Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness in Peace Support Operations

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Sammanfattning

Rapporten analyserar hur olika strukturer och former av civil-militära relationer på strategisk nivå påverkar effektiviteten i internationella insatser. Att omsätta säkerhetspolitiska mål till ett militärt maktinstrument kapabelt att bidra till att uppnå dessa mål är en förhandling över civil-militära gränser på strategisk nivå. Den civil-militära strukturen och kulturen påverkar därmed det militära instrumentets kapacitet, vilket i sin tur påverkar försvarsmaktens effektivitet inom internationella insatser. Denna typ av civil-militär påverkan på effektivitet kallas i rapporten *indirekt påverkan*. Den civil-militära gränsytan måste emellertid även fungera som en effektiv länk i den operativa orderkedjan under pågående insatser. På den strategiska nivån analyseras konfliktområdet, de operativa målen formuleras, och resurser fördelas. Detta medför att den civil-militära strukturen och kulturen har en tydlig *direkt påverkan* på den militära effektiviteten inom internationella insatser.

Slutsatsen är att det krävs ökad integrering inom den civil-militära gränsytan, vilket innebär närmare strukturellt samarbete och samordning mellan de relevanta departementen och myndigheterna inom internationell krishantering. Syftet med sådan integrering är dels att skapa de strukturer som krävs för att på ett effektivt sätt leda olika myndigeter mot gemensamma mål i insatsområdet. Dels att öka den ömsesidiga kunskapen och förståelsen för motparter och samarbetspartner på andra departement och myndigheter, och därigenom underlätta samordning och samarbete över dessa gränser. Genom dessa strukturella och kulturella förändringar inom den civil-militära gränsytan på den strategiska nivån kan ökad effektivitet i insatsområdet uppnås genom bättre samordning av diplomatiska, ekonomiska och militära resurser mot gemensamma politiska mål.

Nyckelord: Civil-militära relationer, military effektivitet, strategi, fredsfrämjande insatser, upprorsbekämpning, myndighetssamordning, internationella insatser, civil-militär samverkan

Summary

This report discusses how different strategic level institutional arrangements in the civil-military interface influence the operational conduct and effectiveness of armed forces involved in complex peace support operations. The report notes that there are at leas two important civil-military aspects of effectiveness. The civil-military interface must function effectively as the provider of well trained and equipped forces of adequate size and nature for modern operations, which is referred to as the *indirect impact* of civil-military relations. The civil-military interface must also function effectively as an important level in the operational chain of command, providing co-ordinated civil-military analysis, planning and execution of operations. This *direct impact* of civil-military relations is the main focal point of the report. Without well functioning civil-military relations, effectiveness in complex peace operations is unlikely. In essence, for increased effectiveness, the civil-military interface should strive towards increased integration of the military and civilian echelons. The purpose of such integration is to create enough mutual trust, knowledge and understanding across the civil-military divide to provide both the necessary structures, and a working culture, that serve to co-ordinate the different instruments of power towards intended political effects in the field.

The empirical cases of the study are US and British civil-military relations at the strategic level of command, and their respective conduct of operations in Iraq.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, military effectiveness, expeditionary operations, strategy, Iraq, irregular warfare, American way of war, Counter-insurgency, interagency co-operation

Contents

Foreword

The report is published as a chapter in a volume edited by Kobi Michael, Eyal Ben-Ari and David Kellen titled *Transformations in the World of Warfare and Peace Support Operations* (2008, forthcoming). It was initially presented at the 18-21 June, 2007 conference on "Military Transformations and Peace Support Operations: Current Experience, Future Developments and Possible Implications for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Theater", arranged by the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution, HUJI, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. This report also incorporates the thoughts from the theoretical chapters of the author's PhD thesis titled 'The Missing Link: Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness in Complex Irregular Warfare', Department of War Studies, King's College, London, January 2008. The author would like to thank Dr. Kobi Michael, Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and Karin Bogland, FOI, for valuable comments on earlier drafts. Finally, the author would like to thank Prof. Bengt Abrahamsson and Dr. Johannes Malminen for comments and corrections at the FOI seminar on 15 January 2008. The responsibility for any remaining errors or omissions rests entirely with the author.

1 Introduction

The conflicts of the new millennium seem ever more bewildering, complex and asymmetric. The starting point of this report is therefore the acknowledgement of a transformation in strategic affairs – a changing strategic context in which the most important and frequent operations involving Western armed forces will be different forms of complex peace support operations. This means a reversal of interest from traditional large-scale warfare between states to different forms of small wars.[1] One of the main features of these conflicts is the far-reaching and complicated aims of operations, such as state and institution building, imposed democratization, economic development and respect for human rights. This means that Western armed forces will be operating in contexts often involving a combination of counter-insurgency, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, as well as economic development and state building. The military will therefore only play a part (often not even the leading part) in operations that are likely to include a wide range of actors, such as civilian government departments and agencies, international organizations, private security companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as host government agencies and security forces. For example, British doctrine argues that 'In the light of experience gained in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, it became evident that coherence could only be achieved if strategic processes, planning and objectives were harmonized across all instruments and agencies'.[2] Arguably, the most salient problem of complex peace support operations is therefore to co-ordinate the different instruments of power into a coherent, comprehensive strategy. The report therefore asks two main research questions:

1. How do the patterns of civil-military relations affect the conduct of operations in the context of complex irregular warfare?
2. How could operational effectiveness be improved by changing the patterns of civil-military relations?

[1] See for example Rupert Smith,, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper, No. 379 (March 2006); Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

[2] UK Ministry of Defence, *The Comprehensive Approach*, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, (January 2006), p. 1-1

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this report is to discuss how different strategic level institutional arrangements in the civil-military interface influence the operational conduct and effectiveness of armed forces involved in complex peace support operations.

1.2 Main Arguments and Key Terms

The hypothesis of the report is that the nature of civil-military relations is an important factor in understanding effectiveness in complex peace support operations. The report notes that there are at leas two important civil-military aspects of effectiveness. The civil-military interface must function effectively as the provider of well trained and equipped forces of adequate size and nature for modern operations, which is referred to as the *indirect impact* of civil-military relations. The civil-military interface must also function effectively as an important level in the operational chain of command, providing co-ordinated civil-military analysis, planning and execution of operations. This *direct impact* of civil-military relations is the main focal point of the report. A conclusion is therefore that without well functioning civil-military relations, effectiveness in complex peace operations is unlikely. In essence, for increased effectiveness, the civil-military interface should strive towards increased integration of the military and civilian echelons. The purpose of such integration is to create enough mutual trust, knowledge and understanding across the civil-military divide to provide both the necessary civil-military structures, and a working culture, that serve to co-ordinate the different instruments of power towards intended political effects in the field.

Structural integration at the strategic level of the civil-military interface is imperative for increased effectiveness. There are two main reasons why integrated civil-military structures at the strategic level provide better results in complex PSOs. First, the indirect impact means that integrated structures provide more accurate and up-to-date interpretations and adjustment to the functional imperative of the armed forces. This means that the instruments of national power, not least the military, are better suited to the contemporary strategic context. Second, the direct impact of integrated structures is that they provide more inclusive command and control structures at the strategic level, which means that all relevant actors in complex operations are co-ordinated through integrated planning and execution of operations – providing what is called a comprehensive approach to planning and operations.

Complex peace support operation (PSO) is a concept employed within this report in a generic way to include all operations beyond conventional interstate warfare.

As such, the concept includes the many traditional concepts referring to different forms of operations other than war: PSOs, stability and support operations, counter-insurgency, humanitarian interventions, small wars and low-intensity conflict. The report uses the concept of civil-military relations to refer to the relationship between the political and military leaderships at the strategic level of command, within the ministries of defence and within the interagency arena.

