Integrated Missions –
A Liberia Case Study

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Sammanfattning

FNs 'Integrated Missions' symboliserar det mest teoretiskt utvecklade konceptet för utförandet av omfattande och samordnat genomförda fredsfrämjande operationer. Den här rapporten utforskar konceptet och granskar dess tillämpning genom en fallstudie på UNMIL – FNs fredsfrämjande insats i Liberia. Rapporten ger en översikt över de strukturer som utgör en integrerad FN-operation och kartlägger dess genomförbarhet. Syftet är att skapa en uppfattning om hur begreppet tillämpas och beskriva skiljelinjen mellan teori och praktik.

Denna rapport utges inom ramen för FOI:s projektet 'Koncept, Metodik och Verktyg för Effektbaserad Ledning'. Studien har genomförts för att utöka projektets empiriska bas.

Nyckelord: Integrated Missions, Comprehensive Approach, Liberia, UNMIL, Civil-Militär Samverkan.

Summary

The United Nation's Integrated Missions concept symbolise the most mature conceptual development of a comprehensive approach to peace operations. This report examines the Integrated Missions concept and studies its implementation through a case study on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It outlines the structures that constitute an integrated mission and describes how these have been applied in practice. The aim of the report is to create an understanding for how the concept is implemented and explore the divide between theory and practice.

This report is published as part of the *Effects-Based Command in Crisis Management* project at FOI. The study has been conducted in order to increase the empirical base of the project.

Keywords: Integrated Missions, Comprehensive Approach, Liberia, UNMIL, Civil-Military Relations.

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Executive Summary

Integrated Missions are characterized by an integrated command structure which blurs the lines between the military and the civilian peace support effort. It is important for nations contributing troops to such missions to understand how this model is exercised. The concept and organisational principles of Integrated Missions are readily available, but the empirical experiences of how they are put into practice remain limited. Whilst the theory behind integrated missions is fairly well-developed, there is a massive gap between thinking and implementing; the Integrated Missions concept has yet to be fully put into practice. Despite this gap, several UN missions have been proclaimed 'Integrated Missions', amongst these the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

Established in 2003, UNMIL was the first mission to attempt to implement the Integrated Mission concept. The mission is fully integrated in the sense that the traditional divisions between the humanitarian and the politico-military UN effort in Liberia have been overturned. The entire UN system present in the country operates under the single leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and is integrated through the combined function of the DSRSG/HC/RC.[1] This integrated command structure is imperative and integral feature of Integrated Missions, and now a guiding principle for the design and implementation of UN complex operations. Through this integration the relationship and communication between the mission and UN system already present in the country has been largely institutionalised. Coordination mechanisms between the various actors operating in a peace support environment are also routinely provided for in integrated missions, even though their application has been somewhat more informal. For example, the responsibility for the coordination of humanitarian activities was improvised in the Liberian context, and became even further integrated with the UN mission than originally intended nine months into the mission with the closure of OCHA in Libera. The official rationale for the incorporation was to strengthen humanitarian coordination but unofficial accounts point to OCHAs poor performance and clashes between OCHA and UNMIL as necessitating the change. 'Integrated Missions' is an evolving concept, responding to emerging challenges. The Integrated Missions concept is still adjusting and has been flexible in seeking out the most

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[1] In the role of DSRSG/HC/RC, the Humanitarian assistance Coordinator (HC) and the Coordinator responsible for the developmental effort (RC) are combined with the function of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, integrating the humanitarian, developmental and political functions of the mission into one single entity and breaking the autonomy of the UN Country Team which was previously a separate entity from the UN mission and concerned only with the development and humanitarian mandates.

appropriate forms of coordination even though the devising of such mechanisms is still a work in progress. Particularly, the endeavour of increasing coordination with non-UN actors has been a case of practical 'trial and error'. The closure of OCHA might in fact have had negative consequences on coordination with the broader humanitarian community, who would usually only rely on humanitarian common services not too closely associated with the UN mission. Nonetheless, UNMIL provides a good example of inter-organisational coherence at the local, in-country, level through its establishment of County Support Teams (CSTs) [2], bringing together a wide range of actors – international institutions, donors, NGOs and other relevant actors – in a coherent peace effort at county level, as called for in the IM concept. [3] The creation of the CSTs was completely ad hoc, but has been hailed as a good innovation and possible model for future operations.

In theory, the integrated command and field-level coordination mechanisms merely constitute half of an ideal integrated mission. Several functions for integrated mission planning and mission support exist as concepts, but have not been more than partially implemented. The 'Integrated Missions Planning Process' is a concept for formulating a common strategic framework by which the wider UN system can be engaged in a comprehensive peace approach. The planning process, which was created after the establishment of UNMIL, is theoretically sound but has had implementation difficulties. The establishment of an Integrated Missions Task Force, an essential 'planning body' in the integrated planning process, was attempted during early stages of UNMIL but functioned poorly and was eventually replaced by a more traditional working group. Strategic level coordination is an area where the IM theory and practice most clearly diverge and where the further development of the IM concept needs to place its focus. Liberia provides a clear structure for internal and external communication at field-level and a process through which the entire UN system can be mobilized in a coherent and comprehensive pursuit of commonly agreed objectives, but it fails to fulfill the last component of Integrated Missions: to clearly define these objectives and the purpose of UN engagement. Without a strategic framework identifying these goals and objectives, upon which coordination should be based, the Integrated Missions structure cannot be described as

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[2] Based in each of Liberia's fifteen counties the CSTs comprise UN military, political, humanitarian and developmental actors; county administration and sometimes NGOs working in collaboration with the Liberian national government according to a strategy devised by the Government with input from the World Bank, the IMF, donors and other stakeholders.

[3] United Nations. 2006. *Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination, 17 January 2006.*

anything but a half finished structure.The experience of UNMIL shows that whilst integration at field-level has either been institutionalised or informally improvised, it has at the headquarters and planning level mainly been absent. At this level, when theory has proven impractical the UN has relied on fall-back strategies and traditional approaches not always consistent with the IM concept. At the strategic level the implementation of IM has so far failed to capitalize on the potential of the United Nations as a broad and inclusive wide-ranging organisation in creating a fully comprehensive peace operation, leaving a great divide between the Integrated Missions concept and practice:

Integrated Missions Concept:

- A clearly defined strategic framework outlining the purpose of UN engagement and desired objectives, based on the particular context of the intervention.
- A process through which the entire UN system can be mobilised in a coherent pursuit of the commonly defined objectives.
- A clear structure for internal and external communication and coordination.

Integrated Mission Practice:

- Institutionalized integrated command structures for internal relations, communication and coordination
- Informal and improvised structures for communication and coordination with external actors.
- Impractical and poorly implemented theoretical processes for mission planning.

1   Introduction

1.1   Rationale

A changed international security environment has lead to the development of new concepts driven by a desire to manage new situations. Failures during the 1990s led the UN to seek new approaches that could better deal with the actors and situations it was encountering. The UN's 'Integrated Missions' (IM) concept, as well as the 'Comprehensive Approach' (CA) used by such agents as the European Union and the United Kingdom are examples of new approaches seeking to integrate and coordinate between military and civilian actors. Their aim is to lead to a more inclusive and all-encompassing approaches, which are required to appropriately address the complexity of modern emergencies. Similar concepts have also been developed by other actors which have come across the same problems and sought to find new solutions. The Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) is a military concept developed to address this changed security situation. EBAO, whilst not as inclusive, is a parallel approach sharing the aspirations and underlying drivers of CA and IM. In effect, EBAO can be described as the 'military aspect' of a Comprehensive Approach, as it has been by the UK Ministry of Defence.[4]

For nations contributing troops to such missions it is important to understand how these concepts are operationalized. Just like 'EBAO' the concept of IM and CA are often referred to, but the empirical experience of how they are put into practice remains limited. CA is little more than a concept, and IM, despite elements of the concept being applied in several recent peace operations, has yet to be fully implemented.

This report is published as part of the *Effects-Based Command in Crisis Management*[5] project at FOI. The project studies different approaches to peace operations with a focus on multifunctional concepts such as IM and CA. This study has been conducted in order to increase the empirical base of the project on three key areas: strategic guidance; coordination structures and processes; and in-field coordination mechanisms. 'Integrated Missions' is a key concept for strengthening these issue areas within the UN. The purpose of this report is to, by studying the UNs mission in Liberia, provide a better understanding of the concrete mechanisms in place to conduct Integrated Missions. It also aims to

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[4] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. 2006. *The Comprehensive Approach: Joint Discussion Note 4/05*. Shrivenham: Joint Doctrines and Concepts Centre, p 8.
[5] 'Koncept, metodik och verktyg för effektbaserad ledning', authors' translation.

outline the gaps between outcome-based thinking and outcome-based practice, contextualising a mainly theoretical underpinning within an operational framework and provide a basis for future conceptual developments.

1.2   Why Focus on Integrated Missions?

The United Nations' 'Integrated Missions' symbolise the most mature conceptual development of a comprehensive approach to peace operations. In an integrated mission, conflict management is undertaken with an holistic approach linking peacekeeping with peace building through an integrated command structure that makes the division between the military and the civil difficult to distinguish. UN peace operations have long included civil-military structures and important lessons could be learnt from studying the evolvement of these structures into the Integrated Missions concept. The UN is also, in reality, the only organisation able to bring together all relevant actors in a comprehensive approach.

The concept and organisational principles of integrated missions are readily available, yet there are not any such missions that have been fully implemented; most missions encompass only elements of the developed concepts. This makes the study of their application more difficult. It, nonetheless, also serves well to describe and investigate the huge gap that still exists between theory and practice when referring to effects-based operations.

1.3   Why Liberia?

Despite the gap between concept and practice several UN missions have been proclaimed 'Integrated Missions', amongst them the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Established in 2003, UNMIL was the first mission to attempt to implement the Integrated Mission concept, which had been developed since the 2000 Brahimi Report. The mission is fully integrated in the sense that the traditional divisions between the humanitarian and the politico-military UN effort in Liberia have been overturned. The entire UN system present in the country operates under the single leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG); mandated to "coordinate all United Nations activities

in Liberia".[6] Liberia is in many ways an unusual peace mission. It has a broad mandate, covering the wide spectrum of peace operations, from peace-keeping/peace enforcement to peace building, making the mission multidimensional and complex. Mandated under chapter VII of the UN charter, UNMIL was given a peace enforcement authorisation that it has rarely had to use. Well received by a war-tired population, UNMIL has met little resistance. Initially numbering some 15,000 troops UNMIL is one of the largest peace missions ever deployed and unusually robust. Adding to that, Liberia itself is a relatively small country with a population of just over three million people. Lacking strategic importance for the five permanent Security Council members, UNMIL is an uncontroversial mission and has not suffered from many of the problems usually associated with UN peacekeeping. In comparison to similar UN operations in Africa, for example the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISL), UNMIL has been regarded a considerable success and represents the most developed version of post-Brahimi UN peacekeeping reform.[7] Whilst therefore not completely representative of a general peace operation Liberia serves the purpose of studying how the integrated missions concept has been opera-tionalized well. With a broad multifunctional mandate requiring the cooperation of all actors involved and little else to hamper integration than the dynamics of integration itself, Liberia poses an excellent case study for exploring how mission integration works in practice.

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[6] Sida, Lewis. 2005. *Challenges to Humanitarian Space: A review of humanitarian issues related to the UN integrated mission in Liberia and to the relationship between humanitarian and military actors in Liberia*. Study facilitated by the Monitoring and Steering Group: Liberia. Accessed 2008-06-05 at:
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/infocentre/general/docs/Challenges%20to%20humanitarian%20space%20in%20Liberia.pdf, p7; United Nations Security Council. 2003. *Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.* S/2003/695, p 1.

[7] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia.* Study commissioned by Cordaid. ISBN-10: 90-73726-58-1, p 7.

2 Integrated Missions

An Integrated Mission is a process whereby the wider UN system is integrated into one single structure in pursuit of an inclusive and coherent operation. The integration occurs at two levels, the first one at the UN headquarters through the 'Integrated Missions Planning Process' which seeks to bring together the military, political, civil and humanitarian sections of the UN to develop a joint set of mission objectives.[8] The second level is the field level of operations. Here the military, political and humanitarian components of UN engagement in a particular conflict setting are integrated under a single leadership; with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as the overall head of mission.[9]

The spectrum of tasks of a contemporary peace operation range from traditional peacekeeping activities, such as monitoring ceasefires, to peace building – supporting civil society and rehabilitating state structures, for example. These increasingly complex and multifaceted missions, requiring the efforts of a multitude of actors, have raised the issue of coordination and need for more unified peace efforts. This need has led to the development of the Integrated Missions framework, where the different arms of the UN system is organised under a clearer chain of command and where each arm is merely one single tool in a larger toolbox.[10] Integrated Missions are therefore not solely multifunctional in their nature, but also 'system-wide' operations.

2.1 Birth of the IM concept

The concept of Integrated Missions has only been developed over the last few years and has its basis in some of the recommendations made in the 2000 'Report

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[8] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process: Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006*. New York: DPKO, United Nations; Sida, Lewis. 2005. *Challenges to Humanitarian Space: A review of humanitarian issues related to the UN integrated mission in Liberia and to the relationship between humanitarian and military actors in Liberia*. Study facilitated by the Monitoring and Steering Group: Liberia. Accessed 2008-06-05 at: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/infocentre/general/docs/Challenges%20to%20humanitarian%20space%20in%20Liberia.pdf, p 6.

[9] Fiawosime, Albert. 2005. 'An Integrated Approach to Peace Support Operations', In F. Aboagye & A.M.S Bah (Eds*.), Tortuous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*. A project of the Peace Missions Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. ISBN-10: 1919913831, p 181.

