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## Visit to the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the Russian General Staff



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**User report**

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<b>Abstract (not more than 200 words)</b> A delegation from the Defence Analysis Division at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) visited the Center for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces on 3-6 September 2001.  This was the first meeting between representatives from FOI and CMSS. The first aim was therefore one of mutual acquaintance with the organization and overall research work of the counterpart. A second aim was to discuss five beforehand mutually agreed topics in the form of a seminar. The topics were European security and crisis management, Nato expansion, international operations, the character of future conflicts and information operations (IO).  As a result of the seminar it was concluded that necessary requirements for continued dialogue concerning some of the questions discussed during the seminar are present. During the exchange of opinions it was clear that overall there were no diametrically opposed views and that common basic ideas exist. For obvious reasons the differences of opinions were largest concerning Nato expansion, while only minor differences characterized the views on for example the character of future conflicts. Of the five topics discussed the character of future conflicts and international operations are probably those best suited for future development. However, since CMSS and FOI emphasised different aspects of these two topics a necessary point of departure for future joint research efforts will have to be a discussion on definitions and common approaches.		
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<b>Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord)</b> En delegation från avdelningen för Försvarsanalys besökte den 3-6 september 2001 Centret för militärstrategiska studier vid de ryska väpnade styrkornas generalstab.  Detta var det första mötet mellan representanter för respektive organisation varför ett första syfte var att lära känna varandras organisationer och forskning i stort. Ett andra syfte var att i seminarieform diskutera fem i förväg gemensamt överenskomna teman: europeisk säkerhet och krishantering, Natoutvidgning, internationella operationer, framtida konflikters karaktär och informationsoperationer.  Besöket gav vid hand att förutsättningar för fortsatt dialog föreligger avseende några av de frågor som berördes under seminariet. Under meningsutbytet kunde konstateras att de ryska och svenska delegationerna inte i någon väsentlig omfattning hade diametralt motsatta uppfattningar och att gemensamma grundidéer finns. Av naturliga skäl var meningsskiljaktigheterna störst i synen på Natoutvidgningen, medan t.ex. endast mindre skiljaktigheter karaktäriserade synen på framtida konflikters karaktär. Av de fem diskuterade områden framstår framtida konflikters karaktär och internationella operationer som de mest utvecklingsbara. Eftersom parterna lade emfas vid olika aspekter även inom dessa områden bör fortsatta diskussioner kring definitioner och gemensamt synsätt bli utgångspunkten för en eventuell framtida dialog.		
<b>Nyckelord</b> Europeisk säkerhet, krishantering, Natoutvidgning, internationella operationer, framtida konflikters karaktär, informationsoperationer		
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# 1. Introduction

In October 1998 Major General Leonid Luzhkov and Colonel Vladimir Chugunov from the Center for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the Russian General Staff attended the seminar *Character of Future Armed Conflicts* organised by the Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA<sup>1</sup>).

Since the character of future conflicts seemed to be one of several mutual interests the division for Defence Analysis at FOI attempted to establish a closer contact with the CMSS. For many reasons no contacts materialised during 1999 and 2000. Before the Swedish European Union presidency (January-June 2001) renewed efforts were undertaken to arrange a first working meeting with CMSS.

In September 2001 it was finally possible to arrange a FOI-CMSS seminar. It was mutually agreed that the seminar should treat the following five subjects:

- Russian and Swedish views on European security
- Consequences of NATO expansion, especially for Northern Europe
- European crisis management
- The character of future armed conflicts
- Possible international agreements in the area of information operations

This report is a documentation of the seminar that took place in Moscow on 3-6 September 2001. It should be pointed out from the very beginning that a first overall aim of the seminar was one of mutual introduction and presentation of CMSS and FOI, their respective work, organisations etc. in general. The rather generous agenda including five very wide topics was used as a way to survey possible areas of future closer co-operation, which could yield more substantial and practical results.

Below follows a chronological description of how the seminar proceeded and what the different speakers said. The reader will find the seminar programme in appendix 1. Only abstracts of the speakers' presentations are given in the main body of the text. The full papers are included in appendix 2.

## 1.1. Participants

From the Center for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS) the following persons took part:

- Colonel Vladimir Ostankov, Head of CMSS
- Major-General Leonid Luzhkov, 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy head of CMSS
- Colonel Aleksander Koltiukov, 2<sup>nd</sup> Deputy head of CMSS
- Colonel Vladimir Konev
- Colonel Vladimir Lutovinov
- Colonel-General Yevgeni Kondakov (ret.)

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<sup>1</sup> On 1 January 2001 FOA merged with the Aeronautical Research Institute (FFA) and was renamed Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).



- Lieutenant-General Anatoli Klimenko (ret.)
- Colonel Vasili Voblenko (interpreter)
- Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksander Bachkovski (interpreter)
- Sergey Griniaev (day 2 only)

From the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) the following persons took part:

- Jan Foghelin, Head of Division, Division for Defence Analysis
- Elisabeth André Turlind, Head of Department, Military Operational Research
- Bengt Andersson, Director of Studies, Dept. For Security Policy and Strategy
- Niklas Granholm, Senior Analyst, Dept. For Security Policy and Strategy
- Wilhelm Unge, Analyst, Dept. For Security Policy and Strategy
- Pär Eriksson, Deputy Director of Studies, Dept. For National Defence Analysis



## 1.2. Continued contacts

As a result of the seminar it was decided that CMSS should send a representative to a FOI conference on the character of future conflicts in Stockholm on 15-16 October 2001. Colonel Aleksander Koltiukov and colonel Aleksander Lebedev (interpreter) participated in the round-table discussions on 15 October and gave a presentation on the day after. Colonel Koltiukov's presentation is included in the FOI report *Proceedings from the Conference "The Character of Future Conflicts: Pre-conflict and Conflict Dynamics"*.<sup>2</sup> Since his presentation at the FOI-CMSS seminar in September was not complete it was decided to incorporate the October presentation into this report.

<sup>2</sup> Elisabeth André Turlind (ed.), *Proceedings from the Conference "The Character of Future Conflicts: Pre-conflict and Conflict Dynamics"*, FOI-R—0312—SE, December 2001.

## 2. Abstracts of the Presentations

As part of a mutual introduction of the participants colonel Vladimir Ostankov, Head of the CMSS, gave a brief presentation of the Center, its work and organisation. See appendix 3. Jan Foghelin, Head of Division, then presented the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) in general and the Division for Defence Analysis in particular. See appendix 4.

### 2.1. *Russian and Swedish Views on European Security*

**Colonel Lutovinov** a Russian view on European security. In his presentation he stressed that Russia currently strongly supports the use of non-military means to regulate international relations. A cornerstone in the reforming of the Russian armed forces is the principle of defence sufficiency, i.e. forces to deter the outbreak of armed aggression towards Russia taking into account the economic possibilities of the country. According to colonel Lutovinov there are two protruding trends presently: the risk of (global) nuclear war is very small, whereas the risk of local conflicts is constantly increasing. US aspirations for world leadership are increasing the political tensions in the world and NATO's new policy endangers the security regime of many areas, among others the European. At the same time new threats are emerging, such as terrorism, ecological and demographic problems. There is a need to maintain the present security structures. The most serious threats today are to be found outside Europe. The problem, however, is that a common European "Secure House" is being built without Russia, which is particularly problematic when it comes to economics. Russia is used as a raw material base. The distance between Central and Eastern Europe on the one side and Russia on the other is increasing. Despite the fact that the future European Union crisis management forces will give EU a certain degree of independence vis-à-vis the USA, this project is seen as a way of streamlining the EU-US relationship.

However, the building of these crisis management forces proceeds without Russian participation. Colonel Lutovinov then made three proposals to find a way out of this dilemma. 1) Build a European crisis management force without NATO monopoly. 2) Peace-keeping, crisis management and arms control could be used as a counterweight to US dominance. 3) Increase military-technical co-operation as a means to build European security against different new threats like terrorism.