1.3 Method and Outline

The initial method of this paper is a deductive process through which a literature review produces a theoretical framework for analysis. This framework is then empirically illustrated through a comparative analysis of two cases. For the comparative study, US and British civil-military relations, as well as their respective conduct of operations in Iraq from 2003 have been chosen. Emphasis is placed on the stabilisation and reconstruction phases of the campaign, which justifies the use of Iraq as a peace support operation. The study of American and British operational conduct in complex irregular warfare is intrinsically interesting as the two countries, for different reasons, are likely to participate in, and lead such operations in the future. The US has a particular role as the sole remaining military superpower and will in that role continue to be engaged in complex peace support operations. The UK has a unique experience and capability of complex operations, including counter-insurgency. That experience, in combination with a large international presence, makes them likely to continue to engage in and lead operations of that kind, not least within the EU and/or NATO frameworks.

The research design, involving a theory section and a comparative study, creates the possibility to contrast and compare different structures and methods of command and their effectiveness in contexts that have important similarities and differences. Again, the US and the UK are of great interest. Despite many relative similarities in culture and background, including extensive experience in both conventional large-scale warfare and counter-insurgency operations, the two countries operate very differently. They also have very different patterns of civil-military relations. Essentially, the cases were chosen based on their relevance to the theory of the report. They contain similarities and contrasts that make them helpful in understanding the causal relationship between certain patterns of civil-military relation and operational effectiveness.[3]

[3] Martin Denscombe, *The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 33–34.

The report is structured as follows. First, the report sets the theoretical framework through a review of the field of civil-military relations theory, as well as the concepts of mission command and trust. A theoretical framework describing the impact of civil-military relations on operational effectiveness, as described above, is also formulated. Second, the hypothesis and the theoretical framework is empirically illustrated and refined by a comparative empirical analysis of the patterns of civil-military relations in the US and the UK, as well as the respective countries' operations in Iraq from 2003.

2 Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness

A number of civil-military aspects of effectiveness are emphasized in the recent lessons learned reports coming out of complex PSOs, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. They stress the importance of increased co-operation and co-ordination of civilian and military instruments of power. Civil-military aspects are also becoming part of the strategic studies literature and military doctrine.[4] There is, in other words, relative consensus regarding the importance of the civil-military aspects of effectiveness. This consensus is not, however, matched by a corresponding body of work that seeks to increase the understanding of the relationship between civil-military relations and military effectiveness. A useful starting point is nevertheless the field of civil-military relations theory.

The central problem discussed in civil-military relations theory is the need to maximize the protective value that the armed forces can provide, and the need to minimize the domestic coercive powers that the same forces will inevitably possess, thus creating *effective armed forces under democratic civilian control*.[5] Despite the inherently dual aims of civil-military relations theory, Suzanne Nielsen notes that the field of civil-military relations theory has mainly focused on the issue of civilian control. The impact that civil-military relations has on military effectiveness is not nearly as well studied within the literature.[6]

The starting point of civil-military relations theory is often the assumption that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to a society's security, and a societal imperative based on the ideologies, social forces and institutions that are dominant within the society.[7] How the functional and societal imperatives should be allowed to influence the structure and culture of the armed forces is, in other words, one of the main questions dealing with the civil-military aspects of effectiveness.

[4] For example, see the literature on effects-based operations and the comprehensive approach. Another source is recent counter-insurgency doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic.

[5] Michael Quinlan, in a lecture to NATO in 1993, cited in Christopher Dandeker, 'Military and Society: The Problem, Challenges and Possible Answers', paper presented at the 5th International Security Forum, 14–16 October 2002, available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/5isf/5/Papers/Dandeker_paper_V-2.pdf>

[6] Suzanne C. Nielsen, 'Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness', *Public Administration and Management*, 10:2 (2005), pp. 61-84.

[7] Huntington, Samuel, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1957), p. 2.

Christopher Dandeker notes that in the search for a useful combination of the functional and societal influences, theorists tend to employ a 'zero-sum' view – thinking that it is only possible to maximize either military strength or civilian control.[8] However, the conceptualization of the relations between functional and societal imperatives in zero sum terms is misleading, according to Dandeker, as it assumes that military adjustments to civilian values necessarily undermine military effectiveness, and that the focus on military effectiveness must necessarily mean decreased civilian control or non-adherence to the values of civil-society.[9] The normative aim of civil-military relations theory should, thereby, not be striking a balance between the imperatives, but in finding *synergies* between the imperatives – solutions that strengthen both civilian control and military effectiveness.

It should, however, be noted that the idea of civil control goes beyond the specific nature and characteristics of different patterns of civil-military relations. Although a number of aspects of civil-military relations differ in various cases and theories, the logic of civil control as the mechanism that assures the superiority of the civil echelon is generally the same. Kobi Michael therefore highlights the fact that the essence and rationale of civil control is common to all patterns of civil-military relations, or that they at least should be: 'The common denominator of all definitions is the expectation that civilians will set the limits on the military's action and ensure concordance between those actions and the political echelon's objectives as well as maintain the elected echelon's superiority'.[10]

Before looking at different approaches to civil-military relations it is of importance to take a closer look at the concept of effectiveness. What constitutes effectiveness in military organizations? The semantic definition clearly implies that effectiveness should be related to the capability to achieve the desired outcomes of conflict, i.e. victory.[11] However, Millett, Murray and Watman argue that 'victory is not a characteristic of an organization, but rather a result of organizational activity'. Therefore, outcome alone, or the more specific 'victory',

[8] Christopher Dandeker, 'Military and Society: The Problem, Challenges and Possible Answers', paper presented at the 5th International Security Forum, (14-16 October 2002), available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/5isf/5/Papers/Dandeker_paper_V-2.pdf>, pp. 2-3.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Kobi Michael, 'The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations: The "Discourse Space" Model and the Israeli Case during the Oslo Process', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 33, No. 4, (2007), p. 519

[11] Bengt Abrahamsson, 'Defeating David? Effects Based Operations: Challenges to Military Organization and Professionalism', in Bengt Abrahamsson, Robert Egnell and Karl Ydén, *Effects Based Operations, Military Organization and Professionalization* (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2006), pp. 15 and 19–20.

is not a useful measure of effectiveness.[12] Outcomes in contemporary operations are also not about absolutes. As already noted, Rupert Smith argues that the aims of contemporary military operations are changing from pursuing concrete objectives and victory to establishing certain conditions from which political outcomes can be decided.[13] In this context, battles field victories, or other outcomes of military operations, are often only small parts of the comprehensive operations with far-reaching political aims. It is, therefore, more useful to speak in terms of success than of victory. A debate in the UK during the summer of 2007 has highlighted a more pragmatic approach to success amongst the military leadership. The British Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, spoke of the importance to achieve success in the theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq, interestingly adding: 'however you define success'.[14] This pragmatic and flexible view of success stands in stark contrast to the traditional, absolutist view that requires victory.

Millett, Murrey and Watman argue that instead of analyzing effectiveness in terms of outcomes, a more fruitful approach is to study the processes by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power: 'A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available'.[15] This means that effectiveness should also be related to the concept of *efficiency*. This concept is about the parsimony of resources, and is, according to Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, often the more important factor in the hierarchical bureaucracies of military organizations – 'doing more with less'.[16] Bengt Abrahamsson rightly claims that while efficiency is often a precondition for effectiveness, it is certainly not sufficient. Effectiveness or goal attainment may also be achieved with little efficiency, as in the German airborne attack on Crete in 1941. While the Germans achieved the objective of defeating the British-led CREFORCE, and occupying Crete, the operation entailed severe losses and was considered a 'catastrophic victory'.[17] Another problem with outcome as the measure of effectiveness is that contemporary operations often take place over a very long period of time. Waiting until the final verdict of

[12] Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations', *International Security*, 11:1 (Summer 1986), p. 37.
[13] Smith, *The Utility of Force*, p. 269
[14] General Sir Richard Dannatt, 'Address at the RUSI Future Land Warfare Conference on the subject of "Tomorrow's Army; Today's Challenges"', 5 June 2007, accessed 02/09/07 at <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/>.
[15] Millett, Murray, and Watman, 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations', p. 37.
[16] Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, 'Introduction', in Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.), *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), p. 9.
[17] Abrahamsson, 'Defeating David?', p. 15.

history will thus deprive scholars of meaningful analysis until the very end of the campaign in question.

