



FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden's largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors.

Cecilia Hull, Emma Svensson

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges

Photo: David Axe

Titel	African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Afrikanska Unionens fredsfrämjande utmaningar
Title	African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exe African Union Peacekeeping Challenges
Rapportnr/Report no	FOI-R--2596--SE
Rapporttyp Report Type	Användarrapport User report
Månad/Month	October
Utgivningsår/Year	2008
Antal sidor/Pages	58 p
ISSN	
Kund/Customer	Försvarsdepartementet
Forskningsområde Programme area	1. Analys av säkerhet och sårbarhet 1. Security, safety and vulnerability analysis
Delområde Subcategory	11 Forskning för regeringens behov 11 Policy Support to the Government.
Projektnr/Project no	A12018
Godkänd av/Approved by	Sara Gullbrandsson
FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys	FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
164 90 Stockholm	SE-164 90 Stockholm

Sammanfattning

AMISOM är Afrikanska Unionens tredje fredsfrämjande insats. Operationen etablerades år 2007 och bemyndigades att uppgå till 8000 soldater men har haft stora svårigheter med styrkegenerering och isättandet av de trupper som faktiskt utlovats av medlemsstaterna och av otillräckliga tillgångar hos både AU som institution och de afrikanska staterna. Brist på resurser, institutionell kapacitet och tillräcklig finansiering är utmaningar som erfarits av AU:s tidigare operationer, speciellt insatsen i Sudan, likväl som AMISOM. Som resultat har AMISOM förhindrats från att uppfylla sitt mandat och är högst beroende av framtida stöd ifrån utomstående parter och FN för att fullgöra sin uppgift.

Nyckelord: Afrikanska Unionen, fredsfrämjande insatser, AMISOM, Somalia, Burundi modellen

Summary

AMISOM is the African Unions third peace support operation. Established in early 2007 and mandated to constitute 8,000 troops AMISOM has suffered from difficulty in generating troops and in deploying troops pledged due to deficient resources of both the AU and its member states. AMISOM shares most of the challenges experienced during the AUs previous mission in Sudan, as well as its operation in Burundi: lack of resources, capacity and funding, as well as poor institutional capacity to manage operations. As a result AMISOM has been prevented from implementing its mandate and is heavily dependent on assistance from outside partners, including the United Nations, to fulfil its purpose

Keywords: African Union, Peace Support Operations, AMISOM, Somalia, Burundi model

Table of contents

Foreword	7
Executive Summary	8
1 Introduction	10
1.1 Context and purpose	10
1.2 Method and outline	10
2 The African Union	12
3 Mission Context	14
3.1 Somalia conflict history	15
3.2 The role of Ethiopia	20
3.3 How AU came to be involved, from IGASOM to AMISOM	22
4 AMISOM	26
4.1 Deployment	27
4.2 Funding and support	29
4.3 Performed tasks	30
4.4 UN takeover?	31
5 Strengthening AU PSO capacities	35
5.1 Strengthening AU management of operations: Support from the international community	35
5.1.1 Poor institutional ability to manage operations	35
5.1.2 AU dependency on outside assistance	36
5.1.3 Differing views on UN-AU relations	37
5.1.4 UN support to AMISOM and the AU	38
5.1.5 Still not meeting the needs of the AU	39
5.2 The Burundi Model: Assisting the TCCs	41
5.2.1 Reintroducing the Burundi model	41
5.2.2 Burundi model consequences on troop contribution	42
5.2.3 AU difficulties in managing outside assistance	43

5.2.4	Supporting the Burundi model through bilateral arrangements.....	44
5.2.5	African solutions, worldly means	45
6	Concluding remarks	48
	Abbreviations	51
	References	53

Foreword

This report was written under the general framework of the FOI Studies in African Security programme, a research trust within FOI's Division of Defence Analysis. The work has taken place within the core project of this programme: Project Africa, funded by the Department for International and Security Affairs (Fö/SI) in the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Currently, one priority for this project is to increase the knowledge and awareness about the African Union (AU) as a peace and security actor in contemporary Africa.

To help in providing understanding of the current capabilities and needs of the emerging AU Peace and Security Architecture, the Africa project is conducting a series of studies of the peacekeeping missions undertaken by the AU so far. In August 2008 two reports, dealing with the experiences from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) respectively were published. This report, focusing on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) will be followed by a study of the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES) to the Comoros Islands, to be published later in the year.

The authors would like to thank Karin Bogland, Markus Derblom, Peter Haldén Teresa Åhman and Justin McDermot at FOI's Division of Defence Analysis for valuable support and comments. The authors would also like to thank officials within the African Union for accommodating this study. The responsibility for any remaining errors or omissions rests entirely with the authors.

Executive Summary

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established in January 2007 to replace the Ethiopian troops that had invaded Somalia at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to defeat the network of Islamic courts which had taken over large parts of the country.

AMISOM was mandated to:

- Support the TFG in its effort of stabilising the country and further dialogue and reconciliation;
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and
- Creating conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia.

To fulfil this purpose AMISOM was also given a range of tasks including to protect the TFG and its infrastructure; support a voluntary disarmament process; assist in the reestablishment and training of Somali security forces; and monitor the security situation.

The Mission was mandated to 8,000 troops, plus civilian elements. As of yet only some 3,000 troops have been deployed. These constitute two battalions provided by Uganda, deployed in 2007, and two battalions from Burundi, deployed during 2008.

Like the AU's previous missions, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and particularly the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), AMISOM has suffered from troop-generation difficulties. Whilst Uganda deployed its battalions relatively swiftly, the Burundian battalions long stood ready to be transferred to Somalia but lacked the resources and logistical capacity to sustain a deployment. Similarly, Nigeria and Ghana have offered a total of 1,200 troops but not had the resources to deploy them to Somalia. Even if all the troops pledged would be deployed AMISOM would only amount to slightly more than half the troop size the AU Peace and Security Council estimated it to need to be able to fulfil the mandate. As a result, AMISOM, just like AMIS, has failed to perform most of its tasks. Instead AMISOM's function has been limited to safeguarding infrastructure such as the Mogadishu port, airport and an important access routes between them.

During AMISOM, just as during AMIB, the AU has relied on the troop contributing countries (TCCs) being self-sustaining during deployment. This is usually referred to as the 'Burundi model' and has made both Uganda and Burundi heavily dependent on logistical and economical support from outside

states and organisations. The Burundi model is a pragmatic response to the fact that the AU itself does not have the resources to support its TCCs. Unfortunately the model has had negative consequences such as member states being unable to participate in AU missions without the support from partners.

The resolution authorising AMISOM also formulated an expectation that the UN would take over the responsibility for the mission within 6 months. The UN has in its turn been unwilling to do so unless a comprehensive peace agreement, in support of which the UN could deploy, is reached. The AU has therefore had to extend AMISOM at several occasions. At these occasions the organisation has also reiterated that the UN, especially considering the limited resources of the AU, carries the ultimate responsibility for international peace and security and should increase its support to Somalia. The AU has therefore requested both economical support and a range of other resources from the UN, which the UN in turn has been unwilling to provide; arguing that the UN also is scarcely resourced and that regional organisations themselves carry the responsibility to secure own needed assets. Nonetheless, the UN has provided both AMISOM and the AU with planning and support staff to assist its management of operations. In addition, the Secretary-General has suggested the UN assist bringing AMISOM to approved UN standards to facilitate a swift re-hatting of the mission to a UN operation, should such a need arise.

The experiences of AMISOM show that AU missions are still defined by great ambition but deficient resources. An envisaged division of labour, where the AU swiftly intervenes when faced with new African crises or windows of opportunities, but expects to hand over to a UN operation as soon as possible, is also evident. This reflects the pragmatism of the African Union regarding the deficiencies of its own organisation, even though this division of labour has not been supported by the UN. One fundamental difference between the organisations is their views on the basic elements of peacekeeping operations, their purpose, role and potential as conflict resolving mechanisms; why and when we intervene and what requirements are needed for a successful operation. What is even more evident is the willingness of the African Union as an institution, although perhaps not as much so at the level of individual member states, to take on difficult and complex conflicts on its own continent that other organisations shun, and carry the responsibility for the protection of African lives.

1 Introduction

1.1 Context and purpose

The African Union (AU) has led its own Peace Support Operations (PSOs) since 2003, when it deployed its first PSO, AMIB, to Burundi. The African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which deployed in the beginning of 2007 is the third PSO undertaken by the organisation. The African Union has also sent a smaller mission to the Comoros Islands and has undertaken peacekeeping activities in Darfur, firstly as AMIS and later as part of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

The AU is working with member states and partners to increase its ability to plan, deploy and manage PSOs. The AU's ability to undertake such peace and security responsibilities surpasses that of most other regional organisations in Asia, South America and the Middle East.¹ Yet, the AU risks being misunderstood as having more capacity than it actually possesses. The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of AMISOM in order to increase the understanding of the AU as a peace and security organisation, as well as the challenges facing the organisation in the establishment and management of future peace operations. It is a part of a study series exploring the African Union as a regional peace and security actor and covering all its peace support operations. Evaluating the organisation's capability to conduct PSOs can be of use for informing Swedish policy towards Africa and the AU, since support for the evolving African peace and security architecture is part of the official Swedish strategy for promoting international peace and security. It can also be of use to a range of other actors interested in the African Union.

