of the leading hawks.

⁸⁶ Christopher Hope, "Libya: Cameron plan for no-fly zone shunned by world leaders", *Telegraph*, 2 March 2011.

⁸⁷ Ben Smith, "The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya", House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

⁸⁸ Ben Smith, "The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya", House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

⁸⁹ UK National Security Adviser, "Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser's Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned", 1 December 2011.

⁹⁰ Ian Black, "Post-Gaddafi Libya 'must learn from mistakes made in Iraq'", *The Guardian*, 28 June 2011; Patrick Wintour, Nicholas Watt, "David Cameron's Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped" *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011. Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

⁹¹ Henry Samuel and James Kirkup, "Libya: France leaves David Cameron struggling to regain initiative", *The Telegraph*, 22 August 2011.

Foreign Secretary of State William Hague, Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke, and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg were among the most sceptical. Somewhere in the middle, arguing caution and pointing to the unknown after Gaddafi, were Defence Secretary Liam Fox and Chief of Defence Staff General David Richards.⁹² After military action had been authorised, however, Fox is said to have become “hawkish”.⁹³

Once the government had made the decision, the political system and the relevant authorities, including the newly established NSC, adapted quickly.⁹⁴ This was the first time UK forces had been deployed in a new crisis since the setting up of the NSC in May 2010.⁹⁵ The overall assessment was that the NSC functioned well during the crisis.⁹⁶ NSC meetings, normally held once a week, were held on a daily basis and were chaired by the Prime Minister or his deputy. Relevant UK embassies could participate via video link. A subsequent review by the National Security Adviser concluded that the coordinating mechanisms of the NSC had overall functioned well by bringing together relevant Ministers and officials. It also said the NSC’s recommendations enabled the government to make rapid, well-informed and well-coordinated decisions. The NSC Libya committee and its subcommittees met 182 times from 25 February to 2 November.⁹⁷ One interviewee meant that the high frequency of meetings at times made the focus of discussions drop from the strategic to the tactical level.⁹⁸

⁹² Gove was reported to have been advocating an even tougher line than Cameron. Gove also questioned why the Foreign Office had failed to foresee the Arab Spring. Later on General Richards and Liam Fox were said to have been among those arguing that a NFZ was not enough and made the case for planning to train and equip the rebels. Patrick Wintour, Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron’s Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped”, *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011; Mark Urban, “Inside story of the UK’s secret mission to beat Gaddafi”, *BBC News*, 19 January 2012; Michael Clarke, “The Making of Britain’s Libya Strategy” in Adrian Johnson and Saeed Mueen (eds.), “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012.

⁹³ Michael Clarke, “The Making of Britain’s Libya Strategy” in Adrian Johnson and Saeed Mueen (eds.), “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012.

⁹⁴ Interview, London, 8 March 2012.

⁹⁵ The British Prime Minister’s Office, “Establishment of a National Security Council”, 12 May 2010; and “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned”, 1 December 2011.

⁹⁶ UK National Security Adviser, “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned”, 1 December 2011.

⁹⁷ There was no fixed membership for the subcommittees discussing Libya; the different departments represented in general reflected the NSC (L) membership which consisted of Prime Minister Cameron, Deputy Prime Minister Clegg, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Hague, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change Chris Huhne and Secretary of State for International Development Mitchell. Chief of Defence Staff General Richards and the Attorney General were invited to attend occasionally. See UK National

When it became clear that the US was only prepared to lead the military mission in its initial phase, the UK saw NATO command and control structures as the sole option.⁹⁹ While France advocated for a bilateral solution with the UK, London preferred NATO to take charge, with the alliance already having experience of leading multinational missions. The British long-held view that NATO is “the bedrock” of its defence¹⁰⁰ was a key factor behind the stance and one interviewee pointed out that Secretary of Defence Liam Fox was a notably strong supporter of NATO.¹⁰¹ In February 2010, Fox summarised his view on the UK position, “The United States will remain our number one global strategic partner and NATO will remain our preferred security alliance”.¹⁰² One view held in London was that the use of a French or British operational headquarters (OHQ) would have made it easier for the Americans to walk away from the military efforts.¹⁰³ In terms of convincing the French to let NATO take over the command, Peter Ricketts and Cameron’s Chief of Staff Ed Llewellyn – both with solid knowledge of how NATO works – are reported to have played a major role. Ambassador Ricketts had served as Permanent Representative to NATO and Llewellyn as advisor to Paddy Ashdown in his role as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁰⁴ The UK said its delegation to NATO played a central role in getting NATO to adopt the same criteria for a military intervention as that of the UK – demonstrable need, clear legal basis and regional support.¹⁰⁵

The UK government was faced with several unforeseen events along the way. France’s early recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) took London by surprise.¹⁰⁶ While France recognised the NTC on March 10, 2011, the UK gave its formal recognition only on July 27, 2011. A British official interviewed for this report described the French recognition as being “small”

Security Adviser, “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned”, 1 December 2011.

⁹⁸ Interview, London, 8 March 2012.

⁹⁹ Three interviews, London, 8-9 March 2012. See also Alastair Cameron, “The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO” in Adrian Johnson and Saeed Mueen (eds.) “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012.

¹⁰⁰ HM Government, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review”, October 2010.

¹⁰¹ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012

¹⁰² Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox, “Liam Fox: The EU should only act when NATO cannot”, speech, 11 February 2010.

¹⁰³ Interview, London, 9 March 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron’s Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped” *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011.

¹⁰⁵ UK National Security Adviser, “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned”, 1 December 2011; Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, London, 8 March 2012.

compared to the UK recognition which was a “big recognition”.¹⁰⁷ The National Security Adviser’s review of the UK handling of the Libya crisis notes that the UK policy of recognising states and not governments will be evaluated, “The UK has supported the NTC since its creation on 5 March. The UK’s long-standing policy is to recognise States, not Governments. But in certain exceptional cases, such as happened with the NTC and Libya, HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] should be ready to review and adapt such policies, even where deeply engrained, where that is clearly in the UK’s interests to do so”.¹⁰⁸

Neither was the UK prepared for the US to take such a pronounced backseat role in the military campaign.¹⁰⁹ There are different views as to whether the sudden French launch of the operation was fully coordinated with the British. While not corroborated in London, some mean France and the UK had planned the launch of the operation jointly, but that the Royal Air Force (RAF) backed out at the very last moment.¹¹⁰ All in all though, while informed, the UK and other coalition partners appear not to have been fully coordinated with prior to the French airstrike launch. Some say this led to some irritation on the British side – which has since faded; others mean London from the start was relaxed about the sudden launch.¹¹¹ Reading between the lines, the UK at times thought the French were acting a little too hastily.¹¹²

The UK leadership held different views as to whether Gaddafi himself was a legitimate target according to UNSCR 1973. General David Richards, Head of the UK armed forces, said Gaddafi was not a legitimate target while Defence Secretary Fox said he might be. Cameron avoided a direct answer saying all attacks on Libya would be consistent within the mandate of UNSCR 1973.¹¹³ The issue was also the subject of differing opinions between UK and France.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ Interview, London, 8 March 2012.

¹⁰⁸ UK National Security Adviser, “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned”, 1 December 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews, Paris, 6 March 2012; London, 8 March 2012.

¹¹⁰ Alastair Cameron, “The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO” in Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen (eds.) “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012.

¹¹¹ Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron’s Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped”, *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011.

¹¹² Interview, Paris, 6 March 2012.

¹¹³ Ben Smith and Arabella Thorp, “Interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5916, 6 April 2011. See also *BBC News*, “Timeline: UK’s road to action in Libya”, 15 April 2011; Patrick Wintour and Ewen MacAskill, “Is Muammar Gaddafi a target? PM and military split over war aims”, *The Guardian*, 22 March 2011; *BBC News*, “Libya: Removing Gaddafi not allowed, says David Cameron”, 21 March 2011.

¹¹⁴ Ian Black and Helen Pidd, “Libya strategy splits Britain and France”, *The Guardian*, 15 April 2011.

Similarly, there were discussions on whether arming the rebels would be in violation of UNSCR 1970 as it had imposed an arms embargo on Libya. Prime Minister David Cameron raised the idea of arming the Libyan rebels the first time on February 28, 2011.¹¹⁵ On April 3, Foreign Secretary William Hague said, “We have taken no decision to arm the rebels, the opposition, the pro-democracy people, whatever one wants to call them and I’m not aware of any of our allies taking the decision to do that.”¹¹⁶

On March 29, 2011, at a conference on Libya arranged in London, the Libya Contact Group was set up. At its first meeting on April 13, 21 countries and representatives from the UN, the Arab League, NATO, the EU, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States met. The African Union was present as an invitee.¹¹⁷ The role of the Contact Group was to give overall political direction to the international effort.¹¹⁸

Describing it as a “UK-conceived structure”,¹¹⁹ the British National Security Adviser highlighted the Contact Group as key for the coordination of international political and diplomatic efforts, providing the mission with an international voice.¹²⁰ The Contact Group-formula is widely talked about as a formula that will be repeated in future crisis.¹²¹

4.2 Motivating the UK

While there are several possible explanations for UK engagement in Libya, none clearly stands out. The British military and security policy community expressed a certain level of surprise as to why the UK took such a proactive role.¹²²

London had set three conditions which had to be met before an intervention: there had to be (1) a demonstrable need; (2) legal basis, and; (3) regional support.

¹¹⁵ Ben Smith, “The Security Council’s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

¹¹⁶ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “*Foreign Secretary discusses Libya and Cote d’Ivoire*”, Press release, 3 April 2011.

¹¹⁷ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Libya Contact Group: Chair’s statement”, 13 April 2011.

¹¹⁸ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Foreign Secretary sets out UK aims for Libya Contact Group”, 13 April 2011. See also NATO, “The Contact Group needs to respond to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people, says NATO Secretary General”, 13 April 2011.

¹¹⁹ UK National Security Adviser, “Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned”, 1 December 2011.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., and Interview, London, 8 March 2012.

¹²² Interviews, London, two on March 8, two on March 9, 2012. See also: Alastair Cameron, “The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO” in Adrian Johnson and Saeed Mueen (eds.), “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012.