Effectiveness is, therefore, a combination of conduct and outcome. Outcome is evaluated through the course of history, but conduct can be measured on the spot by comparing it to what is considered best practice in operations. This study employs the concept of effectiveness as a measure of the quality of military conduct, and acknowledges that efficiency is an important part of this analysis, especially when the final outcome of operations is not applicable, as is the case in this report.

2.1 The Divided and Integrated Approaches to Civil-Military Relations

Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz have come to dominate the field of civil-military relations for the last half century and still serve as a useful starting point. Huntington treated the functional imperative of the armed forces as an external given, which can only be interpreted and adjusted to by military professionals without interference from the political leadership. Without interference from the political leadership or civil society, the military will automatically adjust for maximum effectiveness in relation to the functional imperative.[18] Huntington, therefore, advocated a radical form of military professionalism, which emphasizes isolation and autonomy of the military for maximized effectiveness. Military professionalism, in this view, demands obedience to civil authorities but allows complete control over internal organizational matters.[19] It was also considered the rational and sensible approach to civil-military relations in the early Cold War period when standing armies grew to unprecedented proportions, and when the strong military influence on policy during WWII was fresh in memory.

The practical structure of this approach is that civil-military relations should include a clear divide between the political and military leaderships in order to allow for objective control of the armed forces and military professionalism. Such professionalism will according to this tradition inevitably lead to military effectiveness by allowing the military to define and adjust to its own functional imperative.

[18] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1957), pp. 2, 229.
[19] Arthur D. Larson, ' Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations' *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 2 (Spring 1974), pp. 57-72.

Peter Feaver summarizes Huntington's argument as 'autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which leads to secure civilian control'.[20] A military organization well separated from the political leadership in a conservative civilian society will, therefore, according to Huntington, both be well adjusted for its purpose and under democratic civilian control. In paraphrasing Feaver, Huntington's causal chain regarding effectiveness would be: autonomy leads to professionalisation, which leads to structural and cultural adjustment to the functional imperative, which means military effectiveness. This view of civil-military relations and effectiveness is here referred to as the *divided approach*.

This approach has nevertheless become problematic as the changing strategic context of the post-Cold War has clearly placed new demands on the armed forces for operational effectiveness. The changing strategic context also means that the functional imperative of defending the nation not only involves winning the nations' wars, but also includes tasks such as maintaining international security, defeating international terrorism, and protecting citizens overseas. The practical application of the functional imperative has thereby changed. Many armed forces have nevertheless been slow to recognize this fact, and to adjust its organization and culture for the new tasks.

An empirically based critique comes from Eliot Cohen who criticizes Huntington's conclusion to avoid political interference in military affairs by making the empirically based argument that the truly victorious wartime leaders have all interfered in the military sphere to a very large extent. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion are used as examples of leaders who during wartime have continued to control their generals in a way that Huntington and others would find most damaging. They questioned, opposed and fired generals, engaged personally in military strategy, and even let the political imperative determine how to fight the war.[21] Cohen's conclusion is that political leaders should become more involved and exercise more control over the military in war.[22] However, after studying only four rather specific cases in history, the strong causal link made by Cohen between civilian intervention and military success and effective civilian control is not entirely convincing.[23] The obvious counterargument would involve looking at the operations where political

[20] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003), p. 18.
[21] Cohen, *Supreme Command*, pp. 5–10.
[22] Ibid., p. 209.
[23] It should be noted that Cohen only used wars of survival as his empirical objects of study. These are special cases that should certainly be compared and contrasted with small wars and operations other than war in order to paint a full picture.

meddling has led to failure, i.e. Iraq. Cohen's analysis is useful as an empirical corrective of Huntington, but should not be seen as an alternative theory. Lawrence Freedman has elegantly commented that the true lesson of Cohen's analysis was that 'war's fundamentally political character requires meddling even though its quality and impact cannot be guaranteed. As useful as professional wisdom may be, it can never answer the most important questions or supply a reliable shortcut to success'.[24]

Morris Janowitz instead supports the tradition of pragmatic professionalism, which denounces military autonomy and instead emphasizes integration with civilian society, and even participation by civilian officials in the formulation of professional standards and the evaluation of performance.[25] The shape of professionalization should be determined by immediate needs, by what is acceptable to the parent society and by what is seen to be the most effective way of getting the job done. Anthony Forster calls this armed forces 'fit for purpose' – whatever the task may be.[26] Significantly, Janowitz argues that the political leadership must control both the criteria and information for judging the effectiveness of the military establishment. 'The formulation of the standards of performance the military are expected to achieve are civilian responsibilities, although these standards cannot be evolved independent of professional military judgement'.[27]

The implication of the pragmatic approach is expressed by Richard Kohn, who argues that '[n]o decision or responsibility falls to the military unless expressly or implicitly delegated to it by civilian leaders. Even the decisions of command – the selection of strategy, of what operations to mount and when, what tactics to employ, the internal management of the military – derive from civilian authority'.[28] In structural terms, the military leadership should be integrated with the political level in order to develop increased political understanding and sensitivity among the armed forces, and to ensure the relevancy of the military operation to the political goal. Kobi Michael has in relation to this provided a highly useful definition of effective civil control as 'the mechanism that assures that military force is used for the implementation of those political goals that best serve the public good as determined by the political echelon'.[29] The Janowitzean

[24] Lawrence Freedman, 'Calling the Shots: Should Politicians or Generals Run Our Wars?', *Foreign Affairs*, 81:5 (2002), p. 191.
[25] Larson, ' Military Professionalism' (1974), pp. 57-72
[26] Anthony Forster, *Armed Forces in Europe*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 43
[27] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (NY: The Free Press, 1960), p. 420
[28] Richard H. Kohn, 'How Democracies Control the Military', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No 4 (1997), p. 142
[29] Michael, 'The Dilemma' (2007), p. 522

notion of civil-military relations is hereafter referred to as the *integrated approach*.

It is of some importance to emphasise that the divided and integrated approaches to civil-military relations are in fact two extremes along a continuum. The dualistic design of this report is chosen in order to highlight and contrast differences in order to build a theoretical framwork rather than to describe the entire continuum. To study cases at the centre of the continuum is an interesting area for future research.

There is general agreement regarding the notion that societal characteristics may be reflected in the ability of a country to create military power.[30] The pattern of civil-military relations is in other words treated as a causal factor in the creation of forces 'fit for purpose'. By being the arena in which funding, doctrine and direction for the military organization is decided, the strategic context interpreted, and by overseeing the implementation of those decisions, the constitution of the civil-military interface is an important factor determining the quality of the forces available for operations. This is what this report refers to as the *indirect impact* of civil-military relations.

However, lessons learned from peace support operations in the contemporary strategic context show that the civil-military interface must not only function well during peacetime preparation of armed forces, but also during operations as a highly important factor in the chain of command. This is within the report referred to as the *direct impact*. This aspect of civil-military relations and effectiveness is not well covered in the literature and therefore serves as the main focal point of this report. What are the consequences of different civil-military structures within the operational chain of command?