1.2 Method and outline

The study is based on a range of first and secondary sources, including official AU and UN documents, academic publications, newspapers and reports by non-academic organisations. It is also based on a small number of complimentary interviews with AU and Swedish officials.

¹ Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 2

The second section of this report outlines the history of the AU to present an overview of the organisation. The third focuses on Somalia and how the AU came to be involved in the Somali peace process, providing a short conflict history and explanation of the circumstances leading up to the authorisation of AMISOM. The fourth part of the report outlines a descriptive account of the AMISOM mission and the challenges facing the AU when deploying such missions. The fifth section then focuses on evaluating the support needed to strengthen AU capacities to undertake successful PSOs, and evaluates the efforts of providing such assistance already undertaken. The sixth and final part concludes the study.

2 The African Union

The predecessor to the AU, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in May 1963. The charter of the OAU stated that peace and security should be established and maintained in Africa.² At the same time, the charter underlined the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the individual member states, which was later translated into a principle of non-intervention.³ Alongside only being able to take action when all member states had come to a consensus, this made the organisation a weak actor in promoting peace and security on the continent. Due to the political context it was operating in, the main focus of the OAU came to be the fight against apartheid and colonisation, and thus in 1994 when apartheid came to an end, so did the purpose of the OAU.⁴

During the 1990s several new conflicts struck the African continent. The failure of the international community to intervene against these, and particularly the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, created a desire to find 'African solutions to African problems'. A wave of newfound pan-africanism that not only promoted cooperation on security issues, but also the principles of democracy, accountability, good governance and political openness, swept the continent.⁵ It was in this context and spirit that the AU was born in Sierte, Libya in 1999. The Constitutive Act of the AU was later signed on 11 July 2000, with the inauguration of the organisation taking place in July 2002.⁶ Constituting all states on the African continent except Morocco, which opposes the membership of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), the AU is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.⁷

The AU as an organisation works for political and economic cooperation between its member states in hope of reducing poverty, increase respect for human rights and promote peace and democracy. The main difference between the AU and the OAU, apart from stronger institutions, is the condemning of non-constitutional governmental changes and the "right of the Union to intervene in a

² Organization of African Unity, 'Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter', <http://www.oau-creation.com/OAU%20Charter.htm>

³ Murithi, Tim. 2008. 'The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia'. *African Security Review* 17:1, p. 72

⁴ Bogland, K et al. 2008. *The African Union – A study Focusing on Conflict Management*. FOI Report FOI-R- -2475- SE, p.13

⁵ Ibid, p. 13

⁶ Ibid, p.14

⁷ African Union, 'AU Member States', <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/memberstates/map.htm>

Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.⁸

Two important organs for AUs peace and security agenda are the Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2002 and the AU Commission. The PSC, the AUs main decision making body, can be compared to the UN Security Council. The AU Commission, on the other hand, works on day to day peace and security issues and has a role similar to the UN secretariat.⁹ Within the Commission is the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) which is the institutional body directly responsible for achieving the AUs goal of creating peace and security on the African continent. The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) rests within the PSD. The PSOD is the division responsible for managing the AUs Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and other peace initiatives such as conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁰

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)¹¹ was the first PSO undertaken by the AU and provided an early sign of the organisation’s willingness to intervene in conflicts on its own continent. The AU has since then also taken on missions in Sudan (AMIS and UNAMID)¹², Somalia (AMISOM) and most recently in the Comoros Islands. In 2004 the AU also initiated the creation of an African Standby Force and a Common Security and Defence Policy.¹³

⁸ African Union, ‘Constitutive Act of the African Union’, Article 4h. http://www.africa-union.org/about_AU/abConstitutive_Act.htm#Article4

⁹ Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operations*, p. 15

¹⁰ African Union, ‘Peace and Security Directorate’, http://www.africa-union.org/Structure_of_the_commission/depPEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20Directorate.htm

¹¹ See Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Burundi: Lessons learnt from the African Union’s First Peace Operation*. FOI Report 2562

¹² Ekengard, Arvid. 2008. *African Union Mission in Sudan: experiences and lessons learnt*. FOI Report 2559

¹³ Francis, David. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Ashgate, pp.128-130

3 Mission Context



Map of Somalia. Ref: UN Cartographic Section. Somalia No.3690, Rev. 7 January 2007

3.1 Somalia conflict history

Somalia was separately colonised by Great Britain and Italy but by the time of decolonisation in 1960 a decision was made to create one common state. For the newly independent Somalia it was not only important to unite the British and Italian parts of the country, but also French Somaliland (today's Djibouti), the Ogaden and Haud regions (annexed by Ethiopia) and parts of northern Kenya.¹⁴ In its endeavour to unite a greater Somalia, the state turned to the Soviet Union for support against the Western-backed Ethiopia and Kenya.

In the years following independence an attempt was made to make Somalia a parliamentary democracy. Clientelism, clan favouritism and factional politics impeded this venture and in 1969 Commander Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in a coup.¹⁵ Barre introduced a socialist one party system, supported both financially and military by the Soviet Union.¹⁶ In the mid and late 1970s the political environment changed with the USSR re-aligning itself in support of Ethiopia. Somalia, in its turn, started seeking out support from the United States.¹⁷

The United States was economically supportive but did not provide as much military assistance as Barre required.¹⁸ A failed attempt to support an uprising in Ogaden, much due to the fact that the Soviet Union was sustaining Ethiopia instead of Somalia, led to hundreds of thousands Somali refugees from Ogaden crossing the border into Somalia.¹⁹ These events, along with a declining economy and a directionless dictatorship favouring Barre's clan, resulted in discontent with the government. In 1978 a number of officers attempted a coup d'état, but failed. As a response the regime used excessive force against the clan to which most of the officers belonged, resulting in a rise of clan-based opposition groups. Various militias began to form and this was the beginning of a long-drawn civil war.²⁰

¹⁴ History World, 'History of Somalia',

<http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad20>

¹⁵ Doyle, M & N. Sambanis. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, p. 146

¹⁶ Säkerhetspolitik.se, 'Fördjupning Somalia',

http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

¹⁷ Doyle, M & N. Sambani. 2006. *Making War*, p. 146

¹⁸ Säkerhetspolitik.se, 'Fördjupning Somalia',

http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

¹⁹ History World, 'History of Somalia',

<http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad20>

²⁰ Elmi, A.A & A. Barise. 2006. 'The Somali conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peacebuilding Strategies'. *African Security Review* 15.1, p. 34

In 1991 Barre was finally overthrown by the United Somali Congress (USC) and its leader Ali Mahdi. The ousting of Barre led to a full collapse of the central government and a rise in factional conflict.²¹ The new government, lead by Mahdi, only controlled parts of Mogadishu since other warring groups, as well as a breakaway USC faction led by Mohammad Farrah Aideed, did not accept the government and the fighting therefore continued.²² In May 1991 the Somali National Movement (SNA) proclaimed the former British colony independent under the name Independent Republic of the Somaliland. Even though it has not been internationally recognised, it has worked as an independent state ever since.

Since 1991 Somalia has not had an effective central government and has experienced continuous warfare as different clans compete for power. A range of peace initiatives have been undertaken over the past 17 years, including several major peace conferences supported by the international community, but violent confrontations still occur regularly. Several peace agreements producing new governments have been reached since 1991, but all previous ones have failed.²³

In 1992 the UN imposed an arms embargo with the purpose of “establishing peace and stability in Somalia”.²⁴ Later on that same year, after mediating a cease-fire agreement, the UN deployed the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to oversee the agreement and protect the humanitarian relief work that was taking place due to a severe famine. The UN presence was severally opposed by the Aideed faction of the USC. It was quickly realised that UNOSOM was too small to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance in a lawless Somalia. In an attempt to increase security a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a multinational force of 37,000 soldiers led by the United States through ‘Operation Restore Hope’, was authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC).²⁵ In March 1993 a peace agreement was signed between Aideed and Mahdi, along with other warring parties, where a Transitional National Council was agreed upon. Subsequently UNITAF was transformed into UNOSOM II.²⁶

Nevertheless, the attacks on the UN continued. In June 1993 the Pakistani contingent was attacked and 24 troops killed. Two months later, in an attempt to

²¹ Doyle, M & N. Sambani. 2006. *Making War*, p. 147

²² Uppsala University Conflict Database, ‘Somalia’, http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=141®ionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

²³ Murithi, Tim. 2008. ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations’ p. 80; International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2008. Conflict in Somalia: Faint Hope of Resolution’. *Strategic Comments* 15:4

²⁴ Security Council Resolution S/RES 733(1992), ‘Imposition of Arms Embargo’. 23 January 1992.