[10] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. *Side By Side or Together?: Working for Security, Development & Peace in Afghanistan and Liberia*. The Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, pp 5-7.

of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping'. The report was commissioned by the UN to make recommendations for reform of the UN peacekeeping system after it during the 1990s, and failures such as Rwanda and Bosnia, had proved ill-equipped to undertake more complex peace operations. The report would subsequently be known as the 'Brahimi Report', named after diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi who had chaired the panel producing it. The report examined past peacekeeping capabilities and made suggestions for improvement. Amongst other things the Report pointed out that the Secretariat lacked the structures for the coherent mission planning needed for a successful and efficient approach to peace operations. The Brahimi Report never mentioned the conceptual frame-work for Integrated Missions per se. It only made the recommendation that an Integrated Missions Task Force, consisting of staff from throughout the wider UN system, be developed as a standard vehicle for planning new peacekeeping missions and supporting these throughout deployment.[11] Whilst the report stopped short of referring to Integrated Missions planning at UN headquarters level, Brahimi himself, once becoming the SRSG in Afghanistan, adopted an 'integrated' approach at country level as well, perhaps explaining the association between the Brahimi report and the concept of Integrated Missions often made.[12]

The integration of a mission is an attempt to make use of all available resources to deal with the challenges faced by a peace support operation at various stages of its operations.[13] The Integrated Mission concept has sought to develop a shared understanding of the mandates and functions of the various agencies and actors within the UN system, to ensure coordination and effectiveness of the UN presence and prevent confusion and duplication of tasks.[14] Integration does not entail incorporating one entity of the UN system into another; each UN agent is to maintain their own mandate, identity and responsibility. Integration rather refers to establishing clear structures, processes and mechanisms of coordination to connect these individual entities and form one coherent approach based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of priorities and desired over-arching aims.[15] Neither is the Integrated Mission concept meant to achieve system wide coherence within the UN family exclusively. The complex peace-

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[11] United Nations General Assembly. 2000. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A/55/305–S/2000/809. New York: General Assembly & Security Council, pp 35-37.

[12] Sida. 2005. *Challenges to Humanitarian Space*, p 6.

[13] Nilsson, C & Lagerström, M. 2006. *Civil-militär samverkan i princip och praktik*. FOI-R—2104. Stockholm: FOI, p 27.

[14] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, p 3.

[15] DeConing, Cedric. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations'. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol 10:1, p 24; Eriksen, Bjørnar. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*. Master Thesis. Norwegian Defence Staff College, p 29.

keeping spectrum means that the UN always operates within an even larger international system and the Integrated Mission must be understood as part of a greater framework that also includes external actors, such as international donors, International Organisations (IOs), international and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local governments, regional organisations, neighbouring states and other external stakeholders also engaged in the peace support effort. The integrated concept seeks, to the greatest extent possible, harmonize the activities of these external actors with that of the United Nations, as well as promoting coherence among the external actors themselves.[16]

2.2 What is an Integrated Mission?

As stated earlier the two most important features of an Integrated Missions is the **chain of command** – integrating the overall mission under the single leadership of the SRSG – and **integrated mission planning** – defining the purpose and objectives of the UN mission (these two features are explored in greater detail below). The result of these two features is that, in brief, an Integrated Mission can be described as possessing three encompassing qualities:[17]

- A clearly defined purpose of the UN engagement in a conflict situation based on assessments made by the Integrated Missions Task force, including the extent of autonomy required of each UN agent to achieve desired effects.
- A process through which the entire UN system can be mobilised in a coherent pursuit of the objectives defined by the Task Force.
- A clear structure for internal and external communication and coordination. This includes mechanisms for monitoring and revising the strategic objectives in collaboration with UN headquarters, and mechanisms for deploying needed assets and resources.

2.2.1 Integrated Mission – Chain of Command

In an integrated mission the SRSG has the outmost responsibility and absolute command for both the civil and the military parts of the mission. The SRSG is

[16] DeConing, Cedric. 2007. Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace building and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. ISBN: 978-82-7002-170-3. p 5; DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 25

[17] Eide, E.B., Kaspersen, A., Kent, R & von Hippel, K. 2005. *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, commissioned by the United Nations' Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (the Expanded ECHA Core Group), p 16; Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, p 3.

supported by two deputies – DSRSG rule of law and DSRSG/HC/RC Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction. The DSRSG/HC/RC has particular importance for the Integrated Missions concept:

The UN coordinates its humanitarian assistance through the Emergency Relief Coordinator within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) internationally. At country level this responsibility lies with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The UNs developmental efforts are coordinated through the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) internationally, and the Resident Coordinator (RC) at country level.[18] Each UN operation thus has an HC and an RC at country level. In most contexts these two functions are combined and held by one single person, leading the humanitarian and development effort of the UN Country Team, composed of all UN funds, programs and agencies active in one particular country.[19] The UN Country Team is present in most developing countries, whether or not there a conflict or crisis in the area.[20] In a peace operations scenario the HC/RC has traditionally been outside of the peace-keeping structure, separating the humanitarian and developmental tasks of the Country Team from the political and military goals of the peacekeeping mission. A peacekeeping mission becomes an 'integrated mission' when this autonomy is broken and the HC/RC function is integrated with the peace operation through the creation of a Deputy SRSG (DSRSG) that also functions as the HC/RC.[21]

With the creation of a DSRSG/HC/RC the Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator roles are incorporated into the office of the SRSG. This is contro-versial because it places the humanitarian effort in the hands of the SRSG – which in essence is a political function. In more traditional peacekeeping opera-tions the humanitarian agencies are separated from the peacekeeping missions in interest of neutrality and preservation of the distinction between humanitarian and political objectives. In these traditional missions the UN headquarters in New York and Geneva serve to coordinate between the SRSG – the head of the peacekeeping mission, and OCHA and IASC (the Inter-Agency Standing

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[18] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, p 23.

[19] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*, p 28.

[20] DeConing, Cedric. 2007. 'The Implications of the Integrated Missions Concept for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations'. African Peace Support Trainers Association. Accessed 2008-06-05 at: http://www.apsta-africa.org/news/article17072007.php, p 3.

[21] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 23; DeConing. 2007. 'The Implications of the Integrated Missions Concept for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations', p 3; United Nations. 2006. *Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination, 17 January 2006*, p 2.

Committee) – the two agencies responsible for the humanitarian effort. The SRSG is then formally only the head of the political and military effort and the humanitarian component remains separated from the mission.[22] The integration of the HC and RC into the office of the SRSG allows the SRSG the ability to oversee and control the entire UN effort and ensure coherence between the various sectors.[23] This function facilitates integration across the UN system that combines the political and security responsibilities with the development and humanitarian mandates.[24]

The objective of this kind of integration is, as stated above, greater efficiency and effectiveness. Uniting the UN effort under a single leadership obviously helps to enhance cooperation and communication between the various components of the mission. Whilst placing a lot of pressure on the SRSG, such unity is needed to ensure a coherent and well-directed peace operations approach. The chain of command structure of an Integrated Mission obviously serves to unify the effort at the operational level but a strategic level integrated approach is also needed to identify the effects and outcomes that are desirable and towards which the operation should be directed. The following section seeks to outline the Integrated Mission approach to strategic mission planning.

2.2.2 Integrated Mission – (Integrated) Planning

Other than the unifying role of the SRSG, an integrated mission is also defined by a new and unique structure for mission planning – the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The IMPP is the basic planning tool for all new UN peace operations. It includes wide participation of key actors from the broad UN system in the planning process, both at headquarters and country level. The aim of the IMPP is to facilitate common understanding within the wider UN system regarding its aims and objectives in a particular country. [25] It also aims to mobilize the wider capacities of the UN system relevant to achieving a desired outcome into the planning process in order to guide the mission throughout the lifespan of the operation.[26]

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[22] Wahlberg, M., Asplund, M. & Olsson, M. 2005. Koncept för civil-militär samverkan vid fredsfrämjande insatser. FOI Memo 1597. Stockholm: FOI, p 12.

[23] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*, p 30.

[24] DeConing. 2007. 'The Implications of the Integrated Missions Concept for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations', p 3.

[25] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008. Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO, United Nations, p 55; Nilsson & Lagerström. 2006. Civil-militär samverkan i princip och praktik, p 27.

[26] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process, p 3.*

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The IMPP is dependent on two physical entities undertaking the assessment and analysis for successful planning. The first one is the Integrated Missions Task Force (IMTF), recommended by the Brahimi report; the second the Integrated Missions Planning Team (IMPT):

The IMTF is an integrated planning body at headquarters level, its members representing the secretarial departments and the wider UN system – senior representatives of the political, military, police, security, humanitarian and development sections; technical, operational and logistics staff; representatives from the UN Country Team; and the SRSG (once appointed) – to prepare key planning and policy documents, monitor progress and advice the deployed mission. The exact membership may change throughout the planning process. [27] The IMPT is an equally integrated and dynamic body, representing the same broad spectrum of the UN system but at country level. The IMPT is brought into existence once an Integrated Mission has been deployed to the field.[28]

The IMTF is central to the planning process throughout all planning stages and the entire mission, although its level of involvement may change according to the mission's priorities and needs. In the latter part of the planning process the Planning Team takes over as the more central planning vehicle, although in close consultation with the Task Force.[29]

The IMPP commences with the Secretary General's decision to initiate an IMPP. After it underwent a review in 2006 the IMPP was divided into three broad stages: 'Advance Planning', 'Operational Planning' and 'Review and Transition Planning'.[30] For more detailed information on these stages of the planning process and their outputs see Annex A.

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[27] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process, p 3*; Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*, p 35.

[28] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process, Annex A.*

[29] Ibid, p 18.

[30] International Peace Academy. 2007. 'Meeting Note: Seminar on Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies', meeting note from seminar March 1, 2007 in New York organized by the International Peace Academy and the Center on International Cooperation. Accessed online 2008-06-09. Available at: http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/155/FINAL_Meeting_Note_-_IPA-CIC_Peacebuilding_Strategy_Meeting_March_1.pdf, p 3.

3　The Liberia Case

Ref: United Nations. Liberia, no. 3775 Rev.6.

3.1　Background to the conflict

Formed in 1847 by freed American slaves returning to the African continent, Liberia is the oldest republic in Africa. Situated on the West African coastline, the Liberian state forms part of the unstable Mano River region; an area troubled by conflict which in the case of Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone has lead to prolonged and particularly atrocious civil wars.

Like most conflicts there is no single cause to explain Liberia's civil war. Long-standing socio-economic grievances and ethno-political tensions within the country, along with regional dynamics eventually erupted into physical conflict.[31] Soon upon the establishment of the independent Liberian republic, the former slaves – maintaining close ties with the United States – would form an

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[31] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia*, p 74.

African-American elite, subjecting the indigenous Liberians to suppressive rule and segregating the country. The elite took on a form of governing that has best been described as 'domestic colonialism': characterized by persistent discrimination and inequality. Despite the oppressive rule, Liberia remained relatively calm with an economic growth and a socio-economic development that was unusually high for an African state until 1979.[32] In 1979 popular protests over food prices emerged, culminating in 'rice riots'. Violence broke out and indigenous army sergeant Samuel K. Doe took over the presidency in a coup d'état. Doe's rule would, however, prove even more oppressive and brutal than previous presidential reigns, leading only to increased ethnic rivalry and turmoil.[33]

In 1989 the National Patriotic Liberation Front (NPLF), led by Charles Taylor, entered the country from Côte d'Ivoire. The NPLF capitalized on the resentment felt by the oppressed population and caused a trend of emerging and realigning armed factions – often oriented along ethnic lines, setting Liberia off on a downward spiral that would eventually erupt into a civil war.[34] International actors attempted to intervene. In 1990, roughly a year after violence broke out, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered a ceasefire and deployed a ceasefire monitoring force (ECOMOG) to Liberia, in an effort to stabilize the situation in the capital. Taylor refused to disarm and ECOMOG only succeeded in getting dragged into the fighting whilst new armed factions emerged and disappeared.[35]

Ethnic cleansing, rapes and forced recruitment into rebel groups, including the systematic use of child soldiers, would lead huge numbers of Liberians to become displaced within their own country or flee into neighbouring states over the next 14 years. The war and destruction would have devastating effects on Liberia and destabilize the whole Mano River region. ECOMOG and the UN observer mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), established in 1993, remained in the country, but failed to alleviate the situation.[36]

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[32] Scaef, T. 2004. Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs): Case Study Liberia. Working Paper No. 9: Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations on behalf of the World Bank / UNDP and BMZ, p 3.

[33] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict: NGO-Military communication in Afghanistan and Liberia,* pp 43- 44; Frerks et all. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia*, p 73.

[34] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia*, p 73.

[35] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict: NGO-Military communication in Afghanistan and Liberia,* p 43

[36] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia*, p 72.

After several failed ceasefires and attempted elections Charles Taylor was finally brought to the presidency in 1997, after having won the votes of over 75% of the war-tired Liberian population. After the election, both ECOMOG and UNOMIL withdrew from the country. [37] Unfortunately, the election of Taylor failed to induce stability. Continued oppression by the Taylor government allowed Liberia to disintegrate once more, relapsing into civil war. By the summer of 2003 over 200,000 people had been killed and approximately half the Liberian population had been displaced. [38]

In June 2003 at a peace negotiation in Accra, Taylor agreed to step down in the interest of peace. His departure into exile in Nigeria, by invitation of the Nigerian president, paved the way for the establishment of an interim government and the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by various Liberian stake-holders in August that same year. The departure of Taylor and the signing of the CPA brought a recommitment by the international community to assist in returning peace and security to Liberia. By request from the UN, ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL and humanitarian organisations that had left the country because of the violence returned, greeted by a total humanitarian crises caused by the fighting. [39] The peace agreement had called for the establishment of a National Transitional Government of Liberia to become effective in October 2003. It also requested that a UN stabilizing force, with peace enforcement capa-bilities mandated under chapter VII of the UN charter, be deployed to Liberia to assist the transitional government and help keep the peace. The Security Council transferred ECOMILs mandate to a UN operation and one month after the CPA had been signed, the Security Council authorised the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) by resolution 1509/2003. [40] UNMIL was authorised 15,000 military personnel and mandated to oversee the ceasefire agreement, implement and monitor the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) process, provide security to United Nations staff and facilities, protect civilians under immanent threat, support Security Sector Reform and assist the implementation of the CPA; including

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[37] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia*, p 72; United Nations Security Council. 2003. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia. S/2003/875, p 1.