Before answering that question, the civil-military aspects of effectiveness should be placed within a context. A large number of factors are of importance for the operational conduct and effectiveness of the armed forces in military operations, for example the political nature of the state, strategic doctrine, military culture and history, the nature of the enemy, geography, training and equipment. This report studies the effect of the often overlooked factor of civil-military relations. All these factors determining the conduct of military operations are part of an intricate web of causality, working on different levels of overlapping causal chains. Interestingly, the patterns of civil-military relations in a state, although not the most obvious causal variable when explaining operational conduct, are more or less related to the majority of the factors mentioned above. Operating at an overarching level in the causal chain, this single variable therefore has the

[30] Nielsen, 'Civil-Military Relations Theory', p. 75

potential to relate and co-ordinate a large number of factors into a more comprehensive narrative, explaining effectiveness in complex operations.

2.2 The Civil-Military Interface in the Operational Chain of Command

As an important level of the operational chain of command, the civil-military interface must be organized to provide efficient strategic and operational level command centres, capable of advanced planning, as well as quick analyses and decisions regarding operations. At this level in the chain of command, political objectives are translated into strategy and operational plans, and decisions regarding size and structure of the force to be deployed are made. Thus, different patterns of civil-military relation may have a direct and very practical impact on operational success and effectiveness.

Moreover, lessons learned from contemporary peace support operations stress the importance of comprehensive civil-military approaches, involving integration and joint planning at the strategic and operational levels, as well as co-operation and co-ordination at the tactical level to achieve unity of command and effort. In order to achieve such co-ordination of planning and execution, the organisational structures and working culture within the civil-military interface must function well. Moreover, in the field of operations, the development of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) and civil affairs units indicate the increasing importance placed on the co-operation and co-ordination of the different actors at the tactical level. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of this.[31] The comprehensive and co-operative approaches to operations must be provided by the institutional structure and culture of the civil-military interface.

Risa Brooks has analysed at the impact of political control mechanisms and argues that the highly centralized and rigid command structures of Arab regimes, the use of direct leadership rather than mission type command, and the tinkering with the chains of command for political reasons, have a negative influence on the effectiveness of Arab armies.[32] Moreover, Samuel Huntington's main argument is that the political leadership should avoid any interference in military

[31] Provincial Reconstruction Teams are administrative units consisting of a small operating base from which a group of sixty to more than one thousand civilians and military specialists work in a co-ordinated manner to perform small reconstruction projects or provide security for others involved in aid and reconstruction work.

[32] Risa Brooks, 'Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes', *Adelphi Paper* 324. (New York: Oxford University Press 1998), p. 46

affairs for maximum military effectiveness. As already noted, Eliot Cohen criticises this conclusion empirically by arguing that the truly victorious wartime leaders have all interfered in the military sphere to a very large extent.[33] Deborah Avant similarly highlights the importance of low cost civilian monitoring and strong civilian control of the armed forces. Without such control, the military will resist necessary innovation as the strategic context changes.[34]

However, despite these contributions, the limited literature on how different structural arrangements in the civil-military interface affect operational effectiveness means that theoretical inspiration must be sought elsewhere. Therefore, the following section turns to military command and control to strengthen the theoretical framework of the report.

2.3 The Concepts of Mission Command and Trust

The increasing political sensitivity of operations in the contemporary strategic context, involving global media scrutiny, means that the political and military leadership have sought ways to micro-manage events from headquarters. This despite the fact that increased operational complexity and pace of events should indicate a need for dispersion rather than centralization of command.[35] Centralized, or direct, command is for several reasons not an effective solution to the problems of politically sensitive operations. First, situations on the ground are very hard to assess if you are not there physically. Wrong or insensitive decisions may be the outcome. Second, micro-management often means that people with little understanding of soldiering will make the decisions, be it politicians with none or little experience, or high-ranking officers who have not experienced these situations for decades, or ever. Third, centralized command is time consuming. The reason is that when using centralized or detailed command, subordinates must refer to their headquarters when they encounter situations not covered by the commander's original orders.[36] In the short-term, this means a

[33] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), pp. 5–10, 209.
[34] Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, (London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 49.
[35] Christopher Dandeker, 'Surveillance and Military Transformation: Organizational Trends in Twenty-First Century Armed Services', in Kevin Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson (eds.), *The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 240
[36] US Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, (2003), accessed 06/03/2005 at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-0/>, §1-80.

loss of operational speed and missed opportunities while waiting for new orders. In the long-term, it leads to a loss of quality and initiative of junior commanders and soldiers who are neither encouraged nor forced to make their own decisions and to learn from their own actions.

Therefore, most armed forces' doctrines on command and control emphasize the importance of *mission command* in complex environments – a philosophy of decentralized command based on trust and initiative. In essence, mission command involves giving orders about what to do and what the aims are, but not how to do it. Commanders can by explaining their objectives, and by communicating the rationale for military action throughout their commands, give junior commanders and their soldiers 'insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and, most important, why the mission is being undertaken'.[37] Thus, commanders are allowed to hold a 'loose rein', allowing subordinates freedom of action, while at the same time demanding that they exercise initiative and adjust actions according to new input of information. This means that commanders make fewer decisions, and thus it allows them to focus on the most important ones.[38] Richard Lovelock argues that when commanders on all levels understand their general roles within a larger perspective, as is ideally the case when employing mission command, 'they are also more able to think laterally and share objectives through unity of effort, decentralization, trust, understanding, and timely decision making'.[39]

There is, however, always an element of increased risk involved in mission command – the risk that the subordinates have not really understood the intent, or the risk that the commander has made a bad decision or provided too few resources. Mission command theory, therefore, always involves a trade-off between ineffective but safe command and effective but risky command. Dealing with such risk requires mutual trust between superiors and subordinates.[40] In sum, mission command requires high levels of trust and understanding, initiative from subordinates, and clarity of intent and aims from commanders.

Interestingly, the traditional divided notion of civil-military relations is very similar to that of mission command in its demand for a clear dividing line between political decisions and military implementation. Operations are

[37] US Department of the Army, *Mission Command* (2003), §1-79.
[38] Ibid., § 1-74
[39] Richard Lovelock, 'The Evolution of Peace Operations Doctrine', *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Summer 2002), p. 69
[40] C.S. Oliviero, 'Trust, Manoeuvre Warfare, Mission Command and Canada's Army', *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,* (Aug 1998) <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/ADTB/Vol_1/August_98/english/Trust_maoeuvre.htm>

delegated to the military and other agencies in a way that clearly resembles the ideals of mission command, stating what to do, but not how to carry out the task. However, as observed above, the successful implementation of mission command requires the components of mutual trust and understanding, clear intent from commanders, and initiative from subordinates. Without clear aims, mutual trust and understanding, there is a risk that the political leadership meddles in strictly military affairs and increasingly micro-manages what it considers to be politically sensitive situations. There is also a risk that the military chain of command misinterprets the aims and intent of the political leadership, and how these aims should be translated into military actions.

The concept of trust is a key to successful mission command and deserves further attention. The rich sociological literature on trust distinguishes different forms of trust relevant to the argument of this report. First, *interpersonal trust* refers to trust between people. In a review of the literature, Dmitry Khodyakov makes a useful distinction between thick and thin interpersonal trust. 'Thick interpersonal trust originates in relationships with strong ties and depends on the personalities of both the trustee and the trustor'. This form of trust involves personal familiarity with the counterpart, as well as strong emotional commitment to the relationship.[41] Lynn Zucker calls this character-based trust, because it is based on social similarities and shared moral codes – personal characteristics like gender, ethnicity and cultural background.[42] This form of trust thereby depends on similarity and strong emotional relationships between people.

