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Bo Ljung, Johannes Malminen, Björn G. Backström, Sten Ternblad,

E. Anders Eriksson, Åke Wiss, Ann Ödlund, Jan Leijonhielm,

Wilhelm Unge, Ingmar Oldberg, Carolina Vendil,

Åke Påhlman, Niklas Granholm, Jan Foghelin.

Aspects of the Kosovo Operation
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Bo Ljung, Johannes Malminen, Björn G. Backström, Sten Ternblad, E. Anders Eriksson, Åke Wiss, Ann Ödlund, Jan Leijonhielm, Wilhelm Unge, Ingmar Oldberg, Carolina Vendil, Åke Påhlman, Niklas Granholm, Jan Foghelin.	Bo Ljung
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Aspects of the Kosovo Operation March-June 1999

Abstract (not more than 200 words)

FOI Defence Analysis has on behalf of the Parliamentary Defence Committee analysed the Kosovo Operation. A number of aspects are treated in different chapters written by FOI researchers. The following subjects, i.a., are discussed: NATO's security policy considerations, the implementation of the air operation, IT-related efforts, and influence of Russian thinking. In addition to this, implications for future Swedish International operations and experience gained by NATO are dealt with.

This report is an English version of FOA-R—00-01488-170—SE "Aspekter på Kosovo-operationen mars-juni 1999".

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Aspekter på Kosovo-operationen Mars-Juni 1999

Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord)

FOI Försvarsanalys har för Försvarsberedningens räkning gjort en analys av Kosovo-operationen. Ett antal aspekter och konsekvenser belyses i olika kapitel skrivna av FOI-forskare. Bland annat diskuteras NATO:s säkerhetspolitiska överväganden, flygoperationens genomförande, IT-relaterade insatser samt påverkan på ryskt tänkande. Härutöver tas upp implikationer för framtida svenska fredsfrämjande insatser samt NATO:s lärdomar inför framtida operationer.

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INTRODUCTION
Bo Ljung

Preface

In June 1999, the Defence Committee requested the Division of Defence Analysis at FOA, the Swedish Defence Research Establishment, to analyse the newly concluded Kosovo operation. The assignment sought primarily military strategic aspects and conclusions for Sweden. Against this background, division analysts and researchers at FOA conducted a study of the Kosovo operation, which was presented as a working memorandum (FOA Reg. nr 993737/S) to the Defence Committee on 1 September.

The study illustrates a number of aspects in separate chapters by different FOA researchers. The scope was limited by which personnel were available during the summer months (and who could be spared from other work assignments). The scope was also governed by the fact that the study was conducted shortly after the operation was concluded. The amount of information available was consequently limited.

At the same time, the Defence Committee was informed that FOA's Division of Defence Analysis would revise and supplement the study, as additional information became available. In support of this, two seminars including foreign participants were arranged during the autumn - a major one (together with the Defence Committee) and a smaller one - which illustrated the operation from security-policy/strategic and operational points of view.

The present report represents the findings of that review.

The Kosovo operation is a remarkable occurrence. For the first time in the 50-year history of NATO, the organisation resorted to armed action against another state in an out-of-area operation. In addition, such action lacked support from a UN resolution. The operation should be viewed against the background of recent developments in the Balkans. As a part of crisis management in the Balkans, it has had several consequences: security-policy, strategic, operational and tactical. The course of events illustrates the strategic decision-making process in a coalition of democratic states when the conflict these are confronted with is asymmetrical and the purpose of intervention humanitarian.

The course of events led to NATO's possible courses of action being limited: only offensive action with military means remained. The operation was carried out in different stages with successive decision-making and with political control over details. Its implementation also illustrated the inner functions of the alliance: the USA acted relatively independently within the framework of the operation. The question can thus be asked how far the implementation can be militarily considered successful?

Another question concerns the factors characterising the planning and decision situation in Belgrade during the course of the conflict. What was the intelligence position (possibly with external support) at the time? What finally made Belgrade give up?

The operation raises several more all-embracing questions also. With the strategy chosen, did NATO achieve its political targets? Did NATO members have partially different political objectives prior to a joint operation and in this case, how far were these achieved? What could the consequences be for European security architecture and the relationship between the USA and its European allies?

The course of events had repercussions internationally, primarily for Russia's relationship to NATO but also for those of other countries. These countries too drew their own political and military conclusions from the operation, which was considered as a state-of-the-art war.

The operation-illustrated deficiencies in European-NATO allied military capability (also focused on in the Defence Capabilities Initiative). This applied among other things to strategic transport capacity, airborne refuelling, and the balance between attack and fighter capacity and C3I capability. In this connection, European crisis management ability within the framework of the EU has again come to the fore.

Lastly the operation gives cause for deliberations concerning Swedish crisis management capability. These may concern the decision-making process prior to participation in international operations, the composition of military units and systems and the tactical performance of units.

With the sketched problem description and the study's terms of reference, the study was arranged as follows.

The first section deals with NATO's security policy objectives in the conflict and how these influenced the choice of military means. Two consecutive sections discuss Operation Allied Force (air strikes, issues of target selection, etc) and information operations. Humanitarian aspects are then dealt with, stress injuries and refugee aid. A further section deals with how the Kosovo operation affected the Russian political and military High Command; then how the conflict affected the views of Asiatic states on national sovereignty. The problems the Swedish political and military systems were confronted with regarding planning participation in international operations are discussed next. A concluding section discusses how views on future wars have been affected.

Hence the study describes and analyses selected events and problems. Other problems are not dealt with in more detail, as shown by comparing the foregoing study design and problem description. To these belong the planning and decision situations in Belgrade, how far NATO's overall targets were reached, the consequences for European security architecture and conclusions for Sweden's part regarding the design of military units and their tactical performance, etc, in international operations.

The study design and the aims of the various chapters were governed by the material and the resources available, but also by which problems were immediately topical. No integrative conclusions have been drawn: some of the issues not dealt with will, however, are raised in other reports.

The source material upon which this study was based is mostly western, mainly comprising news agency reports or material supplied by NATO's press service. In

addition, Russian and other news agency bulletins were used. Thus opportunities to scrutinise the actors' underlying motives were limited: internal NATO discussions, for example, were not available.

Summary

NATO's political and military considerations. It is debatable whether there was parity between the security-policy objectives of the NATO operation and the military means used to reach these. Declared security-policy objectives were to prevent a major new war in the Balkans and to prevent ethnic cleansing and violence against civilians in Kosovo. A further desire was to prevent refugees flooding to other parts of Europe. To this can be added the important objective of upholding NATO credibility.

The choice of military means was based on the following factors. Tolerance of own losses was extremely low. It was therefore judged that there were good prospects of achieving a rapid conclusion with air combat forces alone. One point of departure was, as far as possible, to avoid causing Yugoslavia permanent damage and thus turning public opinion even further against the West. The lack of rapidly available ground forces made concentration on air power unavoidable.

Operation Allied Force. The operation was viewed initially as a peace enforcement operation designed to bring about agreement and not victory. Its course did not follow current western doctrines of air power involving a rapid and intensive introductory phase. The strike against Yugoslavia did not come as a strategic or operational surprise. The operation was marked by a low tempo, gradually escalated through commitment of increasing resources and expansion of target categories.

Initially there were few "authorised" targets, mainly military. Restrictions were imposed with regard to flight altitudes and the risks to civilian populations. Parts of the civilian infrastructure were subsequently included, such as electricity supplies, radio and TV distribution networks, and communications. These targets proved relatively easy to eliminate and a substantial effect was achieved rapidly.

The change over time – from an initial restriction to military targets, to subsequent resource reinforcement and expansion to embrace strategic targets and the build-up of forces in Turkey and Hungary – resulted in the conflict resembling more a war than a peace mission.

IT-related resources. NATO did not use "cyber-weapons" strategically against critical infrastructure. On the other hand, credible sources claim that these were used fairly successfully tactically – interacting with other weapons systems – by the USA during air operations. That IT-related resources were used for intelligence gathering must be regarded as certain. In addition, the Internet was an arena for expressing viewpoints and propaganda.

Humanitarian Aspects. NATO to some extent used psychological warfare methods. To bypass the Yugoslavian authorities' tough methods of control over the media, news broadcasts and propaganda were transmitted direct to the general public and to the ground forces.

NATO attributed humanitarian aspects to the Kosovo operation. Critics raised the question of how far the West's right to intervene to protect the rights of suppressed minorities extended. They also considered there were no real grounds for hope of ethnic reconciliation.

The flow of refugees from Kosovo to Macedonia and Albania was taken care of by NATO, which among other things built refugee camps. This assistance was welcomed by the UNHCR. After a few weeks, the numbers of refugees had increased to more than 500,000. Their experiences of abuse and encroachments may result in close to 10% of them suffering from psychological problems in years to come.

The influence on Russian political and military thinking. The Kosovo conflict contributed towards increased respect for NATO's capability among Russian political and military leadership. In the new military doctrine a tougher attitude was declared against the rest of the world, with stronger emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons. Ratification and continued negotiations within the START process were delayed.

Relationships with NATO, and in particular with the USA, deteriorated, at least temporarily. Military co-operation with NATO ceased, but was later partly resumed. Russia did not however sever her bilateral connections with western countries during the conflict. The economic burden of debt to the West limited her freedom of action and possibilities. Russia's reduced role in world politics had once again been confirmed. Dependence on the West weighed heavier than her relationship with Serbia.

Different reactions to the Kosovo conflict among OSS members led to decreased collaboration among them. Russia's interest in collaboration with China and India seemed to increase.

For Russian military leadership, the course of the NATO operation underlined the need for modern military equipment. The notified increase in the military budget probably went to cover the costs of KFOR participation, and even more, for the war in Chechnya. Reform of the Russian armed forces will probably be delayed even more.

The Kosovo conflict and Asia. The NATO operation increased concern, mainly in China and India, that major powers or international organisations would increasingly set human rights over the sovereignty of individual states. This could lead to serious difficulties agreeing on future international operations under UN auspices. For China, however, the Kosovo conflict also created certain complications in her relationship with the USA and Western Europe, as well as in her Taiwan policy.

Implications for Swedish peace-promoting missions. During 1998 and 1999 the Kosovo crisis presented Sweden with several problems. The Swedish system of planning and deployment of troops for international activities was unable to handle deployment of a unit of this size within less than about five months following a decision, despite lengthy and clear advance warning. Given the rapid courses of present crises, this appears inadequate.

The problems that arose in Kosovo after air operations ended, due to a lack of ground forces, could partially have been reduced through quicker deployment of Swedish troops. Sweden's contribution to stabilisation of the conflict area was therefore absent for far too long.

Sweden's role in European security policy may in the future be affected negatively when our stated line of full participation, even in a difficult crisis management situation, is not demonstrated reliably. Diplomatic work on mechanisms for Euro-Atlantic crisis management, and the reputation Sweden earned through her efforts in Bosnia since 1993, may thus risk being partly wasted.

NATO's experience for future operations. NATO countries consider the Kosovo operation largely a success. It seems therefore that there will be no major changes in their military planning in the near future. Attempts will be made however to eliminate weaknesses that came to light. Thus a simplified military command structure and smoother procedures for co-operation between political and military levels are thus desirable. Similarly, many improvements can be made in systems for observation, intelligence and command, not least regarding interoperability.

Pilotless UAVs and satellite systems showed their importance during the operation. Access to guided weapons was a key factor. Major European NATO investments in advanced weapons and commands systems, interoperability, etc, are necessary. These failed to produce the desired effects.

One consequence for similar conflicts in the future, where NATO is a participant, may be that air strikes are emphasised more as an active means. Politically it is expected that own losses can be kept extremely low. Operations will probably continue to be controlled from political level through more, or less, far-reaching restrictions governing their implementation.

Calendar

1998
The 31 of March. UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1160 condemning violence by Yugoslav security forces against civilians in Kosovo, and establishing a weapons embargo against Yugoslavia.
May. American ambassador Holbrooke arranges first meeting between Yugoslav President Milosevic and Kosovo leader Rugova. The meeting proves fruitless. NATO's Secretaries of State approve certain measures to promote stability in the region.
12 June. The "Contact Group" issues in London a statement demanding a cease-fire and the return of refugees.
July. Establishment of Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, following agreement from Milosevic.
2 September. Secretaries of State Albright (USA) and Ivanov (Russia) jointly demand that Belgrade ceases the offensive and that Kosovo-Albanians agrees to negotiations with Belgrade.

23 September. Security Council adopts Resolution 1199, urging withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, return of refugees and access by humanitarian organisations.

24 September. NATO's Secretaries of Defence approve "Activation Warning" for two limited air strikes.

28 September. Milosevic claims victory over Kosovo uprising. Fighting continues, however. No Yugoslav withdrawal of forces.

1 October. North Atlantic Council (NATO's highest governing body) issue "Activation Request" for the two air strikes.

5 October. UN Secretary-General reports that Belgrade has not complied with Resolution 1199. NATO issues "Activation Orders" for the two air strikes. In Belgrade, Holbrooke tries to persuade Milosevic to comply with the Resolution.

13 October. Serbian President Milutinovic presents unilateral outline proposal for peace agreement. North Atlantic Council instructs SACEUR (American General Clark) to delay starting the air strikes. Milosevic agrees with NATO Secretary-General Solana on a verification force. SACEUR agrees with Yugoslavian Army Chief on air reconnaissance over Kosovo.

25 October. OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission established, following Yugoslav consent, to verify Yugoslav compliance with Resolutions 1160 and 1199. SACEUR and the NATO Military Committee chairman (German General Naumann) reach agreement in Belgrade with Yugoslav leaders on withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.

27 October. North Atlantic Council postpones the two air strikes in consequence of the agreement.

1999

15-16 January. Kosovo Verification Mission reports serious deterioration of the situation in the area. It verifies serious outrages by Yugoslav forces against Albanian population.

28 January. Solana demands that Yugoslav authorities immediately comply with the agreement of 25 October 1998.

29 January. Ministers of the Contact Group meet in London. They demand that both sides cease their acts of violence, and summon representatives from the Yugoslav and Serbian governments, and from the Kosovo-Albanian side, to Rambouillet in France, on February 6, for consultations led by Contact Group.

30 January. North Atlantic Council voice support for Contact Group efforts. Solana authorised to order air strikes against Yugoslav territory. Intelligence reports show build-up of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.

6 February. Talks in Rambouillet commence.

23 February. Contact Group Minister meets in Rambouillet to confirm interim agreement on political solution. Parties undertake to sign the agreement at a meeting in France on March 15.

19 March. After further negotiations in Paris, the Kosovo-Albanian side signs the agreement. The Belgrade delegation leaves the negotiations without signing. Western ultimatums are regarded as violations of international law. One-third of Yugoslav armed forces now concentrated on Kosovo or immediate surroundings. OSCE Mission leaves Kosovo.

20 March. Yugoslav forces start major offensive that drives several thousand Albanians from their homes and villages. Summary executions occur. Many houses destroyed.

21 March. Holbrooke goes to Belgrade to give Milosevic final warning.

22 March. North Atlantic Council authorises Solana to decide whether additional, more comprehensive, air operations are necessary.

23 March. Holbrooke leaves Belgrade without any concessions from Milosevic. Solana orders SACEUR to commence air operations against Yugoslavia.

24 March. Operation Allied Force starts.

25 March. Yugoslav government breaks off diplomatic relations with USA, France, Germany and Great Britain.

30 March. Russian Prime Minister Primakov, Secretary of State Ivanov and Defence Minister Sergeyev talk with Milosevic in Belgrade.

3 April. NATO missiles launched against Belgrade for first time and destroy Yugoslav and Serbian Ministries of the Interior.

6 April. Yugoslavia declares willingness for 6-hour cease-fire and negotiations with Rugova. NATO rejects offer since it is not linked with a political agreement or a security arrangement.

6-10 April. North Atlantic Council approves plan for NATO humanitarian efforts in Albania. Ivanov says NATO-led implementation force in Kosovo unrealistic and demands instead larger UN commitment.

14 April. Germany proposes 24-hour cease-fire on air operations, to give Belgrade the opportunity for withdrawal. Russian President Yeltsin appoints former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin as Peace Envoy.

16 April. North Atlantic Council approves the activation order for Operation Allied Harbour.

21 April. EU countries support plan to prevent oil supplies from or through member countries to Yugoslavia. NATO missiles destroy Serbian Socialist Party premises and Milosevic's private residence, as this considered to be a command and control centre for the army and special police.

22 April. NATO summit meeting confirms terms that must be fulfilled before air operations cease. Meeting proclaims intensification of these.

23 April. NATO strikes against Serbian television building in Belgrade, which is being used for propaganda purposes. Yugoslavia accepts international military presence in Kosovo, following discussions between Chernomyrdin and Milosevic.

1 May. President Clinton extends American sanctions to include sales of oil products, as well as freezing Yugoslavian assets in the USA.

6 May. At G8 meeting in Bonn, it is announced that the West and Russia are unanimous about the basic strategy for solving the conflict.

7 May. NATO aircraft strike Chinese embassy in Belgrade by mistake.

8 May. UN Security Council special session discusses bombing of Chinese embassy. China accuses USA and NATO of deliberate attack, while alliance apologises for unfortunate mistake. Ivanov cancels trip to London.

10 May. China severs links with USA regarding arms control and human rights. Yugoslavia announces partial withdrawal of troops from Kosovo, accuses NATO of genocide and makes demands for the International court to order NATO to stop air operations.

11 May. Chernomyrdin meets Chinese President in Peking and calls the bombing of the Chinese embassy an act of aggression. China hints that it might veto Western attempts to reach peace agreement via UN, unless the bombing ceases. NATO claims that Yugoslav army and special police have intensified activities in Kosovo.

16 May. Italian Prime Minister D'Alema suggests NATO cease-fire, presuming that Russia and China support a Security Council resolution demanding that Milosevic accept the terms of the G8 countries.

17 May. EU appoints Finnish President Ahtisaari Special Envoy to Kosovo. Greece wants temporary cease-fire to allow opportunity for diplomatic measures to work.

23 May. NATO starts bombing campaign against Yugoslav power supplies, which causes serious interruptions in military activities and water supplies.

27 May. Milosevic and four other Yugoslav leaders accused before UN war crimes tribunal of crimes against humanity.

1 June. Yugoslavia informs Germany that they accept the G8 countries' peace principles and demand that the bombing ceases.

3 June. Yugoslavia accepts terms placed before the country by Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin.

6 June. Solana announces difficulties in helping restore Yugoslavia, as long as Milosevic stays in power.

7 June. NATO and Yugoslav commanders fail to agree on conditions for troop withdrawal, and end talks. NATO escalates bombing campaign. Ministers for Foreign Affairs from the G8 countries try to formulate draft for UN resolution in Bonn. Yugoslavia insists that resolution must be adopted before international troops may enter Kosovo.

8 June. G8 countries agree during talks in Cologne on proposal for UN resolution. NATO demands that Yugoslavia resume talks on troop withdrawals immediately. Resumption of such talks takes place in Macedonia.

9 June. Military talks on troop withdrawals continue. Late the same day, agreement reached between the two parties.

10 June. After definite proof has been received of withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, Solana orders cessation of air operations. Security Council adopts Resolution 1244 on Kosovo. In Cologne, G8 Ministers formulate plan to tie Balkan area to Western Europe and rebuild Kosovo.

13 June. UNHCR aid mission commences.

20 June. In accordance with 9 June agreement, Yugoslav troops have completely withdrawn from Kosovo. Solana officially ends NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.

Source: Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report.
Report to Congress. U.S. Department of Defence. 31 January 2000.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

Johannes Malminen

The critical variables in the decision-making situation NATO confronted at the outset of the Kosovo conflict primarily concerned humanitarian intervention and the internal and external credibility of the alliance. Irrespective of what decision was made regarding intervention, the solidarity of the alliance was at stake. Clearly, the decision by the alliance to get involved in the conflict posed a risk: NATO could not anticipate how things would develop, and for an organisation that for half a century had dealt very carefully with its military dimension, this choice had far-reaching consequences. Yet the fact that the alliance, despite apprehensions to the contrary, maintained its solidarity suggests that its institutional cohesion and strength have been under-valued.

The course of the conflict was controlled on the NATO side primarily by political considerations, and secondarily by military ones. It involved substantial risk-taking to act offensively and "out of area" for the first time, without explicit sanction from the UN Security Council. At the same time, failure to act would have had serious consequences, even though a UN mandate, following earlier statements by Security Council members, seemed to be out of the question. One essential condition for success was for NATO to retain legitimacy for its actions, mainly as regards domestic policy but also in the eyes of the international community. Throughout the entire operation, the alliance made every effort to explain and motivate their actions, with the purpose of maintaining legitimacy, keeping opinion on their side and avoiding increased tension within the alliance.

It is still, however, difficult to establish what impelled the Belgrade government's action during the conflict. It is likely that Yugoslavia hoped to be able to secure a compromise that was better than the Rambouillet agreement, to obtain stronger support from Russia; and that NATO would fail militarily and/or politically with their bombing campaign. In addition, the attraction for the political leaders of successfully challenging the international community should not be underestimated. A number of factors seem important in the Milosevic regime's decision to give up. Firstly, the Russians were letting them down both in terms of direct help and in terms of exercising significant clout in the great power game. Secondly, Tony Blair's and Bill Clinton's statement that a ground operation was no longer out of the question put the military aspects of the conflict in a different light. Thirdly, the cohesion within NATO was stronger than expected and continuously strengthened as the conflict progressed. Fourthly, all the neighbouring countries received security guarantees from NATO in exchange for access to bases and airspace and this accentuated the solitude of the regime. Finally, the KLA gained military strength and efficiency on the ground and forced the Yugoslavian army to expose itself to air strikes from the alliance. This rendered the air operations more effective. These factors and the fact that Milosevic was charged by the Hague Tribunal, probably made NATO's offer of an agreement seem more attractive in comparison with the alternatives: social collapse, loss of power and the definitive separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia.

In practice, NATO gained several new "members" when security guarantees were given to Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania in exchange for the right to use bases and fly over their territories, as well as to stop transport to and from Yugoslavia. It remains to be seen how NATO will handle these countries in the future; both with regard to their security and the price they have had to pay to support NATO's operation.

There is a basis in international law for NATO's action in Kosovo. The operation was based on the notion that certain crimes are so extreme that the state responsible for them can be subjected to military intervention. This therefore represents an exception to the time-honoured principle of sovereignty. Even though the NATO operation was not sanctioned by the UN and thus lacked the legal backing that some states desired, the operation was not an obvious breach of international law. NATO used two arguments to justify its actions. The first was based on the UN Security Council resolutions, and the second on international law. Both these arguments emphasised the protection of the population of Kosovo.

It is obvious that humanitarian considerations had an unusually large influence on NATO's decision to intervene. Adam Roberts goes so far as to claim that "Operation Allied Force marked a high point in the increasing stress on human rights and humanitarian issues which has been a striking feature of international relations in the post-1945 era."[1] The alliance could not tolerate ethnic cleansing in Europe. In addition, it was feared by some that conflicts in the Balkans could increase instability in Europe. The humanitarian arguments for NATO's intervention in the conflict were not mirrored in the resources that the NATO Council was prepared to make available. A greater commitment to air operations and/or ground troops at the start would probably have ended ethnic cleansing more quickly. A full-strength NATO operation, however, would have incurred greater risks in the form of collateral damage that could have had devastating consequences. The members of the alliance would have had difficulties justifying the operation at home when casualties in their own forces occurred and internationally if civilians were injured or killed.

One important restriction for NATO was not to risk allied lives during the operation. This obviously influenced the implementation of the operation and the exclusive allied reliance on air power. That ground warfare was ruled out from the beginning was primarily due to the difficulties of conducting ground operations without losses, and the uncertainty of public opinions in member states, particularly in the US. Ground troops were therefore excluded at an early stage, a decision that was widely reported in the media. Militarily, this decision to publicly announce the unwillingness to commit ground troops hampered the efficiency of the air operation. It gave Yugoslavia a very clear idea of how the operation was to be conducted as well as its limitations. Yugoslavia could therefore adapt to the circumstances in an optimal manner. If statements about not committing ground troops were less categorical and specific preparations, for example in the matter of logistics, had been taken, then some uncertainty would have been preserved and the bombing campaign would presumably have been more effective. The result instead was that Serbian units could concentrate on expelling Albanians and hiding themselves and their weaponry away

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[1] Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", Survival vol.41, no.3 (Autumn), p.102

from air strikes. On the other hand, politically, the self-imposed restriction to openly exclude ground troops was viewed as an unfortunate but perhaps inevitable fact, when a coalition of democratic states is to conduct an operation without member states' vital interests being threatened.

The significance of air power and a reluctance to accept losses have laid bare a number of problems with regard to NATO's ability to carry out military tasks and to minimise civilian casualties. It is, for example, extremely difficult to completely avoid collateral damage and such restrictions take away the momentum of an operation. Also, NATO's self-imposed restrictions with regard to minimum altitude forced them to concentrate on fixed targets such as bridges and buildings, since these are easier to identify from high altitudes than moving targets are. Restrictions like these allow for minimal allied collateral damage but increase the possibility of civilians and neutral states (neighbouring countries) being subjected to unwarranted injury or damage. In time this could undermine the legitimacy of an operation. What subsequently appears as one of the worst cases of collateral damage, were the bombed bridges across the river Danube. This has had serious economic consequences for neighbouring countries, especially downstream, as this international passage has not been navigable since the bombing.