[38] Center of International Cooperation. 2008. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*. New York: New York University, Center of International Cooperation, p 58.

[39] Sida, Lewis & Szpak, Chris. 2004. An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers: including Case Studies of HICs for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia, commissioned by DFID and USAID. Accessed online 2008-06-09. Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LHON-67BCX3/$file/Evaluation_HIC_USAID_Aug_2004.pdf?openelement, Appendix A; Fiawosime. 2005. 'An Integrated Approach to Peace Support Operations', p 166.

[40] United Nations Security Council. 2003. Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003). S/RES/1509 (2003).

assisting the transitional government in re-establishing state authority throughout the country and preparing for general elections.[41]

Elections were eventually held in the autumn of 2005. The Harvard educated economist and runner-up to Charles Taylor in the 1997 election – Ellen Johnsson Sirleaf – would be the first elected female president in Africa.[42] Liberia is no longer a collapsed state and a lot of progress has been made. Yet, the country still has a long way to go in terms of recovering from the war. The unemployment rate remains at 85%, food insecurity is high and large numbers of the population are still dependent on food aid, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than 50% of its pre-war levels and Liberia does not even appear on the UN Development program's (UNDP) Human Development Index 2007/2008 rankings.[43]

In the meantime, UNMIL remains deployed. In 2007 the Security Council decided on a gradual draw down, reducing the number of troops in the country over the next few years. Nonetheless, UNMIL is expected to have 9000 troops on the ground in Liberia in 2010, still ranking it one of the largest peace operations ever.[44]

3.2   UNMIL – Structuring an Integrated Mission

Acting under chapter VII of the UN charter (albeit with consent of the warring parties), the Security Council decided to mandate UNMIL with five overarching tasks [45]:

1. **Support and monitor the ceasefire agreement**, including developing an action plan for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants, collecting and destroying weapons.
2. **Protect United Nations staff and facilities**, including ensuring security and freedom of movement, as well as to protect civilians under immanent threat.
3. **Support [but not provide] Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance**.
4. **Support Security Sector Reform**, including assisting the government in restructuring the police force and the formation of a new army

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[41] United Nations. 2003. Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003); Center of International Cooperation. 2008. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, p 58.

[42] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism:Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia,* p 73; Elavanalthoduka, Mathew. 2005. 'The Task is Awesome…'.UNMIL Focus, Vol. 2:1, p 18.

[43] Scaef, T. 2004. *Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs): Case Study Liberia*, p 2;   United Nations Development Program. 2008. 'Statistics of the Human Development Report : 2007/2008 Human Development Index rankings'. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/

[44] Center of International Cooperation. 2008. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, p 57.

[45] United Nations Security Council. 2003. Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), p 4.

5. **Support the implementation of the peace process**, including assisting in re-establish national authority throughout the country, develop a structure for a national legal and judiciary framework and prepare for the holding of national elections.

UNMIL, established in 2003, was the first time the UN attempted to implement an Integrated Mission. The mission is fully integrated in the sense that the entire UN system present in the country operates under the single leadership of the SRSG.[46]

Consisting of over 16.000 international civilian and military staff, UNMIL measures as one of the largest peacekeeping operation ever deployed by the United Nations. The vast majority of UNMIL personnel fall into the military category, nonetheless, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between the mission's military and civilian components as they serve both military and developmental purposes in accordance with the Integrated Mission concept.[47] As evidenced by the mandate, UNMIL is a truly multifunctional mission and display of the challenges of civil-military relations. The operation encompasses the broad spectrum of tasks of a peace support operation, including military (peace-keeping), developmental (peace- and state building) and humanitarian (aid and relief) tasks. Because of the complex nature of these tasks, close coordination is necessary to achieve almost any aim of the mission. Furthermore, few of these tasks fall solely into only one realm. The DDRR effort is a good example of such a task that requires the skills and effort of both civil and military actors. Another example is logistics; the road conditions in Liberia are particularly poor, making many humanitarian agencies rely on the use of the military's means of transpor-tation to be able to access many of the areas outside of the capital, Monrovia. Whilst the peacekeepers facilitate such provisions of humanitarian aid, NGOs and other development organisations are often contracted by the peacekeeping mission to implement Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).[48] For more information on QIPs see section 3.3.1.

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[46] United Nations Security Council. 2003. Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2003/695, p 1; Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict*, p 44; Sida. 2005. Challenges to Humanitarian Space, p 7.

[47] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism,* p 96.

[48] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict*, pp 47-48.

UNMIL can be divided into five overarching mechanisms, which all fall under the command of the SRSG;[49]

1. The Military component, headed by the Force Commander.
2. Rule of Law department, headed by the rule of law DSRSG.
3. Civilian Police unit, headed by the Police Commissioner
4. Administration, headed by the Director of Administration
5. Department for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction, headed by the multi-hatted DSRSG/HC/RC.[50]

The military, police and administrative components are traditional elements of UN peacekeeping missions and their roles are relatively self-explanatory. The two DSRSGs are each responsible for two departments – Rule of Law, and

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[49] Interestingly whilst mandated with assistance to the formation of a new army, UNMIL has not been commissioned to train this army, a task which would usually fall under the UN mission. This responsibility for Security Sector Reform in Liberia has been assumed by the US, which has hired private security firm DynCorp as its implementing partner, to train the police force and construct the new national army. Frerks et all. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism, p 78;*
Corpwatch. 2005. 'Liberia: U.S. Hires Private Company to Train 4,000-Man Army'. Accesed online 2008-06-09 at: http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11857.

[50] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict*, pp 44-45; Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions, p 37.*

Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction, respectively – which have greater impact on the Integrated Missions concept.

The Rule of Law department includes Civil Affairs, Human Rights, electoral division, judiciary division, corrections services. This section concentrates on rebuilding the government and judiciary structures and is responsible for organizing elections and training the national police. Its tasks include the following elements:

- The resumption of activities of the Civil Service (carried out by Civil Affairs)
- Organisation of elections (Electoral Division)
- Promotion of Human Rights (Human Rights Protection Section)
- Restoration of the Judiciary (Judiciary Division)
- Rehabilitation of Prisons (Corrections/Prison Advisory Service)

The tasks of this department often require intensive interaction with the military component of the mission. Military support was instrumental in organizing the elections, for example. Because of time-restraint and the poor road conditions UNMILs helicopters where needed to distribute ballot forms and transport equipment needed for constructing election offices. Security provided by UNMIL troops was also needed throughout the whole election process.[51] Whilst the Rule of Law department works in close relation to other UNMIL structures it does not often interact with external actors, such as NGOs.[52]

The Department for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction, as evident by its name, works to address humanitarian and development needs. It coordinates the humanitarian activities in the country, including those undertaken by non-UN agencies and is highly involved with NGOs and other agents operating in the field, facilitating interaction and coordination between local and international NGOs and the UN agencies.[53] The department is divided into three sections; 'Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation' (RRR), 'Humanitarian Coordination' and 'Programme Planning & Assessment'.

3.2.1   Mission Planning

The second feature of Integrated Missions, the 'Integrated Missions Planning Process', was only developed in 2004: in the months after UNMIL deployed to Liberia. UNMIL is considered an Integrated Mission because of its integrated chain of command. The IMPP, one of the core conceptual features of integrated

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[51] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism*, p 78.
[52] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict, p 45.*
[53] Ibid.

missions by today's standards, on the other hand, did not exist as such at the time of UNMILs conception and was therefore, naturally, not instantly implemented. Despite not a part of a wider integrated missions planning process, the implementation of an Integrated Missions Task Force was attempted during the planning of UNMIL – the first major UN operation after the release of the Brahimi report – to facilitate integrated planning and decision-making. Formed in the summer of 2003, the IMTF, amongst other things, undertook a pre-deployment assessment mission to Liberia. The SRSG and Force Commander were chosen early on and participated in the planning stages of the mission, with the SRSG serving as chair of the IMTF meetings. Studies suggest that whilst the IMTF might have improved communication between UN departments and agencies and facilitated horizontal discussion and planning, it failed to operate as a true problem-solving body, lacking decision authority and seeking out higher–level bodies for validation and appeal.[54] Whilst SRSG Klein did participate, he did not use the IMTF as a key planning asset.[55] The IMTF eventually devolved into a briefing and discussion format serving more as a brainstorming and drafting committee. One reason for this might have been sheer size, at one point the IMTF for Liberia was constituted of more than 50 people.[56]

It has been argued that the UN system still tends to rely on resolving issues upwards through a single chain of decision makers (Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) → Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping → Secretary-General, for example), leaving other departments and agencies with little say in final decisions.[57] Proven an ineffective planning mechanism the IMTF was eventually replaced by a 'Liberia Working Group', set up and chaired by the DPKO.[58] The establishment of the Liberia Working Group was in many ways a fall-back strategy and served to limit the number of participating agents, seeking a balance between inclusiveness and effectiveness.[59] With participants from the various UN departments coming together for regular meetings, the Liberian Working Group shared many features with the IMTF. The working group fed into meetings of DPKO senior management and functioned as an aide to the DPKO rather than managing UN-wide contributions to mission planning. Resorting to traditional decision-making structures, using the DPKO as a lead

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[54] Tardy, Thierry. 2004. 'The Brahimi Report: Four Years On', proceedings of a workshop held at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy 20-21 June 2004, p 10.

[55] Durch, W., Holt, K., Earle, C & Shannahan, M. 2003. The Brahimi report and the Future of United Nations Peace Operations. Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Centre, p 69.

[56] Ibid, p 48.

[57] Ibid, p 49.

[58] Tardy. 2004. 'The Brahimi Report: Four Years On', p 12.

[59] Boulden, J., MacFarlane, S.N., Prantl, J & Williams, D. 2005. The Consolidation of Peace in Africa. Centre for International Studies Working Paper Series No: IS001, p 18.

department, the Working Group functioned as a flow of current information from the DPKO to other UN departments and agencies: operating as an information-sharing tool rather than working as a joint, UN-wide, mission planning mechanism.[60] The Working Group attempted, but failed, to draft a joint integrated strategy for Liberia. Yet, it was reportedly remarkably more successful in working out differences between the military and police division concepts within UNMIL than the IMTF.[61]

As such the attempted implementation of the IMTF was a great disappointment, particularly because of a failure of delegating problem-solving and decision-making authority. Instead the integrated planning was circumvented by an ad-hoc fix channelling decision-making through a traditional process which might have seemed effective but hampered mission integration. IMTFs have also been set up for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), with similar results, and the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The Interdepartmental Task Force in Sudan managed to develop a Unified Mission Plan, a core document for the implementation of the mission. The Sudan UN Country Team has also developed a work plan that is to be seen as part of the wider mission plan.[62]

In April 2004 UNMIL released an Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP).[63] Developed by the SRSG and the Senior Management Team, the IMIP is a mission-wide strategic and operational framework for the implementation of UNMILs mandate and tasks as outlined in the mandatory UNMIL mission plan. Based on resolution 1509 (2003) it identifies eight core objectives and outlines a range of programs for how to achieve them.[64] For example, to safeguard human rights is a core goal and providing human rights training to local authorities, assisting in establishing an independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and investigate war-related violations of human rights, three of the programs aimed to achieve this objective.[65] The IMIP is not an overarching strategic framework, but has a strong advantage in being an implementation plan appro-priately developed by those with executive authority.

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[60] Durch et al. 2003. The Brahimi report and the Future of United Nations Peace Operations, p 48.
[61] Ibid
[62] Eriksen. 2007. Integrated Missions, pp. 52-58.
[63] McCandless, Erin.2008. 'Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in transitional settings'. ISS paper 161. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria. ISSN: 1026-0404, pp. 7; Government of Liberia. 2004. National Community Resettlement and Reintegration Strategy. Pp.27. Accessed 2008-06-04, Available at http://www.frontpageafrica.com/documents/libreset.pdf, pp. 27
[64] UN General Assembly. 2004. *Proposed budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 (14 May 2004).* A/58/798, p 4
[65] OHCHR. 2004. *Africa: Quarterly Reports of Field Offices.* Public Report March 2004. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, p 26.