NATO adopted the same conditions.¹²³ These conditions were seen to have been met once the campaign started: the threat of an impending massacre was believed to be real, legal approval was granted through UNSCR 1973, and the region had endorsed action, most notably through the Arab League's calls for the UN Security Council to impose a NFZ over Libya. But what drove London to push for these conditions to be met – why did the UK think an intervention was the correct move forward?

Most frequently referred to in the government's official statements is the responsibility to protect the Libyan people.¹²⁴ Prime Minister Cameron and many of his fellow party members had vivid memories from past failures to act in genocides such as Srebrenica and Rwanda.¹²⁵ There was now a sense that Britain could not sit idle on the sidelines, especially given its role as a major European power.

Washington's call for someone else to take lead in Libya likely played a role. It is possible that the UK was eager to step up to those demands in order to preserve its 'Special Relationship' with the US.¹²⁶ It has been suggested that independent judgement and action on the part of the UK was a way for London to prove that it remained relevant in its relationship with Washington.¹²⁷

Prime Minister Cameron may have wanted to prove that he, like his predecessor Tony Blair, was an international leader.¹²⁸ The Prime Minister may also have felt extra pressure to express support for the Arab Spring in order to stave off criticism provoked by a trade mission in the Middle East at the end of February that he made together with British arms manufacturers.¹²⁹

Of great importance was also that the Libya intervention enjoyed large domestic support among the public as well as across political lines. While the next general elections were not planned to be held until 2015, a successful outcome in Libya could strengthen Cameron's credibility. The political opponent and labour leader

¹²³ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012. *BBC News*, "Libya: David Cameron statement on UN resolution", 18 March 2011. See also NATO, "Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, Brussels", 10 March 2011.

¹²⁴ See for example *BBC News*, "Libya: David Cameron statement on UN resolution", 18 March 2011.

¹²⁵ Interviews, London, two on 8 March; two on 9 March 2012. Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, "David Cameron's Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped", *The Guardian*, 2 October 2011.

¹²⁶ IISS Strategic Comments, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", Volume 17, Comment 18, April 2011.

¹²⁷ Zaki Laïdi, "Vive the refreshed Anglo-French alliance", *Financial Times*, 1 May 2011.

¹²⁸ Interview, London, 9 March 2012.

¹²⁹ Interview, London, 9 March 2012. See also John Higginson, "David Cameron faces criticism for 'arms trade' trip to Middle East", *Metro*, 21 February 2011; Andrew Grice, "Cameron defends arms sales in push for growth", *The Independent*, 7 March 2011.

Ed Miliband gave his full backing for a military response and an almost united Parliament approved the British military participation in a 557-13 vote.¹³⁰ Memories of the Lockerbie bombing probably played a role in unifying support.¹³¹ Concerns that terrorist groups would take advantage of a possible power vacuum in Libya, perhaps also to acquire Gaddafi's weapons, was also of importance.¹³² Some commentators have pointed to British strategic interests in the country, including oil and gas, as adding fuel to London's readiness to intervene. Libyan rebel leaders said early on that companies from the countries supporting them could expect to be rewarded by lucrative oil contracts.¹³³ Arguably, from this perspective, London had more to gain from removing Gaddafi than for example Italy, France and Germany, which before the crisis were importing larger volumes of oil from Libya than the UK.¹³⁴

Interesting to note is that the newly signed Franco-British defence treaty was not seen by interviewees to have been a significant push factor behind UK's impetus. That said, the timing of the crisis meant it became something of a test case of the defence cooperation. It also meant France and Britain had already established efficient communication on both the political and military level, facilitating the crisis response.¹³⁵

* * *

At the end of the day, the Libya experience did not change the way the UK views the roles of and division of labour between the EU and NATO. NATO remains the cornerstone of UK defence policy, and London wants to ensure that there is no duplication of resources between the two organisations. Accordingly, NATO is seen to be more suitable for handling military operations while the EU should focus on softer security, e.g. peacebuilding, making use of its broader set of instruments at hand to manage crises. London's preference for NATO also

¹³⁰ UK Parliament “*Commons Hansard: Voting list of MPs*”, 27 March 2011. The Libya debate was, however, not free from political squabbling. Labour charged the government with “incompetence”, pointing to a statement by Foreign Secretary William Hague in which he had mistakenly insinuated that Gaddafi had fled to Venezuela, the late evacuation of British citizens from Libya and the failed secret SAS mission to Benghazi. See Hélène Mulholland, “David Cameron defends ‘excellent’ foreign secretary William Hague”, *The Guardian*, 9 March 2011.

¹³¹ Interview, London, 9 March 2012; interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

¹³² Interview, London, 8 March 2012.

¹³³ Julian Borger and Terry Macalister, "The race is on for Libya's oil, with Britain and France both staking a claim", *The Guardian*, 1 September 2011; James Kirkup and Bruno Waterfield, "Libya: British team aims to secure oil deals", *The Telegraph*, 1 September 2011.

¹³⁴ International Energy Agency, "Facts on Libya: oil and gas", 21 February 2011.

¹³⁵ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012

reflects its preference for the US, and the latter was confirmed during the Libya crisis. Importantly, Washington's call for someone else to take lead in Libya was most likely a key reason for why the UK decided to engage in Libya.

5 The United States - The Indispensable Prompter

The US hesitated before taking a position in the Libya crisis. However, once on board, the US played an indispensable role both politically and militarily. Washington made clear early on that its military engagement in Libya would be limited in time and scope. About 10 days into the Libya intervention, the US pulled back its attacking components and took more of a supporting role, contributing only unique assets. That the US opted for what has been described as a “back-seat role” in the Libya campaign sparked a debate about whether the leader of the world was turning its focus eastwards, and expecting Europe to handle its own neighbourhood.

5.1 The Political Decision-Making Process

”The days leading up to Obama’s decision were perplexing to outsiders. American Presidents usually lead the response to world crises, but Obama seemed to stay hidden that week. From the outside, it looked as though the French were dragging him into the conflict.”¹³⁶

In August 2010, Obama signed a five-page memo on trends in the Middle East and North Africa in which people’s growing discontent with their regimes was described.¹³⁷ Obama had tasked his foreign policy team to develop strategies for each country in the region and discuss the pros and cons of the US supporting the regimes or opposition forces. When the group had finished the memo, the Tunisian vegetable vendor Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire and the world witnessed what would be the start of the Arab Spring.¹³⁸ The memo seems to indicate that the President understood there was the risk of uprisings in the Arab world. Nevertheless, the US – together with the rest of the world – was caught by surprise.

Washington hesitated and took a long time before choosing a position in the Libya crisis. In the US, the pressure to take action originated largely from human

¹³⁶ Ryan Lizza; “The Consequentialist”, *The New Yorker*, 2 May 2011.

¹³⁷ The Memo “*Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa*” is classified but referred to in Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist”, *The New Yorker*, 2 May 2011. Lizza is a Washington correspondent for *The New Yorker*. See also Peter Feaver, “What do the personnel moves (and the reporting on them) tell us about Team Obama?”, Blog Shadow Government, *Foreign Policy*, 29 April 2011.

¹³⁸ Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist”, *The New Yorker*, 2 May 2011.

rights groups and a few Members of Congress. Senators John McCain (R) and John Kerry (D) both urged for US action, but the dominating opinion in Washington was that an intervention in Libya was a bad idea.¹³⁹ Also the public was against an intervention. Public opinion polls showed that the vast majority of Americans were concerned about the situation in Libya, but did not consider it to be the responsibility of the US to handle.¹⁴⁰

On February 25, the US shut down its embassy in Tripoli and imposed unilateral sanctions against Libya, one day before the UN called for multilateral sanctions in UNSCR 1970. On March 3, President Obama said Gaddafi had lost legitimacy and should relinquish power. Beside these steps, Obama held a low profile throughout the proceedings to the military campaign in Libya and political commentators criticised him for being hesitant.¹⁴¹ The cautious and uncertain US approach reportedly annoyed both President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron.¹⁴²

Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, was among the most vocal sceptics against the proposal of a NFZ over Libya. Gates thought a NFZ would be insufficient and that US ground troops in the end would have to be deployed.

“...[L]et's just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences. That's the way you do a no-fly zone, and then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down [...] But that's the way it starts.”¹⁴³

He was also said to worry about a Western intervention sparking a storm of protest throughout the Arab world, possibly leading to terrorist attacks.¹⁴⁴ The lack of post-war planning as well as uncertainties about who the rebels were (including if they had any connections to Al-Qaida) also played a role. Gates pointed to US economic realities after Iraq and Afghanistan, which were not the best. Moreover, there had been second thoughts about a complete military

¹³⁹ Ben Smith, “The Security Council’s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011; J. McCormack, “McCain Praises Obama’s Libya Speech”, *Weekly Standard*, 28 March 2011; Simon Tisdall “Obama is being driven towards Libya”, *The Guardian*, 7 March 2011.

¹⁴⁰ See Polling Report “Libya”. <http://www.poolingreport.com>.

¹⁴¹ Jeanette Torres, “Obama Still Hesitant to Declare No-Fly Zone over Libya”, *ABC News*, 8 March 2011; Gary Bauer “Obama a Hesitant Crisis Manager”, *Human Events*, 21 March 2011; Frank W. Hardy, “Reluctant President Becomes Eager Partner in UN No-Fly Resolution”, *Suite101*, 19 March, 2011

¹⁴² Nigel Morris and David Usborne, “Cameron frustrated with Obama’s refusal to act over no-fly zone”, *Independent*, 17 March 2011.

¹⁴³ Elise Labott, “U.S. Mulling Military Options in Libya”, *CNN*, 2 March 2011.