The NATO operation proved that a large organisation can seldom reach a decision that extends beyond the lowest common denominator. In addition, the need for the support of domestic opinion was of considerable importance. Throughout the campaign, leaders of alliance states needed to be sensitive to the risk of suffering major political losses domestically. It is interesting in this context that it was mainly the social democratic parties in Great Britain, France and Germany that sought implementation of the operation. These politicians' determined support by these politicians for intervention in Kosovo was necessary to avoid public opinion turning against NATO.

Developments within NATO before during and after the Kosovo war indicate that it was largely event-driven. NATO once again showed a capacity to reformulate its purpose and adapt to the prevailing security-policy situation. This event-driven development further makes it extremely difficult to foresee the direction of NATO's development in the future. It is noteworthy that NATO's newest members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic), despite their exposed positions, firmly showed their willingness to politically defend and according to military capability participate in the NATO operation.

There is already much to indicate that future operations will be comprised of a "coalition of the willing". In the Kosovo operation, Greece was one of a few NATO members that adopted a bystander attitude and then participated to a minimum degree. The alliance held together since doubtful members chose to keep a low profile, rather than opposing the operation. If "out of area" operations become more common to NATO, it will be important for NATO solidarity that members can exclude themselves from operations that are not in their national interests. However, with a focus on "out of area" operations NATO runs the risk that the individual members' diverging interests for "out of area" operations may slowly erode the collective security dimension that the alliance has built up over decades.

For the first time since the Second World War, Germany appeared as an important actor in international military crisis management and this generated heated public debates domestically. Nevertheless, Germany managed to successfully carry out the operation, much to the credit of foreign minister Fischer. Without his resolute public support for the operation the outcome could have been entirely different. Does the Kosovo experience mean that Germany has matured as a foreign policy actor and is prepared to shoulder a greater responsibility in spheres other than the economic one after Kosovo? So far most signs indicate that Germany will resume her low profile in an attempt to avoid further domestic political turbulence.

The United States took responsibility for the lion's share of the bombing campaign, and even more so for support measures such as AAR (Air-to-Air Refuelling) and transport, where her share was overwhelming.[2] This is a clear example of the European states' inability to manage similar conflicts by themselves. It must be said, however, that Europe, in relation to its own contribution, had considerable influence in the political process and implementation of the bombing campaign. The question is how much longer the US will be willing to contribute resources for the solution of European problems? It is still far too early to see any distinct changes in defence budgets and their priorities after Kosovo, even though such have been announced within the framework of the DCI Initiative[3]. What the Kosovo war made clear is the differences between the United States and Europe in terms of capacity and technological abilities. Europe is entirely dependent on US resources in an operation like Kosovo, with requirements for high precision and negligible losses. European countries will need to invest substantially to approach US capability levels and integrated capacity. The first sign of change is French President Chirac's suggestion, following the Kosovo conflict, to establish convergence criteria for the defence policies of EU members, to pave the way for a common European defence policy. It is still too early to form an opinion as to whether European countries really have the capability to implement a restructuring and integration of EU members' territorially based forces. Dependence on the USA will in all probability remain great.

The link between political objectives and military means must always be questioned in a "humanitarian intervention" of the Kosovo kind. The fact is that the bombing campaign did not succeed in achieving the political goal of rapidly preventing a humanitarian disaster. There was no political will to conduct the high-risk operation that would have been necessary for effective prevention of ethnic cleansing and violence against the civilian population in Kosovo. In spite of this, some of NATO's primary objectives were achieved. The great majority of expelled Kosovo-Albanians was able to return home. On the other hand, KFOR has still not managed to find a satisfactory way to prevent Kosovo-Albanian acts of violence or revenge against Serbs or Gypsies. The big challenge for the KFOR operation now is to win lasting peace, and success will require co-operation between both the Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians. A lengthy commitment in Kosovo has only just begun.

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[2] According to Stuart Johnson, RAND, the USA accounted for 73% of the total of 38,004 air missions and about 80% of a total of 442 support aircraft were American.
[3] DCI, Defence Capability Initiative, mentions areas that NATO members should improve, for example. the ability to deploy and mobility, survival, endurance and logistics, C3.

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT - A STRANGE WAR

Björn G. Backström and Sten Ternblad

Introduction[4]

There are different "prestige words" to describe how military intervention is to begin and be implemented. Some of these are surprising, violent and ruthless. When one studies the Kosovo conflict more closely, it is difficult to use these words to characterise how the operation was conducted. We have therefore regarded it as meaningful to consider the Kosovo conflict from a peace enforcement perspective, where the goal is settlement, not victory.

The Kosovo conflict is often referred to as a war. From the Serbian perspective, the conflict was definitely perceived as a war. The NATO countries expressed it as armed conflict, even if the term war does crop up. To contrast these perceptions, we present the course of events from a war perspective. The intention is to conjure up a picture of a strange war, almost a nineteenth-century one although waged with modern means. The course of the operation does not follow the doctrines, formulated mainly in the American Air Force, on how air operations and air strikes should be conducted. These doctrines speak of a rapid and intensive initial phase, where synchronised, parallel operations strike at all a society's vital targets. These targets are generally considered as being relatively few.

It is apparent that certain debaters and senior military personnel[5] who criticised the operational course of the conflict had already from the start adopted a war perspective. They are critical of the moderate inception, the need to escalate and the relatively slow pace of operations. Even as peace enforcement, the operation itself was criticised for its inability to handle the most apparent problem, the expulsion of Kosovo-Albanians.

Our account of operation ALLIED FORCE, and in particular its plan of operations, shows that escalation of a peace enforcement operation risks leading to a situation resembling outright war, where the prime objective is victory. The shift from one perspective to another is what is usually termed "mission creep". Downright war involves traditional ground operations, while even at the planning stage of this operation, such were excluded. This is best illustrated by the fact that the staff of NATO's most senior operational commander, Admiral Ellis, had no planning component for a ground operation.

In all probability, the question of ground forces was discussed thoroughly in political and military deliberations within NATO, and ground operations were a recurrent

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[4] The flow of information from the Kosovo conflict is considerable. Information is partially also of a propaganda nature or intentionally slanted. Many sources derive from official NATO documents, either directly or in processed form. During our selection of documents, however, we have tried to check against different sources, to the best of our ability, including Serbian. Presentation however, is on a NATO basis.

[5] Air Marshal Walker for example

subject throughout the entire operation. Earlier statements against ground operations came from NATO's Council of Ministers and from President Clinton. Those who probably applied most pressure for a ground offensive were the British.
The only major NATO force readily available for ground intervention, the allied rapid reaction corps[6], has a permanent British commander. The British should have had an interest in being able to show the importance of such a force for peace enforcement operations. In the middle of May, when the results of air operations were still lower than expected, planning for a ground force of 175,000 men was actualised, plan "B minus". This force could have been put in action in September at the earliest.

The USA have a totally dominant ability to conduct all-embracing air operations, from air defence and strategic bombing to tactical, close-air-support in ground warfare. The other NATO countries' capability is substantially lower, both in size and in quality. This is particularly clear regarding strike and bomber aircraft. It has subsequently emerged that there was not just one air operation but in practice two. Apart from the NATO-led operation aimed at the Kosovo area and of a tactical nature, there was also an US-led strategic operation. The total American effort in support of the NATO operation was called operation NOBLE ANVIL.

Are ALLIED FORCE/NOBLE ANVIL examples of successful air operations? This question is difficult to answer, since it depends on what success includes. The official NATO/USA perception is that the air operation achieved the political goal of ending Serbian acts of violence in Kosovo and thus was successful. The result however, was affected by Milosevic's submission. In the longer term, one may wonder whether anything has been solved? The need for ground troops in Kosovo is evident and today no end of the problem is in sight.

Regarding implementation there were some remarkable successes. The greatest is that NATO achieved the goal of no combat losses. The Kosovo conflict is the largest armed conflict ever where this target has been achieved. Also, collateral damage was limited, even though civilians were killed or wounded during the air strikes. Some cases drew particular attention, firing on a refugee column thought to be harbouring security police, strikes on a bridge while a civilian passenger train was crossing, and the bombing of the Chinese embassy.

Was ALLIED FORCE/NOBLE ANVIL successful in knocking out strategic targets? It is apparent that only fixed targets could be localised and attacked. Sometimes, repeated sorties were necessary, but the targets were destroyed. It is unsure however, whether whole systems were completely knocked out. Naturally, this depends on what system was being dealt with. The American Department of Defence accounts immediately after the air operations[7] gives large knock-out percentages for different strategic targets, but only oil refineries and the railway connection between Serbia and Kosovo and Montenegro were knocked out to 100 %.

At tactical level (attack on ground troops), the air operations had poor results almost to the end. The goal was to eliminate ten units (tanks, combat vehicles, artillery, etc)

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[6] ARRC, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.

[7] DoD press conference 10 Juni 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/g990610-J-0000K.html

per day. For the nearly six weeks this sub-operation took, the final toll was about 800 eliminated units, but some 80% were eliminated during the last 10 days, prior to the air operations ending on June 9.[8] Experience shows the difficulties involved in eliminating from the air ground troops that tactically adapt and do not deploy, move or engage in combat. According to NATO's press conference appraising the tactical phase,[9] NATO were good at deciding whether individual attacks were successful, in their Battle Damage Assessments (BDA). There is good agreement between what was stated at the press conference during the combat and what analysis after the battle has shown.

No strategic surprise

Strategically speaking, the Serbian command cannot have been surprised that NATO used armed force. NATO had earlier threatened this. In addition, sources state that Serbs were present at the combined air operations centre, CAOC,[10] several days before the air operations, and that these could follow the preparations for the attacks.[11]

The prelude to the Kosovo crisis started early in spring 1998, when the Kosovo-Albanians rose against Serbian rule in Kosovo. The situation escalated and developed into regular war between armed Kosovo-Albanians and Serbian police. Belgrade chose to send in heavily armed military forces and special police. Armed elements of the Kosovo-Albanians organised themselves within the UCK, a liberation movement formed a few years earlier. During the summer, the engagements became more serious. The UCK were forced back and many Kosovans chose to flee to the mountains to avoid Serb reprisals. The contact group for former-Yugoslavia[12] put forward a list of demands to Milosevic to stop the conflict. The EU and the UN also put pressure on Milosevic. The humanitarian situation gradually grew worse and nearly almost 300,000 refugees were expelled prior to the approaching winter.

At the beginning of the conflict, NATO chose to support a peaceful, political solution, but already in the early summer of 1998, it was clear that military pressure needed to be put on Milosevic. On 15 June, a show of military strength called *"Determined Falcon"*[13] was conducted. This show of force was a widespread air operation over Macedonia and Albania with more than 80 aircraft from 13 NATO countries taking part. This operation also served to train the Combined Air Operations Centre, the COAC, which later on would form the hub in the operation ALLIED FORCE. At this point of time, the first plans for an air strike against Serbia were drafted.

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[8] DoD press conference 10 June 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/990610-J-0000K-007.jpg

[9] NATO presskonferens den 16 september 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990916a.htm and particularly http://www.nato.int/pictures/1999/990916/b990916zk.jpg

[10] CAOC, Combined Air Operations Center.

[11] Centrally placed officer in CAOC.

[12] USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia.

[13] See e.g. DoD News Briefing Thursday, June 11, 1998 -- 2 p.m. and Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/determined_falcon.htm.

SACEUR issued a planning order at the end of September, and the plans for air operations against Serbia and Kosovo were worked out and support requested from the NATO countries. On 13 October, NATO decided to issue an activation order[14] for two air operations.[15] One concerned a limited operation with readiness to mount attacks on military targets in the area with long-range missiles from ships and aircraft, and the other was a phased air operation, which could be gradually stepped-up. The foreign Embassy personnel who left Belgrade at this time were warned that NATO might resort to violence.

Richard Holbrooke managed to reach an agreement with Milosevic on a peaceful solution to the crisis. As part of this agreement the OSCE, supported by the UN Resolution of 24 October would despatch 2000 observers to monitor compliance with the agreement. Operation EAGLE EYE was carried out to verify the agreement using unmanned reconnaissance vehicles. NATO air units were forward-based to Italy with an 96 hours alert to maintain the pressure on Milosevic. SACEUR decided at the start of November to reduce part of the immediate alert.

During January 1999, a number of problems arose for OSCE observers in Kosovo, and NATO decided on January 20 to resume the forward air basing in Italy. The alert for starting an air operation against Yugoslavia was 36 hours. The same day that the UN Secretary General expressed great concern over developments in Kosovo, NATO warned the parties to the conflict that NATO was ready to use the necessary means to stop the conflict and to find a peaceful solution.

Yugoslavia agreed to negotiations in Rambouillet. These began in February and were broken off in March without agreement. Parallel with the Rambouillet negotiations, the situation in Kosovo became increasingly dramatic and the first signs of a larger Serbian operation, with police and military units intending to drive out Kosovo-Albanians, became clearer[16].

Over the weekend of 20 -21 March, all the OSCE observers withdrew from Kosovo and in the evening of 24 March, NATO began air operations against Yugoslavia.

Parallel operations

USA's military resources are completely dominant within NATO and had a decisive significance for the outcome of the Kosovo conflict. In practice, the American forces were organised as a parallel shadow organisation to NATO. The American effort went under the name NOBLE ANVIL and was considered officially as support to NATO. In the NATO operation ALLIED FORCE, operational control over subordinate air combat forces was exercised by COMAIRSOUTH, General Michael Short. The fact that he was also chief[17] of the American air component in NOBLE ANVIL made it possible to co-ordinate two parallel operations. In point of fact it is not remarkable

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[14] ACTORD, "activation order".

[15] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force.htm.

[16] The German intelligence service gave the name HORSESHOE for the Serbian operation.

[17] JAFCC, Joint Air Force Component Commander

that the USA had a parallel organisation; the French effort in Kosovo may also be said to have been similarly organised in operation TRIDENT. The difference however, is that the French operations were commanded by NATO, which does not appear to be the case for the main part of the American operations during the first month.

Within NOBLE ANVIL American air combat forces carried out missions that may be described as strategic, i.e. directed against targets in Serbia north of the 44th parallel[18] (including Belgrade). NATO missions during the first month were the tactical operations in Kosovo and the Yugoslav third army area south of the 44th parallel. The French also pointed out the circumstance that the USA acted on its own with forces under American command, but the criticism was courteous. Primarily it appeared to be the political influence on the operations that was the controversial issue between France and the USA and the fact that all NATO members 'irrespective of how powerful' should follow joint political decisions.[19]

It would be easy to interpret the USA's attitude as lack of confidence in NATO's ability to conduct the air operations, and the difference in capability was one of the points of discussion during the NATO meeting in Toronto following termination of the conflict. General Short has also described the USA's capability in relation to other NATO members as an A team and a B team, where the B team could only be used for tactical air operations in Kosovo, which also turned out to be the case. The USA had already criticised NATO's management of the air operations in Bosnia[20] during DELIBERATE FORCE and NATO's new command structure may be seen as an answer to this criticism. The intention was for this command structure to come into force in connection with the NATO summit in April 1999,[21] which thus from the American point of view could be considered a problem during the spring of 1999. Operation NOBLE ANVIL was organised in January 1999 in connection with the second run-up against Serbia. The first run-up was as early as autumn 1998 but alert was lowered in consequence of the agreement regarding OSCE observers in Kosovo.[22]

Operational plan 10601 which would later apply to operation ALLIED FORCE was introduced through an activation order (ACTORD) on 13 October 1998, which was preceded by an alternative plan for a limited air operation. Both plans were the result of a number of alternatives tried during the summer of 1998.[23] The plan involving limited air operations concerned cruise missiles and air sorties against fixed military targets such as headquarters, communication points and ammunition dumps, target

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[18] Col. M Svejgaard & Maj. K Nödskov, "The use of air power during operation 'Allied Force'", Militaert tidskrift - tema Kosovo, 4/1999.

[19] Press conference with Defence Minister Alain Richard, 10 November 1999. www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques/p121199/121199.htm

[20] J Hillen, "Peacekeeping at the speed of sound". http://132.60.140.12/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/hillentxt.htm

[21] See for example NATO Review 1988 nr 1. http://www.mfa.ee/nato/docu/review/1998/9801-03.htm.

[22] NATO operational plan 10602 EAGLE EYE. See e.g. http://www.fueakbw.de/sicherheitspolitik/uno-missionen/kosovo_3htm.

[23]http://www.afa.org/kosovo/crisis.html

categories that predominated during operation DELIBERATE FORCE in Bosnia in 1995.

The second, phased, plan had two main purposes, to stop the atrocities in Kosovo and set conditions for negotiations, and secondly to prevent or hamper Serbian ability to intervene with yet more violence. The phasing was intended to create flexibility to stop the operation if the Serbs were prepared to negotiate. After the event it is clear that NATO's planning was poor. The limited air operation with cruise missiles and individual air attacks may be considered almost as a demonstration of strength. The phased operations were insufficient to prevent the Serbs from taking the initiative in Kosovo before NATO had built up its forces. In the final operation plan phase one comprised both the limited operations with cruise missiles and the intention to gain air supremacy. Phase two was attacks on military targets in Kosovo and on military targets within Serbia (south of the 44th parallel) that could be used for reinforcements in Kosovo. In phase three the operation was to be extended to 'strategic' targets throughout Serbia.[24]

There was within NATO never any political authorisation to introduce phase three. Nevertheless within a week both tactical and strategic targets were attacked all over Yugoslavia. The explanation of this was probably that the USA conducted the strategic operations within the framework of operation NOBLE ANVIL. At the NATO summit in Washington on 23 April 1999 the leaders of the alliance agreed to strengthen and further step up the air sorties, including those against targets containing military industrial infrastructure, media and other strategic targets such as electricity and telecommunications. NATO also listed the political conditions for terminating the operation. Milosevic was to:

- Guarantee a verifiable end to military actions and immediately stop the atrocities in Kosovo.
- Withdraw military and paramilitary forces and special police units from Kosovo
- Agree to international military presence in Kosovo.
- Agree to immediate and secure return of refugees and Kosovo Albanians who had been chased out.
- Give credible assurances of preparedness to contribute to a political solution based on the Rambouillet negotiations.

SACEUR was given full freedom of action and in practice the parallel operation NOBLE ANVIL was hereby concluded.

Implementation

Surprising? No operative surprise

With a doctrine based upon a war perspective, the inception should have been operationally surprising. Operation ALLIED FORCE was, however, not introduced in this way.

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[24] Senate hearing 21 October 1999 "Kosovo: Lessons Learned" with General Clark, Admiral Ellis and General Short. http://usa.grmbl.com/s19991014f.htm.

The actual attacks were introduced in the evening of 24 March 1999 around eight o'clock local time. Even the day before, 23 March 1999, however, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana[25] said that he had just instructed SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, to initiate air operations against Yugoslavia:

'I have just directed SACEUR, General Clark, to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I have taken this decision after extensive consultations in recent days with all the Allies, and after it became clear that the final diplomatic effort of Ambassador Holbrooke in Belgrade has not met with success."

Solana especially emphasised that NATO did not intend to wage war against Yugoslavia:

Let me be clear: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia.

NATO stressed that the action was directed against the Yugoslav government because of its oppression and policy of violence.

The same day the political and military strategic objectives of NATO action in the Kosovo crisis were stated:

NATO's overall political objectives remain to help achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international community. More particularly, the Alliance made it clear in its statement of 30th January 1999 that its strategy was to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political solution.

It was also stated in language reminiscent of Clausewitz, that NATO's military measures were intended to support the political objectives:

Alliance military action is intended to support its political aims. To do so, NATO's military action will be directed towards halting the violent attacks being committed by the VJ and MUP and disrupting their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of Kosovo, thereby supporting international efforts to secure FRY agreement to an interim political settlement."[26]

Thus the military measures were directed towards stopping the Serbian attacks on Kosovo and at breaking Serbia's ability to conduct continued attacks upon the population of Kosovo.

The following day, 24 March, Solana stated that he had been informed by SACEUR that NATO air operations against targets in Yugoslavia had started. It scarcely came as a surprise to Solana and hardly as a great operation surprise to Milosevic, either. Solana once against stressed that NATO was not waging war upon Yugoslavia.

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[25] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/99032313_tlt.htm
[26] VJ is the regular Yugoslav army, MUP are the special police and FRY stands for the Yugoslav republic.

Violent? Inception of the operation – imposing the conditions

The same day that Solana stated that he had instructed SACEUR to initiate air operations against Yugoslavia, SACEUR probably gave the order to attack. Late in the evening of 23 March local time, two B-2 Spirit bombers took off from their home base in Whiteman, Missouri each armed with sixteen of the latest JDAM precision weapons.[27] Fifteen hours later, around eight in the evening the day after, they flew in over Serbia. This was day one. The attack on Serbia commenced on 24 March at 19.00 hrs GMT and the first phase of the operation was introduced.

The surprise for the Serbs was, strategically speaking, hardly great. Nevertheless it was hard for Serb early-warning to note the opening of the war. The B-2 bombers use stealth technology as their protection. B-52s with long-range cruise missiles had started around midday from bases in England and came nowhere near Serbian air space. Fighters and aerial reconnaissance with AWACs patrolling over Bosnia and the Adriatic Sea were by then routine. Signal intelligence aircraft and other reconnaissance aircraft had been surveying the area for months. Reconnaissance satellites circled the earth ceaselessly. From vessels and submarines in the Adriatic, Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired against well-ranged fixed targets. 'Several dozen' cruise missiles were fired. When the first F-117 attack aircraft crept in over Serb air space they were escorted by jamming aircraft and aircraft with anti-radiation missiles to suppress the anti-aircraft defence and destroy fixed radar installations. The B-2s had dropped their bombs with precision on the Serbian defence aircraft runways and the MiG-29 and MiG-21 fighters could not take off, being locked into their bases.

The first wave was followed by two more and a total of approximately 150 aircraft sorties were carried out. Only a small proportion were attack aircraft and bombers, the other missions were support such as in-flight refuelling aircraft, command-and-control aircraft, fighters, etc. A total of over forty targets were attacked.[28] When the attack was initiated NATO had over 371 aircraft available, of which 210 were American. Fourteen days earlier (while the Rambouillet negotiations were still going on) the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise left the area with 75 aircraft on board. On 19 March NATO reinforced the area with three EA-6B and four KC-135 (jamming aircraft and air-to-air refuelling respectively). Of the available aircraft, 120 were attack aircraft or bombers[29].

Respect for the comprehensive Serb anti aircraft defence was great, particularly for the low-altitude system, i.e. up to about 4000 metres. Rules of engagement prescribed flying over fifteen thousand feet, i.e. at medium and high altitudes. Serb air defences that could operate at these altitudes were few and careful optimisation of jamming systems had been carried out against these systems. The airborne jamming systems were however in short supply, which meant that fairly large combined "packages" of twenty to forty aircraft, mixed fighter, attack, jammers and aircraft with missiles, were used to suppress the anti-aircraft defence.

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[27] The JDAM is a 900-kg bomb which with its integrated GPS and inertial navigation system, independently of the weather, can hit a target co-ordinate stated to an accuracy of 13 metres.
[28] General Clark at the NATO press conference on 25 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm
[29] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force_orbat_trends.htm

The pace of the operation was low, partly because of meteorological limitations. During the first 24 hours of the operation 55 cruise missiles were deployed (compared with 151 during the first 24 hours of the Gulf War). During the operations first two days 400 sorties had been flown using nearly 400 aircraft. It was not until day six that a start was made on operating round the clock, i.e. daytime as well as night-time.

Already after the first two days the focus shifted from air defence to military and police fixed installations such as headquarters, command-and-control centres, ammunition dumps and stores. It was pronounced that phase two had been introduced. Information on what targets had been attacked was at this stage scarce and it was not until day eight (1 April) that SACEUR made a public summary in which target categories were also specified.[30]

During the first few days three Yugoslav MiG-29s were shot down. Their targets were probably NATO's airborne radar reconnaissance aircraft, AWACs, or in-flight refuelling aircraft stationed over Bosnia. Two were shot down by American air defence aircraft flying a patrol route over Bosnia and the third over Kosovo by a Dutch F-16 on a corresponding air defence mission. NATO and the USA maintained five patrol areas for air defence aircraft. One was over Hungary, two over Bosnia and one each over Albania and Macedonia.

The base locking had not been entirely effective. It was probably possible to take off from the civilian airport of Sourcin very near the main MiG-29 base at Batajnica outside Belgrade. Sourcin was probably not attacked during the first 24 hours since there were probably international passenger aircraft there.

It was also during this phase that NATO lost its first aircraft with the very-much-discussed shooting-down of an F-117 stealth aircraft, a great propaganda triumph for Milosevic. NATO's second confirmed aircraft loss, an F-16 over western Serbia, came much later but Yugoslav propaganda reported incredibly exaggerated figures for shot-down NATO aircraft. None of these asserted figures may be taken as correct.

Ruthless? Choice of targets

As early as SACEUR's press conference on 25 March he presented the principles for NATO's choice of target.[31] This was no coincidence since the NATO council had carefully scrutinised the choice of targets for the operational plan and presumably reserved the right to authorise continued extension of the target categories. SACEUR gave four principles that governed the choice of targets:

- Targets relating to military forces and security forces.
- Minimise collateral damage.
- Maximise the effect against Yugoslav offensive capability.
- Target types (air defence, command and control and military and police infrastructure).

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[30] General Clark at the NATO press conference on 1 April 1999.
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990401c.htm.
[31] General Clark at the NATO press conference on 25 March.
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/990325a.htm.