Derived from the IMIP, a Results-Based Budgeting framework was also created to deal with the economic aspects of UNMIL activities and to ensure resource efficient implementation of the UNMIL mandate.[66] To bring together the Mandate Implementation Plan and the Budgeting Framework, and to consolidate these with the Government of Liberia's 2006 four-pillar poverty reduction strategy, UNMIL and the UN Country Team created the Integrated Mission Priorities and Implementation Plan (IMPIP). The IMPIP sought to bring together the various mission objectives and strategies in one comprehensive strategic direction.[67] The IMPIP reportedly deals with all the four-pillars in the government's framework – enhancing national security; revitalizing the economy; strengthening governance and the rule of law; and rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services [68] – but emphasize UN priorities on these issues and outlines projects and initiatives in accordance with various thematic sectors. [69] In August 2006, the IMPIP was made a cornerstone in an invigorated Planning Process to re-write the mission plan as UNMIL moved into a peace consolidation phase and mission priorities changed.[70]

The changed conflict environment in Liberia meant that the mission began planning for consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal (CDW). The CDW plan works like an assessment tool to monitor and evaluate the fulfilment of the mission mandate by establishing benchmarks, drawing on the IMPIP and government frameworks, to be reached within each phase.[71] It also works to draw attention to areas of potential conflict to alert other actors involved in the peace building process.[72] Currently in the drawdown phase since the 1st January 2008, the benchmarks, outlined by the Secretary-General in his 2008 report, seek to provide linkages between UNMILs mandate and longer-term peace building

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[66] United Nations General Assembly. 2004. *Proposed budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 (14 May 2004).* A/58/798, p 4

[67] United Nations Development Group. 2006. *2006 Resident Coordinator Annual Report- Liberia.* Accessed online 2008-06-09. Available at: http://www.undg.org/rcar.cfm?fuseaction=N&ctyIDC=LIR&P=490; McCandless, Erin.2008. *Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in transitional settings.* ISS paper 161. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria. ISSN: 1026-0404, p 7

[68] International Monetary Fund and International Development Association Liberia. 2007. *Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.* Accessed 2008-06-30, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Liberia-JSAN_IPRSP(April18-2007).pdf

[69] McCandless, Erin. 2008. *Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in transitional settings.* ISS paper 161. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria. ISSN: 1026-0404, p7

[70] Ibid

[71] McCandless, Erin. 2008. *Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in transitional settings*, p. 11; Peace Building Fund. 2008. *Priority Plan for Peace Building Fund Liberia*, February 2008. Monrovia: UN Peace Building Fund, pp. 8

[72] Ibid

aims, such as reconciliation and health. The benchmarks are also followed by 'indicators of progress' to facilitate evaluating the progress of obtaining them.[73] Consultations were made before the development of the CDW. These included a Technical Assessment Mission, led by the DPKO and including the department of Political Affairs, OCHA, department of safety and security and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. During a period of 11 days in mid-2007 the Assessment Mission met with UNMIL, the UN Country Team, the government of Liberia, ECOWAS and African Union (AU), as well as political parties, NGOs and civil society to collect information to develop a draw-down plan.[74] The Assessment Mission determined that sufficient implementation of UNMIL mandate had been made and the general security situation in Liberia had improved sufficiently to allow for the planning of gradual drawdown of the mission. It also established some criterions to guide the pace of the drawdown process. Furthermore, the Mission recommended that a second Technical Assessment Mission be sent to review the security situation in Liberia during 2010, and only then make plans for the final withdrawal and successor arrangements.[75]

3.3 What are the coordination mechanisms?

3.3.1 Office of the DSRSG/HC/RC

The DSRSG/HC/RC works, in many ways, to coordinate between UNMIL and the UN Country Team. The Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation Section, and the Humanitarian Coordination Section are both situated in the Department for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction under the office of the DSRSG/HC/RC. These sections, and their role in supporting mission integration, are described in greater detail below.

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[73] United Nations Security Council. 2008. Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. S/2008/ 183, Annex 1

[74] United Nations Security Council. 2007. *Fiftheenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia.* S/2007/ 497, p 3-4

[75] Ibid, p 13-14, 17

The Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation (RRR) Section

The Relief Recovery and Rehabilitation (RRR) section focuses on relief and rehabilitation activities, but implement very few of these itself. Rather the RRR section assesses, monitors and gives advice on developmental issues to UNMIL and the UN Country Team consisting of all other UN agencies, funds and programmes operating in Liberia. It is also tasked with the gradual transferral of responsibility for relief, recovery and rehabilitation to the Liberian government.[76] At the inception of UNMILs deployment, the section focused mainly on the relief component (facilitating the distribution of food and medical supplies). As Liberia moved further into the peace building phase the recovery and rehabilitation elements became more important. RRR officers are based in the field across Liberia's four sectors. They serve as a link between the national and sectoral levels; reporting back to the Monrovia HQ regarding activities at local level, and translate policy decisions at headquarters (HQ) level to actors operating in the field. They also monitor the integration of IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants in the local communities.[77]

The Quick Impact Project (QIP) Unit is also under the jurisdiction of the RRR section. A Quick Impact Project is a quick-fix reconstruction activity, originally unrelated to peacekeeping and first used by the UNHCR in 1991. By recommendation of the Brahimi report, QIPs, however, became an integrated feature of UN peacekeeping. QIPs can be seen as a small-scale projects of benefit to local communities – for example, limited infrastructure, non-recurrent training

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[76] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism*, p 79.
[77] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict,* p 46.

activities and provision of needed equipment– aimed not directly at supporting further development or alleviate long-term humanitarian poverty but to 'win the hearts and minds' of the local population.[78] Whilst standards for the use of QIPs states that these need to be of benefit of the local population in both the short and the long-term, the aim is to establish 'credibility' of the mission, its mandate and the peace process.[79] They must be completed within three months, cost less than $ 25,000 and be 'highly visible' to the local population, contributing to good PR for the mission. QIPs are not intended as humanitarian projects, but as political means aimed to boost the popularity of the peacekeepers, yet, the QIP unit resorts under the humanitarian DSRSG. The funding for the QIPs come in part from the mission budget, or from each national contingent and is channelled through the DPKO. The RRR section, assesses and monitors these projects, as well as help NGOs write QIP proposals.[80]

In Liberia most QIPs are implemented by local NGOs or other civilian agents, and are therefore largely associated with the NGOs, not the peacekeepers, making the objective of increasing the popularity of the peacekeepers erroneous. Furthermore, UNMIL was also so widely well-liked even before deployment that QIPs to increase the popularity of the mission have hardly been required. If the QIPs are measured by a political objective they therefore seem redundant. Critics have also argued that the implementation of QIPs has been anything but quick and sometimes caused more trouble than gain.[81] Others criticise QIPs in general on ethical grounds and argue that seemingly humanitarian actions should never be used as political leverage because they diminish the humanitarian space and endanger the neutrality of humanitarian organisations.[82]

The Humanitarian Coordination Section (HCS)

The HCS was originally not a part of UNMIL at the time of its inception. The responsibility for the coordination of humanitarian activities in Liberia was separate from the peacekeeping mission and belonged to OCHA. The Humanitarian Coordination Section, under the authority of the DSRSG/HC/RC

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[78] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism*, p 79; Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2007. *DPKO Policy Directive 12 February 2007: Quick Impact Projects*. New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, p 4.

[79] Ibid, 3; United Nations. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p 7.

[80] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism*, p 79; Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2007. *DPKO Policy Directive: Quick Impact Projects*, p 4

[81] Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict, p 47.*

[82] Weir, Erin. 2006. Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, p 37.

took over this responsibility from OCHA in July 2004.[83] The rationale for incorporating this task of coordination into UNMIL was to strengthen humanitarian coordination, although unofficial accounts blame poor performance by OCHA and bad personal dynamics between OCHA and UNMIL staff,[84] thus OCHA was closed and replaced by the creation of the HCS.

The HCS acts like an interface between the UN agencies, international and local NGOs and the various departments of the Liberian Government. It manages information, coordinates, plans, assesses, analyzes and monitors humanitarian activities. Its objective is to maximize the effectiveness of relief operations by coordination at key levels and facilitate linkages between needs and means.[85] To do so, the HCS has got six humanitarian coordination offices at provincial capitals, including in Monrovia, and undertakes country-wide regular meetings for key actors within and outside the UN system.[86] The HCS has established two main regular mechanisms for interagency coordination meetings:

- The Humanitarian Action Committee (HAC), which arranges bi-weekly meetings for UN agencies and NGOs, which include security presentations by UNMIL and thematic presentations on key sectors and programs.[87]
- Security Management Meetings (SMTs), composed of UNMIL and the heads and security officers of all UN agencies in the country. These meetings address security issues and contingency planning relating to threats to stability in Liberia. The SMTs are chaired by the SRSG and seeks to establish a common security system and security standards throughout the UN system, including curfews.[88]

To achieve its objective of efficient coordination the HSC makes use of the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC). Originally an OCHA entity, established in August 2003 before the deployment of UNMIL, the HIC came under the leadership of the DSRSG/HC/RC at the same time as the wider HCS was established.[89] The HIC seeks to support humanitarian coordination through the provision of information products and services and the creation of a common

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[83] United Nations Security Council. 2004. Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. S/2004/ 725, p 12.

[84] Frerks et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism,* p 80.

[85] Ibid, p 81; United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2006. 'The Humanitarian Coordination Section', UNMIL Website. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=humanitarian.

[86] Van Klingeren, Marleene Van. 2007. *Communication in Conflict,* p 47; Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination: lessons from a survey of Afghanistan and Liberia'. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol 10:1, p 103.

[87] Ibid

[88] Ibid; Fiawosime. 2005. 'An Integrated Approach to Peace Support Operations', p 186.

[89] UNOCHA. 2006. 'HCS-UNMIL & HIC Liberia, briefing pack April 4, 2006'. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

humanitarian framework.[90] To this end the HIC provides services such as internet facilities to humanitarian workers and compiles data to meet information and coordination needs. This includes a database of contact details, meeting schedules and mapping systems, such as the Who does What Where (WWW) which traces funding, sectors of intervention and geographical distribution of interventions within the country.[91] The HIC also provides cartographic maps and a range of surveys and assessment reports. The HIC is a common service to the humanitarian community in Liberia and neighbouring countries.[92] It has been argued that whilst the HIC is popular and widely used amongst the humanitarian sector, its actual coordination role is dubious. Information is not regularly updated and its website inaccessible in most of the country. In effect, the HIC might best be considered a 'starting point' for coordination; a database that serves a humanitarian purpose by making information publicly available, something that would otherwise be difficult for many NGOs.[93]

Humanitarian and other Frameworks

The UN in Liberia (consisting of the Country Team – all non-UNMIL UN agencies and programmes, and UNMIL) works in accordance with the objectives of a few key strategy and planning documents; including a series of frameworks for reconstruction, development and other efforts of assistance actors.[94] These include the Post-Conflict Needs Assesment (PCNA), initiated in 2003 by the SRSG as a list of perceived reconstruction needs at the time of UNMIL inception,[95] and further developed by UNDP, UN development Group Office (UNDGO) and the World Bank.[96] The PCNA was replaced by the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RBTF), a national and system-wide framework involving the Government of Liberia, the UN, World Bank and

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[90] Sida & Szpak. 2004. An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers, Appendix -Liberia

[91] Olson & Gregorian. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination, p 103; Frerks et all. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism*, p 80.

[92] Humanitarian Information Centre for Liberia. 2005. 'Welcome to the Humanitarian Information Center (HIC)', HIC website. Accessed online 2008-06-09 at: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/about/index.asp)

[93] Sida & Szpak. 2004. An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers, Appendix –Liberia; Van Klingeren. 2007. *Communication in Conflict,* p 64.

[94] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'UN Complex Peace Operations,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ISBN 978-0-9802704-0-2, p 105.

[95] DeConing, Cedric. 2007. Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace building and Integrated Missions, p 13.

[96] Ryan, Jordan. 2007. 'Development Assistance in Post-Conflict Fragile States', presentation at Danida Development Days Workshop, Copenhagen, 11 June 2007. Accessed online 2008-06-09. Available at: http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/836E69A2-C925-4835-B6F2-F7EDB6BF9BD8/0/FragilestatesJordanRyan.doc, p 8.

international donors in a strategy to move Liberia from a post-conflict to a development setting, covering the period between 2004 and 2006.[97] In 2006 the RBTF, in its turn, was replaced by the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP) outlining the governments peace building and development strategies, including the four overarching pillars of enhancing national security; revitalizing the economy; strengthening governance and the rule of law; and rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services.

The iPRSP is to be followed by a full Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) from 2008, covering the period until 2011.[98] In support of the iPRSP and to avoid a gap in the transition between emergency and development support the HCS has prepared a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). The CHAP, established in 2007, provides an analysis of the context and assessment of needs and scenarios. It also sets out long-term goals and objectives, as well as identifying roles and responsibilities of various organisations.[99]

The HCS has also organized a joint funding appeal of all relevant humanitarian actors – NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN agencies and donors, amongst others. It is called the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and is the UNs main tool for humanitarian coordination, strategic planning and cooperation for joint strategies of addressing humanitarian needs. During 2006, the year of establishment of the CAP, more than $US 70 million was raised for urgent humanitarian needs. Through the CAP and the CHAP the HCS identifies, and call attention to, the priorities of the humanitarian community.[100]

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[97] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. *Side By Side or Together?*, p 37.
[98] Ibid, p 38.
[99] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination, p 103.
[100] Ibid, pp 103-104

Ref:'National and United Nations planning and programming processes in Liberia' in United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012, p 9

As a part of a humanitarian reform agenda within the UN, the organisation has adopted a 'cluster approach' to humanitarian coordination. Starting in 2006, Liberia became one of four countries to test out the new approach, which seeks to create field-level partnerships on key issue areas, so called 'clusters', in need of a humanitarian assistance framework. The Cluster Approach is outlined in the 2005 RBTF, developed by the Liberian government with input from the UN and the World Bank. The approach is a framework for cohesion on key needs that applies to a range of actors in Liberia, including UNMIL. The whole of the UN in Liberia is important in helping to implement the tasks of the clusters; the Office of the DSRSG/HC/RC is to help the field coordination of the cluster areas through various means and UNMIL peacekeepers are crucial in addressing key cluster issues, such as security. The cluster approach mechanism in Liberia operates under the authority of the HCS but require the effort of all UNMIL mechanisms and the Country Team.

The cluster areas include, but are not exclusive to:[101]

- Security
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

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[101] National Tranistional Government of Liberia. 2005. *Results Based transitional Framework.* Monrovia: Government of Liberia, pp 14-18.

- Reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and refugees
- Governance and Rule of Law
- Elections
- Basic Services (i.e. water, sanitation and health)
- Productive capacity and livelihoods
- Infrastructure
- Economic Policy and Development Strategy

Each cluster is lead by a UN agency, producing an action plan and channelling funding to implementing partners, such as NGOs and local government, for example. The clusters focus on humanitarian emergencies and have had mixed success in Liberia considering that by 2006 Liberia was already in a post-conflict recovery state. The clusters have nonetheless served to fill a gap between the humanitarian and development efforts.[102]

The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is the formal UN response to the iPRSP and focuses on how the broader UN system will support it and the coming full PRSP and assist national recovery and development between 2008 and 2011. It is also based on the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) developed in mid 2006. The UNDAF has been formally endorsed by the Government of Liberia. In the UNDAF five outcomes, corresponding to the PRSP, are outlined. The first outcome, for example, articulates the increased capacity of national and local authorities to provide security and prevent violence. This is particularly important since UNMIL is planned to slowly transfer the responsibility for this to the Government of Liberia (GoL) during the time period of the UNDAF. The UNDAF is the common strategic framework for the UN in Liberia, including both UNMIL and the agencies within the UNCT, to help the UN 'deliver as one'.[103] Whilst the UNDAF is a framework for the whole of the UN in Liberia, the iPRSP had also, as previously mentioned, together with the Mandate Implementation Plan laid the foundation for the Integrated Mission priorities and Implementation Plan to outline UNMIL priorities and projects.

