


# Security Sector Reform: A Nordic – Baltic agenda

KARLIS NERETNIEKS  
RIINA KALJURAND

FOI  
RKK/ICDS



FOI  
Swedish Defence Research Agency  
Division of Defence Analysis  
SE-164 90 Stockholm, Sweden  
Phone: +46 8 555 030 00  
Fax: +48 8 555 031 00  
www.foi.se



Toom-Rüütli 12-6, Tallinn 10130, Estonia  
Phone: +372 6949 340  
Fax: +372 6949 342  
info@icds.ee  
www.icds.ee

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Karlis Neretnieks  
Riina Kaljurand

FOI  
RKK/ICDS

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## List of Abbreviations

|                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| BALTDEFCOL                    | Baltic Defence College   |
| BALTSEA                       | Baltic Security Assistance Forum                                   |
| CIMIC                         | Civil-Military Co-operation  |
| CMR                           | Civil-Military Relations   |
| CSCE<br>in Europe             | Conference on Security Co-operation                                |
| CST                           | Cross Service Team   |
| DAN CON                       | Danish Contingent  |
| DCAF                          | Geneva Centre for the Democratic<br>Control of Armed Forces        |
| EAPC                          | Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council                                  |
| EOD                           | Explosive Ordnance Disposal  |
| ESDP<br>Policy                | European Security and Defence                                      |
| ESTCON NSE<br>Support Element | Estonian Contingent, National                                      |
| ESTGUARD                      | Estonian Guard Battalion   |
| ESTPLA                        | Estonian Platoon   |
| ESTRIF                        | Estonian Reconnaissance in Force                                   |
| EU                            | European Union   |
| EUBAM                         | European Union Border Assistance<br>Mission to Moldova and Ukraine |
| EUBG                          | European Union Battle Group  |

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| EUFOR<br>Althea | European Union Force Operation   |
| EUFOR MNTF (n)  | European Union Force Multinational<br>Task Force North                     |
| EUPM            | European Union Police Mission  |
| EUPOL COPPS     | European Union Police Mission for<br>the Palestine Territories             |
| EUPT<br>Kosovo  | European Union Planning Team for   |
| EUSEC           | European Union security sector<br>reform mission in the DR of the<br>Congo |
| GCSP<br>Policy  | The Geneva Centre for Security   |
| HQ              | Headquarters   |
| HUMINT          | Human Intelligence   |
| ID              | Intensified Dialogue   |
| IO              | International Organisations  |
| IPAP            | Individual Partnership Action Plan   |
| IPBC            | International Police Basic Course  |
| IPDC<br>Course  | International Police Development   |
| ISAF            | International Security Assistance<br>Force (Afghanistan)                   |
| JWGDR           | NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group<br>on Defence Reform                      |
| KFOR            | Kosovo Force   |



|                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| LITCON               | Lithuanian Contingent   |
| LMA                  | Lithuanian Military Academy                                   |
| LOT<br>(Bosnia)      | Liaison and Observation Team                                  |
| MAP                  | Membership Action Plan  |
| MCM                  | Mine countermeasures  |
| MNC-I                | Multinational component - Iraq                                |
| MND                  | Multinational Division  |
| MoD                  | Ministry of Defence   |
| MINUSTAH<br>in Haiti | United Nations Stabilisation Mission                          |
| MONUC                | United Nations Organisation Mission<br>in the DR of the Congo |
| MSOC                 | Multinational Staff Officers Centre                           |
| NAF                  | National Armed Forces   |
| NATO                 | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation                            |
| NBG                  | Nordic Battle Group   |
| NCO                  | Non-Commissioned Officer                                      |
| NGO                  | Non-governmental Organisation                                 |
| NORDCAPS             | Nordic Co-ordinated Arrangement for<br>Military Peace Support |
| NRF                  | NATO Response Force   |
| NTM-I                | NATO Training Mission - Iraq                                  |
| OECD                 | Organisation for Economic Co-<br>operation and Development    |

|                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| OECD-DAC<br>Committee         | OECD – Development Assistance                              |
| OIF                           | Operation Iraqi Freedom                                    |
| OSCE<br>operation in Europe   | Organisation for Security Co-                              |
| PAP-DIB                       | Partnership Action Plan on Defence<br>Institution Building |
| PARP<br>Review Process        | Partnership for Peace Planning and                         |
| PiP                           | Partnership for Peace Programme                            |
| POL MND (cs)<br>Poland        | Multinational Division South led by                        |
| PR                            | Public relations   |
| PRT                           | Provincial Reconstruction Team                             |
| RC (s)                        | Regional Command South                                     |
| SFOR<br>Herzegovina           | Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and                          |
| SHIRBRIG<br>Readiness Brigade | Multinational Standby High                                 |
| SOFA                          | Status of Forces Agreement                                 |
| SSR                           | Security Sector Reform                                     |
| UKTF                          | United Kingdom Task Force                                  |
| UN                            | United Nations   |
| UNAMA<br>Afghanistan          | United Nations Mission in                                  |
| UNCIVSOC<br>Course            | United Nations Civilian Staff Officers                     |

|                         |                                    |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| UNMEE<br>and Eritrea    | United Nations Mission in Ethiopia |
| UNMIK                   | United Nations Mission in Kosovo   |
| UNMIL                   | United Nations Mission in Liberia  |
| UNMIS                   | United Nations Mission in Sudan    |
| UNMIT<br>Leste          | United Nations Mission in Timor    |
| UNMOC                   | United Nations Observers Course    |
| UNMOGIP<br>and Pakistan | United Nations Observers in India  |
| UNOCI<br>d'Ivoire       | United Nations Mission in Cote     |
| UNPCC<br>Course         | United Nations Police Commander    |
| UNPOC<br>Course         | United Nations Military Observers  |
| USCENTCOM               | United States Central Command      |

## Sammanfattning

Rapporten syftar till att hitta vägar att förstärka och utveckla nordisk-baltisk samverkan när det gäller arbetet med säkerhetssektorreformer i tredje land.

Rapporten avhandlar bara sådana aktiviteter som hittills hanterats främst av respektive lands försvarsministerium.

Idag saknas en internationellt accepterad och heltäckande definition av vad SSR omfattar eller borde omfatta. Dock har EU skapat en definition, som trots sin tämligen allmänna karaktär, tydligt säger att SSR är ett mycket vitt begrepp och som omfattar mer än det som traditionellt har betraktats som säkerhetssektorn, polis, militär och liknande organisationer.

De rekommendationer som lämnas i rapporten grundar sig på främst tre kriterier:

- redan existerande nordiska, baltiska eller rent nationella aktiviteter bör så långt utnyttjas som en plattform för vidare verksamhet,
- finns det redan pågående aktiviteter som skulle kunna bli få ett bättre genomslag, eller kunna effektiviseras, genom att flera länder blev engagerade,
- vilka strukturella eller organisatoriska åtgärder skulle behöva vidtas för att underlätta ett närmare nordisk-baltiskt samarbete inom detta område.

Rapporten belyser också vissa problem som kan uppstå på grund av ländernas olika historiska erfarenheter; till exempel kan de nordiska ländernas långvariga och intima samarbete ses som ett problem av de baltiska staterna, en klubb med vilken det är svårt att samarbeta med på jämlika villkor.

Nyckelord: SSR, Säkerhetssektorreform, Norden, Baltikum

## Executive Summary

The report aims at identifying ways of enhancing Nordic-Baltic co-operation when it comes to supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities in third States. This report will hopefully contribute to a deeper Nordic – Baltic relationship and a more efficient use of the resources allocated by the different countries to support SSR. It could also contribute to a stronger regional voice in the framework of EU-SSR related policy-making.

SSR covers a broad range of domains and engages many different actors. However, this report has been tailored especially for the Nordic and the Baltic Defence Ministers' meeting taking place in Stockholm in November 2007 to enhance co-operation within the domain of ministries of defence.

*Thus, it must be stressed that this report mainly contains the SSR related activities that fall into the domain of ministries of defence.* There are exceptions such as reforming police forces, border guards and similar organisations that normally belong to other ministries. The reason that they are mentioned here is that some activities such as preparing police officers or civil servants for work in international military staffs or missions, for purely practical reasons, have been conducted by agencies belonging within ministries of defence.

SSR has no clear or internationally accepted definition. This makes it hard to distinguish what aspects of it should be included, or excluded, when considering SSR. At the moment, there is an unfortunate tendency to include more or less every agency or organisation that has the slightest connection with the security of a country or its individual citizens. The UN has just started a process aimed at creating ground rules in this area. Currently the EU seems to be the one organisation that has gone the furthest when it comes to agree on some guiding principles. NATO's approach is more operational and instrumental but their guiding principles coincide largely with those of the EU.

These guiding principles can be summarised as SSR being something that aims at:  
creating good governance of security institutions and accountability to civil authorities  
introducing or enhancing democratic norms, the rule of law and respect for human rights  
strengthening political dialogue  
it is also stressed that SSR has to have a multi-sector approach in order to have a more comprehensive impact.

The EU, NATO, UN and other international organisations as well as the Nordics and the Baltic States are all engaged in a large number of SSR related activities where agencies

subordinated to ministries of defence are engaged. They include, among others, activities such as reconstruction work in Afghanistan, support to build democratic security institutions in the Caucasus and on the Balkans, aid to protect the environment, advise on how to create modern agencies capable of taking on challenges such as organised crime and similar threats to society, armed protection of local institutions etc.

Among the Nordic states there already exist several common arrangements concerning SSR. For decades the Nordic countries have run joint UN courses for military observers, military police and staff officers and other personnel who are capable of playing an important role in different SSR activities.

The Baltic Defence College in Tartu can be considered as a joint Nordic-Baltic institution that from the beginning has had as one of its main tasks to contribute to SSR. Therefore, there already exists a reasonably firm foundation which should be built on when it comes to future co-operation.

When considering areas of enhanced co-operation three criteria have mainly been applied, namely:

- Are there already existing schemes that could be developed on a joint basis thereby creating a greater output for a minimal investment?
- Are there areas where several countries are already active and where the efficiency or the impact of the programme could be enhanced by engaging other countries?
- Are there any prerequisites for, or at least specific measures that could facilitate, a more structured and deeper co-operation between the Nordics and the Baltic States?

Based on these criteria the following recommendations are made:

1. A joint *Nordic-Baltic conference on SSR* should be organised, the aim of which should be to give all countries concerned an opportunity to present their views on SSR and to create an opportunity for the “SSR-community” in the region to meet. Also organisations such as the EU, NATO, DCAF and others should be invited. The conference could serve as a vehicle for further initiatives.
2. A *Nordic-Baltic Co-ordination Committee* for joint SSR activities should be formed. The primary aim of the committee should be to function as a forum for information exchange, thereby making it possible to avoid duplicating projects and also to facilitate the start up and running of common projects. Due to the very wide scope of SSR the committee should have representatives from all (or most) ministries that are involved in SSR.

3. The *Baltic Defence College* should be used as one of the main vehicles for training Nordic-Baltic personnel on SSR matters. The college should also be utilised, to a larger extent than today, for the training of military and civilian personnel from “target” countries. It should also be developed into a Nordic – Baltic centre, or hub, for academic research on SSR.
4. A *database* should be established in which all states concerned listed their assets available for different SSR tasks as well as ongoing and planned activities. If enough resources could be made available the administrative handling of the database could be developed into a Nordic-Baltic SSR secretariat, thereby creating an institutionalised memory on SSR.
5. The Nordics should take a more active role in a *South Caucasus Clearing House* as this is a geographic area which the Baltic States have prioritised. It is probably a prerequisite for joint action in this area.
6. The Nordics and the Baltic States should launch a *common initiative* on how to better co-ordinate EU and NATO SSR activities.
7. Joint Nordic-Baltic working/research groups should be initiated on how to *evaluate different SSR activities* in regions where joint activities have been conducted.
8. The possibility of creating a joint Nordic–Baltic training centre for the disposal of explosive ordinance should be investigated.
9. In ongoing projects concerning *Defence Planning* and *Coast/Border Guards* it should immediately be investigated whether they could better be turned into joint Nordic-Baltic projects. This would, in some cases, have the effect of enhancing the credibility of the advice given (when representatives from the Baltic States are included) or, in other cases, probably give the recipient a more unbiased view of different solutions available (particularly when non NATO or non EU members are included)

When considering the above recommendations some stumbling blocks, or dangers, that might influence Nordic–Baltic co-operation have to be kept in mind. The Nordic countries have a very long history of co-operation and also similar cultural and political backgrounds. They are also currently more prosperous than the Baltic states and this might very easily lead to a situation where the Nordics try to dominate, consciously or unconsciously, and where the Baltic states might be oversensitive to anything that they might interpret as “big brother” behaviour. Special care must therefore be taken in creating procedures and a mindset which ensures that all participants are both treated as, and feel to be, equal partners.