These deadlines for political decisions came to be what governed the various phases of the operation. It is reasonable to assume that NATO wished to feel its way and see Milosevic' reaction. According to the New York Times a NATO diplomat stated that in the first phase some hundred targets had been approved and that these targets were to be considered as military fixed installations, i.e. air defence targets, military installations and the garrisons of the security police.

This agrees reasonably well with SACEUR's first major briefing on 1 April regarding the first phase of the operation in the first week. He specified some hundred targets which he called centres of gravity, to be seen as places where the attacks took place, in many cases in several rounds, on different days.

The concept of target has sometimes been misunderstood in the general debate and repeated attacks interpreted as low effect. Certain types of target and particularly those concerning infrastructure have what is usually called many "aiming points" e.g. a garrison made up of some thirty buildings may be called one target. To attack each building, for example, may require thirty sorties. An anti-aircraft missile ramp may also be designated as a target but perhaps requires only one aircraft. In addition, certain targets must be attacked several times since they are repaired, the most typical being airports.

SACEUR gives four target categories. Briefly[32] they are the following:

Target categories	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D1-8
Air defence	24	15	5	8	6	6	5	1	38
Command-and-Control system	12	12	6	3	4	4	2	2	24
Ammo., fuel dumps, etc	1	1	1	3	1	3	4	3	13
Military forces	2	4	6	7	12	5	6	8	32
Sum	**38**	**32**	**18**	**21**	**23**	**18**	**17**	**14**	**107**

Note that the lines do not add up since the same target could need attack for several days.

The shift in the centre of gravity from air defence to other targets after two days is clear. The total number of targets per 24 hours reflects the weather situation, which rapidly worsened. In the above compilation military forces refers only to fixed installations. NATO's reports differ somewhat from American reports, which in the category of military forces contain a mixture of fixed targets and terrain-deployed tanks, combat vehicles, artillery etc. This is more evident after the first month when the centre of gravity of the operation becomes field-deployed combat force in Kosovo. To some extent this also reflects the fact that the tactical targets in Kosovo were of greater interest to NATO than to the American defence department.[33]

Very great restrictions prevailed during the missions: own and civilian losses were to be kept to an absolute minimum. The rules of engagement (ROE) permitted NATO to fly at low altitudes (under fifteen thousand feet) only under determined conditions.

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[32] No combined evaluation of the air missions has yet been published. The figures are based on compilations of pictures reported at NATO press conferences. During the first few weeks, however, information was scanty. Operational secrecy was great and the information that there had been leaks could not be confirmed. In 1998, the previous year, a French officer had been arrested and accused of having passed material to the Serbs.

[33] Cf. also the parallel operations ALLIED FORCE and NOBLE ANVIL reported above.

This restriction was relaxed during the final phase of the conflict in Kosovo when the war of attrition against Serb tanks, combat vehicles and artillery was intensified. NATO succeeded well in avoiding own losses - no soldier was killed in combat during the 78 days the operation lasted.

Restrictions regarding collateral damage and the fact that NATO absolutely wished to avoid killing or injuring civilians meant that it was preferred to abort a mission than to risk hitting civilians. When the weather proved so bad during the beginning of the conflict, many attack missions were cancelled or broken off. As an example, the British conducted a total of four attacks during only two of the first six days. [34] For the whole of the first month the weather proved a great obstacle and NATO preferred to refrain from attacks with unguided weapons rather than causing unnecessary collateral damage.

Throughout, one gains the impression that NATO chiefly attacked systems and functions within the selected target categories rather than the persons who served the systems. The primary intention was not to kill the persons who did the work but only to destroy their resources. Many sources state that buildings bombed were empty or even evacuated before they were bombed. Serb media seldom reported large numbers of dead in bomb raids against different objectives, such as the interior ministry, media stations and military barracks. Nor during the NATO presentation of the evaluation of the effects against field units in Kosovo was any assessed number of killed and injured soldiers reported. To a direct question from a journalist at a press conference: "General, can you give us an estimate of how many Yugoslav troops were killed?" General Clark answered: "I can give no estimate of that whatsoever. We have no way of knowing."[35] In a "normal" war this is naturally information that is followed up continuously.

Continuation of the operation. Isolating the combat forces

This phase saw reinforcement of the air combat forces. The need to increase tactical missions in Kosovo and its vicinity was chiefly a consequence of the intensified expulsion of Kosovo Albanians by the Serbs. B-1B bombers were based in England and were used initially against targets in Kosovo. An important addition to this tactical offensive was also the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier task force which was re-routed to the Adriatic. The Theodore Roosevelt was sailing through the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf to relieve the USS Enterprise. The strategic importance of this is shown in the fact that the USS Kitty Hawk carrier task force had to make its way from East Asia to relieve the Enterprise. In this way there was for a short time no carrier task force in the strategically important area around Korea. It is somewhat strange that the Enterprise in turn left the Adriatic some two weeks before the start of the air operation.[36] The Theodore Roosevelt carrier task force includes two missile cruisers, one missile destroyer and a submarine carrying Tomahawk

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[34] General Guthrie at the MOD press conference 30 March, http://www.mod.uk./news/ kosovo/ brief300399.htm

[35] NATO press conference 16 Sept 1999 http//www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990916a.htm

[36] One reason can be that the USA judged that there were sufficient forces for the strategic operation within the framework of operation NOBLE ANVIL. The tactical attacks on ground units in Kosovo were primarily a NATO interest.

two missile cruisers, one missile destroyer and a submarine carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles. The number of cruise missile platforms thus increased from six to ten. However it seems scarcely credible that it was the increased cruise missile capacity that governed the decision to redirect the Theodore Roosevelt. It is more probable that it was the F-14 and F-18 attack aircraft that were required and particularly the few EA-8B (Prowler) ECM jamming aircraft.

After the first week there was a clear extension of the choice of targets to the second phase of the operation plan. At this point it became clear that Milosevic would not immediately comply with NATO demands. What degree of difficulty SACEUR may have had in getting the politicians' agreement to introduce this phase is hard to say. It was at this point that discussion of micro-management started and those nineteen NATO countries would have to authorise each choice of target.

The second phase contained the following target categories:[37]

- Communications.
- Fuel supplies.
- Command and control systems.

The Danube bridges destroyed at Novi Sad are a clear example of the first category. Less clear, however, is that the destruction follows a pattern, in that the three army areas were divided up and possibilities of reinforcing the combat forces in Kosovo were reduced. This was partly the 2nd army in the Montenegro area adjoining Kosovo and partly the 1st army in the Belgrade area. The three army areas were further divided: for the 1st army along the Danube, for the 2nd in the northern Montenegro mountains and for the 3rd in the Kosovo area. The traditional way of bringing up reinforcements by rail was rapidly interrupted with the cutting-off of the four railways leading south. The railway into Macedonia was attacked - probably by mistake - when a passenger train was crossing the Grdelica Bridge. Two railways run into Kosovo and railway bridges and a tunnel were destroyed, rendering traffic impossible. The fourth railway leads down into Montenegro and was efficiently closed. SFOR also took part in this cutting-off where a short section of railway runs through Herzegovina.

The main reason for cutting off the railway to Montenegro was to prevent the transport of oil and petrol from the Adriatic ports. The significance of this became clear when attacks on fuel supply increased. The effect of dislocating rail traffic was very rapidly 100 %. The roads into Kosovo were attacked in the first instance but the effect was moderate and given as 50%. NATO also kept a road open from Pristina in Kosovo to Nis, probably deliberately. It is unclear why, but the intention was that the Serbs should leave Kosovo. This may have been a political demand within NATO. Certain other large roads were also cut off including the new motorway east of Belgrade.

The attacks on the Danube bridges were never complete. Mainly the bridges in Belgrade were not attacked. Nevertheless this meant that Danube River traffic was hampered and many vessels remained in Romania/Bulgaria at the Serbian frontier.

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[37] DOD press conference http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/g990610-J-0000K.htm.

The attacks on fuel supplies were directed towards oil systems and distribution (pumping installations) but the two large refineries in Novi Sad and Pancevo were also destroyed. The NATO assessment is that strategic supply was stopped and operative supply hampered (which should be interpreted as the 3rd army area) in combination with attacks on communications. The tactical fuel supply in Kosovo was slightly affected but NATO's view is that the freedom of movement of combat forces successively decreased. That this measure can only have a long-term effect (time horizon of several months) is shown by the fact that the Serbs, when they withdrew starting on 10 June, had no fuel problems.

Command and control systems attacked in this phase were largely the radio transmitters and radio link systems. However the Serbian defence used many redundant systems such as wire, fibre-optics, satellite telephones and short-wave radio. Many of the telecommunications systems are however mixed military/civilian, particularly the wire systems. There are no signs that the wire systems were significantly damaged. Telephone traffic to and from Yugoslavia including the Internet appears only to have been subjected to disturbances, chiefly in the later phase when the electrical system was affected. An obvious suspicion was that the USA had penetrated the military system through offensive infowarfare. There are various indications of this and some confirmation has started to appear in the press. These indications were prompted by whether infowarfare had any operative significance. A conflict situation between the intelligence service and the military regarding use of the systems appears to underlie the "disclosures".

In this phase, attacks on field-deployed units in Kosovo were also initiated. According to the operational plan this should probably have started somewhat later but may have been brought forward in consequence of the Serbs' rapidly increased repression of Kosovo Albanians. It was also presumably a political decision. Reinforcement with aircraft from USS Theodore Roosevelt fits this pattern. The English and French aircraft carriers Independence and Foche, which also arrived at this point, had probably also been included in the plan.

Escalation of the operation - strategic bombing

On 23 April (day 30) NATO stated that air supremacy at high altitude had been achieved and Yugoslav air defence had been appreciably damaged; 70 aircraft had been destroyed and five shot down in dog-fights (a sixth was shot down on 4 May). NATO maintained that 40% of SAM-3 anti aircraft systems and 25% of SAM-6 had been destroyed.[38]

The operational tempo remained low since the intensity of the use of available resources was not high. During a fortnight of good weather, 200-300 sorties a day were flown (excluding SEAD anti-aircraft suppression). At most just 300 attack sorties were flown during 24 hours (plus just under 100 SEAD). This was in a period when over 500 attack aircraft were available. Roughly speaking each available attack aircraft flew on average one sortie every other day. Added to this were a large number of other missions, chiefly fighter missions but also in-flight refuelling, combat control, reconnaissance and ECM, with different aircraft.

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[38] NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea at NATO press conference 23 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990423l.htm.

The most obvious aspect of this operation is that orientation was towards strategic targets such as industry, electricity supplies, radio and television and targets within the capital, Belgrade. In connection with such an attack, a B-2 dropped 3 JDAM bombs, which hit their target, the Chinese embassy, with great precision. This mistake by the CIA intelligence service is still being discussed. Milosevic's residence was hit, as were the headquarters of the governing socialist party.

Some 40 days into the conflict NATO attacked electrical systems and Belgrade and many cities were blacked out, to remain so for several days. After 43 days it was officially announced from Serb headquarters that the national electricity system had collapsed and that 60 % of the country was without electricity. Part of the attack on the electrical system was done with graphite bombs which cause short-circuits but no direct physical damage. NATO maintain that switching stations and transformer stations were deliberately attacked and not the direct production of electrical power, fully aware that repairs were being done but that if so they could strike again.

At the beginning of June there was also an extension of directions of attack from bases in Hungary and Turkey. NATO maintained they could attack round the clock from all points of the compass, from the air and from the sea. This was undoubtedly true and presumably contributed to Milosevic finally capitulating and saying he was prepared to sign the peace treaty. No air missions were in fact flown from Hungary or Turkey.

Termination of the operation – decimating ground-deployed units

Simultaneously with the escalation of the strategic attacks, serious strikes were initiated against military and police units deployed in various places in Kosovo. This involved basically attacks on mobile ground targets such as tanks, APCs, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft positions and also helicopters.

One lesson from the Gulf war was this very difficulty of engaging mobile ground units from the air. Development of this capability, termed 'sensor-to-shooter' involves detection, rapid identification and report of target position to the nearest aircraft. Experience shows that this development has not gone far enough.

The objective was to destroy ten units (tanks, APCs, artillery pieces etc) per day. In the just over six weeks of the sub-operation, the final tally was some eight hundred units destroyed according to NATO. This figure has been disputed but the information that the figure was a maximum of ten units is almost certainly incorrect and based only on propaganda. The objective of ten units per day would seem to have been met in good measure were it not that the majority, around 80 %, were destroyed during the last ten days before 9 June, the day upon which the operation ended. The UCK commenced an offensive around 25, May, which forced the Serbs to take countermeasures. The fighting developed into trench warfare and artillery bombardment at Mount Pastrik on the Albanian frontier, artillery pieces constituting the majority (approx. 450) of the units destroyed. B-52 carpet bombing with bomblets during the last few days of the conflict destroyed two Serb battalions at Mount Pastrik. Until the start of the UCK offensive NATO had only managed to destroy an average of some five units per day despite a very intensive effort by

combined arms operations. This tactic allowed great flexibility, with the Kosovo area divided into zones with airborne combat control in A-10s, F-16s, F-18s or F-14s. The forward air controller monitored his zone, identified targets and called up aircraft. At night IR-cameras and night-vision goggles were used. These attacks were combined with anti-aircraft suppression and unmanned Predator reconnaissance aircraft. It is also very likely that Special Forces ground units were in the area and assisted with identification. Note that the restrictions regarding collateral damage were still very great and there were not only Serb forces on the ground but also both refugees and UCK guerrillas. Friendly-fire casualties have been reported.

Presumably it was for this phase that the attack helicopters based in Albania were intended. Insufficient training, no authorisation for night flying, the risk of anti-aircraft fire, etc, meant that the gunships were never deployed.

NATO's evaluation of the attacks against field units was presented at a press conference on 16 September.[39]

9 June 1999, day 78

It is hard to know what would have happened had the UCK offensive not lured the Serbs out of their defensive positions in Kosovo. As mentioned earlier, NATO was probably prepared for a **protracted operation.**

The rate at which combat forces deployed on the ground were destroyed did not correspond to the objective. Escalation of the strategic offensive had been commenced through deployment in Hungary and Turkey. The Theodore Roosevelt carrier task force that left the Adriatic at the beginning of May was, at the end of May, in the Ionic Sea west of Greece. There are certain indications, including a NATO-organised mine force, that there were possibilities of mining the Montenegro harbours and introducing a total blockade, including economic. It is conceivable that the Danube River traffic could also be stopped using airdropped mines had not broken bridges stopped the traffic anyway. Extension of the list of targets to the national political leadership and its functions and infrastructure was one further conceivable category of targets. As mentioned in the introduction section the risk of mutual escalation and prolongation of a conflict can lead to 'mission creep' where the original purpose gets lost.

Defence Minister Cohen speaking at the DOD press conference on 10 June:[40]

When I announced the first air attacks on Yugoslavia I declared a clear military objective - to downgrade and reduce the Serb military forces. For the last eleven weeks NATO has followed this objective with patience, persistence and with great precision. As a result the Serb troops are leaving Kosovo and NATO troops will now ensure peace and stability.

Three months ago Yugoslavia was an well-armed country with a substantial air defence. We have reduced the air defence threat by destroying more than 80 % of Yugoslavia's modern combat aircraft and strategic anti-aircraft systems. NATO has

[39] http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990916a.htm
[40] http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/t06101999_t0610asd.html

destroyed a substantial part of the infrastructure possessed by Yugoslavia in support of the military, we have reduced her capacity to manufacture ammunition by more than two thirds and we have eliminated all oil-refining capacity and more than 40 % of military fuel stocks. But more importantly, we have decimated the military forces in Kosovo by destroying more than half their artillery and more than two thirds of their combat vehicles.

We have flown seventy-eight days on end without serious injuries and with only two aircraft lost. [...] For the first few days over 90% were precision-guided weapons and over time the average became 35%, which were dropped with precision in small areas such as oil refineries, ammunition dumps and troop assembly areas.

Of 23,000 bombs and missiles we have confirmed that only 20 missed and led to collateral damage.

Summary of the operation

Yugoslav defence forces air defence

The air force consisted of five fighter squadrons, four attack squadrons and two reconnaissance squadrons. Aircraft types were MiG-29 FULCRUM (relatively modern fighter/17 a/cs) MiG-21 FISHBED (old fighter/64 a/cs), MiG-21R (reconnaissance/18 a/cs), J-22 Orao (poor fighter-attack/66 a/cs) and G-4 Galeb (advanced trainer/75 a/cs). In addition there were 52 attack helicopters and a number of transport helicopters.

Air defence consisted of fifteen air defence regiments with 1,850 anti-aircraft weapons calibred from 20 mm to 54 mm, eight anti-aircraft battalions with SA-2 (24 fire units) SA-3 (16 fire units) and SA-16 (60-80 vehicles with fire units), short-range anti-aircraft missiles in the form of SA-9 and SA-13 (130 pcs), and man-portable missiles SA-7 (500) and SA-16 and SA-18 (230+).

NATO's air combat forces

Initially (24 March), 371 NATO aircraft (of which 210 were American) could be used for operations. Gradually aircraft were added from various NATO countries. The exact figures are somewhat hard to establish but for the first few days in April there were approximately 400 aircraft. Subsequently the build-up was rapid during April. On 30 April the resources had been doubled and as early as 6 April they had increased by 30 %; on 12 of April by 50 %. On 25 May NATO had over 1000 aircraft, with Hungary tasking aircraft to the operation, and when Turkey allowed operation from its territory at the beginning of June this rose to over 1,100 aircraft, i.e. treble what was originally available. NATO used many types of aircraft. Thus for example there were fifteen types of attack aircraft and bombers, four types of fighters, and twelve types for ECM. UAVs were also used including Predators and Hunters.

NATO's capability grew from 120 attack aircraft at the outbreak of hostilities to 250 on 13 April, 340 on 27 April[41], by the end reaching some 550 attack aircraft. Apart from air combat forces different types of cruise missile were also used, fired from aircraft, ships and strategic submarines.

What did Yugoslav air defence achieve?

Early attempts (during the first few days of the conflict) were made using fighters. Though the objectives of these were not stated, the probable intention was to destroy command and control platforms (AWACS) to the east and southeast. Sorties by aircraft in pairs proved too weak to achieve this. The result was dog fights with NATO's heavy fighters and the shooting-down of the Yugoslav Mig-29s. When in addition NATO achieved base-locking, i.e. destroyed Yugoslav air base runways and aircraft on the ground, Yugoslav fighter forces ceased to be a threat.

The Yugoslav anti-aircraft forces succeeded well with the traditional anti-aircraft tasks: NATO was forced up to high altitudes, weakening its strike capability particularly against small mobile targets and in poor weather. The restrictions laid by NATO on its sorties regarding collateral damage involved limitations when flying at 15,000 feet. Yugoslav anti-aircraft forces were less successful in actually shooting down aircraft although about ten UAVs and possibly some cruise missiles were destroyed.

What did NATO's air combat forces achieve?

NATO's initial objective was to strike against Serb air defence, to impair its capability and be able to operate securely (unthreatened) and effectively. The second objective was to strike military (chiefly army) installations such as headquarters and barracks.

Various articles written after the conflict stated that the introductory phase was cautious and had limited objectives and vague purposes. Subsequently - particularly after introducing phase three after about a month - when the purpose was to destroy electrical and industrial installations, large parts of the capacity were in fact destroyed. In a report after the war [42] the American defence department claimed that the following capacity had been destroyed:

Production of explosives	50 %
Production of ammunition	65 %
Assembly and repair of air equipment	70 %
Production and repair of combat vehicles	40 %
Oil refining	100 %
First army garrisons/corresponding	35 %
Second army garrisons/corresponding	20 %
Third army garrisons/corresponding (Kosovo)	60 %
Electrical power	35 %
Road connections between Serbia and Kosovo	50 %
Railway connections between Serbia and Kosovo	100 %

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[41] Anthony H. Cordesman "The War in Kosovo: Beyond the First Month. Status as of Day 50", CSIS
[42] General Shelton at the DOD press conference, 10 June,
  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/t06101999_t0610asd.html

Throughout, it may be noted that what are termed fixed targets can be hit and destroyed. There is certain robustness about many targets and many hits may be required to destroy the target. It may take up to a week or more before it is destroyed. At the same time capacity in various functions may be seriously influenced through attack from the air. Once a start had been made on attacking Belgrade's electricity supply it failed almost immediately and was out of action for days. Following repairs repeated attacks led to the target being virtually impossible to repair. The same applies to radio and television. Railway communications were destroyed but not all road communications (in particular the road between Pristina and Nis appears to have avoided attack, presumably to make possible the withdrawal of third army units along this road). Bridges may require repeated attacks to be destroyed. One example is the third and last bridge (a combined road and railway bridge) over the Danube in Novi Sad which required four attacks - extending over several days - before it was destroyed.

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND IT-RELATED SECURITY ISSUES

E. Anders Eriksson

What was the significance of information operations (IO) in the Kosovo conflict ? Open sources offer no clear answer to this question and it is in the nature of things that much relevant information would certainly be kept secret for a long time to come. But both what happened and what did not happen - and the more or less well-founded views arising in different quarters - will acquire great significance for developments in an area which has already earned such great attention, but which so far has so little "case history".

A central question is how to view the asymmetries. Does IO contribute to the superiority of the technologically superior side as other IT-based military applications do, or is the dependence on IT of a more technically advanced country an Achilles heel that can be exploited by an opponent with lower technology who is therefore more robust? Or did Kosovo show that the attention given to IO during the past few years was - in IT language – "hype"?

Note that the type of IO focused upon here is *logical* - i.e. software-based - to exploit or disrupt the opponent's information and information systems. Electronic countermeasures directed at communications systems fall outside this limitation, as does propaganda through technically unimpeachable e-mail and home pages. These limitations may however sometimes prove problematical - e.g. sending "mass-produced" mail (e-mail bombing) to cause a server to go down, is generally counted as a logical attack while it is more doubtful how a similar effect should be considered if it is achieved by a large number of upset individuals each sending an e-mail letter. Some more intricate issues of delimitation are discussed below.

Less sophisticated threat actors: Serbia and "hacktivists"

No strategic IW against critical US infrastructure

A first area of questions concerns the frequently presented speculation that almost anybody using hacker tools generally available on the Internet could cause significant effects on e.g. critical US infrastructures and other social functions. There is nothing to show that this was so to any significant degree.[43]

Expressions of discontent from "hacktivists"

What a wide circle of "hacktivists" on both sides actually managed to achieve, however, was to spread propaganda on the Net, partly through data intrusion and also by causing web servers to go down through e-mail bombing.[44] Noted attacks

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[43] "Serb forces also claimed they developed an information attack capability. However, the Pentagon has found no direct evidence of such an effort." Robert Wall, "USAF expands Infowar arsenal," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 15/11, p 102 (year 1999 unless otherwise stated).

[44] *Boston Globe 3/4, Fox News 15/4.*

concerned the NATO web site[45] and diverse American government home pages in protest against the bombing of the Chinese embassy.[46] This type of activity has also continued since the war itself.[47]

Such protest actions do not threaten central functions within e.g. US warfare unless very serious IT security mistakes are made. But since American defence communicates with suppliers via the Internet, "expressions of opinion" in the form of e-mail bombing and hacking against home pages may nevertheless have certain indirect effects on the conduct of the warfare (see the following section on the Iraq war).

American security measures

During the Iraq war it is stated that the UN coalition's logistics could have been seriously affected via web sites accessible via the Net - and which in some cases were in fact hacked even though the perpetrators did not wish or were not able to exploit the situation.[48] Subsequently the security level for American defence use of IT has certainly been substantially raised. In the connection with the Kosovo conflict one topical proposal was to create a new network (independent of the Internet) for the contacts American defence currently handles via the public Net. This Extranet would represent a third layer apart from the present Intranets for secret and open information. The new net would probably have a small number of well-defended connections with the Internet.[49]

Sophisticated threat actors: what was the USA doing in Cyberspace ?

Precision attacks on Milosevic's accounts? International-law aspects of IO

During and for several months after the air war, information on the USA's information warfare - apart from "banalities" and the questions mentioned above - followed two fairly significant themes. The first was based on a Newsweek story that President Clinton had approved a plan to get at Milosevic through e.g. cyberattacks on his foreign bank accounts.[50] This aroused scepticism regarding its feasibility and criticism regarding the legality and the long-term consequences for the USA itself of establishing such a practice in warfare through unprovoked use of infowarfare.[51]

A *Washington Post* article in October gave better-informed material regarding these questions. During the Kosovo war Pentagon jurists were stated to have laid down guidelines for military use of information operations. The guideline state that any information operations should be directed against military targets, with minimisation

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[45] *CNN 31/3.*

[46] *Lycos News 12/5.*

[47] Red Nordland, 'E-zone combat: Hostilities may end on the battlefield, but there's never a truce on the Internet,' *Newsweek 11/10, pp 72-73.*

[48] This emerged among other things, through discussions at a conference (see A.Eriksson 'Dutch Hackers Hacking for Saddam?', pp23-24 in M. Prinzell (ed.) "Travelogue from InfoWarCon 6, Brussels 7-9 May 1997," Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 1977).

[49] *Federal Computer Week 20/6.*

[50] *Newsweek 23/5.*

[51] *MSNBC 28/5.*

of collateral damage and the avoidance of indiscriminate attacks. In line with this the claims regarding plans for attacking Milosevic's accounts were dismissed *en passant* as were those against civilian Yugoslav objectives. Apart from the legal aspects, reasons given for this were the "embryonic" condition of the IT weapon - which also makes it difficult to judge effects and hence to minimise collateral damage - and the rudimentary and decentralised character of certain Yugoslav systems.