However, in governmental institutions, interactions and trust between people who do not often meet are of greater importance as this is the more normal form of interaction in these settings. This is what Khodyakov calls thin trust, which is created through interactions of people who do not know each other well. 'It represents reliance on weak ties and is based on the assumption that another person would reciprocate and comply with our expectations of his or her behaviour, as well as with existing formal and ethical rules'.[43] Zucker similarly refers to process-based trust, built on experiences of reciprocity.[44]

Social reality is nevertheless not only dependent on persons and their activities, but there are also institutions and abstract systems. Other ways to build trust than

[41] Dmitry Khodyakov, 'Trust as a Process: A Three-Dimensional Approach', *Sociology,* 41:1, (2007), p. 121
[42] Lynn G. Zucker, 'Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure', in Staw and Cummings (eds) *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 8, pp. 53–112. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986).
[43] Khodyakov, 'Trust as a Process' (2007), p. 122-123
[44] Zucker, 'Production of Trust' (1986), pp. 53-112

through personal relations are therefore necessary. This is where confidence or trust in systems or institutions becomes important. *System* or *institutional trust* refers to trust in the functioning of organizational, institutional and social systems. It flows from institutional arrangements that create and sustain trustworthy behaviours, such as broad societal norms, guarding institutional arrangements and organizational governance systems. These abstract principles can bring about varying degrees of embedded trust, of shared norms and expectations, and of reciprocity.[45] Khodyakov argues that trust in institutions depends on their 'perceived legitimacy, technical competence, and ability to perform assigned duties efficiently'.[46]

How does knowledge about mission command theory and trust help in the analysis of civil-military relations for maximized effectiveness in operations? Mission command theory emphasizes that effective command and control in the political-military interface requires clear aims from the political leadership. It also requires an extensive understanding of how to use the military tool to achieve political aims, as well as a well developed strategic conceptual framework. At the same time, mission command requires excellent political understanding within the military in order to translate political aims and directives into appropriate military activity. This is what Kobi Michael refers to as effective substantive civil control, as opposed to the normative formal assumption of civilian control that was mentioned earlier. Substantive civil control is weakened by instances when the political leadership has no clear vision or strategic preference, and when there is a knowledge gap and/or a gap in analytical and conceptual tools. In these instances, the military takes the position as an 'epistemic authority'. The military controls the agenda of the civil-military interface and thereby develops a political dependence on the military for information.[47] Michael therefore argues that in order for the political leadership to wield effective substantive control, it must 'generate knowledge and put forward high-quality challenging alternatives to those that the military adduces'. However, he also notes that in order to achieve such an alternative requires a revolution in governmental culture.[48]

Mutual understanding and effective command and control in the civil-military interface also require mutual trust. It is, therefore, imperative that the civil-

[45] Katinka Bijlsma-Frankema and Ana Cristina Costa, 'Understanding the Trust-Control Nexus', *International Sociology*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 261-2
[46] Khodyakov, 'Trust as a Process' (2007), p. 123
[47] Kobi Michael, 'The Israeli Defence Forces as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual Challenge in the Reality of the Israel – Palestinian Conflict', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (June 2007), p. 443-445
[48] Michael, 'The Dilemma', (2007), p, 541

military interface should be constructed to increase trust and mutual understanding across civil-military and departmental boundaries. Michael argues that due to the different organizational cultures and interests of the civilian and military echelons, the inherent nature of the relationship is inevitably conflictual, but that such conflict can be healthy as long as it is controlled.[49] One important way to keep conflicts at a 'healthy' level is to increase mutual understanding and respect across the boundaries.

The knowledge that interpersonal trust is based on social similarities and shared moral codes, and/or experiences of reciprocity, means that trust within the civil-military interface can be achieved by recruiting people with similar social background and moral code on both sides of the divide, or to promote a common civil-military culture of shared moral values within the interface. It also means that the civil-military organizations, such as the department of defence, or inter-agency planning teams, should strive to integrate staff from both sides of the civil-military divide, in order to create interpersonal trust and mutual understanding through personal experiences of reciprocity.

Understanding that different institutional arrangements may evoke and sustain trustworthy behaviour means that the structures of the civil-military interface must be carefully constructed to promote co-operation and trust. If interpersonal trust is lacking within the organization, there can at least be a level of belief in the structure or culture of the organization to provide a basic level of trust. Competition between the different agencies of the civil-military interface may evoke distrustful behaviour within interagency structures. As an example, an operational planner may not know his/her counterpart from the other side of the civil-military divide, and the planner also feels that there are few shared values with the counterpart. Instead of instinctively distrusting the counterpart, the planner may instead fall back on institutional trust based on the fact that the different agencies have always co-operated well towards common goals, as well as the knowledge of a recruitment and promotion system within the other agencies that makes it highly unlikely that the counterpart is anything but competent and trustworthy. Finally, the planner may also fall back on previous personal experiences of working with people from other agencies with good results.

After reviewing the literature and establishing a theoretical framework that describes the following chapter analyses two empirical cases in order to further illustrate the causal relationship between certain patterns of civil-military relations and operational effectiveness.

[49] Kobi Michael, email correspondence with the author, 4 October, 2007.

3 Evaluating Different Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

Among several approaches to civil-military relations, this report has emphasized two extremes in the divided approach, as advocated by Samuel Huntington, and the integrated approach, as introduced by Morris Janowitz. In the real world these approaches are relatively well represented as implemented in the cases of the US and the UK civil-military relations. Although it is well beyond the scope of this report to empirically test the theoretical outline, the purpose of this section is to provide an empirical taster, which serves to highlight and discuss a number of points made in the previous sections.

3.1 US Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

American civil-military relations are to a large extent the ideal representation of Huntington's divided approach. The US has poorly developed structures for interagency co-operation and co-ordination. Power is decentralized and national security issues therefore tend to be dealt with in departmental stovepipes. Where different forms of interagency structures exist, the competitive political culture of checks and balances means that interagency working groups and committees generally lack the authority, as well as the internal trust and understanding among participants, which is necessary to conduct meaningful work.[50] The National Security Council is obviously central in this respect, but it mainly functions in an advisory role to the President and has no executive function.[51] A CSIS study argues that the NSC is not a planning of operations or co-ordination headquarters, and currently has neither the authority, nor the capacity to fulfil such a function.[52] Within the Department of Defense, the civilian and military sections are not well integrated. Instead, the department is purposefully divided to ensure the purification of military and political affairs. This divide between the policy and military sides of the Pentagon has led to a stovepipe structure in

[50] Matthew F. Bogdanos, 'Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step', *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 37 (2nd Quarter, 2005), p. 11.
[51] Cecil V. Crabb and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1989), p. 9.
[52] Clark A. Murdock (ed.), *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2004), p. 61.

which civilian and military sets of expertise are not co-ordinated until the very top levels of the department.[53]

These findings are interesting with reference to the theoretical discussion on trust. The limited interagency structures, as well as the divided civil-military structures within the Pentagon, mean that there are few opportunities for civil servants and officers from different departments and agencies to meet face to face and thereby develop interpersonal trust that comes from previous positive experiences, mutual respect and at least some level of mutual understanding. The different backgrounds of military officers and civil-servants also mean that no thick interpersonal relationships exist from common schooling or background. Moreover, there is little institutional trust as there are few positive experiences of working together. Neither the interagency system, nor counterparts from other agencies and departments, are trusted. The civil-military interface of the US chain of command during operations does not function well and thereby affects the effectiveness of complex operations negatively. [54]

The US armed forces' historical development of professionalism in isolation from the political leadership in the wake of the Civil War, in combination with the high costs of civilian monitoring and control of the armed forces, has meant that the functional imperative of the US military has been interpreted and defined by the military itself – winning the nation's wars in defence of its people and values.[55] The resulting strategic culture, or American way of war, begins with a conceptual division between war and peace, which means that there is really no conceptual space for 'grey area' operation between these extremes – such as complex peace support operations.[56] The dualistic view of war and peace, as well as of political and military affairs, is perpetuated in the divided pattern of civil-military relations. The preferred way of war involves large-scale conventional campaigns, fought quickly at minimum cost. It also involves the maximum use of force, and the application of high technology to maximize firepower.[57] US troops

[53] Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, 'A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process', *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 39 (4th Quarter, 2005), p. 52.

