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Reflections on Operational Analysis in exercise COJA 03

Defence Analysis
SE-172 90 Stockholm

SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY

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Henrik Moberg	Henrik Moberg
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Report title

Reflections on Operational Analysis in exercise COJA 03

Abstract (not more than 200 words)

Co-operative Jaguar 2003 (COJA 03) was held at Karup Air Station in Denmark from the 24 March to the 4 April 2003. COJA 03 was a NATO/PfP Joint Combined Command Post Exercise (CPX).

Sweden had 29 posts in the exercise including one civilian post in the OA-cell. The OA-cell in COJA 03 was organised as a part of the Command Group (CG), and so responsible to the Commander but was responsive and managed by the Chief of Staff (COS).

The nature of many of the OA tasks makes it difficult to fit them in an exercise environment. Many tasks are progressive and would in a real mission be going on for a long time, e.g. data collecting and statistical surveys. In this respect the OA-cell should concentrate more on how to approach a problem, than to give a complete solution.

This report focuses on the OA-cell in COJA 03. The first chapter gives a brief introduction to the exercise and the scenario. The report will then focus on the work in the OA-cell, and give some examples to problems and solutions. In the conclusions there are some reflections made during the exercise by the author.

Keywords

operational analysis, operations research, CJTF, exercise, CPX, OA, OR, NATO, PfP

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Henrik Moberg	Henrik Moberg
	Godkänd av Elisabeth André-Turlind
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Rapportens titel (i översättning)

Reflektioner på operationsanalys under övning COJA 03

Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord)

Co-operative Jaguar 2003 (COJA 03) hölls vid Karups flygbas i Danmark mellan den 24 mars och 4 april 2003. COJA 03 var en Nato/Pff stabsövning.

Sverige hade 29 platser i övningen, varav en plats i OA-gruppen. OA-gruppen var en enhet i stabsledningen, och därmed direkt ansvarig inför befälhavaren, men svarade och lydde under stabschefen.

Typen på flera OA-uppgifter gör att det är svårt att passa in dem i en övning. Många uppgifter löper över tiden och skulle i en riktigt operation lösas under lång tid, t.ex. datainsamling och statistiska undersökningar. I detta avseende bör OA-gruppen under en övning mer koncentrera sig på hur ett problem bör lösas, än att fullt ut lösa uppgiften.

Denna rapport fokuserar på OA-gruppen i COJA 03. Det första kapitlet ger en kort beskrivning av övningen och scenariot. Sedan beskrivs hur OA-gruppen arbetade, med exempel på hur vissa problem löstes. Sist ges några reflektioner på operationsanalys under en övning.

Nyckelord

operationsanalys, OA, övning, CJTF, NATO, Pff, FOI i fält

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1 Introduction

Co-operative Jaguar 2003 (COJA 03) was held at Karup Air Station in Denmark from the 24 March to the 4 April 2003. COJA 03 was a NATO/PfP Joint Combined Command Post Exercise (CPX). Initially planned as a live exercise, the exercise shifted to a CPX due to manning and force contribution problems.

Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) was CINCNORTH, Officer Conducting the Exercise was COMJCNE and Exercise Director was COMJCNE.

The nations represented in the exercise were Azerbaijan, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the USA.

Sweden had 29 posts in the exercise including one civilian post in the operations analysis (OA) cell. The opportunity to participate with a Swedish OA specialist was courtesy of the flexible planning procedures, and a direct answer to a request from Swedish Joint Forces Command.

This report focuses on the OA-cell in COJA 03. The first chapter gives a brief introduction to the exercise and the scenario. The report will then focus on the work in the OA-cell, and give some examples to problems and solutions. In the conclusions there are some reflections made during the exercise by the author.

2 Background COJA 03

The overall aim of the exercise was:

> "To further develop the interoperability between Partner Nations and NATO in the conduct of a NATO led Combined Joint Crisis Response Operation (CRO) and to enhance military interoperability of forces by training commanders and staffs in the procedures required to conduct a NATO led Combined Joint CRO employing forces with different equipment, organisation and doctrine."