It is very probable that the combined experiences of the Nordics and the Baltic states are best suited for, and will have the greatest impact, if they are applied to projects aiming at reforming the security sector, in a broad sense, in the former Soviet republics.

Last, but not least, it has to be born in mind that most Nordic – Baltic activities will be conducted in an environment where especially the EU and NATO, but also the OECD and UN, will provide both the framework and much of the co-ordination. At the same time the Nordic-Baltic “block” consists of a considerable number of both EU and NATO members and this could give it a certain amount of influence - particularly if it can create a common agenda on where and how these two organisations should engage themselves in different SSR activities. This, in turn, could lead to still greater possibilities for co-operation.

All things taken together there is a good case for deeper co-operation between the Nordics and the Baltic states when it comes to SSR.

Keyword: SSR, Security Sector Reform, Nordics, Baltic States, Baltic Sea Region



# 1. Background

*The report aims at identifying ways of enhancing Nordic-Baltic co-operation when it comes to supporting Security Sector (SSR) activities in third countries.*

The Nordics and the Baltic states are today engaged in numerous different activities which aim to reform the security structures in several countries. Just to mention some examples: Sweden and Lithuania each run a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are all active in promoting security sector reform in the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. Norway is deeply engaged in the restructuring of the Serbian armed forces. Denmark is leading a project in Ukraine concerning parliamentary oversight of armed forces. Finland has a comprehensive programme to train military observers. All the Nordic and the Baltic countries support the activities of the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), the Geneva Centre for the Democratisation of Armed Forces (DCAF) and so on.

Although, many of the projects are appreciated by the recipients it is also obvious that most of them are not comprehensive enough to have a decisive impact on the organisation/governmental body upon which they are focused. The resources that each of the donor countries can allocate are too limited to cover the needs, both in terms of financial support and the provision of trained personnel. There is also the problem that neither the Nordic nor Baltic countries individually, except in a very few cases, has the necessary expertise in all the areas needed to take on the task of reforming a certain organisation like the armed force of a country or its system for democratic control of its security sector.

Just to illustrate some of the difficulties of solely bilateral action, one can question the extent to which, say, Sweden or Norway alone can give comprehensive advice on security matters to a state that aspires to become a member of both NATO and the EU as neither of the above countries is a member of both organisations. Or, how many experts in a certain area can Latvia or Estonia afford to send abroad without jeopardising activities at home?

Obviously there is a good case for enhanced co-operation to achieve conclusive results. Today there already exist different programmes run by the EU, the European Parliament, NATO and other multinational organisations. The European Commission has also formulated a common platform for security sector reform, where the need for co-operation is stressed. At the same time as the importance of the EU cannot be overestimated, with its presence and long-term commitments in many of the countries where reform is on the agenda, the role of smaller countries with special expertise or characteristics should not be disregarded.

## 2. Method

There have been mainly two methodological problems in addressing the topic. The first one concerns how to find common ground when it comes to how to define SSR. Two approaches have been considered. One being to create a Nordic-Baltic definition which is based on the values and perceptions acceptable to, and favoured by, the participating states. Another is to use a definition accepted by an international body of which all the Nordic-Baltic states are members. Using a broadly accepted definition of a nebulous subject such as SSR, of course, encompasses the risk that the definition, due to compromises, is so broad that it does not give any guidance. Nevertheless, the latter course has been chosen as, at least, it provides a common denominator from which the work can begin. Elements of both the EU's and NATO's approaches to the SSR have been used to give some supporting framework to the study.

The second methodological question that has to be addressed is whether to begin with an analysis of the needs of certain countries or to start with an analysis of what a Nordic-Baltic cooperative venture might be able to offer.

In this report, due to the formulation of the task<sup>1</sup>, the second avenue of approach has been chosen. This is mainly for three reasons:

- this report aims at creating a platform for long term decisions leading to creating capabilities that could be useful in more than a few specific cases;
- it takes time to propose well functioning procedures and arrangements among the countries that might participate in a project and, in the meantime, new "target countries" may be identified;
- by just looking at certain selected countries there is a risk that the special expertise of the Nordic-Baltic alliance is not being used in the most efficient way and that the available resources might pay much greater dividends if used elsewhere.

In principle, this report covers only such areas that might belong within the domains of the respective ministries of defence. It would be a step too far to include the whole spectrum of activities which could have a bearing on what the European Commission or any other actor considers as SSR (see next chapter). This limitation already creates problems due to the fact that different agencies that are traditionally seen as part of the security sector, i.e. border or coast guards and some intelligence services, might belong within ministries other than the MoD, depending on which country you look at. Also such

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<sup>1</sup> The analysis of the specific needs of the recipient countries is being conducted by a research team at the Swedish Defence Academy

an obvious part of the security sector as the police are very seldom, if ever, subordinated to the minister of defence, although some police forces such as “gendarmes” may well be.

As there is no obvious model applicable to all Nordic and Baltic states all areas of activity in which Nordic and Baltic states’ defence ministries are engaged have been taken into consideration. Also this approach is not without its problems as some activities that are either led by, or prepared by, agencies belonging to the MoD domain are paid or manned by other ministries and are, therefore, dependent on these ‘outside’ deliberations when it comes to deciding what might, or might not, be fruitful for them to engage themselves in. Hence, the study might give an impression of inconsistency.

Taking the above mentioned factors into consideration the following tools for SSR activities will be covered in the report:

the use of military assets (individuals, units, training establishments, etc)

the use of coastguard or border guard assets

the use of civilian expertise in areas/agencies that normally are subordinated to ministries of defence, such as ministerial departments, military staffs, etc.

There will always be some activities, present or future, that will not fall neatly into any of these categories but are, nevertheless, assigned to the minister of defence. But that should not be taken as an excuse for trying to pass the buck on. Rather it should be regarded as an illustration of the complexity of SSR. There are no clear boundaries as to what constitutes a country’s security sector.

### 3. The role and character of Security Sector Reform

The term ‘security sector reform’ was first coined in 1998 by the UK Development Minister, Claire Short. However, the concept itself had been shaped by a number of policy experiences and processes long before that<sup>2</sup>. On the EU level the issue was first promoted under the UK Presidency in 2005 when it was agreed that SSR is an important part of Community support.

From having been an activity focussed very much at transforming the traditional security organisations in a country, such as its armed forces, police, border guards etc, and creating a system for democratic control of these organisations, Security Sector Reform (SSR) now encompasses activities with much broader aims.

The two main organisations involved in security sector reform, from a Nordic – Baltic point of view, are the European Union and NATO. The, to some extent, differing views on security sector reform by these organisations is therefore presented below. Other organisations, such as the UN and OSCE, are also involved in SSR activities but have so far not become frameworks in which the whole scope of today’s SSR activities are co-ordinated. A short overview of their activities is given later in the report.

#### 3.1. The European Union

Security Sector Reform Strategy represents a new approach in the EU’s foreign policy and external assistance. It will probably be a key area of action for the EU in the years ahead.

The European Union’s view on security sector reform is reflected mainly in three documents: *Security System Reform and Governance, Policy and Practice* by the OECD (2004)<sup>3</sup>, *EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform* by the Council of the European Union (2005) and *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* from the European Commission (2006), COM (2006) 253<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Law, D.; *Security Sector Reform in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Unfinished Business in Reform and Reconstruction*, Bryden, A., Hänggi, H. (eds), DCAF Publications 2004

<sup>3</sup> *Security System Reform and Governance, Policy and Practice*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD, 2004

<sup>4</sup> *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2006) 253, Brussels, 24.5.2006

The OECD Guidelines make up the basis for both EU documents but the European Commission and the Council have now started to work on how to implement the EU's SSR policy. As the discussions and recommendations in this report will be based mainly on the principles presented in the above mentioned documents it seems relevant to quote some of the most important passages from these documents

Concerning the nature and role of security sector reform the following paragraphs illustrate some of the main factors that should guide activities in this area (underlined by the authors of this report).

“Today there is greater recognition in the international community and within the EU that security sector reform or security system reform, as it is also referred to, reflecting the multi-sector nature of the security system is an important part of conflict prevention, peace building and democratisation and contributes to sustainable development.”<sup>5</sup>

“The need for a more coherent and common EU concept on SSR across the three pillars has, therefore, been raised by Member States and the Commission in order to contribute to a more effective EU external action in this area.”<sup>6</sup>

“SSR should be seen as a holistic process, strengthening security for all citizens as well as addressing governance deficits.”<sup>7</sup>

“SSR should take a broad, coherent and integrated approach that addresses wider governance and the security concerns of the people. This multifaceted approach should be managed in a coherent way, ensuring that all the lines of action, such as good governance, democratic norms and rule of law, respect for human rights and long term institution building, personnel management, training and provision of equipment are mutually reinforcing.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid p 3

<sup>6</sup> Ibid p4

<sup>7</sup> Ibid p 4

<sup>8</sup> *EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform*, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 October 2005, pp11

“Security sector reform is an integral part of EU enlargement, as regards pre-accession countries, and is an important part of development cooperation and external assistance to third countries.”<sup>9</sup>

The paragraphs above make it very clear that the EC sees security sector reform as a very broad concept encompassing traditional security organisations as well as other institutions and activities that earlier had been regarded as a part of “civil” society.

Obviously not everything that can constitute a threat to the individual can be seen as a task for the “security sector” to handle and which should be labelled as targets for security sector reform. Auto-accidents, lung-cancer due to smoking and other hazards, although being dangerous, fall into other categories.

The EC definition of the security system which merits reform under the heading of “Security System Reform” is as follows:

“Based on the OECD-DAC definition the **security system** can be defined as all state institutions and other entities with a role ensuring the security of the state and its people.

*Core security actors including law enforcement institutions:* armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence services; coast guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units.

*Security management and oversight bodies:* parliament/legislature; government/the executive, including ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; national security advisory bodies; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society, including the media, academia and NGOs.

*Justice institutions:* justice ministries; prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and tribunals), implementation of justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems; human rights commissions and ombudsmen etc.

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<sup>9</sup> *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2006) 253, Brussels, 24.5.2006, pp9

*Non-statuary security forces:* liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; etc.

*Security system reform* means transforming the security system, which includes all these actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and, thus, contributing to a well functioning security framework. For the EC, the objective is to contribute explicitly to the strengthening of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the efficient use of public resources. In this respect, civilian control and Parliamentary oversight are key aspects of SSR.”<sup>10</sup>

Based on the role of security sector reform and the definition of what constitutes the security system of a state, the Commission has laid down five guiding principles that should guide EC support for SSR.

“Security system reform processes should be:

- nationally/regionally owned reform processes designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law and respect for human rights, in line with internationally agreed norms;
- addressing the core requirements of a well functioning security system, including the development of a nationally conceived concept of security, with well defined policies and good governance of security institutions, while ensuring that any developments in the professional security forces includes safeguards ensuring both their accountability to the civil authorities as well as their capability to carry out the operational tasks assigned to them;
- seen as a framework for addressing diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, based on a gender-sensitive multi-sector approach and targeting reform needs in different key sectors. This includes the separation of tasks between different services and institutions while taking into account the role of civil society and other non-state structures of governance; for example, in the traditional justice systems in some societies as regards the development and implementation of national SSR;
- based on the same principles of accountability and transparency that apply across the public sector in general and, in particular, improved

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid pp 6 and 7 (emphasis in the original text)

- governance through greater civilian and parliamentary oversight of security processes;
- based on political dialogue with each partner country addressing human rights developments and security concerns and be carried out in synergy with other instruments.”<sup>11</sup>

Both European concepts of security sector reform, as presented by the Council and by the Commission, allow for a broad scope of possible activities. The aim is that these concepts would complement each other and be joined together within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR.

The European Council adopted an SSR concept in relation to ESDP (second pillar) which can be seen as more operational and similar to NATO’s approach; while the European Commission produced a communication in relation to Community (first pillar) SSR activities having a somewhat more post-conflict perspective<sup>12</sup>.

This gives the Nordic and Baltic states a large amount of freedom to choose projects and to target countries where their special expertise can be utilised. The guidelines also encourage the pooling of resources at a regional level to develop the most cost effective way to achieve results and to create comprehensive programs. At the same time it is quite obvious that Nordic – Baltic initiatives have to be put into a broader context such as the UN, EU, NATO and others to achieve the best impact.

Currently the European Union is engaged in several SSR projects in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa. A list of examples of where the EU is engaged, or has been engaged, in SSR activities can be found in **Appendix 1**.