[54] See Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change* (1994); and Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons* (2002)

[55] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (1957), p. 229.

[56] Echevarria, 'Towards an American Way of War', (2004), p. v; Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons* (2002), p. 43.

[57] See Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973). Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons* (2002), pp. 43–44; Robert M. Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), pp. 111–113; Thomas G. Mahnken, 'The American Way of War in the Twenty-First Century', in Efraim Inbar (ed.), *Democracies and Small Wars* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 78–81.

are therefore essentially organized around the division as the defining organization and emphasize the warrior ethos as the foundation of military culture. [58]

However, the uncompromising focus on conventional warfighting has left the US military ill prepared for complex peace support and post-conflict type operations. [59] Despite the fact that the US military has mainly been involved in irregular warfare since the end of the Second World War, US military and strategic culture is firmly fixed on what it sees as its core task – defeating conventional enemies that threaten the freedom of the American people. This unshakable belief in the essence of the organization has, according to John Nagl, precluded any organizational learning and adjustment to unconventional wars or operations other than war.[60] It has also led to what Nagl describes as 'a remarkable aversion to the use of unconventional tactics'.[61] The idea of 'organisational learning' is contested and Deborah Avant provides a similar argument by looking at the individuals of the organisation rather than the learning capability of the organisation itself. She contends that the US military culture and training system has provided individuals with little flexibility and learning skills, instead emphasising doctrinal thinking and zero-risk leadership.[62] During the peace support operations of the 1990s, and more recently in Iraq, we have witnessed how US troops seek to apply the traditional American way of war in complex contexts.[63] As an example, Robert Cassidy summarizes the US role in Somalia by arguing that 'maximalist and conventional attitudes about the use of force led the U.S. military to abandon the OOTW [Operations Other than War] principle of restraint, and thus legitimacy'.[64]

[58] It should be noted that speaking of US military culture is a simplification as the US military is a vast organisation with great differences in organisational cultures between the different services of the military.
[59] Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons* (2002), p. 205.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid., pp. 43–44.
[62] Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, pp. 26–28; see also Tony Corn, 'Clausewitz in Wonderland', *Policy Review*, (September 2006), accessed September 2006, <http://www.policyreview.org/000/corn2.html>,
[63] See James Jay Carafano, 'Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America's Military for 21st Century Missions', *Heritage Lecture*, No. 810 (22 October 2003) accessed 18/05/04, <www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL810.cfm>, pp. 2–3.; John Garofano, 'The United States in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Points of Tension and Learning for the U.S. Military', in Jean Callaghan and Mathias Schönborn, *Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004); Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (London: Allen Lane, 2006).
[64] Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss* (2004), pp. 155, 162–165.

3.2 US Operations in Iraq

The final verdict regarding the outcome of US operations in Iraq remains for history to decide, but a number of conclusions can be made at this stage. Most importantly, the security situation is far from under control, which inhibits progress in the political and economic areas. A bleak view comes from Toby Dodge, who argues that Iraq is a collapsed state in which a resultant security vacuum has driven the country into sectarian civil war.[65] The Iraq Study Group Report observes that the US has made 'a massive commitment to the future of Iraq in both blood and treasure'. By February 2008, over 3,950 American soldiers had lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 21,000 have been wounded. To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq War, and costs are running at about $8 billion per month. The Iraq Study Group's concluding assessment reads:

> *Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States…. The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.* [66]

The US troops in Iraq have conducted their operations in accordance with the traditional American way of war during the invasion phase, and to a large extent during the post-conflict phase. The campaign was interpreted as an essentially conventional war, which is also what the US military planned and trained for. The invasion was an overwhelming display of superiority in terms of technology and organization on the conventional battlefield. However, when Saddam Hussein's regime fell, it quickly became clear that the US leadership had failed to create a serious strategy for the post-conflict phase, something which is partly the fault of US patterns of civil-military relations. Interagency co-operation failed in the planning process and did not produce a comprehensive approach. The lack of civil-military co-operation and interagency structures in the US case means that co-ordination and co-operation is even more difficult in times of crisis and operations as complex issues with serious consequences have to be dealt with quickly. Not even for the obviously multifunctional tasks of post-conflict operations in Iraq did the US administration manage to set up interagency work-

[65] Toby Dodge, 'The Causes of Failures in Iraq', *Survival*, 49:1 (Spring 2007), pp. 89–90.
[66] James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, 'The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach', United States Institute of Peace, (9 December 2006), p. 27.

ing groups and joint civil-military planning teams.[67] Civil-military co-operation within the Pentagon also failed to produce plans that effectively connected operational and tactical activity to the strategic aims. The limited interaction over departmental boundaries, with the subsequent limitation in expertise in the planning process, allowed a small number of people to plan operations on a number of flawed assumptions about Iraq.[68]

There were in fact deep divisions between the State Department and the Department of Defense over how to plan for conflict stabilization and nation building. The rift began at the top with personal problems between Secretary of State Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and extended down to the 'working levels' of the departments. President Bush's National Security Directive 24 on 20 January 2003 put the Office of the Secretary of Defense in charge of the nation building efforts, and effectively led to the efforts of the State Department and other agencies being 'dropped, ignored, or given low priority'.[69] The post-conflict planning lacked civil-military co-operation and co-ordination. A Council on Foreign Relations report highlights the weakness of the NSC structure and argues that the lack of a body or an arm within the US government formally responsible for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations is a major reason for poor post-conflict planning and lack of interagency co-operation. 'Policy and implementation are divided among several agencies, with poor interagency coordination, misalignment of resources and authorities, and inadequate accountability and duplicative efforts'.[70]

In the field, the civilian and military components failed to create unity of command, which made co-operation and co-ordination difficult – not least as the civilian Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) refused to co-locate with the military command. There was confusion about the chain of command, as well as serious friction in the working relationships between the military and civilian sides of the operation. Different views about how to stabilize, reconstruct and democratize the country led to frequent conflicts between the military and civilian leaders in the field.[71] The failure to achieve unity of

[67] William L. Nash, (Chair), 'In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities', Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, (2005), accessed 15/09/05, <www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities.pdf>, p. 7.
[68] Anthony H. Cordesman,, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 498.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Nash, 'In the Wake of War', p. 7.
[71] See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. 180–181; Paul L. Bremer and Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), pp. 316–317.

command thereby led to an even more serious failure to achieve unity of effort.[72] The fact that General Garner refused to co-locate ORHA with the military command meant that ORHA and later the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) remained out of touch with the conditions in the field, adding to the lack of expertise or experience with peacemaking and nation building.[73] Key issues like jobs and economic security were as a consequence addressed much later than should have been the case in a campaign for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population.[74]

The tactical behaviour of US troops in Iraq, especially the first three years of the campaign, revealed that they have neither been trained, nor mentally prepared for post-conflict type operations, or complex irregular warfare. Instead, the US military resorted to conventional tactics based on firepower and technology, with the addition of an overemphasis on aggressive force protection policies, which separated and alienated the US troops from the local population.[75] US forces also lacked cultural sensitivity and understanding of how the political aims of the operation must be reflected in their behaviour on the ground. The tactical principles of complex peace operations were therefore also violated.[76] Instead of hearts and minds operations, involving minimum use of force, force protection through closer connections with the local communities, and an understanding of the political primacy and consequences of operations, the strategic narrative has been lost in heavy-handed tactics and a failure to understand local culture as well as the nature of the enemy and the strategic aims.[77] The incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib, in combination with the criminal investigations of serious crimes committed by US troops in Iraq, thereby raise questions regarding the warrior values which are the foundation of US military training.