¹⁴⁴ John Barry, “Robert Gates’ Fears About Libya”, *The Daily Beast*, 8 March 2011.

withdrawal from Iraq, and staying on would demand further resources.¹⁴⁵ Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon and Counterterrorism Chief John O. Brennan also urged for caution.¹⁴⁶

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was first sceptical of military action in Libya, but then changed course. In doing so, she joined two other members of Obama's foreign policy circle who had been arguing for military action: Samantha Power – National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights – and Susan Rice – US ambassador to the UN. Their influence in advocating for military action against Gadaffi is well recognised and prompted media to describe them as “the women who called for war”.¹⁴⁷

Already on February 25, Clinton said a NFZ was “an option we are actively considering”.¹⁴⁸ On March 1, she repeated that a NFZ was not off the table.¹⁴⁹ However, these statements were followed by a more cautious approach, most likely reflecting Defence Secretary Robert Gates' scepticism. From March 12 though, after the Arab League had requested action from the UN Security Council, Clinton seemed to have decided to work actively for an intervention in Libya.¹⁵⁰ The rapid developments on the ground and Clinton's private meeting with NTC representatives in Paris are thought to have made a significant impact on the Secretary of State. Furthermore, while the State Department had all along been divided on how to act in Libya, many of her advisors were arguing for an intervention.¹⁵¹ A reasonable question is also to what extent Hillary Clinton was influenced by her husband's regret from having failed to intervene in Rwanda in 1994.¹⁵² In the media, Hillary Clinton's diplomatic efforts have been portrayed as key for mobilising NATO member states, and thus making the intervention come about.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁵ Ben Smith, “The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Ben Smith, “The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

¹⁴⁷ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Still Crusading, but Now on the Inside”, *The New York Times*, 29 March 2011; Tara McKelvey, “Samantha Power's Case for War on Libya”, *The Daily Beast*, 22 March 2011; John Avlon “Libya Airstrikes: The Women Who Called for War”, *The Daily Beast*, 20 March 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Martha Raddatz, “President Obama Wants Options as Pentagon Issues Warnings About Libyan No-Fly Zone”, *ABC News*, 3 March 2011.

¹⁴⁹ Ben Smith, “The Security Council's No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

¹⁵⁰ Jonathan Alter, “Woman of the World”, *Vanity Fair*, June 2011.

¹⁵¹ Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by Clinton”, *The New York Times*, 18 March 2011.

¹⁵² “Clinton regrets personal failure on Rwanda genocide”, *Reuters*, 23 July 2005; Jonathan Alter “Woman of the World”, *Vanity Fair*, June 2011.

¹⁵³ For example, Clinton defended the intervention before a divided Congress, overcame former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' opposition and spent hours on the phone with Italian Prime

That Secretary of State Clinton and the State Department pushed for a military operation while the Pentagon and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates were strongly opposed to it has received much attention in depictions and analyses of the period leading up to the war. Libya is said to have been the first time the pair Gates and Clinton were of different opinions.¹⁵⁴ Some observers are convinced that Gates had given Clinton his informal approval before the final decision to intervene was made.¹⁵⁵

While there are reports of a complex relationship between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama; Clinton, Robert Gates and General David Petraeus formed a small and influential group around Obama on national security issues. Some political commentators say that the fact that Gates has now retired and that Petraeus serves as head of the Central Intelligence Agency may lead to Clinton's ideas having even more impact in the US administration.¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, one can also argue that the fact that the Secretary of State and Gates often agreed on issues could make Clinton's voice less influential now that Gates is no longer on her side.

On March 16, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice indicated for the first time that the US Administration supported a NFZ.¹⁵⁷ In her capacity as US ambassador to the UN, she is reported to have played a major role in the passing of UNSCR 1973.¹⁵⁸ On March 19, President Obama ordered US military forces to launch attacks against Libyan military targets in support of the resolution.¹⁵⁹

When notifying Congress about the US participation in the campaign, President Obama emphasised the fact that no ground forces were deployed and that it was a limited mission in both "nature, duration and scope".¹⁶⁰ The fact that it was

Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Foreign Minister Franco Frattini when Italy threatened to prevent NATO from using its territory. Clinton also mediated between Italy-Turkey and France. At a later stage, Clinton persuaded President Obama to grant full diplomatic recognition to the rebels, allowing them access to billions of dollars from Gaddafi's previously frozen accounts. Clinton is also said to have played an important role in persuading the Arab states, which had committed military support to the intervention, not to pull out of the mission. See Joby Warrick, "Clinton credited with key role in success of NATO airstrikes, Libyan rebels", *Washington Post*, 31 October 2011.

¹⁵⁴ Ryan Lizza, "The Consequentialist", *The New Yorker*, 2 May 2011.

¹⁵⁵ Interview, London, 9 March 2012.

¹⁵⁶ *Bloomberg*, "Hillary Clinton Deserves Credit for U.S. Role in Libya: View", 8 September 2011.

¹⁵⁷ U.S. Mission to the United Nations, "Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council Stakeout on Libya", 16 March 2011.

¹⁵⁸ Helene Cooper, and Steven Lee Myers, "Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by Clinton", *The New York Times*, 18 March 2011.

¹⁵⁹ The White House, "Remarks by the President on Libya", 20 March 2011.

¹⁶⁰ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Letter from the President regarding the commencement of operations in Libya", 21 March 2011.

authorised by the UN Security Council and undertaken with both European and Arab partners was also underlined.¹⁶¹

Both Republican and Democratic members of Congress criticised Obama's decision to go to war. Much of the criticism was of procedural nature, questioning if Obama had the *legal* right to start the attack when he had not sought approval from Congress. As a result, a group of members of Congress sued President Obama for having taken unilateral military action against Libya and several proposals were presented to cut off financing for the operation. Those against US involvement also pointed to the lack of a timetable for a commitment, the uncertain global political implications of an intervention and lacking intelligence on the rebels.¹⁶² From the Republican side, it was also about attacking the Democratic President, portraying him as arrogant and ignorant of the Constitution.¹⁶³ The Libya intervention created an unusual bloc of anti-war Democrats and Tea Party Republicans.

One of Obama's early conditions for a US engagement in Libya was that it had to be limited in time ("days not weeks").¹⁶⁴ After 10 days the US took on a more supporting role, contributing only unique assets. The European partners were to a considerable extent dependent on US capabilities – the United States accounted for 80 per cent of all air-to-air refuelling, much of the air monitoring and practically all electronic warfare after the overall command had been handed over to NATO.¹⁶⁵ Even if the US early on had signalled that it would not take a prominent role in the international coalition, the withdrawal came as a surprise to many of its partners, according to government officials in Paris and London.¹⁶⁶ One US official was convinced that the US would not have engaged in Libya if they had not been certain that someone else would take over the operation, emphasising that this was also made clear to the coalition partners at an early stage.¹⁶⁷

The US role in Libya has been downplayed by the US administration. At the same time, there was a wide debate in Washington about the description of

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² James Lindsay, "Obama's 'Poorly Conceived' Libya Intervention", Council on Foreign Relations, 22 March 2011.

¹⁶³ Charlie Savage and Mark Landler, "White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation", *The New York Times*, 12 June 2011; Mark Madell, "Boehner warning to Obama over Libya mission", *BBC News*, 14 June 2011.

¹⁶⁴ Dewin Dwyer, "Obama to Members of Congress: Action Versus Libya to Last 'Days not Weeks'", *ABC News*, 18 March 2011; Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, "Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by Clinton", *The New York Times*, 18 March 2011.

¹⁶⁵ Fredrik Lindvall and David Forsman, "Internationella Insatser i Libyen 2011" ("*International operations in Libya 2011*"), Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), June 2012.

¹⁶⁶ Interview, London, 8 March 2012; Interview, Paris, 6 March 2012.

¹⁶⁷ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

Obama's foreign policy as "leading from behind", first coined in a *New Yorker* article. Critics of the Obama administration were quick to pick it up, arguing that the US should show international leadership and not stand in the background and rely on other countries. An official at the State Department described the US role in Libya as rather "not allowing the operation to fail".¹⁶⁸ An American NATO official interviewed for this report admitted that the phrase was valid in a sense, but argued it was often used incorrectly.

"One can say that France and the United Kingdom led publicly and we did it in other ways. All moved in the same direction, but France and the United Kingdom were perhaps more up-front. The others reacted a tiny bit later but arrived to the same conclusion."¹⁶⁹

Ivo Daalder, US Ambassador to NATO, tweeted the following response following a congratulation to Obama's "leading from behind"-approach: "That's not leading from behind [...] [w]hen you set the course, provide critical enablers and succeed, it's plain leading."¹⁷⁰

It should be noted that even after NATO had taken over operational command of the military operation, US presence still remained significant given that the organisation is politically and militarily dominated by the US. In the Libya intervention, several US military commanders had top positions in NATO's command and control system. While the Commander of Operation Unified Protector, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, was Canadian, both of his bosses; the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Samuel J Locklear III, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James Stavridis, were Americans.¹⁷¹

5.2 Motivating the US

Several possible reasons have been identified in order to explain why the US decided to intervene in Libya. One of the most obvious was the sense of moral obligation. As Gaddafi threatened to carry out mass killings of his own people (whom he referred to as "rats"¹⁷²), the US felt a moral obligation to act.

¹⁶⁸ Tomas Valasek, "What Libya says about the future of the transatlantic alliance", Centre for European Reform, July 2011.

¹⁶⁹ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Roger Cohen, "Leading From Behind", *New York Times*, 31 October 2011.

¹⁷¹ NATO, "Operation Unified Protector: Command and Control", http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110325_110325-unified-protector-command-control.pdf.

¹⁷² *You Tube*, "Muammar Gaddafi speech" (translation) 22 February 2011.

When President Obama in 2009 received the Nobel Peace Prize, he talked about “just war” in his acceptance speech: “There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified”, mentioning specifically the prevention of genocide.¹⁷³ Accordingly, it is reasonable that past failures to act in for example Srebrenica, Rwanda and possibly during the Green Revolution in Iran were still fresh in the minds of the administration.¹⁷⁴

It was of great importance that the intervention had international backing. Obama had already in his 2008 presidential campaign made clear that the US under his lead would avoid unilateral action and, in international crises, would rather try to mobilise the international community and cooperate with regional partners. The President also chose to give his speech of March 28,¹⁷⁵ in which he explained US Libya policies, at the National Defense University with international diplomats specially invited, rather than from the Oval Office as custom. This has been interpreted as a way for the administration to emphasize that the Libya intervention was an international effort.¹⁷⁶

President Obama also stated that an intervention in Libya was important for the sake of the credibility of the UN. Inaction would risk the future credibility of the UN Security Council.¹⁷⁷ Equally important was that the Arab League had urged for the international community to intervene and specifically called for a NFZ over Libya.¹⁷⁸ It is possible that the US saw Libya as an opportunity for the US to improve its reputation in the Arab World. Paradoxically, while Washington’s hesitation in deciding on a military response was not a deliberate strategy and may even have delayed action, the administration’s silence and pronounced backseat role at start might have made the support of the Arab League possible.¹⁷⁹ It is plausible that the member states of the Arab League would have been less eager to call for military action in the wake of similar calls from the US.