Colonel Lutovinov expressed his willingness to listen to Swedish suggestions and to choose a perspective proposal for further co-operation.

### 2.2. *Consequences of NATO Expansion*

**Bengt Andersson** pointed out that the dismantling of the concentration of standing forces in central Europe at the end of the last century was a drastic but almost non-violent change in East-West relations. This has led to a reorientation in many countries. Among others the Baltic States. The probability for their acceptance into NATO at the coming Prague meeting in the autumn of 2002 has, in a short time span, gone from small to large. This could contribute to a stable positive development in the Baltic States and increase the possibility for a flourishing trade in the whole region including the most western parts of Russia. In anticipation of a low regional tension Sweden is reducing her military forces but will still have to contribute to

the European crisis management capacity. In case of a continued peaceful climate in the region there will be little need for any changes in that development. The most demanding case would be a situation with a military build-up in the region that exceeds what Sweden could handle with her own resources. That would raise the issue of a Swedish change in her security policy, especially since a full-fledged modern defence solely founded with national resources will probably be far beyond our economic capacity.

But once again – what kind of serious conflict could create such a case? With or without Nato enlargement in the region, its hard to find one emanating from the Baltic Sea region and if there is a conflict elsewhere – why should that lead to tension in this area?

**Colonel-General Kondakov's** point of departure was that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact created a dilemma for NATO as a defensive organisation for collective security. Many alternatives were possible, but the final solution was eastward expansion. From a Russian point of view the buffer zone was transformed into a logistical area for enhanced power projection capabilities some 650-750 km closer to Russia. A NATO expansion would mean some 50 divisions, 250 aircraft, 100 SAM systems, 500 materiel depots etc very close to the Russian border. At the same time Russia has decreased its forces by 40 per cent (there is not a single army or corps in the Leningrad military district and all the divisions are reduced in strength). Taken together these facts mean a threat to Russia. Furthermore, Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan are talked about as possible future NATO members.

The development shows that the USA uses force unilaterally (e.g. the Balkans). As a historical parallel Hitler occupied Eastern Europe without fighting and then attacked the Soviet Union.

International relations after the Cold War did not become bloc-less. NATO with its intimidating capability will expand further expansion after a second expansion. The non-reformed NATO poses a threat to Russia. NATO's behaviour is evidence that the alliance sees Russia as a threat. All these facts have led and will lead to changes in Russian military policy (doctrines, reforms, Armed Forces structure and the military-industrial complex).

### **2.3. *European Crisis Management***

**Lieutenant-General Klimenko** began his presentation with a discussion on the definition of crisis. The first definition of crisis could be instability. Another definition is that crisis is a subset of a conflict. A crisis can be regarded as a stage of a conflict during which an agreement is reached or the crisis transforms into a conflict where force is used. Crisis management can have as its task to prevent the crisis from escalating or to take it to a qualitatively new level.

A majority of today's conflicts are internal and only a very few external. However, in many cases the internal aggression could not have escalated without external help (funding, arms etc.). This in turn has led to an increase in peace-enforcement operations.

Lieutenant-General Klimenko also compared the NATO operation Essential Harvest in which the Macedonian government was subjected to demands that they undertake constitutional changes, with the Baltic states, which have not been faced with such demands by the West in order to be integrated to the Western structures such as the EU.

Peace-enforcement is not crisis management. One problem with peace-enforcement operations is that they are much more difficult to carry out. Once a "conflict gets out of the bag" it lives its own life and has its own logic.

Russia today sees as its main tasks the following three tasks:

1. To learn the art of avoiding/preventing conflicts. A well-oiled monitoring system is needed internally and externally. Not only early warning is needed, but also the instruments to enforce the policy. Preventive diplomacy within the framework of OSCE should be a cornerstone. Its main task should be to elaborate concrete measures for a prophylactic policy, measures that are clearly formulated and applicable in practice. Another important issue is international agreements banning support of different kinds to conflictogenic parts of the world. Unfortunately, such external support has not been stoppable in the Balkans or in Chechnya.
2. Crisis management must be able to manage crises before violence breaks out. The most delicate and at the same time important question is how to combine/balance non-military measures with military a ditto for demonstration of force if necessary by for instance the OSCE.
3. A Russian key issue is strict upholding of international law. Russian experience shows that military resources should also be usable in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. Therefore the localisation of these forces is important.

As a point of departure for his discussion at the conference, **Niklas Granholm** formulated the question what happens when an army with a post-modern outlook is confronted with an army with a premodern outlook. How does an intervening force go about to understand how its own posture and the effect it has on the society that it is supposed to affect?

Using the British diplomat Robert Cooper's model with three main types of societies (pre-modern, modern and post-modern) in the world today, it is useful to ask the question how international interventions could develop in light of Cooper's theory. In the post-modern states, the armed forces there, as in any society, are a reflection of the society that holds and develops them. The belief systems that societies on different levels of development hold are deep-seated and do not change quickly nor easily. The post-modern societies have developed armed forces with a very different outlook from the ones in the premodern states that they are most likely to intervene in.

	State	Intellectual Basis	Foreign Relations
Pre-modern	Where the state Functions it is Authoritarian or weak. Control may break Down often. Feudal systems and Military empires	Religion, religious art And music.	Chaotic, imperial or Linked to a religious order objective is Acquisition of Territory
Modern	Centralised and Bureaucratic. State responsible for Education, health and Welfare and military Functions	<u>Early</u> : rationalist; Hume, Voltaire, Kant, Machiavelli, Newton. <u>Late</u> : Darwinism, Hegel, Marx, Clausewitz, Tolstoy, Mann, Zola.	<u>Early</u> : Inter-state relations dominate. Separation of Domestic and Foreign Policy. Commerce becomes a reason for war.
Post-modern	Power diffused both Domestically and Internationally; Democratic, Influenced by mass-Media and popular Emotion. Competing pressures Complicate decision-Making	Diversity and Uncertainty. Existentialism. Wittgenstein, Camus, Joyce, Einstein, Heisenberg, Warhol.	Transparency and Mutual vulnerability Non-state actors including media, important. Policy time-frame Shortens.

Source: Robert Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order*, Demos 2000.

**Pär Eriksson**<sup>3</sup> discussed the developing EU military crisis management capability and outlined where it stands now, the summer 2001, and what the main remaining obstacles are. Among the obstacles that Mr Eriksson discussed in the presentation are the Union's weak credibility as a military crisis manager, the uncertainties regarding the purpose of the capability, the deficiencies in military capabilities and the relationship EU-NATO. He also touched on the importance of a EU-Russian co-operation in the area of crisis management.

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<sup>3</sup> This presentation on European security was given day 2 of the seminar.

## 2.4. *The Character of Future Conflicts*

**Colonel Koltiukov** chaired the seminar the second day. In an introductory remark he explained that at the Center some 70 per cent of the time is devoted to questions of an operational nature. This work is mainly performed for the Defence minister or Chief of the General Staff. The results of the Center's work is usually integrated into the policy or operational activities with a time lag of 3-5 years. An example of such work is the forthcoming Russian-Belorussian military doctrine, which is due in October/November 2001.

**Elisabeth André Turlind** presented the project *The Character of future conflicts* in which her research group is trying to learn about the mechanisms behind conflicts, the circumstances under which conflicts arise and where they start. Do factors such as ethnic race, raw materials (oil, minerals, precious stones), water, geography and religion constitute the underlying causes – or is it simply a question of money? Where can one find the actors? Who are they? Can they be characterised into groups? Are there any links between them – apparent or concealed? Is it possible to simulate this kind of problem using a computer model in order to see if any patterns emerge?

In the future it will be more and more rare that there is a war between nations. The struggle will be between different groups or organisations and they are hitting the target by small vehicles with advanced technology.

**Colonel Koltiukov** began his presentation by stressing that to a large extent he agreed with the conclusions of the former speaker, perhaps with a somewhat different emphasise on a few points.