3.3.2   CIMIC

Peacekeeping was once considered to be mainly a military affair. The concept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in a peacekeeping mission originated with the increased presence of civilian actors in peace operations and aimed to provide

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[102] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination, pp 41-42, 104.
[103] United Nations in Liberia. 2007. *United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012: Consolidating Peace and National Recovery for Sustainable Development.* Monrovia: United Nations in Liberia, p 3, 5.

a framework for how the military was to deal with this presence. Within Nato and EU operations the term CIMIC refers to Civil-Military *Cooperation,* whilst within UN operations the acronym is understood as Civil-Military *Coordinatio*n. Whilst the UNs concept of 'Civil-Military Coordination' is not supposed to be abbreviated as CIMIC, to keep from confusing it with the Nato term, for example, the acronym is still frequently used, although sometimes with the addition of *UN* CIMIC to differentiate between the two terms. It is, however, important to remember that there is a vast difference between the two concepts. Furthermore, within the UN system there is another, compatible civil-military coordination doctrine – CMCoord. The 'Civil-Military Coordination' policy (UN CIMIC) is a concept developed by the DPKO and takes a peace operations approach. Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) was developed by OCHA and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to guide civil-military coordination in response to humanitarian disasters. [104]

The traditional CIMIC concept, such as in Nato's CIMIC doctrine portrays CIMIC as the gatekeeper for all civil-military coordination and liaison.[105] This does not appropriately relate to the challenges of the system-wide multidimensional coordination that is the foundation of UN Integrated Missions.[106] De Coning argues that this concept might still be useful in the context of Nato operations, but has been made largely redundant in modern UN operations. He states that in Integrated Missions the military effort is so widely embedded in an overall multidimensional mission that it is no longer useful to speak solely of 'Civil-Military' Coordination at a strategic level. Doing so portrays a false and misleading dichotomy, suggesting a bi-polar system and ignoring the multi-polar reality of integrated missions.[107] De Coning further argues that the DPKOs Civil-Military Coordination concept is meaningful at the operational and tactical levels, but points out the need to understand the particular uniqueness of how civil-military cooperation is operated in the context of UN Integrated Missions.[108] UN Civil-Military Coordination is not a gatekeeper for all civil-

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[104] Department of Peackeeping Operations. 2002. *Civil-Military Coordination Policy*. Accessed online 2008-06-09. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/DPKO_CMCOORD_Policy.pdf ; Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 2008. *Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); UNOCHA. 2008. *United Nations Civil-Military coordination Officer Field Handbook*, Version E 1.1. Geneva: Civil-Military Coordination Section, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations

[105] NATO. 2003. *Allied joint doctrine-9 Nato Civil.Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*. Nato Standardization Agency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

[106] DeConing, Cedric. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', pp. 1-2.

[107] Ibid, p 34.

[108] Ibid, pp. 5-6

military liaison, and does not refer to the overall civil-military coordination strategy of a whole mission. To undertake an Integrated Mission, system-wide coordination to plan, implement and monitor the execution of relevant tasks is needed. This includes coordination across the UN system and between the UN and other external actors, whether local or international. Such coordination mechanisms are built into the Integrated Mission design and form a range of loosely interlinked coordination mechanisms that when put together provide an overall, and mission-wide, coordination system.

Whilst the civil and military components in a UN mission is already integrated under one legal and organisational structure [109] CIMIC in Nato and EU context is needed to establish cooperation between the legally separate military force, and civilian actors operating in the same mission area.[110] UN civil-military coordination rather seeks to improve coordination between military and civilian actors already integrated under one mandate, between the military force and the UNs wider programs and agencies, and between the military and non-UN entities in their area of operations.[111] The DPKOs policy on Civil-Military Coordination states:

> *"UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives."[112]*

Reading this description almost everything UNMIL does could be described as civil-military coordination. In its operational reality, however, civil-military coordination within integrated missions is a very specialized function. Despite the essential need for coordination in integrated missions, the civil-military coordination function in such missions is no more important than in other missions. On the contrary, Integrated Missions are by their very nature more comprehensive and have these mechanisms built into mission design, decreasing the dependence on its civil-military coordination function.[113] This does not mean that 'Civil-Military Coordination' in UN missions is not important; it just means

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[109] DeConing, Cedric. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', pp. 5-6

[110] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'Overview and Introduction,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ISBN 978-0-9802704-0-2, p 18.

[111] Ibid; DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 13..

[112] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2002. *Civil-Military Coordination Policy*, p 2-3.

[113] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions*, p 72.

that its greatest importance lies in a particular setting and operates as a coordination tool within a larger network of coordination mechanisms.

DPKOs civil-military coordination guidelines state that the integration of UN missions has allowed for the interaction also in non-security related fields.[114] Whilst the primary role of the military in a UN mission is to provide security and ensure a safe environment in which civilian actors can operate, its secondary role is to support other actors in implementing the overall mission objectives. This is often done by the lending of resources and skills to civilian actors. The military can, and according to the Civil-Military Coordination policy should, contribute towards development and humanitarian activities – such as relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation projects – where able and needed.[115] DPKO Civil-Military Coordination policy is an example of the newfound understanding that the interface between peace and security, and relief and reconstruction is narrow when addressing a complex conflict system through a comprehensive approach, and that the military can not do it alone.[116]

UN Civil-Military Coordination policy essentially deals with military support to civilians. The support is provided either in terms of security – military escort of humanitarian convoys, for example – or as a non-security related provision of military assets – the use of equipment such as trucks or helicopters for instance, or sharing of skills, knowledge or manpower.[117] UN civil-military coordination is responsible for facilitating coordination between military and civilian actors in Mission Support (providing resources and skills to civilian partners in pursuit of mission objectives) and Community Support functions (QIPs and other projects aimed at supporting local communities and build confidence in the peace operation and the peace process),[118] but not in the wider peace operations context. As stated earlier, mechanisms for such civil-military coordination are built in to the mission design and not channelled through the civil-military coordination function. One example is the provision of security of UN personnel and assets, which is coordinated by the UN department of Safety and Security. Other examples include: civilian protection, coordinated by the DSRSG/HC/RC and Force Commander; military participation in mission planning, coordinated

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[114] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2002. *Civil-Military Coordination Policy*, p 1.

[115] Ibid, p 2.

[116] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'Overview and Introduction,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, p 11; Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions*, p 69

[117] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2002. *Civil-Military Coordination Policy*, p 1; Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 2008. *Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies*; UNOCHA. 2008. *United Nations Civil-Military coordination Officer Field Handbook.*

[118] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions*, p 65

through the Integrated Mission Planning Team; military participation in conflict and situational analysis, coordinated through the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC); military participation in day to day and mission wide coordination, coordinated by the Joint Operations Centre (JOC); and military support to UN logistics, coordinated by especially set up logistical coordination systems.[119]

The secondary nature of the UN CIMIC role is reflected in its structure, which is not very well developed and obtains few of the mission's resources. In UNMIL there are seven civil-military coordination officers at Force Headquarters and one each in the four sector HQs, comprising overall eleven officers. With a total of approximately 15,000 troops, civil-military coordination staff represents 0.001% of the force strength and 0.1% of the 160 Force HQ and Sector HQ staff.[120] The civil-military coordination function within the mission observably represents a very small part of the overall mission effort.

CIMIC Cell Force HQ
7 CIMIC officers at UNMIL HQ

CIMIC Cell Sector HQ
1 CIMIC staff at all sector HQs

The civil-military coordination cell located at Force HQ is responsible for advising the Force Commander on the civil-military coordination campaign plan, provide guidelines on civil-military coordination areas of priority to sector level cells and develop a database containing information on all civil-military coordination operations carried out. In some settings the civil-military coordination cell may run a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) as a forum for day-to-day communication and first point of contact to coordinate civil-military and humanitarian activities at field level.[121] At other times, such as within UNMIL in Liberia, the civil-military coordination officers rather participate in operational

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[119] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 33.

[120] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'Overview and Introduction,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, p 23.

[121] Lipson, Michael. 2005. 'Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Peacekeeping', paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1-5, 2005, p 13.

level coordination mechanisms established by other agencies.[122] In Liberia, the UNMIL civil-military coordination unit, for example, participated in the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) and the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), both originally established by OCHA and run by the Humanitarian Coordination Section under the DSRSG/HC/RC.[123] They also participated in the UN Joint Logistical Centre (UNJLC) hosted by the World Food Program until its dissolution in 2004.[124] Furthermore, within UNMIL a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) [125] has been established, with many similarities to a CMOC but attuned to an integrated mission.

UNMIL civil-military coordination staff also runs local-level headquarters in the four sectors of Liberia. The Sector HQs have one civil-military coordination officer each and serve as a link between the military units and the Force HQ. It also maintains sector level civil-military coordination information, participates in sector-level coordination activities and serves as a coordination point between the military and civilian actors at local level.[126]

Civil-military coordination below sector level is a responsibility of the national contingent itself. Very few non-Western troop contributing countries have developed CIMIC doctrines and structures. These countries also tend to provide the large bulk of troops to peacekeeping missions. Therefore civil-military coordination at contingent level is rarely practiced and the military force rather relies on coordination at sector level.[127]

UNMIL military forces participate in a range of activities to alleviate suffering and promote development in Liberia, in coordination with civilian actors. Examples include transportation, infrastructure repair, health, education, sanitation and community sports activities.[128] Civil-Military coordination officers usually work only to liaise and carry information regarding any such

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[122] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'CIMIC Structure and Organization,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ISBN 978-0-9802704-0-2, p 179.

[123] DeConing, Cedric (ed). 2006. 'ToR Humanitarian Information Centre,' in *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ISBN 978-0-9802704-0-2, Annex p 373: Fiawosime, Albert. 2005. 'An Integrated Approach to Peace Support Operations', p 174.

[124] United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. 2004. 'Liberia: UNJLC completed its mandate in Liberia', UNJLC Website. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.unjlc.org/ImportedObjects/19007

[125] See following section (4.3.3)

[126] DeConing. 2006. 'Overview and Introduction,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, p 23.

[127] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions,* p 65.

[128] United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2006. *Guidance for Civil-Military Coordination in Liberia*. Monrovia: United Nations Mission in Liberia HQ, 3.

mission support and community support tasks, whilst they are actually executed by people with the appropriate resources and skills. National contingents provide the resources needed to carry out QIPs and will undertake these themselves, or hire local contractors. The UN, however, prefers the contingents to channel this effort through the civil-military coordination structure to avoid duplication and interruption of civilian activities[129] in accordance with UNMILs Civil-Military guidelines and the 'do-no-harm' principle.[130] A civil-military coordination officer might be asked to identify a potential QIP, facilitate its application and monitor its execution, but will rarely carry out the project himself.[131] UNMILs civil-military coordination section is tasked with the following functions:[132]

- Assist in the assessment and planning of contingency preparations and exercises.
- Provide advice on the civil conditions and the effect of military operations on the civilian population and organisations, and vice versa.
- Prepare educational material for the force on the anticipated civil conditions and brief staff.
- Facilitate the exchange of unclassified information.
- Support the staff in the managing of contracts and agreements.
- Provide continuous assessments on civilian needs.
- Conduct civil-military coordination activities.
- Co-ordinate plans for the transition of responsibilities and functions to civil authorities and agencies.

3.3.3 JMAC / JOC – Intelligence Gathering and Joint Operations

The UN has always lacked the means of gathering the intelligence needed to make the informed decisions required to optimally conduct peace operations. Any intelligence gathering in the host nation might also be interpreted as espionage and there is a concern regarding how to protect sensitive or restricted information with such a multi-faceted and multi-national organisation. In consequence there has been a self-imposed restriction on such information gathering, often resulting in deficient operational information, leaving the peace-

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[129] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions,* p 43.
[130] United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2006. *Guidance for Civil-Military Coordination in Liberia*, p 7.
[131] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'Overview and Introduction,' in C. DeConing (ed), CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations, p 25
[132] DeConing, Cedric (ed). 2006. 'UNMIL SOPs,' in CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ISBN 978-0-9802704-0-2, Annex p 347.

keeping mission vulnerable and ineffective. The establishment of integrated mechanisms for gathering and interpreting information was mentioned in the Brahimi Report as necessary for successful peace operations. Whilst the nature of the UN system still prevents the organisation from establishing its own intelligence offices, it has tried to address the issue of integrated information gathering and management at field level by establishing Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs) and Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) as standard mechanisms for civil-military information-sharing and analysis in Integrated Missions.[133] Operating out of mission headquarters they are staffed by military, police and civilian staff and provide support to the whole mission and the UN Country Team, as well as non-UN entities as appropriate.[134]

DPKO policy states that the JMAC and JOC shall be prioritized and established as first priority in new missions. The intent is to ensure that each integrated mission has in place the mechanisms needed to form a mission-wide situational awareness that will form the basis for informed decision-making and help alert attention to potential threats to the security and safety of UN staff, and the overall peace operation. It also seeks to make sure that the various mission components serve the objectives of the overall mission.[135]

The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) is a tool for collating information on developments within the theatre of operations and joint action upon the information gathered. The JOC is staffed with personnel from various part of the mission and is supposed to act as a 24-hour 'situational centre' focusing on day to day operations. It provides the missions leadership, as well as UN headquarters, with an up-to date general operational picture and alerts awareness to situational challenges requiring attention. When a crisis occurs, the JOC becomes the mission's crisis management centre.[136] In Liberia the JOC started its operation relatively late in the mission, leading to some confusion and turmoil in the beginning of the DDRR process.[137]

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[133] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 6.