In conclusion, the divided patterns of civil-military relations have, in the US case, led to a conventional definition of the functional imperative and the creation of a corresponding structure and culture of the US armed forces. Indirectly, the impact of the US divided pattern of civil-military relations has resulted in an American way of war that is not well adjusted to the contemporary strategic context. In the words of Andrew Garfield: 'The U.S. military appears to have the

[72] Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2005), p. 299.
[73] Cordesman, *The Iraq War* (2003), pp. 499–500.
[74] Ibid., pp. 500, 502.
[75] Alice Hills, 'Something Old, Something New: Security Governance in Iraq', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 5:2 (2005), p. 192.
[76] Cordesman, *The Iraq War* (2003), p. 502.
[77] Christopher H. Varhola, 'American Challenges in Postwar Iraq', Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, 27 May 2004, accessed 12/8/2005, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20040527.americawar.varhola.iraqchallenges.html>.

wrong organizational culture to fight the war in which it is currently engaged, [Iraq], which is the most likely type of warfare it will face over the next twenty years'.[78] The direct effect of the divided US approach to civil-military relations is that, in the context of operations, the US is struggling to achieve the necessary joint civil-military planning, co-operation and co-ordination of operations. There is little trust within the system in peace time and this is exacerbated in time of conflict. As a link in the operational chain of command, the US civil-military interface functions poorly.

3.3 The British Pattern of Civil-Military Relations

On the whole, the British structure and culture in the civil-military interface resemble the Janowitzean notion of civil-military relations of integration and mutual understanding. At the interagency level, there is an extensive and somewhat intricate web of committees, which aims to make government policy informed by all the relevant departments. It also means that there is a culture of co-operating and working towards common goals across Whitehall. However, despite the co-operative culture and the relatively extensive interagency structures, there are, as in most political bureaucracies, turf wars between the different departments and agencies, and tendencies to work in ministerial stovepipes. The committee system as a form for interdepartmental integration is also problematic as it is sometimes considered too slow for the planning and command of contemporary military operations involving high levels of complexity and fast moving operational pace.[79]

Within the Ministry of Defence, the integrated civil-military structures are nevertheless more noticeable. In the everyday workings of the ministry as well as in the command of operations, there is a joint civil-military structure that ensures military understanding of government policy as well as politically informed military advice.[80] In the central areas of the ministry there is widespread civil-military mixed management of the different divisions. Where the head is a military officer the deputy is often civilian and vice versa.[81] The ministry's inte-

[78] Andrew Garfield*, Succeeding in Phase IV: British Perspectives on the U.S. to Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq* (Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2006), p. 29

[79] Presentation on 'the Comprehensive Approach', by Edwin Samuels, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and Lt. Col. Tim Russell, MoD, Swedish Ministry of Defence, 24 May 2006.

[80] UK Ministry of Defence, 'Departmental Framework', accessed 10/04/07 at <www.mod.uk>, p. 4; MoD, 'Key Facts about Defence', MoD Website, accessed 05/03/07, <http://www.mod.uk>

[81] William Hopkinson, 'The Making of British Defence Policy', *RUSI Journal*, (October 2000), p. 33.

grated structure leads to a common culture of mutual understanding and trust among military and civilian personnel.[82] This is reinforced by another important aspect of the British system – the highly professional civil service. Its apolitical nature and the fact that it holds positions at the very top of the ministries provide for high levels of political and military understanding, as well as institutional memory of crisis management that more fleeting political and military leaderships can never provide.[83] With the dual knowledge and understanding, the civil-service also functions as buffers and mediators between the political and military wills of the Ministry.

With reference to the theoretical discussion on trust, the British case of integration provides interpersonal trust within the Ministry of Defence as well as, to a more limited extent, within the interagency and inter-ministerial structures. The common background and close working relationships even provide what sociologists call thick interpersonal trust. Zucker argues that this form of trust is based on social similarities and shared moral codes – personal characteristics like gender, ethnicity and cultural background.[84] Narrow social recruitment, close working relationships across the civil-military divide, and the small size of the ministry support this process. Frequent personal contact across some departmental and ministerial boundaries also develops thin interpersonal trust within the civil-military interface and the interagency structures. Although these contacts do not develop close personal relationships they provide familiarity and trust in other organizations through the process of reciprocity.

British military professionalism and military culture were formed under close scrutiny of the British government during the imperial era of colonial policing. This meant that the British military was forced to develop political sensitivity not only to handle the essentially civil-military operations in the colonies.[85] The political leadership's effective control over military administration, promotions and appointments, also forced the commanders in the field to be more sensitive to the preferences of the cabinet.[86] In contrast with the US case, the British way of war has always been whatever task the political leadership has defined for the armed forces, most often involving counterinsurgency type operations in the colonies.

[82] Interview with Brig. Simon Mayall, (MoD, London, November 2004).
[83] Bill Jones and Dennis Kavanagh, *British Politics Today*, 7th edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 186–187.
[84] Zucker, 'Production of Trust' (1986), pp. 53–112.
[85] Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency, 1919–1960* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 64.
[86] Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change* (1994), pp. 38,40.

Thus, the integrated pattern of civil-military relations has, in the British case, led to an unconventional definition of the functional imperative and the creation of a structure and culture of the British armed forces that can be summarized as pragmatic and flexible, with emphasis on the minimum use of force. Another aspect of the British way of war, derived from the pragmatic lessons of colonial policing, is close co-operation between the civilian and military aspects of national power.[87] The resulting British way of war is therefore theoretically well adjusted to the contemporary strategic context of complex peace support operations.

3.4 British Operations in Iraq

The British forces in Iraq largely operated in accordance with best practice and lessons learned from complex peace support operations. Tactically, British forces conducted hearts and minds operations involving the minimum use of force, good political understanding, and force protection through foot patrolling and interaction with the local community. The British troops, moreover, displayed an ability to be tactically flexible. The siege and fall of Basra showed well-developed political understanding of the British armed forces and restraint in the use of force even in open battle. The patience and respect for civilian lives and property during the battle for Basra serve as an example of what Lawrence Freedman calls 'liberal warfare'.[88] Not only did they have the capability to adjust from the invasion phase to the post-conflict reconstruction tasks, they also displayed the same flexibility when being exposed to different levels of threat like during the Black Watch operations south of Baghdad in support of the US operations in Fallujah. Several instances in which escalation would seem normal were, in fact, deescalated by the British.

At the same time, a number of counter-insurgency principles were violated. Most importantly, the British failed to draw upon the complete set of national instruments of power.[89] At the strategic level the interagency committee system was not utilized to its full potential, creating strategic-level planning of the operations in Iraq that were of low quality as it seriously underestimated the post-conflict phase of the campaign and consequently did not produce an effective Phase IV

[87] Rod Thornton, 'The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 85.
[88] Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (2006)
[89] Louise Heywood, 'CIMIC in Iraq', *RUSI Journal*, 151:6 (December 2006), pp. 36–40.

plan.[90] This can partly be explained by the fact that the British were the junior partner in the coalition, and therefore not solely responsible for strategy and operational planning in Iraq. However, the British did have leverage in the process of operational planning and, in the end, accepted the Pentagon plans without using its leverage to a large extent.[91] At the tactical level, the principles of civil-military co-ordination and co-operation, as well as unity of command and effort, were also violated.[92] The co-operation between different agencies involved in the British operations was substantially more limited than expected from the British approach.