¹⁷³ “Barack Obama receives Nobel Peace Prize: speech in full”, *The Telegraph*, 10 December 2009.

¹⁷⁴ David Jackson, “One reason for Obama’s decision on Libya: Rwanda”, *USA Today*, 24 March 2011.

¹⁷⁵ The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya” (transcript), 28 March 2011.

¹⁷⁶ Lynn Sweet, “Obama’s Libya Speech: Not in the Oval Office, and that’s okay”, 28 March 2011.

¹⁷⁷ White House Report; “*United States Activities in Libya - report to Congress*”, 15 June 2011. Available online on *Foreign Policy* and *Washington Post*.

¹⁷⁸ See Ben Smith, “The Security Council’s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya”, House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. and Mark Mardell, “Boehner warning to Obama over Libya mission”, *BBC News*, 14 June 2011.

Some analysts view the US engagement in Libya as a sort of “payback” to its European allies for their contribution in Afghanistan, something which also Secretary of State Clinton implied in the quote below.¹⁸⁰

“We asked our NATO allies to go into Afghanistan with us 10 years ago [...] They have been there, and a lot of them have been there despite the fact that they were not attacked. The attack came on us...they stuck with us. When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies...this was in their vital national interest...”

Another possible motive for why Washington decided to act was that Libya was seen as threatening to destabilise the region. Libya was in 2006 removed from the US blacklist of states supporting terrorism after having abandoned its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme and renounced terrorism. The US upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy and, in 2008, Condoleezza Rice was the first US Secretary of State to visit Libya since 1953.¹⁸¹ The fighting in Libya ignited fears that the country once again would become a base for terrorists or that Gaddafi would resume the development of weapons of mass destruction. Gaddafi’s role in the Lockerbie bombing may also have been in policy makers’ minds.

Furthermore, a possible reason adding weight to the yes-side could have been that Libya was “doable”, since Libya is a country consisting 90 per cent of desert and was well suited for air combat, albeit demanding long flights. The coalition also enjoyed the support of a rebel army on the ground.

Some, but relatively few, observers and commentators have pointed at US energy and economic interests in Libya.¹⁸² At the time of the intervention, Europe received over 85 per cent of Libya’s crude exports. The US, on the other hand, imported 5 per cent of Libyan exports, representing some 0.5 per cent of US total domestic oil consumption.¹⁸³ It is of interest to note, however, that the NTC’s first sale of oil was to a US oil refiner.¹⁸⁴

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¹⁸⁰ Byron York, “Gates: Libya not vital U.S. interest. Clinton: Yes, it is”, *Washington Examiner*, 27 March 2011.

¹⁸¹ Christopher Blanchard, “Libya; Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 18 2011.

¹⁸² See for example *United Press International*, “Libyan war about oil, U.S. lawmaker says”, 22 March 2011..

¹⁸³ International Energy Agency, “Facts on Libya: oil and gas”, 21 February 2011; Paul Davidson, “What’s Libya’s impact on oil?”, *USA Today*, 3 October 2011.

¹⁸⁴ Jamie Crawford, “Libyan rebel group sells first oil to U.S.” *CNN*, 8 June 2011.

The administration distanced itself from the description of having “led from behind” in Libya after critics meant it implied lacking US leadership on the international arena. However, while in many ways playing an indispensable role in the intervention, the US was keen to stay in the background and for allies to take the lead. Washington’s calls for burden-sharing with allies are not new and the positive experiences from Libya together with an increased focus on Asia-Pacific should indicate that the US will continue to encourage European allies to assume a larger responsibility for its geographical neighbourhood.

6 The EU and NATO

6.1 The EU – Inaction and Indecision

The EU has received extensive criticism for its inaction and indecision over Libya. The EU's failure to act in Libya severely damaged the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and raised questions not only about the EU's capability as a crisis manager but also about the organisation's strategic objectives and priorities. A general perception in the aftermath of the Libya crisis was that pooling and sharing initiatives keep CSDP alive, while political trust and confidence are weak.

6.1.1 The Political Decision-Making Process

The EU Member States openly disagreed on how to handle Libya, bringing back memories of the discord over Iraq in 2003.¹⁸⁵ In addition to the general disagreement over how the EU should respond to the Libyan crisis, there was a pronounced annoyance among several member states that some chose to declare their positions before any common EU stance had been adopted or even discussed.¹⁸⁶

On March 11, EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy called for an extra EU summit on the Libya crisis after a request from France and the UK.¹⁸⁷ The meeting discussed a series of proposals put forward by David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy. Expressing their support for the NTC, Sarkozy and Cameron also suggested the establishment of a NFZ over Libya:

“We condemn, and call for an immediate halt to, the use of force against civilians by the Gaddafi regime. We support continued planning to be ready to provide support for all possible contingencies as the situation evolves on the basis of demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and firm regional support. This could include a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks, working

¹⁸⁵ Erik Brattberg, “Opportunities lost, opportunities seized: the Libya crisis as Europe’s perfect storm”, European Policy Centre, 30 June 2011.

¹⁸⁶ The French recognition of the NTC was for example made unilaterally the day before a European Council meeting on 11 March. Andrew Rettman, “France alienates fellow EU countries on Libya”, *EUobserver*, 10 March 2011.

¹⁸⁷ Andrew Rettman, “EU calls emergency Libya summit for 11 March”, *EUobserver*, 1 March 2011.

with Allies and partners, especially those in the region. We are working together on elements of an appropriate UNSCR.”¹⁸⁸

The Summit ended without support for the British and French calls. A French official described how the proposals were received among the other member states: “The answer was a flat ‘NO, forget about it’”.¹⁸⁹ The same French official recounted that another early French proposal – that the EU should manage the maritime embargo given its experiences from the Horn of Africa – also fell through due to lacking political will among member states.¹⁹⁰

On April 1, 2011, the EU started to prepare for a military operation in order to support humanitarian assistance operations in Libya (EUFOR Libya). An Operational Headquarters was activated in Rome. EUFOR Libya was to be deployed only if requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The UN OCHA-conditionality meant that the decision whether there would be an EU mission was left in the hands of a United Nations agency.¹⁹¹ Since there was never any request from OCHA, the EU mission was never launched.

6.1.2 Motivations and Results

Different reasons were given when member states tried to explain their reluctance to get involved in Libya. Romania argued it was not yet “the moment” for a military solution in Libya and that a NFZ was something only NATO could undertake.¹⁹² Some thought the UK-French proposals were leaning towards “regime change” and did not want to take part for that reason.¹⁹³ Yet others interpreted the Libya intervention as being motivated by oil interests. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov said the military intervention in Libya was an “adventure driven by petroleum interests”¹⁹⁴ while German Defence Minister de

¹⁸⁸ “Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy”, *The Guardian*, 10 March 2011.

¹⁸⁹ Interview, Paris, 6 March 2011.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Council of the European Union, “Council decides on EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya”, 8589/11, Brussels, 1 April 2011. See also *EU Observer*, “Foreign ministers wary of EU military role in Libya”, 11 April 2011.

¹⁹² Sanskar Shrivastava, “Nations Oppose Military Intervention in Libya”, *The World Reporter*, 19 March 2011.

¹⁹³ Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said only on April 19 that Gaddafi in power was not an option. See *BBC News*, “Poland backs Libya regime change”, 19 April 2011.

¹⁹⁴ *EU Business*, “Libya intervention driven by oil interest: Bulgaria PM”, 21 March 2011

Maizière rhetorically asked “Could the fact that we are suddenly intervening now have something to do with oil?”¹⁹⁵

Somewhat surprisingly, Poland – traditionally viewed as being Atlanticist – distanced itself from the intervention. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski early on described developments in Libya as an “internal problem” and Prime Minister Tusk accused the European leaders of being hypocrites due to their inconsistency on human rights.¹⁹⁶ When explaining the Polish decision not to engage in Libya, analysts have highlighted that Poland had no direct interests in Libya and that Poland was already involved in Afghanistan. Poland also justified its decision by referring to the importance for Warsaw to take a neutral position ahead of its incoming Presidency of the EU in the autumn of 2011.¹⁹⁷ However, despite the fact that more than half of EU’s member states refused to get involved in Libya, it was the German opposition which surprised the most (see Chapter Four). Some EU member states who shared Berlin’s misgivings about the intervention could hide behind the German position.

The EU has worked on developing its CFSP for over a decade. Given the very nature of the Libya crisis (democratic aspirations), its scale (a relatively small area affected) and its location (Libya being close to Europe), many saw this as a golden opportunity for the EU to take lead, yet a CSDP mission was never really viewed as an option.¹⁹⁸

The Libya crisis highlighted the EU’s lack of permanent planning structures, which, in turn, hinders advance planning and, ultimately, a quick response to crises.¹⁹⁹ Within two weeks of the start of the crisis in Libya, NATO had reportedly prepared four possible operational plans, compared to the two months it took for the EU to reach the same planning stage.²⁰⁰

The High Representative, Catherine Ashton, was widely criticised in her attempts to be the common voice of the EU. Throughout the Libya crisis she chose a line of “the lowest common denominator” and was always among the last

¹⁹⁵ Ralf Beste and Dirk Kurbjuweit, “SPIEGEL Interview with Defense Minister De Maizière ‘We Will Not Get Involved’ in Libya”, *Spiegel Online International*, 20 June 2011.

¹⁹⁶ *Reuters*, “Polish PM chides Europe over Libya ‘hypocrisy’”, 9 April 2011; Josh Rogin, “Polish FM on Libya: No no-fly, let Them work it out Internally”, *Foreign Policy*, 2 March 2011.