[134] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions,* p 38

[135] Ibid, pp 38-39.

[136] Ibid; Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008. *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, p 70.

[137] UNOCHA. 2005. OCHA Situation Report Cote d'Ivoire 11-16 June 2005. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Accessed 2008-06-09 at http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/05a/ixl128.html

The Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) is an integrated entity which collects information from a wide range of sources in all security sectors and produce medium and long-term analysis of the operational situation and issues affecting the mission to support decision-making and mission-planning.[138] The JMACs multidisciplinary structure is designed to encourage input of information from all components of the mission and to undertake joint analysis of the information provided. The JMAC draws on open sources, information gathered by all elements of the mission, and information given by humanitarian representatives.[139] Its main task is to provide the Senior Management Team with intelligence to form an understanding of trends and developments in the field, and to prepare all mission wide reporting to UN headquarters.[140] It is then the responsibility of the JOC to coordinate a response to the intelligence gathered.

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[138] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008. *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, p 71; Weir. 2006. Conflict and Compromise, p 15.

[139] Weir. 2006. Conflict and Compromise, p 14.

[140] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions,* p 39.

The UN mission in Liberia was the first peace operation to establish a joint information analysis cell. The UNMIL JMAC consists of military, police and civil analysts and unlike traditional information cells – focusing on information to assist the Force Commander – seeking to benefit the wider mission. The aim of the establishment of the JMAC was to integrate and coordinate information management mechanisms, in an attempt to create a holistic intelligence hub to analyse and disseminate information within and outside of UNMIL.[141] It does not have any particular intelligence or information gathering cells, but information is gathered on a daily basis in traditional ways – by MilObs (Military Observers) and other 'eyes and ears' of the mission. The JMAC produces a daily intelligence report and a weekend summary including an analysis of the information gathered during the week.[142]

Reportedly, UNMIL information gathering has managed to succeed in taking a positive regional perspective. Because of personal connections and nationality of the JMAC officers, coordination and regular sharing of information occurred between UNMIL and UNAMSIL and MINUCI, the UN missions in neighbouring Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.[143] Otherwise, reports state, the JMAC function has worked less than ideally. The key problems have been UNMILs structure and procedures, along with an unsupportive mind set. The JMAC has found it difficult to get all mission components involved. There has been a resistance amongst policing and civilian parts of the mission to participate in what has been seen as a 'military organisation', followed by minor 'turf wars'. This view has only been reinforced by a geographical separation of UNMIL HQ, which has hampered integration and information sharing. The Police Commissioner was stationed at mission Headquarters, next to the SRSG, whilst the Force Commander and the JMAC have been located half an hour´s drive away.[144] There has also been resistance of other mission components to have to 'give up' staff to go work in the JMAC, although the inclusion of staff from all main areas of the mission is crucial for the effective workings of the cell. Furthermore, few JMAC personnel have had training in collecting and under-standing intelligence. Whilst these skills might easily be acquired, a high turnover of personnel in Liberia has meant that the JMAC has had a short collective memory and has continuously operated at low capacity. It has also been chronically understaffed and often lacked many of the skilled analysts it

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[141] Boden, Magnus. 2006. *Har FN blivit bättre på att etablera fredsfrämjande operationer i Afrika?*. Försvarshögskolan. FHS:327/6:1, p 35, 42
[142] Ibid, p 35.
[143] Ibid
[144] Ibid, p 35, 42; Malan, Mark. 2005. *Intelligence in African Peace Operations: Addressing the Deficit*, KAIPTC Paper, No. 7, August 2005. Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre, p 22.

would have needed to process the information gathered correctly, as well as information managers to update information.[145] Because UN headquarters also lacks strategic integrated intelligence cells, something recommended by Brahimi but not enforced, support from the secretariat has neither been available.[146]

Whilst the word 'intelligence' no longer seems taboo within UN peacekeeping missions, the means to gather such intelligence are still insufficient.[147] Neither the JMAC nor the JOC have been adequately used as the mechanisms for information integration they were intended.[148] Just like with the overall Integrated Missions concept, the theory behind the JMAC and JOC has been well developed, but never fully operatationalized. The elements that have been established have been highly ad hoc in their nature.

3.3.4 Joint Logistical Coordination Systems

Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC)

Other than the JMAC and JOC, UNMIL also provides other joint services, such as the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC). The JLOC is staffed by both civilian and military personnel and provides assistance on logistical issues to the whole UN mission, as well as external agents and agencies.[149] It is a part of the Integrated Support Services which is built into the organisational structure of all major UN operations to reduce duplication of efforts, enhance the institutional memory, improve coordination and promote the pooling of expertise, knowledge and experience.[150]

The JLOC functions as the coordinating body for logistical support, maintaining a database of all logistics assets in the mission, whether they belong to the military, civilian or police components.[151] Located at force HQ in Monrovia and at sector levels the UNMIL JLOC collects information on logistical assets and

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[145] Malan, Mark. 2005. *Intelligence in African Peace Operations*, p 35.

[146] Boden. 2006. *Har FN blivit bättre på att etablera fredsfrämjande operationer i Afrika?, pp. 44-45*.

[147] Malan. 2005. *Intelligence in African Peace Operations, p 25*.

[148] Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. 2004. Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, UN, p 8.

[149] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Mission,* p 38; Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008. *Peacekeeping Operations:Principles and Guidelines.* New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO, United Nations, p 77.

[150] United Nations General Assembly. 2006. Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. A/60/696, p 38.

[151] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) 2: Structure of United Nations Peace Operations. New York: Training and Evaluation Service, DPKO, p 12.

requirements and directs, monitors and coordinates the implementation of logistic operations in the field.[152] The JLOC brings together logistics officers from all components of the mission and the UN Country Team, as well as external actors such as NGOs, at regular meetings.[153] It provides an opportunity to share information, as well as conduct joint planning and preparation for joint operations and facilitate cooperation on logistics and support issues. The JLOC, for example, facilitates the joint use of airfields, access routes and seaports. It controls the deployment of the military contingents and coordinates the planning and provision of logistics support from and to all mission components, as well as the humanitarian organisations operating in Liberia, on the basis that the logistics support is consistent with mission objectives.[154]

The JOC and the JMAC also belong to the Integrated Support Services common to UN peacekeeping missions but are newly created standards. The use of logistics operations centres have a longer history, but the integration of UN missions has opened up the access to UN logistics by humanitarian organisation and put more pressure on UN logistics resources, such as transportation assets. The JLOC has therefore become an important feature of sustaining Integrated Missions.[155]

Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)

To coordinate logistics functions between the humanitarian organisations in Liberia, another mechanism, the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), was also in place between 2003 and 2004. The UNJLC was a UN Common Service activated when field-based inter-agency logistics coordination is required to support humanitarian actors in a complex emergency.[156] Hosted by the World Food Program contributing staff, resources and housing, the UNJLC in Liberia reported to the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.[157] The UNJLC was thus not affiliated with the UN mission, but established to support the UN Country Team. The mandate of the UNJLC was to assist the UN agencies operating in Liberia in gathering general logistics infor-mation such as sea and airlift capacities, transport procedures and infrastructure

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[152] United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2006. 'Division of Administration', UNMIL website. Accessed 2008-06-08. Available at: http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=admin
[153] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) 2, p 12.
[154] United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2006. 'Division of Administration; General Assembly. 2006. A/60/696, p 38.
[155] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions,* p 40.
[156] United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. 2006. 'What is UNJLC?'.
[157] United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. 2006. 'Bulletin 27 UNJLC Liberia', UNJLC Website. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.unjlc.org/ImportedObjects/17797

assessment, customs issues, consolidation of cargo and to provide information sharing tools.[158] To this end the UNJLC chaired weekly Joint Logistics Working Groups and a Road Task Force. Once the mandate of the UNJLC had been completed it was phased out and closed down in 2004 and replaced by a Logistics Planning Team, consisting of an international Logistics Planning Officer and a national Logistics Assistance. The Planning Team operated from, and reported to, the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator. The Planning team would continue to chair the Working Group and the Task Force.[159] Its main tasks was to assist the UN agencies operating in Liberia in deploying outside of Monrovia, as well as coordinating asset and cost sharing of fuel, communication and water requirements for UN agencies. The Planning Team was only operable, as planned from its inauguration, for three months.[160] Since then the JLOC has been the most important tool for coordination of logistics support even in relation to the humanitarian organisations in Liberia.

3.3.5 Other Integrated Missions Approaches – County Support Teams

The County Support Teams (CSTs) were developed in Liberia to bring the peace building effort to the local level. Whilst the County Support Team approach was created to address the particular situation in Liberia and not an institutionalized feature of UN integrated missions, it is important to mention in the context of this report. The CSTs are good examples of a comprehensive mission approach integrating the whole UN family, drawing on all resources available and ensuring a coherent approach to development with particular sensitivity to local context. They are a key mechanism for implementing the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) at county level.[161]

Established in 2006, the CSTs are based in each of Liberia's fifteen counties and were created to address a perceived lack of coordination linkages and information flows between the national and county level.[162] Monrovia, and other larger urban areas, had long been the centre for the peace building and reconstruction effort and hosted most of Liberia's infrastructure and basic social services. This had lead to a great inequality in living standards and services available between

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[158] United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. 2006. 'What is UNJLC?'

[159] United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. 2004. 'Liberia: UNJLC completed its mandate in Liberia', UNJLC Website. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.unjlc.org/ImportedObjects/19007

[160] United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. 2006. 'Bulletin 32 UNJLC Liberia', UNJLC Website. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.unjlc.org/ImportedObjects/18861

[161] United Nations in Liberia. 2007. *United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012,* p 31)

[162] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. Side By Side or Together?, p 39.

urban and rural areas, something that was recognized by the Liberian government as a threat to the long-term peace. The CTSs were formed by UNMIL with the intention of bringing together the knowledge, expertise and resources of the UN in support of local government and provide an on-the-ground UN presence to assist in the restoration of civil authority and build capacity at county level.[163] Their aim is to facilitate inclusion and decentralization and to prepare local administrations for the eventual takeover of the responsibility for security, recon-struction and development.[164] The CSTs also seek to, at county level, ensure a coordinated approach to local development and post-conflict reconstruction, and to devise recovery and developmental strategies.[165]

Each of the fifteen local-level based CSTs are comprised of UN actors, from both UNMIL and the UN Country Team, county administration and sometimes NGOs. Each team is coordinated by an appointed CST facilitator drawn from amongst the UN representatives present.[166] The CSTs are supported by a management structure at central level made up of the UN, the Liberian Ministry of Internal Affairs and other governmental ministries, county representatives and NGOs.[167]

The work of the CSTs has been aligned to the priorities for development outlined in the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP) established by the national government,[168] which is to be followed up by a full Poverty Reduction Strategy during 2008.[169] The coordination is effectively undertaken by the hosting of regular meetings, usually called County Assessment and Action Meetings between the UN Country Team, local authorities and NGOs. These meetings are usually organized around the four peace building pillars identified in the iPRSP. Based on the issues covered in the meetings a monthly County Assessment and Action Report is produced. These reports were initially used

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[163] United Nations in Liberia. 2006. *At Work together*. Monrovia: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations in Liberia

[164] United Nations Development Group. 2006. 2006 Resident Coordinator Annual Report- Liberia. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.undg.org/rcar.cfm?fuseaction=N&ctyIDC=LIR&P=490

[165] United Nations Mission in Liberia. 2006. *Guidance for Civil-Military Coordination in Liberia*, p 7.

[166] Harvey. J, Karl. J, Motsi. M & Golakai, N. 2007. *The example of 'County Support Teams' as an integrated mission approach at the local level in Liberia*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO & UNDP, p 7.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination', p 38.

primarily for UN purposes but have increasingly become a tool for central government planning.[170]

In addition to being a coordination mechanism and in support of the iPRSP the CSTs have project funds attached. The projects are funded by the UNDP with support from the Swedish and Irish governments. They are administrated by the UNDP and implemented at local level by UNMIL Civil Affairs and UN volunteer staff. The projects cover rehabilitating and developing infrastructure, capacity training and information management related issues.[171] g

The CSTs have brought the UN further together in a comprehensive approach to the wider peace effort, with a focus on common local objectives within the context of the iPRSP, taking national ownership into account. The result has been an enhancement of civil authority outside the capital and local involvement in planning processes; promoting better relations between the central government and the counties. The reach of UN actors into the heartland of Liberia has also been improved.[172]

The CST has played an important role as a joint framework for international action in Liberia. Whilst not institutionalized as an Integrated Mission feature, and despite the specificities of the Liberian context, the Country Support Team approach is an innovative model with a strong commitment to mission integration that could perhaps become recurrent practice. In a report evaluating the establishment of the Country Support Teams and the Liberian context the DPKO argues that the CST is a model that could be usefully replicated:

> *"[It] may well have application in other integrated mission environments; both as a model for implementing integration down through the mission, and as a model for supporting local governance"[173]*.

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[170] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination', p 39; Harvey et all. 2007. *The example of 'County Support Teams' as an integrated mission approach at the local level in Liberia, p 8.*

[171] Harvey et all. 2007. *The example of 'County Support Teams' as an integrated mission approach at the local level in Liberia,* pp. 7-8

[172] Ibid, p 12.

[173] Ibid, p 18.

4   Conclusion

It is important to remember that peacekeepers alone cannot achieve lasting peace; they require the effort of many other actors. Coordination between these organisations to ensure an effective and well-directed comprehensive approach is a difficult but essential undertaking. To this end 'Integrated Missions' are now the UN mission structure of choice. This section will evaluate the effect of the various mechanisms available to create coherence amongst the different actors involved in integrated missions.