²⁵ United Nations, ‘UNOSOM’, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>

²⁶ Säkerhetspolitik.se, ‘Fördjupning Somalia’, http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

capture Aideed, hundreds of Somalis and 18 American Soldiers were killed and mutilated. Pictures of the US soldiers being dragged around Mogadishu was broadcasted over the world and this subsequently led to a US withdrawal from Somalia. The UN mission also left the country in March 1995, leaving a limited UN political office for Somalia (UNPOS) which was based in Nairobi for security reasons.²⁷

Aideed died in 1996 and was succeeded by his son Hussein Aideed. This opened up a window of opportunity for continued negotiations but unfortunately new fights broke out at the end of that year. As a result of the continued fighting, no group managed to take control of the country between 1997 and 2000, leaving Somalia without any form of government.²⁸ Then in 2000, a peace conference aimed at forming a Somali administration was initiated by Djibouti and the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).²⁹ The conference led to a peace agreement which provided for the establishment of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and a Transitional National Government (TNG) mandated for three years. The new government nonetheless never managed to extend its power beyond Mogadishu and faced severe opposition from several warlords and other groups, often backed by Ethiopia³⁰, refusing to accept the peace agreement. The spoilers united in 2001 to create a military alliance – the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) – with the purpose of overthrowing the TNG.³¹

In 2001 IGAD once more tried to negotiate a solution to the conflict. These negotiations went on until 2004 and resulted in the establishment of new Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) such as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) (the TNG's mandate had expired in 2003). The TFG has a five year interim mandate to prepare Somalia for elections to be held in 2009. Due to security concerns, the TFG started its work in exile in Kenya, but then established itself inside Somalia, firstly in Jawhar and later on in Baidoa in 2006. The TFG was led by Abdullahi Yusuf, who had previously ruled the autonomous Somali region of Puntland with military and financial backing from Ethiopia. Ethiopia backed the TFG and its

²⁷ Security Council Report.org, Somalia January 2006,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gKWLeMTIsG/b.1313241/k.EFBA/January_2006BR_Somalia.htm

²⁸ Säkerhetspolitik.se, 'Fördjupning Somalia',
http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

²⁹ IGAD is composed of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea withdrew its membership from the organisation in 2007

³⁰ Cornwell, R. 2006. 'Somalia: Distorting Reality?'. *African Security Review*. 15:12, p. 77

³¹ Säkerhetspolitik.se, 'Fördjupning Somalia',
http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

appointment of Yusuf, whom it knew would not renew Somalia's claim on the Ogaden region.³²

In the meantime a network of local Islamic courts had organised themselves under the name of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).³³ The UIC was formed as a rival to the transitional federal administration. The courts system had existed since the collapse of the Somali state as a governance experiment in a government vacuum. During the past decade, apart from running the courts, the Sharia courts had also built a school and health system.³⁴ This meant that they had provided the basics of a social security network, thus making it easier for the UIC to gain support from the local population.

In late 2004 Yusuf requested that a multinational peacemaking force be sent to Somalia to prevent the destabilisation of the country by the presence of millions of small arms and thousands of militiamen active within the state.³⁵ In January 2005 IGAD decided to deploy a peace support mission (IGASOM) to Somalia.³⁶ The AU endorsed the mission the following month.³⁷ Capacity issues and disagreement over the composition of the force delayed the deployment of IGASOM and the mission never materialised. Another concern was the reluctance of the UN to lift the 1992 arms embargo, which the TFG had requested an exemption of, to allow for the restoration of security by government forces and a peacemaking operation.³⁸

Not originally considered a major political or military force the Islamic Courts started making military advancements during spring 2006. By June 2006 the UIC had gained control over Mogadishu and its environs. TFG President Yusuf made the claim that the UIC was linked to international terrorists and was receiving support from foreign forces.³⁹ During the second half of 2006 peace talks,

³² Cornwell, R. 2006. 'Somalia: Distorting Reality?'. *African Security Review*. 15:12, p. 76

³³ Baxter, Z. *Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts*, http://www.clocksandclouds.org/issue_two_articles/ITC%20Somalia%20and%20the%20UIC.pdf, pp. 9-10, 12-14; Also known as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS), Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC), Joint Islamic Courts, Sharia Courts System and Union of Sharia Courts. The term UIC will be used here for reason of consistency

³⁴ Peace and Security Council, Information Note on the Situation in Somalia, PSC/PR/2(LV), 17 June 2006; Baxter, Z. *Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts*, p 14

³⁵ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (XXII), 5 January 2005; Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary General', S/2005/89, 18 February 2005

³⁶ IGAD, 'Communiqué on Somalia'. 31 January 2005

³⁷ Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), 7 February 2005

³⁸ Security Council Report.org, Somalia, January 2006, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.1313241/k.EFBA/January_2006BR_Somalia.htm; Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General, S/2005/89, 18 February 2005

³⁹ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2(LXIX), 19 January 2007

referred to as the Khartoum negotiations, lead by the League of Arab States, were held between the TFG and the UIC.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the fighting between the governmental and the Islamic courts continued and in the autumn of 2006 the UIC had gained control of most of the Somali territory. At this time the TFG asked Ethiopia for military assistance. In December 2006 Ethiopia intervened in Somalia, with the backing of the United States which supported the ousting of the Islamist militia in accordance with its 'war on terror'.⁴¹ Soon the government forces, with the support from the Ethiopian army, had pushed the UIC back to Mogadishu and in December the capital had been reclaimed as well.⁴² Nevertheless, whilst Ethiopia, whose presence had incited renewed insurgency, was eager to withdraw before the situation got out of control,⁴³ the TFG requested that it remain inside Somalia from fear of a renewed security vacuum and a return to the status quo as before its intervention. Ethiopia agreed that it would withdraw only as soon as a multinational peace support operation could be established to relieve it.⁴⁴

In January 2007 the AU deployed AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia) with the intent that the mission would be taken over by the UN within six months.⁴⁵ The fighting continued and the US, suspicious of UIC/ Al-Qaeda cooperation, started to carry out air strikes. At the same time, the resistance towards the TFG was increasing and the opposition, consisted of former UIC-groups and others, formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). To date AMISOM remains deployed, albeit, due to poor capacity, with far fewer troops and capacities than originally intended. Ethiopian forces still remain in Somalia and the security situation is continuously volatile leaving the UN reluctant to deploy a UN peace operation.⁴⁶ Observers have drawn parallels between Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, due to the alliance between Ethiopia, the US and the TFG in a fight against Islamists,⁴⁷ and the existence of "an internationally supported but fragile government reliant on foreign forces, whose presence galvanises the anti-government insurgency, which in turn is

⁴⁰ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2(LXIX), 19 January 2007

⁴¹ Botha, A. 2007. 'Somalia: Africa's Iraq?'. *ISS Today*, 15 March 2007

⁴² Peter-Baker, D. 2007. 'The AU standby Force and the Challenge of Somalia'. *African Security Review* 16:2, p. 120

⁴³ Heitman, R. 2007. 'South Africa too stretched to send troops to Somalia'. *Janes's Defence Weekly*. 44:5, p. 44

⁴⁴ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2(LXIX), 19 January 2007

⁴⁵ Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), 19 January 2007

⁴⁶ Säkerhetspolitik.se, 'Fördjupning Somalia',

http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

⁴⁷ Botha, A. 2007. 'Somalia: Africa's Iraq?'. *ISS Today*, 15 March 2007

the main cause of the humanitarian crisis”.⁴⁸ As recently as 9 June 2008, however, a new agreement, the Djibouti agreement, was signed between the TFG and the ARS. The agreement provides for a cessation of hostilities and requests that an international stabilisation force facilitating the withdrawal of Ethiopia be deployed by the UN.⁴⁹ The outcome of the agreement has yet to be determined.

3.2 The role of Ethiopia



Map of the Ogaden region. Ref: BBC News

Ethiopia intervened in the Somali conflict upon request from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in December 2006. However, the Ethiopian involvement in the Somali conflict has a far longer history. The two countries have rivalled over ethnic and religious differences throughout their past. During ‘the scramble for Africa’, when European powers divided Africa amongst themselves, Ethiopia was given the Ogaden region which had been a part of Somalia. Later on, Britain handed Ethiopia other regions that Somalia considered belonging to an independent Somalia.⁵⁰ Two wars were fought over land issues,

⁴⁸ ‘International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2008. Conflict in Somalia: Faint Hope of Resolution’. *Strategic Comments* 15:4

⁴⁹ Security Council Report.org, Somalia, Chronology, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2876199/>; APF. 2008. ‘AU extends Somalia mission but asks UN to take over’. *Daily Star*, 2 July

⁵⁰ Elmi, A.A & A. Barise. 2006. ‘The Somali conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peacebuilding Strategies’. *African Security Review* 15.1, p. 34

in 1964 and 1977. Both countries have also supported rebel groups inside the other's territory. Ethiopia was for example active in the creation of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) which sought to overthrow the TNG.⁵¹ The 2004 agreement, resulting in the establishment of the TFG, was allegedly much a result of Ethiopian thinking, who believed that a weak and dependent government would prevent Somalia from once again claiming the Ogaden region.⁵²