The very fact that civilians have gotten involved in the work means that the goals etc. have changed and that the political aspect is now governing the development. Military men are occupied with forces and technology (incl. future ditto) and preparing for the latest war. But occupation of territory is no longer necessary. Control of communications etc. is the essential thing.

What we see today is local conflicts. However, these must be looked upon from different perspectives. The Iran-Iraq war, for instance, was a conflict on life and death, whereas the conflict in former Yugoslavia was a minor conflict, but involving many nationalities. And the conflict between national interests is what we are going to see in the future. The effect of this conflict of national interests could, in combination with the technical development, have disastrous consequences. Several trends are distinguishable today:

- An increased threat from non-state actors or organisations. Despite the fact that nobody officially supports them they have substantial resources, but the international community does not discuss this issue. This is a type of conflict we will see in the next 10-15 years.
- Regional alliances are forming, but the coming into being of a multipolar world could lead to instability.
- Struggle for natural resources could lead to large-scale conflicts.

What should be done? The objective development cannot be stopped, but perhaps be steered onto certain manageable tracks. Regional security regimes are therefore of importance. These must however be subordinated to and/or coordinated by the UN.

Colonel Koltiukov concluded his presentation by saying that based on the conclusions put forward by Mrs. André Turlind this is probably an area with great potential for co-operation and one, which could yield concrete results.

## **2.5. *International Agreements in the Area of Information Operations***

**Jan Foghelin's** point of departure was the diversified nature of what is called information warfare (IW) and information operations (IO). In order better to structure the discussion worldwide clearer definitions will have to be formulated. Today these terms are often used describing everything from more technical aspects of military warfare to a partly new type of strategic warfare. Even though the similarities between IW/IO and weapons of mass destruction are sometimes pointed out there are also many differences. However, some of the common features are global reach and small-scale actors' possibility to inflict severe damage.

Another characteristic feature of IW/IO is its ability to affect vital, civilian functions of a modern society. Awareness of the threat and possible countermeasures are therefore crucial. A prerequisite for successful defensive efforts is national co-operation between federal bodies and private companies. For IW/IO protection international co-operation will also be needed. However, it is doubtful whether the UN is the best forum for co-operation.

Due to shortage of time **Sergey Griniaev's presentation** had to be omitted. It has however been included in appendix 2.

Mr. Griniaev nevertheless asked Mr. Foghelin why the United Nations is not a suitable forum for an international agreement on limitations in the area of information operations?

Jan Foghelin: There are three main reasons, in my opinion: the first concerns the problem of verification. An international agreement/treaty that cannot be reliably verified should not be created. Secondly, the UN is too broad a spectrum of nations and different interests with different cultures and knowledge about information operations for it to arrive at a consensus opinion on IO. Thirdly, different countries have different vulnerabilities and therefore different interests in solving them.

Colonel Koltiukov added that the most important part of the IO complex to limit is the psychological warfare dimension.

**End of seminar**

## Appendix 1: Programme for the seminar 3-6 September 2001

Cultural activities during the visit to Moscow such as ballet at the New Opera Theatre, visit to Marshal Zhukov's memorial Museum and excursion around Moscow has been omitted.

<b>3 September 2001 Day of Arrival in Moscow</b>		
<b>4 September 2001 First Day of the Seminar</b>		
10.00-11.00	<i>Briefing with colonel Vladimir Ostankov, Chief of the CMSS</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mutual introduction of the participants</li> <li>• CMSS and FOI tasks and organisation</li> <li>• General research progress and results</li> <li>• Eventual lines and spheres of scientific cooperation</li> <li>• Programme revision for possible amendments</li> </ul>	
11.00-13.00	<i>Seminar – Morning session</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russian and Swedish (Nordic) views on European security</li> <li>• Consequences of NATO expansion, especially for Northern Europe</li> </ul>	
15.30-17.00	<i>Seminar – Evening session</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• European Crisis management: why, where, when, how</li> <li>• Possibilities of preventive actions</li> <li>• Similarities and differences between Sweden/Western Europe and Russia concerning doctrines for peace support operations</li> </ul>	
<b>5 September 2001 Second Day of the Seminar</b>		
10.00-11.00	<i>Seminar – Morning session</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The character of future armed conflicts</li> <li>• Possible international agreements in the area of information operations</li> </ul>	
11.00-11.30	<i>Conclusion of the seminar</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Final exchange of views</li> </ul>	
12.30-14.30	<i>Reception on behalf of the CMSS Command</i>	
<b>6 September 2001 Day of Departure</b>		





## **Appendix 2: Presentations during the CMSS-FOI seminar 2001**

Colonel Lutovinov: A Russian View on European Security

















## Bengt Andersson: The Baltic Sea Region – An Area in Transition?

In times of change, there is a need to ponder possible future development and their consequences. We as researchers are often asked to support that process. And what I will share with you are some of my thoughts on the ongoing changes in the Baltic Sea area. Hence, the views and opinions expressed in my speech do not necessarily correspond to those of the Swedish Defence Research Agency or the Swedish government.

My background is as a researcher working with defence planning and scenarios at different staff levels and at the Ministry of Defence since the beginning of the 1970s.

In those days all military contingency planning was focused on the gulf between East and West, the concentration of forces in Europe and the nuclear balance. Within this setting we studied contingencies resulting in attacks on Sweden and used them as tool to support shaping our defence forces. All scenarios were in way or the other linked to a potential clash in Central Europe between East and West.

The dismantling of the concentration of standing forces in central Europe that began in the late 80's was a drastic but almost non-violent change in East-West relations. Russia - the heir of the devolved Soviet Union - accepted the unification of Germany and that the Baltics re-emerged as sovereign states. Neither did the pullout from Central Europe result in a military build-up in the northwestern part of Russia, as some western analyst did fear. The petrifying dividing line in Europe, formed under half a century was not there any more: This has forced all European states to rethink their defence arrangements.

As a consequence, Nato has changed both structure and focus. In the early 1990's Nato saw a new role as an organisation dealing with crisis management in Europe and her surroundings. Nato still retains its article 5 on collective defence. But today the focus on that article, in the enlargement process, is more on meeting the Czech president Havels request for countries from behind the former iron curtain to be allowed Nato membership as a sign of the irreversibly of their transformation into sovereign European states.

Among the countries in this category are the Baltic States. The probability for their acceptance at the coming Prague meeting has, in a short time span, gone from small to large. The Baltic States are also candidates to membership in the EU. For anyone still living in the mindset of the Cold War this would mean a dramatic change in the military strategic situation in Northern Europe. But considering that there seems to be few areas of conflict coupled to the region and that all parties have an interest in developing co-operation, this should not be a problem. The build up of national defences in the Baltic States, as is done today with support from among others the Nordic countries, will also be instrumental by giving the Baltic States a defence capability that can fulfil its peacetime role without deployment of Nato units in the region. Hence retaining the low military profile in peacetime.

Nato and/or EU membership will also give the Russian speaking people living in the Baltic countries an opportunity to decide their membership and identity without the lingering uncertainties associated with such a choice today. This could contribute to a stable positive development in the Baltic States and increase the possibility for a flourishing trade in the whole region including the most western parts of Russia.

With this positive scenario as the most likely one, it's hard to envision any military threat against Sweden at least within this decade, even though Sweden most probably will reduce her defence spending during this period. But what will Swedish security policy and defence look like in the long run? We are by no means alone in reducing defence spending and forces, both EU countries and Russia have seen substantial reduction in their military capacity. At the same time there is a rapid development in the military field, modern materiel is becoming obsolete and the heavily armed and mechanised forces of "Central Europe model" will hardly re-emerge. But armed conflicts will not vanish, neither within nor from the borders of Europe. Hence there will remain a military component in European security. This will mean a replacement of existing systems and since technology offers savings both in monetary terms and reduction in personnel, more technologically advanced systems will be bought.