4.1   Conclusion and Findings

4.1.1   Institutionalised coordination

The integrated command structure, where the entire UN presence operates under the leadership of the SRSG, is a basic feature of the concept of mission integration and essential in ensuring coherence by establishing clear structures of communication and amalgamation between the mission and the other UN actors active in the country. The integrated command structure has been institutionalized and is the common feature of all new UN peace operations. Whilst the Integrated Missions concept includes other features, the integrated command structure has essentially constituted mission integration in practice. It seems that this has had a positive impact on UNMIL. UN humanitarian agencies, usually independent from the mission structure, have generally reported that they feel that the integration of UNMIL has resulted in greater coherence, at least at field level, and have endorsed becoming part of a UN integrated structure since this has allowed them more input into the general peace operation.[174]

4.1.2   Improvised coordination

Other than the integrated command structure, UNMIL also provides a range of mechanisms for coordination on specific issues. The Integrated Missions concept requires that such mechanisms exist, but their specific form and function varies between missions and their implementation can therefore often be of an improvised nature.

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[174] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 27.

Coordination with Humanitarian and non-UN agents

One example of such improvised coordination is the closure of OCHA and the establishment of the UNMIL Humanitarian Coordination Section. UNMIL has sought to find the most appropriate forms of coordination, establishing own coordination functions and participating in others where suitable. IM is an evolving concept and UNMIL has been adjusting in its attempt to devise fitting coordination structures. Particularly, the endeavour of, to the extent possible, increasing coherence with non-UN actors has been a case of practical 'trial and error'. The closure of OCHA and establishment of the HCS is a striking example of an ad-hoc attempt to improve coherence between the UN mission and the Country Team.

Whilst UN agencies themselves seem not to have minded this further integration, for the same reasons as stated above, it has had less positive effect on the relationship between UNMIL and non-UN organisations. The broader humanitarian community, who would usually only rely on humanitarian common services not too closely associated with the UN mission, have not been happy about this measure and it has in fact impeded coordination with some of the more independence minded organisations. Coordination mechanisms such as the CAP and CHAP have improved coordination between UN agencies and NGOs and helped form a common understanding of problems and solutions.[175] Yet, depending on their individual identity and mandate, many NGOs refuse to coordinate with the UN, and particularly the peacekeeping mission, believing that it undermines their independence and impartiality. Many organisations, such as the ICRC for example, are concerned that association with the UN might lead to hostile actions by belligerents and would jeopardize the security of its personnel, and its mission.[176] NGOs often have to weigh the advantages of short-term cooperation with UNMIL against long-term alienation, since they are likely to remain in Liberia for a long time after the UN mission has left. For NGOs the concept of Integrated Missions can often be the case of too much coordination. The most serious concern regarding the integration of UN peace operations is the perceived lost of 'humanitarian space' by non-UN humanitarian agencies, for which integration means becoming more closely associated with the UN mission.[177]

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[175] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 34.
[176] Van Klingeren, 2007. *Communication in Conflict,* p 31.
[177] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 27.

In general there seems to be a divide in perception of the success of the coordination mechanisms between otherwise similar UN and non-UN agents. Amongst non-UN humanitarian agencies, the sentiment seems to be that even though the coordination processes have had some success in fostering coherence they tend to serve the UN agenda over that of NGOs and civil society.[178] For many humanitarian organisations, working in an integrated fashion with the UN, means working according to a political timetable and framework rather than in response to humanitarian needs.[179] Coordination does not require integration. For NGOs and other independent humanitarian organisations integrated missions might be a case of too much coordination, this was particularly the case with UNMIL. Whilst integrated missions need to include structures for effective *coordination* with these actors, the UNMIL example shows that humanitarian coordination might be better of left to an independent OCHA and kept *outside* of the political and military structures.

As noted by Olson[180], it is interesting that most of the controversies regarding Integrated Missions have concerned the pressure such missions put on the humanitarian coordination side of the missions and not the traditional culture clashes between soldiers and humanitarians often reported. Overall, military officers have coordinated well with humanitarian agents, particularly at county level. However, their participation in civil-military meetings have sometimes been criticized for taking too much of a briefing format, with the military focusing on 'telling others what they do', which constitutes little more than information sharing and not coordination.[181]

Coordination at the local level

Despite an otherwise lack of strategic planning UNMIL does provide a good example of inter-organisational coherence at the local operational level: the establishment of County Support Teams (CSTs), bringing together a wide range of actors in a coherent peace effort at county level. The CST initiative in Liberia is an example of where integrated operations have been combined with a strategic framework. The creation of the CSTs was completely ad hoc, but has been hailed as a good innovation and possible model for future operations. They have lead to a more comprehensive peace building and development strategy integrating the efforts of the UN mission with that of the Liberian government and international donors through the implementation of the Liberian PRSP at

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[178] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination', p 21.
[179] Ibid, p 28.
[180] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination', p 45.
[181] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions,* p 73.

local level. The CST truly exists within a greater strategic comprehensive approach; unfortunately they are quite unique examples.

4.1.3 (Hampered) Effectiveness

On certain issues, the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms have been hampered by factors that are not directly inherent in the coordination mechanisms itself bur rather results from a lack of resources or misplaced use of resources. The UNMIL CIMIC cell, despite being of an average size for UN missions, has been understaffed and under resourced for its task; revealing more about UN missions in general than UNMIL specifically. The same issues have hampered the effectiveness of the JMAC and the JOC. It seems that the issues impeding effective coordination often are the same as have always impeded effective peace operations. Liberia, currently in a post-conflict reconstruction situation, is in greater need of skilled engineers than the large amount of peace-keepers it receives. Yet the rigid UN system and the inflexible UNMIL budget does not allow for resources to be allocated in this way. Commentators have argued that coordination essentially is about ensuring that international assistance responds to the need of the country. In Liberia, it is not always a lack of coordi-nation that has resulted in a failure of meeting perceived needs, but a rigidity of the response mechanisms available.[182] The Integrated Missions concept has been flexible in establishing a range of coordination mechanisms; it has rather often been the inflexibility of the UN system itself that has impeded their effec-tiveness.

Like most peace support operations, UNMIL has not been spared from mission-specific operational mishaps either. For example, the location of mission head-quarters was divided amongst three separate locations in Monrovia. This did not serve the integration of the mission and as argued earlier, reinforced a civil-military divide. The DPKO argues that the physical separation of the political and the military parts of the mission "perpetuated the idea of separate chains of command, which is inconsistent with UN policy".[183] Insufficient use of recom-mended technical equipments (such as teleconferences etc) has also strained and impeded effective communication between UNMIL and UN Headquarters.[184]

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[182] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. Side By Side or Together?'., p 50.
[183] Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. 2004. Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, p 8.
[184] Ibid, p 10.

4.1.4 Issue-specific successes and failures

In general the integrated approach and the coordination mechanisms have had mixed results. The coordination mechanisms seem to have worked well to support humanitarian activities, particularly in the health and education sectors. Olson argues that this is partly because of the UN led Humanitarian Coordination Section which has functioned well and allowed for common analysis and strategy making amongst civilian assistance actors. Olson also points out that this is an area with a history of joint engagement and coordination, which likely helped facilitate this mechanism.[185] In contrast he points to Security Sector Reform (SSR), an area with little history of contact and where the mechanisms for coordination and participation were 'new and untested'. Olson argues that SSR in Liberia was plagued by poor coordination which rarely went beyond information sharing and lacked sufficient consultative processes to ensure the input of the public. The Liberian government, the UN and NGOs did not share a joint strategic vision for SSR activities, instead the more powerful external actors defined the framework of SSR without taking into account the sometimes contrasting views and solutions by the various agents dealing with the issue. As a result a false coherence emerged: "a superficial commitment to common strategies on paper only".[186] The reasons behind the weak performance of the coordination mechanisms in relation to SSR have been suggested to have been a lack of expertise on SSR issues from donor countries and lack of local ownership of the process in combination with the absence of a SSR specific coordination mechanism to engage the wider aid community. Suggested recommendations for the future include a special SSR working group to bring together donors, UNMIL, CIVPOL and actors with experience in SSR in the region and a Liberian security perspective, as well as civil society.[187] It seems that coordination has worked better on issues where there is less divergence on how they should be implemented. This shows that unlike coordination (the act of ordering a relationship), coherence (a logical unity) cannot simply be created at the operational level but must exist within a joint understanding, formulated at the strategic level, of what needs to be achieved and how to achieve it.

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[185] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination', p 20.
[186] Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. Side By Side or Together?'., p 45 ; Olson, L & Gregorian, H. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination', pp. 20-21, 24
[187] Ibid, p 47.

4.1.5 Summary

This report has outlined the concrete mechanisms for coordination at the operational level, as existed in the UN integrated mission in Liberia. At the operational level UNMIL truly is an integrated mission. There has been a noticeable operational effect of the integrated coordination mechanisms on the relationship and communication between the various UN components operating in Liberia; the greatest of which concern the relationship between the 'traditional' political and military elements of the mission and the humanitarian component. The greatest 'negative' effect of mission integration has been the perceived threat to humanitarian space – however, even that threat is widely debated considering the relatively peaceful situation in Liberia.

The experience of UNMIL shows that integration at field-level has either been institutionalised or informally improvised. Improvisation is acceptable, and even enviable. It is important that Integrated Missions are not designed in blueprint, but that form follows function and is established in relation to the particular context. The degree of autonomy each UN agent enjoys in an Integrated Missions should be decided based on a context specific analysis of needs and requirements. To this end UNMIL has done well in seeking out and trying new approaches to integration and coordination, even though some have been more successful than others.

However, the Integrated Missions concept has yet to be fully implemented at planning level, and at this level it has a long way to go. There is still a lack of system-wide coherence at the strategic level and true 'integration' in mission planning. Theories for how to facilitate an integrated strategic framework have been developed. The IMPP and IMTF look good on paper but have been poorly implemented. The Integrated Missions structure has been labeled the mission management structure of choice within the UN system. Yet, it can not be described as anything but a half-finished structure.

In conclusion, it has been noted that there is a great divide between the Integrated Missions theory and the implementation of the concept. UNMIL provides a clear structure for internal and external communication at field-level and a process through which the entire UN system can be mobilized in a coherent and comprehensive pursuit of commonly agreed objectives, but has faced difficulties fulfilling the last component of Integrated Missions: to implement a fully integrated planning process to clearly define these objectives and the purpose of UN engagement.

The difference between theory and practice is best described as below:

Integrated Missions Concept:

A clearly defined strategic framework outlining the purpose of UN engagement and desired objectives, based on the particular context of the intervention.

- A process through which the entire UN system can be mobilised in a coherent pursuit of the commonly defined objectives.
- A clear structure for internal and external communication and coordination.

Integrated Mission Practice:

- Institutionalized integrated command structures for internal relations, communication and coordination
- Informal and improvised structures for communication and coordination with external actors.
- Impractical and poorly implemented theoretical processes for mission planning.

4.2   Remarks and recommendations for future research

4.2.1   The Importance of 'Strategy'

In UN Integrated Missions, as exemplified by the Liberia case, the lack of a strategic framework is a key challenge. Various frameworks do exist, one of which is the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP). PRSPs are facilitated by the World Bank and IMF, prepared by the host country and include the input of domestic stakeholders and external developmental actors and donors.[188] The CST project, in its turn, is a comprehensive approach for its implementation. Yet, they are only partial processes that lack connectivity to an overall strategic framework and the general peace operation. In much the same way the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) in Liberia – which sought to journey beyond the development realm as a strategy for a broader post-conflict setting – also failed to connect appropriately with the UN mission.[189]

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[188] International Monetary Fund. 2007. Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 07/60. Wahington DC: IMF

[189] DeConing. 2007. Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace building and Integrated Missions, p 13

Without a strategic framework, no matter how excellent the coordination mechanism at field level are, there will be no benchmark against which coherence in overall operations can be measured: "It is impossible to achieve coherence if the framework, with which individual agents have to be coherent, is missing".190 The lack of a clearly articulated overall peace support strategy has long been a critical shortcoming in UN peacekeeping and peace building missions. An overall strategic framework with outlined overarching objectives and aims that are desirable to all, as well as a strategy for achieving them, is crucial to obtain coherence in an Integrated Mission. Such a strategy is important to ensure that the conflict has been properly understood and as a result, that the measures of addressing it are appropriate. The development of a 'solution' is dependent on defining the 'problem'. A joint understanding of the major root causes of the conflict and the dynamics that keeps it going is essential to under-taking a genuine peace support operation.191 Such a strategy also needs to include input from the organisations that for various reasons cannot operate to closely to the UN mission at field level.

The planning process is not an implementation plan; structures for mandate implementation planning exist within UNMIL in the IMIP, and also the IMPIP, but are separate from the mission planning process and the responsibility of those with executive authority. Rather a strategic framework identifies goals and objectives: the desired effects on which action and coordination should be based. In the past few years a move has been made towards creating such frameworks with the development of the IMPIP and the recently invigorated IMPP, however, these have been developed relatively late in UNMILs life span and the essence of strategic planning has coincided with planning for the exit of the mission, thus they represent only the latter part of an Integrated Planning Process.

At the strategic level few coordination mechanisms have been in place. Several functions for integrated mission planning and mission supports exist as concepts, but have not been more than partially implemented. The result is that, despite the fact that many of the operational coordination mechanisms are routinely provided for, Integrated Missions are still undertaken on a strategically ad-hoc basis. It is clear that the processes for implementation of integrated planning needs to be strengthened at the UN HQ level if the Integrated Missions concept is at all to move any further. Proponents for further development of the IM concept should be aware that the current IMPP is primarily a UN system tool, and seek ways of

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[190] DeConing. 2007. Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace building and Integrated Missions, p 23.

[191] DeConing. 2007. Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace building and Integrated Missions, p 12

reaching beyond the UN family to create a comprehensive approach connecting the UN mission to a wider peace building framework at the strategic level. This objective should provide the basis for future conceptual developments.