The American position is stated to have been that the above guidelines stem from existing international law and that this is sufficient for regulating the international area. Russia follows the opposite line and in the UN has raised the issue of special regulations against information warfare.[52]

Information operations in the air war

The second theme started as a debate on why IO - apart from intelligence gathering - had *not* been used against Serbia ("With the shooting war against Yugoslavia it should be crystal clear to anyone that exotic American cyberbombs have not aided the effort in any way."). Reasons given in this debate were problems of legality and American first-use (see above), the lack of visible damage which vitiates evaluation of the effect achieved, conflict between passively collecting intelligence and actively disrupting or effecting the opponent's intelligence, and the fact that IO has come to be viewed as a strategic - and therefore political - weapon the use of which requires decisions "within the Beltway" i.e. in Washington. [53]

Starting in August 1999, however, this picture has been modified. Chiefly it was David Fulghum, Senior Military Editor of the well-respected *Aviation Week*, who - with reference to anonymous sources within American defence - drew a picture of how tactical IO had been used to disrupt Yugoslav air defence. This is said to have concerned inserting false targets into the Yugoslav control system. [54]

The attention paid to this in other media may appear surprisingly little. The Washington Post gives important independent confirmation however. In an article the main message of which is based further on the above theme of why IO was not used ("We went through the drill of figuring out how we would do some of these cyber things if we were to do them," said a senior military officer, "but we never went ahead with any".) there suddenly appears the claim that "US forces did target some computers that control the Yugoslav air defence system [...] but the attacks were launched from electronic jamming aircraft rather than over computer networks from ground-based US keyboards". [55]

Inserting false targets requires a logical attack. Nor would ECM against communication links be mentioned as an attack on computers ("did target some computers" according to the *Washington Post*). It is important to clarify this since electronic counter measures are now sometimes included under IO and since some

[52] 'Military grappling with rules for cyber warfare,' *Washington Post 8/11*; E. Anders Eriksson, Malin Fylkner, 'IT-Related Threats In The Network Society: Suggestions for a Swedish Proactive Agenda,' scientific Report, FOA-R--00-01459-170--SE, April 2000.

[53] William M.Arkin in *Washington Post 7/6*.

[54] David A.Fulghum, *Aviation Week & Space Technology 23/8*.

[55] See note 52.

judges consider that the American efforts were reportedly ECM attacks. In other articles Fulghum treats in detail the American capability to efficiently counter the opponent's co-ordinated air defence capability through very advanced electronic disruption of communications.[56] According to most sources the attacks on the Yugoslav air defence were directed from ECM aircraft hitherto used for electronic warfare against communications (EC-130 Compass Call). Satellite systems were also indicated in a few articles as a source of cyber attack. [57] It is moreover scarcely credible that the Yugoslav anti aircraft control systems would have been accessible via the Internet - and therefore via "ground-based US keyboards". The aggregate picture emerging regarding IO in the air war nevertheless indicates that there was something in the original picture of non-use - even according to those who claim that logical attacks occurred. The operation is claimed to have been preceded by doubts regarding the difficulties of assessing collateral damage in the case of attack and therefore in deciding about the compatibility of such attacks with international law. Not until after the shooting down of an F-117 - a stealth aircraft - were certain operations with "cyber weapons" permitted. Even then however difficulties are said to have been found in an over-long decision cycle. Against the background of this problem General John Ralston, USA's vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, is quoted as saying that IO experts in future need to be physically present in 'air operations centres' when missions are being planned. In line with experience from Kosovo a relatively large number of measures are now being adopted. As well as the air force, the army is also said to be demonstrating great activity. [58]

In general it appears that "logical " IO in military operations is being ascribed great importance for the future. Colonel Sammy A.Peirce, responsible in the Pentagon for air force information warfare operations, sees traditional electronic countermeasures as increasingly difficult in a future in which the opponent can exploit commercial communication systems with great redundancy. For this reason it will be important instead - as according at least to *Aviation Week* and *The Washington Post* already happened during the Kosovo operation - to be able to disrupt the function of systems by introducing false information. [59]

Dominate Cyberspace Awareness? American view of IT for debate, propaganda and the collection of intelligence

A last area of questions is how the USA and NATO elected to exploit its more general superiority within IT based sections of the world economy. A noted case was when a Serbian TV channel was removed from European satellites.[60] Another question was whether Yugoslavia should be disconnected from the Internet. A representative from the American government rejected such suggestions with the argument that "full and open access to the Internet can only help the Serbian people know the ugly truth about the atrocities and crimes against humanity being perpetrated in Kosovo by the

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[56] David A.Fulghum, 'Compass Call To Dominate Electronic, Info War,' etc. *Aviation Week & Space Technology 18/10, pp50-56.*
[57] David A. Fulghum, "Telecom Links Provide Cyber-Attack Route," Aviation Week & Space Technology 8/11, p. 1883; Robert Wall op.cit. note 43 p 102.103.
[58] Robert Wall et al, note 43, pp 103-103; David A.Fulghum, 'Army Hackers Go Airborne', *Aviation Week & Space Technology 18/10* p 37.
[59] Robert Wall op sit, note 43, pp 102-103.
[60] *Telepolis, 1/6.*

Milosevic regime".[61] In a more conspiratorial spirit one can wonder whether the wish to be able to run information operations via the internet - probably chiefly for collecting intelligence - played its part when the USA took up its stand on this issue.[62]

The above shortcomings in the ability to exploit modern technology for information and propaganda - and the need to develop this - have also been treated in American post-Kosovo discussions. [63]

Conclusions

One main conclusion is that cyber weapons have not started to be used strategically - e.g. in the form of the greatly discussed broad attacks on critical infrastructure - what are termed *Weapons of Mass Disruption* (WMD).

On the other hand credible sources maintain that the USA in the air war used them tactically with some success. Even though some appear to doubt this information there is on balance strong evidence that IO at tactical level - i.e. in collaboration with other weapons systems - will achieve increased significance in debate and development. For reasons of international law, the USA appears to wish limit its IO to military targets. However, there is no technical obstacle to other - technically highly competent - actors using similar methods against other types of target. For this kind of more precision-oriented use of cyber weapons, the term *Weapons of Precision Disruption* (WPD) has been coined. [64]

That IO has been used for gathering intelligence must be considered as quite certain. Here it is quite natural that "gossip" has been indulged in on with great restraint - even long after the event.

In addition, the Internet has provided an arena for the expression of opinion and propaganda. For example, since the American Forces communicate with suppliers via the Internet, "expressions of opinion" in the form of e-mail bombing and hacking against home pages can also have certain indirect effects on the conduct of war.

In sum, there is little - if anything - in the Kosovo experience to indicate that information operations were asymmetrical to the disadvantage of the technically more sophisticated side. This naturally does not imply that cyber-WMD in the form of e.g. data viruses may be neglected - on the contrary, sophisticated security is necessary. But the risk of WPD operations - within the framework of conventional warfare or as a step in e.g. sophisticated economic criminality - must be given corresponding importance and, in many ways, places high demands upon the defender. [65]

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[61] *Wired News 14/5.*

[62] David A.Fulghum op sit, note 57

[63] Jason Sherman, 'On Message: Just Because You Dominate the Digital Battlespace Doesn't Mean You Win The Information War', *Armed Forces Journal International,* October 1999, p 13.

[64] E.Anders Eriksson, 'Information Warfare: Hype or Reality', *The Nonproliferation Review,* Spring-Summer 1999.

[65] Eriksson op sit. Note 64.

HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

Åke Wiss and Ann Ödlund

Introduction

Reporting from areas afflicted by war is not always reliable. Many interests have much to gain through 'their side' getting sympathy in their own area and internationally. This may lead to different parties consciously spreading false information for the purposes of influencing opinion. This requires the recipient to check the sources from which the information comes. Where the reliability of a piece of information must be determined rapidly, checking may be hard.

In this chapter some general aspects of the Kosovo conflict are discussed using the information available during June 1999. The selection of aspects is based on the design of the mission, the orientation towards the FOA project "Threat analysis in international operations" and the present authors' view of the events. There will be no detailed discussions in the chapter since the questions presented require more time-consuming analysis.

The aspects discussed are: humanitarian war, alternatives to air strikes, strategies for intervention in a state in dissolution, stress injuries and mental illness, and help for people who are being displaced.

Humanitarian warfare

NATO wishes to portray the war conducted in Kosovo as a humanitarian war. This type of warfare raises at least four problematic questions:

1) For whose human rights is it worth raging a war to defend ? In reality, all people's rights should be equally worth defending. There may be a difference concerning interest from the western world depending on whether the conflict is in Europe, Asia or Africa.
2) How universal are human rights ? Has the west the right to intervene to protect the rights of oppressed minorities ? Bringing European "light"to Asian and African "darkness" is an argument that was used during imperialism.
3) How should humanitarian war be waged ? Is it for example right to bomb infrastructure ? The situation in Kosovo was probably worsened by the slow start to the air war - the Serbs gained more time to commit atrocities. How early and how rapidly the international community reacts may be decisive for the possibility to succeed. [66]
4) Who is prepared to wage war to guarantee human rights ? Do regional organisations have the right to encroach upon state sovereignty to guarantee human rights without a UN mandate ? It is possible that the results of the NATO and UN efforts in Kosovo may serve as a guide to how future intrastate conflicts may be handled?

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[66] Newsweek, June 28, 1999.

It appears that the USA and NATO attempted to avoid repeating the mistakes committed in 1994 in the conflict in Bosnia. There the UN attempted to be independent and refused to allow either side to win. Economic sanctions were introduced against the Serbs and a weapons embargo against the Muslims. Both these measures worked and the idea was to encourage the parties to reach a negotiated solution. The problem was that reality did not function in this way. The result was neither peace nor an end to the killing but years of military deadlock, many wounded and killed and political intrigues.

President Clinton's policy in Kosovo has been criticised by, among others, Henry Kissinger.[67] Kissinger finds no realistic basis for Clinton's assurance that the ethnic groups will be reconciled after a brief NATO occupation. Ethnic groups in Bosnia have not become reconciled after three years of NATO peacekeeping. The Kosovo Albanians, once a more liberal and democratic leadership has replaced Milosevic, are expected to abandon their demands for independence. In fact however the KLA and many returning refugees have simply refused to accept the identity cards (prepared by among others UNHCR, OSCE, the EU and the Albanian government) that clearly show the holder to be a Yugoslav citizen: "How can we accept citizenship of a state which killed us and expelled us by force ?" [68]

The KLA has independence as its objective, not autonomy. As Kosovo moves towards independence the pressure will increase on Macedonia where a third of the population are ethnic Albanians. This may risk extending the conflict or, as now, lead to ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Romaine's.

Alternatives to air bombing

Was there an alternative to air bombing ?
1) Economic sanctions. This type of measure has been used in earlier conflicts. It has proved that such do not give rapid results and in addition they have seldom been complete. The irony of using sanctions is that they strike at the civilian population, creating unnecessary suffering. The destructiveness of sanctions is exemplified in the case of Iraq. Various UN organs have estimated that sanctions have contributed to more deaths than all use of weapons of mass destruction since the beginning of time - people have therefore started talking about 'sanctions of mass destruction'. [69]
2) Capture or kill the leader. This may perhaps be seen as an alternative to air bombing and sanctions. There are however certain problem with this approach and it was never really a conceivable solution in Kosovo. There are many reasons for this. Experience from other similar operations - Noriega in Panama, Aideed in Somalia - and also American legislation: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination". [70]

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[67] 'Doing Injury to History' Kissinger, H. Newsweek April 5, 1999.
[68] 'Who will lead the Kosovo Albanians now?: Making Sense of Kosovo's Feuding Factions' ICG Kosovo Briefing. Tirana 28 June 1999.
[69] 'Sanctions of Mass Destruction', Mueller, J & Mueller, K. Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, No. 3.
[70] 'Stalking Saddam', US News and World Report, 23 February, 1998.

3) Undermine the leader's legitimacy. This was a method used in parallel with air bombing in Kosovo. NATO used psychological warfare, directed at the Serb population, to undermine the authority of Slobodan Milosevic. An aircraft known as 'Commando Solo' broadcast news and propaganda in Serbocroat. Another example is the pamphlet intended to weaken the fighting spirit of Yugoslav soldiers containing the following announcement in Serbocroat: "Over 13,000 Yugoslav service members have already left the armed forces because they can no longer follow the illegal orders in Milosevic' war against civilians in Kosovo".[71]

When an attempt is made from outside to depose the leader of a sovereign state, questions must be answered: how will the power relations in the area change if a leader disappears ? Will some other country exploit the situation when the country of which the "war criminal" is leader is undergoing a change of leadership ? What will the political consequences be for the country when its leader is captured ? Is it certain that the successor is more democratic ? What risk is there a) that the leader may become a martyr, b) that a revanchist mood is created in the country ?

If the leader of a state is to be captured and brought to justice as a war criminal, it is important that he or she is captured alive. For this purpose, various combinations of conventional and non-lethal weapons may be used. It is hard to imagine a mission without conventional weapons, in view of the risk of meeting armed groups attempting to prevent the international force from arresting the suspected war criminals. The security forces can be placed hors de combat with normal conventional weapons while in the eyes of the world this may seem to be unnecessarily great force, and in the worst case involve counter-fire and regular fighting. A different way of solving the problem is to use non-lethal weapons. For example, grenades disseminating malodorous substances pepper sprays and 'bean bag' ammunition can be used. In support, shells with optical ammunition may be used to temporarily blind people and surveillance equipment. Also UAV's should be used, chiefly for reconnaissance but also for delivering non-lethal weapon techniques.[72]

In the case of capture it must be made clear upon whose mandate this has been performed. What is to be done with the war criminal once caught ? There must be a tribunal that is accepted and respected and whose judges are neutral. In the Nuremberg tribunals it was the victors who judged the losers - it is hard to see that this would be the case in today's war criminal trials. Today international criminal legislation is more just towards the accused. Slobodan Milosevic has been accused in The Hague and could successfully prosecute against a trial with judges from a NATO country. Should a panel of judges from China, Russia and Pakistan judge him ? Naturally, nationality should not decide, but many of those appointed to international tribunals are 'political puppets', and a trial would test the legitimacy of the court just as much as it would Milosevic' guilt.[73] One problem is that future tyrants or war criminals can conclude that there is no reason to negotiate/compromise since peace or cease-fire leads only to a trial. This problem exists regarding e.g. Saddam Hussein -

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[71] 'Psychological weapons added to NATO arsenal' 28 April 1999 Pagoo2's News Press Releases. http://members.tripod.com/pagoo2/News5/news321.html

[72] Kindvall, G & Wiss, A.. 'Non-lethal weapons - an opportunity or a threat ?'. FOA-R--98-00634-170--SE.

[73] 'Not an Open-and-Shut Case', Robertson, G., Newsweek June 7, 1999.

the west gives him no way out. There is presumably no state where he could find asylum. What is required of him is that he should commit (political) suicide.

Strategies for intervention in a state in dissolution

Every conflict and every war is unique and complicated but one question must be asked 'Who rules when the fighting is over ?'[74] This implies that the world community must have a clear advance picture of who is going to run the conflict-afflicted area. Milosevic' rule in Kosovo was falling apart and one of the UN's tasks after the air strikes was to attempt to create an autonomous democratic Kosovo.

A study[75] of the UN operation in Somalia 1992-1995 presents two models for how a new political and legitimate order can be established in a state in dissolution:
1) Accommodate existing forces - A strategy based on the judgement that the forces that have survived or developed from a collapsed state represent the primary source of legitimate authority. It is therefore upon these that a new lasting order should be developed.
2) Encourage new institutions - From this perspective it is judged that the organisations developing from a collapsing state under certain conditions cannot serve as the basis for a new lasting order. These groups are assumed to have acquired power using armed force, plunder and terror against the population. Any lasting political stability must be based upon the resources for legitimacy available within civilian society.

The world community in the Somalia case basically elected to attempt to build the country upon the visible military representatives and their fractions, a strategy, which appears to have been chosen in Kosovo also. In Somalia this proved a difficult course. One conclusion from Somalia is that it is important for the world community to adopt a realistic approach to the conditions and not allow wishful thinking to govern if a successful political programme is to be produced. Unless the strategy is based upon actual circumstances in the decaying state, the possibility of success is small. A different conclusion is that the world community's strategy must be sufficiently flexible for operative doctrines and mandates to correspond to differing and changed conditions. Many local actors behave differently and change over time in response to the inducements given during an intervention.

In Kosovo the UN through Resolution 1244 (1999) determined to establish a transitional administration in Kosovo, where "the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo".[76] Achieving peace and

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[74] Betts, R.K. 'The Delusion of Impartial Intervention'. From 'Managing Global Chaos - Sources of and Responses to International Conflict', Crocker, C.A, Hampson, F.O. with Aalle, P. (Eds.). United State Institute of Peace Press 1998.
[75] Lyons, T. & Samatar, A.I. 'Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction'. The Brooking Institution 1995.
[76] S/RES/1244 (1999).

stability in an area where many atrocities have been committed may prove problematic.'

Stress injuries and mental illness among civilians, relief personnel and soldiers affected

There are great demands that soldiers and staff from NATO and the UN should be able to handle and meet people and situations of which these soldiers normally lack experience or can imagine:
a) raped and humiliated women, people who have lost their families and relatives and who have undergone unimaginable traumata,
b) people who are both victims and perpetrators,
c) mass graves, and
d) large streams of refugees.

Mental injuries among civilians in Kosovo

Experience of rapes and other atrocities and traumata is a tragic reality for people in the refugee camps in and around Kosovo. The refugees require strong psychological support, as well as food, water and protection. Between 5% and 10% of the refugees may be affected by post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)[77] as a result of the war. This means that they will suffer from mental problems for years to come.

Many relief workers will also suffer from traumatic stress after having dealt with thousands of refugees on a daily basis. Debriefing[78] and opportunities of talking about one's feelings and experience are extremely important for countering burn-out, and these measures also function to prevent delayed psychological reactions and PTSD.[79]

Great psychological requirements on military personnel in peace-keeping missions

Great psychological demands, faulty checking and small possibilities of influencing one's situation lead to mental stress. The extreme environmental conditions met by UN soldiers during the Kosovo mission require high mental alertness, great knowledge and security in the role that soldiers must play.

One study[80] has shown the peacekeeping under dangerous conditions where life threats occur together with restrictive rules of engagement and insufficient security represent a unique class of potentially traumatising phenomena. The interaction of

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[77] The concept of PTSD refers to reactions based on earlier traumatic events. These reactions may consist of panic attacks, 'flashbacks' and nightmares, guilt feelings, emotional numbing and an overpowering desire to flee.

[78] Debriefing is a formal meeting performed individually or in small groups. Debriefings are usually held following an extreme stress situation, for the sole purpose of handling feelings persisting after the trauma.

[79] 'Kosovo Survivors Suffering from Horrible Stress' Ball State University 27 April 1999. http://www.newswisw.com/articles/1999/4/STRESS99.BSU.htm

[80] 'The Psychological Demands of Peacekeeping for Military Personnel'. Lits, B. NC-PTSD Clinical Quarterly 6 (1); 3-8 (Winter 1996). Http://www.dartmouth.edu/dms/ptsd/CQ_V6N1B.html

"war-zone" stress and "peace-enforcement" may represent a new pattern in military peacekeeping operations.

The UN forces in Bosnia had the job of protecting towns and regions designated by the UN as safe from Serbian aggression. Serbian troops however took many of the safe areas and the UN troops in some cases had to stand by helplessly as various atrocities occurred. The peacekeeping soldiers also acted as a buffer between hostilities and the civilian population. The result of an investigation of Canadian soldiers in Bosnia shows that more than 20% of them show symptoms of PTSD and depression. [81]

It is of the greatest importance that the mental health of returning peacekeeping soldiers is given attention and evaluated systematically. The soldiers should also be given opportunities to express their feelings regarding the mission without restraint. The nearer a peacekeeping mission is to "peace enforcement" the greater the risk that troops are exposed to traumatising events. International missions require treatment of acute traumata on site and debriefing as standard on return home.

Assistance to people who are being displaced

What the Serbs did in Kosovo is perhaps not ethnic cleansing in the strict sense but it could come under the heading of systematic and serious ethnic persecution. This is a breach of the seventh article of the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty was signed by 120 nations in 1998 - ironically enough not by the USA.

In the introductory phase of the Kosovo conflict many Kosovo Albanians fled to neighbouring countries. NATO helped those who were fleeing partly by building refugee camps in Macedonia and partly by sending troops to Albania. It is interesting that one of the combatants should participate in humanitarian aid operations of such magnitude. This help was welcomed by the UNHCR which had been caught napping by the large stream of refugees, after a few weeks amounting to more than half a million. Why did the aid get going so late ? Italy is only one hour' flying time from Albania. Food, blankets etc could have been brought up considerably earlier.[82] The most important lesson of earlier streams of refugees is that the nature of the conflict affects the nature of the refugees' situation and hence the need for help.

When dealing with large refugee streams it is important to have a long-term objective for the assistance one wishes to give. Based on the nature of the conflict and how it is ended, there are different ways of helping refugees:[83] 1) create a protected area within the country; 2) give the refugees security in camps in neighbouring countries; 3) give the refugees homes far away from the area; 4) ensure that the refugees can return to their homes.

Normally the fourth option is sought, but experience shows that this is also the most problematical and the one that requires the longest political involvement. The other

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[81] Ibid.

[82] 'Lost in the Wilderness', Shawcross, W., Newsweek April 19, 1999.

[83] 'Exporting misery', The Economist, April 17th 1999.

three options are to some extent a reward to whoever wishes to get rid of the people - the ethnic cleanser.

In Kosovo NATO elected to direct their efforts to creating conditions for the refugees to return home, i.e. the fourth option above. Problems here are that people have had traumatic experiences and are suspicious of those who remained and are Serbs or Romaine's. On the other hand there has been no problem to persuade the majority to return voluntarily. The problem that has arisen is to protect all population groups in Kosovo, chiefly the Serbs. Through its action NATO and the UN have solved one refugee problem - the Koso Albanian - but created another - the Koso Serbian.

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT - INFLUENCE ON RUSSIAN POLITICS AND MILITARY THINKING

Jan Leijonhielm, Wilhelm Unge, Ingmar Oldberg and Carolina Vendil

In this chapter the effects on Russia are analysed in chiefly military-strategic and security-political respects. The analysis is supplemented with reviews of the effects of Russian developments within the areas of domestic and foreign policy.

Conclusions

<u>Military effects</u>

Respect for and disquiet over NATO's capacity increased among Russian political and military leadership. The unexpected disbursements for exercises, KFOR, Dagestan and above all Chechnya altered priorities within the military budget.

Large unforeseen costs further delayed the military reform.

Military co-operation within the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) increasingly was split into two main blocks - visible among other things in the pattern of exercises. Russia's military presence and opportunities for exerting pressure within the CIS decreased. Georgia, however, was pressured into temporary concessions since this country was particularly exposed.

Increased priorities for improving command and control systems, remote-controlled weapons, precision weapons and reconnaissance appear necessary but difficult to finance.

The Kosovo war contributed to the new draft military doctrine becoming more aggressive in its attitude to the world around Russia. The role of nuclear weapons was stressed more than before.

Ratification of START-2 and the beginning of START-3 negotiations was delayed until April 2000.

Military co-operation with NATO was interrupted but gradually resumed. Bilateral military agreements and programmes of support with countries in the West, however, were not interrupted.

Russia sees a parallel to Kosovo in Chechnya, chiefly in political respects. Militarily however, the differences predominate. The lessons to be learned from the wars will therefore probably differ.

<u>Foreign policy</u>

Impaired relations with primarily NATO and the USA. Russia's reduced role in world politics was once more confirmed - the multipolar world is a myth.

Attempts at closer co-operation with China and India.

Baltic NATO membership, is probably delayed.

A comparison between Kosovo and Chechnya shows that Serbia was not a vital Russian interest, while Chechnya is. In the former case Western influence and Russian dependence on the west counted for more than relations with Serbia, while in the case of Chechnya the concern for the integrity of the federation outweighed Western protests over the violations of human rights.

Domestic politics

The Kosovo war involved temporary negative effects on the attitude of the Russian leadership and the public to NATO, the USA and to a certain extent the West.

Almost 50 per cent of the Russians, however, remained positive towards co-operation with the West at the end of the war.

The Duma election in December 1999 was not affected by the war in Kosovo. The Chechnya conflict, however, played a decisive role. In the presidential election in March the same was true.

The president, the government and the national Duma played more or less predictable roles during the war.

No shifts in electoral sympathies because of the Kosovo war have been noted.

Economic effects

The burden of debt to the West and the attitude of IMF played important roles. Thus Russia's freedom of action became in reality strongly limited.

High costs for KFOR, Chechnya etc. represented new strains upon the military budget, which was increased by approximately 60 per cent. They also limited opportunities for investments in the economy and threatened the positive economic trend.

The military-industrial complex obtained new orders but this will not alleviate the troublesome situation and the painful restructuring process will have to continue. As a result Russia may attempt to increase weapons export to, among others, "rogue states".