An interesting explanation for the failure to apply what is considered the British approach to complex operations is that the traditional committee system of planning was bypassed by the presidential style of leadership employed by Prime Minister Blair. The Butler Report argues that 'the informality and circumscribed character of the Government's procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgement'.[93] In essence, the traditional approach to planning and operations, involving interagency co-operation and co-ordination through the committee system, may therefore have been circumscribed because of a more centralized and controlled form of leadership, as well as the need for increased speed of deliberation in the run-up to the war.

The consequences of the 'hands-off' approach of the British forces in Iraq are contested by academics and practitioners alike.[94] While substantial results have been achieved in terms of security sector reform and handover of responsibilities to Iraqi authorities, the British have failed to provide security for the Iraqi population, or for civilian organizations that have not been able to operate in the south of Iraq. The small number of troops is a significant factor as the British from 2004 have operated with merely about 8,000 troops in a vast area of operations.[95] In an imperial policing fashion, the British seem to have found what they

[90] House of Commons Defence Committee, *Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post Conflict Operations: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2004–05* (London: The House of Commons, 2005), HC 436, pp. 15–17.
[91] Ambassador Christopher Meyer cited in Mary Jordan, 'Blair Failed In Dealing With Bush, Book Says', *The Washington Post,* 8 November 2005, accessed 28/06/2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/07/AR2005110701569.html>
[92] Heywood, 'CIMIC in Iraq' (2006), pp. 36–40
[93] *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*, HC 898, HMSO, 14 July 2004, p. 160.
[94] See as an example, Human Rights Watch, *Basra: Crime and Insecurity under British Occupation*, (2003), accessed 03/04/06, <www.hrw.org/reports/2003>, p. 8.
[95] MoD, 'UK Operations in Iraq: Key Facts and Figures', Defence Fact Sheet, accessed August 2006, <http://www.mod.uk/>

feel is an acceptable level of violence without wasting too many resources and without creating too much of an imprint on Iraqi society. However, the result is that the British approach in Iraq has failed to establish a condition from which to achieve the political aims of the operations by political and diplomatic means.

The British pattern of civil-military relations has had a positive impact on operational effectiveness by providing a military culture and structure well adapted to the contemporary strategic context. It has also provided interagency structures and a co-operative political culture that also often provides good co-operation and co-ordination in the field of operations. The committee system of the interagency structure, and the extensive civil-military integration within the MoD, provides a structure and culture that is better suited for comprehensive approaches and civil-military co-ordination than the US case. Interestingly, in Iraq the positive indirect impact was obvious in the tactical behaviour of British troops. However, the direct impact was less successful as the interagency system was not used to its full potential. The result was thereby that the multifunctional co-ordination of strategic planning and the operational and tactical execution in the field, did not reach the level of co-ordination that is expected of the British approach.

4 Conclusion

This report has emphasized the importance of civil-military relations as necessary factor in understanding effectiveness in complex peace support operations. The report outlined a theoretical framework of direct and indirect civil-military impact on operational effectiveness, thereafter used in the analysis of the cases of UK and US civil-military relations. The impact of the two different patterns of civil-military relations was illustrated empirically by analysing US and British operations in Iraq from 2003. The primary conclusion is that the civil-military aspects of effectiveness in complex peace operations are of such importance that estimates of effectiveness without reference to these aspects are of little value. Understanding the direct and indirect impacts of different patterns of civil-military relations on operational effectiveness is therefore imperative in improving military and civilian conduct for mission success in complex PSOs.

The report has argued that in complex peace support operations, structural integration at the strategic level of the civil-military interface is imperative for increased effectiveness. There are two main reasons why integrated civil-military structures at the strategic level provide better results in complex PSOs. First, the indirect impact means that integrated structures provide more accurate and up-to-date interpretations and adjustment to the functional imperative of the armed forces. This means that the instruments of national power, not least the military, are better suited to the contemporary strategic context. Second, the direct impact of integrated structures is that they provide more inclusive command and control structures at the strategic level, which means that all relevant actors in complex operations are co-ordinated through integrated planning and execution of operations – providing what is called a comprehensive approach to planning and operations. The empirical cases have served to highlight how two different patterns of civil-military relations affect operational effectiveness in the cases of the US and the UK.

An important consequence of the conclusions of this report is that increasing the effectiveness of armed forces in contemporary peace support operations is not primarily a military endeavour. Instead, increased effectiveness requires comprehensive civil-military approaches, which in turn requires integrated and effective civil-military relations – as an important level in the operational chain of command, and as the arena in which the structure and culture of the armed forces is decided. However, to change the very foundations of political institutions and bureaucratic cultures is a cumbersome process, to say the least. Moreover, the institutional arrangements of the civil-military interface in certain countries are

part of unique political systems, which in turn are the results of long historical processes and particular political cultures. The fact that all political systems are different does not mean that lessons from other systems are impossible to learn from, but lessons from across boarders must be adjusted and implemented in accordance with the cultural circumstances of the system. With a sound understanding of the fundamentals and peculiarities of each system, the recommendations of this report, may well be implemented in very different contexts.

4.1 Future Research Directions

The cases explored by this report have been useful for the construction and first tests of an interesting hypothesis of the causal relationship between certain patterns of civil-military relations and military effectiveness in complex irregular warfare. To further test and refine the hypothesis and the theoretical framework a number of different case studies are of interest and importance. This report used two cases of civil-military relations perceived to be at the extreme ends of what is actually a continuum between a divided and an integrated structure and culture. Further cases of these extreme ends should be studied in order to test the hypothesis. Such case studies of extreme cases along the continuum of civil-military integration give an opportunity to change a number of variables that may either strengthen or weaken the hypothesis of this report. Studying countries like Sweden, with highly divided civil-military structures, yet a co-operative parliamentary political system and a different geo-strategic position as a small, neutral power, would, therefore, be of great interest from a theoretical point of view. A case study of France, with a relatively similar historical colonial background as the British, yet a very different political system, would also be interesting.

However, future studies should also seek to include cases along the middle sections of the continuum to provide a complete picture of the theoretical framework. The interesting question which can only be answered by looking at further cases is whether outcome – meaning effectiveness in complex irregular warfare – also follows a continuum as expected, or if there is a tipping point somewhere that creates more of a dualistic outcome – either you are effective or not. Obviously, looking at historical operations with actual outcomes in victory and defeat is beneficial in this respect.

The international aspects of civil-military relations are also an area worth studying further. As many peace support operations take place within an international institutional framework – be it NATO, the UN, the AU or the EU – the civil-military structures and cultures are further complicated. Within the EU

the concept of Comprehensive Approaches to operations has been inherited from the British and within the UN framework a similar approach highlighting the importance of co-ordinated civil-military operations is developed under the banner of Integrated Missions.

A further interesting area of enquiry is the lessons learned from the process of creating jointness between the different military services. Has it succeeded, and if so, to what extent? What roadblock have been identified in this process and what seem to be important factors for success. There should be a number of lessons that are relevant in the process of creating better jointness across the civil-military divide.

In the Swedish case further research should involve a detailed study of the civil-military interface. The exact constitution and nature of existing inter-ministerial and interagency working groups and co-operation structures should be outlined, as well as the perceived need for such structures within the system. In order to understand the structure and culture of civil-military relations in Sweden, such a study should be conducted on the foundation of a historical understanding of civil-military relations in Sweden. Such work has not been done, which means that there is a need for plenty of basic research. Further understanding of the civil-military interface may be achieved through comparative studies with neighbouring countries, as well as with other relevant cases that highlight specific patterns of civil-military relations.

There are also a number of more specific studies that are of interest. How does the organizational division between the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces affect the effectiveness of defence management and command and control during operations? Moreover, what are the lessons from the Norwegian example, which has abandoned the organizationally divided approach by integrating the military leadership with the Defence Ministry? The case of Norway could not be more relevant for Sweden

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