The Ethiopian invasion, undertaken upon the request of the TFG and with support from the United States, was initially successful. Ethiopia expressed a desire to withdraw soon after the defeat of the UIC and has stated that it would withdraw as soon as a peace support operation could stabilise the situation enough to allow for its withdrawal. The prevailing security situation and the slow deployment of AMISOM has prevented an Ethiopian withdrawal and its forces has remained in Somalia to sustain the TFG for lack of a viable peacekeeping force.⁵³ The UN Secretary-General has stated that the reinforcement of AMISOM is necessary to facilitate Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia.⁵⁴ Meanwhile Eritrea has suspended its IGAD membership due to Ethiopia's presence in Somalia and the IGAD support thereof.⁵⁵ Since AMISOM was deployed not long after Ethiopia intervened in the conflict, concerns have been raised that there is a risk of AMISOM being seen as too closely connected to Ethiopian interests, thus jeopardising its neutrality.⁵⁶ AMISOM's mandate clearly states that the operation shall support and protect the TFG in carrying out its tasks.⁵⁷ Because legitimacy of the TFG as representative of the Somali state has been greatly contested, this has provided another case for those who question the neutrality of the AU forces, arguing that AMISOM is essentially backing a weak illegitimate government and carrying out the will of the IGAD countries and TFG president Yusuf.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Elmi, A.A & A. Barise. 2006. 'The Somali conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peacebuilding Strategies'. *African Security Review* 15.1, p. 34

⁵² Cornwell, R. 2006. 'Somalia: Distorting Reality?'. *African Security Review*. 15:12, p. 77

⁵³ Heitman, R. 2007. 'South Africa too stretched to send troops to Somalia'. *Janes's Defence Weekly*. 44:5, p. 44

⁵⁴ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/204, 20 April 2007

⁵⁵ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/381, 25 June 2007; Mulugeta, A. 2008. 'Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa', *International Peacekeeping*, 15:2

⁵⁶ Von Gienanth, T. 2007. *Asian, European and African Policies, Practices and Lessons Learned in Peace Operations in Africa: An Indian-European Dialogue in the Context of the German EU Presidency 2007*. Centre for International Peace Operations Report, p. 17

⁵⁷ Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), 19 January 2007

⁵⁸ BBC, 'AU peacekeepers mired in Somalia', 24 September 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7633625.stm>

3.3 How AU came to be involved, from IGASOM to AMISOM

In early 2003 the AU initiated preparations for sending a military observer mission to Somalia upon the request of the IGAD Technical Committee. However, prevailing insecurity in Somalia delayed the deployment of such a mission. By the time the security situation had improved the TFG president Yusuf stated the need for a strong PSO to deploy to Somalia. Yusuf argued that the situation had made an observer mission redundant and “no longer warranted” and that Somalia rather needed a peacemaking force.⁵⁹ Yusuf also stressed the need for the peace support operation to include the bordering states, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The inclusion of the frontline states was controversial due to their close and sometime biased involvement in the conflict.⁶⁰ Not long thereafter, at an AU Commission seminar, it was recommended that the deployment of a force, possibly together with IGAD, be considered. The seminar also proposed a mandate to protect the transitional federal institutions and the civilian population, facilitate disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and train the security forces, amongst other things.⁶¹ Shortly afterwards, Uganda stated its interest in sending troops to such a mission.⁶²

A few months later, in January 2005, a different proposal regarding an African Mission in Somalia, for the first time using the acronym AMISOM, was suggested by the AU Commission and accepted by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC).⁶³ The proposed mandate was somewhat changed to include assisting in the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, support reconstruction efforts and assist the TFG in its relocation to Somalia from its then exile in Kenya. The need for full support from the UN and the EU regarding management and planning of the mission was also stated.⁶⁴ Soon thereafter a fact-finding mission was sent to Somalia to prepare for the planning of the mission.

At the end of January 2005, a decision was made within IGAD to deploy a PSO (IGASOM) to Somalia. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda offered to

⁵⁹ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (XXII), 5 January 2005

⁶⁰ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2005/392, 16 June 2005

⁶¹ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (XXII), 5 January 2005

⁶² Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2005/89 18 February 2005; Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué’, PSC/PR/Comm. (XXII), 5 January 2005

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (XXII), 5 January 2005

participate.⁶⁵ To be able to deploy, IGAD had to amend its own charter due to the principle of non-interference regarding the internal affairs of the member states that was stipulated there.⁶⁶ IGASOM was authorised by the AU PSC in February 2005. At the same time as the PSC authorised IGASOM it also called on the AU Commission to report in detail on the possibility of establishing an AU peace support operation.⁶⁷ Hence, there were two possible tracks being investigated regarding the deployment of a force to Somalia.

Both potential deployments faced a couple of obstacles: firstly, the Islamic Courts and extremist groups had made it clear that they would not accept foreign troops on Somali territory; secondly, the UN arms embargo, which had been in place since 1992, would need to be revised for the PSO to be able to transfer weapons into Somalia. Nevertheless, in May 2005 the PSC authorised deployment of IGASOM with the purpose of supporting the TFIs, training Somali security forces, supporting disarmament, monitoring the security situation, protecting its own forces and facilitating humanitarian operations. IGASOM was also to create conditions to enable a take over by the AU, which would be possible when the TFG had returned to Somalia and some peace and stability had been established.⁶⁸ At the same time it was reported that several Somali groups had voiced its opinion that IGASOM should exclude troop contributions from the frontline states – Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, since those countries could not be seen as neutral in the conflict.⁶⁹ The UIC, which was gaining control over Mogadishu, stated its willingness to dialogue but only as long as IGASOM would not deploy.⁷⁰

The first phase of IGASOM was to be constituted by troops from Uganda and Sudan; however, there was a lack of funding to enable the deployment.⁷¹ Neither had an exception to the arms embargo been granted. The UNSC stated that it needed a detailed mission plan to consider such a request.⁷² Not until April 2006 did a panel consisting of representatives from the TFG, AU and IGAD agree to

⁶⁵ IGAD, 'Communiqué on Somalia'. 31 January 2005

⁶⁶ Mulugeta, A. 2008. 'Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa', *International Peacekeeping*, 15:2

⁶⁷ Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), 7 February 2005

⁶⁸ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (XXIX), 12 May 2005; Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIX), 12 May 2005

⁶⁹ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (XXIX), 12 May 2005

⁷⁰ Peace and Security Council, Information Note on the Situation in Somalia, PSC/PR/2(LV), 17 June 2006

⁷¹ IGAD, 'Joint Communiqué'. 12 June 2005

⁷² Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2005/32, 14 July 2005; Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2006/11, 15 March 2006

develop such a plan.⁷³ Another condition for the arms embargo to be lifted was the development of a National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP), which was adopted in June 2006. However, there were doubts about the NSSP fulfilling the conditions set up by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as about the UICs willingness to accept it.⁷⁴

By August 2006 IGAD had developed a deployment plan for IGASOM. After being revised by the AU PSC it was endorsed in the beginning of September 2006 and IGAD called on the UNSC to decide on an exemption of the arms embargo.⁷⁵ It was stated that the frontline states would not be part of the mission. However, Djibouti and Eritrea had shown some hesitation regarding the deployment if the mission was not accepted by all parties within Somalia.⁷⁶ Also, in a letter to the UNSC, the UIC stated that they were against any changes to the arms embargo as long as the Khartoum negotiations, mentioned above, were ongoing.⁷⁷

After several discussions, and against the advice of UN Secretary-General Annan, the UNSC on 6 December 2006 authorised IGAD and AU member states to set up a mission in Somalia. IGASOM was mandated to monitor the implementation of agreements between the TFG and the UIC, secure the movements of the involved parties, provide security in Baidoa, protect the government and the TFIs and train the national security forces.⁷⁸ An exemption to the arms embargo was also granted. The resolution was welcomed by the TFG, whilst rejected by the UIC. The frontline states were also excluded from participating in IGASOM. By excluding these, Sudan and Uganda were the only remaining of the countries that had offered to supply troops. Since Sudan was struggling with its own internal conflicts and had peacekeepers present within its own territory, in reality, Uganda was the only viable troop contributor.⁷⁹ IGAD had to rethink its troop contribution plan and hence IGASOM never managed to deploy. An important reason for turning IGASOM into an AU mission was the possibility of drawing troops from a wider range of AU members. Apart from the lack of troop contributors, other reasons for IGASOM never being deployed was the resistance met by non-government factions within Somalia and the fact that

⁷³ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2006/418, 20 June 2006

⁷⁴ Security Council Report.org, Somalia, July 2006, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.1816671/k.B3AC/July_2006BRSomalia.htm

⁷⁵ IGAD, 'Communiqué', 5 September 2006

⁷⁶ Security Council. 'Report of the Secretary-General'. S/2006/838. 23 October 2006

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ For the full mandate see Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1725(2006), 6 December 2006

⁷⁹ Paradoxically, despite hosting both UNAMID and UNMIS, Sudan in 2008 participated in the AU mission to the Comoros

not even a quarter of the estimated cost of US\$ 335 million for the mission had been pledged.⁸⁰ Following suit, tensions and violent clashes between the TFG and the UIC increased inside Somalia. During the latter part of December the fighting intensified leading Ethiopia to eventually intervene in support of the TFG. The idea of deploying an IGAD mission was now fully abandoned in favour of an AU operation.