### 3.2. NATO

SSR has not been widely used as an operational concept within the Euro-Atlantic region until very recently. In the 1990s SSR related objectives, such as good governance, were understood by the post-authoritarian transition states only in terms of democratic control of the armed forces and defence reform. However, post-communist legacies in security apparatus have led analysts and practitioners to think more holistically about key factors of security sector governance<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid pp 7 and 8

<sup>12</sup> NATO, the EU and the Challenge of Defence and Security Sector Reform: Building Peace and Stability, Together or Apart, NATO PA –DCAF Seminar Report, 4 December, 2006

<sup>13</sup> Ibid pp7



NATO does not have an official SSR concept agreed on by its member states<sup>14</sup>. However, NATO's Policy of Partnership and Co-operation and the PfP have lasted for more than 10 years and have established partnership relations with 20 countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP).<sup>15</sup>

The EAPC is the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's co-operation with its Partners, and PfP is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO<sup>16</sup>.

NATO's Partnership Policy has evolved and been strengthened since its inception in 1994. Important enhancements of Partnership Policy have been launched and also brought to fruition at different NATO Summits. By adding more democratic and economic components to the defence components of different PfP programmes and initiatives, NATO's concept of security sector governance is constantly broadening.

By now, NATO has developed an operational understanding of SSR that it uses in its programming activities in partner countries. Defence reform and SSR are mentioned in some NATO Partnership programmes documents as necessary requirements to prepare countries in transition for eventual membership of Euro-Atlantic organisations and participation in peace support operations<sup>17</sup>. NATO has set up a number of criteria for both the Partners and the Alliance and offers a number of instruments helping to fulfil these criteria:

#### *Partnership for Peace*

PfP was launched in 1994, as a practical programme that would transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. The North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace would deepen their political and military ties and contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic Area<sup>18</sup>.

The PfP aims at:

- facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or within the responsibility of the CSCE;
- the development of co-operative military relations with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen the ability to

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<sup>14</sup> Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform, DCAF Publication 2006

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> NATO Basic Texts, *Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace*, Prague Summit 21-22 Nov 2002

<sup>17</sup> Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform, DCAF Publication 2006 (p12)

<sup>18</sup> Partnership for Peace Framework Document, 1994, NATO Basic Texts, [www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm)

undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and others, as may subsequently be agreed upon; i.e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of members of the North Atlantic Alliance<sup>19</sup>.

*The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)*

As a PfP tool for enhancing the interoperability of forces and capabilities available for PfP activities, the PARP cycle was first launched in December 1994. It is offered to Partners on an optional basis and draws on NATO's experience of defence planning involving both bilateral and multilateral elements. For each two-year planning cycle, Partners wishing to participate provide a wide range of information about their defence policies, PfP co-operation and relevant financial and economic plans, as well as an overview of their armed forces, which they intend to make available for PfP co-operation.<sup>20</sup>

*Principles of Enlargement*

A further and very important step towards enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area was the inviting of other European countries to become Allies, as stated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. A Study on NATO Enlargement was conducted in 1995 to give an overview of the purposes and principles of future enlargement.

The main principles were to unite the efforts for collective defence, contribute to development of peaceful and friendly international relations and maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing the roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of assuring common security. In order to follow the principles, the new Allies needed to foster the patterns and habits of co-operation, consultation and consensus building, emphasize common defence and extend its benefits, increase transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defence policies<sup>21</sup>.

*Membership Action Plan*

Another programme is the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which was launched in 1999 to assist those countries, wishing to join the Alliance, in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support in all aspects of NATO membership. The MAP includes detailed requirements for membership including the broader view of the SSR. The MAP is divided into five chapters:

- Political and Economic issues including settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid

<sup>20</sup> The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process, NATO Handbook  
[www.nato.int/docu/handbook/](http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/)

<sup>21</sup> Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO Basic Texts, [www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm)

forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.

- Defence and military issues focus on the ability of the country to contribute to collective defence and to the Alliance's new missions. Full participation in PfP is an essential component. Through their individual PfP programmes, aspirants can focus on essential membership-related issues.
- Resource issues focus on the need for any aspirant country to commit sufficient resources to defence to allow them to meet the commitments that future membership would bring in terms of collective NATO undertakings.
- Security issues centre on the need for aspirant countries to make sure that procedures are in place to ensure the security of sensitive information.
- Legal aspects address the need for aspirants to ensure that legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within NATO are compatible with domestic legislation<sup>22</sup>

*Individual Partnership Action Plan, Intensified Individual Dialogue*

PfP, through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners' capacities and interests, demonstrates its flexible and operational character.

The MAP, building on the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and Intensified, Individual Dialogue (ID) on membership questions, is designed to reinforce the commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership. Objectives fall into the general categories of political and security issues; defence, security and military issues; public information; science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security and resource issues<sup>23</sup>.

An IPAP sets out the co-operation objectives and priorities of the individual partner country whilst NATO will provide focused, country-specific advice on reform objectives. Intensified political dialogue on relevant issues may be an integral part of an IPAP process, which is a prophase of MAP.

*The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building*

After the NATO Istanbul Summit the Euro-Atlantic Partnership policy was refocused and renewed. The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) was launched in June 2004, in Istanbul, in line with NATO's special focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia.

While threats to stability remain in the strategically important region of the Balkans, and particularly in Kosovo, events in Afghanistan, where NATO leads the ISAF operation,

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<sup>22</sup> The Membership Action Plan, NATO Handbook, [www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm)

<sup>23</sup> Individual Partnership Action Plan, NATO Topics, [www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html)

have demonstrated that threats to common security increasingly come from the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area. In this environment, international stability and security will increasingly depend on domestic reform on the one hand and wide international co-operation on the other.

PAP-DIB provides a common political and conceptual platform for bilateral and multilateral co-operation in developing and sustaining efficient and democratically responsible defence institutions, including the armed forces, under democratic and civilian control.

This Action Plan will make maximum use of existing EAPC and PfP tools and mechanisms. The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) will serve as primary instruments for pursuing PAP-DIB objectives and PARP will be adapted for this purpose.

This Plan offers Allies and all Partners a common political and conceptual platform for bilateral and multilateral co-operation in developing efficient and democratically responsible defence institutions. IPAP and PARP will serve as primary instruments for pursuing those commonly recognised reform objectives formulated in PAP-DIB.

NATO will also enhance support to those Nations engaged in IPAP, including by programming education and training in defence management and defence reform. Such programming will seek to tap the expertise of Partners and new Allies, which have successfully undertaken defence reform. NATO will also launch a series of workshops on defence and security economics with Partners participating in IPAP<sup>24</sup>.

NATO's global reach and the wide scope of its SSR activities is illustrated by examples of recent and ongoing NATO missions as listed in **Appendix 1**.

### 3.3. Other players in the field

Apart from the European Union and NATO there are also other significant players in the field: the most important of these being the UN. But regional organisations such as the African Union and OSCE have also engaged themselves in SSR. Apart from international organisations (IO) there is at least one important hybrid between these relevant IO's and NGO's that plays an important role when it comes to SSR research and operations and that is DCAF (The Geneva Centre for the Democratisation of Armed Forces). This latter is presented later in the report under the heading "Nordic-Baltic non-country related activities". All of the Nordic and the Baltic states are stakeholders in DCAF.

UN

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<sup>24</sup> PAP-DIB, NATO Basic Texts [www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040607e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040607e.htm)

In numerous cases during the last 60 years many UN activities in peace keeping and nation building could very well have been called security sector reform, if the term had then existed. Up until the present time there has been no UN framework or common definition for SSR. The Update Report on Security Sector Reform of 14 January 2007 and the following debate in the Security Council might be a first step towards creating universally accepted definitions and a UN policy in this area.<sup>25</sup>

Some UN missions are already explicitly or indirectly referred to as having an SSR task. These are<sup>26</sup>:

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)  
United Nations Mission in Cote d' Ivoire (UNOCI)  
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)  
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)  
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)  
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)  
United Nations Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT)  
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

#### OSCE

The OSCE with its 56 member states is deeply involved in SSR through its engagement in areas such as the democratisation of state institutions, border control management, human rights, military reform, policing and the rule of law.

Field operations such as the missions to Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are examples of OSCE activities whose aim reform of those countries' military structure. *The Forum for Security Co-operation* and *The Conflict Prevention Centre* are the two main tools of the OSCE when it comes to SSR.<sup>27</sup>

### **3.4. Co-operation between the main international actors**

The broad concept of security, which embraces more than the armed forces alone, has brought many different actors into the area of SSR. On the one hand, numerous modes of competences enable the recipients to choose the most suitable one. On the other hand,

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<sup>25</sup> [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org) , 2007-06-21

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> [www.osce.org/activities](http://www.osce.org/activities) , 2007-07-11

there is a risk that without shared conceptions, governments, international organisations and NGOs will pursue conflicting goals and undertake incompatible activities<sup>28</sup>. The western actors are both partners and rivals at the same time. This kind of rivalry leads to questions of effectiveness and of what is to be achieved. Bilateral and even multilateral projects are often dependent on the national politics of the day, which can diminish the aspect of sustainability. Control of the use of resources is weak and the lack of follow-up activities leads to the situation where any relief may only be temporary.

NATO and the EU represent the two main actors within the area of SSR both because of their resources and their vast experience. However, a lack of inter-institutional co-ordination as well as inadequate co-ordination of partnership policies and different requirements for the new members in the security field weakens both the donor countries ability to give, and the recipients' ability to receive, assistance.

NATO and the EU are working in some areas where the lines of responsibility and competence are unclear<sup>29</sup>. Some analysts point out that these organisations are not natural partners as there are too many differences between their origin, mandate, working methods, culture and membership criteria. Of course, part of the problem derives from the members whose priorities lie in deepening and expanding NATO, and those who would rather limit NATO and expand the EU.<sup>30</sup>

It is clear that NATO's priorities mainly lie in the military field, while the EU covers a much broader spectrum. NATO probably offers a superior structure while the EU provides a broader scope.

From a Nordic-Baltic point of view this difference in emphasis is not of decisive importance as all the countries in the region have extensive experience in working with both organisations.

One danger that has to be taken into account is the risk of competition or overlap between NATO and the European Union in some, mainly military, projects. As the Nordics and the Baltic states together represent a fair number of members in both the European Union and NATO this grouping might be utilised to initiate processes leading to a clearer distinction between the responsibilities of the two organisations, or at least to initiate action on ways to avoid such overlap.

Although not that big, the Nordics and the Baltic states nevertheless constitute a sizable number of countries in both the EU and NATO and all of them are loyal members in at

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<sup>28</sup> Forster, A.: *Civil-Military and Security Sector Reform: West Looking East*, Workshop paper prepared for the 4<sup>th</sup> International Security Forum, 2000.

<sup>29</sup> W. B. Slocombe, *NATO, EU and the Challenge of Defence and Security Sector Reform*. P. Fluri, S. Lunn (Eds), DCAF 2007.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid pp7

least one of these organisations. Together, therefore, they would have distinct possibilities of influencing both the EU and NATO on some aspects of SSR.

## 4. The Nordics and the Baltic states, present and future SSR activities in the MoD sphere

A list of where and how the Nordics and the Baltic states are engaged in different SSR activities is to be found in **Appendix 2**. The list is far from being complete, however, because of the disproportional amount of information received from individual Nordic and Baltic MoD's. Despite its incompleteness, the list has been included in order to illustrate the reach and comprehensiveness of SSR related activities as well as to detect areas of possible co-operation.

The timeframe for these activities mostly covers the period 2006-2007 and beyond including those activities which have not yet started. Some ongoing activities started earlier than 2006 but as they are not yet completed they have been included as well.

As the interpretation of what can be considered as an SSR can be very broad and will probably vary from country to country the activities listed encompass more or less all kinds of actions concerning the security sector - from military training and parliamentary oversight of security organs to support for the creation of a functioning legal system. As the report aims at developing co-operation concerning SSR-activities within the realm of the Nordic-Baltic Ministries of Defence, the emphasis in the list is on operations where the resources provided come under the jurisdiction these ministries.

One obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the list is that, taken together, the Nordic-Baltic activities encompass a very broad range of different fields of competence and geographic areas. It is clear that much is to be gained, both in economy and efficiency, by concentrating the efforts on both fewer recipients and on fewer, but more comprehensive, projects.

A second conclusion might be that there is very great potential in Nordic-Baltic co-operation as there are very few areas where the combined resources of the Nordics and the Baltic states could not make an important contribution, should they decide to do so.

Apart from trying to reach conclusions on possible areas of co-operation based on ongoing activities some other factors also have to be taken into account. Those that are considered to be the most important are:  
existing co-operative schemes and the political aim of SSR endeavours .



## 4.1. The Nordics

The Nordic states have established a long standing co-operation on SSR-related activities originating in the needs of different UN operations during the nineteen seventies and eighties. In the process different bodies such as NORDCAPS and SHIRBRIG have been formed to enhance co-ordination and activities in the field.