¹⁹⁷ Daria Dylla, “Poland, Libya and NATO”, *Atlantic Council*, 6 March 2011.

¹⁹⁸ See for example A. Nicoll, “War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2011.

¹⁹⁹ For more on the EU’s planning process, see for example Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “EU Battlegroups: What Contribution to European Defence?”, SWP Research Paper, June 2011.

²⁰⁰ Nicole Koenig, “Libya: A wakeup call for CSDP?”, TEPSA Brief, March 2012.

internationally to take a stance, for example, in saying Gaddafi must go or expressing support for military action.²⁰¹

When the international community eventually decided to respond to the Libya crisis, only five of EU's 27 member states participated in strike missions (France, UK, Denmark, Belgium and Italy). Four member states participated with air support (Sweden, Spain, Netherlands and Greece) and two participated in the naval operation to enforce the arms embargo (Bulgaria and Romania). The rest of the EU member states did not participate at all.²⁰²

The EU has received extensive criticism for its inaction and indecision over Libya. Eva Gross, of the Institute of European Studies, talked about a messy EU response, "Rather than showcasing post-Lisbon EU leadership, European reactions to the Arab Spring were all too familiar as a cacophony of voices from individual European capitals drowned out Brussels-based institutions and personalities".²⁰³ Sven Biscop, of Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, pointed at the lack of European unity saying that the "Europeans have no collective idea whatsoever of their role as security providers in their own neighbourhood".²⁰⁴

6.2 NATO – Not the First Choice, but then Performed

NATO's engagement in Libya has been widely portrayed as a success of the alliance.²⁰⁵ However, at the initial stage of the uprisings in Libya, it was unclear whether NATO would have a role at all with member states openly disagreeing. Initially, under US coordination, French, British and US military operations were conducted under the different code names of Operation Harmattan (France), Operation Ellamy (UK), and Operation Odyssey Dawn (US). On March 31, NATO took over full command of the Libya operation under Operation Unified Protector (OUP).

²⁰¹ IISS Strategic Comments, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", Volume 17, Comment 18, April 2011. Interviews, Paris, 6 March 2012 and London, 9 March 2012.

²⁰² NATO, "NATO fact sheet on contributing nations", 5 April 2011; *Wikipedia*, "2011 military intervention in Libya: Forces committed". See also A. Nicoll, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", The International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2011.

²⁰³ Eva Gross, "Impotent bystanders? How did the EU and US respond to the Arab Spring?", ISS, 27 September 2001.

²⁰⁴ Sven Biscop, "The future of EU-US security and defence cooperation: what lies ahead?" Debate, ISS, 29 September 2011.

²⁰⁵ Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya – The Right Way to Run an Intervention", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2012.

6.2.1 The Political Decision-Making Process

At the initial stage of the uprisings in Libya it was unclear whether NATO would have a role at all. On March 3, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said NATO had no intention to intervene in Libya, adding though that the defence alliance always undertook prudent planning for “all eventualities”.²⁰⁶ It is of interest to note that while Washington hesitated on how best to respond to the Libya crisis, within NATO the US is said to have been proactive in pushing for the alliance to start preparing on the military side should there be agreement on military action.²⁰⁷

Soon after the military intervention had been launched, several states said they preferred NATO to be in charge of the operation. While France opposed the idea of NATO taking over, many countries threatened to boycott any other arrangement. The British were the ones who most clearly pushed for the intervention to take place under the NATO umbrella, but also Italy early on set an ultimatum that the operation had to be led by NATO for their bases to be used.²⁰⁸ France and Turkey both opposed a NATO framework at different times, albeit for different reasons. For a more detailed account, see Chapter Two (pp. 19-20).

Eventually, disagreements were solved and on March 25, NATO announced it would gradually take over command of the operations. NATO assumed full command of the Libya campaign on March 31.

6.2.2 Motivations and Results

The positions of some key member states with regard to NATO’s role in the intervention have been discussed in previous chapters.

In the end, while NATO took over military command of the Libya campaign, political control seemed to have rested largely elsewhere than with NAC. The Libya Contact Group was charged with political coordination, and, in order to circumvent divisions within NATO, shorter-term and operational decisions were largely made in Paris, London and Washington as well as between countries participating in the campaign, mainly the eight ones that performed airstrike missions.²⁰⁹ This interpretation seemed to have been confirmed when, in April, Obama, Sarkozy and Cameron published a joint op-ed in the *International*

²⁰⁶ NATO, “Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Prime Minister of Montenegro Mr. Igor Lukšić”, 3 March 2011.

²⁰⁷ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

²⁰⁸ *EU Observer*, “Italy presses for Nato command of Libya war”, 22 March 2011.

²⁰⁹ See e.g. IISS Strategic Comments, “War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”, Volume 17, Comment 18, April 2011

Herald Tribune that appeared to call for regime change, widely interpreted as setting a political direction for the mission.²¹⁰

The efforts of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in the Libya crisis have been praised. His willingness to take initiative has been highlighted as has his readiness to push member states forward even though he at times got criticised for pushing too hard.²¹¹ One case in point is when at one NAC meeting on Libya the Secretary General criticised France's and Germany's positions in such strong terms that it resulted in the French and German officials leaving the meeting in anger.²¹²

NATO's engagement in Libya is broadly viewed as a success. In a joint article, US Permanent Representative to NATO, Ivo H. Daalder, and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), James G. Stavridis, portrayed it as a "model intervention" praising NATO for responding quickly, fulfilling the mission, involving partners and sharing the burden among member states.²¹³

* * *

Libya underscored the fact that the envisioned shift of power from the capitals to Brussels has not occurred. Instead, while the Contact Group was responsible for political coordination, shorter-term and operational decisions seemed to have been made in the capitals, especially of those countries participating in the airstrike missions. This is also a result of the relatively limited number of states participating in the campaign. Only eight of NATO's 28 member states participated in the airstrike sorties over Libya. The lack of shared perceived threats and strategic interests means challenges to international security will most likely be met by temporary coalitions of the willing also in the future, as was the case in Libya. While such solutions offer countries flexibility, ad hoc alignments also risk creating blocs, for example, based on differing views on the use of force. NATO's positive experiences from collaborating with non-member states in the Libya campaign encourage a continued interest to explore and deepen various forms of operational partnerships. The tendency for temporary coalitions of the willing to meet international security threats is likely to accentuate the appeal of such broader collaborations.

²¹⁰ Obama, Barack, Cameron, David, and Sarkozy, Nicolas, "Libya's Pathway to Peace", *International Herald Tribune*, April 14, 2011.

²¹¹ Three interviews in Brussels, 9 May 2012.

²¹² Kim Willsher, "Sarkozy opposes Nato taking control of Libya operation", *The Guardian*, 22 March 2011.

²¹³ Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya – The Right Way to Run an Intervention", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2012.

7 Conclusions and Implications

When analysing events leading up to the military campaign in Libya, it is of interest to consider whether they have in any way changed the setting for international security policy. Is it possible to identify any new patterns in the shaping of international politics? The Libya operation and its enabling circumstances were in many ways unique. At the same time, the preceding decision-making process and the military operation confirmed and highlighted certain states of affairs and trends in international security.

Some of the issues and trends identified in this study were not new, but were rather confirmed by the Libya crisis. One case in point was the lacking confidence in CSDP. As stated by one interviewee, the EU did not disappoint “as there were no expectations”.²¹⁴ Indeed, a general sense of fatigue with international institutions could be detected in discussions with interviewees. In the same breath, some expressed a more positive sentiment towards the formation of smaller defence collaborations between a limited number of countries, such as that which was signed between France and the UK in November 2010. Moreover, the Libya crisis seemed to confirm that the formation of coalitions of the willing have become the norm to meet international security challenges. It remains to be seen whether these trends may undermine the cohesion of NATO and/or the EU by creating blocs, based on for example operational partnerships.

The surprise and, to many, disappointment was instead Germany. On the one hand, Germany’s decision not participate in the intervention was largely seen to have been a deviation, partly due to specific domestic circumstances. On the other hand, some of the reasons for Berlin’s unwillingness to join were based in deeply rooted factors – Germany’s reluctance to use force as a foreign policy instrument and the relatively slow policy-making process.

Yet another thing which stood out when considering the period leading up to the intervention in Libya was that a couple of European member states were at the forefront both in pushing for and carrying out the campaign. The contributions of the US were indispensable to the efforts, but it was also clear that Washington shunned the spotlight. US calls for its European allies to step up to the plate and shoulder a greater responsibility for security in Europe are not new. In addition, the Libya campaign highlighted European capability gaps. However, the success of the intervention together with its relatively heavy European component may still suggest that European countries will be more willing to take a proactive stance also in future crises, and that the US will expect them to do so.

²¹⁴ Interview, Paris, 7 March 2012.

At the same time, it is important to remember that France – and, more specifically, President Sarkozy played a critical role in pushing for the military effort in Libya. It is unclear whether his successor, President Hollande, would have been as aggressively proactive. This underlines the ever so important part played by personalities. However, in the case of Libya, the speed of events arguably made them even more influential as the number of decision makers with a say became very limited.

Some of the findings in this study may warrant further research and detailed analysis. For example, it could be of interest to look more into challenges and opportunities of new and old forms of partnerships for NATO. In Libya, the collaboration with and contributions of non-member states were much valued and viewed as a positive experience. Another intriguing question is how best to solve the challenge of existing capability gaps and stretched defence budgets, which call for countries to specialise and realise synergies by pooling and sharing, in a world of flexible responses and ever changing coalitions of the willing? That is, how can countries best prioritise their military structures and equipment when one does not know with whom one will collaborate tomorrow when meeting possible challenges to international security? Similarly, a study on influencing factors in, and results from, international defence collaborations could be of value, for example analysing to what extent factors such as shared defence cultures and defence industries make a difference.

There are also a number of thought-provoking issues on the national level. For example, it could be of interest to delve into the question of how different political systems and institutions determine the direction and speed of policies, and what role a National Security Council, or a corresponding arrangement, can play. Considering specific countries, this study raises numerous follow-up questions. The US is a case in point. The experiences of the US from the Libya intervention together with Washington's new focus towards the Asia-Pacific may warrant a fresh examination of US views and expectations of the EU and NATO.