⁸⁰ Mulugeta, A. 2008. 'Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa', *International Peacekeeping*, 15:2

4 AMISOM

Upon it being clear that IGASOM would not be able to deploy, the AU PSC decided to authorise the deployment of AMISOM on 19 January 2007, in order to replace the Ethiopian forces still on the ground in Somalia.⁸¹ A long and complex process of finding an organisation that could deploy a PSO to Somalia thus came to an end. Unfortunately, the procedure of putting the PSO in place would be an ever more challenging process.

AMISOM was mandated for an initial period of six months “with the clear understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation”.⁸² A month later, on 21 February 2007, the UN Security Council endorsed the deployment.⁸³

AMISOM’s mandate included:

- Supporting the TFIs in their effort of stabilising the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation;
- Facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance; and
- Creating conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia.⁸⁴

To be able to fulfil these objectives AMISOM was given the following tasks:

- Support dialogue and reconciliation, working with all stakeholders;
- Provide, as appropriate, protection to TFIs and their key infrastructure to enable them to carry out their functions;
- Assist in implementing NSSP, particularly the reestablishment and training of Somali security forces;
- Provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts;
- Monitor, in areas of deployment, the security situation;
- Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs; and

⁸¹ Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, p.8

⁸² Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué’, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007

⁸³ Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1744, 21 February 2007

⁸⁴ Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué’, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007

- Protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right to self-defence.⁸⁵

The mandate, otherwise ambitious, did not include the protection of civilians, making it difficult for the AU force to have an actual impact on the ground. This was particularly the case in Mogadishu where attacks on civilians, by all parties to the conflict, would massively surge during the spring of 2007. Indiscriminate shelling caused the flight of one third of Mogadishu's population within four months of the authorisation of AMISOM. Fleeing civilians were subject to looting, harassment and sexual violence by armed militia, abuses that AMISOM peacekeepers in Mogadishu had little or no effect on, partly because of its deficient mandate.⁸⁶ International Human Rights advocacy groups have called on the AU to rectify the omission but the narrow mandate still remains. Also, whilst mandated with the facilitation of humanitarian aid the mandate does not explicitly state the protection of humanitarian workers. Such protection is greatly needed in Somalia, as evident by the recent killing of the head of the United Nations Development Program in Mogadishu, which followed a series of killings and kidnapping of aid workers in the country.⁸⁷ The security vacuum in Somalia has led most international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to evacuate all its international staff, straining the delivery of much needed humanitarian assistance.⁸⁸

4.1 Deployment

AMISOM was to consist of both military and civilian components amounting up to 8,000 peacekeepers. In addition to Uganda, states such as Nigeria, Ghana and Burundi soon stated their willingness to contribute.⁸⁹ Uganda offered 1600 troops, Burundi 1500-1600, Nigeria 850 and Ghana 350 troops.⁹⁰ South Africa, which, with its great military capacity, had participated in previous AU missions,

⁸⁵ Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007

⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch, 'HRW Letter to UN Security Council on Upcoming Mission to Africa', 12 June 2007 <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/12/africa16144.htm>; Amnesty International, 'Somalia: protection of civilians must be priority', Public Statement, AFR 52/009/2007 (Public), 24 April 2007 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/009/2007/en/dom-AFR520092007en.html>

⁸⁷ BBC News, 'Aid groups mull leaving Somalia', 14 July 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7505135.stm>

⁸⁸ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

⁸⁹ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (LXXX) 18 July 2007

⁹⁰ IRIN, 'Somalia: A turtous road ahead in search of peace', 13 March 2007, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/157f219de83e61803c7259d3c256f0fe.htm>

announced that it would be unable to contribute troops to AMISOM due to its commitments to MONUC – the UN mission in DR Congo – , and AMIS, as well as its presence in Burundi.⁹¹

Uganda began the deployment of two battalions and a force headquarters in Mogadishu in March 2007. However, the generation of troops have been a slow process due to financial and logistical constraints making it difficult for the troop contributing countries (TCCs) to deploy.⁹² Despite being technically ready to deploy in mid 2007, Burundi delayed its deployment several months due to lack of equipment.⁹³ Until the end of December 2007, when Burundi deployed 192 soldiers, the two Ugandan battalions were the only peacekeepers present in Somalia.⁹⁴ In January 2008 Burundi had finally deployed a full battalion, 850 soldiers, leaving the total strength of AMISOM at 2,613 troops, far from the 8,000 that the mandate had called for.⁹⁵ The second Burundian completed its pre-deployment training in late spring 2008 to then await the equipment needed for deployment.⁹⁶ Only in mid- October 2008 did the second Burundian battalion manage to deploy to Somalia.⁹⁷

Today, AMISOM consists of just above 3,000 troops.⁹⁸ In a best case scenario, should all troops pledged actually be deployed, AMISOM is expected to reach a maximum strength of 4500 troops. This is, however, highly unlikely.⁹⁹ Nigeria, like the other troop-contributors is lacking resources and will only be able to deploy with support from the United States.¹⁰⁰ Other than a lack of resources and logistic support, a less than ideal security situation, which deteriorated after the authorisation of AMISOM, has also enforced reluctance amongst the TCCs to deploy. Shortly after arrival, the Ugandan contingent started suffering attacks and in May 2007 four Ugandan peacekeepers were killed.¹⁰¹ Attacks and killings of

⁹¹ Heitman, R. 2007. 'South Africa too stretched to send troops to Somalia'. *Janes's Defence Weekly*, 44:5, p. 44

⁹² Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (LXXX) 18 July 2007

⁹³ BBC News, 'Burundi delays Somali deployment', 7 August 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6935033.stm>

⁹⁴ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008

⁹⁵ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/178, 14 March 2008

⁹⁶ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

⁹⁷ Reuters, 'Insurgents Attack African Union Troops in Mogadishu', 13 October 2008, <http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnLD336065.html>

⁹⁸ Reuters, 'Convoy Ambushed as Peacekeepers Deploy to Somalia', 12 October 2008, <http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnLC005811.html>

⁹⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2008. Conflict in Somalia: Faint Hope of Resolution'. *Strategic Comments* 15:4

¹⁰⁰ Wallis, D. 'US helping deploy Nigeria, Burundi troops in Somalia', 01 July 2008, Reuters Africa

¹⁰¹ Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, p.8

the peacekeepers have continued throughout the mission¹⁰² with attacks on the newly arrived Burundian contingent in October 2008 the latest in a series of such actions.¹⁰³

4.2 Funding and support

The logistics support for AMISOM has been based on the model of operational self-sustenance by TCCs that was firstly practiced by the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)¹⁰⁴: the so called ‘AMIB Concept’ or ‘Burundi Model’¹⁰⁵. A different concept, with similar outcomes, was applied to AMIS but the Burundi model was again advocated during the planning for AMISOM, as the task of sustaining the TCCs was too much to handle for the narrowly resourced union.¹⁰⁶

Since the membership of the AU tends to be states with limited resources the Burundi Model has proven problematic. (For a more in-depth discussion of the model see section 5.2). In reality the TCCs to AMISOM have been far from self-sustaining, instead requiring not just logistical support, including equipment and air-lifts, but also training, from AU partners. The Ugandan deployment was, for example, supported by the US government, which has provided assistance such as airlift, equipment and procurement of supplies, logistics and sustenance in the mission area. Algeria also contributed by airlifting the Ugandan contingent to Somalia.¹⁰⁷ NATO, which undertook its first mission on the African continent by supplying airlifts to AMIS, has also, in principle, agreed on providing airlift to AU member states willing to deploy to Somalia. The organisation has, however, not yet received any requests for such assistance.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S//2008/466, 16 July 2008

¹⁰³ Reuters, ‘Insurgents Attack African Union Troops in Mogadishu’, 13 October 2008, <http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnLD336065.html>; Reuters, ‘Convoy Ambushed as Peacekeepers Deploy to Somalia’, 12 October 2008, <http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnLC005811.html>

¹⁰⁴ For more details see Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Burundi: Lessons learnt from the African Union’s First Peace Operation*. FOI Report 2562

¹⁰⁵ Also known as the AMIB model or Burundi concept; E-mail correspondence with the Head of the AU Operations and Support Unit, 9 July 2008

¹⁰⁶ Hansson, Percy. 2007. *Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet, nr 14. ‘AU, TCCs och Sverige: förslag om intensifierat samarbete inom fred och säkerhet’*. 27 February 2007

¹⁰⁷ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (LXXX) 18 July 2007

¹⁰⁸ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (LXXX) 18 July 2007; NATO. ‘Nato’s assistance to the African Union in Somalia’, 2 April 2008, <http://www.nato.int/issues/au-somalia/index.html>; NATO, ‘NATO supporting African Union’s missions’ Press Release (2008)018, 1 February 2008 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-018e.html>

The United Kingdom, in its turn, supported a reconnaissance mission by Burundi, to prepare for its deployment. France and the US provided training to the Burundian troops before their deployment and the US sustained and supported the 192 Burundian troops deployed in December 2007.¹⁰⁹ Despite such support by AU and bilateral partners, the Burundian deployment was delayed due to a failure to mobilise other assistance, such as major equipment, in-theatre logistical support and payment for troop's allowances.¹¹⁰ A similar challenge is facing Ghana and Nigeria, which have yet to deploy its pledged troops to Somalia. Other than these countries, Kenya, Italy, the EU, Sweden, China and the League of Arab States have also provided support and financial assistance to AMISOM.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, out of the total budget for the first year of deployment, amounting to US \$ 622 million, just a little over US \$ 32 millions had been contributed in January 2008, leaving the mission short of needed resources.¹¹²

Besides support to TCCs, the AU has also required assistance with mission management and planning at headquarters level. In support of developing AU capacity in this area, the UN and other partners have deployed military, police and civilian experts to Addis Ababa. The EU has also pledged €5 million to the establishment of the AMISOM Support Management Planning Unit (SMPU).¹¹³

4.3 Performed tasks

AMISOM's ability to perform the tasks outlined in its mandate has been hampered due to lack of resources and the failure to deploy sufficient troops, a predicament AMISOM shares with other AU missions, most notably AMIS, and many PSOs in general. A volatile security environment, ongoing conflict, and a slow reconciliation process, in combination with the delays in deploying AMISOM, has meant that the mission has had very limited effect on the prevailing situation in Somalia. Nevertheless, the mission has managed to perform some limited tasks successfully. The Ugandan battalions based at Mogadishu airport has from the start of the mission conducted security tasks in and around the airfield and begun patrolling activities in other parts of

¹⁰⁹ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008

¹¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹¹ Ibid; Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008; For more details on the Swedish contribution see section 5.2.