The exercise was designed to provide training opportunities at two levels of command, namely at the Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ and Land Component Command (LCC) HQ. The primary training audience was NATO and PfP commanders and staffs, operating within the multi-national JTF HQ and LCC. COJA 03 was the first NATO/PfP exercise to train the operational and tactical level under a CJTF concept at the same time.

The core of the multi-national JTF HQ was comprised of personnel from JHQ NE, augmented by PfP and NATO staffs. The multi-national JTF HQ numbered approximately 250 people. The LCC was mainly staffed by personnel from Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group augmented by PfP and NATO staffs. The LCC HQ numbered approximately 120 people.
The primary training audience was supported through the Distaff with response cells (RCs). The ambition was that the primary training audience should have a seamless

interaction with all functions or roles, just like in a real peace support operation (PSO). Nearly every function in the LCC and JTF HQ had matching RCs (or functions). The primary training audience could interact both up and down in the chain of command as well as with international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for example. The structure of the exercise and the interactions are shown in picture 1 and 2.



Figure 1) The structure of how the Distaff and the Training audience interacted. (From COJA03 presentation)



Figure 2) The Training audience of the JTFHQ and LCC and the response cells (RC's) and other Distaff functions. (From COJA03 presentation)

2.1 COJA 03 Scenario

COJA 03 was designed to train Commanders and Personnel in a Multi-National Peace Support environment. The following text is an abstract from the Exercise Specification dated 25 July 2002.

The protagonists are Norland, Ostland, Sudland and Wetland. Norland, Ostland and Wetland have large ethnic Sudeter communities, or Telemarkers, living in the tri-border (Telemark) area between the three countries. However, the Telemarkers have never been accepted nor integrated into the national infrastructures of the three countries.

A hard militant core, the Telemark Liberation Army (TLA), has formed and claimed responsibility for terrorist style attacks on both the Norland and Ostland capitals. The Political wing of TLA, the "Telemark Unity Party" (TUP), has actively campaigned throughout the international forum on behalf of the ethnic Sudeters and gained sympathetic support from many of the more liberal countries.

Norland forces have regularly crossed into Ostland and Wetland in pursuit of TLA activists. This has resulted in skirmishes with Ostland troops causing casualties on both sides.

During November 2002 Norland troops crossed the border into Ostland and failed to withdraw. Sudland, under the pretext of protecting the ethnic Sudeter (Telemarker) population, entered into a military alliance with Ostland. Sudland deployed troops into Ostland, Naval units into the Skagerrak and placed their Air Forces on immediate readiness.

Figure 3) The warring parties. (From EXPI)

Following this a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) demanded the withdrawal of Norland and Sudland into their own pre-defined territory and called for a Maritime and Air Exclusion Zone. Subsequently, the UN Special Envoy to Aravia secured a cease-fire based on a UN resolution in order to deploy a Multi-National Air, Land and Naval Peace-Keeping Force (TFOR) into the area whilst a peaceful settlement is sought.

2.2 TFOR

TFOR was, as previously mentioned, organised as a CJTF HQ, mainly with staff officers from JHQ NE, but augmented by officers from NATO as well as PfP countries. See Annex 2.

COM TFOR was tasked to:

a. Deploy a Land force within the Telemark region.
b. Establish a Maritime Force in the Maritime Exclusion Zone.
c. Provide Air superiority within the Air Exclusion Zone.
d. Assemble and disarm all Norland, Sudland and Ostland forces within the disputed Telemark region.
e. Deter aggression by Norland, Sudland and Ostland forces within the Telemark region.
f. Co-ordinate and control the withdrawal of all Norland, Sudland and Ostland forces to their peacetime locations.
g. Provide a safe and secure environment for the IO/NGOs.
h. Assist in internally displaced person (IDP) repatriation.
i. Withdraw following the re-establishment of the international borders

3 Operational Analysis team

The OA-cell in COJA 03 was organised as a part of the Command Group (CG), and thus responsible to the Commander, but was responsive and managed by the Chief of Staff (COS). The team consisted of three members and two shadow posts representing five nations (Italy, Latvia, Moldavia, Norway and Sweden). Whitin the group there was only one person who had former experience in OA.

The mission of the OA-cell during CJTF Operations is to provide timely independent scientific and analytical advice to the Commander and to assist in the decision-making processes of the CG[1].