Below follows a summary of trends and issues, which were identified in the research for this study. The inferences made are divided into three sections; first presented are those which relate to the international system at large; then, follows a section on the EU and NATO, and; lastly, some implications are drawn with regard to individual member states.

7.1 The International System

- *“Wars of Choice” - The New Normal*

Today, challenges to international security will be met by temporary coalitions of the willing. Libya showed that countries will make different assessments as to whether they want to join a military mission. At the

end of the day, only eight of NATO's 28 member states participated in the airstrike sorties over Libya. Some observers concluded that the lacklustre support weakened NATO politically. Arguably, however, the divergent views and willingness to contribute are not strange given the lack of common threats and strategic interests shared by all. Nor should it be viewed as a failure for NATO if all member states do not join a mission. But there are also those who speak of a widening divide between states in NATO and the EU in terms of how they view the use of force. While offering flexibility, ad hoc alignments could thus create blocs.

- ***The Continued Weight of International Approval for Legitimacy***

The countries who wanted to see a military intervention against Gaddafi were keen to first secure international backing and, then, were careful to underscore the fact that the action was mandated by a UNSCR. Given the trend of temporary coalitions being formed to deal with separate international crises, multilateral approval (e.g. by way of UNSCRs), remains essential. In such a setting of "wars of choice", getting a stamp of approval from the international community can translate into a sense of legitimacy, and possibly also into increased capabilities as additional countries may feel more comfortable with joining a mission.

Gaining international legitimacy by way of a UNSCR is linked to the question of the UN Security Council's membership and that of consistency – why intervene in country X but not in country Y? Critically, China and Russia did not use their veto in the vote on UNSCR 1973. However, ensuing disagreement on the mandate, with Beijing and Moscow seeming to feel that the mission to protect Libyan civilians turned into a hunt for Gaddafi, has already affected their voting in the Security Council. Their sense of having had their fingers burned over Libya is a main explanation for why they are now vetoing action in Syria. Of course, as much as ad hoc coalitions are a result of divergent views and interests, such differences can also hinder international support for an action. It is of interest to note that some of the countries that are often mentioned as potential candidates for permanent seats on the Security Council – Germany, India and Brazil – abstained from voting on UNSCR 1973.

- ***Setting a Precedent for R2P?***

UNSCR 1973 invoked the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) to authorise the military operation which followed. Some commentators meant the international community's willingness to take the hard line set a precedent and increased the likelihood for future actions to protect civilians in need. Most, however, seemed to conclude

that the Libya campaign harmed the concept of R2P given the opinion among some that the military mission went beyond the R2P mandate granted in UNSCR 1973. Most notably China and Russia appear to be of the view that the military campaign which was waged to protect the Libyan people quickly became a war to oust Gaddafi.

7.2 The EU and NATO

- *A More European NATO?*

European member states were at the forefront of the NATO intervention in Libya, and expectations are that European countries should be prepared to shoulder a larger defence role in Europe. Neither the French nor the British were prepared for the US to take such a pronounced backseat role. At the same time, the US has for long called on its European allies to step up to the plate and contribute more to NATO. Indeed, expectations are that the US will not be able to take lead everywhere, but that Europe should be able to handle problems in its own neighbourhood, especially given Washington's increasing focus towards the Asia-Pacific and its own budget cuts. That raises the question of what European countries are capable of doing with only limited military support from the US. That said, the dominating view in many European capitals is that this will not take place at the expense of Europe's security – the collective defence commitment under Article V remains unthreatened.²¹⁵ It should also be emphasised that there is a broad recognition that while Washington was reluctant to lead international efforts in Libya, the US played a decisive role and the operation highlighted European capability gaps and dependency on US support.²¹⁶

- *NATO Looks to Operational Partnerships*

The Arab League's support was a crucial reason for why the Libya intervention happened in the first place, and the participation (while of varying degree) of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Morocco was much appreciated and was seen to add a sense of legitimacy to the campaign against Libya – a fellow member state of the League. Also the air patrols carried out by non-NATO member Sweden were highly praised. These successful collaborations with operational

²¹⁵ Interview, Brussels 9 May 2012.

²¹⁶ For an evaluation of the Libya intervention, see Fredrik Lindvall and David Forsman, "Internationella insatser i Libyen 2011" ("*International operations in Libya 2011*"), Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), June 2012.

partners will most likely fuel a continued interest for NATO to explore and deepen its various forms of dialogues and partnerships. The tendency for temporary coalitions of the willing to join forces in different crises is expected to accentuate the appeal of such broader collaborations. In future operations, one of the first questions will most likely be, ‘What partners do we have in the area?’.²¹⁷ Categorising countries based on whether they are members or not of the alliance will increasingly be replaced by an interest for whether states are contributing to NATO operations or not.

- ***The Shift of Power From the Capitals to Brussels has Not Occurred***

Ultimately, political control of the Libya mission rested in the capitals. The system of fluid coalitions in “wars of choice” and a general scepticism against, and fatigue with, international institutions means power rests mainly in the capitals of member states while Brussels has less influence. While the Contact Group was charged with political coordination, shorter-term and operational decisions were most likely made by Paris, London and Washington as well as between the nine countries conducting air strike missions.²¹⁸ NAC, on the other hand, became a secondary decision forum, mainly as a way to circumvent divisions within the alliance. That France advocated for placing political control of the mission with the Contact Group has been seen by some as a way to divert decision-making away from NATO's core.²¹⁹ The Contact Group is considered to have functioned well though, giving the intervention a clear international voice, and the concept is likely to be copied in the future.

- ***EU's Inaction in Libya Affirmed Negative Sentiments Towards CSDP***

The EU's failure to reach agreement and act in Libya affirmed negative sentiments with regards to the organisation's capacity to provide hard security. In the UK, EU-sceptics were given water to their mill. In France, disappointment was considerable. While Quai d'Orsay still publicly promotes a stronger EU, there is now a perceivable sense of fatigue with international institutions after Libya. The EU's failure to act militarily close to home raises questions about the organisation's

²¹⁷ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

²¹⁸ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy Norway, the UAE, the UK and the US. This was a conclusion reached also e.g. in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “War in Libya: Europe's confused response”, IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 17, Comment 18 – April 2011.

²¹⁹ Alastair Cameron, “The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO” in Adrian Johnson and Saeed Mueen (eds.), “Short war, Long Shadow - The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, Whitehall Report 1-12, RUSI, 2012.

strategic objectives and priorities as well as capability as a crisis manager. A general perception in the aftermath of the Libya crisis was that pooling and sharing initiatives keep CSDP alive, while political trust and confidence are weak. Instead, the EU's response in Libya had a civilian orientation, and it should be noted that coordination through DG ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office) reportedly functioned well.²²⁰

- ***Smaller Defence Collaborations - "Finding Friends Within the Family"***

There is a strong trend towards the formation of defence collaborations between a limited number of individual member states. The difficulties both within NATO and the EU in reaching agreement during the Libya crisis and the failure of the EU not only to act in Libya but also to deliver on CSDP, are causing member states to look for a smaller number of likeminded allies. Cuts in defence budgets and the resulting need to realise synergies are at the same time encouraging countries to cooperate. The tendency to seek bilateral security agreements also reaches outside Europe. Some European countries are eager to enter bilateral defence collaborations with Washington in order to solidify the links with the US.

This trend of forming smaller defence partnerships was exemplified by the UK-French defence treaty of November 2010 and the countries' ensuing cooperation in the Libya operation. While the treaty is not considered to have been a driving factor behind the intervention, its functioning was to some degree tested in Libya. Regarded as having mainly been a success, European coalitions comprising a smaller number of friends are now widely spoken of as a possible formula for the future, and especially so in Paris. However, such groupings risk dividing the EU and thus eroding the sense of solidarity between member states – the very glue holding the union together. Many interviewed for this report expressed a hope that the Franco-British treaty will set the course for other member states to enter similar defence collaborations or even that between Paris and London.

However, whether the Franco-British treaty will succeed in boosting cooperation within the EU remains to be seen. It is interesting to note that a rift may have evolved between France and the UK with regard to how they view their relationship. The new French President François Hollande is said to be less keen than his predecessor on exclusive

²²⁰ See for example Erik Brattberg, "Opportunities lost, opportunities seized: the Libya crisis as Europe's perfect storm", European Policy Centre, Policy Brief, June 2011.

bilateral agreements, and instead prefers to open up collaborations to other European allies.²²¹ It is of interest to note that France and Germany signed a broad defence procurement cooperation in June 2012,²²² possibly revealing Hollande's more inclusive view of defence collaborations.

- ***Europe's Capability Gaps to Spur Defence Collaborations?***

The military operation in Libya revealed gaps in European military capabilities, particularly in areas such as ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities and air-to-air refuelling.²²³ While the campaign has been described as a success in terms of European countries taking the lead, the operation still very much relied on US capabilities, including command and control functions. Neither are European military arsenals expected to grow given planned defence cuts. This speaks for lessons from Libya acting as a pull factor for increased pooling and sharing to realise synergies. On the other hand, "wars of choice" and fluid coalitions of the willing create a sense of uncertainty which can severely undermine efforts to pool and share military capabilities. Events leading up to the military campaign displayed a lack of unity on when to intervene and on the use force. Continued capability gaps in Europe suggest a continued dependency on the US and, consequently, a restricted room for manoeuvre in security policy-making.

7.3 Member States

- ***Fast Moving Events Crippled the Political Systems in Many Countries***

The political systems in all countries had some difficulties in keeping up with the rapid developments. There was not always time for consensus to be built and ministers were at times overruled. Moreover, the fast moving pace meant at times that information sharing between the countries, rather than coordination, was the order of the day. The military operation was launched only one month after protests had erupted. In order to get some perspective on how rapidly the intervention

²²¹ Carola Hoyos, "Anglo-French defence pact opened to other allies", *Financial Times*, 24 July 2012, and Tomas Valasek, "Is the Franco-British defence treaty in trouble?", Centre for European Reform, 27 July 2012.