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (LXXX), 18 July 2007; Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008; See also section 5.1

Mogadishu with the arrival of needed equipment.¹¹⁴ As the Burundian troops reached Somalia, AMISOM had extended its tasks to include the protection of the seaport, southern Mogadishu's Kilometre 4 traffic circle district and the presidency. To a limited extent, AMISOM has also received weapons from various parties to be destroyed or stored. Other than that, the mission has provided – upon request – escorts to humanitarian organisations and “limited” humanitarian support to the local population.¹¹⁵ AMISOM is currently developing a concept of operations for the Somali Police Force and is undertaking planning for future disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) measures.¹¹⁶ However, the mission has so far had minimal impact on the endeavour of restoring peace in Somalia.

The difficulty faced in performing its tasks, even though dependent on the lack of troops to undertake them, has also had a basis in the issue of command and control. Observers have noted that AMISOMs structures of command and control have not been clear, and that the command has been without cohesion as the AU only issues ‘guidelines’ to national contingents serving in the mission.¹¹⁷ This of course risks hampering the mission’s effectiveness, as the few troops deployed might still have difficulties knowing what they are supposed to do. An insufficient mandate and unclear concepts of operations and command structures, as well as underdeveloped doctrines for how to conduct PSOs within the AU framework, have all had a negative impact on AMISOMs effectiveness and ability to perform its tasks.

4.4 UN takeover?

AMISOM was deployed with the intention that the UN would soon take over the responsibility for a PSO in Somalia, and that the mission would only last for a period “ideally not exceeding six months”.¹¹⁸ The mission being ‘blue-hatted’ and turned into a UN force is still an aspiration of the AU. In March 2007 the UN Secretary-General dispatched a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to Somalia to investigate the possibility of deploying a UN peace operation.¹¹⁹ Based on its findings the TAM developed two different scenarios to which the

¹¹⁴ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2007/204, 20 April 2008

¹¹⁵ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008

¹¹⁶ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2007/204, 20 April 2008 ; Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008

¹¹⁷ Security Council Report.org, ‘Somalia, April 2007’, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2620663/k.B79E/April_2007BRSo_malia.htm

¹¹⁸ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008

¹¹⁹ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2007/115 28 February 2007

Secretary-General formulated corresponding possibilities for UN engagement in Somalia. In the first scenario there would be a cessation of hostilities, a peace agreement that included external monitoring would be reached, and a security situation that allowed such monitoring and furtherance of the peace process would exist, at least within the capital. The scenario also required a reduction in spoiler activity. During these circumstances the Secretary-General envisaged it possible that the UN could be able to deploy an integrated and multidimensional peacekeeping force. In the second scenario, hostilities between the TFG and opposing elements would continue and the political process would have made insufficient progress or collapsed altogether. The instable security conditions would cause AMISOM difficulty in attempting to control the situation and conduct its operations. Under such circumstances the Secretary-General considered a UN deployment impossible, or at least inappropriate. Instead, he suggested that a peace enforcement mission undertaken by a coalition of the willing and authorised by the UN Security Council would be better suited to address such circumstances.¹²⁰ The second scenario depicted the realities on ground in Somalia. The Security Council, hesitant to send a UN operation to Somalia, agreed with the Secretary-General's findings.

Since no decision has been taken by the Security Council to authorise a UN mission the AU PSC has had to extend AMISOMs mandate for an additional sixth months on several occasions. The extensions have been endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC).¹²¹ Simultaneously with the first extension, the AU called on the UN to put in place a support package to AMISOM, focusing on financial, logistical and technical support.¹²² Later on, in August 2007, the president of the AU commission stressed the need for a UN deployment saying that "the task at hand goes far beyond the capacity of the African Union" and required urgent attention by the UNSC "which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".¹²³ Nevertheless, for the UN a UN deployment was not a viable option during the prevailing circumstances since such a force could only be "deployed in support of a political process, not

¹²⁰ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/204, 20 April 2008

¹²¹ See Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXX), 18 July 2007; Security Council Resolution S/RES/1772 (2007), 20 August 2007; Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008, Security Council Resolution S/RES/1801/2008, 20 February 2008; Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/HSG/Comm. (CXXXIX), 29 June 2008

¹²² Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXX),

¹²³ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/499, 21 August 2007

as a substitute for one”.¹²⁴ Instead it has kept reiterating the consideration of a coalition of the willing.¹²⁵

Despite its reluctance to deploy a UN mission under current conditions the UN has undertaken contingency planning for the eventuality that the situation in Somalia would change. A UN fact finding mission visited the AU Commission during January 2008. The conclusion of the mission was once more presented as different scenarios. These ranged from the belligerents entering a viable political dialogue in an otherwise continuously volatile environment; which could result in the relocation of UN political, humanitarian and developmental offices to Somalia, to a situation where the political and security arrangements have been fully consolidated, Ethiopia has withdrawn, and a UN PSO presence have been accepted by the parties to the conflict. The last scenario could result in the UN launching an operation which could amount to include up to 27 000 troops.¹²⁶ The fact-finding mission also recommended that the UNSC, in the present, consider the possibility of a maritime task force, an idea that has gained momentum, resulting in UN resolution 1816 (2008) which gives the right to states cooperating with the TFG to enter Somali territorial waters to repress piracy.¹²⁷

At the same time as the scenarios were presented, the AU Commission specified what type of logistical financial and technical support it required from the UN to sustain the mission.¹²⁸ The Secretary-General responded with a proposal for UN support which focused, among other things, on completing the deployment of AMISOM and to ensure that AMISOM is deployed, to the extent possible, according to UN standards to facilitate the re-hatting of its troops to UN peacekeepers should this be required. It also focused on building AU institutional capacity. To these ends, firstly, an additional group of UN technical advisers other than ten planners already provided by the UN (see following section) should be deployed to the AMISOM planning team at AU headquarters (HQ) and, secondly, a AU-UN donor conference should be held to enhance coordination between the AU and the TCCs and to highlight the needs of AMISOM, as well as to solicit new donors.¹²⁹ So far nothing has been decided with regards to the Secretary-General’s suggestions; however, the Secretary-

¹²⁴ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2007/381, 25 June 2007

¹²⁵ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2007/566, 6 September 2007

¹²⁶ Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2008/178, 14 March 2008

¹²⁷ Security Council Resolution S/RES/1816(2008), 2 June 2008

¹²⁸ For a detailed list see Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2008/178, 14 March 2008

¹²⁹ Security Council, ‘Letter from Secretary-General to President of Security Council’, S/2008/309, 8 May 2008

General reports that the UN Secretariat is working in collaboration with the AU to further these aims.¹³⁰

In June 2008 an agreement between the TFG and the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) was concluded in Djibouti and formally signed the following month. In accordance with the agreement a ceasefire was to start in September, with the requirement that an international stabilisation force (from friendly countries, excluding neighbouring states), authorised by the UN, deploy within 120 days and that Ethiopian troops withdraw from Somalia upon the arrival of a sufficient number of UN peacekeepers.¹³¹ It remains to be seen what impact this agreement will have. Several months later the ceasefire still has not been implemented and the talks have deadlocked over the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. Nonetheless, the Security Council has stated the commitment of the UN to support the implementation of the Djibouti agreement, and that the Secretariat is planning UN support for an international stabilisation force and carrying forwards contingency planning for a UN peacekeeping presence in Somalia.¹³² The Secretary-General also noted in July that a significant progress towards creating the kind of viable peace process that a UN mission could be deployed in support of, had been made with the advancements of the Djibouti talks.¹³³ Regardless of any advances, UN representatives have noted that the UN would struggle to find countries willing to supply troops to a mission in Somalia, given its past history with peacekeeping.¹³⁴ The Secretary-General has argued that the generation of troops will be dependent on the demonstrated commitment to the peace agreement and the implementation of the ceasefire.¹³⁵ As of yet, the Djibouti agreement has not contributed to improve the security situation in Somalia and the expectations on the agreement remain low considering the many peace agreements reached in previous years, amounting to very little in terms of Somali peace and security.