The Military Sector

Jan Leijonhielm and Wilhelm Unge

The Armed Forces in an exposed economic position

The Russian armed forces have recently been affected by a number of unforeseen expenses, which will probably delay implementation of the military reform and reduce possibilities of maintaining troops in many CIS countries. In addition, the supply of military units in the Russian regions will probably be impaired, which could accelerate the process of military disintegration that has been going on for some years. According to one report Russia has almost 29,000 men in peacekeeping operations within the CIS and elsewhere.[84] The forces in Chechnya are excepted since this is Russian Federation territory.

The cost for maintaining close to 4,000 men in KFOR has been estimated to between 100 and 500 million US dollars annually.[85] Even if Russian troops cost somewhat less than corresponding NATO units through lower personnel costs (however, Russian officers' salaries are to be substantially raised) the high estimate appears to be the most probable one considering what the NATO contingents cost. The cost of operations in Dagestan and Chechnya cannot yet be specified, but on the basis of the number of air sorties and artillery strikes, and the risk of a protracted and possibly extended war, the cost will be great. A decision to increase airborne paratrooper forces by 5,000 will in the long term contribute to the increase in costs. The relatively large exercises conducted in 1999 further eroded the military budget. The finance ministry has produced estimates of the increased costs that amount to some 90 billion roubles while military estimates are around 25 to 30 billion roubles.[86] The military estimates include basically purely military operative costs and debts to the military industry, officers and others. If costs of this type together with social and reconstruction costs are included, the finance ministry estimates are probably too low.

The military budget for 2000 was put preliminary at 2.1 % of GNP, a reduction from 2.9 % in 1999. The Russian government then, during autumn 1999, added 30 billion roubles to cover the cost of the war in Chechnya and also, for the same reason, increased the budget for 2000 to 143 billion roubles, or 2.64 % of GNP, an increase by almost 60 % over 1999. Russian GNP increased by 1.6 % during 1999 and has by and large recovered from the collapse of August 1998. Prospects for increased growth during 2000 are good. Exactly how much of the military budget is implemented is not known but normally it appears to vary between 60 % and 75 %. Putin stressed in his policy speech to the national Duma when he for the first time appeared as Prime Minister that the most important thing at present was to ensure that the military budget was really implemented. However, the probability is that this will not happen. Compensation for inflation, for example, is only paid in part. During 1999 inflation was 37 %.

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[84] AIR FORCE Magazine, October 1999, p 64.

[85] ITAR-TASS 23.10.1999, Segodnja 15.11.199, the Russian finance ministry according to the BBC, SWB, Weekly Economic Report 19.11.1999.

[86] Ibid, and Krasnaja Zvezda 2.10.1999, interview with the chairman of the Duma defence committee.

The costs of the KFOR force and the war in Chechnya have so far been taken mainly from extra-budgetary funds, international grants (e.g. to the UN) and similar. Raised taxes on alcohol and tobacco are other possible sources of finance that have been discussed.[87]

On the whole the military sector is acutely under-funded and without hope of substantially increased grants over and above coverage of the costs of the Chechnya war. There will be small materiel procurement during 2000, percentage wise large increases, albeit from a very low level. The result for other military sectors will probably be that the already under- financed military reform will be delayed, and that Russia will be forced to cut down on her stationing of troops in the former Soviet republics. This is already happening in e.g. Moldova, and president Yeltsin declared in October 1999 that he did not intend to renew the treaty on the stationing of frontier troops in Turkmenistan. The force in Tadjikistan will probably shrink since the Russian divisions there no longer represent a necessary contribution to the security picture.

Splits in the CIS hastened

The war in Kosovo contributed to increased splits within the CIS since only Russia and Belorussia broke off relations with NATO. The group of former Soviet republics which long had demonstrated its reluctance towards continued participation and security within CIS - Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, also called the GUUAM group, maintained a low profile in the protests against the war or even offered support to the NATO alliance (Moldova and Azerbaijan). Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have now also decided to leave the Treaty of Tashkent. Despite Russian protests, the GUUAM group concluded a security treaty with NATO at the Washington meeting in April 1999. In addition, in its pattern of military exercises, the approach to NATO has been underlined. Thus an exercise was held in Ukraine in August 1999 with other members of the group, together with new and old NATO members, under the name "Peace Shield 99". At the same time Russia conducted the exercise "Combat Commonwealth 99" together with the more Russia-friendly states within the CIS - Armenia, Belorussia, Kirgizistan and Kazakhstan. The remaining CIS member, Turkmenistan, is so far maintaining a neutral wait-and-see position.

The splitting-up of the CIS taking place in parallel with Russia's shrinking military capability and hence reduced opportunities to exert military and security-political pressure upon members tending to fall by the wayside has aroused disquiet in Moscow. A clear pattern is thought to be discernible: where Russian influence is shrinking, NATO's is growing. Remaining possibilities for exerting pressure to influence these countries are primarily economic. The majority of GUUAM members has extensive trade with Russia and Ukraine, particularly, is greatly dependent upon Russia's energy-carriers. Recently however, even this possibility for Moscow has declined since the export of raw materials to the CIS has been drastically cut. During the Chechnya war Georgia was subjected to severe Russian media pressure to close

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[87] Ibid.

the frontier between Georgia and Chechnya to the guerrillas, and was also exposed to bombing, according to Russia unintentional. In January 2000 they partly gave in and approved joint guarding of the frontier, a step backward in their liberation from Russia.

For further analysis of disintegration within the CIS see the chapter on "Foreign policy effects" below.

Co-operation with NATO

In connection with the outbreak of the Kosovo conflict Russia broke off all contacts with NATO. President Yeltsin is stated to have decided on 26 June to withdraw the moratorium on contacts with NATO. However the resumed co-operation concerned only KFOR while other contacts remain pending.

Foreign Minister Ivanov said that future partnership and co-operation between NATO and Russia was not excluded if the parties could establish mutual confidence. Russian insistence upon mutual confidence appeared based partly on a fear that NATO could perform a mission similar to that in Kosovo in e.g. Azerbaijan or perhaps even in Chechnya in the future. This view was also clearly shared by the Russian general public, particularly at the beginning of the war. The public was apparently affected by the one-sided view of the war given in the media, and resulted in a number of statements of alarmist character from both political and military leadership and from leading debaters. Opinion polls in many large Russian newspapers showed a massive majority of more than 90% against NATO's bombings and more than 80% were negative towards the USA during the run-up to the war. Anything else would have been astonishing in view of the version of the causes and course of the war presented by the Serb-friendly Russian media. Opinion polls in the final phase of the war, however, showed that approximately half the population considered co-operation with the west crucially important to Russia's future.

Russia´s official bilateral relations with mainly the USA and Great Britain but also with other western countries returned after the war almost to normal, i.e. to the status quo ante the Kosovo war. It was NATO as a collective that was the great culprit. For domestic-political reasons Moscow was therefore more cautious about returning all-too-quickly to its earlier relations with NATO as an organisation. A further possible factor was Russian disappointment that its influence in the Partnership Joint Council (PJC) was not great enough to be able to stop the bombing before it had started. During the autumn relations grew worse through criticism of Russia's way of waging war in Chechnya. This marked the latest variants of Russian military and security doctrine (see below).

Other aspects of relations with NATO are also dealt with in the chapter "Foreign policy effects" below.

Russian military exercises during the war

A certain raised level of exercising within the Russian armed forces and sections of the paramilitary forces could be observed during the Kosovo war. Not least, the exercises were given remarkably large media coverage. It is true that the military training year ends with exercises for many units during the summer. It is however striking how many Russian unit commanders and exercise commanders maintained in the press that their own exercise had nothing to do with Kosovo. This was presumably true in many cases, but the message nevertheless comes over clearly.

Zapad (West) 99 was run during July together with Belorussian units, arousing much attention in Russian and foreign media. It is by nature a recurring event[88] but this time was of unusually large size, with some 50 000 men and strikingly large air combat forces. The exercises appear to have had as an objective to defeat an attack upon Kaliningrad and to practise air defence against attacks similar to those Serbia was subjected to. It also included strategic staff and command exercises with the strategic nuclear weapons forces. The underlying purpose was presumably to train the armed forces and the paramilitary forces jointly, with the task of maintaining the country's territorial integrity, i.e. being able to handle conflicts similar to those in Chechnya or Dagestan and at the same time prevent third-party interference. During the exercise elements of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were simulated. The reason for the former is considered to be that the military command had felt it impossible to repulse an attack with conventional combat forces. The intention with the latter was, rather, to mark in US eyes the fact that Russia is still capable of conducting strategic operations with nuclear weapons.

International military-related contacts during the Kosovo conflict

It is worth noting that Russia by and large maintained most of her bilateral contacts with the west, including contacts with NATO countries, during the conflict in Kosovo.

Thus co-operation with the USA continued regarding the handling of nuclear fuel and the destruction of missiles and warheads in compliance with the Nunn-Lugar programme. Co-operation within TACIS, ISTC and other "threat reduction programmes" proceeded largely according to plan. FOA arranged an international conference in Moscow on the destruction of chemical weapons right in the middle of the war. A number of prominent NATO countries including the USA and Great Britain took part. The list of examples can be made long. Negotiations with IMF and the World Bank on the "civilian" side continued likewise and proved to be an important factor in preventing Russia from acting actively on the Serbian side.

It is maintained in some quarters that Russia continues this type of activity only since it can thus go on milking western organisations for money. There may be some truth in such assertions but it nevertheless appears reasonable to assume that the country's long-term need of good relations with the West was what tipped the balance. Without foreign aid Russia would, moreover, experience considerable difficulty in e.g.

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[88] Although it was now more than a decade ago since it last took place.

handling the weapons destruction processes at the rate necessary if security risks in the areas are not to be increased.

Discrepancy between Russian rhetoric and action

Russian rhetoric was at times very noisy and there were conflicting messages. A more careful study shows that the harshest statements came from the political opposition in the national Duma while members of the government, despite periodic outbursts in the same spirit as those of the opposition, were sending clear signals that Serbia should not be allowed to jeopardise Russia's future. Primarily the foreign ministry had a dampening effect on the most far- reaching messages, e.g. regarding the issue of possible stationing of intermediate-range missiles in Belorussia.

The "Pristina incident", the event after the war when Russian troops occupied the Pristina airfield, may serve as an illustration of the Byzantine or, if it is preferred, the de-institutionalised trait in Russian domestic policy. According to a credible source President Yeltsin had in principle approved of some form of Russian countermeasure in the case of a NATO invasion.[89] When this occurred on the night of 15 August, the Russian General Staff decided independently to occupy the airport since the president's staff did not consider Yeltsin should be woken. The foreign minister or the Kosovo negotiator responsible was not informed. This illustrates the problem and risks associated with the Russian form of presidential government. An important conclusion for the Russians must however have been that individual operations on a small scale can give large dividends politically/diplomatically. In other words this may be a pattern to be repeated in future conflicts.

Russian military lessons from the Kosovo conflict

Russian military command has drawn some important conclusions for Russian military development from the Kosovo war. Some of these were presented in papers and speeches at the jubilee of the Russian War Science Academy in June 1999. Some of the main points are worth noticing.

Professional admiration for NATO's ability to wage war was clear. This applied particularly to command functions and the great mobility and ability for rapid growth in strength of the air forces. The choices of bomb targets and their implementation were also considered impressive not least since they had such a great effect on the Serbian infrastructure. The increased importance of precision weapons and modern weapons was stressed particularly as Russia largely lacks such weapons. It was readily conceded that this type of warfare would be inconceivable with the obsolescent Russian weapon systems, but it was also stressed that self-defence tactics must be based upon meeting the enemy with other types of weapon and forcing him to fight on the conditions of the attacked party. The decisive importance of air superiority was strongly stressed - no air defence can hold out against such enemy air superiority in the long run - and this must be achieved through a combination of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft defence. Military R&D and military industry should

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[89] Shlykov, Vitaly: 'Kosovo i kontrol nad vooruzhennymi silami', Voennyj Vestnik nr 5 juni 1999.

in the future put their priorities on areas such as high precision weapons with all-weather capability, cruise missiles and stealth technology in different forms.

The new military doctrine and the new security concept

On 14 May 1999 Defence Minister Sergeyev stated that NATO's aggression against Iraq and Yugoslavia rendered necessary a conceptual review of Russian military doctrine, work that had already been going on for some years to revise the doctrine of 1993.[90] During the summer of 1999 the Russians made it clear that the Kosovo war would have repercussions on the military doctrine being developed. [91]

The doctrine published in October 1999 indeed bore clear traces of the changed Russian worldview.[92] It stated that threats against Russia including military ones are growing and that NATO is conducting an aggressive and unsanctioned policy against different states. The need for a multipolar world is stressed. The role of nuclear weapons continues to dominate and their use is no longer limited to situations where the nation's existence is at stake, but extends to "situations where other means have proved ineffective". At the same time it should be stressed that the doctrine is of a defensive nature and according to it, no *large-scale* military threats exist. On the contrary these are declining, including the threat of a large-scale nuclear war. In some respects, the 1993 military doctrine was more radical than the 1999 one, and the role of nuclear weapons was presented there in a more remarkable manner than in the newly published one, e.g. since there was officially an end to a commitment to the principle of 'non-first use'.

The Security Concept published in January 2000 is in many respects marked by the same spirit as in the Military Doctrine. It is a shorter variant of the draft presented in October 1999 and was to be approved in March 2000.

It should also be stressed that the Military Doctrine, like the National Security Concept, is first and foremost a political document the real significance of which for security-policy relations and the development of the armed forces are limited.

The role of nuclear weapons

During April 1999 there were rumours that Russia intended to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belorussia in response to NATO's aggression in the Balkans, and this was supported by the Belorussian president. Such statements appeared to stem from the opposition in the national Duma and other representatives not linked to the executive power. The president's administration, the foreign and defence ministries were more restrained or downbeat in their rhetoric.

One event that was strongly linked with this and which aroused great attention with far-reaching coverage in Russian and international media was the Security Council

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[90] Interfax, 'Minoborony peresmotrit voennuyu doktrinu', Segodnya, 15 mai, 1999.

[91] Speech by the chairman of the doctrine committee, vice chief of general staff Manilov in Helsinki, June 1999.

[92] Krasnaya Zvezda 9.10.1999.

meeting of 29 April 1999. The president himself conducted the meeting and under melodramatic forms swore those present to silence.

According to then Secretary Putin, the decisions concerned the development and use of tactical nuclear weapons, a review of the strategic weapons and their role in Russian military strategy as expressed in the new Military Doctrine.[93] A review of Russian nuclear weapon capability had however been planned some while earlier, i.e. before the Kosovo crisis.

In this respect, then, the meeting had no connection with Kosovo but on the other hand the decisions taken may have been influenced by the Kosovo crisis. Russian commentators including the well-known Pavel Felgenhauer in Segodnya, believed they knew that tactical nuclear weapons could according to military command be used in local wars. "The limited nuclear war! Why not?" was the heading of Felgenhauer's article.[94] Moreover, the nuclear balance of terror would 'gain' if nuclear weapons proved to be usable on the battlefield. An effective use of tactical nuclear weapons in this way (i.e. as precision weapons) would, however, require extensive development and could not be implemented for several years. Further, the cost would be very high for the Russian nuclear R&D programme. The development would probably be decided by what strategic concept prevails in the Russian military command. Defence minister Sergeyev, has appeared as the advocate of nuclear weapons while Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin has advocated the increased significance of conventional weapons.

A possible START-3 treaty may also include tactical nuclear weapons. However it appears unlikely that Russia would entirely abandon these. In times of conventional military weakness they represent a last resort, a defensive weapons system for the protection of Russia in the strategic directions in the event of a large-scale attack. A treaty including the ten to twelve thousand tactical nuclear weapons would primarily be aimed at easing the economic burden upon the country's shoulders. The economic obstacles to rapid dismantling will remain large during the foreseeable future.

Russia and the USA intended to start talks regarding continued nuclear disarmament during August 1999, Prime Minister Sergej Stepasjin and Vice President Al Gore announced on 27 July 1999. The talks were intended to carry forward the dialogue towards a START-3 treaty.[95]

In summary, therefore, the recent Russian initiatives to resume disarmament negotiations may be seen as part of an attempt to lighten the nuclear weapons burden and create economic latitude for investments in conventional weapons technology. This need may have become increasingly acute following Kosovo and the longer the national Duma insists on not ratifying START-2.[96]

The about-turn on the disarmament issue which can therefore be discerned shortly after armed hostilities ceased in Kosovo, is further proof of the pragmatism of Russian foreign policy. This pragmatism has several causes.

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[93] Izvestiya, Segodnyaa, Kommersant Daily among others 6-7.5 1999.

[94] Segodnya 6.5 1999.

[95] 'New discussions on disarmaments' , Svenska Dagbladet, 29 July 1999, p 6 (TT-Reuters).

[96] In April 2000 the Duma ratified START II.

The military (and indirectly economic) cause is that the world and Russia have witnessed yet another demonstration of what high-tech conventional weapons can achieve. The first eye-opener was probably the Gulf War of 1991. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the assessed character of future (and contemporary) conflicts in the New World order have shifted the centre of gravity away from nuclear weapons towards conventional weapons systems. So far, however, Russia has clung to the strategic nuclear capacity to maintain her status as a great power and thence be able to represent one pole, albeit smaller than the USA in the new multipolar world which the country says it wishes to see. As mentioned above the Russian leadership realises that Russia cannot afford the number of nuclear weapons the country possesses today. The effects of modern conventional weapons technology have been further accentuated in Kosovo and with uncomfortable clarity shown the Russians that the country must as soon as possible lighten the burden of nuclear weapons in order to be able to keep up with the development of conventional weapons. [97, 98]

The political pragmatism was clearly marked by the fact that Russia did not intend to break off relations with the west. Russia proved to have the ability to conduct negotiations and solve complicated questions at different levels and simultaneously without connecting these, i.e. the country can appear multidimensionally in the world arena. On one hand it was possible rhetorically to give support to Serbia while at the same time negotiations were going on with IMF and the World Bank as well as attempts to achieve peace in Kosovo. Early on in the Kosovo conflict president Yeltsin declared that the conflict should not be allowed to jeopardise Russia's future. In view of the domestic-political situation in Russia, this could not be said much more clearly: Serbia could not count on much support from Russia and Russia did not intend to close the door to the West. Russia realised that opportunities of effective sanctions were lacking and that the future choice was to operate within a given framework or to continue to pretend to be a superpower with the devastating consequences this could have.

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[97] This assertion is true even if the exact effect of precision weapons in Serbia/Kosovo, which has not yet been established, appears somewhat exaggerated.

[98] We have earlier pointed at the possibility for Russia to ratify START-2 and proceed towards START-3 in order to create economic latitude for conventional rearmament according to the military reform. The argumentation is given in 'Scenario1 Lone Wolf' in *Rysk militar förmåga I ett tioårsperspektiv*, (Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective), Jan Leijonhielm et al, FOA-R --99-01151-170--SE, May 1999, p 295.

Kosovo and Russian Foreign Policy

Ingmar Oldberg

Russia's relations with NATO during and after the war

NATO's bomb strikes against Yugoslavia from March 1999 immediately worsened relations between Russia and NATO. When the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov on his way to economic negotiations in the USA heard the news of the bombing, he had his aircraft turn back in mid- flight over the Atlantic. Supported by public opinion that was unanimously on the side of the Serbs against NATO, the Russian leadership demanded a stop to the bombing and a resumption of negotiations. The bombing was termed aggression and genocide, and was condemned as a violation of the UN Charter and the Founding Act signed by Russia and NATO in May 1997. The bombing was claimed to strengthen rather than to weaken the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's position.
Just like Russia had viewed the previous war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it disregarded the Serb repression and the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo before the war - - which was the reason for the bombing in the first place, and blamed the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians to the neighbouring countries during the war on the NATO bombings. Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty was seen as the overriding issue and as a precedent for Russia, which also had problems with separatism. Since Russia saw Milosevic as Yugoslavia's legally elected president, it also condemned the Western decision to bring him and his men before the international war criminals tribunal.[99] Thus the Russian Duma established its own committee to investigate NATO war crimes against the population of Yugoslavia. In addition, the Duma supported Yugoslavia's accession to the union between Russia and Belarus, a union in which military co-operation was far-reaching, and it once again postponed ratification of the START-2 treaty with the USA.[100]

As protest against the bombing Russia broke off her official relations with NATO. Military representatives were called home from the NATO headquarters in Brussels, planned meetings and activities related to the Partnership for Peace co-operation and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council were cancelled, and no delegation was sent to NATO's fiftieth anniversary celebrations in April 1999. Russia sent a reconnaissance vessel to the Adriatic, opposed NATO's oil blockade against Yugoslavia and said it intended to continue deliveries. Russia also criticised the fact that NATO at its anniversary meeting approved of a new strategic concept, which extended NATO's responsibility and permitted actions outside Europe without a UN mandate. This concept was also seen as legitimising the intervention against Yugoslavia and future interventions in the ex-Soviet area that Russia considered vital to its security.

To solve the conflict in Kosovo, Russia proposed a peace force consisting of units from Russia, CIS states neutral countries or - if NATO was to be included – primarily it's new members. To the last, Russia insisted that the Russian units should be given

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[99] Summary of World Broadcasts (*SWB*) *BBC*, 30 March 1999, SU/3496 B/1 ff, 31 March 1999 SU/3497 B/6 ff.
[100] S. Babaeva, A. Sadchikov, 'Iugoslaviia khochet prisoedinit k sebe Rossiiu', *Izvestiia*, 10 April 1999; A Nikolaev, 'Agressiia NATO v Iugoslavii' *Krasnaia zvezda*, 16 November 1999.

their own supervision zone and operates under their own command, which in effect could allow continued Serb control over a part of Kosovo. It is possible that hopes regarding this contributed to Milosevic's final acceptance of signing the agreement with NATO to withdraw his forces. Immediately after the agreement was signed, Russia surprised the world by first of all countries transferring a force from Bosnia to Kosovo by land, which seized the Pristina airport, and Russia exercised strong pressure on Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria for permission to fly in large reinforcements across their airspace. [101]

But on the other hand the Russian leadership declared right from the beginning that it did not wish to be drawn into the war. Russia did refrain from sending weapons and troops and confined itself to humanitarian help, the NATO blockade was not broken and President Yeltsin never sanctioned the extension of the Russia-Belarus union.

Throughout the war Russia strove to play a role of her own by assuming the role of mediator between NATO and Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Primakov flew to Belgrade at the end of March despite the ongoing bombing campaign and drew up a peace plan, which however was rejected by NATO. Yeltsin's special envoy, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, then continued the mediation process. In collaboration with the EU representative, Finland's President Ahtisaari, a plan was finally produced which satisfied NATO and which Yugoslavia reluctantly accepted (see below). Russia after all respected Hungary's, Romania's and Bulgaria's refusal to allow Russia to fly in reinforcements to Pristina before NATO and Yugoslavia had concluded an agreement. After the war Russian relations with NATO, including the USA and Great Britain which had been driving forces behind the bombing, were normalised, even though criticism remained. Thus the talks with the USA about the ABM treaty, the START-II and III, were soon resumed.

There are many reasons why Russia finally accepted to co-operate with NATO instead of unilaterally supporting Yugoslavia over Kosovo. First, NATO's superiority was all too great and Yugoslavia was without a chance to withstand it in the long run. NATO's member states, nineteen since March 1999, managed to keep together during more than two months' bombing despite internal protests in Greece, Italy, the Czech Republic and even Germany. While NATO's air war was not so effective against military targets, it destroyed a large part of Serbia's infrastructure. The alliance suffered minimal losses of its own and started certain preparations for a ground war against Yugoslavia. Inside the Yugoslav Federation, the state of Montenegro opposed Serbia's policy with regard to Kosovo, and there were signs of growing opposition to the war and the Milosevic regime. Finally, Yugoslavia was isolated and obtained no material assistance from anywhere.

Russia herself was economically and militarily weak (apart from its possession of nuclear weapons) and found it very difficult to send aid to Yugoslavia. The Russian government was heavily dependent upon loans and credits from the rich western countries and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. When the war was over, Russia was indeed rewarded with new credits. Russia also had strong reasons to

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[101] 'Russia-NATO standoff on Russian forces at the Prishtina airport, talks continue' 14 June 1999 www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono/exe/4248, F Lewis, 'A clash with Russia in Kosovo came too close for comfort', *International Herald Tribune*, 1 October 1999; *SWB BBC*, 9 June 1999, SU/3556 B/9, 15 June SU/3561 B/5 ff.

continue disarmament discussions with the USA so as to limit the USA's strength. The Senate, for example, wanted to develop a limited ABM system, which could curtail the Russian ability of retaliation in case of a nuclear attack. Moreover, if Russia continued to support Yugoslavia she would be isolated in world politics and the tendency to side step the UN, in which Russia had the right of veto, could be strengthened. But the main reason for Russia's involvement in the conflict at all was probably her wish to be respected as a great power and to play a major in great-power politics.

Finally it should be mentioned that Russia lacks a tradition of friendship with Yugoslavia since the Soviet era, rather the opposite is the case. Support for the Orthodox Slav brethren was fostered primarily by the anti-Yeltsin patriotic-communist block in the Duma and Yeltsin's personal relationship with Milosevic was poor as opposed to contacts with the western leaders. [102] Lastly, NATO's attack on Yugoslavia did not directly affect Russia's security.