²²² Sabine Siebold, "Germany, France to deepen defense cooperation", *Reuters*, 14 June 2012.

²²³ See for example UK Defence Committee, "Ninth Report – Operations in Libya", 25 January 2012.

was initiated, one may recall that it took the international community more than a year to act in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

- ***Personalities Matter***

As so often is the case, personalities played a critical role in the unfolding of events. It is possible that the speed of events also acted to restrict the number of decision makers who were influential. This underscores the potential consequence of upcoming elections across Europe and in the US for the future direction of EU and NATO. The US presidential elections are to be held in November 2012, German federal elections in 2013 and the British general elections are scheduled for May 2015. Possible consequences of Sarkozy's loss and François Hollande's victory in the French presidential elections in 2012 are discussed below.

7.3.1 France

- ***France Learned that NATO Works***

Paris discovered that NATO can serve French interests and that it can have a leading role within the organisation. It also learned that NATO can be efficient in times of crisis. This speaks for a continued French commitment to the integration process into NATO. Simultaneously, France's military performance as well as its proactive approach, while at times annoying its allies, gained the respect of other member states. Consequently, France – previously limited to the EU and various forms of collaborations with other countries – has gained another instrument in its toolbox for safeguarding its interests and promoting international security.

Despite having expressed scepticism against France's return to NATO's military command and promised an evaluation of the decision, new President Hollande is not expected to backtrack and leave the alliance's structures. Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian, at the time Hollande's Senior Advisor, said "We would not have done [the integration], but we are not going to undo anything."²²⁴ Hollande himself, when asked whether he was not just following Sarkozy's policy with regard to NATO, chose to link it to his desire to strengthen European defence.

"I set a condition for France's return into the integrated military command – namely, that there should be progress on Defence

²²⁴ Leo G. Michel, "Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests", Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, *Strategic Perspectives* 10, April 2012.

Europe... Over the coming months I'll ensure Defence Europe can be strengthened in the framework of the Alliance and therefore of NATO.”²²⁵

- ***France Remains Committed to the EU but Shows Fatigue***

The French view is still that both the EU and NATO are valuable and have roles to play. The lacklustre response of the EU during the Libya crisis did however translate into a certain level of fatigue in Paris with CSDP. Increasingly, French analysts and officials speak of the value of supplementary relations, including NATO as well as bilateral and multilateral collaborations.²²⁶ The Franco-British diplomatic and military cooperation in Libya is raised as a successful example.

Effectively testing the bilateral defence treaty signed only months before, the bilateral collaboration with the UK during the Libya crisis has been praised as a success and French officials seem proud of how its forces performed. The French and British armed forces are seen to share many qualities, including their expeditionary profiles and full spectrum military capabilities. Interviews conducted in Paris for this report, as well as reports in media, indicate that the French government is now eager to open up the cooperation to additional European countries. As noted by one commentator: “Let us not forget that several French circles hoped that the co-operation could help bring the UK closer to European defence.”²²⁷

All in all, new President Hollande is expected to deliver a similar defence policy as his predecessor, albeit with a more cautious style.²²⁸ Hollande, possibly less disillusioned than those in the government during the Libya crisis, may be more willing though to inject new energy into strengthening CSDP.²²⁹ Many question marks are expected to be ironed out in the upcoming White Paper. The work is reportedly

²²⁵ French Embassy in the UK, “Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Press Briefing by M. François Hollande, President of the Republic”, 21 May 2012, www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Hollande-on-NATO

²²⁶ Interviews in Paris, March 2011. See Leo G. Michel, “Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, *Strategic Perspectives* 10, April 2012.

²²⁷ Vivien Pertusot, “Defence and Foreign Policy Under President-elect François Hollande”, Commentary, RUSI, 6 May 2012.

²²⁸ See for example Jean-Pierre Darnis, “François Hollande’s Presidency: A New Era in French Foreign Policy?”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 1219, June 2012.

²²⁹ Interview, Paris, 7 March 2012, and see for example Vivien Pertusot, “Defence and Foreign Policy Under President-elect François Hollande”, Commentary, RUSI, 6 May 2012.

coordinated by Jean-Claude Mallet, the same official who led Sarkozy's strategic review. This indicated a level of continuity.²³⁰

7.3.2 Germany

- *Germany's Reluctance to Use Force Will Remain*

Germany's stance in the Libya crisis was in a way a deviation; in another way it was not. While a set of particular circumstances led to Berlin's chosen course, events also very much highlighted Germany's deep reluctance to use military force as a foreign policy tool. This will not change in the near future.

That said, it is important to bear in mind that Germany has taken giant leaps in terms of its willingness to act militarily abroad. There is a more honest discourse among policy makers on the use of military force as a viable option²³¹ and the country contributes some 4,900 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).²³² Moreover, the Bundeswehr is slowly transforming its Cold War structure to a more expeditionary profile. While on-going reforms involve reductions of the armed forces by some 25 per cent to up to 185,000 soldiers, plans are also to be able to at any one time deploy up to 10,000 military personnel.²³³ While the earlier Bundeswehr Concept had provided for the deployment of up to 14,000 military personnel, the German forces has found themselves to be stretched to their limits with only some 7,000 military personnel deployed.²³⁴

Some commentators suggest the tension that arose following the abstention has made Berlin more attuned to its allies' expectations and more likely to take an active role in the future.²³⁵ While this may be true, the profound averseness to war due to the country's history and amongst other things, experiences in Afghanistan, compounded by large cuts in

²³⁰ Jean-Pierre Darnis, "François Hollande's Presidency: A New Era in French Foreign Policy?", Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 1219, June 2012.

²³¹ See for example Wolfgang Ischinger, "Germany after Libya: Still a responsible power?" in Tomas Valasek (ed.), "All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO", Centre for European Reform, 1 March 2012.

²³² www.isaf.nato.int, accessed on 12 June 2012.

²³³ German Federal Ministry of Defence, "Current Status of the Bundeswehr Reorientation", 1 November 2011, www.bmwg.de.

²³⁴ Presse- und Informationsstab des BMVg, "Structural Reform: Briefing of the Defence Committees", 1 Sept 2010, www.bmwg.de.

²³⁵ See for example Wolfgang Ischinger, "Germany after Libya: Still a responsible power?" in Tomas Valasek (ed.), "All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO", Centre for European Reform, 1 March 2012.

the defence budget, speaks against Germany becoming more prone to military action. Until 2014, the defence budget of 30 billion euros is to be cut by upwards of 8 billion euros.²³⁶ In addition, Germany is not expected to drastically change its line of policy with current policy makers in place. Elections in 2013 could be decisive.

- ***German Caution Did Not Pay Off in Elections***

While Germany's cautious approach to a Libya intervention much reflected voters' weariness of getting dragged into another war, German policy makers may have drawn the lesson that foreign policy issues rarely win elections. In the regional elections, which followed soon after the Security Council's vote on UNSCR 1973, Foreign Minister Westerwelle's party FDP suffered losses. In the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, the FDP won just above the five per cent of the vote required for representation in the state parliament. However, in Rheinland Palatinate and Saxony Anhalt, Westerwelle's party failed to get into state parliament.²³⁷ Merkel's Christian Democratic Union suffered a huge setback in Baden-Württemberg, in which the party had ruled for almost six decades.²³⁸

- ***Germany Emerges as a Slightly Less Attractive Partner***

While irritation was considerable among allies when Germany chose to head for the exits instead of supporting military action in Libya, feelings now seem to have cooled down, and there is even some understanding for why Germany made the decisions it did. As noted by some commentators, the episode has for example not resulted in a fallout between Berlin and Washington.²³⁹ Indeed, the US itself was hesitant to intervene for a long time.

At the same time, for allies, the Libya events confirmed that Germany is a country which is reluctant to use force and has a slow-moving political process. Germany has for example for a long time been criticised for its national caveats – restrictions placed on German troops in Afghanistan. While Germany and France have a close relationship in the defence area,

²³⁶ Patrick Keller, "Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, June/July 2012, 54:3, 95-110.

²³⁷ Matt Zuvelat and Spencer Kimball, "Foreign minister resigns as head of Liberals, faces party executive", www.dw.de, 3 April 2011.

²³⁸ *Spiegel International Online*, "Massive Setback for Merkel Greens Score Big in Key German State", 28 March 2011.

²³⁹ Felix Berenskoetter, "Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany's Abstention on Libya", Blog, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 21 April 2011, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/04/germany-libya/>

concerns have been raised also in Paris whether Germany is a reliable military partner if there is a risk of combat.²⁴⁰ Berlin's preference for the status quo also surfaced when Germany advocated against any transformative agendas in debates preceding NATO's new 2010 Strategic Concept.²⁴¹

All in all, this may mean that Germany appears as a slightly less attractive partner in areas such as pooling and sharing as well as military operations, as these rely on confidence and shared views on security and military action.

- ***German Policy Making Not Designed for Quick Responses***

Germany's policy-making system is not designed to move quickly. Even if there would be a willingness to show active response, the policy-making process will continue to hamper swift action in a similarly rapidly evolving crisis such as that in Libya. Germany's at times protracted policy making, built on consensus-building, stands in contrast to crises involving for example R2P, which by their very nature often call for a quick response. Analyst Wolfgang Ischinger has suggested that Berlin should consider the establishment of something similar to a National Security Council in order to improve and facilitate the security policy process and structure, e.g. improved systematic analysis in situations similar to that of Libya.²⁴²

7.3.3 The United Kingdom

- ***Libya Revealed UK Preferences for and Reliance on the US***

Although the Franco-British collaboration worked well, the Libya crisis also seemed to reveal the UK's continued preferences for and reliance on the US. One case in point was that Washington's call for someone else to take lead in Libya is believed to have been a key motivator behind the UK's decision to engage in Libya.²⁴³ A British analyst interviewed for this report indicated that British fears that the use of a French or British OHQ would have made it easier for the Americans to

²⁴⁰ Leo G. Michel, "Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests", Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, *Strategic Perspectives* 10, April 2012.

²⁴¹ Patrick Keller, "Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 54:3, 95-110.