Whilst Liberia provides an excellent model of the challenges and opportunities of an integrated chain of command, it has lacked the integrated planning mechanism that is the second core feature of UN Integrated Missions, particularly as outlined in the revised 2006 guidelines on Integrated Missions Planning Process. The reason for this lack is obvious: the mission was established before the concept of integrated planning was fully developed. Further case studies are needed to explore to what extent integrated planning has been achieved. Unfortunately the Integrated Missions Planning Process seems like it has yet to be fully implemented in any context. Future research should explore the reason for this, as well as investigate what parts of the process, if any, have been put to practice to establish the limits and potentials of fully integrated missions. As part of the planning for the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) an advance mission was sent to the theatre. The advance mission reportedly greatly benefited the mission and provided a good foundation for success, even though the overall planning and implementation process was flawed.[192] The UNMIS experience might therefore provide a valuable case study. The UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) could also provide an interesting case of how integrated planning has been, or has not been, undertaken in the context of a hybrid mission. Reportedly, an IMPP was set up to guide the initial planning phase for UNAMID but was not fully applied given the hybrid nature of the mission and because of a lack of 'user-friendly manuals' on how to implement the process.[193]

Recommendations

- Strategic level planning and analysis coordination is an area where the IM theory and practice most clearly diverge, and where the further development of the IM concept needs to place its focus.
- Further research on integrated mission planning is needed. Future studies should explore the challenges of integrated mission planning to date through case studies on, for example, UNMIS and with deeper focus on processes within UN HQ. Such case studies could be helpful to advance the IM concept

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[192] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions*, pp. 51-52.
[193] UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2008. *Departmental report: Assessing our Performance Against PSA Targets*. 07-05-2008. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom. Accessed 2008-06-03 at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/dr-2008-psa, p 163. ; UK Ministry of Defence. 2008. *MoD Public Service Agreement: Autumn performance Report* 2007-2008. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2007/DEP2007-0366.pdf, p 11.

and help strengthening an inclusive and integrated planning process that can provide a strategic framework on which an integrated mission will be based.

- Studies should also focus on the relationship between the various strategic and operational frameworks that are in existence. A continued case study of planning in Liberia could more closely survey the IMIP, the CSTs, IMPIP and other operational frameworks, interviewing UN and other actors on ground in Liberia to obtain a better picture of how these are put to practice and how they overlap.

4.2.2   The unique context of UN Integrated Missions

UNs Integrated Missions operate in a particular context that is unique and could not be replicated by any other international organisations such as NATO or the African Union. DeConing argues that the AU and others are likely to apply the core features of mission integration to their own operations. They are right to attempt to do so, but DeConing puts out the reminder that any such non-UN integration will necessarily refer to multidimensional rather than system-wide integration[194] Whilst the African Union, for example, does have structures for practicing so called multidimensional missions: missions that have integrated military, political and police functions, it can never practice 'system-wide' integration which is possible in a UN mission. This is simply because the AU as an organisation is not as inclusive and extensive as the UN.[195] The UN includes a range of civilian funds and programs that deal with issues such as health, economy, the environment, development and humanitarian assistance. Whilst the AU could cooperate with the same funds and programs, they are not a part of the AU itself and the cooperation would not be institutionalised in the same way as would in a UN system-wide setting. The difference between multidimensional integration and system-wide integration is thus that system-wide integration implies common ownership of the agents to be integrated and that coherence therefore (ideally) is more easily available. In reality the UN is the only organisation able to bring all the relevant actors together in a system-wide comprehensive approach, even though the European Union is a contender as well. In a peace support setting, organisations, such as the ones mentioned above, will nonetheless operate alongside UN political, humanitarian and development actors. Whilst not themselves part of the UN it is essential that these organisa-

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[194] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations', p 26.

[195] Ibid. DeConing points out the the AU's 'Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) which is a mechanisms that brings together military, police and civilian functions together in one planning process and compares this to the UNs Integrated Missions Task Force, which is a incorporates not just those entities but planners from the wider UN system: DPKO, DPA, UNDG, OCHA and others.

tions develop the structures and mechanisms for meaningful coordination and coherence with UN agents. Such coordination is possible, but it is important to remember the particular context of UN Integrated Missions when establishing these structures to create a realistic and particular framework for coordination between these international organisations.

Recommendations

Further studies could explore how a common Comprehensive Approach can be implemented at the international level between different organisations pursuing greater cohesion. They could include;

- An organisational study to explore what structures do exist within the UN system for inter-organisational coordination in a situation where an Integrated Mission is not present and the peacekeeping component is provided for by another organisation. Kosovo, for example, could prove a very interesting case for such a study.
- Organisational studies on the capacities for inter-organisational coordination that exists within organisations like the EU and AU, and how these need to be developed to promote a comprehensive approach.

4.2.3 The particular characteristics of UN Civil-Military Coordination

For troops participating in Integrated Missions, the biggest difference to traditional peacekeeping is the changed understanding of civil-military coordination as something that goes beyond the civil/humanitarian – military dichotomy. The traditional separate civilian and military identities no longer apply in Integrated Missions and perhaps a new understanding of CIMIC in the context of these operations needs to be developed. The traditional CIMIC concepts that have been developed by various states can not easily be applied to multidimensional environments such as UN Integrated Missions. In such operations coordination between participating actors takes place through a variety of mechanisms and civil-military coordination entails a range of tasks not traditionally included in the CIMIC concept, such as assisting humanitarians with transportation. It also excludes certain traditional CIMIC functions that are now dealt with through other coordination structures. This means that countries contributing troops to Integrated Missions need to overlook their own CIMIC concepts (and perhaps expand their definitions) to be compatible with such operations. Troop contributing countries (TCCs) at least need to be aware of this difference and educate their soldiers accordingly.

Recommendations

- For individual troop contributing countries it is important to understand the concepts and theories behind Integrated Missions, how these are put into practice and what implications this has on its soldiers when participating in peace operations. Further studies could explore the difference between national CIMIC concepts (if any) and UN CIMIC to prepare TCCs for participation in Integrated Missions. In this particular context, perhaps the most important task for TCCs is to comprehend and endorse the meaning of CIMIC in UN operations.
- TCCs should also work with the UN, which is currently restructuring its training of peacekeepers, to ensure that the training and doctrine for peace-keepers is modified to fit the requirements of mission integration.

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Abbreviations

CA	Comprehensive Approach
CCA	(UN) Common Country Assessment
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation/ Coordination
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CST	Country Support Team
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DPA	(UN) Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EBAO	Effects Based Approach to Operations
EBO	Effects Based Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
FC	Force Commander
GoL	Government of Liberia
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCS	Humanitarian Coordination Section
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
IM	Integrated Missions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
iPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operations Centre
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell

JOC	Joint Operations Centre
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
MINUCI	UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights
PC	Police Commissioner
RBTF	Results Focused Transitional Framework
RC	Resident Coordinator
RRR	Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	African Union/ United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Programme

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Appendices

Appendix A - The Integrated Mission Planning Process

The Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) commences with the Secretary Generals Decision to initiate such a process.

1. Setting the stage: Advance Planning

The first Stage of the planning process attempts to 'set the stage' for UN engagement through developing strategic options for such involvement.[196]

LEVEL 1.1: 'Advance Planning' managed by IMTF

The first stage of the planning process seeks to make a Strategic Assessment of the situation on the ground. The assessment involves the input of all relevant UN actors – particularly the UN County Team and the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO), consultations with Member States, including the potential host government and possible troop/police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) as well as other international, regional and intergovernmental organisations and other external stakeholders.[197] The Strategic Assessment, for example, explores conflict dynamics, the humanitarian situation, existing UN engagement in the country and activities of other organizations.[198] The aim of the assessment is to give the Secretary General a comprehensive and clear situational understanding by which he can determine the appropriateness and viability of a UN peace operation, conceive of risks, identify priorities and develop a framework for further UN engagement.[199] Based on this information the Secretary- General creates a Strategic Planning Directive outlining strategic objectives and suggested role and aim of UN involvement. If the Secretary- General decides that

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[196] International Peace Academy. 2007. 'Meeting Note: Seminar on Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies', meeting note from seminar March 1, 2007 in New York organized by the International Peace Academy and the Center on International Cooperation. Accessed 2008-06-09 at: http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/155/FINAL_Meeting_Note_-_IPA-CIC_Peacebuilding_Strategy_Meeting_March_1.pdf, p 3.

[197] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008. *Peacekeeping Operations:Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO, United Nations, p 48.

[198] Eriksen, Bjørnar. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*. Master Thesis. Norwegian Defence Staff College, p 35.

[199] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*: Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006. New York: DPKO, United Nations, pp. 5-6.

a peace operation is a viable and appropriate form of UN engagement the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) the lead agent in the continued integrated mission planning process.

The timeframe of this phase is recommended to a period of at least four weeks.[200]

Main outputs:

- Strategic Assesment
- Secretary-Generals's Strategic Planning Directive

LEVEL 1.2: 'Foundational planning' managed by IMTF

The aim of the foundational planning process is to develop a comprehensive concept of operations report to be submitted to the Security Council.[201]

This stage in the planning process includes the deployment of a Technical Assessment Mission to the theatre as soon as security conditions allows. Consisting of members from the various secretarial departments, as well as the wider UN system, the aim of the mission is to analyse and asses the overall situation on the ground and the implications for an eventual peacekeeping. This calls for deeper engagement with the UN Country Team and other local actor.[202] At this point the IMTF may designate some members of the team to remain in the field to support UNCT involvement in the planning process. The UNCT may also, on its part, send representatives to UN HQ to participate in the planning process with the DPKO.[203] A budget planning group also works closely with the UNCT to rightly appreciate budget gaps and assure the peacekeeping force will be given the assets needed to support the Country Team.[204] The findings and recommendations of the assessment mission is then compiled into a 'first draft mission plan'.[205] At the end of this phase, based on the draft mission plan, the Secretary General submits a report detailing the 'concept of operations' (CONOPS). This report recommends options of size and scope of an envisaged peace operation and is the foundation on which the Security Council authorizes

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[200] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. Integrated Missions Planning Process, p 6.
[201] Ibid, p 2.
[202] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008. *Peacekeeping Operations:Principles and Guidelines*, pp. 48-49.
[203] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions, p 35.*
[204] Ibid, p 36.
[205] Ibid, p 35.

and mandates a mission.[206] The desired timeframe of the foundational planning phase is estimated at around 6 weeks.[207]

Main outputs:

- USG's Planning Directive
- Joint Transition Plan (needed if the UN is to 'inherit' the operation from another actor)
- First Draft Mission Plan
- Draft Mission Budget
- Report of the Secretary General

2. Operational Planning

The operational planning phase seeks to operationalize the draft mission plan and transfer authority of the operation to the SRSG.[208]

LEVEL 2.1: 'Operational Planning managed by IMTF

This level of planning seeks to develop the draft mission plan, add a detailed operational strategy for how the missions mandate will be implemented and establish a framework for integration of the mission, such as coordination mechanisms and command and control arrangements – including relationship with the UN Country Team. This Advanced Draft Mission Plan, which should be fully costed, must also include mission objectives, overall mission structure and strategies for DDR, human rights, rule of law and protection of civilians, for example.[209] A directive will also be sent to the SRSG, initiating the transfer of planning responsibility from the secretariat to the actual mission. The timeframe for this phase is approximately 6 weeks, or until the SRSG has been deployed.[210]

Main outputs:

- Advanced Draft Mission Plan
- Mision Budget Report
- Directive to the SRSG

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[206] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions*, p 36; Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2008*. Peacekeeping Operations:Principles and Guidelines*, p 49.

[207] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, p 7.

[208] International Peace Academy. 2007. 'Meeting Note: Seminar on Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies', p 3.

[209] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions, p 36;* Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process,* p 2.

[210] Ibid, p 10.

LEVEL 2.2: 'Implementation Planning' managed by IMPT -peacekeeping operation and UNCT jointly, in close coordination with IMTF

This phase covers the transition of responsibility to the field of operations.[211] Once a directive has been sent to the SRSG he is the head of the mission, as well as the planning process. Together with the missions Senior Management Team (DSRSGs, Force Commander and Police Commissioner) the SRSG will establish a country level 'Integrated Mission Planning Team'(IMPT) that will finalise the mission plan.[212] The IMPT should equally represent the peacekeeping mission and the UN Country Team, it will report to the mission leadership: the SRSG.[213] The IMPT starts an exercise at country level to review and validate the advanced draft mission plan. The IMPT, with support from the UN Country Team, eventually adopts a finalized mission plan based on this review.[214] Timeframe: 2-3 weeks.[215] During the various stages of the planning process the IMPT should work in close relationship with te IMTF at headquarters level.

Main outputs:

- Establishment of the Integrated Mission Planning Team
- Final Mission Plan

3. Review and Transition Planning

The final stage addresses issues of draw-down and transition as well as continuous updates

LEVEL 3.1: 'Continuation Planning' managed by IMPT

The mission plan is the authoritative framework for aching mission objectives, yet it needs to remain flexible in face of changing circumstances. The continuation planning phase aims to keep the mission plan up to date from the moment it has been adopted by the SRSG until a decision has been taken to reconfigure or end the operation.[216] This phase lasts throughout the lifespan of the mission.

Main outputs:

- Periodic reviews
- Monitoring and updates

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[211] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, p 2.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid, Annex A.
[214] Eriksen. 2007. *Integrated Missions, p 36*
[215] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, p 13.
[216] Ibid, p 2, 4.

LEVEL 2.2: 'Transition and Exit planning' managed by IMPT in consultation with IMTF

This phase in the planning process provides a framework for exit planning and development of an exit-strategy by the SRSG and UN Country Team once a decision to end the mission has been made. It also facilitates substantial revisions to the mission plans due to dramatic changes on the ground, or in response to a Security Council request.[217] The phase commences once a process of transition or exit-planning has been initiated and ends with a revised SRSGs Directive and Mission Plan.[218]

Main outputs:

- Revised USG's Planning Directive
- Report of the Secretary General
- Revised Mission Plan
- Revised SRSG's directive

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[217] Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2006. *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, 16.
[218] Ibid.