As a member of the OA-cell you have the opportunity to follow the work at different places at the HQ, which gives an insight how the staff works. This is normal modus operandi for an OA. The CH OA followed different meetings during the exercise in order to be updated, as well as to be able to identify problem areas that could be addressed by the OA-cell.

Figure 4) The OA-team.

3.1 OA tasks

In connection with the start of the exercise the COS gave 10 progressive task to the cell:

1. Develop an international relations interaction and interest matrix, incl. interest of and options for indigenous players.
2. Collect and evaluate Host Nation domestic data on demography, economy and commerce, infrastructure and resources.
3. Conduct war gaming of Courses of Actions and provide planning support to J5 and others as required.
4. Evaluate joint interfaces with CCs, UN and CIMIC partners.
5. Evaluate efficiency and economy of effort in Logistics.
6. Evaluate TFOR staff structures and procedures.
7. Evaluate the integration of augmentees.
8. Support ad hoc staffing needs.

[1] Operational Analysis Special Staff Instruction, AFNORTH, 2003.

9. Develop Operational Reserve request and deployment decision tree and decision criteria.
10. Contribute to Lessons Learned.

In addition, four tasks were given during the exercise:

11. Analyse, and advise on, TFOR interoperability / harmonisation.
12. Review practice of establishment of Common Operational Picture (COP) and advise on improvements.
13. Research and advise on InfoOps/PsyOps impact within the Joint Operation Area (JOA).
14. Develop system of metrics to measure mission success.

3.2 Some examples of solutions

3.2.1 Research and advise on InfoOps / PsyOps impact within the JOA.

The first thing was to interview the InfoOps cell at TFOR HQ. It could be noticed that they had very well established Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) for the different programmes. The analysis is in Annex 3.

3.2.2 Review practice of establishment of COP and advise on improvements

Initially the task was analysed to establish some kind of consensus concerning what a COP actually is about. After this the team attended staff meetings to evaluate what kind of pictures that were in fact used, and to what extent various information needs were met. The report can be viewed in Annex 4.

3.2.3 Develop system of metrics to measure mission success.

The task was given to the cell on the third day of the exercise. The problem could be regarded as a classical OA task: How to benchmark a PSO? In a combat mission the measures of effectiveness are more easily distinguished, for example rate of advance or number of units lost. In a PSO the MoEs are often of a different kind.

The approach was to try to identify MoEs for the TFOR mission. Two kinds of MoEs were identified. First the ones that TFOR directly could influence, TFORs own performance. The second kind concerned how the warring parties complied with the agreements and how the conditions of the civilian population improved over time in the JOA. (It could be noted that the tasks given by the COS support the analyses of both kinds.)

To support the collection of data and to analyse the MoE, a non-compliance database was implemented in Microsoft Access. The ambition was that the OA-cell should store every incident that could have an impact on the success of the mission.

The MoEs were extracted from the TFOR OPLAN. The mission end-states and objectives from the OPLAN were broken down in different parts of the JOA as well as for different players. The estimates were then compiled with the aid from different cells in

TFOR HQ and discussed in the OA-cell. Eventually the estimates were put into an Excel spreadsheet every evening. The task is described in the slides in Annex 5 pp. 4 and 5.

4 Conclusions

The OA-cell in COJA 03 demonstrated that there is a need for an OA-cell to support the CG during a (CJTF) exercise. OA has proven its effectiveness at the Operational-Tactical level of NATO operations over the last years, and should in future exercises be a natural part of a CPX at this level. This should also be the case for national exercises in Sweden. There should be more opportunities for proper training of an OA, and not only as a part of the exercise planning or in the evaluation.

The nature of many of the OA tasks makes it difficult to fit them into an exercise environment. Many tasks are progressive and would in a real mission be going on for a long time, e.g. data collecting and statistical surveys. The focus during an exercise should be on the type of issues and on what methods that are suitable to solve them. In this respect the OA-cell should concentrate more on how to approach a problem, than on how to give a complete solution. The approach and method to solve a problem is the essential task during an exercise like COJA 03.