²⁴² Wolfgang Ischinger, "Germany after Libya: Still a responsible power?" in Tomas Valasek (ed.), "All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO", Centre for European Reform, 1 March 2012.

²⁴³ See for example IISS Strategic Comments, "War in Libya: Europe's confused response", Volume 17, Comment 18, April 2011.

walk away was one explanation for why London wanted NATO take over command and control of the campaign.²⁴⁴

- ***No Change in UK View on Division of Labour Between the EU and NATO***

Libya did not change the way the UK views the roles of the EU and NATO: NATO first – if not NATO, then a coalition of the willing, if not NATO nor a coalition of the willing, then – perhaps – the EU. The UK policy line is still that there should be a division of labour between the organisations, with NATO handling military operations and the EU focusing on softer security, e.g. peacebuilding, making use of its more comprehensive toolbox.²⁴⁵

- ***EU's Failure to Act Provided Ammunition for British EU-Scepticism***

The UK has long been recognised as one of the most EU-sceptic countries in Europe. According to a recent YouGov poll, conducted in the spring 2012, 51 per cent of the British would vote to leave the EU if a referendum was held.²⁴⁶ The EU's inaction in Libya further reinforced these negative sentiments towards the organisation.²⁴⁷

But with the US increasingly looking towards the Asia-Pacific and calling for Europe to take care of its own neighbourhood, it may arguably not be wise for the UK to discard the EU if it is to preserve its 'special relationship' with the US. For the US, the UK is an important partner in the EU. Already in 2009, US Ambassador to the UK Louis Susman said the UK needed to remain a strong player in the EU.²⁴⁸

- ***Libya Tested the Newly Established National Security Council (NSC)***

Libya was the first time UK forces had been deployed in a new crisis since the setting up of the National Security Council (NSC) in May 2010.²⁴⁹ A subsequent review by the National Security Adviser concluded that the coordinating mechanisms of the NSC had overall functioned well by bringing together relevant Ministers and officials. Its

²⁴⁴ Interview, London 9 March 2012.

²⁴⁵ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

²⁴⁶ YouGov, "Sunday Times Survey Results", 2012.

²⁴⁷ Clara Marina O'Donnell, "Britain draws the wrong lessons from Libya", Centre for European Reform, 1 August 2011.

²⁴⁸ Policy Network, "What future for Europe?", 2011.

²⁴⁹ The British Prime Minister's Office, "Establishment of a National Security Council", 12 May 2010, www.number10.gov.uk/news/establishment-of-a-national-security-council, and UK National Security Adviser, "Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser's Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned", 1 December 2011.

recommendations had enabled the UK government to make rapid, well-informed and well-coordinated decisions. The NSC is likely to play a prominent role also in future crises.

- ***Reflections on UK Policy of Recognising States***

France's early recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) took London by surprise.²⁵⁰ The National Security Adviser's review of the UK handling of the Libya crisis notes that the UK policy of recognising states and not governments will be evaluated:

"The UK has supported the NTC since its creation on 5 March. The UK's long-standing policy is to recognise States, not Governments. But in certain exceptional cases, such as happened with the NTC and Libya, HMG should be ready to review and adapt such policies, even where deeply engrained, where that is clearly in the UK's interests to do so."²⁵¹

7.3.4 The United States

- ***US Calls for Burden-Sharing Not a One-Off***

While the US played a crucial role in the Libya intervention, the administration was keen to stay in the background and for allies to take the lead. Washington welcomed the true burden-sharing.²⁵² President Obama has since proclaimed that the US led from the front, in response to conservative criticism at home that the US should take leadership in the world and not settle for a strategy of "leading from behind". However, ultimately, the US approach throughout the intervention was one of discretion. This, in turn, enabled a more international profile of the intervention, and one which paid off.

US calls for burden-sharing are not new and the positive experiences from Libya should indicate that the US will continue to encourage a division of labour between itself and Europe, where European allies are expected to shoulder a larger responsibility for its geographical neighbourhood. At the same time, the Libya intervention showed that the US is not turning its back on Europe.

²⁵⁰ Interview, London 8 March 2012.

²⁵¹ UK National Security Adviser, "Libya Crisis: National Security Adviser's Review of Central Coordination and Lessons Learned", 1 December 2011.

²⁵² See for example "Biden: Libya action is shared burden", *CNN*, 20 October 2011.

- ***Libya Confirmed Obama's Foreign Policy Line – No Doctrine***

The reasoning behind the US decision to go to war in Libya confirmed Obama's earlier statements on the use of military force under his presidency. Simultaneously, one of the conclusions drawn was that the President does not have a solid doctrine but that US policy under Obama will instead rather be made on a case-by-case basis.²⁵³

Multilateralism and a light military footprint have emerged as main components of this administration's policy line. While the US stands ready to use force unilaterally in the case of a direct threat, indirect threats, such as the crisis in Libya, will be responded to multilaterally.²⁵⁴ Obama corroborated this in his speech at the National Defense University on March 28, 2011, in which he explained the intervention in Libya.²⁵⁵ When the US contributes to defend shared interests, including the prevention of genocide and keeping the peace, he said co-operation and burden-sharing were key.

- ***The Libya Campaign Built Confidence between Washington and Paris***

The Libya intervention showed the US that France could be an able and trustworthy partner. From a US perspective, France gained respect, but events also revealed CSDP's shortcomings. All things considered, the US view on the role of the EU and NATO did not change. The US does not object to progress of the EU, but not at the expense of NATO. US analysts expressed optimism that new French President Hollande will remain committed to the French integration process into NATO.²⁵⁶

7.4 Concluding Remarks

The Libya crisis shed light on a number of issues and trends in international affairs. Many of these already existed but were accentuated by the unfolding of events. At the same time, it is important to underline that the case of Libya was in many ways unique. Libya was a fairly small country and its geographical location was less sensitive than that of, for example, Syria. The military mission was also made easier by the fact that there was a relatively unified opposition

²⁵³ See for example Lizza Ryan, "The Consequentialist", *The New Yorker*, 2 May 2011, and Michael Crowley, "Obama's Libya Speech: No 'Doctrine', but a Peek at Priorities", *TIME*, 31 March 2011.

²⁵⁴ David Rohde, "The Obama Doctrine", *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2012.

²⁵⁵ Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 28 March 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript>

²⁵⁶ Interview, Brussels, 9 May 2012.

movement on the ground. Moreover, legitimising international support was granted as there was seen to be a clear humanitarian threat to the Libyan population. In addition, the unrest in Libya ignited on the heels of similar uprisings in neighbouring countries, which was creating a strong sense of solidarity across the world for the democratic wave sweeping across the region. Ultimately, the intervention could be undertaken with the rare blessing of the UNSC (albeit with abstentions).

International consensus was easier to reach as the opponent was Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi was a controversial leader, also in the Arab world, and the conflict quickly got to be portrayed by media like a play in which good fights evil. On the stage, the various countries assumed different parts. Gaddafi played the villain. Among the good guys, France, with President Sarkozy at the helm, stole much of the limelight throughout the crisis. The UK also took a lead part, but appeared somewhat more cautious when compared to France, with Prime Minister Cameron repeatedly finding himself diplomatically one step behind the French President. Their European colleague Germany had what seemed to be stage fright, deciding to cancel its appearance all together. Somewhat differently to what we may be used to, the US chose a more discreet role, staying in the background reminiscent of a prompter. However, in the same way as a prompter is indispensable to any play, the political and military contributions of the US proved to be crucial for the intervention in Libya.

While the stage set for the Libya crisis may have been unique, it is possible to discern some general trends relating to international affairs, and the EU and NATO in particular. We hope this report has been successful in presenting some.

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
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APPENDIX 1 - UNSCR 1973²⁵⁷



²⁵⁷ Security Council, SC/10200, 6498th Meeting (Night), Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions".

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Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya,

Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note further of the Secretary-General's call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and *stressing* that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, *welcoming* the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and *calling on* the international community to support those efforts,

Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Demands* the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. *Stresses* the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and *notes* the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

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3. *Demands* that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

Protection of civilians

4. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and *requests* the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. *Recognizes* the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, *requests* the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

No Fly Zone

6. *Decides* to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

7. *Decides further* that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

8. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and *requests* the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

9. *Calls upon* all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. *Requests* the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement

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paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

11. *Decides* that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. *Decides* that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : "Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, *calls upon* all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections";

14. *Requests* Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and *further requests* the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) ("the Committee") immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. *Requires* any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

16. *Deplores* the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and *calls upon* all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

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Ban on flights

17. *Decides* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

18. *Decides that* all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

Asset freeze

19. *Decides* that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

20. *Affirms* its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

21. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

Designations

22. *Decides* that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *decides further* that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

23. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970

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(2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

Panel of Experts

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

26. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. *Decides* that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

28. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011).

29. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Libya: UNSCR proposed designations

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
Annex I: Travel Ban			
1	QUREN SALIH QUREN AL QADHAFI	Libyan Ambassador to Chad. Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the regime.	
2	Colonel AMID HUSAIN AL KUNI	Governor of Ghat (South Libya). Directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.	

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
Annex II: Asset Freeze			
1	Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar	Position: Director, External Security Organisation	
2	Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis	Position: Defence Minister	Title: Major General DOB: --/--/1952. POB: Jalo, Libya
3	Matuq, Matuq Mohammed	Position: Secretary for Utilities	DOB: --/--/1956. POB: Khoms
4	Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1970. POB: Tripoli, Libya
5	Qadhafi, Saadi	Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations	DOB: 25/05/1973. POB: Tripoli, Libya
6	Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1982. POB: Tripoli, Libya
7	Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah	Position: Director Military Intelligence	Title: Colonel DOB: --/--/1949. POB: Sudan

Entities

1	Central Bank of Libya	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.
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<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
2	Libyan Investment Authority	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	a.k.a: Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) Address: 1 Fateh Tower Office, No 99 22nd Floor, Borgaida Street, Tripoli, Libya, 1103
3	Libyan Foreign Bank	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family and a potential source of funding for his regime.	
4	Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Jamahiriya Street, LAP Building, PO Box 91330, Tripoli, Libya
5	Libyan National Oil Corporation	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Bashir Saadwi Street, Tripoli, Tarabulus, Libya