Russia's position in the Balkans after the war

The conflict was terminated on conditions that predominantly satisfied NATO's wishes and strengthened its position in the area. Russia did get a resolution in the UN Security Council giving a mandate for the international civil and military presence, and NATO's bombing ceased. But the bomb stop did not come until Yugoslavia had started to withdraw its military and other forces from Kosovo according to a rapid timetable: not beforehand as Russia had demanded. The KFOR was placed under NATO command and became dominated entirely by the large NATO countries - the opposite of the Russian proposals.

Russia's coup of taking control of the Pristina airport contributed to her obtaining a place in the peacekeeping force and not being directly subordinated to the NATO command. But Russia gained no control over the air space and no zone of her own, e.g. in northern Kosovo where the Serbs dominated, since NATO opposed an ethnic division of Kosovo. In reality Kosovo became a NATO protectorate, where the Russian troops, no more than about 3000 men, were divided over three zones and became dependent upon NATO for their maintenance.

The agreement did indeed confirm the integrity of Yugoslavia and aimed at the demilitarisation of the KLA guerrillas which Russia has stamped as terrorists; but in reality Serbia lost all control over the province and its outer frontiers. Yugoslavia was thus broken up. The KLA gained dominating influence when the Albanian refugees started to return, while the disarmament of the organisation was given a generous deadline and was not complete. When the Albanians then started to drive out Serbs and other minorities from Kosovo the NATO forces attempted to prevent this but failed, which was grist to the Russian mill. [103] Because of Russia's former support for the Serbs (and the Serbs reference to this) and information that Russian volunteers

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[102] See also Eric Yesson, 'NATO and Russia in Kosovo', *RUSI Journal*, August 1999, pp. 20 ff; Wolf Oschlies, 'Slavische Brüder und russische Balkan-Politik', *Osteuropa*, no. 6, 1999, pp. 555 ff; Oleg Levitin, 'Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 130 ff.
[103] 'General L. Ivashov warns that Russia may change its Kosovo policy', 14 Sept. 1999 (www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/4414), *SWB BBC*. Dec. 1999, SU/3709 B/8.

had participated in the ethnic cleansing, the Kosovar Albanians were hostile to the Russian units in Kosovo and hampered their work.

The war further resulted in a worsening of Russia's relations with Yugoslavia. Its collaboration with NATO and its inability to provide assistance became a disappointment to Serbia and contributed to her capitulation. After the war Russian support for Milosevic also diminished. The then Prime Minister Stepashin said at the end of July that he felt no friendship towards him, and declared that the suffering of the Yugoslav population was more because of his regime than because of NATO's bombing. Subsequently Montenegro's president, who opposed Milosevic and wished to reconsider Montenegro's membership in the Yugoslav federation, was received officially in Moscow.
But Russia also advocated that the EU rebuilding programme should include Serbia without regard for Milosevic' regime, and it promised a credit for Yugoslavia.[104] In October a bilateral trade agreement was signed stipulating among other things long-term supplies of fuel to Yugoslavia, and later Russian officials said that a free trade zone had been formed between the countries.[105] In view of Russia's economic weakness, however, it is doubtful whether this aid can be extensive.

The Kosovo conflict and the refugee disaster further caused Macedonia and Albania to become heavily dependent upon NATO. Croatia and Bosnia, who had earlier fought bloody wars with Yugoslavia, became relatively stronger when the NATO bombing seriously weakened Yugoslavia. The former Warsaw Pact members Hungary, which had recently become a NATO member, and Romania and Bulgaria, which also wanted membership, supported NATO's war operations and the oil embargo against Yugoslavia. As mentioned they stopped Russian troop transports by air before NATO gave the go-ahead. Hungary even stopped a convoy of humanitarian aid from Russia and made air bases available to NATO. In return, during the war NATO gave security guarantees to Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries and the EU subsequently established a programme for economic reconstruction. But this increased western influence in the Balkans can hardly be seen, as any large loss for Russia since her position in the region had long been very weak.

Russia's relations with the Baltic and CIS states

The Kosovo conflict also affected Russia's relations with her immediate neighbours in various ways. Relations with the Baltic states deteriorated somewhat since these clearly supported NATO's bombing war, condemned Milosevic and early declared themselves willing to take part in peacekeeping under NATO command. These Baltic decisions can be seen partly as a step in their endeavour to become members of NATO. The Kosovo war reinforced the resistance of the Russian military to Baltic NATO membership, which they feared would mean NATO air bases in the Baltic region, from which Russia could be attacked just like Yugoslavia was.[106]

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[104] 'Stepashin takes part in the signing of the Stability Pact', 30 July 1999. (www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/4309)
[105] *SWB BCC*, 1 Dec. 1999, SU/3706 B/12, 14 Dec., SU/3717 B/10, 15 Dec. 1999, SU/3718 B/12
[106] *SWB BBC*, 2 April 1999, SU/3499 B/5, N Lashkevich, "Strany Baltii podderzhivaut deistviia NATO", *Izvestiia*, 30 March 1999.

Particularly after the war, however, both Russia and the Baltic States officially stated that they did not wish their mutual relations to be disturbed by such external events. The most important effect of the Kosovo war for the Baltic states was probably that NATO attention and resources were shifted to the Balkans and probably rendered a NATO expansion in the relatively calm Baltic area less likely. This probably pleased Russia and displeased the Balt´s. Russia could also use the Kosovo war as an excuse for her own interference in Estonia and Latvia, considered to be pursuing ethnic discrimination against the Russian inhabitants there.[107]

Regarding Russia's relations with the CIS states, the war contributed to speeding up the differentiation within this loose organisation. NATO's bomb strikes brought Russia closer to Belarus, the only CIS country that like Russia broke off her relations with NATO. The parliaments of both countries agreed on taking Yugoslavia into their common union. In fact, the Belorussian leadership was even more hostile to NATO that the Russian and like the patriotic-communist opposition in Russian pressed for assisting Yugoslavia. President Lukashenka called NATO "fascists", declared he was "prepared to discuss" with Russia the placing of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, and wished to raise the question of arms supplies to Yugoslavia. As the only foreign head of state Lukashenka visited Belgrade.[108] The war became an additional reason for speeding-up the negotiations on deepening the union between Russia and Belarus and its military integration. At the end of June 1999 (after the Kosovo war) Russia and Belrus held the largest military manoeuvres for many years, practising particularly air defence. (However, the exercise had probably been planned long ago). For Russia, deepening the union with Belarus could serve as a compensation for waning hopes of closer ties with Yugoslavia.
But the development of this union probably depended more on the expansion of NATO and its usefulness for Russian president in winning Slavophile votes in e.g. the Duma elections in December 1999. Despite all the mutual agreements the Russian-Belarus union has so far been mostly an empty shell (except in the military field) because of the differing economic interests and domestic power struggles. Yugoslavia's accession to the union is probably by now a closed chapter. The fact that Russia finally settled with NATO must have been a disappointment to Lukashenka, Belarus found herself even more isolated from the west.

Regarding Russia's relations with Ukraine the Kosovo war similarly led to a certain rapprochement insofar as the Ukraine leadership also criticised the NATO strikes. President Leonid Kuchma offered to mediate and sent a delegation to Belgrade, and Ukraine allowed the passage of humanitarian aid transports from Russia. The left-dominated parliament even wanted to reassess decisions on Ukraine's nuclear-free status and to send weapons to Yugoslavia. Ukraine also suffered economic losses from the war (the Danube traffic). These signs kindled hopes in Yeltsin and others of developing the so far declaratory "strategic partnership" with Ukraine.

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[107] See also Lars Wedin, "Kosovo: Krisens säkerhetspolitiska följder", *Internationella studier*, no 3, 1999, p. 16

[108] *SWB BBC*, 2 April 1999, SU/3499 D/1 ff; V Mukhin, "Otvet na agressiiu NATO imeetsia?", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 28 April 1999; R. McMahon, "The Ease: Reaction to NATO air strikes ranges from opposition to support, 29 March 1999 (http://search.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/3/F:RU,990329134718.html).

Yet Ukraine was more cautious in her criticism of NATO than Russia was and never broke off her relations with the alliance. The Ukrainian leadership criticised the parliament's proposal to help Yugoslavia and sent humanitarian help to the Albanian refugees. The country continued to hold manoeuvres with NATO and subsequently participated in the peace force under NATO command, in which the USA paid for the transport.[109] Ukraine thus continued to conduct an independent foreign policy. After the war in Kosovo Russia and Ukraine were once again bogged down in economic disputes and internal power struggles as both states faced presidential elections. In October 1999 Ukraine's President Kuchma was re-elected.

Regarding the reactions of the other CIS states, Moldova – in contrast to Ukraine and similar to Romania – did not condemn the NATO air strikes but instead offered an air base for NATO actions. In July for the first time a NATO exercise was conducted in the country, arousing Russian fears that the separatist regime they supported in the eastern part of Moldova was being threatened by the same fate as Yugoslavia.[110]

Concerning Azerbaijan and Georgia, both supported, like Russia, the principle of territorial integrity, but their own experience caused them to condemn the Serbs' ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Azerbaijan wished to regain control of Nagorny Karabakh and other areas occupied by Armenia, and Georgia demanded the return of Abkhazia to central control, and both states wished their refugees to be allowed to return to occupied territories. Finding no support from Russia for this, they turned to NATO. Azerbaijan offered NATO bases on its territory and Georgia wished to get rid of the Russian bases in the country. They therefore supported NATO's bombing and Azerbaijan even offered troops for a ground operation against Yugoslavia in the framework of a Turkish force. In Russia there was growing disquiet that the Caucasus would be NATO's next playground after Yugoslavia.[111] Armenia for her part, while defending the principle of national self-determination, asserted by the Kosovar Albanians, concurred in Russia's condemnation of NATO's bombing, mainly from fear of her Muslim neighbours and need of Russian support.

Turning to the reaction of the Central Asian states to the Kosovo conflict, Russia gained certain support in her condemnation of the NATO air strikes mainly from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are among her closest allies, but not even they broke off relations with NATO. As Muslims, the central Asians were, in addition, critical of the Serb repression of the Kosovar Albanians and of Russian talk about Orthodox and Slav solidarity. But the intrusion of fundamentalist Tajik rebels into Kyrgyzstan shortly thereafter demonstrated the military weakness of these states and caused them to seek help from Russia.

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan decided during the spring 1999 not to renew their membership in the CIS Collective Security Pact any longer, and their co-operation with Ukraine and Moldova developed increasingly into an alternative block, called

[109] *SWB BBC*, 29 March 1999 SU/3495 D/1 ff, 2 April SU/3499 B/5; A Alekseev, "Metastazy vojny priblizilis k SNG", *Vedomstvennoe prilozhenie Rossiiskoi gazety*, 15 Mar 1999; V Mukhin, "Na Ukraine desant NATO", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 7 August 1999.

[110] A Ruzskii, "Preliudiia novomu pochodu na vostok", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, no 18, 1999; p Baumgartner, "Moscow, Minsk and Milosevic", *The New Presence* (Prague), May 1999, p.3.

[111] V:Kuznechevskii, A Chichkin, "Natovskaia agressiia protiv Iugoslavii", *Vedomstvennoe prilozhenie Rossiiskoi gazety*, 3 April 1999; *SWB BBC* 30 march, SU/3496 F/1; D Gornostaev, "Nachav s Balkan, SshA zaimutsia stranami SNG", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 April 1999.

GUUAM after the countries' initial letters. At the NATO 50th anniversary meeting these states demonstratively concluded a co-operation treaty with the Alliance. At the same time the states remaining in the Collective Security Pact (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) stepped up their military co-operation. The Kosovo war and Russia's role in this thus contributed to widening the split of the CIS into two blocks.[112] NATO's military victory strengthened the western orientation of several CIS states and weakened Russia's position.

It may be added that Russia's participation in the KFOR force after the war was a heavy burden on the already under-financed Russian armed forces and hastened a reduction of Russia's "peace-creating" forces in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan.[113] Russian border troops had already left Kyrgyzstan and Georgia. However, the significance of the Kosovo war should not be exaggerated. Its effects on the CIS states decrease with geographical distance and the passage of time and they may be hard to differentiate from other factors. Primarily internal problems and disagreements among the states determine Russia's relations with her neighbours.

Russia's relations with the Asian great powers

The deterioration of Russia's relations with the West during the Kosovo war also prompted Russian talk of increased co-operation with Asian states. Russia's tolerant attitude towards the Serbs' ethnic cleansing was not popular with the Muslim states, but India and China concurred with Russia in condemning NATO's bombings and in advocating political solutions via the UN. India maintained that over half the population of the earth condemned the bombings.[114] In view of their own problems with separatists, both India and China shared the Russian view that the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states are superior to the citizens' human rights.

As opposed to Russia, China was affected directly by the war when NATO bombs damaged its Belgrade embassy in May. Russia supported China's sharp protests and both Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister Ivanov soon visited Peking, whereupon the parties agreed on once again communiqués advocating a "multipolar world" in which the USA did not dominate and on condemning dictates. Ivanov spoke of developing the strategic partnership with China, but the joint communiqué stressed that they were not seeking to form a military-political alliance against any other party. [115]

Yet the war in Kosovo brought no real improvements in Russia's relations with the countries mentioned. India soon lost interest in this remote question since her conflict with Pakistan - also a nuclear power - over Kashmir flared up. In a similar way China became preoccupied with events in Taiwan. In the end also China accepted the agreement on Kosovo and laid down her vote in the UN Security Council. Both India and China were more interested in co-operation with the West than with Russia, which had proved to be militarily and economically weak, and also their mutual relations were and remained frosty.

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[112] A Korbut, 'Reanimatsiia obshchikh interesov', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 maj 1999.

[113] M Galeotti, 'How long is Russia's arm?' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, s. 9.

[114] Baumgartner, *op.cit.*

[115] *SWB BBC*, 29 March, SU/3495 B/1 ff, 10 May, SU/3530 B/1 ff, 3 June SU/3551 B/5, 4 June 1999, SU/3552 B/1 ff.

Kosovo and Chechnya

Starting August 1999 the Kosovo issue was increasingly overshadowed in Russia by the Chechnya issue, which directly affected its security and integrity. The capture by Chechnyan Islamists of some villages in Daghestan and some mysterious bomb attacks in Moscow and other cities led to a Russian counter offensive which in September became a war to wipe out "the terrorist bases" in Chechnya and restore federal control there. This gained powerful support from the Russian public.

A preliminary comparison between these wars reveals similarities, differences and mutual influences. In both wars the parties maintained strict control over their war reporting. In the same way that NATO during the Kosovo war disregarded Russia's protests over civilian victims and material destruction in Serbia and the Russian calls for a cease-fire, Russia disregarded Western protests and calls for a political solution in Chechnya. In Russian eyes both conflicts were internal matters (for Serbia and Russia respectively) involving separatists encouraged by the West. In both cases the West talked of defending human rights. [116]

However, in the course of time the differences between Kosovo and Chechnya and the similarities between the first and the second Chechnya war emerged all the more clearly. Regarding the way the wars were waged, the war against Serbia was an air campaign in which NATO attempted with precision bombing to avoid civilian victims, while Chechnya was chiefly a land war with air support. Large Russian ground forces were committed and soon involved in long-drawn-out battles in Chechnyan urban areas, which severely afflicted the Chechnyan civilian population and also led to rising Russian casualties. Winning the war and taking revenge for losses in the earlier one became a prestige issue for Russia and an asset for the new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the campaign for the Duma election in December 1999 and the presidential election in March 2000. While the "separatists" became the real winners in the Kosovo conflict with NATO's indirect help, in Chechnya Russia occupied the whole republic and the "separatists" were dispersed and went over to guerilla warfare.

The Chechnya war of course became an even greater burden upon the Russian armed forces and the economy in general than her involvement in Kosovo. This probably contributed to accelerating the withdrawal of troops from the CIS states and to the reduction of the troops on the Baltic borders, among them an airborne brigade, to be used in Chechnya instead. [117] In addition, the costs incurred in Chechnya probably increased the problem of maintaining Russian troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and constituted a supplementary explanation of the threats to withdraw troops from Kosovo.

The Chechnya war also weakened Russia's position in South Caucasus even more. The war led to harder Russian pressure on Georgia, including military incursions to shut down the Chechnyans' supply routes, which in turn strengthened Georgia's western orientation. The war further undermined Russian plans to develop its pipeline north of the Caucasus and contributed to a decision by the governments

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[116] L. Ivashov, 'Nam udalos otstoiat rossiiskie interesy', *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 December 1999.

[117] 'Russia to withdraw troops from Baltic borders?' 26 Oct. 1999, (www.ballad.org/action.lasso?)

concerned and Western oil companies in November 1999 to build a new pipeline for Caspian oil through Georgia and Turkey. The USA started to speak of its interests in the area, which deeply worried the Russian leadership.

All these questions which directly affected Russia's view of its security interests were added to earlier and continuing problems with NATO such as NATO's extension eastwards, its bombing war with Yugoslavia, the US decision to develop its ABM defence, the bombing of Iraq etc. During autumn 1999 these factors together induced official Russian representatives openly to point out the USA as a threat to Russia.[118] Post hoc, therefore, the Russian assessment of NATO's role in the Kosovo war and its result became increasingly critical.

Thus while relations with the USA and NATO worsened as a result of the Kosovo and Chechnya wars, the Russian leadership endeavoured increasingly to improve its relations with its neighbours in Asia. Despite his poor health Yeltsin visited China in the middle of December 1999. There he accused Clinton of forgetting that Russia had a large arsenal of nuclear weapons and declared that he and China's president had agreed that they would "dictate to the world how things are to be, not only he" (Clinton). The joint communiqué of the meeting expressed unity on the value of multipolarity and the superior role of the UN, and with respect to the Iraq and Kosovo conflicts. It defended the 1972 ABM treaty and warned of the dangers of international terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic separatism. Russia supported China's claim to Taiwan in return for China approving of Russia's policy regarding Chechnya. In conclusion there was once again talk of "strategic partnership" with the clarification that this referred to deepened co-operation and co-ordination, which was not directed towards any third party. [119] However, no breakthrough was reached this time either since both parties was constrained by other, wider concerns as already noted.

The outcome of the Kosovo conflict was thus both a sign of Russia's weakened position in the world and a contribution to this weakening. Russia's relations with the West deteriorated without relations with other countries improving to the same extent. The Chechnya war further deepened Russia's differences with the West and soon overshadowed the Kosovo conflict since this affected Russia's own security interests much more.

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[118] I. D. Sergeev, 'Osnovy voenno-tekhnicheskoi politiki v nachale XXI veka, *Krasnaia zvezda*, 9 December 1999, 'Harsh anti Western statements made by two top military leaders', 15 November 1999 (www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/446)
[119] *SWB BBC*, 11 Dec.1999, SU/3715, B/1f, 13 Dec. 1999, SU/3716. B14 ff.

Kosovo and Moscow's Political Scene

Carolina Vendil

Russian opposition to NATO's enlargement ended in anticlimax once the enlargement had taken place and the same was true of the initially high-pitched Russian support of the Serbs in the Kosovo conflict. The latter rhetoric soon ended up in well-tried parlance on geopolitics and the desirability of a multipolar international system. Although an element of pan-Slavism or a notion of orthodox-Slavic brotherhood between Russians and Serbs undeniably played a part in Russia's attitude to the fighting in Kosovo, the significance of these feelings should not be overstated. Patriotic themes have long been legion in Russia's domestic political life. Rhetoric stressing the Serbs as Slavic brothers was significant mainly in that context.

Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union the conflict in Yugoslavia had been a troublesome issue for Russian leadership to tackle both on the domestic and the foreign policy arena. On the domestic scene, the political opposition raised demands for the lifting of sanctions against Belgrade. At the same time, Russia did not wish to become isolated on the world arena. Thus, Russia decided to send only humanitarian aid to Belgrade and the president rejected a law proposed by the Duma on lifting sanctions against Yugoslavia in September 1995.[120]

It is of interest to recall the reactions in the Russian Duma and among presidential candidates to NATO's bombing of Bosnian-Serb positions in April 1994 and September 1995. Such a comparison makes impossible to speak of a decisive radicalisation of the opposition between April 1994 and May 1999. The Communist Party and Zhirinovskii's block in the Russian parliament were extremely active already in 1994. The Duma put forward demands for lifting sanctions against Belgrade and sent a delegation to Yugoslavia. On its return the delegation proposed a "military-political alliance with Serbian national elements on the territory of former Yugoslavia".[121] When NATO initiated bombings for the first time in April 1994, the Duma protested and demanded, among other things, that no countries involved in the conflict should take any measures without first consulting Russia. In addition to this, the Duma delegation demanded a tougher attitude from the Russian foreign ministry.[122]

Likewise, the Duma sent a delegation to Bosnia in September 1995, which came back to Moscow demanding tougher action from the Russian president and Foreign Ministry.[123] At the same time, a poll conducted by VTsIOM indicated that the Russian public was not overwhelmingly in favour of military aid to the Bosnian Serbs. Although 21 per cent of the respondents said they sympathised with the Serbs, only six per cent wished for Russia to provide armaments to them.[124] Vladimir Zhirinovskii, however, was strongly in favour of military aid to the Bosnian Serbs. In

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[120] *Interfax,* 1454 GMT, 14 September 1995 in BBC SWB (16 September 1995), SU/2410, B/1.

[121] *ITAR-TASS,* 1332 GMT, 6 April 1994 in BBC SWB (8 April 1994), SU/1966 B/3.

[122] *Postfactum news agency,* 1345 GMT, 13 April 1994 in BBC SWB (15 April 1994), SU/1972 B/3.

[123] See for example *ITAR-TASS,* 1238 GMT, 19 September 1995 in BBC SWB (21 September 1995), SU/2414, B/6.

[124] *Interfax,* 1430 GMT, 21 September 1995 in BBC SWB (23 September 1995), SU/2416, B/6.

his view, "The war in Bosnia could be stopped from Moscow if we had a normal foreign minister".[125]

The protests of the patriotic-communist block against NATO's bombing in 1999 are strikingly reminiscent of those of 1994 and 1995. In 1999, this political block again demanded that Russia should play a more prominent role and that she should demonstrate more tangible support for the Serbs. If possible the pitch was somewhat higher. Immediately after the bombings were initiated in 1999, Vladimir Zhirinovskii proclaimed NATO "heirs of Nazism" and Gennadii Ziuganov of the Communist Party considered NATO to be increasingly shifting down the "road of Hitlerism".[126] Soon, however, the message became wrapped up in geopolitical jargon. There was again more talk of an upset balance of power in the international system than of Slavic brotherhood.

Zhirinovskii's call to Russians to enlist as volunteers on the Serb side appears to have been answered by a very small group indeed. This did not stop Zhirinovskii's party from claiming that as many as 70 000 volunteers from Russia were in Yugoslavia as early as in April 1999 – a figure that compared to Serbia's total force in the area (max. 50 000) appears rather unreasonable to say the least.[127] Zhirinovskii also distanced himself from Ziuganov in that he on 26 March 1999 was of the opinion that "the President has assumed the right attitude" on the Kosovo issue.[128] Ziuganov and the Communist Party for their part accused Yeltsin in early June 1999 of having "betrayed Russia's interests in the Balkans" and the former Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, of "having given in to NATO on all points and in practice giving his consent to an occupation of Yugoslavia".[129]

The centrist block was represented by some of the strongest candidates for the presidency at the time. Of these many were or had been closely associated with the Kremlin like for example the Major of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, and the leader of Our Home Is Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin. The latter was also involved in the peace negotiations in the Kosovo conflict. Their statements on Kosovo did not overstep the official Russian line. Alexander Lebed, governor of Krasnoiarsk and former Secretary of the Russian Security Council, represented a similar line. However, Lebed also levelled severe criticism at the Kremlin leadership. In an interview on 26 March 1999 he criticised NATO's bombings chiefly because the US, in his view, had not followed international law. According to Lebed, the Kremlin had through inept management got itself into debt and dismantled the army. "In such a situation Russia

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[125] *Interfax,* 1211 GMT, 13 September 1995 in BBC SWB (15 September 1995), SU/2409, B/11.

[126] Vladimir Zhirinovskii's press release, 24 March 1999, *Segodnia V. Zhirinovskii napravil vozzvanie k russkomu narodu sleduiushchego soderzhaniia,* on LDPRs homepage on the Internet, http://www.ldpr.ru/duma/zav.html, downloaded on 19 May 1999 and Gennadii Ziuganov's press conference, 30 April 1999, *Press-konferentsiia rukovoditelia fraktsii KPRF v Gosudarstvennoi Dume G.A. Ziuganova 30 aprelia 1999 goda,* on KPRF's home page on the Internet, http://www.kprf.ru/arhiv/rescon/990430pc.htm, downloaded on 3 August 1999.

[127] *Segodnia,* 6 April 1999.

[128] Vladimir Zhirinovskii's press release on 26 March 1999, *Interviu V. Zhirinovskogo SMI v kholle apparata fraktsii,* on LDPR Internet homepage, http://www.ldpr.ru/duma/zav.html, downloaded on 19 May 1999.

[129] Gennadii Ziuganov's press conference, 9 June 1999, *Press-konferentsiia rukovoditelia fraktsii KPRF v Gosudarstvennoi Dume G.A. Ziuganova 9 iiunia 1999 goda,* on KPRFs home page on the Internet http://www.kprf.arhiv/prescon/990609pc.htm, downloaded on 3 August 1999.

can in no way adopt a worthy position." Lebed also linked the problems in the Balkans to the situation in the Caucasus.[130]

The democratic block, represented foremost by the liberal party Yabloko, immediately condemned the bombings. This was done, like Lebed, mainly referring to principles of international law. Yabloko also pointed to the consequences NATO's action could have for the international system in general.[131] It is, however, important to note that Russian politicians from the democratic camp made statements that were no more drastic than those of some politicians in the West who were critical of NATO's bombing.