As with all military development there is a risk of a reopening of an arms race in some area, even if there is no deliberate will to do so. Continued openness will be of importance to avoid suspicions based on lack of confirmed data. Arms control regimes like CFE, reports and inspections according to the Vienna Document and Open Skies plays an important role here and can serve as model for future arrangements.

As to the tasks of the Swedish defence forces, Sweden will as a EU member have to contribute to the European crisis management capacity. On the global arena Sweden's UN membership will still be a serious commitment. The resources spent on the defence of Sweden's own territory will of course be coupled to development in Northern Europe. In case of a continued peaceful climate in the region there will be little need for any changes. The most demanding case would be a situation with a military build-up in the region that exceeds what Sweden could handle with her own resources. That would raise the issue of a Swedish change in her security policy, especially since to build up a full fledged modern defence solely with national resources will probably be far beyond our economic capacity.

But once again – what kind of serious conflict could create such a case? With or without Nato enlargement in the region, its hard to find one emanating from the Baltic Sea region and if there is a conflict elsewhere – why should that lead to tension in this area?

Well Ladies and Gentlemen – those were my thoughts on the past and future in Northern Europe. Thank you for your attention.

Colonel-General Kondakov: Consequences of NATO Enlargement for Russia and Northern Europe













Lieutenant-General Klimenko: Management of Crises in the European Region









## Niklas Granholm: Different World, New Challenges – Implications for International Military Operations.

My presentation today consists mainly of two parts. It should not be regarded as a finished product, but rather as part of ongoing studies in the area of international relations, particularly in the realm of conflict management and its possibilities in today's world.

I speak here in a personal capacity, as analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. The views presented here are not necessarily representative of those of the Swedish government.

The change in Europe in 1989 was not only the end of the cold war but also the end of a 300-year period of a state system in Europe. The new situation spurred many analysts to try and describe the contemporary world and contribute to the debate. Among the most notable were Samuel Huntingtons "The Clash of Civilisations" and Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History". They were in the end rejected since they were found lacking. Huntington's concept of "civilisations" was severely criticised, mainly because of its vagueness. Fukuyama's mainly on the grounds that his description of our whole world as embracing one ideology only – liberalism – simply wasn't accurate.

There is indeed need for analysis of this kind. The confusion in how to describe the period we now live in is monumental. It has in turn led to a handling of conflicts that has been less than adequate in many ways.

Robert Cooper, a British diplomat, has in a short and brilliant analysis, suggested a way to describe our contemporary world. The world system today is divided into three main parts where different rules apply: the Pre-Modern world, the Modern and the Post-Modern. The division is not based on geography or vague concepts of "civilisation", but rather a set of different characteristics that shape the behaviour of the three different types of states. I shall try to describe briefly the types of states in this world.

### **The Post-modern states**

According to Cooper, the post-modern state puts emphasis above all on the individual. It is mainly, "unwarlike", since war is a fundamentally collective activity. It is characterised by more pluralism, more complexity and less centralisation than the bureaucratic modern state. Mass media, particular interest groups or regions gain in influence, since the state itself has become less dominating. Movement towards privatisation of state functions and greater autonomy can be clearly seen. The member states of the European Union provide the clearest example of this Post-modern development today.

The post-modern states interact between themselves with openness and transparency. They may not always like each other and there are certainly conflicts, but there is open interaction, which provides security. None of the post-modern states have territorial ambitions against each other, and the use of force between them is ruled out. Thus, they do not have to worry about threats from their post-modern neighbours and security is thereby enhanced.

## **The Modern states**

In the modern state it is different. The use of force against neighbouring states is not ruled out, at least not theoretically. Order in the modern state system, if it exists in this part of the world system, is based on balance of power or, of hegemonic states. For example, the Persian Gulf could be one area in which it necessary to think in classic balance of-power terms. In the modern state a strict separation of domestic and foreign policy means that state sovereignty is recognised as central. External interference in domestic affairs is prohibited, and there is a clear divide between foreign and domestic issues.

The ultimate guarantor of security for the state in the modern world is force. National interest and force, as described by Niccolò Machiavelli and Carl Von Clausewitz, are seen as the main determining factors in international relations for the modern state.

The concepts and values of the modern world are still the dominating in our thinking on international relations; Realist theories, as well as idealist, come out of this view of the world. Also, the United Nations in its original form belongs to the modern world. On the one hand, state sovereignty is emphasised and on the other the use of force to maintain status quo. The veto power ensured that the UN did not take on more than it could handle. The UN's role, as originally conceived was to stabilise the state system, not to change it fundamentally.

## **The pre-modern world**

In the pre-modern parts of the world the state can no longer live up to Max Weber's well know criteria of exercising the legitimate monopoly of the use of force. The state, such as it exists, is a weak and fragile structure, and may have lost its legitimacy as a result of abuse of that monopoly. It may also have lost it as a result of the availability of conventional weapons today. The state may also be so dominating in its exercise of power that it stops society from functioning.

What is different for the pre -modern states from before is that the imperial tendency, to expand, annex and control new territories, is no longer present in the countries that are most capable of imperialism. Land and natural resources, with the exception of oil, are no longer as important as a source of power for the most technologically advanced countries. To govern other people, especially if they are hostile, is a burden. The cost for saving distant countries from ruin is considered too high. The choice for the states in the pre-modern parts of the world is limited: Few if any of the states capable of imperial rule are no longer interested in them. The choice is thus between empire and chaos, and chaos is what we have chosen.

But this is nothing new. Zones of chaos have existed before, and probably will in the future. The difference is that they are no longer isolated from the rest of the world. Today a country with an international airport can be part of the pre-modern chaos.

For the most part, countries in the pre-modern chaos may excite pity rather than greed. Pity may reach us through massmedia and television in particular. Two concepts from the 1990's illustrate this: the CNN-effect and the concept of humanitarian intervention.

If the state itself becomes too weak in such states and non-state actors, Such as drug syndicates, organised crime or well-organised terrorist groups, start using its territory as bases for



attacks on modern and post-modern parts of the world. In that case they may eventually have to respond.

### **Implications for Security**

The implications for security are different in different parts of Coopers world. The system in the modern world requires the traditional methods of dealing with threats to stability. The Gulf war provides a typical example: Vital resources for the western world – oil – in one state were threatened by an ambitious other state, Iraq. The western response was to build a powerful coalition to deny Saddam Hussein the near monopoly of oil and secondly, to deny Iraq the access to weapons that could threaten the west itself. Wars of this type has their reference point not in the wars of annihilation during the twentieth century, but rather wars with the more limited goals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Gulf War was a war in defence of the collective interests of the west, not of ideologies.

The dilemma for the postmodern states in its relations with the modern and pre-modern states I have described poses several problems. Firstly, among the postmodern states the rule of law and open cooperation on security is the norm. Secondly, when dealing with states in the modern world a more robust set of options come to the fore: the use of force can not be ruled out, for those who live in a world with set s of values from the eighteenth century.

Coopers advice for the postmodern states is that they should not forget that even though their neighbours are friendly and law-abiding, other laws apply in other places. This is problematic, since it means that the postmodern states must apply a sort of double standard in its dealings with the outside world. The temptation to neglect both the physical and psychological defences is real and represents one danger for the postmodern states.

### **Security and the premodern world**

A rational analysis of how to deal with the states in the premodern world would lead to the conclusion not to get involved at all. An intervention in a zone of chaos could become unsustainable, either because it will be prolonged and expensive or, if it is unsuccessful and therefore it damaging to the government that ordered it.

For the postmodern states, such rational doctrines are not sufficient. In the postmodern state, foreign policy is driven by domestic politics. Media and moral sentiment will be important factors in determining whether to take part or not in interventions in the pre-modern world.

In an intervention in a pre-modern state, Carl Von Clausewitz' dictum still applies; war is the continuation of politics with other means. From this follows that a military intervention can not be seen as separate from a parallel political proces to solve the conflict.