In the beginning there was some confusion concerning what the cell should do. This was partly due to the fact that there were no job descriptions available for the OA staff. There must be a SOP (or the like) available before the exercise starts, so that every member can indentify his or her role.

The background needed to participate as an OA in an exercise like COJA03 must be knowledge of the CJTF concept and different staff procedures. More important is however that the personnel should have experience in OA and be familiar with analysis methods and tools.

For the OA-cell to work efficiently, it is important that the COS knows how to use OA and that OA can facilitate his or her decision-making. Without proper guidelines and tasks the cell could find itself in a vacuum. However, if this should nevertheless occur, it is highly important that CH OA has a broad experience of OA and takes initiative to identify suitable tasks for the cell.

There were not any tools available to the OA cell, with the exception of Microsoft Excel and Access, which in most cases are sufficient to start with. These tools can also be used to develop models suitable for the job, but because many of the tasks in an exercise are compressed in time, it is essential that tools and models are available immediately to the OA staff. There is a lack of time to implement new tools during an ongoing exercise.

The exercise also showed the importance to have a back office function with OA augmentees. Many of the tasks in a PSO are of such nature that they are more easily solved with many information sources available, for example library resources and Internet. This, I suggest, should be taken into consideration when sending out an OA team (which I know that for example DSTL has done in the past).

The composition of the OA group should be in accordance with standard operational procedures (SOP), with a mix of personnel with different skills, though all must be familiar with OA. My experience is also that a mixture of civilians and officers facilitate and improve the work in the OA cell. The CH OA should at least be familiar with PSO and have experience in OA.

As a civilian it was a good opportunity to train and to refine the OA-skills in a "non-peace" environment. The standard role for an OA during an exercise is as a part of the planning or evaluation team.

To sum up, I encourage every OA to participate in an exercise, and I also recommend decision-makers and officers at different levels to take the opportunity to use this function as a vital contribution during an exercise.

Annex 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms

Acronym		Comment
ACC	Air Component Command	
CG	Command Group	
CH	Chief	
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation	
CINC	Commander in Chief	
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force	
CoA	Course of Action	
COJA	Co-operative Jaguar	
COM	Commander	
COP	Common Operational Picture	
COS	Chief of Staff	
CPX	Command Post Exercise	
Distaff	Directing Staff	
HQ	Headquarters	
IO	International Organisation	
J5	Joint Policy and Plans branch	
JCNE	Joint Command North East	
JHQ NE	Joint Headquarters North East	
JOA	Joint Operations Area	
LCC	Land Component Command	
LIVEX	Live Exercise	Exercise involving troops
MCC	Maritime Component Command	
MN	Multi-National	
MoE	Measure of Effectiveness	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation	
OA	Operational Analysis	
PfP	Partnership for Peace	
PSO	Peace Support Operation	
RC	Response Cell	
SOP	Standard Operational Procedures	
TFOR	Telemark Task Force	
TLA	Telemarkers Liberation Army	
TUP	Telemark Unity Party	
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution	

Annex 2: TFOR structure.



Annex 3: InfoOps/PsyOps impact

Task: Research and advise on InfoOps / PsyOps impact within the JOA.
Implied tasks: None

Task analysis

Q1: What is Impact?
Gather information and data i.e. what has been done and where? The Non-Compliance database has proven to be one effective source.

Q2: How to measure impact?
Define Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) and do analysis how they are changing, e.g. how have the mine accidents varied over time. For the MoE that cannot be measured directly, opinion polls must be conducted. This must be further investigated because it is uncertain that sufficient statistics are available. Compare different areas and target groups (demography), i.e. compare opinions over time.

Report

The analysis has first been concentrated to gather information about the different target groups, which has been conducted satisfactory by the LCC InfoOps branch and others.

The MoE have been established early in the different PsyOps programs. The analysis shows that it is still necessary to continue with follow-ups in different areas, especially in the Telemark area, to improve the impact of InfoOps.

The overall estimate is that TFOR InfoOps has improved the conditions in the JOA.

Specific issues

Ostland
There is some doubt about the statistical data on Ostland, which could influence the significance of the different polls that have been conducted in the area.

Norland
The impact of InfoOPs in Norland has not been as well as expected. This issue has to be studied further in the forthcoming InfoOps missions.