The latest framework for common Nordic SSR activities is *The Nordic Initiative* where Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have joined forces to co-ordinate their activities, especially in the Western Balkans. This initial target area has now been expanded to also cover the Ukraine. A more detailed description of activities conducted within the framework of *The Nordic Initiative* can be found under the heading of “Nordic-Baltic common activities” later in this report.

When it comes to the Nordic countries the political aims of SSR have seldom had the clear objective of promoting the security interests of the Nordic countries themselves. Rather, it is more a question of helping the recipient countries to create structures which are compliant with international norms of democratic rule and good governance. However the idea of self interest should not be totally neglected when analysing Nordic behaviour; e.g. well functioning, democratic, structures in the Balkans are of course something that is beneficial for European security and thereby also to the security of the Nordics.

## 4.2. The Baltic States

The ministries of defence of all three Baltic states co-ordinate and provide their SSR related assistance to NATO Partner countries through the NATO PFP programmes – IPAP, MAP, ID and PARP. They also participate in the ESDP missions of EUFOR-ALTHEA and the EU Battle group (BG) but so far the EU has not developed a suitable framework in which these ministries of defence can effectively operate. Scarce resources and also recent experience with the NATO MAP process also make it more relevant for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to disseminate their know-how through the NATO framework to the transition countries queuing up in the waiting room for NATO Membership or Partnership.

Foreign policy goals form the main basis for the Baltic engagement in SSR related activities in third States. However, SSR related activities do not form an integrated system and, as with the Nordic States, the Baltic states take an *ad hoc* approach when viewing different domains in isolation. Different ministries are responsible for supporting activities in their own domains and to keep funding individual programmes without always assessing the overall impact. Being a very new agenda, there is no common

understanding of the role of either international organisations or individual states when it comes to support for SSR.

Many NATO members doubt if the operations of security actors, other than the military, should be a part of the Alliance's mainstream business. While Estonia and Lithuania support NATO's broader view of SSR, which also includes civil society engagement in the reform, Latvia sees the civil society engagement as a non-security related activity, which should be conducted by other organisations such as the EU or OECD and not by the Alliance. In general, The Baltic contribution and support of SSR in third states mostly lies in the dissemination of their own reform experience.

### 4.3. Nordic – Baltic common activities

#### Nordic Initiative

The initial overall aim of *The Nordic Initiative* was to provide a coordinated and combined approach to the activities of the five Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden - in the Western Balkan countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in order to more effectively contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability in the region. The geographic scope of *The Nordic Initiative* has been enlarged to the Ukraine. Also Georgia might become an area of interest.

Within the *Nordic Initiative* a Nordic steering group for the Western Balkans has been formed to co-ordinate different Nordic efforts. The group has been in existence since 2004 and meets every second month.

The Nordic and the Baltic states have joined together in a Nordic-Baltic initiative towards the Ukraine. The initiative was proposed at the end of 2005 and became operational during 2006. The idea behind the initiative was to offer a more significant contribution to Ukrainian defence reform. The Nordic countries can offer guidance based on experience from previous assistance to other nations. The Baltic countries can offer experience from having gone through similar reforms. The group also benefits from having experience of different security and defence policy alignments. The Joint Nordic-Baltic initiative towards the Ukraine forms part of the larger NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Project with the five operational expert teams (plus the assignment of one individual) as follows:

- Defence Resource Management and Finance Management – Finland lead nation, Norway participates;
- Civil-Military Co-operation (Cimic) - Sweden lead nation, Finland participates;
- Public Relations - Lithuania lead nation, Finland, Latvia and Estonia participate;

- Parliamentary Relations - Denmark lead nation, Swedish and Estonia participate;
- Legal issues - Norway lead nation, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland and Swedish participate.
- Support to the Multinational Staff Officers Centre (MSOC) on questions concerning PSO by seconding a Swedish officer to the centre.

Within the framework of the Nordic Initiative support is also given to the following projects:

PRISMA, a project aiming at the resettlement of armed forces personnel in Serbia and Montenegro;

LEPEZA, a similar project to PRISMA in Macedonia;

the Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Sarajevo and the Peacekeeping Operations Centre in Belgrade;

the digitalisation of military archives in Serbia;

training and education abroad for military personnel from the Western Balkans at the Baltic Defence College and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Studies.

In addition to contributing their expertise, some countries also support the overarching NATO-project financially.

#### Other common projects

- Estonian-Swedish-Georgian Joint Environmental Management Project in Vasiani Military Base. The project which started in autumn 2004 should lead to the creation of a Military Environmental Policy Concept and Action Plan for Georgia. An Environmental Management unit is being created within the Georgian General Staff as a result.
- Latvia-Norway-Georgia – Seminar organised in 2006 together with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence on Intelligence Reform Capacity.
- Latvia-Norway-Ukraine – Seminar organised in 2007 together with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence on Intelligence Reform Capacity.
- Baltic cooperation on public relations for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova
- Baltic co-operation with MAP countries on defence reform

#### **4.4. Nordic – Baltic common non-country related activities**

##### BALTDEFCOL

The Baltic Defence College in Tartu is unique in its international set up. The three Baltic countries are responsible for the running of the college, but at the same time there is a group of ten other countries supporting the college by seconding instructors, sending students, etc. All the Nordic countries are participants in this group of supporting countries.

The aim of the Baltic Defence College when it was founded in 1998 was, among other things, to train and educate a new generation of democratically minded and modern-thinking officers for the armed forces of the Baltic states.

BALTDEFCOL should today be considered as perhaps the only existing staff college that is truly international and where the curriculum is totally adapted to NATO standards.

During recent years the Baltic states have offered scholarships to students from other former Soviet republics, giving officers and civil servants from these countries an opportunity to study for a prolonged period among students from modern, western, military organisations.

The Baltic Defence College stands out as an obvious vehicle, in any joint effort by the Nordics and the Baltics, when it comes to promoting democratic reforms in military organisations.

There are many ways in which the college could be utilised in this respect. For example, it could:

- offer scholarships;
- arrange special courses;
- support the creation of similar institutions elsewhere;
- conduct research.

### DCAF

The Geneva Centre for the Democratisation of Armed Forces (DCAF)<sup>31</sup> has the express task of promoting democratic control of the security organisations within a state. It may be considered as the leading European institution in this area. Its activities cover a very broad spectrum of topics related to SSR, such as parliamentary control of the armed forces, legal aspects of security organisations and their work, police and border guard reform, demobilisation and reintegration, gender issues in conflict areas.

The Nordic and the Baltic countries are all members of the DCAF Foundation Council and, therefore, have a certain influence on DCAF activities.

It seems natural that DCAF should be considered as a possible tool for joint Nordic-Baltic SSR endeavours.

### GCSP

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)<sup>32</sup> has played an important role in creating the new Euro-Atlantic security community after the cold war by offering courses on security policy to mid career civil servants, diplomats and military officers. So far 790 students have attended courses at the GCSP. The activities of the centre have recently expanded to also cover Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

As with DCAF, all the Nordic and Baltic countries are members of the GCSP Foundation Council. This fact opens up the possibility of engaging GCSP in the SSR activities sponsored by the Nordic and Baltic countries.

### NBG

The Nordic Battle Group (NBG) is the best integrated military unit in the Nordic-Baltic context. Within the NBG personnel from Estonia, Finland, Norway and Sweden train and work together and operate under common routines and procedures. The possibilities of using the NBG as a platform for teaching and developing joint Nordic-Baltic procedures for use in SSR projects should not be underestimated.

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<sup>31</sup> [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch) , 2007-04-17

<sup>32</sup> [www.gcsp.ch](http://www.gcsp.ch) , 2007-04-17

## **4.5. Some conclusions regarding ongoing Nordic-Baltic activities**

The full picture of Nordic-Baltic SSR activities gives a very diverse impression. There ought to be a great potential for synergies in terms of both economy and efficiency (impact).

Some of the already existing common activities and institutions offer good opportunities for applying different methods leading to deeper co-operation particularly with regard to training, education and research.

The combined resources of the Nordics and the Baltic states offer a great variety of competences which should give ample possibilities to find different areas for co-operation, and also to tailor projects to suit most recipients.

Earlier co-operation between the Nordics and the Baltic states has created a common platform of thinking when it comes to how SSR projects should be handled, both from the point of view of the donor and the recipient.

To some extent there are diverging views when it comes to the role of SSR, ie. a more altruistic Nordic approach compared with a more security-oriented approach (own security) in the Baltic states. This might be solved by compromise when it comes to possible target areas (geographic).

The stronger emphasis on NATO by the Baltic states, compared with the Nordics – especially Sweden – where the EU is perhaps the more preferred framework, might create problems. Co-operative Nordic-Baltic ventures should benefit from better co-ordination between the two organisations.

## 5. Other factors promoting success

Apart from factors such as special expertise or political suitability derived from the characteristics of different countries participating in a SSR-project there are also some other things that should be taken into account when considering the merits of different Nordic and Baltic initiatives. As the aim of this paper is to suggest how, and in which areas, the Nordics and the Baltic states could initiate and run common projects it seems appropriate to highlight some of these “non state dependent factors”.

The discussion concerning these factors is mainly based on experience connected with the support given by the Nordics to the Baltic states during the nineteen nineties.

### 5.1. A clear vision of what should be achieved

In the case of the Baltic states it was clear from the beginning that the aim was to replace Soviet-type methods and thinking with western norms and procedures. This made it relatively easy to introduce new ideas that were acceptable to the recipients. The Soviet system was so discredited, even hated, that more or less anything different was welcome. Also the task of the security agencies, mainly the military and the border guards, was clear. It was a question of defending the territorial integrity of the countries. When it came to the military there was a consensus on the strategic, operational and tactical concept that should be introduced. Altogether this created a very good environment for change and co-operation.

In an astonishingly short time, in all three Baltic states, a credible comprehensive, total defence organisation<sup>33</sup>, a modern legal framework and, perhaps what was most pleasing, a military organisation appreciated by the population were created. This situation might be considered as unique compared with the tasks which the Nordics and the Baltic states might have to take on in the future, in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, it clearly

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<sup>33</sup> In no case was a comprehensive “Total Defence” concept fully implemented, but there were thought-through strategies and plans upon which to build. The Baltic states, having joined NATO, adopted a new strategy and new priorities, but that does not alter the fact that Nordic-Baltic co-operation during the 1990’s should be regarded as a success story, although not without problems during the process. Now the Baltic states are established members of both NATO and the EU. Although there will always be a debate on the relative importance of external help this only illustrates the problems with measuring the impact of different SSR activities – which, in this report, is recommended to become an area of academic research.

shows how important it is to have a common goal on which all parties can agree and are prepared to work for.

## 5.2. First hand experience is invaluable

Although the heading might sound self evident it should be stressed. In the mid 1990's when the Baltic states were striving at building total defence concepts similar to those in the Nordic countries, including conscription, they also received advice from other countries that relied on wholly professional armed forces and who were members of NATO. Very often it turned out that officers from these latter countries had no clue whatsoever of the advantages, disadvantages and organisational consequences of relying on conscripts for manning units or what the Nordic total defence concept meant. This is, however, not surprising, as like most people, they tended to refer to their own experience and training when confronted with a problem. This created quite a lot of confusion as representatives of the Baltic states, with no experience of either system, were forced to take decisions on contradictory advice.

The same situation, but in reverse, happened in the early 2000's when it became clear that the Baltic states were going to join NATO. As at this time the Swedish and Finnish advisors had very little to offer when it came to topics such as NATO staff procedures or how to structure a wholly professional army, etc.

## 5.3. Too many cooks

One problem related to "First hand experience" was that far too many countries, and, to some extent, also "free lancers" were involved in advisory activities in the Baltic states. The duplication or even triplication of advisory activities in certain areas did not just create confusion but also resulted in unhealthy competition between different advisory groups; sometimes they were even slandering each other. Apart from this, ministers and other high-ranking people sometimes hired personal advisers from abroad, complicating matters still more.

The Nordics plus other donor countries set out quite successfully to eliminate these problems among themselves by creating a co-ordinating body, BALTSEA<sup>34</sup>, where all projects sponsored by them were discussed and where agreements were made on different work-sharing arrangements. The BALTSEA forum was created to support the Baltic

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<sup>34</sup> BALTSEA consisted of the Baltic states, the Nordics, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, France, Poland, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and Iceland



states in pursuing defence related goals and in becoming members of NATO. The forum was dissolved after the membership goal was fulfilled.

It has to be admitted that although agreements had been made within BALTSEA, some countries or individuals representing countries, still pursued policies contradictory to those agreed upon.