The postmodern states must accept that intervention in the premodern chaos will be a fact of life. Four requirements can contribute to make these interventions less dangerous and more sustainable;

- clear and limited objectives,
- limited resources,
- a political process attached to the military operation,
- a decision taken in advance to withdraw if objectives cannot be achieved.

This is in condensed form what Coopers analysis tells us.

But how will interventions from postmodern states then be conducted? As I said earlier, the postmodern societies are increasingly centred on the individual. Military organisations in all countries reflect the values of their own societies. Thus, the values in these societies indicate that it will probably be more difficult than before to find the right people with the right motivation to take part in the operations, which will take place mainly in the pre-modern states that have collapsed into chaos. For a government that wants to be re-elected to explain to the public why these operations should be conducted, is increasingly difficult.

And what happens when an army from a postmodern society, with its setup of values and rules, intervenes in a premodern, more or less collapsed society with a very different ethos? The armed structures there may not play according to same rules as the intervening force. What then? We have already seen in Somalia how such an operation can develop. The forces there were withdrawn after what was considered unacceptable losses in relation to the stated objectives.

It is also possible that the intervening force overreacts and in itself contributes to prolong and aggravate the conflict it came to help solve. The Israeli strategist Martin van Creveld has stated that the opposing forces in this type of conflicts as time passes, tend to become more and more alike in their modus operandi. If so, what happens when a force under stress and confusion overreacts and use too much force? It may "solve" the immediate problem but contribute to failure on the strategic level.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

These are complicated questions, but I believe that those are often the most relevant to ask. Indeed, we have to ask them even if they are difficult and the answers may be uncomfortable. I would appreciate your views on these complicated questions.

Thank You.

## Pär Eriksson: The European Crisis Management Capability

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity to talk about the European crisis management capability. I will focus on where the ESDP project stands today, summer 2001, and what the major remaining challenges are.

### **EU Crisis Management Capability**

The question of a military dimension to the European Union has been on and off the table for at least three decades. However, it was not until the Franco-British bilateral summit in Saint Malo, in December 1998, that an agreement could be reached that was acceptable for transatlantic countries like Britain as well as “eurocentrics” like France and the non-aligned countries like Sweden. While Britain for the first time accepted that the Union could have a “capacity for autonomous action”, France accepted an important role for NATO. Furthermore, it was agreed that this was not a common European defence but a capacity for crisis management only.

In a series of subsequent decisions the capability has been further elaborated. Militarily, it will focus on the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peace enforcement). By 2003 the Union should be able to send out 60 000 soldiers plus “necessary” air and naval forces on operations lasting at least one year.

One of the advantages that the EU has concerning crisis management is that it, apart from the military instrument, has economic and political instruments as well. Furthermore, the EU Member States have considerable civilian crisis management resources as well, such as rescue services, legal experts, civil administrators and police. Pools of these experts have been formed. For instance, the Union will be able to send out 5 000 police officers on operations.

A number of new institutions have also been set up within the EU. The most important one is the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which, under the Council, has the overall responsibility for crisis management issues within the Union. Furthermore, a EU Military Committee has been created, consisting of the Chiefs of staffs of the Member States, together with a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management consisting of Ambassadors. Finally a EU Military Staff, consisting of about 120 officers, has been formed in Brussels.

The development of this new crisis management capability has been remarkably fast for the usually slow Union. However, several serious obstacles still remain and need to be handled before the capability is really fully operational. Few believe that all of these obstacles will be overcome until the end of 2003. Hence, a more realistic view is that the force might be fully operational by the end of this decade.

In the next few minutes I will discuss some of these remaining obstacles.

### **The Union’s weak credibility as a crisis manager**

The European states have a weak track record as crisis managers after the operations in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The countries disagreed on issues ranging from the strategic goals of the intervention down to the tactical/operational conduct of operations.

As a result of this there will probably exist some doubts regarding the will and persistence of the European Union member states. Will they really be able to act in a unified way in times of pressure? The parties to a conflict might be inclined to test the will and ability of the Union. Hence, it could be useful to ask oneself why parties to a conflict would like to have the EU as the guarantor of their peace agreement? In many cases, the simple answer might very well be “those parties that would like to have a peacekeeper that they believe they can control and manipulate”.

However, although the problems mentioned above are very much real there are also positive trends. For instance, the enormous amount of political prestige that has been invested in EU crisis management means that it would be very hard to accept anything else than a success. Furthermore, the new crisis management institutions within the EU bureaucracy will probably help achieving necessary consensus in the decision making.

### **The purpose of the EU crisis management capability**

As I said earlier, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is about crisis management, not about collective defence. However, EU membership in itself of course has security implications. It is for instance very difficult to imagine one state being attacked without the other member states reacting. On the other hand, this has less to do with the ESDP and more with the political and economical ties developed between the member states.

To discuss the more exact purpose of the ESDP has, however, been very difficult. The EU member states have different interpretations of terms like crisis management and Petersberg tasks. Some regard peace support operations such as SFOR and KFOR as the upper limit in the so-called Petersberg spectrum. Others would include operations such as the Kosovo air campaign.

These difficulties to discuss the purpose of ESDP should not, however, be taken as a sign of any hidden agenda. Rather, it is quite a typical way of handling differences within the EU: “If you do not agree, do not discuss it.”

### **Deficiencies in the military capability**

The EU member states have committed some 100 000 soldiers together with 100 ships and 400 aircraft to the EU force pool. However, it still remains to be seen if the member states will actually be able to deliver this. In many cases the contribution made is made up by a number of excluding options: “Either the mechanised brigade or the airborne brigade.”

Furthermore, the pool of forces needs to be considerably larger than the largest operation. First of all, it will still be a national decision whether or not to participate in a specific operation. In some cases one or several states will chose not to participate. Another aspect is that since every operation is unique, the force pool must consist a mix of forces to be able to respond to a wide spectrum of crises. Finally, the EU needs to have an escalatory potential – parties to a conflict must know that if they try to challenge the EU force there will be a distinct response. With such a potential the inclination of parties to “test” the EU would probably decrease considerably.

Among the military capability deficiencies, the most troublesome ones are probably the so-called strategic capabilities such as strategic intelligence, strategic transport and command

and control (C<sup>2</sup>). However, also deficiencies in operational/tactical capabilities such as suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) and precision engagement ammunition are problematic to say the least and could hamper the EU capability to carry out operations in a safe and efficient manner.

### **EU and NATO – Autonomy or Dependence?**

As was noted above, the EU member states early on decided that the EU would, when necessary, use NATO resources. Among those resources identified are the most important ones probably planning and C<sup>2</sup> capabilities.

However, there is a tension between the EU need for NATO resources and the non-EU NATO states demand for influence over future EU crisis management operations. Although few EU member states accept any decrease in EU decision-making autonomy, there are some differences in how this autonomy is viewed. For some countries, like France, autonomy means that the EU decides to act when it feels that it has to, regardless of what any other organisation thinks. For others, like the UK, the wording in official documents that the EU only will act in cases where “NATO as a whole is not engaged” means that in all practical aspects NATO will have a kind of “right of first refusal”.

Furthermore, there is slight contradiction in US policy: While repeatedly calling for Europe to take on a greater responsibility regarding security matters – not the least by increasing the European military capability – the US at the same time shows little will to let European influence on these matters increase. In a speech by the then Foreign Secretary of the United States, Madeleine Albright, the US prerequisites for supporting ESDP was summed up as the “three D:s”: No decoupling (meaning that ESDP must not effect NATO cohesion negatively), no discrimination (meaning that ESDP must not mean that non-EU NATO members are cut out) and no duplication (meaning that the EU should not develop structures like C<sup>2</sup> systems that already exist inside NATO).

The Turkish position is especially problematic among the non-EU NATO states. The country is afraid that ESDP will be used against them, for instance in Cyprus, and that they will be left outside of an important future forum for European security. Hence, they have been very reluctant to accept ESDP and as a consequence are blocking any agreement that means that the EU would have any automatic access to NATO resources such as planning and C<sup>2</sup>.