¹³⁰ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

¹³¹ Ibid APF. 2008. 'AU extends Somalia mission but asks UN to take over'. Daily Star, 2 July.

¹³² Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2008/33, 4 September 2008

¹³³ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

¹³⁴ Security Council, 'Report of the Security Council mission', S/2008/460, 15 July 2008

¹³⁵ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

5 Strengthening AU PSO capacities

The AU has been characterised by big ambitions and deficient resources since its formation.¹³⁶ The same observations can be applied to its Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The AU has limited capacity to both plan and manage operations and its PSOs have been characterised not only by slow deployment but also by unclear mandates, concepts of operations and command structures. Many of the challenges of AMISOM have also been experienced by the AU's previous missions; AMIB and AMIS. When discussing how the capacity of the AU can be strengthened to improve how its PSOs are undertaken, the conclusions apply not only to AMISOM but to AU PSOs in general. This section therefore features thoughts on the future of AU PSOs and how AU operations can be strengthened in general, albeit with special reference to AMISOM. Major challenges face the AU as a young organisation, amongst the two most important; the need to strengthen headquarters capacity to manage PSOs and the task of finding external resources to compensate the organisation's inability to, logistically and financially, sustain its operations. The following section will investigate the support needed to strengthen AU capacities to undertake successful PSOs, and evaluate the assistance already given. The section is divided into two parts; the first outlines the need to directly supporting the organisation itself, and the second explores the assistance required by the troop contributing countries.

5.1 Strengthening AU management of operations: Support from the international community

5.1.1 Poor institutional ability to manage operations

The number of staff employed by the AU is comparatively small in relation to the organisation's ambitions, and personnel often carry multiple responsibilities. The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), responsible for planning, managing and deploying AU PSOs, as well as conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction, has only nine staff members.¹³⁷ This can be compared to

¹³⁶ High Level Panel of the Audit of the African Union, 'Audit of the African Union', African Union Addis Ababa 18 December 2007

¹³⁷ Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, p. 3

the some 630 personnel employed by the UNs Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).¹³⁸ Given the difficult conditions for the AU staff, tasks frequently outweigh capacity. In addition, whilst recruitment is an option, in reality much of the competence required is not always available in Africa, but has ventured out of the continent. Where the needed competencies have remained in Africa, they have most likely been employed elsewhere than within the poorly resourced AU. As a result, the responsibility to foresee and plan a mission, support the deployment of troops and equipment, and manage the operation throughout its lifespan, has been a task difficult for the organisation to achieve with its limited resources. It has been argued that the organisation needs a larger number of specialists and expertise, along with more general staff, better internal coordination and clearer lines of responsibility; as well as increased funding for its programmes.¹³⁹

5.1.2 AU dependency on outside assistance

Dependency on external financing is one core challenge of the AU. The organisation is heavily dependent on external resources and financing to sustain its functions, this is the case also with its PSOs. When outside partners have lent financial support to AU PSOs, it has often been aimed at strengthening direct operations, leaving AU institutional capacity undeveloped.¹⁴⁰ Recommendations have therefore been made for increased coordination between AU planners and the DPKO, staff exchanges to increase competences of civilian staff, and lending of UN expertise to AU headquarters to facilitate the development of stronger planning cells and to build greater institutional capacity.¹⁴¹

AU officials still stress the idea of 'African solutions to African problems'. Yet, the desire for external assistance has been voiced repeatedly during the establishment of AMISOM. In particular, the AU has sought assistance to strengthening AU strategic level management of operations, to enable the AU to carry out its AMISOM responsibilities as well as manage future PSOs. For the most part the AU has turned to the UN to request assistance, putting pressure on the UNSC to grant a UN support package to the AU. In doing so it has asked the

¹³⁸ Bogland et al. 2008. *The African Union*, p. 24

¹³⁹ Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 68

¹⁴⁰ Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, pp. 3-4

¹⁴¹ Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 68

UNSC to bear in mind the many constraints of the AU and the refusal of the UN to replace AMISOM with a UN operation.¹⁴² The UN agreed in early 2007 to dispatch ten military, police and civilian experts to AU HQ to assist with AMISOM planning and management.¹⁴³ The experts were to form a part of a new Strategic Management and Planning Unit (SMPU) for AMISOM to be staffed by the AU, UN and partners jointly, totalling a number of 35 personnel.¹⁴⁴ By the end of September 2007 all ten UN planners had arrived and had assisted the AU in revising the AMISOM concept of operations, as well as providing briefings to a reconnaissance mission sent by Burundi to prepare for the deployment of its first load of troops.¹⁴⁵

Simultaneously with the establishment of the SMPU the AU also called on the UN to put in place a support package to AMISOM.¹⁴⁶ In the beginning of 2008, the AU commission, upon the request of the Secretary-General, outlined the specificities of the envisaged support package. The package included logistical and technical support, such as provision of staff and advisors, plus \$800 million in financial assistance.¹⁴⁷

5.1.3 Differing views on UN-AU relations

Some Security Council members, namely France, the UK and Russia, have opposed using UN means to finance AU missions, arguing that the UN's already scarce resources should be used to manage its own operations and not in support of activities by other organisations.¹⁴⁸ Other states, notably African members and Italy, have urged the UNSC to respond favourably to the request for support.¹⁴⁹ Uganda has openly complained of double standards, pointing to UN support for the AU mission in Darfur.¹⁵⁰ In general, the permanent members and other non-African states have rather supported the establishment of a voluntary multi-donor

¹⁴² Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/204, 20 April 2007; Security Council, Meeting Records, S/PV/5858, 20 March 2008

¹⁴³ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/204, 20 April 2007

¹⁴⁴ Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, p. 3

¹⁴⁵ Security Council, 'Letter dated 20 September 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council', S/2007/566

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

¹⁴⁷ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/178, 14 March 2008

¹⁴⁸ Security Council Report.org, Somalia, April 2007,

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2620663/k.B79E/April_2007BRSo_malia.htm

¹⁴⁹ Security Council Report.org, Somalia, 2 May 2008,

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.4096805/>

¹⁵⁰ Security Council, Meeting Records, S/PV/5858, 20 March 2008

trust fund for AMISOM as its main funding mechanism.¹⁵¹ In April 2008 the UNSC, through resolution 1809, stated that it recognised that cooperation with regional organisations could improve collective security and welcomed AU peace initiatives. However, it also recognised the difficulty in using UN assessed contributions to fund regional organisations and pointed out that regional organisations have the responsibility to secure the human, financial and logistical resources needed for their own organisations.¹⁵²

Whilst the debate continues, the Secretary-General has presented a proposal for UN support to AMISOM. The proposal focuses on allowing the AU to carry out its AMISOM responsibilities, as well as ensuring that the mission is deployed to UN standards to facilitate a swift transition to a UN mission should such a mission materialise. It envisages the sending of seven additional technical advisors, pending budgetary approval by the General Assembly, to the SMPU in response to the immediate needs of the AU. In addition, these and the experts already present will help build long-term institutional capacities to better allow the AU to plan and undertake future PSOs.¹⁵³ The Secretary-General does not mention the \$800 million financial assistance requested, but rather proposes that the organisations together set up working-level meetings with countries that have vowed to contribute troops and donations to follow up on their outstanding pledges. He also called on the UN and AU to jointly host a donor conference to highlight the needs of AMISOM, coordinate with TCCs and other contributors, and attract new donors.¹⁵⁴ While, as to date, none of these proposals have materialised, the UN secretariat claims to be working closely with the AU to take these steps forwards.¹⁵⁵

5.1.4 UN support to AMISOM and the AU

The AU and UN are working to better coordinate activities and facilitate a relationship of mutual benefit between the organisations. Before 2005, UN support to AU PSOs were provided on an ad hoc basis.¹⁵⁶ Since 2005, however, the UN has operated an assistance cell at AU HQ to provide technical support to

¹⁵¹ Security Council Report.org, Somalia, 2 May 2008, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.4096805/>

¹⁵² Security Council Resolution S/RES/1809 (2008), 16 April 2008.

¹⁵³ Security Council, 'Letter from Secretary-General to President of Security Council', S/2008/309, 8 May 2008

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

¹⁵⁵ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

¹⁵⁶ Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 3

AMIS, and now does the same for AMISOM. Other permanent measures for coordination and support have also been established since then, although most remain at embryonic stages. In 2006, for example, the UN established a Peace Support Team with offices at both AU and UN HQs. The UN office serves as a focal point of the UN and its DPKO to build AU peacekeeping capacity and support the development of the African Standby Force (ASF). The Addis office seeks to build AU HQ and field capacity for planning, deploying and managing PSOs.¹⁵⁷ The AU and UN are currently undertaking a study on the needs and requirements of the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) to manage ongoing and future PSOs in the long-term. When the study is completed the DPKOs Support Team will work with the PSOD towards implementing the findings and strengthen the organisation's capacity.¹⁵⁸

5.1.5 Still not meeting the needs of the AU

Declarations and resolutions on enhancing AU-UN cooperation point out the desire to strengthen the relationship between the UN and the AU and underscore the importance of cooperation, but do not otherwise specify the nature of their relationship.¹⁵⁹ Whilst more regular and robust support for the AU is being provided, it has been argued that the UN still lacks a 'strategic vision' for what it wants to achieve by its assistance to AU peace and security capabilities, not to mention clear and undivided support of member states for the provision of such assistance.¹⁶⁰ This has led, as argued, to an inconsistency in the UNs approach.