Refugee target group
There have been difficult to see any significant improvement in some of the MoE, but that is probably due to other circumstances than in the information arena, for example social conditions.

CG OA-cell

Annex 4: Common Operational Picture

Task: Review practice of establishment of COP and advise on improvements.

Implied tasks:

Task analysis

Q1: How to define the Common Operational Picture (COP)?
Q2: How has the COP been established from the different Recognised Pictures (Land, Air and Maritime) at TFOR?
Q3: Is it really a COP, in the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) for example, or are there just 3 separate pictures?
Q4: What kind of information from the Recognised Pictures is necessary to have in the COP?
Q5: How could the process be improved?
Q6: How often is it necessary to update the COP?

Report

The COP should consist of the three CC's Recognised Pictures to make up the core of COP. There is also a need to have the CIMIC, PSYOPS, INFOPS, INT and etc. information in the same manner (depending on the type of mission it could of course be only one or two CC's involved). In a PSO is the CIMIC picture especially important. The COP should not have the same detail as the CC's pictures, but should be concentrated on relevant information for the operational level. When the situation dictates there should be an option to have more detailed information.

Each individual cell inside the JOC had their own picture, but there were no observations of COP within JOC. There should be one screen or map that includes all vital information accordingly. This source will give the COM access to relevant information and to plan ahead.

The information should be automatically updated for the core elements of COP. The detail of the information should be on appropriate level (operational) according the situation development.

The COP should be updated at least two/three times a day, or when the situation dictates.

When the COP is established the suggestion is to evaluate the result. This should be done by monitoring and "freeze" the different pictures at a specific time to compare and evaluate the differences and to what level it would influence the mission.

Annex 4: Common Operational Picture





Annex 4: Common Operational Picture

Common Operational Picture (COP)

- The level of detail of the information (filtered) should be on the appropriate level (operational) according to the situation development
- In addition to the core COP, a display/board (Traffic lights) that shows different status such as LOG, CIMIC, etc should be available in the JOC.

Analysis of the COP

- When the COP is established the intention is to evaluate the result.
- This should be done by monitoring and "freeze" the different pictures at a specific time.
- The results should be compared and evaluated over time to resolve differences and analyse in which extent they influence the mission.

Elements of the COP



Annex 4: Common Operational Picture



Annex 5: Presentation at COM evening briefing.

OA special briefing

Ops Analysis support to Ops and Planning

HQ TELEMARK FORCE

by

LTCOL TONARELLI (CH OA)

Karup, 2 April 2003

Agenda

- **What is OA**
- **OA-mission**
- **Possible OA-tasks**
- **TFOR OA main tasks**
- **Examples**
- **Conclusions**

2003-04-15 NATO / PfP UNCLASSIFIED 2

Operational Analysis

- **OA is the application of scientific methods to assist decision makers and solve problems.**
- **It is used to improve situational awareness, to facilitate decisions and to improve the quality and effectiveness in:**
  - **operational planning,**
  - **joint coordination and targeting,**
  - **joint military affairs,**
  - **logistics and**
  - **civil-military co-operation.**

2003-04-15 NATO / PfP UNCLASSIFIED 3

Annex 5: Presentation at COM evening briefing.







Annex 5: Presentation at COM evening briefing.

Some examples

Non-Compliance database



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TFOR OA main tasks

- Collect and evaluate data:
  - Non-compliance database
  - HN data (demography, economy etc.)
- Support TFOR in analyzing ad hoc questions
- **Specific TFOR issues:**
  - **Research and advise on InfoOps impact in the JOA**
  - **Analyze and measure mission success**
  - **Evaluate efficiency and economy of effort**

2003-04-15 NATO / PfP UNCLASSIFIED 9

TFOR OA main tasks

- Collect and evaluate data:
  - Non-compliance database
  - HN data (demography, economy etc.)
- Support TFOR in analyzing ad hoc questions
- Specific TFOR issues:
  - Research and advise on InfoOps impact in the JOA
  - Analyze and measure mission success
  - Evaluate efficiency and economy of effort
- **Develop analysis tools**

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Annex 5: Presentation at COM evening briefing.