However, resistance exist also inside the Union. Greece, for instance, does not want any agreement that means concessions to the Turks. France, on her side, does not really want any agreement at all that would mean EU dependence on NATO resources.

These differences may seem somewhat odd since 11 of the EU member states are also members of NATO. It is not a too wild guess that in times of crisis some kind of pragmatic solution would be reached. Still, this could take time and time is normally very scarce in a crisis situation.

### **ESDP and non-EU states**

ESDP is trying to be an open and transparent project, and other countries are invited to participate in EU operations. However, the EU decision-making autonomy is not negotiable. In a crisis situation non-EU states will not be invited to formally participate until EU policy has been formed. This would be fairly similar to the situation in NATO today.

In the work of including non-EU countries in the ESDP project, priority has so far been given to non-EU NATO members and EU candidate states. However, Russia is identified as an especially important partner for peace and stability in and around Europe. This calls for modalities for co-operation being worked out, but this will probably not be done until similar modalities have been agreed with NATO and its member states. This should not be seen as negligence of Russia but rather as a result of political and military realities. In the current forming phase of ESDP and the crisis management capability, EU needs NATO and the NATO resources more than it needs Russia and Russian resources. Once the EU-NATO question is solved, the relationship with Russia will most certainly be a priority issue. It is hard to see how the EU would be able to carry out any complex operation without such a relationship.

### **Sweden's new role**

Sweden has welcomed the development of the EU crisis management capability and been a strong proponent for the progress, not least during the Swedish EU presidency. Even if the civilian side of crisis management has been an especially important to Sweden – to some extent as a result of other states not giving priority to this vital area – the military side has not been downplayed. The EU presidency also meant that Sweden for the first time chaired important institutions in the European security and defence system.

However, Sweden is still non-aligned even if, as I said earlier, the EU membership definitely has security implications. From a Swedish standpoint non-alignment is defined in quite a “legalistic” manner: Sweden is non-aligned as long as Sweden does not give or take formal security guaranties. Although this definition could be discussed – personally I believe that it does not give credit enough to the kind of security bonds that are developed within an organisation like the EU – it does, if used, allow Sweden to declare itself still non-aligned.

The EU membership and ESDP means the opportunity for Sweden to be able to participate in and influence important security decisions and to be a part of a greater security context. However, ESDP also means responsibilities. Sweden will have to participate in future operations with resources roughly proportional to the size of the country. It will be difficult to opt out of operations, at least if the opting out has to do with risk or costs. Every country will have to pull its weight in the long run. Although the current Swedish contribution to the force pool is a considerable step forward – all in all about 2 000 soldiers from all branches – it is still somewhat low compared to the Swedish part of the EU overall GDP. As a researcher I believe that in the long run the Swedish numbers will have to be increased. If and when that happens it will probably have a deep impact on Swedish security and defence policy as well as on Swedish military structures.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to talk to you on the subject of European crisis management. I will of course be prepared to try to answer your questions.

## Colonel Koltiukov: Military Conflicts of the XXI Century – From Global Confrontation to Local Conflicts and Terrorist Wars<sup>4</sup>

Ladies and gentlemen, Dear Sirs!

Let me express my gratitude for the opportunity to share my opinions here with you today.

In my presentation I would like to express some of my views on the character change of wars and armed conflicts in the XXI century.

As it seems we have stepped into a complicated period of the World history full of contradictions. It is a period characterized, first of all, by expectation of big changes. The situation in the World and in its main regions will be formed up under an extremely complicated process mainly based on the revision of the whole system of the international relations and on forming of a new World order. It will be a long, dynamic, extremely insatiable and tense process. We can see a tendency of a sharp polarization of the World's powers. The existing unipolar World, headed by the United States, it seems, will not suite a number of European states, and countries such as China, Japan and the Islamic World. Each of these poles, I mean the centers of power, have its own goals, its personal views on means and ways to reach their goals. This fact creates prerequisites for the emergence of seats of tension, capable to transform into military conflicts.

A composite intercrossing of the political and diplomatic, socio-political, economic, informational and military means, aimed at reaching purely political goals has started to constitute the main peculiarity of the inter-state confrontation and wars in the XXI century.

Political and diplomatic, economic and informational forms of, mildly speaking, competition, have started to acquire a more targeted and coordinated character and have enlarged their scales. They are mainly aimed at situation destabilization in other countries including inspiration of internal disturbances, riots and acts of terrorism.

The extremely deepened informational confrontation, piercing through all, starting from the diplomatic, economic and up to the military fight of the confrontation forms, never the less has a rather independent character. The information struggle prepares and accompanies political and diplomatic and military actions as well. Information and information technologies have started to become a more and more effective weapon.

However, under the circumstances of the new forms of confrontation increase, the validity of the military force still remains. Life teaches, that nobody wants to account to the opinion of the weak ones. Military force gives more weight to political, diplomatic and economic actions. The Armed forces bolster and support an economic blockade and other forcible actions.

From the point of view of military politics, war is the last argument to resolve a problem. But, a country will not unleash a war if it has some other means and ways to reach its goals.

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<sup>4</sup> This presentation was given at the FOI seminar *The Character of Future Conflicts: Pre-conflict and Conflict Dynamics* in Stockholm on 15-16 October 2001 (cf footnote 2). It does not completely correspond with the abstract of colonel Koltiukov's original September presentation made in Moscow that was included in the main body of the text.

Wars, as a continuation of politics by forcible means, differ from one another, first of all by the political goals, which are the prime aim of the confronting parties. The political goals in many ways form up the strategic pattern of a war.

The analysis of the former wars witnesses that they had been mainly stick to the general political war line, which is to force the enemy to except the aggressor's conditions.

During the centuries long this goal was obtained by waging of a total war envisaging a subsequent settlement of strategic tasks, the main of which was inflicting the defeat to the enemy's military power and depriving it of the means to continue the war. The final goal used to be the seizure of the enemy's territory.

The idea of a total war reached its peak during the global confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However, in our opinion, the global changes that have taken place in the World, make the very idea of the total war, at least for the Western developed countries, unacceptable. I shall try to explain why!

On the one hand, more powerful and effective means of armed struggle call up an opportunity of setting the most resolute political and strategic goals. On the other hand, the devastating consequences of application of the present day armament, mark certain limits for both sides and put border lines for political and military and strategical aspirations.

Firstly, the possibility of destruction even by conventional weapons of the key objects of economics and infrasructure of the leading states (such as nuclear, hydro and heat electrical power plants, dams, main bridges, high-technology, including chemical, industrial enterprises) makes to revalue from new positions the risk of the war with a state having modern and up to date Armed Forces. Secondly, in democracy-oriented states any protracted war with huge man and material losses, decreases the customary life-level of the population and automatically leads to the resignation of the government, which started the war.

If the war is a continuation of the politics, it must take into the account the post-war interests of the state. A state, which completely exhausts itself during the war, makes its post-war policy untenable. These and other factors have induced the developed democratic states to revise their positions pertaining to the use of military force, to change the armed struggle methods and have forced more careful and precise determining of the political goals of the war.

Along with this, it would be rather careless not to take into consideration that in the not industrially developed states, having a different form of government, approaches to the determining of political goals of the war have not changed. In such countries the life of a human has not acquired such value like in the developed Western countries. There is still a dream about the new political World re-division, about new territories and living space.

So, the extremely increased, during the last century, might and power of the armaments resulted in tremendous losses in population and economics. The emergence of weapons of mass destruction, regarding to the negative ecological and other consequences, has put the possibility to use the victory results under the great doubt.

From the very point derives and takes its further development the idea of international crisis management. The main aim of the management is to force the enemy or the opponent to ac-



cept (which is traditional) the enforced conditions, while excluding significant losses in manpower and materiel. This goal determines the frameworks of the force application in the following main parameters:

- limitation of the war theatre in space which means the boundaries of the state-victim of aggression;
- limitation of the armed struggle in physical spheres -fight in the air and the space and its projection on the ground targets;
- limitation of the means of the armed struggle - prevention from the use of nuclear and other kinds of the mass destruction weapons.