As mentioned above, the protests against NATO's bombing may be compared to the resistance to NATO enlargement. The fierce resistance to the enlargement process gradually ebbed away once Russia faced fait accompli on the issue. The rhetoric regarding the Kosovo crisis followed a similar parabola: threat tended to give way to geopolitical grizzling. The Russian domestic political agenda had become dominated by the troubles in Dagestan already by August 1999. The total absence of rhetoric regarding the Kosovo conflict in the official election manifestos for the Duma election of 1999 further strengthened the impression that Kosovo was no longer high or even existent on the political agenda.[132]

The short exposé above suggests that Russian protests both from the leadership and the opposition should be seen against the background of Russia's falling status as a great power rather than as an expression of institutionalised orthodox Slavic brotherhood. Russia ascribes to herself great international importance and is still not prepared accept a role as a second-line nuclear power. Everything suggests that we be bound to experience similar situations in the future as Russia's status as a great power becomes increasingly eroded. Indeed, it would have been naive to expect this difficult adjustment process to occur overnight and without friction.

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[130] Interview with Lebed on the events in Kosovo, 26 March 1999, *Otvety Gubernatora Krasnoiarskogo kraia A.I. Lebedia na voprosy predstavitelei pressy po povodu sobytii v Kosovo,* on Lebed's homepage on the Internet, http://www.alebed.org.win/index.htms/PRART?article=1999-03-26, downloaded on 3 August 1999.

[131] Yabloko's resolution regarding the war in the Balkans, *Resoliutsiia o voine na Balkanakh,* on Yabloko's homepage on the Internet, http://www.yabloko.ru/Themes/Foreign/kosovo-3.html. downloaded on 19 May 1999.

[132] See e.g. the Communist Party's election platform *'Predvybornaia platforma izbiratelnogo obedineniia 'KPRF'',* on the party's Internet home page, http://www.kprf.ru/arhiv/platforma.htm, downloaded on 17 January 2000, *'10 punktov programmy Zhirinovskogo'* on the LDPR home page on the Internet, http://www.ldpr.ru/info/10_ldpr.htm, downloaded on 17 January 2000, the election platform of Our Home Is Russia, *'10 shagov v XXI vek'* , on its Internet homepage, http://www.ohr.ru/docs/program/plat.html, downloaded on 17 January 2000, Yurii Luzhkov's and Yevgenii Primakov's joint election manifesto, *'Manifest Izbiratelnogo bloka 'Otechestvo - Vsia Rossiia'',* on their Internet home page, http://all-russia.ru/scripts.fulldoc.cgi?8, downloaded on 17 January 2000 and Yabloko's declaration, *'Rossiia v XX veke',* adopted in September 1999, on the party's Internet home page, http://www.yabloko.ru/Union/Program/decl-99.html, downloaded on 17 January 2000.

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND ASIA

Åke Påhlman

Recent developments in the Balkans with the escalated conflict around Kosovo and NATO's air war against Serbia and Serb units in Kosovo have already had some effect on actions and statements of some Asian countries. So far the Asian countries involved have acted chiefly via diplomatic channels (most frequently in the UN),[133] but in the long run the conflict in the Balkans - when it has been analysed in more detail - may be expected to influence materiel procurement programmes, the structures of military forces, training activities in the military sectors, and so on. Concurrently with developments of this type there may be changes in the policies of individual countries regarding arms control and control of the dissemination of technologies for weapons of mass destruction. How quickly such developments can have effect is hard to define.

Very preliminary conclusions

- For some Asian states (chiefly China and India) NATO's air war against "rump Yugoslavia" has intensified fears that the "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity" of individual states in the future may be violated with increasing frequency by great powers and/or international organisations (UN, NATO) with the excuse that human rights and ethnic/religious/political minorities are being threatened. This increased disquiet can lead among other things to difficulties in reaching unanimity on future peacekeeping/peace-enforcing operations under UN auspices.

- For China the Kosovo conflict has entailed particular difficulties for her Taiwan and Europe policies, and complications in her relations with the USA and Western Europe.

- One or another Asian country may be expected to modify (and in some cases hasten) procurement programmes for military materiel as a consequence of the appraisal of tactical-operative and other experience from the Kosovo conflict.

Aspects of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual states

After the breakdown of the Rambouillet negotiations, increasing warnings came from various Asian states regarding military intervention against "rump Yugoslavia". In particular there came warnings regarding military sanctions without support/ participation from the UN. Such support pre-supposed approval by the UN Security Council, to which China as a permanent member did not intend to agree.

Underlying this care for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual states there are many complex motives, both domestic and foreign-political. Many Asian

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[133] See the section 'Russian relations to Asia's great powers' in the chapter 'Russia and Kosovo: foreign-policy effects'.

states have for many years had problems with separatist and liberation movements of regional, ethnic or religious character, and with the protection of human rights for various population groups. The prospect that such problems could lead to military intervention or sanctions from an outside great power, group of countries, regional combination or other international organisation directed against an individual state evidently frighten various national leaderships.

That particularly China and India have stressed these aspects in diplomatic contexts may presumably be explained to a significant degree with the Taiwan and Kashmir problems.[134] Neither regional great power can be expected to accept foreign military intervention in Taiwan or Kashmir. In the Taiwan case, military intervention by the USA has occurred with the purpose of deterring military action from China directed against Taiwanese Sea routes and land areas. A frightening scenario for the Chinese leadership is probably an American military intervention on the side of Taiwan with explicit support from a UN General Assembly majority. Not a particularly credible scenario - but there are other variants which possibly can appear to the Chinese leadership to be uncomfortably realistic.

The US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 7 May, may possibly still be perceived by some Chinese leaders as part of a systematic military action purposing to imprint upon national leaderships (particularly the Chinese) the risks associated with active military resistance to international peacekeeping or peace-promoting operations. Such perceptions are probably nourished by, among other things, the circumstance that one of the bombs against the Chinese embassy hit the embassy's intelligence section. Even if it is at present impossible for outsiders to judge with any certainty what underlay this bombing (a planned attack for the purpose of destroying simply the Chinese embassy intelligence section or a mistake in the selection of targets for the bombing aircraft[135]), it is impossible to maintain with any degree of reason that just this bombing had any decisive effect either upon the outcome of NATO's military operations against Serbia or upon China's view of US and NATO action in the Kosovo conflict.

As opposed to this, there are signs that China in the security-policy and diplomatic game against the USA is still attempting to use the Belgrade embassy bombing as a "lever" to gain advantages that perhaps do not even have any direct links with the Kosovo conflict or other developments in the Balkan area. This game is going on despite concluded negotiations on mutual damages (for personnel losses and damage related to China's embassy in Belgrade and damage to the USA embassy in Peking, respectively). [136]

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[134] See e.g. Amitav Acharaya "A Concert of Asia?", *Survival*, Autumn 1999, p. 90,95.

[135] See e.g. a compilation of various statements from NATO and American authorities in Anthony H Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo,* Washington, D C, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 1, 1999, p 67-75.

[136] New China News Agency, Beijing, 'F M Tang urges US to tell truth of embassy attack', in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report,* 10 March 2000 (FBIS-CHI-2000-0310).

The Kosovo conflict, China's Balkan relations and Taiwan

To China's great irritation the newly-established diplomatic relations between Macedonia and Taiwan have given Taiwanese leadership possibilities of pushing its diplomatic game further after the Kosovo conflict. With its embassy in Macedonia as base, the Taiwanese government has already introduced a comprehensive aid programme in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. The programme is believed to have a budget of US$300 million.[137]

China has in different ways attempted to prevent the implementation of this aid programme but so far without any major success. For the Taiwanese leadership, the aid is an important element in their attempts to gain informal support from other countries for their demands for continued de facto independence.

During the past few months China has adopted measures to strengthen her position and influence in the Balkans. At diplomatic level the efforts have been intensified through e.g. joint action in the UN Security Council with Russia in support of implementation of Resolution 1244. In particular China and Russia are seeking powerful steps from UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and KFOR to ensure that Kosovo is not broken out from Yugoslavia, that security is guaranteed for all ethnic groups in Kosovo and that the Kosovo Liberation Army is finally disarmed and dispersed.[138]

Bilateral relations with Yugoslavia have also been extended to embrace the economic area. Among other things China has given financial support to the Belgrade regime (total US$ 300 million in gifts and credits). Further, China has organised distribution and sales of Chinese-manufactured consumer goods (including clothes) in various parts of Serbia.[139]

China also appears to be endeavouring to develop new relations with Albania, which have been strained and periodically frozen since the fall of Albanian communism. Even though China and Albania have radically differing views on how development in Kosovo should be handled, bilateral relations have seemingly improved. Among other things an agreement has clearly been reached regarding Chinese support for the further development of Albania's energy supply system.[140]

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[137] Central News Agency, Taipei, 'Premier Siew returns from trip to Macedonia', in BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Part 3*, 11 August 1999, FE/3610 F/5-6; Central News Agency, Taipei, 'Foreign minister, Macedonian counterpart sign joint statement', BBC, *SWB, Part 3*, 2 March 2000,FE/3778 F/1.

[138] New China News Agency, Beijing, 'UN Envoy: Respect Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, end violence', in BBC, *SWB, Part 3*, 18 February 2000, FE/3767 G/2; New China News Agency, Beijing, 'Xinhua cites Russian officials on UNSC's Kosovo Resolution', in *FBIS, Daily Report*, 17 March 2000 (FBIS-CHI-2000-0317).

[139] Paul Harris, 'China re-establishes Balkans influence; *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 2000, p 4.

[140] *Ibid.*

Consequences for materiel procurement planning in the Asian countries

There is still no reliable information on changes in plans for materiel procurement as a consequence of the Kosovo conflict and the NATO manner of implementing its military actions. That the conflict is the subject of comprehensive analysis in the Asian military commands is, however, very probable. The Chinese military command already appears to have completed significant parts of this analysis and perhaps also made decisions on what consequences the Kosovo conflict's military operations should have for Chinese armed forces materiel procurement, force structure and training.[141] It appears that the Chinese military command has particularly noted the strategy, tactics and weapons mix used by NATO in the Kosovo conflict compared with allied operations in the Gulf War (1990-91). Among other things the extensive use in the Kosovo conflict of "smart weapons" (cruise missiles, satellite guided bombs etc.), NATO's rapid achievement of air supremacy and "information dominance" together with - not least - the fact that the initial attacks against Yugoslavia's military command, communications and infrastructure were conducted at long range and without resistance from Yugoslav air defence. Chinese military analysts appear to have been surprised by how far NATO forces were able to strike Yugoslav ground targets without even being detected in time for defence measures to be undertaken. In addition the analysts appear to have been surprised by NATO's ability to conduct protracted bombing.

Some Chinese military analysts appear to wish to put priority on improvements in air defence, particularly of military bases and C4I structures. Regarding tactical performance, Yugoslav ground units' capability for acting dispersed and concealed has been impressive. Increase in such capacity in Chinese forces presupposes improvement in both transport capacity and command, control and intelligence systems.

Other experience from the Kosovo conflict will probably influence the plans of Chinese military command for possible military intervention in Taiwan. For example, calculations of what would be required of the Chinese armed forces to achieve initial air supremacy over the Taiwan Straight and Taiwan have probably been refined and perhaps are more realistic - presumably with consequences for materiel procurement over the next few years.

Interest can probably expect to increase in the procurement of advanced air defence systems, reconnaissance systems and different types of precision weapon in other countries than China. This may favour, among other things, Russia's export of military materiel - in particular air defence systems.[142] For Russia, this has hitherto concerned chiefly modernisation packages for older air defence systems (SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6), while sales of modern SA-10 and SA-12 systems have not yet reached

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[141] The following argument is based upon David Shambaugh, 'China's Military Views the World', *International Security,* vol. 24, no 3 (Winter 1999/2000), p 57-61. See also Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, January 2000), p 28-30, downloaded from the internet 19 March 2000, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/pills2.htm.

[142] Robert Wall, 'Russia's Premier SAMs Seen Proliferating Soon', *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* 27 September 1999, p 36.

such large volumes, presumably mostly because of high costs. However, the Russian air defence systems are probably competitively priced. Great interest is also expected in a new Russian air defence system, S-400, which includes good performance against cruise missiles. This system is expected to be deployed with Russian units at the beginning of 2001,[143] and to be available for export a year or so later.

Analyses of the Kosovo conflict may also influence the direction of the longer-term parts of countries' materiel procurement plans, including military R&D programmes. Information on such programmes and possible changes in them is normally very scarce and fragmentary. For example China - according to as-yet-unconfirmed information - has recently established and started implementation of her second large long-term military R&D programme (the "1.26" programme). The first programme of this kind - the "86.3" - was started in 1986 and is said to have been finished in 1996.[144]

From the scanty and as-yet-unconfirmed descriptions of the "1.26" programme it does not emerge how far analyses of the Kosovo conflict have affected its orientation.[145] However it cannot be excluded that Chinese military R&D plans may have been able to take account of altered priorities and new elements in US military R&D programme occasioned by experience from the Kosovo conflict. [146]

It will probably be a year or more before the picture clears somewhat regarding how the countries in Asia and other parts of the world outside "the west" have changed their materiel procurement plans, force structures and military co-operation patterns across the frontiers as a consequence of analyses of the Kosovo conflict. That such changes are on the way appears likely. Whether they also entail new security policy patterns of action and relations' only time will tell.

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[143] Piotr Butowski, 'Russia's first S-400 squad to deploy by next year', *Jane's Defence Weekly,* 26 January 2000, p 13.

[144] Wen Jen, 'Jiang orders hi-tech aerospace weapons development - '1.26' programme signed and placed under Hu Jintao's command', *Tai Yang Pao* (Hong Kong), 21 March 2000, p A19, broadcast in translation in BBC, *SWB, Part 3,* 22 March 2000, FE/3795 G/5-6.

[145] *Ibid.*

[146] For examples of such changed priorities and new elements in the US military R & D programme see Scott Courley & Bryan Bender, 'Designing the Army-After-Next', *Jane's Defence Weekly,* 6 October 1999, p 22-26; Ramon Lopez, 'USAF's smarter bombs get longer legs', *Flight International,* 3-9 November 1999, p 20; Robert Wall, 'USAF Expands Infowar Arsenal'. *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* 15 November 1999, p 102 f; Nick Cook, 'USAF move to block off urban ´safe havens", *Jane's Defence Weekly,* 22 December 1999, p 28.

ARE WE TAKING INTERNATIONAL PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS SERIOUS?
Implications for Swedish International peace-support operations during the Kosovo crisis.

Niklas Granholm

Summary

The Kosovo crisis, dating from late summer 1998 until August 1999, illustrates many of the problems that the deployment of armed forces to modern international peace-support operations poses for the Swedish military and the Swedish political system as a whole. Most of these problems are of a domestic nature and should therefore be possible to remedy.[147]

- The Swedish system for planning and deploying military units for international peace-support operations appeared at the time unable to contribute to operations on the scale of Kosovo within a shorter time period than c. five months following the decision to send such troops. This despite clears warning signs and ample time for preparations. Given the dynamic course of modern crises, this would appear – from many points of view – to be inadequate. Some measures for reducing such delays are proposed in this memo.

- The problems, which arose in the operational area and indirectly in the rest of Europe due to lack of troops early on, could have been dealt with, at least partially, through a more rapid Swedish deployment of units. Sweden's contribution to basic security and stabilisation within the conflict area was delayed for what was, in the circumstances, an unacceptably long time.

- Sweden's role and standing as concerns European security policy may be affected negatively, as our ability to participate fully in difficult crisis management situations was not demonstrated in a credible manner. The extensive diplomatic efforts directed towards the development of mechanisms for Euro-Atlantic crisis management, and the standing earned through our performance in Bosnia from 1993 and onward, therefore risks being depreciated.

The conclusions in this article should be viewed as preliminary. It is, nevertheless, hoped that they give some indication of where the problems lie. The subject continues to be studied, e.g. within the project *International Operations - Support and Analysis*, being carried out at the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA).

The course of the crisis and Swedish actions

On June 23rd 1999, the Swedish government made a decision to "instruct the Armed Forces to continue with their planning for Swedish participation in KFOR . . .". From

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[147] This memo is limited to the swedish planning of military peace-support operations during the Kosovo crisis. Further, it is based on open sources available at the time. The work covers, with a few exceptions, the period up to September 1, 1999.

this decision it emerged that the contribution to Kosovo would amount to one mechanised battalion, including an engineering unit, comprising some 800 persons. The cost was calculated to be about 900 million SEK for 1999 and would be paid for partly through the disbanding of the Bosnia battalion within IFOR.[148]

The wording of this decision demonstrates that, even at this late stage – just over a fortnight after the UN Security Council decision authorising KFOR and ten days after the Parliamentary decision[149] – planning had begun but was not complete. It was not yet determined how the mission was to be financed, nor was it clear in what area, and together with whom, the Swedish contingent in Kosovo was to serve. Moreover, at the time of the government decision it was not clear when the force could be deployed. The Armed Forces Headquarters maintained that the transport of troops to the operational area could not commence until November 1999. The mix between mechanised infantry units, military engineering resources, mine clearance units etc., and their relative numbers, also remained to be determined.[150]

Some of these unresolved questions may be seen as *exogenous*. In a comprehensive operation such as KFOR, it is natural that uncertainties will arise and cannot be cleared up until late stages in the operation. This will probably always be the case in these types of operations. Although our own actions may have little effect on how such uncertainties are handled, an awareness of this process is important for how operations should be designed.

It is different with *endogenous* factors – in this case our own systems for decision-making, planning and carrying out our part of an international peace support operation. The lead-time before the Kosovo operation – i.e. the government's decision around midsummer and the start of troop deployment at the end of October – illustrates the kernel of the problem. The Swedish system for planning and deploying troops for international peace-support operations seemed at the time unable to deal with operations on this scale in less than about five months following the initial decision – despite clear warnings signs and ample time for preparations. Given the dynamic course of modern crises, this would appear, for many reasons, to be inadequate. A combination of shorter deployment time following a decision – i.e. increased preparedness – and a more speedy (government) decision process would most likely reduce this lead-time.

This long lead-time appears strange, since there were early indications that Kosovo was a crisis area and that war was in the making. The problems within the region were well known for many years, and Sweden had a military presence there since 1993. The signs were clear. The increasingly violent hostilities between the UCK guerrillas and the government early during 1998; the OSSE and NATO agreement with Yugoslavia during October 1998, resulting *inter alia* in the KVM mission and air reconnaissance; the failed peace negotiations in Rambouillet and NATO's ensuing 79-

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[148] *Press release from Ministry of Defence 1999-06-23,* 'New Swedish operations in the Balkans'.
[149] *Government bill No. 1998/99:112 (Proposition 1998/99:112).*
[150] *Press release from Armed Forces 1999-06-24,* (two versions) 'Swedish mechanised battalion to Kosovo', 'Swedish mechanised battalion to Kosovo - updated'. Together, these two versions give insight into the decision-making process concerning where the funds for the operations were to be taken.

day air offensive against Yugoslavia.[151] Added to this, the early demands made on Yugoslavia by the International Contact Group for Yugoslavia included the provision that a peace-support force should be allowed entry into Kosovo in order to monitor the envisaged agreement.

There were thus a number of fairly clear indications that an international peace-support operation was in the making. From available texts it emerges that the cabinet office, as early as the second half of February and the beginning of March 1999, gave NATO a preliminary notification of Sweden's intention to participate in an international peace-support force in Kosovo.[152] A joint Swedish-Finnish battalion was to be mounted intended for operations in a more "benign" environment. A Governmental Commission for a peace-support battalion was given to the Armed Forces on March 30th.[153] The initiative was abandoned later during the spring, when the Rambouillet negotiations collapsed, KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo and the NATO air offensive began on March 24th.

On May 6th, the Government Bill "Swedish participation in the Kosovo peace-support force" was presented to the Swedish Parliament. In connection with this, the minister for foreign affairs declared that:[154]

"In a situation where the parties to the Kosovo conflict have accepted a truce, an international peace-support force will be necessary. Sweden is prepared to contribute to this force . . ."

" . .A peace-support force is necessary to put an end to the great human suffering in the area. It is required in order that refugees be able to return to Kosovo, an irrefutable demand from the world community. It is necessary also to guarantee stability in the region and respect for human rights, and for general elections to be held."

Among other things, the Bill states clearly that:

"It is of great importance that a significant part of the international peace-support force can begin its mission in immediate connection with a truce . . . planning and co-ordination between those nations, which may be expected to be included in the peace-

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[151] Regarding the issue of participation in the NATO-led aerial reconnaissance over Kosovo as a part of the October 1998 agreements, there was even then an inquiry directed to Sweden concerning participation. According to some sources, the Swedish Armed forces declined the first invitation from NATO to participate, when this invitation was forwarded from the Ministry of Defence. One of the reasons given for this, was that an earlier attempt to raise the question of Swedish Air Force participation in international peace-support operations had been met with severe criticism, and that there was no wish to be exposed to such criticism again.

[152] *Government bill, 1998/99:112, p.3f.* The bill was dealt with in committee by the combined parliamentary committees for Foreign Affairs and Defence and was adopted by the Swedish Parliament on June,14th 1999. This, however, does not mean that this was the first time Sweden stated that it could participate in a NATO-led force in Kosovo. As early as August-September 1998, Sweden stated its preparedness to participate in a UN-mandated operation in Kosovo following a peace agreement. *HPM 1998-09-22,* 'Hardening American attitude in the Kosovo conflict'.

[153] *Press release from Armed Forces 1999-03-30,* 'Swedish-Finnish force being prepared'. The financing of this force was arranged early and was added to the supplementary budget to the national budget for 1999 (Government bill 1998/99:100).

[154] *Press release from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1999-05-06,* 'Swedish participation in peace-support forces in Kosovo'.

support force, has therefore been initiated on the Swedish side before the preconditions have arisen for carrying out the operation."[155]

The government's intentions should thus have been absolutely clear to other relevant sections of the administration.

On July 9th, the Armed Forces Headquarters reported to the Ministry of Defence their proposal for the composition of the peace-support force. In connection with this, the Armed Forces also announced that it wished to send personnel) in the form of an advance guard) to Kosovo for preparations.

On July 14th the government decided that such personnel – a total of 26 officers – could be sent to Kosovo. Within this directive, it was stated that the total force should consist of 800-850 personnel. It was also specified that the unit was intended to be placed within the German brigade during October 1999, at the latest.[156] Here, for the first time, it was stated that "the government intends to follow up with a decision regarding the main Swedish force . . .". Thus, as late as the middle of July, the requisite decisions regarding the peace-support force had not been taken.

The Disbanding of Unpredep and the Stream of Refugees to Macedonia

As a consequence of China's veto in the U.N. Security Council, the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) ceased on March 1st 1999. The disbanding of troops thus began and was estimated to take c. three months. During this process, the stream refugees from Kosovo grew steadily. It accelerated further at the end of March, when the Serb regime's plans for the expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population had been put into effect. The greatest stream of refugees in Europe since the years following the Second World War rapidly became a fact. Swedish troops continued to be disbanded and returned, via Thessalonika in Greece, to Sweden for demobilisation.

The resources, both in the form of personnel and equipment, that the Swedish contingent within UNPREDEP represented, could certainly have been used differently. Among other things, a positive contribution could have been made in the impending humanitarian disaster, in which hundreds of thousands of people fled to Macedonia during a short time period. The Macedonian authorities quite simply could not handle such a large stream of refugees.

Swedish resources could have been used to help take care of refugees in Macedonia. Building and organising refugee camps, identifying refugees, preventing anarchy and administering medical care were tasks to which the Swedish contingent could have contributed. A proposal to the Macedonian government, volunteer participation and co-ordination with the British and French troop contingents already in place – and

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[155] *Government bill 1998/99:112*, p.4.

[156] *Press release from the Ministry of defence 1999-07-15*, 'Swedish military personnel to Kosovo'. From the wording in the press release it does not yet seem to be clear whether Sweden was to participate in the force generation conference, planned for the end of July. The wording ' ...it is of great importance that Sweden can participate . . .', appears to suggest this.

who in fact performed some of these tasks – would have rendered an effective contribution to the acute humanitarian situation in northern Macedonian. In addition, Sweden could have gained both in reputation and respect, and – importantly – in experience. Such was not the case. Nor – as an alternative course of action – did Sweden stockpile any equipment in preparation for a possible future operation.[157] In a statement from the Swedish government, it was claimed that such an operation could not be mounted, since there was no mandate from the UN Security Council. However, a bilateral agreement between Sweden and Macedonia would have sufficed for such a humanitarian operation to be carried out. An explanation for the attitude of the Swedish Government is probably to be found in the then ongoing process of funding an operation in Kosovo, which, it was thought, could not be financed concurrently with a humanitarian operation in Macedonian.

Planning the operation -- the Armed Forces

The Swedish Armed Forces' planning for the Kosovo operation during the spring of 1999 entered a more intensive phase when planning for a joint Swedish/Finnish battalion began. Developments during the spring, when the conflict gradually escalated, led to the joint Swedish/Finnish concept being abandoned. The Swedish side, at least, predicted that the level of conflict would be so high that a joint operation with Finland was to be considered all too risky.[158] A national battalion with main battle tanks, fully trained to fight as a battalion, then became the Armed Forces proposal for a Swedish operational force.[159] However, since these additional requirements would, according to the Armed Forces, involve supplementary recruiting – i.e. the reinforcement of SWERAP with approximately 300 men, plus joint training – the transport of the whole unit could begin no earlier than November 1999.[160]

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[157] The Finnish authorities did not draw the same conclusions. Part of the Finnish equipment for Unpredep was stockpiled in Greece.