Some examples

Analyze and measure mission success

COMTFOR Objectives	D+41				
Swift and secure build-up of forces in theatre conducted to establish early presence and ability to monitor JOA:	In Norland	In Ostland	In GZOS	In AZOS	Maritime
Own forces in the JOA.	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7
Secure and continious LOC.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.5
Liasions with other players.	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7
Intel.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8
Force protection and	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Freedom of movement.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
Seamless and affective co-ordination and co-operation with the SRSG.	LEGAD	POLAD			
	0.9	0.9			
Disputed zones dominated through:	In Norland	In Ostland	In GZOS	In AZOS	Maritime
presence	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
situational awareness,	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8
INFO OPS,	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
demonstrated capability to project combat power	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
and the ability to gain rapid, local superiority of force.	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Stability and security enhanced through:	In Norland	In Ostland	In GZOS	In AZOS	Refugee Camps
presence,	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.6
information operations and	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
by facilitating improvement of local living conditions.	0.6	0.8	0.6		0.5
	In Norland	In Ostland	In GZOS	In AZOS	Maritime
Compliance enforced impartially using all available means.	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.8
	Ground	Air	Smuggling		
Adequate control of the border between NORLAND and OSTLAND.	0.8	0.9	0.6		
	Norland	Ostland	Wetland	Maritime EZ	Co w police
Continuation of an effective arms embargo regime in accordance with UNSCR 2048.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
	In Norland	In Ostland	In GZOS	In AZOS	Maritime
Effective force protection within areas defined by the APAP maintained through all phases of the operation.	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Effective and pro-active co-ordination with relevant HN to ensure effective force protection throughout the JOA:	Intel	Legal	Pol	Mil	CIMIC
Exchange of relevant information.	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8
Compliance.	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Own impartiality.	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
A secure environment in the disputed zones seamlessly handled in co-operation with local authorities and NGOs, IOs and GOs.	In Norland	In Ostland	In GZOS	In AZOS	Maritime
Compliance.	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5
Freedom of movement.	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5

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Some examples

Analyze and measure mission success

COMTFOR Objectives / Fulfilments	D+39		D+40		D+41	
	Estimate	Relevance	Estimate	Relevance	Estimate	Relevance
Swift and secure build-up of forces in theatre conducted to establish early presence and ability to monitor JOA.	0.66	1	0.66	1	0.71	1
Seamless and affective co-ordination and co-operation with the SRSG.	0.90	1	0.90	1	0.90	1
Disputed zones dominated through presence, situational awareness, INFO OPS, demonstrated capability to project combat power and the ability to gain rapid, local superiority of force.	0.76	1	0.76	1	0.70	1
Stability and security enhanced through presence, information operations and by facilitating improvement of local living conditions.	0.73	1	0.73	1	0.66	1
Compliance enforced impartially using all available means.	0.72	1	0.72	1	0.78	1
Adequate control of the border between NORDLAND and OSTLAND.	0.80	1	0.80	1	0.77	1
Continuation of an effective arms embargo regime in accordance with UNSCR 2048.	0.72	1	0.72	1	0.80	1
Effective force protection within areas defined by the APAP maintained through all phases of the operation.	0.80	1	0.80	1	0.58	1
Effective and pro-active co-ordination with relevant HN to ensure effective force protection throughout the JOA.	0.77	1	0.77	1	0.74	1
A secure environment in the disputed zones seamlessly handed to a designated follow-on force and/or local authorities.	0.72	1	0.72	1	0.54	1

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Some examples

Analyze and measure mission success



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Annex 5: Presentation at COM evening briefing.

Some examples

Analyze and measure mission success

- The analysis shows that due to some disturbances and incidents in the JOA, mainly regarding to force protection and in establishing a secure environment, the mission achievements has gone down.
- In order to fulfill the objectives it is necessary to stress, or to focus, on political means to maintain a secure environment in the JOA.

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Conclusions

- Started with nothing
- Received guidance by COS
- Continued with coffee and questions
- Went further with discussions and beer
- Followed by an analysis
- Actually produced something (a bit unclear)
- Received feedback
- Ended with a clear understanding of OA

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Ops Analysis team

THE SECRET TOOL OF THE COS