As a whole we can see that the essence of the military crises management in a military-technical aspect means to dictate on an opponent such means and forms of a struggle as well as an employment of such a power where an active side has a clear advantage.

Strategic goals and tasks of a war, forms and methods of conducting a war, i.e. main features of a war character, began to transform under the influence of these and other factors. What principal tendencies of this process should we discuss?

First, the ambition to eliminate an enemy physically and totally has been transformed into an aim to eliminate its vital objects and make principal state institutions as well as the armed forces' groupings unable to function in an organized manner. Second, direct contact of fighting troops began to be replaced with a fire contact at long distances. Struggle at a distance began to prevail and "long distance destruction" has generally increased which, in its turn, results in a fact that clear division between "rear" and "front" meanings start to disappear. Third, information influence starts to acquire an exclusive role together with coercion onto population and military forces. Here we speak also about technical-information influence aimed mainly against troops and weapons control systems. And we also speak about psychological influence aimed against armed forces personnel as well as population. Fourth, general purpose of a war – compulsion of political leadership of a country-victim to accept conditions imposed by aggressor – is more and more often achieved not only by direct use of a military force.

Indirect actions strategy has begun to be employed much more actively with characteristic political-diplomatic and financial-economic pressure, information influence, international law and economic sanctions, subversive activities of special operations forces supported with a demonstration of a military force and readiness to use it.

Military force is directly used if the above-mentioned combination of means and efforts do not bring the results expected. A country-victim of aggression political leadership's and population's will for resistance is crushed by undermining vital forces when key management and control objects as well as main energy and industrial installations are destroyed with simultaneous efforts to suggest both this country's people and a world public a thought of the present leadership incapability to effectively govern a state.

What are the results of the above-mentioned tendencies development? Where do they lead to and what do we have to take into account?

Mass armies, intended for the conduct of the classic large-scale operations on the continental theaters of war have started to lose their actuality. They have started to be substituted by armies having priority in the Armed forces' new branches, equipped with the long-range weaponry, integrated into information and guiding systems and capable of inflicting damage to the enemy practically along its whole territory in the real time and with high accuracy.

It is obvious that the main effort in the armed struggle has been shifted to the air-space sphere, and partially to the sea. That is because the present day branches of the Armed forces can act, mainly, in these spheres.

The course and the outcome of the armed struggle and war in general is determined by a settlement of a strategic task which is to gain air superiority, or at least depriving the enemy from such an opportunity.

In our opinion, combat armament super-systems (belonging to the regional groupings and the Armed forces in general), created on the basis of integration of the existing and perspective reconnaissance and troops (forces) control means, on the precise target acquisition, fire and radioelectronic suppression means will create the material and technical basis for new types of wars. So, the war becomes a "super technological", informational and atomized, and in such conditions each soldier must be equipped with the newest combat means and properly trained how to use them.

Those were the general tendencies of evolution of the war character of the post-industrial epoch and their probable consequences. But there are some other and still valid factors of interest in the nearest future.

The analysis of military conflicts of the passed decades gives the grounds to state that:

- Firstly, not all countries are capable of waging such kind of wars. First of these are only those countries which have the space reconnaissance, communication and navigation systems, up to date industrial capacities, high technologies, capable of providing the mass production of the highly precise strategic systems of armament.
- Secondly, such countries as the USA and the NATO countries in general, from the military point of view, are still capable of waging such wars with the states only having the middle or lower development level and having compact if we can say so "Shoot through" territories.

These very circumstances give the grounds to make a conclusion about the probability of local conflicts and wars and their further escalation in the nearest future.

Making such a conclusion, I would like to stress the following: In modern conditions the notion "World war" has practically lost its meaning. A new notion such "the large scale war" has appeared. Notions such as regional, local war and an armed conflict started to be frequently used. In our opinion a regional war means participation of two or several states in a war waged within one region with the interest of countries, situated in the region. A local war is a war, which is smaller in scale than the regional one.

From the theoretical point of view, such notions may be accepted. The problem is the fact that in this way we may classify wars, which may emerge in any place of the World, and may be accepted by countries planning to wage war outside their territories. For a war waged by the native state, it seems necessary to use a different approach. For example the war between Iran and Iraq, from a foreign point of view, was a local war. But both of these states had to wage it with full tension of political and military potential. For them that was the large-scale war.

Now I would like to say a few words about a new phenomenon in the practice of interstate confrontation, i.e. the terrorist wars. Analysis of the World terrorist activities brings us to a conclusion that: All most all terrorist organizations are products of special secret services which have been taken care for a long time and used as a tool of interstate struggle. The leadership in such organization was executed, in most of the cases, indirectly by means of non-governmental organizations.

At present terrorism has possessed a new quality and has become a tool of global politics. States, which recently, in one form or another, supported terrorism in the territories of their enemies, now have to condemn it.

Formation of global and regional coordination centers, preparing terrorist operations and providing liaison for separate groups and direct executors of an action is one of the peculiar features of the present day terrorism. The executor may be of different religious belief which does not attribute his belonging to a certain state or a religious movement.

To fix the presence in a state terrorists seek for a political asylum. Terrorism infiltrates into social, state, political, economic, and power structures. The agents infiltrated into power structures provide creation of a net of training centers or bases, arrange ammunition and weapon depots, firms and companies, and create funds to finance operations. For the financial support drug trafficking and arms trade are widely used.

There is a tendency of the transformation of separate terrorist acts to the large-scale actions that in its turn started to possess a form of diversion-terrorist wars. During such wars informational and psychological methods of suppression, including creation of the total fear atmosphere, inspiration of anti governmental motions is widely used.

- New features of terrorism were clearly seen during the preparation and carrying out of the terrorist acts in the USA. These are:
- A very high planning level;
- The highest level of the synchronization of the actions;
- Previously organized ply on the market of assets before the devaluation;
- Demonstrative character of the terrorist acts (the destruction of the symbol of the world banking system);
- A very detailed informational support (videocameras were installed beforehand, even the plane crash with the World Trade Center was shown) etc.

So, the terrorist acts in the USA on the 11th of September can be attributed as the global provocation, which is a part of managed crisis concept. In the past such processes were managed by the states and coalitions of states, that had to follow norms of the international law and take into consideration the world public opinion, now we can see the attempt of powerful

and mighty non governmental structures to interfere into the world politics, which don't obey any common rules and norms and act outside the frames of the World Community.

If the World Community does not realize how serious is the danger, and will not take decisive measures to destroy the international terrorism in the root, the World will enter the new epoch - the epoch of terrorist wars.

In conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability of the development of military and political situation each state tries to provide its security and protect itself from the possible threats by means of increasing the military potential. But such reaction on the threats means the beginning of a new stage of global confrontation. Russia follows the course of peace. So we consider it will be expedient to avoid this confrontation and to achieve the peaceful discussion of all conflict matters at the negotiation table under the UN, OSCE and European Union auspices.

Thank You for the attention!

## Elisabeth André Turlind: The Character of Future Conflicts

My name is Elisabeth André Turlind and I am the head of the department of Military Operational Research at the division of Defence Analysis.

At Swedish Defence Research Agency I have been the head of the OR-group working with the Navy and I am now the head of the department of Military Operational Research at the division of Defence Analysis

Our customers are mainly the Armed Forces but also include the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs, National Defence College, the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency planning and other parts of FOI.

At the moment there are more than 50 people (altogether) between the ages of 25 and 65 working with OR. Our academic backgrounds vary from Bachelor of Science, Master of Science or Engineering to Doctor of Science or Engineering.

The operational research groups work in close co-operation with military officers in an "in-house system", which means that they are actually situated with the client. This way of working seems to be rather unique with more advantages than disadvantages. Each OR-group consists of 1 - 6 researchers (and they are situated at the Joint Military Headquarters in Stockholm, at the Centres for the Army, Navy and Airforce, Aeronautical Research Institute and the Ministry of Defence).