BALTSEA also had the great advantage that it was a forum for debate on projects that ought to be initiated, including ideas often coming from the Baltic states themselves, or agencies working in some specific area, where they saw a need for complementary action.

## **6. Other factors to take into consideration**

### **6.1. SSR and democracy**

Often SSR is seen as part of a process aiming at introducing democratic reforms in a country. This might be seen as an obvious prerequisite for engaging oneself in activities that might hopefully lead to better functioning and more efficient security organisations and institutions in a certain country. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the answer is not that easy.

There might be countries where it is seen to be in another third country's own interest, or in the interest of some special group in the country concerned, to increase the efficiency of institutions such as the border guard, customs, anti corruption agencies and others, although the prospects for democracy in that country in the near future appear to be quite bleak. Of course, there is always the prospect that SSR- projects in such countries will also promote the spread of democratic ideas in the long run but, nevertheless, it constitutes a problem. It is a hard task to explain the merits of a policy that aims at strengthening parts of the security sector in a country with a dubious reputation when it comes to human rights and other criteria but which are seen as essential in a democracy.

A parallel that could be drawn is how we tend to look at development aid. Very often the needs of some parts of the population, such as women and children or circumstances that force people to emigrate, are regarded as more important than fallacies in the overall system. The same approach could to a certain extent be applied to SSR. On occasion there might be very good reasons to help a country to reform its police force and judicial system or its coast guard in order to come to grips with the systematic abuse of certain groups in society or to hinder uncontrolled emigration and this regardless of the political system in the country concerned.

### **6.2. Top down or bottom up?**

The EU has traditionally had the 'bottom up' approach when initiating different support or aid programmes such as police reform, border guard training etc.<sup>35</sup> It could also be called a functional approach as in trying to reform different sectors in society, regardless

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<sup>35</sup> *Schroeder Ursula*, European University Institute – Florence, presentation at the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 26 January 2007.

of the large picture, it nevertheless puts more emphasis on practical results than on declaratory actions.

The ‘top down’ approach, involving the commission in direct dialogue with governments in the receiving countries, also has a role of course and especially when it comes to creating an environment in which more practical action can be undertaken.

Both approaches are probably necessary in the long run to create stable democracies with a well functioning security sector, but it is not axiomatic that they have to be pursued with great energy at the same time. Pressing needs in a receiving as well as in a donor country (countries), as discussed in “SSR and democracy”, might very well lead to different priorities in different cases.

When it comes to common Nordic – Baltic states’ activities it is quite obvious that they will mostly belong to the ‘bottom up’ category. It will be a question of using the available expertise in different areas to help to reform or build structures that are a part of the security sector. It is hard to see situations where different constellations of the Nordics and the Baltic states, or when acting as a block, could replace the UN or the European Commission in making deals with governments. When it comes to “top down” the role of the Nordics and the Baltic states is most likely to be in making common suggestions in the appropriate assemblies and thereby initiating action by the governing bodies of the larger organisations.

### **6.3. Measuring success**

Another problem with SSR is the difficulty of measuring the effect of different actions. In many cases the aim of a project is to change the way people think such as convincing people that the old ways of conducting business is wrong. This can be the case in former communist states, countries where ethnic or religious loyalties take precedence over the laws of the country as well countries where, due to weak state structures over a long period of time, people have become used to fend for themselves rather than relying on the state when it comes to basic security needs and rights.

A widely used method has been to try to indoctrinate future generations of military and police officers, as well as civil servants, with our values concerning good governance, democratic control and human rights by offering them training and education outside their

home country. This includes enrolling cadets in “western” war academies<sup>36</sup>, mid career officer training at staff academies<sup>37</sup>, police courses and other similar activities<sup>38</sup>. This approach builds on the assumption that the people concerned will, over time, influence the thinking in their respective organisations and hopefully, some of them, will eventually reach decision-making positions in their respective countries. Although it seems that this method does work there is very little hard evidence on how effective it is. The case of Iran during the last Shah’s regime (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1941 – 1979) could even be an example of where just the opposite was the result. Regardless of how good or bad this method might be it is obvious that it is a very long term investment where the results will only show in 10-15 years time, and then it will be very hard to tell how much of that progress can be attributed to this and how much has depended on other factors.

There are of course areas where the possibilities to evaluate success is, or at least should be, greater. Things that can be measured physically are easier to follow. If the amount of smuggled goods from a certain location decreases it could be an indication that the border guards or customs concerned are becoming more efficient. If soldiers get the food they are supposed to get, relative to the money allocated or if the allocated petrol and munitions for training is available it could be a sign that the actions taken to minimise corruption in the logistic chain are having an effect.

This leads to the conclusion that if we are interested in evaluating the success of different projects, resources also have to be set aside for this evaluation as well as for the action itself. It is also important that relevant methods are developed. There is always the risk that you measure the wrong things, ie. something that is easy to measure and that you will run the risk of offending officials in the receiving country by creating a feeling that you do not trust them. Often a good solution is to post your own people, for prolonged periods, at institutions or in units, both to instruct on the methods you want to promote and to observe if, and how, performance changes. Such a solution has the added advantage that your personnel get to know the local officials and hopefully also gain their trust, both things being a prerequisite for an open exchange of views and thereby also in influencing people’s minds.

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<sup>36</sup> During the 1990’s Sweden trained a large number of cadets from the Baltic states at the Swedish War Academy, Karlberg

<sup>37</sup> Currently (September 2007) officers from several countries are participating in the General Staff Course at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu

<sup>38</sup> Swedish police officers have participated in the training of Iraqi police officers in Jordan

## 7. Possible Nordic-Baltic co-operation

### 7.1. Advantages to gain

The idea of co-operation in itself refers to more than one actor in the field or common activities for preparing personnel and projects. Whereas one actor may be successful, several actors with similar interests together may reach the goal faster and more efficiently. When it comes to co-operation between the Baltic and the Nordic states in the field of the security sector, there are several advantages.

- Economic factors - burden-sharing in terms of costs would make it easier to carry through large-scale activities or activities that involve expensive expertise or the acquisition of expensive equipment. Nevertheless, minimizing the costs should be a positive side-effect of economic co-operation rather than the primary (and only) goal. Good co-operation enables participating states to offer the best and most suitable solution to a recipient country. Increased and well-planned financial contributions from all partners will make it possible to achieve a greater effect in the end.
- Sustainability - creating a common pool of expertise would, in the long run, give the Nordic and Baltic experts a good opportunity to think and act together. When it comes to security sector reform, expertise and know-how differ between the Baltic and the Nordic countries. At the same time, however, it makes it possible to combine different experiences into a more comprehensive regional view, thus helping to create a better understanding of both NATO and the EU and to bring different approaches closer to each other. The importance of personal contacts between experts should not be underestimated as they often turn out to create the most efficient networks to run projects. These relationships are essential in securing sustainability in co-operation.
- Regional co-operation will be strengthened through common activities. Successful projects will further encourage co-operation and build confidence between the Baltic and the Nordic countries. Another aspect to point out is that successful co-operation in one area will very probably create spill-over effects into other areas. The Baltic and the Nordic countries will be brought closer together, contributing to a stronger regional identity and a louder regional voice in the EU and NATO.

- Nordic-Baltic regional co-operation sets a good example to other regions. Long-term common projects often force the participating governments to face the challenges of combining national interests, domestic politics, common values and financial resources with regional ones. Effective regional co-operation presupposes the sharing of some core principles as well as common values, historical, cultural or religious backgrounds. Nordic-Baltic co-operation has been facilitated and supported by common democratic values, cultural and religious closeness. The Baltic Defence College in Tartu, one of the most successful Nordic-Baltic common projects, shows that compromises are possible and difficulties can be overcome if the project serves a good purpose.
- None of the countries pursues an “own agenda” when it comes to promoting interests in a certain area because no one country has the possibility to dominate its partners completely. In the case of the Nordic countries, it can be explained by the long tradition of co-operation and a certain division of labour, whereas the Baltic states, on the other hand, are in the process of building up their niche capacities and lack sufficient resources. Besides, a common agenda based on common understanding should make the Nordic-Baltic block an attractive partner even for big countries and a serious regional voice in both the EU and NATO. An ability to act jointly and come up with common proposals, enhancing the security situation in the region and its neighbourhood, would strengthen regional security co-operation and make a valuable contribution to the ESDP. NATO on the other hand, would benefit from non-members’ insights and competencies.
- The Baltic states over a rather short period of time have developed into modern democratic societies, with growing economies and low levels of corruption. This achievement has resulted in their membership of both the EU and NATO. The Nordic countries have recognized this effort by accepting the Baltic states as stable democracies and equal partners. This recognition is the clearest sign that the Baltic states have managed to become reliable and trustworthy actors in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic example should be encouraging for other transition democracies and for other small countries in terms of building a stronger regional identity and increasing the capacity to co-operate.

## 7.2. Possible areas of co-operation

When considering areas where Nordic-Baltic co-operation could be enhanced already existing, institutionalised, co-operative ventures have been looked into, as a first alternative, as candidates for further development. The main reason for this approach is economy and that already existing expertise and structures can be utilised. The possibility of using existing schemes, where such an activity is chosen for a Nordic-Baltic arrangement, will most certainly shorten the start-up time.

Some common institutions or arrangements, where new activities could be introduced or ongoing projects enhanced, within a Nordic-Baltic co-operative framework are listed below:

The Baltic Defence College could be used as a platform for creating and arranging different types of common courses on SSR. The college would also probably be well suited to undertake research in this area. All the Nordic and Baltic states are “stakeholders” in the college and since its foundation have sent instructors to teach there. Procedures for cost sharing and dealing with other administrative expenses such as housing, travel, etc, are already in existence.

There is a long tradition of co-operation and work-sharing among the Nordic countries concerning training for UN missions. The UN Police Officers Course (UNPOC), Civil Military Relations Course (CMR), UN Civilian Staff Officer Course (UNCIVSOC), International Police Development Course (IPDC), UN Police Commander Course in Sweden, UN Military Observers Course (UNMOC) in Finland and the International Police Basic Course (IPBC in Denmark) are all, to a greater or lesser degree, Nordic co-operative ventures. Engaging the Baltic states in these courses would create a broader base for recruiting instructors and could also introduce new experiences into the curriculum.

The second way to explore areas where Nordic- Baltic co-operation could offer advantages is to look at ongoing activities where several countries already co-operate (see table “Ordered according to type of activity” in **Appendix 3**) and where it is obvious that one or more countries have special expertise. Activities that stand out as possible areas for co-operation are:

All aspects of the Coast Guard from creating a modern organisation to training. Norway, with its obvious expertise in this area, and Sweden already participate in such activities (Sweden within the framework of DCAF).

The Border Guard: Finland’s very long experience in this field combined with the recent experience of the Baltic states when creating their own organisations makes this an attractive option.

Public relations, in connection with the transformation of different security sector organisations, targeted at the organisations themselves and the public. Here all countries except Sweden and Denmark are engaged. This indicates that it might be an area where increased co-operation could be beneficial.

Advise on defence reform aimed mainly at creating organisations that fulfil the NATO criteria for contributing to Membership Action Plans (MAP). Obviously countries that are already members have to be the main contributors in such activities. Norway and all the Baltic states are already engaged in such programs. In this context also “the Small State perspective” should be seen as a definite advantage giving the recipients different inputs than they might get from the great powers or from NATO and the EU, both being organisations where great power interests sometimes dominate.

Planning, budgeting and accounting in the security sector is a crucial area in the use of allocated resources in an efficient way and to combat corruption. Norway, Estonia and

Lithuania are all engaged in different projects in this field. The Nordics, with their traditionally good reputation (hopefully) when it comes to transparency and honesty, and the Baltic states, with their experience of how to transform old communist-style systems to modern western economic systems, could represent a formidable team in this sphere. Legal issues are of crucial importance when creating modern and democratically run security organisations. In some instances this could even be a question of human rights. This area, therefore, also seems to be a candidate for co-operative ventures. Several countries are engaged in munitions disposal. As the training of the people involved is quite expensive and has to cover very broad areas of expertise (such as different kinds of munitions) this seems to be an obvious candidate for joint efforts, especially when it comes to pre-mission training.

Apart from the specific areas of expertise or activities where co-operation could be advantageous some measures that could enhance co-ordination should also be considered. The Baltic states are full and active members of the South Caucasus Clearing House whereas Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are only observers with no specific agenda. To facilitate matters and to co-ordinate efforts in the Caucasus the Nordic countries should also take a more focused interest in the region.

A prerequisite for enhanced co-operation, when it comes to activities in the mission area, and early preparations represent a kind of organised and structured co-ordination.