[158] Grounds for this claim raises several questions regarding how the Armed forces value earlier international operational experience. Nordbat 2 in Bosnia was a Swedish/Danish unit deployed under difficult conditions while the conflict was on-going. The unit is considered to have performed its tasks successfully even though Unprofor as a whole had failed.

[159] Two interesting questions naturally arise. First: When the Swedish/Finnish idea was considered insufficient during early spring 1999, why did not the planning start for a more robust force, to keep the lead time from becoming all too long? Secondly: Why not decide to deploy the force as it was, and subsequently top it up as quickly as possible, with the two additional, recruited companies? The answer to these questions has to do with the protracted trial period which SWERAP (the Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit) found itself in until early spring 1999, at the same time as it was on alert and had been considered 'ready' by the cabinet office (Ministry of defence) since July 1st 1998. Can this state of affairs have contributed to the inability to maintain the thirty-day alert that the government had urged SWERAP to maintain? (See also note 14.)

[160] *Press release from the Armed Forces 1999-06-24* (two versions) 'Swedish mechanised battalion to Kosovo' and 'Swedish mechanised battalion to Kosovo - updated'. SWERAP comprises about 500 men, for which reason other companies must be recruited from trained conscripts who volunteer. SWERAP had been operational and on alert since January 1st 1998. However, the unit was still a trial unit and was not listed as a regular combat unit until February 1999.

With the government decision of June 23rd, the operation acquired a more distinct form. However, as mentioned above, it appeared that the question of funding had not yet been settled. [161]

Preparedness measures involving actual expenditures were not carried out, because the Armed Forces did not consider funding for such measures to be available. In the system for stepwise increases in preparedness for SWERAP, the first step – start package no 1 – was triggered on March 10th with the preparations for the Swedish-Finnish battalion. The next step – start package no 2 – was not triggered until early in July.[162]

More remarkable is the fact that, as late as the second week of July, the Armed Forces stated publicly that detailed planning for the formation of the force and the transport to the conflict area had yet to begin.[163]

Central to modern peace-operations is relevant intelligence – both prior to and during an ongoing operation. Much of the information required, gaining a clear picture of a potential operational area, can be obtaining from open sources or otherwise compiling from existing information, and do need to involve national technical resources. However, certain kinds of information – both within and outside the operational area – cannot be obtained without the aid of such national resources. Despite the clear indications of the development of a conflict, despite repeated reminders from various quarters, and despite good experience in previous operations, central authorities opposed the commitment of such resources. In this case, the reason is said to have been that no instructions or funding had been provided in order to perform this task.

The Nature of the Problem

The situations described above illustrate many of the problems facing Sweden in the area of international peace-support. Some of these are discussed briefly below.

Firstly, it is important to establish that these problems are not due to poor knowledge of how such operations should be conducted, of what practical and technical requirements they call for and of the operational environment in which they are to be

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[161] *Press release from the Ministries for foreign affairs and defence 1999-06-23,* 'New Swedish operations in the Balkans'. The wording ' . . . the government instructs the Armed Forces to proceed with their planning for Swedish participation in KFOR . . . The battalion is estimated at 800 persons. The exact composition of the force will be decided in contacts between the Armed Forces and KFOR', indicates that several unanswered questions remained.

[162] The total cost for the two start packages was 17.4 million SEK. To meet the requirements for actual deployment in 30 days, package 1 needed to be triggered four weeks before a government decision on an operation be taken. Since package 1 was triggered on March 10th, this did not delay the operation. Package 2 was not triggered until 1st or 2nd July, but needed to be completed two weeks before a government decision. Thus, according to its own plans, SWERAP could be deployed, assuming a government decision was made in the middle of August. At the beginning of July the Armed Forces continued to maintain that transport could not be commenced until November. It was therefore a choice of 500 men (SWERAP) in the middle of August, or about 800 men (i.e. SWERAP plus supplementary-recruitment) in November.

[163] *Press release from the Armed Forces 1999-07-06,* "Svenska officerare tillbaka från Kosovo" (Swedish officers back from Kosovo). The last sentence runs: "As soon as a government decision has been taken, detailed planning will be commenced".

carried out. For many years, extensive research and development has been carried out regarding how modern international peace-support operations are conducted, what demands they make and how they relate to international relations. In addition, Sweden has many years of broad, practical experience of modern peace-support operations -- with the Bosnian operation as a weighty example. This includes the Swedish Armed Forces and the Cabinet Office, as well as other authorities within Sweden's Total Defence System. Thus the problems that can be encountered are most probably well known at most levels.

Nevertheless, the process has, so far, been characterised by decisions reaching relevant authorities (in this case the Armed Forces) all too late. Likewise, these authorities, even with prior knowledge of what the decisions were going to entail, neglected to take sufficient measures in order to gain valuable time. From the perspective of the different authorities involved, everyone seems to have acted entirely rationally, in view of the circumstances. The aggregate outcome, however, was far from optimal.

The Cabinet Offices

The areas of responsibility of different ministries partially overlap as regards appropriations and prerogatives[164]. Even if the relationship between different administrative levels is generally satisfactory, differing perspectives, influenced by the different areas of responsibility and budgetary strengths, are sometimes hard to reconcile. Mainly, this means that time and energy are spent in deliberations and negotiations between different parts of the cabinet offices. In the case of the Kosovo deployment, this meant that the cabinet decision of June 23rd did not include all the factors necessary for planning to proceed. Above all, this concerned funding. As late as August, the Armed Forces did not feel that they had the necessary inputs for their planning to proceed. Officials at top levels of the Armed Forces, whose job it is to implement Ministry instructions, sometimes express frustration over how long it takes to receive directions. Such frustration may be justified, but sometimes it is an expression of the continuous game played between an agency and its superiors at the ministerial level.[165]

The final governmental decision regarding the Kosovo operation was taken on August 26th .[166] In view of the speed with which international conflicts develop, there is considerable room for improvement here.

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[164] In the Swedish governmental system, the Cabinet Offices (*regeringskansliet*) consists of the Prime minister's Office and the ministries of Justice, Foreign affairs, Defence, Health and welfare, Finance, Education, Agriculture, Culture, Industry, and Environment. Compared to most other European countries, the ministries are small - really only a staff - with the exception of the ministry for Foregin affairs. The small size is compensated by a large number of agencies and institutes subordinate to the ministries, which fulfill many of the duties normally carried out by ministries in other countries. A peculiar feature, dating from the Thirty Years War, is that cabinet decisions are taken by the cabinet as a whole, not by individual ministers.

[165] *Press release from the Armed forces 1999-08-03,* 'Development of the Bosnia battalion examined'. The last sentence runs: 'The Armed Forces have requested a decision from the government regarding the operation in Bosnia and Kosovo by 12 August at the latest'. An almost identical wording is to be found in *Press release 1999-08-04,* 'Final decision on Kosovo troops remains to be taken'. It is by no means common for a government authority to make public demands in this manner upon the Cabinet.

[166] *Press release from the Ministry of Defence* 1999-08-26, "Beslut om truppinsats i Kosovo" (Decision on troop deployment in Kosovo).

The Armed Forces

Many factors appear to have affected the actions of the Armed Forces in respect to the Kosovo crisis. Firstly, the recent reorganisation of the Armed Forces Headquarters appears not to have had any decisive effect upon the planning of the operation. There appears to have been no shortage of staff resources.

Secondly, the severe tensions, which sometimes develop between the Armed Forces and the Cabinet Offices (Ministry of Defence) -- caused by recent cuts in the Armed forces budget -- probably played an integral part. In a situation characterised by dramatic economic cutbacks, an ongoing, painful reduction of military units, equipment and support personnel, and the disbanding of whole regiments, the effect of an international operation cannot be seen as separated from budget issues. If the Kosovo operation was to be funded from normal Armed Forces appropriations (calculated cost about 900 million SEK for 1999), this would immediately affect procurements or some other form of system development. In such a trade-off, an international peace-support operation may risk losing out. [167]

Thirdly, in its internal balancing-act between the three services, different types of units and the development of new equipment, the negotiating culture within the Armed Forces may have placed something so relatively new and conceptually different as modern international operations on the back burner. The lack of sufficiently many and sufficiently strong internal advocates has contributed to the difficulties of getting international operations off the ground.

The Armed Forces method of handling this issue thus appears to have involved heavy stress on:

- no cost-driving planning is to be carried out until clear directives from the government have been received and funds allocated;
- if an operation is to be carried out, this should not automatically imply that Defence Force appropriations are burdened.

This attitude of the Armed forces, expressed in a number of different contexts, contributed to the unfortunate delay of our contribution to the Kosovo operation.

A key question is why the Armed Forces themselves did not take this new, major task more seriously than they did. Since the 1996 Defence Bill, international peace-support operations have been defined as one of the Armed Forces' four main tasks. There are no formal obstacles that would hinder the Armed Forces themselves from influencing how these main tasks are to be executed, within the framework of allotted resources. It can only be observed that, while peace-support operations have received much attention and publicity, real support has been weak.

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[167] One example of this can be found in the brochure *'Från invasionsförsvar till insatsförsvar' (From anti-invasion defence to taskforce operations)* published by the Armed Forces. Here, 'readiness' is differentiated from 'international readiness' and international operations are decribed as being aimed towards PFP co-operation, exercises and training, for the purpose of increasing interoperability.

Decisions regarding operations and their funding

As is so often the case, the main question is where funding is going to come from. It is therefore unfortunate that initial government directives concerning operations were not accompanied by an indication of where such funds were to be obtained. A decision regarding an operation, without clear sources of funding or a viable plan for organising units, will lead to in-fighting and further delays. Decisions regarding an operation and its funding should preferably be made concurrently. This may not remove all the obstacles, but would certainly contribute to reducing time-consuming in fighting among the parties involved.

Has Sweden's action in the Kosovo crisis had a negative effect on the country's international standing?

On many occasions during the 1990s, Sweden stated that international crisis management was viewed as a central task in the changing security policy landscape. In more specific military-political terms, this meant, *inter alia*, that contributions to international crisis management through Peace-support operations were regarded as one of the principle tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces. Non-binding pledges concerning units, their sizes for various crises and when they should be deployed, have been given to NATO, the WEU and the UN (PARP, FAWEU and SHIRBRIG, respectively). [168]

In the specific case of Kosovo, Swedish actions, in the eyes of the international community, would probably appear to be a symptom of a policy of overbidding. Swedish authorities claim, that SWERAP could be in place in a conflict area 30 days after a cabinet decision.[169] The international community, on the other hand, can now observe that Sweden, in this case, did not live up to its promises. The explanation that troops were not up to full strength, and that supplementary training was required, does not entirely impress. A rapid reaction force worthy of the name is expected to be deployable rapidly, not after five months. [170]

In relation to other countries in Western Europe and Sweden's Nordic neighbours, we were tardy even in this respect. At the end of October, Sweden became the first nation to *relieve* another nation in KFOR.[171]

If the time it takes Sweden to mount operations seen in relation to the situation on the ground – in the area of operations –our efforts in this respect do not seem particularly

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[168] The Swedish contribution to PARP was two mechanised battalions on 90 and 30 day alert, respectively. One was in Bosnia and was about half a battalion, the other was SWERAP, about 500 strong.

[169] During participation in the crisis management games run by the WEU (CRISEX 98), one of the lessons learned for Sweden was that SWERAP was considered to be too small. The smallest unit considered meaningful in that scenario was a full battalion.

[170] An interesting question, albeit outside the subject of this memo, is how much we actually did get for our money. If we assume that SWERAP had not been mounted, and that we instead had mounted the unit according to earlier *ad-hoc* models, it would not have taken much longer, but would have probably have cost considerably less.

[171] In conection with this fact, it is only fair to point out that the battalion has performed its duties very well indeed. Later it has also recived high marks from other countries participating in KFOR.

impressive. Experience shows that the summer season in the Balkans is a time of great activity, while this decreases, and in some respects stops entirely, during the winter season. There was no lack of tasks to be carried out. Mine clearance, humanitarian aid, the maintenance of basic law and order, disarmament and the collection of weapons, and the prevention of new crimes – murder, arson and continued expulsions – were some of the tasks that needed to be dealt with at the very moment the cease-fire came into effect. Some of these tasks are considerably more difficult, or indeed impossible, to carry out during the winter season. The contribution made, therefore, would have to be implemented under considerably worse conditions. All the more people were expelled; there were more mine injuries to care for; fewer weapons were collected.[172] Through its actions, or lack of such, Sweden made itself less relevant to the solution of the Kosovo conflict than is should have been. This fact has not been lost on the world community.[173]

In choosing between proactive and reactive conduct, we have come into a situation in where a reactive pattern of action gained the upper hand. A tardy operation, in which we did not have a sufficiently clear concept of how our units should be organised and what they should contain, can involve greater risks, more dangerous deployment areas and reduced our influence on how factors directly affecting the involved units develop as the operation proceeds.[174]

In comparison with our participation in Bosnia from autumn 1993, our late action in the Kosovo conflict has meant that we risk losing much of the respect won with the rapid and resolute operation in the former case. One of many reasons for our more successful contribution in Bosnia concerned the pending negotiations regarding Swedish EU membership. In influential EU countries, doubts had been raised regarding Swedish will and ability to play a constructive role in European security policy. The Nordic Battalion in Bosnia contributed effectively to dispel such doubts.

What signals did we send to the international community with regard to our delayed, reactive action in Kosovo? Where noticed at all, our actions have contributed to reducing our relevance to the difficult tasks other nations and we faced in Kosovo.[175]

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[172] An indirect but potentially serious side-effect of the conflict is the information concerning offers to sell assault rifles, machine guns, anti tank weapons, mines and explosives from the UCK in western Europe which have now reached the mass media. Should this prove correct, then in this respect too a golden opportunity of reducing the number of illegal weapons in circulation will have been lost. *The Independent 1998-08-16,* "KLA weapons on sale in Britain". Professor Michael Clarke, at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, stated at a seminar at the Swedish Defence College on October 4th – 7th 1999, that a surplus in the order of 250 thousand assault rifles from the Kosovo conflict was thought to be on sale in the port of Rotterdam.

[173] *The Economist, 26 February - 3 March 2000,* 'In Defence of Europe', p. 21f.

[174] Part of the explanation for the sudden change of deployment area for the Swedish battalion from the German brigade's sector in the south of Kosovo, to the British brigade sector in the north, may lie here. It was claimed that deployment in the British sector would facilitate a joint Nordic support element and that lines of transport would be shorter, at the same time as the units' tasks were becoming more challenging, and that the area was well suited to the Swedish unit. This is certainly correct, and raises the question of why, then, Sweden did not advocate such a deployment alternative more strongly from the very beginning? That we are not members of NATO is hardly an adequate explanation, since Finland already had a deployment area in the British sector. *Svenska Dagbladet 1999-08-24,* "Tuffare uppdrag för svensk kosovotrupp" (Tougher tasks for Swedish Kosovo force).

[175] That our contributions are perceived differently, or not noticed at all in the world around, us can be exemplified by the American analyst Edward Luttwak in his description of 'the vigorous Danish tank battalion in Bosnia that replied to any attack on it by firing back in full force, quickly stopping the

Even if it has hitherto been more the case of an absence of positive PR rather than presence of negative PR, international perception of Sweden's will and capability to contribute to effective crisis management will not be improved. Given the present gap between rhetoric and actual demonstrated willpower, this probably does entail negative consequences. We may end up playing in a lower "division" than necessary, not only in the development of European security-policy, but in European politics in general. At worst, Sweden may be increasingly seen as a marginal country; a country possible to manipulate into accepting tasks others deem undesirable. From the point of view of enlightened self-interest, we should avoid such a situation, particularly considering the possibility that the next crisis may arise in an area of central significance to our regional security. Our opportunities to influence -- and gain assistance from -- other states in the Euro-Atlantic sphere, in case of a crisis, could become considerably weakened.

Can these problems be remedied?

As indicated by the discussion above, the problems of perception, preparation, readiness and funding are largely "home grown". How, then, can these different problems areas be dealt with, in order to achieve sufficient preparedness capacity for international operations?

To avoid a game of "musical chairs" between ministries, authorities and agencies, it would help if government decisions regarding international operations were to make it clear to all parties as to where funds for the operation are to come from. Failing this, the various actors will continue to act rationally from their own points of view (i.e. will endeavour to avoid having themselves to pay), to the general detriment of all involved. That there is certain inertia built into the budgetary process, the general purpose being to *balance* the budget, is also an expression of national strategic objectives. It should, however, be clear that the Kosovo operation was not of such proportions as to jeopardise this objective. On the contrary, Kosovo may have considerable positive security-policy effects compared to the means invested.

To help alleviate this problem, budget reserves could be established for the purpose of international operations. This would mean that valuable time is not lost in attempting to put together a budget with too small margins, resulting in force to weak for the operational environment at hand, thus making it dangerously difficult to cope with the complex crisis dynamics that accompany modern peace-support operations.

A recurring problem in the process, leading up to the deployment of a peace-support force, is to determine the right time to deliver formal directives to state agencies and authorities. Directives given too early risk binding the government to one line of action (which, moreover, start costing money), as well as conveying what later on may be perceived as the wrong signals – both abroad and at home. If directives come too late, the authorities involved – in this case the Armed Forces – may find it difficult to manage within the time frame available, or can at least use this as an

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fighting.' By way of this misconception, it can be said that Denmark, with her contribution of a tank company within the joint Swedish-Danish battalion, won a security-policy dividend of a whole tank battalion, while Sweden was nowhere to be seen. *Foreign Affairs July/August 1999, Edward N. Luttwak, 'Give War a Chance'.*

excuse. The consequences are hasty actions, poorly prepared decisions and -- as in the case of Kosovo -- unnecessary reservations from the international community.

The attitude of the Swedish Armed Forces as concern preparations for international operations is another side of the problem. The attitude that one should not take any action that costs money (planning, procurement etc.) without formal instructions from the cabinet office is, in the long run, unacceptable. In view of all the international signals regarding the pending conflict management in Kosovo, it does not appear that any planning was carried out which cost money. In addition, the early and increasingly strong signals that the cabinet office sent out should have given the Armed Forces increasingly clear indications on how Sweden was going to act. That the development of the crisis could not be predicted in detail is of course true, but hardly relevant. Overall, alternative planning could have been carried out and unofficial contacts made, in order to save time.

In the Kosovo operation, for Sweden's part, is was principally a question of when and how many ground troops to deploy, even though there were informal enquiries from NATO regarding other resources.[176] It became clear early on that SWERAP – a reduced battalion – would be insufficient. For military technical-organisational reasons, the battalion is the smallest army unit that can operate independently in the field. This becomes particularly clear if the unit is operating in a modern peace-support operation, far from home, and consequently with long supply lines. Experience from international crisis management exercises, in which Sweden has participated, also demonstrates this. When "reality" now also accords with what research, military technical knowledge and exercises have indicated, it would seem a natural step to upgrade SWERAP to a full-scale battalion. That we have not come equally far in the development of concepts for air and naval units for international peace-support operations remains a weakness yet to be addressed.

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[176] NATO is reported to have directed an informal enquiry to Sweden as to whether a submarine could participate in the Kosovo operation. *Ekoredaktionen 1999-08-26* and *Svenska Dagbladet 1999-08-27,* 'Submarines delivered submerged'.

KOSOVO: LESSONS LEARNED

Jan Foghelin

Historically, the Kosovo operation falls within and American-British inter-war pattern in which air war has received great importance. The trend has been that own losses during the wars of the period have successively decreased (measured in risk of loss per sortie) and the number of sorties to destroy a target has also sunk. (WWII - Vietnam - the Gulf War - Kosovo operation).[177]

The NATO countries consider the operation successful.[178] However some critics maintain that a large number of Kosovo Albanians were not prevented from being expelled from their homes and that the operation could have failed if, e.g. air losses on the NATO side had been higher. It would probably have been possible to conduct the war more efficiently.[179]

That the operation is considered by and large to have been successful also means that the NATO countries do not appear to be making any great changes in their defence planning within the near future. Many views regarding strengths and weaknesses etc. have, however, been reported in different contexts. These will probably have an effect in the long term:

- The USA is not considering any alterations in the relative strengths of the defence services.[180]
- The USA is emphasising weapons rather than platforms.[181]
- UAV systems may be used to a greater extent in the future.[182]
- There are certain weaknesses in the conduct of air war where improvements are needed. In the USA certain urgent research needs are being indicated.[183]
- The question of the quantities of guided weapons etc. has been raised in the USA. Should there be larger stocks or better production capacity.[184]
- European NATO countries have not made the desirable contributions. Greater investments in sophisticated weapons and command and control systems, interoperability etc., are necessary.[185]
- There should have been more options at the start of the crisis (in the event there were chiefly diplomacy and attack from the air).[186]
- Parallel command and control structures (USA and NATO) complicated the command. Procedures need to be improved and the interplay between politicians and the military during operations needs to be practised.[187]
- Poor interoperability was a problem within e.g. communication.[188]

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[177] Cordesman, p. 21, p. 35, p. 39.
[178] DoD, p. 4-5.
[179] Cook, p. 21, Cordesman, p. 42, p. 88.
[180] Bender (1999), p. 3, Cordesman, p. 40.
[181] Bender (1999), p. 3.
[182] Fulghum (August 23).
[183] Fulghum (August 2), p. 55.
[184] Cook, p.23.
[185] Robertson, p. 6., Bender (1999), p. 3, Sparaco, p. 25, Penney, p. 16.
[186] DoD, p. 15-16.
[187] DoD, p. 20-21.

- Many improvements can be made to C4 (Command, Control, Communication and Computers). [189]
- Units must be able to carry out their tasks within a broad spectrum from traditional combat duties via different types of PSO to humanitarian help. [190]
- In-flight refuelling capability was a key capability. [191]
- ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems need improvement.[192] UAV showed good potential. [193]
- Space systems are important. [194]
- More could have been done in the area of information warfare during the operation. Organisation etc. needs to be reviewed. [195]

The consequences for future warfare for NATO may be:

- Air operations are considered an effective way of conducting operations. [196]
- There is a political expectation that own losses can be kept at a very low level. [197]
- There is a political expectation that "collateral damage" can be at a low level without jeopardising the operation. [198]
- Even if this involves friction, intervening politically and setting restrictions on the conduct of operations can work. [199]

War is two-sided. The expectations and preconceptions arising from the points listed above will be subject to attempts at exploitation by an opponent. The war is in danger of becoming asymmetrical. This can in the worst case mean that from the NATO point of view whole operations fail. [200]

The above views are cautiously formulated and entail no radical changes in the structure of NATO countries' Defence Forces.

A more radical interpretation of the lessons learned from the Kosovo operation could be formulated as follows:

- The strategic air war functioned well (measured against criteria such as targets destroyed, with small side effects and small own losses). Resources for such an operation will therefore be further developed. Countries risking exposure to strategic bombing may adopt the following countermeasures

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[188] DoD p.25, p.51.

[189] DoD, p. 27, p. 48-49.

[190] DoD, p. 27.

[191] DoD, p. 33.

[192] DoD, p. 56.

[193] DoD, p. 57.

[194] DoD, p. 124.

[195] Sherman, p. 13, Wall, p. 102.

[196] Cordesman, p. 35, p. 39.

[197] Cordesman, p. 46, p. 48.

[198] Cordesman, p. 64.

[199] Cordesman, p. 147.

[200] Cook, p. 20-23.

- procure sophisticated air defence (if the Serbs had had the S-300 system this would have meant much),[201]
- ensure that society is not crippled if a limited number of point targets are destroyed.

Measures of this nature do not prevent strategic bombing from having its effect, but the costs of reaching a certain result are raised.

- The tactical air war gave poor dividends. Instead of attempting to improve systems for tactical air warfare, other solutions will choose. Primarily there will be investment in unmanned systems (UAVs of different types) or systems with small crew ("arsenal ships"). This means that systems such as the F 22 will be in difficulties.[202]

Much has been written about the Kosovo operation. The above has referred primarily to sources treating military operational experience and the conclusions drawn from this. There is also another sphere of literature, covering the political-military aspects of the operation.[203]

There are many reasons to continue following what is being written about experience from the Kosovo operation:

- the Kosovo conflict is not over. What happens in the future may affect our views of the early military operations,
- new information about the operation is emerging all the time,
- a certain time is often needed before a perspective can be gained upon a complex operation and firmer conclusions drawn.

Examples of interesting question areas:

- does the Kosovo operation imply a definite breakthrough for "air power"[204] or will the operation be the last large operation using manned aircraft on a large scale ?
- will the Kosovo operation form a pattern in that NATO will act without a mandate (from the UN or the OSSE) or will mandates be required in the future ?
- will NATO when the long-term result can be discerned consider that Kosovo types of operation are "profitable" ? Will the NATO countries be able to agree on more operations of this type?[205]

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[201] The problem of countering more sophisticated air defence and the importance of suppression is stressed in the report on experience (DoD p. 64-67, p. 70-71.

[202] THE ECONOMIST, p. 37-38.

[203] Ex. Chomsky. Shirrmacher.

[204] Eyal, p. 26, considers that it was not a breakthrough.

[205] Eyal, p. 25, Bender (2000).

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