The OR-groups objectives are:

- To be able to identify, structure and formulate problems and have the knowledge and skill to apply solutions. By this I mean different methods and models.
- To make analysis based on techniques, tactics, financial frameworks, organisational aspects and security policy
- To be oriented in relevant military facts, the client and the nature of his problem
- To handle uncertainties

The OR-groups help the military decision makers to take the right decisions. The work is primarily focused on long term planning of military defence, but also to some extent on studies of today's forces, for example the development of tactics for the Navy. The long-term studies consist of structure studies - from military defence structures to unit compositions - for example submarines or aeroplanes. We make analyses, evaluations, simulations, war games, computer models and so on.

FOI has a job rotation system. This solves the problem of becoming too familiar with the client. The new researcher starts with one year "at home" so to speak, learning the environment. Then follow periods spent with OR-groups at different military staff units. A cycle of two to four years at each place is usually the optimum.

I would also like to mention that we have a rather large training program, which will take up 10-20 % of the new analysts time.

Typically, the OR-groups work at tactical, operative or strategic level, together with officers to form study groups. A major aspect of their work is based upon information provided by the Military Intelligence, concerning threat scenarios. But what is the underlying factors leading to these scenarios? Since the answer is not self-evident, we set up a project called “The character of future conflicts”.

We are trying to learn about the mechanisms behind conflicts, the circumstances under which conflicts arise and where they start. Do factors such as ethnic race, raw materials (oil, minerals, precious stones), water, geography and religion constitute the underlying causes – or is it simply a question of money? Where can we find the actors? Who are they? Can they be characterised into groups? Are there any links between them – apparent or concealed? Is it possible to simulate this kind of problem using a computer model in order to see if any patterns emerge?

In the future it will be more and more rare that there is a war between nations. The struggle will be between different groups or organisations and they are hitting the target by small vehicles with advanced technology.

When focusing on organisations, which may constitute a serious threat to nations, we find that they mainly consist of organisations capable of acting globally or alternatively co-operating or gaining support from trans-national networks. This co-operation yields economic viability and provides access to competence and technology.

If instead focusing on the conflicts themselves, in which violence or threat of violence exists, it is found that the assault to a high, and probably rising, degree may come from within the society itself. This is true when a criminal organisation tries to take over the legal institutions in a state, when a warlord takes control over economical means within a state, when a fundamentalistic religious movement tries to transform a secular state into a theocracy and when a state utilises asymmetrical warfare and carry out anonymous assaults on other states.

The development and spread of technology expected to occur over the next ten years can benefit the above-mentioned actors in different ways. A criminal organisation using a government as a facade can use technology as a means for strategic deterrence. Should a state choose to openly attack the trans national criminal organisations home base, the organisation can retaliate by striking out against the aggressor’s infrastructure and selected individuals. A state can use technology both as a means of deterrence and to carry out anonymous assaults with a view to weakening competing states and companies.

A fundamentalist religious movement can use technology in order to bring about a state in shock in the initial stages of a holy war aiming at wiping out a culture. In this case the technology paves the way for an on-going struggle, which can continue on a much lower level technologically.

All in all, this indicates that the security of economically developed states can, to a lesser degree than previously, be based on traditionally military defence. It also points out the significance of interstate and international alliance, but with the important proviso, that the choice of ally must be made with great discernment.

## Jan Foghelin: Information Operations (IO)

*Information Warfare (IW)* and *Information Operations (IO)* are terms, which are often used without a clear definition. They are used over a wide area covering more technical aspects of military warfare to a partly new type of strategic warfare (Figure 1). The following comments deals with the latter interpretation (Figure 2).

Potentially IO could be a threat to many important functions in many countries. It is important to be aware of this threat to be able to take countermeasures.

It is possible to disturb IT (information technology) systems from very long distances. In this respect the threat is global. Important disturbances could also be carried out without a big organization. Non-state actors as well as state actors could launch IO attacks.

It has now and then been said that more advanced IT countries have an automatic advantage in offensive IO. It is not necessarily so. Competence in IT is not the only competence needed to pursue an IO successfully. The defence is also important. A country dependent on many and complex IT systems could be more vulnerable than countries, which do not depend on the function of their IT system.

International cooperation against potential IT threats is important and necessary. Cooperation must include private companies. UN is probably not the best forum for co-operation.

A strategic IO attack could be problematic for a country or an organization. There are however, important differences relative to WMD concerning types of effect (killed people versus costs etc). Even if IO could have serious consequences we must be careful with parallels to WMD.







Sergey Griniaev: The Information Component of Crisis Management







## **Appendix 3: About the Center for Military Strategic Studies**



## Appendix 4: About the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

**FOI is an assignment-based authority** under the Ministry of Defence. It has more than 1200 employees, of whom around 850 are university educated research scientist, and is one of the leading institutes in Europe for applied research. Its annual turnover is around one billion Swedish kronor (100 million Euro). **FOI's largest clients** are the Swedish Armed Forces, the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and the Ministry of Defence. Together they account for over 80 per cent of FOI's assignments. Other major clients are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which FOI provides expert support for example on disarmament issues, the Agency for Civil Emergency Planning and the defence industry.

FOI consists of seven research divisions, directorate and staff, as well as a common administrative unit. The divisions are:

- Aeronautics FFA
- C2 Systems
- Defence Analysis
- NBC Defence
- Systems Technology
- Sensor Technology
- Weapons and Protection

**FOIs research is undertaken in nine different areas:**

### **1. Defence and security policy**

Provision of material as a basis for decisions by the Government Offices, for example defence and security policy analysis of the world at large, analysis of threats and risks to society and assessments of the adaptability of the Armed Forces.

### **2. Operational analysis, modelling and simulation**

Support for the longterm planning of the defence organisation. The work comprises direct support to the Armed Forces in the form of operational analysis groups, and analyses of future threats as well as the development of scenarios and data on which to base appraisals. Tools for modelling and simulation are also developed.

### **3. Weapons of mass destruction**

Studies of threats from and protection against weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological and chemical. An important task is to provide scientific foundations for disarmament negotiations and provide knowledge as support for international operations.

### **4. Surveillance, command and control**

Information is of the utmost importance to national and international security. In order to be able to detect, locate and identify camouflaged threats, FOI carries out research, development and appraisal on radar, microwave technology, laser and IR. Sensors for use under water have been a Swedish niche since the submarine incidents of the 1980s. Expertise in laser, hydroacoustics and very-low-frequency electrical fields is the basis for future sensor systems under water. This area also includes research on command and control, sensor technology and communications. Modern sensor systems are linked together in networks similar to the Internet, which has led to increased research activities in sensors and data fusion.

### **5. Combat**

Research on the characteristics of a number of different weapon systems and protection against them. An important area is the development of explosives, for both warheads and propulsion, as well as the development of protection. Another application is mine detection and methods of mine destruction.

### **6. Electronic warfare**

Electronic warfare is an important element in future types of conflict. The research is aimed at improving the capability of the defence and destroying the capability of the adversary with respect to jamming, deception, detection and location. This includes research on electromagnetic weapons, i.e. laser weapons and weapons that use high-power microwave radiation (HPM), as well as protection against such weapons.

### **7. Vehicles**

The research relates to vehicles on land, vessels on and beneath the surface of the sea and aircraft. An important area concerns unmanned vehicles. Aeronautics accounts for the majority of activities. FOIs wind tunnels for aerodynamic experiments are an important resource here.

### **8. Man in the defence organisation**

This area contains both research on interaction between man and technical systems and specialised fields such as war medicine and naval and aviation medicine.

### **9. Civil applications**

Much of FOIs research has civil applications, for example in the fire service or other rescue services and in civil emergency planning. This area also includes research on the environmental impact of defence systems.

For more information see FOI's Internet homepage <http://www.foi.se>.