The creation of a Nordic-Baltic pool of experts in different areas could not just create resources for different contingencies but also facilitate co-operation by enhancing the possibilities to take on tasks that no single country has the ability to handle on its own, due to lack of expertise. Norway has already taken a step in that direction by preparing some of its MoD personnel for SSR missions. A part of this scheme should also be to investigate the availability of different kinds of competence in the Nordic and Baltic states. If this pool of resources is to be of any use some kind of co-ordination is necessary in at least information exchange according to certain common procedures.

### **7.3. Possible stumbling blocks**

The reasons why the Nordic and the Baltic states should co-operate within the area of security sector reform are many and most of them are both logical and pragmatic aimed at the more efficient and effective outcome of the reform in the recipient country. Nevertheless, there are several stumbling blocks to overcome if such co-operation is to reach its full potential.

Without going into detail in discussing the formation of a Nordic identity, one has to keep in mind its long history. The geographical closeness and a certain isolation of the Scandinavian Peninsula (by the Baltic Sea) as well as close historical and cultural ties have helped to create a strong regional identity. All the Nordic countries are well-functioning and transparent democracies with stable economies. The Nordic model of a welfare state has become an example for many societies. Based on these factors Nordic



co-operation in different areas is also well established. The Nordics have discussed, planned and conducted international operations together for the last 30 years.

In contrast, Baltic identity is still developing and the “speaking with one voice” phenomenon has been more difficult to achieve. The Baltic states act less as a “bloc” and, as a result, regional unity and joint action is less evident. After fifty years of Soviet occupation, the process of reconstruction of a nation state and the striving for a national identity has taken precedence over the formation of a regional identity. Finding common denominators for the Baltic and Nordic neighbours may, therefore, be more time consuming than might be expected at first glance. On the other hand, Nordic-Baltic joint ventures might give an impetus to the ongoing process of forming a Baltic identity.

Nordic unity and long co-operation experience makes it more difficult for the Baltics to join in on the same conditions. The Baltic states are still sometimes regarded as “not full members” of the “club”, with a soviet past and scarce resources and with very little experience as donor countries. The Nordic tendency to dominate in the decision-making process may cause a reluctance to co-operate within the Baltic states. In order to carry through a successful project one would need to establish clear rules of engagement.

Another aspect of successful co-operation in respect of the recipient countries is to display regional expertise and knowledge of local circumstances. Partners need to agree on the most suitable approach and pattern of behaviour to help carry through reform in a recipient country – ie. the Nordic way versus the Baltic way. Experiences differ and so do competencies, which means that the one who knows best takes the lead in the project. Nordic experts often possess excellent academic knowledge of the former Soviet Union. They usually also have the advantage of sufficient economic resources for initiating projects. But in many post-soviet states they are regarded as “outsiders” without practical experience on how to handle post-soviet transformation, which is why Baltic experts often see themselves as better suited for consultancy tasks in the area of the former Soviet Union. The Baltic experts are usually more trusted and treated as “insiders” in these regions.

When it comes to the selection of recipient countries, the Nordics and the Baltic states often have different priorities. The Baltic states focus their security-related outreach activities on the states of the former Soviet Union. This can partly be explained by the limited resources, which dictate that investment should be directed towards a limited number of countries where the highest “added value” can be expected. The sharing of a common past makes the Baltic experience more relevant in the post-soviet region. Also, these countries belong within the immediate Baltic neighbourhood and influence the Baltic security situation.

The Baltic selection of countries to assist is also partly due to NATO membership. As recent members of the transatlantic Alliance, the Baltic states are best suited for disseminating experience and know-how of the MAP process among aspirant countries like the Ukraine or Georgia.

The Nordic countries, on the other hand, have focused on the Balkans and Africa. In the case of the Balkans, the reasons are obvious. There are historical ties and continuity as well as the principle of completing processes and missions that have been started. Also, the Balkans lie in the heart of Europe, which makes it a natural choice from the EU security perspective.

The same can be said about Africa. Africa has always been of interest to Europe and the Nordic countries have been engaged in missions in Africa for many years.

The Baltics are more focused on NATO and the Nordics are more focused on the EU. Finding overlapping interests would be necessary.

A rather controversial point is the donor profile of a country. All the Baltic and Nordic states try to develop a niche capacity, which they would like to keep in order to avoid overlap and duplication, ie. Estonia has profiled itself by participating in NATO PfP SOFA seminars and the training of the aspirant countries to implement the NATO legal acquis. Latvia has been good in guiding the aspirants through the MAP process. Lithuania is training officers. Finland trains military observers and Norway probably has the greatest competence in coast guard matters. Should these niche capacities be agreed upon? Should they be further developed or are they changing variables?

One of the biggest stumbling blocks is the financing of possible co-operation as there is no common platform or mechanism for this. How should the costs be divided between the partners when views on how defence planning should be conducted differ from country to country?

Constitutional differences as regards the responsibilities of a minister contra the heads of various agencies.

Different routines and procedures when it comes to running the state and its organisations (legislation, auditing, personnel).

The last two obstacles are not just practical (solvable) problems between the participants in joint Nordic-Baltic projects but rather a question of potential controversy when it comes to recommending a target country to adopt a certain model.

## 8. Recommendations

Three main criteria have been used in the following recommendations.

The costs achieved by better co-ordination and enhanced co-operation have to be in proportion to the results achieved. It may even be possible to reduce costs although this seems quite unlikely. Enhanced co-operation and co-ordination always involve a cost that has to be weighed against the expected gains in efficiency. Therefore, special attention has been paid here to already existing programs that could be enlarged and improved by attracting resources from more participants without increasing the overheads.

'Reinventing the wheel' should be avoided, meaning that where there are already well functioning activities they might be enhanced without changing existing structures. If a certain country has a successful program of some kind there should be no need to transform it into a co-operative venture. Rather, the present lead country should continue in its present role and other countries might be invited to support the programme in one way or another.

A recommended action should lead to a real improvement; enhanced co-operation and co-ordination for its own sake should be avoided. A method that has been applied has been to look for synergies that might lead to actions resulting in a greater impact in the receiving countries, especially in the Caucasus, Central Asia and in the Balkans. In so doing, we have attempted to find ways to merge the Baltic states' experience of transforming their own structures with personnel and economic resources from the Nordic countries.

The above criteria have led to the following recommendations:

1. A joint *Nordic-Baltic conference on SSR* should be arranged. The aim of the conference being to give all countries concerned an opportunity to present their views on SSR and to create an opportunity for the "SSR-community" in the region to meet. Organisations such as the EU, NATO, DCAF and others should also be invited. The conference could serve as a starting point for further initiatives.
2. A *Nordic-Baltic Co-ordination Committee* for joint SSR activities should be formed. The primary aim of the committee would be to function as a venue for information exchange, thereby making it possible to avoid the duplication of projects and also to facilitate the start up and running of common projects. Due

to the very wide scope of SSR the committee should have representatives from all (most) ministries that are involved in SSR.

3. The *Baltic Defence College* should be used as one of the main vehicles for training Nordic-Baltic personnel on SSR matters. The college should also be utilised, to a larger extent than today, for the training of military and civilian personnel from “target” countries. It should be developed into a Nordic – Baltic centre for academic research on SSR.
4. A *database* should be set up where all those states concerned listed their assets available for different SSR tasks including also ongoing and planned activities. If enough resources could be made available the administrative handling of the database could be developed into a Nordic-Baltic SSR secretariat, thereby creating an institutionalised memory on SSR.
5. The Nordics should take a more active role in the *South Caucasus Clearing House* as this is a geographic area which the Baltic states have prioritised. This is probably a prerequisite for joint action in the area.
6. The Nordics and the Baltic states should launch a *common initiative* on how to better co-ordinate EU and NATO SSR activities (see point 9. below).
7. Joint Nordic-Baltic working/research groups should be initiated on how to *evaluate different SSR activities* in regions where joint activities have been conducted.
8. The possibility of creating a joint Nordic-Baltic training centre for the disposal of unexploded munitions, booby-traps and similar devices should be investigated.
9. In ongoing projects concerning *Defence Planning and Coast/Border Guards* it should immediately be investigated whether these could be turned into joint Nordic-Baltic projects. The reason for this being that, in some cases, this would enhance the credibility of the advice given (when representatives from the Baltic states are included) and, in other cases, it would probably give the recipient a more unbiased view of different solutions (when non NATO or non EU members are included).

The Nordic and Baltic states should, together, initiate a study on how to achieve better burden sharing between the European Union and NATO and how to better co-ordinate the activities of both organisations (this is probably a prerequisite for point 6. above).

## **Future studies**

A study should be initiated on how the Nordic Battle Group could be “institutionalised” (a standing fully manned staff) and used as a vehicle for establishing common Nordic-Baltic procedures. This would open up the possibilities for the continuous training of not just officers from the Nordic and the Baltic countries but also for officers from SSR “target countries” in areas such as:

- Civilian - military co-operation and interaction;
- Peace Support operations;
- NATO staff procedures;

And all of this should be achieved within a “small country” environment. Such a concept could serve as a superb complement to the more theoretical education at BALTDEFCOL.

## 9. Appendix 1: Examples of EU and NATO SSR-activities

### 9.1. ESDP civilian, police and military operations

- Currently the European Union is engaged in the following operations<sup>39</sup>:
- EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
- EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)
- EU Planning team in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo)
- EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)
- EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah)
- EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST Lex)
- EU police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa)
- EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DR Congo)
- EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur)

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<sup>39</sup> [www.consilium.europa.eu](http://www.consilium.europa.eu) , 2007-05-29

Earlier the European Union also conducted operations in Georgia (EUJUST Themis) and Aceh (AMM). Although the European Union puts its emphasis on operations in its near neighbourhood it also has a global reach which gives great flexibility for its members to both participate in areas where they might find it advantageous or to suggest new operations.

## 9.2. NATO led Operations

NATO is currently leading the following operations:

- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
- The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- NATO's Assistance to the African Union for Darfur
- NATO's Assistance to Iraq. Training of military Personnel
- NATO's peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, "Operation Allied Harmony" (Skopje HQ)
- NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR)
- NATO led Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean
- NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Project

## 10. Appendix 2: Examples of Nordic and Baltic SSR-activities

### 10.1. The Nordics

#### Denmark

##### Afghanistan

- Denmark has a battalion sized contingent in Afghanistan with the task of protecting and supporting ongoing efforts to rebuild Afghan society;
- Danish personnel are also engaged in three Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT): the Swedish led PRT in Mazar El Sharif, the German led PRT in Feyzabad and the Lithuanian led PRT in Chagcharan.

##### Albania

- Support in establishing a logistics organisation for the armed forces.

##### Bosnia

- Training for Peace Operations;
- Scholarships to NATO schools.

##### Congo

- Part of MONUC with the task of monitoring the cease fire agreement.

##### Croatia

- Feasibility study with Norway on the establishment of an underwater diving school.

##### Ethiopia and Eritrea

- Implementation and observation of border agreements.



Georgia

- Observers both under UN as well as OSCE command.

Iraq

- Battalion sized contingent with the task of protecting the civilian population and supporting the rebuilding of society. Lithuania also has personnel attached to this Danish unit.

Kosovo

- Battalion sized unit in KFOR with a Lithuanian platoon attached;
- Police mission including a small military component;
- Investigation, based on Kosovo ISSD, concerning possible Nordic support.

Macedonia

- Support to a Norwegian project concerning retraining military personnel.

Montenegro

- Participation, together with Norway, in a programme aimed at retraining NCOs;
- Lead nation in an investigation, together with Norway, concerning support in establishing a ministry of defence;
- Support concerning the disposal of surplus munitions.

Middle East

- Participation in UNTSO

Pakistan- India

- Observers in UNMOGIP

Serbia

- Participation, together with Norway, in a programme aimed at retraining NCOs;
- Training of Military Police;
- Scholarships to Serbian students at the Baltic Defence College and GCSP.

Ukraine

- Lead nation, within the framework of the Nordic- Baltic Initiative and the Joint NATO Group on Defence Reform, in a project concerning parliamentary relations and democratic control of the security sector. Sweden is also participating in this project.

Western Sahara

- Observers

General, non-country related, preparations

- Denmark has a long tradition of running international military police courses.

Special expertise

According to officials at the Danish MoD, Denmark might be especially well suited to take on tasks in the following areas:

- Resettlement of armed forces personnel;
- Civil – military co-operation;
- Environmental questions in connection with military activities;
- Parliamentary oversight of the security sector;
- Logistics.

**Finland**Afghanistan (ISAF)

- The Finnish engagement in Afghanistan is mainly geared towards CIMIC related activities which are partly funded by the Finnish MoD and the EU.
- Finland also has personnel in the PRTs in Mazar e Sharif and Maimana.
- Some staff and liaison officers also serve in Kabul.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (KFOR)

- Finland is mainly engaged in different support functions such as communications and military police.

Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)

- Implementation and observation of border agreement (Denmark also participates in this mission).

India and Pakistan

- Observer mission (Sweden and Denmark also participate in this mission).

Kosovo (KFOR)

- Battalion sized unit having the responsibility for running the signals and communication network in a brigade area.
- There is ongoing co-operation with Latvia and Sweden within the framework of the Multinational Task Force Centre.

Liberia (UNMIL)

- The main task of the mission is demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration and rehabilitation. Finland participates with observers.

Middle East (UNTSO)

- Observer mission (Sweden and Denmark also participate in this mission).

Sudan (UNMIS)

- Finnish staff officers participate within the framework of SHIRBRIG.

EU BG

- Finland participates in the Swedish led Nordic Battle Group.

General, non-country related, preparations

- Finland has a long tradition of running international courses for military observers.

**Norway**

Afghanistan

- Norway presently participates in Afghanistan with app 500 personnel. Norway is lead nation for the PRT in Meymaneh.

Africa

- Supporting the development of African military capabilities within the framework of SHIRBRIG.

Albania

- Providing information on the workings and structure of the Norwegian Coast Guard.

Croatia

- Supporting the Croatian Coast Guard by conducting courses for Croatian personnel;
- Conducting a feasibility study, together with Denmark, for creating a Croatian underwater/diving school.

Georgia

- As the lead nation, together with Latvia, giving advice on the development of the Georgian Intelligence Services.

Macedonia

- Courses and seminars for MoD personnel on budgeting, peace support operations and media handling;
- Retraining of armed forces personnel. The project is run by Norway and supported by Denmark;
- Donations of military communications equipment.

Montenegro

- Retraining of armed forces personnel. The part of the programme that is aimed at NGOs is run together with Denmark;
- Participating in an investigation concerning the possibilities of supporting the creation of a ministry of defence. Denmark is lead nation in the project.

Russia

- Retraining of armed forces (mainly naval) personnel from the Russian Northern Fleet. The programme is run by Bodö University.

Serbia

- Retraining of armed forces personnel. The part of the programme that is aimed at NCOs is run together with Denmark;
- Supporting work on a Serbian Strategic Defence Review and acting as lead nation in the NATO Defence Reform Group concerning advice to the Serbian Ministry of Defence;
- Support with budgetary models for the Ministry of Defence;
- Co-operation in the military medical area in Serbia as well as offering courses in Norway;
- Supporting the creation of a Peace Support Centre;
- Supporting the creation of a Security Policy Centre.

Ukraine

- Retraining of armed forces personnel;
- Education on gender issues within the framework of peace-keeping training;
- Training of Coast Guard personnel in Norway;

Participation in the NATO “Professional Development Programme” in five expert teams:

- Planning and Budgeting (Norway lead)
- CIMIC (Sweden lead and also Finnish participation)
- Public Relations (Lithuania lead also Latvian and Finnish participation)
- Parliamentary Relations (Denmark lead also Swedish participation)
- Legal issues (Norway lead also Latvian, Lithuanian, Finnish and Swedish participation).

EU BG

- Participation in the Swedish led Nordic Battle Group.

General preparations – non country related

20% of the personnel of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence have participated in a one week course on SSR and are in readiness to serve abroad within one month. The areas within this scheme where specific support can be rendered by Norwegian MoD personnel are:

- Creating policy
- Planning and budgeting
- Parliamentary oversight
- Personnel planning

Activities under consideration

- Enhanced activities in Georgia similar to those presently going on in the Ukraine (see above)
- Support in developing the security sector in East Timor
- Joint deployments with Serbia (probably for medical support in Africa)

Special expertise

According to officials in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence Norway may be especially well suited to take on tasks in the following areas:

- Procedures and expert knowledge in the running of a small sized; integrated ministry of defence (approx. 300 personnel);
- Defence planning and budgeting in a NATO environment for a modern medium sized military organisation;
- Retraining of former armed forces personnel;
- Coast Guard activities (in broad terms).

**Sweden**Afghanistan

- Sweden currently runs a PRT in Mazar e Sharif, Northern Afghanistan, where the Swedish contingent operates together with Afghan police and military. Finland and Denmark also have personnel in this PRT;
- There are Swedish military personnel seconded to an Observation and Liaison Team and an Afghan brigade HQ. This year Swedish officers will also act as instructors at the Afghan National Defence College in Kabul;
- As part of an EU operation there will be EU police personnel attached to the Swedish PRT.

Albania

- Participation with instructors in the Finnish led programme of training military observers.

Bosnia

- Participation in a Liaison and Observation Team (LOT) as well as staff officers seconded to KFOR HQ in Sarajevo;

- Mine clearing personnel acting as both instructors and conducting their own mine clearing operations;
- Instructors at the Sarajevo Peace Operations Centre.

#### Kosovo

- Sweden currently leads a Task Force Centre in Kosovo which contains battalion sized units from Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.
- There is a Lithuanian platoon within the task force which also contains police personnel from Sweden.

#### Serbia

- Participation in the Programme for Resettlement in Serbia and Montenegro (PRISMA) which is a programme for retraining NCOs.
- Exchange of information and experience concerning crisis management, peace support operations;
- Sponsoring Serbian participation in DCAF courses on border guard issues.

#### EU BG

- Sweden is the framework nation for the Nordic Battle Group in which Estonia, Finland and Norway also participate.

## **10.2. The Baltic States**

### **Estonia**

#### Afghanistan

##### *ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)*

- The current contribution includes a Cross Service Team (CST) and a staff officer in ISAF HQ in Kabul;
- In Southern Afghanistan there is a contingent commander and staff officers in RC (S) (*Regional Command South*), staff officers in UKTF (*United Kingdom Task Force*), a National Support Element (ESTCON NSE), Close Protection Team, Infantry Company, HUMINT team and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team - a total deployment of 131 troops;
- Estonia's first civilian representative in Afghanistan has been stationed at the Lashkar Gah PRT in Helmand province since September 2006. A second civilian representative was seconded to the Afghanistan MOD in February 2007 as an adviser on parliamentary, social relations and public affairs.

Armenia

- Seminar on Personnel Management in Yerevan followed by ‘on-the-job’ training in Estonia;
- Seminar on Public Relations issues together with Latvia and Lithuania in Yerevan;
- Consultations on National Security Strategy by Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian advisers in Brussels and Yerevan.

Azerbaijan

The same kind of assistance concerning public relations and personnel management will be offered to Azerbaijan as to Armenia (see above).

Bosnia and Herzegovina EUFOR-ALTHEA (*European Union Force Operation Althea*)

- Estonia’s current contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA comprises staff officers serving in NATO HQ (NHQ) Sarajevo and in EUFOR HQ Command Group, EUFOR HQ, as well as an infantry platoon (ESTGUARD-3) in EUFOR MNTF (N). The platoon serves in Tuzla (Camp Eagle Base) as part of a Czech-Austrian-Estonian-Slovak Security company and is manned by the Estonian Defence League.

EU BG (*EU Battle group*)

- Estonia will participate in the Swedish led Nordic Battle Group with a force protection/close protection unit plus medical, logistic personnel and staff officers.

Georgia

- Estonia conducted a NATO PfP SOFA Seminar in Tbilisi (implementation of NATO legal *acquis*);
- Estonia is engaged in a trilateral (EST-SWE-GEO) environmental project concerning assistance with drawing up Georgia’s concept for military environmental management;
- Consultations on a defence planning system;
- Consultations on NSA-related issues and information security;
- ‘On-the-job’ training for Georgian personnel in the Legal Department and Defence Planning Department of the Estonian MoD;
- Active participation in the South Caucasus Clearing House;
- Estonian has a defence adviser residing in Tbilisi.

IraqOIF (*Operation Iraqi Freedom*)/NTM-I (*NATO Training Mission in Iraq*)

- An infantry platoon (ESTPLA-14) is currently stationed in Al Taji camp northwest of Baghdad;
- Staff officers assigned to MNC-I and to NTM-I.
- One contact officer in US CENTCOM.
- Within the NTM-I Estonia has donated automatic rifles to the Iraqi Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as one computer lab (11 workstations).



Kosovo

KFOR (*Kosovo Force*)

- A platoon-size unit - ESTRIF (Estonian Reconnaissance in Force) – has served within the Danish KFOR contingent since February 2007.

NRF (*NATO Response Force*)

- Estonia is participating in NRF-7 with an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team;
- Estonia will also participate in NRF-8 with a military police platoon;
- Estonia also plans to participate in NRF from the second half of 2008 with the new Sandown class mine hunters.

The Balkans

- Various peace-keeping missions in Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina since the middle of the 1990s;
- Sponsoring the studies of students from the Western Balkans at the Baltic Defence College;
- Participation in the South-Eastern Europe Clearing House forum;
- Assistance to Macedonia and Croatia in the MAP process;
- Estonia has conducted a NATO PfP SOFA seminar in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007.

Ukraine

- Assistance on defence planning and capacity building;
- Advice on defence and security policy advocacy;
- Estonia has joined the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development within the Security Sector to help increase the role of Ukrainian civil society and security sector related NGOs in participating in wider SSR projects and integrating in Euro-Atlantic structures;
- Training Ukrainian civil and military officials at the Baltic Defence College, including within the Higher Command Studies Course;
- Training Ukrainian civil servants on Euro-Atlantic integration (e.g. internship of Ukrainian defence officials at the Estonian MOD, participation in Estonian-NATO training programmes and seminars, exchange programmes between the Ukrainian and Estonian Schools of Diplomacy; visits by Estonian opinion leaders to the Ukraine);
- Co-operation in military medicine.

UNTSO (*United Nations Truce Supervision Organization*)

- Estonia contributes to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) mission in the Middle East with two military observers.

**Latvia**

Afghanistan

- ISAF - A Latvian Medical Team operates within the contingent of the German Unit;
- Latvia has 38 soldiers serving in Afghanistan - in Maymaneh and Mazar-e-sharif. The contingent will be increased up to 90 soldiers during 2007 and up to 150-200 in 2008;
- Political Adviser to Maymaneh PRT;
- Two Police Advisers to Maymaneh PRT;

As soon as the ESDP (EU policing) mission is operational two more police advisers will be deployed;

- Development Assistance on the social economic environment;
- Latvia is also evaluating the possibility of increasing its civil sector involvement in Afghanistan reconstruction.

Armenia

- 'On-the-job' training in personnel management, public relations and procurement issues;
- 'On-the-job' training in the Public Relations Department of the Latvian MOD;
- Consultations on National Security Strategy by Latvian and Estonian advisers in Brussels and Yerevan;
- Consultations on public relations issues together with Estonia and Lithuania in Yerevan;
- Consultations on mobilization issues, MOD functions and restructuring;
- A Latvian Defence Adviser in the UK MOD Security Sector Advisory Team has been consulting Armenia since 2006;
- Sponsoring of a student on the Higher Command Studies Course at the Baltic Defence College;
- Contribution of a Latvian Border Guard Service expert to the NATO-led assessment mission on Border Security and Control

Azerbaijan

- Consultations on defence budget planning;
- Consultations on military education;
- 'On- the- job' training in personnel management issues;
- Sponsoring of a student on the Army Intermediate Command Studies course and Joint Command and General Staff Course;
- Seminar on public relations issues together with Estonia and Lithuania;
- A Latvian Defence adviser in the UK MOD Security Sector Advisory Team will start advising the Azerbaijan MOD in 2007;
- Training (Ship Divers Course) at the Naval Forces Diving Training Centre since 2007.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

EUFOR-ALTHEA – 2 staff officers

#### EU BG

Within the German-Latvian-Lithuanian-Polish-Slovak EU Battle Group Latvia provides a Military Police platoon and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoon, as well as officers for the BG staff and a National Support Element - a total deployment of approx. 60 – 70 personnel. The troops and the staff will be ready for the stand-by period in the first half of 2010.

#### Georgia

- Seminars on maritime environmental projects for Georgians, Ukrainians and Croatians;
- Advisory role to the Georgian Ministry of European and Euro-Atlantic Affairs since autumn 2005;
- ‘On-the-job’ training for employees of the Georgian MOD in the Military Material Codification and Standardisation, Personnel, Public Relations, Protocol and International Assistance Coordination of the Latvian MOD;
- Consultations on Intelligence Reform Capacity;
- Consultations on Defence Planning;
- Training (Ship Divers Course) at the Naval Forces Diving Training Centre since 2007;
- Donation of military equipment - over 188 radio receivers ( SEM 70);
- Seminar on public relations together with Estonia and Lithuania;
- Sponsoring of a student on the Civil Servants Course at the Baltic Defence College.

#### Iraq

- 12 training slots offered in 2006 and 4 slots in 2007 for training at the EOD School;
- Contribution to the NATO PFP Trust Fund;
- Donation of military equipment and ammunition;
- OIF – 125 soldiers of the Latvian contingent served until May 2007 in the Multinational Division South (MND CS) led by the Polish Armed Forces. From May 2007 the contingent was downsized;
- Participation with one expert in the EUJUST LEX mission in 2006 and with 2 experts in 2007.

#### Kosovo

- A 16 strong Latvian contingent operates in Pristina within the multinational brigade CENTRE;
- EU Planning Team Kosovo – 1 policeman;
- Training offered (for 2 individuals) at the EOD School in 2007.

#### Moldova

Public Relations Seminar (Baltic states + Moldova) in Chisinau. ‘On-the-job’ training for Moldavian expert in the field of public relations in 2007.

Consultations on legal issues and on mid-and long-term planning in the area of logistics;  
Sponsoring of a student at the Baltic Defence College;

- Latvia has appointed an *ad hoc* Advisor for Moldova to provide regular advisory assistance on IPAP issues;
- EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) with 5 border guards and 3 customs officers.

NRF (NATO Response Force)

- The 'Namejs' mine hunter of the Naval Force Flotilla is engaged in the NATO STANDING NATO MCM GROUP 1.
- The Latvian National Armed Forces (NAF) Military Police platoon is engaged in the NRF- 8 contingent.

The Balkans

- Assistance to Croatia on the environmental protection issues including annual workshops on maritime environment protection;
- Assistance to Croatia in the MAP process (legal issues, public relations, classified information protection);
- Assistance to Croatia in strengthening diving capabilities (experience exchange, 2 places offered in the Naval Diving Training School for 2007);
- Advice to Croatia on establishing a Coast Guard Service ('on the job' training planned for 2007).

After signing the Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the defence field Latvia is studying possible assistance projects that could include 'on-the- job' training and expert assistance.

Ukraine

- Military education, training and expert consultations on various aspects of the defence reform process (environmental protection, public relations, demilitarization, etc.);

Financing the studies of Ukrainian officers in the Baltic Defence College since 2003;

Training of Ukrainian specialists in the Naval Forces Diving Training Centre in 2007;

- Within the *NATO – Ukraine JWGDR Programme for Professional Development of Civilian Personnel* Latvia has provided 'on-the-job' training for two Ukrainian experts in the field of public relations in 2006.
- Financial contribution to the *Programme for Professional Development* (20,000 euros in 2007);
- Financial contribution to the *NATO/PfP Trust Fund* project for Ukraine to support the Ukrainian Retraining and Resettlement Centre;
- *Nordic – Baltic Initiative*: Latvia participates with its experts in the joint Public Relations and Legal Assistance teams.

**Lithuania**

Lithuanian SSR-related assistance is focused on the following areas of military training:

Lithuanian Military Academy (LMA)

English language training is offered to Students from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Albania, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan. The 'Captain's' Course is offered to students from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, Croatia, and Kazakhstan

Afghanistan

- 6 Staff Officers in ISAF HQ in Kabul;
- Lithuanian led PRT in Ghor, 136 soldiers;
- 4 Staff Officer at RC (w) (*Regional Command west*).

Armenia

Seminar on public relations issues together with Estonia and Latvia;

- Sponsoring of English Language training and participation at the 'Captain's' Course at the LMA for Armenian students;
- Sponsoring of Armenian students at the Baltic Defence College.

Azerbaijan

- Consultations on public relations issues;
- Sponsoring English language training and participation at the 'Captain's' Course at the LMA for Azerbaijan students;
- Sponsoring of Azerbaijan students at the Baltic Defence College.

Belarus

- English language training for the Belarussian students at the LMA.
- Consultations and regular working-level meetings on issues such as cartography, military engineering, legal, financial and social security issues.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

EUFOR-ALTHEA (*European Union Force Operation Althea*)  
Staff Officer at the HQ in Sarajevo

Georgia

- Seminar on public relations issues in Tbilisi;
- Lithuania has appointed an expert to Georgia in order to help Georgia with the MAP process;
- 'On-the job' training for Georgian civil servants at the Lithuanian MOD;
- Sponsoring of English language training at the LMA for Georgian students;
- Sponsoring of Georgian students at the Baltic Defence College;
- Two military observers in UNOMIG since May 2007;
- Medical courses at Military Medical Service in Kaunas for Georgian students.

Iraq

- Staff Officer assigned to MNC-I (*Multinational component Iraq*);

- Staff Officer at UK MND (SE) HQ (*Multinational Division South-East*);
- LITCON – 9 (DANCON), 53 soldiers;
- 3 Officers POL MND (CS) HQ (*Multinational Division South*);
- 2 Officers at NTM-I (*NATO Training Mission in Iraq*)

#### Kosovo

- 2 Staff Officers at KFOR HQ (Kosovo Force);
- 30 soldiers in KFOR-16.

#### Moldova

- Consultations on public relations issues;
- Sponsoring of English language training and participation at the ‘Captain’s’ Course at the LMA for Moldovan students.

#### The Balkans

- Lithuania is sponsoring English language training and participation at the ‘Captain’s’ Course at the LMA for Albanian and Croatian students.

#### Ukraine

- Consultations on public relations issues;
- Sponsoring of English language training and participation in the ‘Captain’s’ Course at the LMA for Ukrainian students;
- Lithuania has appointed an expert to the Ukraine to help with the MAP process; Lithuania is active in promoting civil-military relations and organising seminars together with the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv and DCAF;
- Lithuania has joined the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development within the Security Sector;
- Medical courses in military medical service in Kaunas for Ukrainian students.

## 11. Appendix 3: Overview of Nordic and Baltic SSR activities

The tables below in no way gives an exact picture of all activities that the Nordic and Baltic States are engaged in. The purpose of the tables is to give a rough overview of the wide scope of activities that the different states participate in and that in many cases similar activities are conducted by more than one state.

### 11.1. Ordered according to target areas

|   | DK | FI | NO | SE | EE | LT | LV |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| <b>Afghanistan</b>                            |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Participating in PRTs                         | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Participation with fighting units             | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Advise and training on CIMIC                  |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |
| Instructors at the Afghan NDC                 |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |
| Advisers serving in Afghan units              |    |    | X  | X  |    |    |    |
| Personnel seconded to ISAF HQ                 |    | X  |    |    | X  | X  | X  |
| <b>Albania</b>                                |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Advice on military logistics                  | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Advice and support on coast guard activities  |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |
| Military observers in Albania                 |    | X  |    | X  |    |    |    |
| Officer training                              |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |
| <b>Armenia</b>                                |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Seminars on human rights and public relations |    |    |    |    | X  | X  | X  |
| Officer seconded to Armenia                   |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |
| Officer training                              |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |
| Scholarships at BALTDEFCOL                    |    |    |    |    |    | X  | X  |
| <b>Azerbaijan</b>                             |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seminars on human rights and public relations |   |   |   |   | X | X | X |
| Advise concerning budgeting and planning      |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| Officer training                              |   |   |   |   |   | X |   |
| Scholarships at BALTDEFCOL                    |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>                 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Peace-keeping training                        | X |   |   | X |   |   |   |
| Participation with fighting units             |   |   |   |   | X |   |   |
| Mine clearing                                 |   |   |   | X |   |   |   |
| Signals and military Police personnel         |   | X |   |   |   |   |   |
| Staff officers seconded                       |   |   |   | X | X | X | X |
| PFP SOFA seminars                             |   |   |   |   | X |   |   |
| <b>Congo</b>                                  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Military observers                            | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Croatia</b>                                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Study SSR needs                               | X |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Courses for coast guard personnel             |   |   | X |   |   | X |   |
| Seminars on maritime environment              |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| Officer training                              |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| <b>Ethiopia/Eritrea</b>                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Military observers                            | X | X |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Georgia</b>                                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Military observers                            | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Advise on creating intelligence services      |   |   | X |   |   | X |   |
| Seminars on maritime environment              |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| Training MoD personnel                        |   |   |   |   | X |   | X |
| Advise on public relations                    |   |   |   |   | X | X | X |
| Advise on MAP process                         |   |   |   |   | X | X | X |
| Scholarships at BALTDEFCOL                    |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |



|  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <b>Iraq</b>                                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Participation in fighting units            | X |   |   |   | X | X | X |
| Training of EOD personnel                  |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| Officer training                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Kosovo</b>                              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Peace-keeping mission units                | X | X |   | X | X | X | X |
| Signals and communications personnel       |   | X |   |   |   |   |   |
| Police mission                             | X |   |   | X |   | X |   |
| Study SSR needs                            | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Liberia</b>                             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| DDR, observers                             |   | X |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Macedonia</b>                           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Conversion training for military personnel | X |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Moldova</b>                             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Scholarships at BDCOL                      |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| Officer training                           |   |   |   |   |   |   | X |
| <b>Montenegro</b>                          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Conversion training for military personnel | X |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Support/Advise to MoD                      | X |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Munitions disposal                         | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Middle East</b>                         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Military observers                         | X | X |   | X | X |   |   |
| <b>Pakistan – India</b>                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Military observers                         | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <b>Russia</b>                                     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Conversion training for military (navy) personnel |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Serbia</b>                                     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Conversion training for military personnel        | X |   | X | X |   |   |   |
| Training of military police                       | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Advise to MoD on Defence Review                   |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Advise to MoD on budgeting models                 |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Peace-keeping training                            |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Co-operation on military medicine                 |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Sudan</b>                                      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Staff officers                                    |   | X |   |   |   |   |   |
| <b>Ukraine</b>                                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Seminars on parliamentary relations               | X |   | X | X |   |   |   |
| Advise on planning & budgeting                    |   |   | X |   | X | X | X |
| Advise on CIMIC                                   |   | X | X | X |   |   |   |
| Advise on public relations                        |   | X | X |   | X | X | X |
| Advise on legal issues                            |   | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Conversion training of military personnel         |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Peace-keeping training                            |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Coast guard courses                               |   |   | X |   |   |   |   |
| Advise on Euro-Atlantic integration               |   |   |   |   | X | X | X |
| Scholarships at BDCOL                             |   |   |   |   | X | X | X |
| Advise on maritime environment                    |   |   |   |   |   |   | X |
| Officer training                                  |   |   |   |   |   | X | X |
| <b>Western Sahara</b>                             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Military observers                                | X |   |   |   |   |   |   |

## 11.2. Ordered according to type of activity

The table below shows the type of activities in which the Nordic and the Baltic countries are engaged abroad, or are currently preparing

|   | DK | FI | NO | SE | EE | LT | LV |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Training of own MoD personnel on SSR          |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |
| CIMIC training                                |    | X  | X  | X  |    |    |    |
| Coast Guard advice & training                 |    |    | X  |    |    | X  |    |
| Defence reform advice                         |    |    | X  |    | X  | X  | X  |
| Intelligence services advice                  |    |    | X  |    | X  |    | X  |
| Legal issues advice                           | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Military medicine training                    |    |    | X  |    | X  |    |    |
| Military observers                            | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |    |    |
| Munitions disposal                            | X  |    |    | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Parliamentary relations advice                | X  |    | X  | X  | X  |    |    |
| Peace-keeping                                 | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Peace enforcement                             | X  |    |    |    | X  | X  | X  |
| Planning and budgeting advice                 |    |    | X  |    | X  | X  | X  |
| Peace-keeping training (abroad)               | X  |    | X  | X  |    |    |    |
| Public relations advice                       |    | X  | X  |    | X  | X  | X  |
| Reconstruction (PRT)                          | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Conversion training of military personnel     | X  |    | X  | X  |    |    |    |
| Scholarships (mainly) at BALTDEFCOL           | X  |    |    |    | X  | X  | X  |
| Signals and communications in missions        |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |
| Staff officers seconded                       | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  | X  |
| Training of military observers                |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |
| Training of international staff officers      |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |
| Training of international military police     | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Training of foreign officers at own academies |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |

### 11.3. “Common institutions” engaged in SSR

| Activity   | Institution       | Partners                        |
|--|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| Training of military observers for international missions                                    | Finland           | FI +Nordics by tradition        |
| Training of military police for international missions                                       | Denmark           | DK +Nordics by tradition        |
| Training of staff officers for international missions  | Sweden<br>SWEDINT | SE +Nordics by tradition        |
| Training of NATO interoperable staff officers and civil servants                             | BALTDEFCOL        | All Baltic and Nordic countries |
| SSR research and outreach activities   | DCAF              | All Baltic and Nordic countries |
| Training of civil servants, diplomats and military officers in security policy               | GCSP              | All Baltic and Nordic countries |
| Developing procedures and a military culture applicable in a joint Nordic-Baltic SSR context | NBG               | EE, FI, NO and SE               |

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Interviews

Interviews were conducted with officials from all of the Ministries of Defence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.