Chapter VIII of the UN charter, discussing regional arrangements, allows for the existence of regional peace and security actors but does not require cooperation with, or financial or other support of, such arrangements.¹⁶¹ Whilst it allows for PSOs authorised by the UNSC but lead by other organisations, it clearly is not designed to support and sustain such operations. An AU mission does not qualify the use of UN funding or support of the UN Secretariat, as expressed in UNSC resolution 1809 (2003).¹⁶² Even so, the UN decided to support the AU mission to

¹⁵⁷ Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, pp. 5-6

¹⁵⁸ Security Council, 'Letter from Secretary-General to President of Security Council', S/2008/309, 8 May 2008

¹⁵⁹ Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations, 'Declaration enhancing AU-UN cooperation', <http://aumission-ny.org/declaration.htm>; General Assembly, Resolution on Cooperation between the United Nations and African Union, A/RES/61/296. 5 October 2007

¹⁶⁰ Holt, V & M. Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 3

¹⁶¹ United Nations, 'Charter of the United Nations', <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

¹⁶² Security Council Resolution S/RES/1809 (2008), 16 April 2008.

Darfur (AMIS) during its deployment. The ability to provide such support, however, required a creative interpretation of UN legal codes and the establishment of a special UN political mission that would have the authority to use UN resources.¹⁶³ Using UN resources to support the AU is therefore neither easy nor self-evident. Yet, considering the UN's relative expertise, resources and experience, along with its unwillingness to undertake a mission in Somalia itself, some feel that the UN has an obligation to support AMISOM, as well as other AU PSO, and argue that the UN should establish formal processes for such cooperation.

The sentiment within the AU is that the two organisations have a complimentary role to play. The UN is the institution with the primary responsibility for peace and security, but the AU has its own moral and legal obligation on the African continent. Where the UN has inhibitions about getting directly involved in a conflict zone, such as Somalia – where its caution to great extent depends on previous experience, the AU is ready to intervene and carry its task. In instances where the AU can commence a PSO but due to institutional constraints will not be able to successfully carry out the mission in the long-term, it would expect the UN to take over the mission, or provide the support needed to make it effective.¹⁶⁴ Officials within the AU, however, argue that the support given to the AU, as well as that proposed by the Secretary-General in response to the requested support package, is insufficient. Whilst the AU has asked for a range of resources to sustain AMISOM, such as equipment, communication systems, setting up of camps and headquarters, as well as other logistical support and funding, the Secretary-General's tender was limited to offering a range of planning staff. Within the AU the offer is described as a “drop in the ocean”, the sentiment being that the AU does not only need planners, but also financial and logistical support without which the planners are then redundant.¹⁶⁵ The AU has already had UN provided planners available for over a year and whilst such support could be meaningful, it presently is not. At the current stage the AU is not able to translate the planning into tangibles on ground because it does not have access to the support systems required to do so. Bluntly, the AU still lacks most of the resources needed to implement the planning, making the planning redundant since the mission on the ground is not supported by it. Instead of merely offering more planners, representatives within the AU argue, the UN should seek to provide the support required to absorb the assistance of the

¹⁶³ Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 62

¹⁶⁴ Telephone interview, former Head of AU Peace Support Operations Division. 20 August 2008.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

already provided planners. That is, assist in building the resources needed to implement the planning, for example.¹⁶⁶ In the meantime the AU must rely on assistance from other partners or otherwise leave AMISOM continuously ill-resourced and deficiently supported.

5.2 The Burundi Model: Assisting the TCCs

5.2.1 Reintroducing the Burundi model

As stated earlier, it had been decided that the TCCs would need to be logistically self-sustaining for the first months of the deployment during the AU mission to Burundi.¹⁶⁷ Since few of the TCCs could actually manage self-sustenance, outside partners such as the US and UK came to support the deployments of participating troops. Nevertheless, the Burundi Model of TCC self-sustainment has become a recurrent theme of the AUs PSOs.¹⁶⁸

When the AU PSC authorised AMISOM it was decided that the new mission too should be based on the Burundi model. TCCs were expected to be self-sustaining for the duration of the mission, including providing for the equipment and services they themselves would need during their deployment. Costs incurred during deployment would be reimbursed to TCCs by the AU as soon funding eventually became available, but the AU has not specified or made any commitments regarding when this will happen.¹⁶⁹ Displaying that the PSC did not assume that contingents would actually be ‘self-sustaining’ the PSC also stated that the AU Commission should assist in mobilising logistical support for the TCCs.¹⁷⁰ Effectively, the use of the Burundi model would merely move the responsibility for the provision of sustenance away from the AU, which did not have the capacity to administer such responsibilities. The PSC also recognised that the deployment of AMISOM would be dependent on the willingness of the international community to provide, “in a predictable and coordinated manner,

¹⁶⁶ Telephone interview, former Head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008.

¹⁶⁷ Aboagye, F. 2004. ‘The African Mission in Burundi: lessons learnt from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation’. *Conflict Trends* 2:2004, p. 13; E-mail correspondence with the Head of the AU Operations and Support Unit, 9 July 2008; Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Burundi*

¹⁶⁸ E-mail correspondence with the of the AU Operations and Support Unit, 9 July 2008

¹⁶⁹ Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué’, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007;

Telephone interview, former Head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008.

¹⁷⁰ Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson’, PSC/PR/2(LXIX), 19 January 2007

financial, technical and logistical support to the TCCs".¹⁷¹ This phrasing is very important; during AMIB confusion arose in regards to what was actually contributed to TCCs by partners, and to whom. AU staffers had therefore requested that coordination between donors be improved, and that the AU be informed of any bilateral arrangements between TCCs and partners. The lack of such coordination had caused problems when TCCs who had received support from donors still requested reimbursement from the AU and risked being provided double reimbursements.¹⁷² The AU also requested that donors clearly indicate their willingness to support the mission, and timely fulfil any commitments they had made.

5.2.2 Burundi model consequences on troop contribution

An AU staff worker reports that the AU, in accordance with agreements signed with TCCs, reimburse every AMISOM soldier at a rate of US\$500 per month. Other than that, TCCs are fully responsible for their command structures and deployment. Generating troops, he argues, is not a difficulty for TCCs, rather the big challenge is training, financing and logistics, for which the TCCs have to look to partners.¹⁷³ However, the difficulty of generating troops might be more prevalent than the AU has expected; AMISOM only ever received pledges of little more than half the number of troops actually authorised. One unintended consequence of the Burundi model might be that TCCs, faced with the model's promise of 'eventual reimbursement', when able, prioritise participation in e.g. UN operations, where reimbursement is instant. Considering the difficulty TCCs have faced in attempting to deploy even those troops pledged, the argument that the biggest challenge is to move troops to where they are needed and keep them supplied, is valid. Yet, the unintended consequences that arise when relying on the Burundi model are worrisome and have great effects on the AU venture as many African states are as little resourceful as the AU itself.

The chair of the AU Commission has noted, with great concern, that few AU member states have provided support, if even symbolic, to AMISOM. He also noted that management of PSOs based on voluntary, and therefore unpredictable, contributions may not be viable, and that the Commission therefore should consider exploring other alternatives.¹⁷⁴ That the AU would take over the

¹⁷¹ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2(LXIX), 19 January 2007

¹⁷² E-mail correspondence with the Head of the Operations and Support Unit within the Peace Support Operations Division of the AU, 9 July 2008

¹⁷³ IRIN, 'Somalia: A turtous road ahead in search of peace', 13 March 2007,

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/157f219de83e61803c7259d3c256f0fe.htm>

¹⁷⁴ Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008

responsibility for sustaining TCCs is not a viable option. Rather AU TCCs are dependent on more steady support from outside actors.

5.2.3 AU difficulties in managing outside assistance

The AU's inability to sustain TCCs and provide mission support is not only a consequence of not having access to enough funding and resources but also because the AU does not have the institutional capacity to carry such a responsibility.¹⁷⁵ This would be the case even if funding was available: "even if funding existed the AU does not have the capacity to turn dollar figures into resources".¹⁷⁶

The Swedish Foreign Ministry provided the AU with US\$ 1.5 million in December 2007 in support of AMISOM. The AU indicated that they wanted to use the money for needed hospital equipment, specifically a field hospital at UN standard level II.¹⁷⁷ Whilst appreciative of donations the AU often finds it difficult to administer such support. While, countries like Sweden show a great deal of goodwill in their assistance to the AU, the AU often is not able to absorb support and utilise it. At the moment the pace within the AU is just too slow and internal systems need to improve before the union can make the best use of donations.¹⁷⁸ It is not a question of not having enough money, rather of how the AU utilises the money given. Donations often result in additional work for already overworked staff and at this point the AU often does not even have the vigour to withdraw the money from the bank, knowing that doing so will overburden the organisation. Besides that, the AU often struggles to account for donations given as it simply does not have the capacity to provide for detailed descriptions of its expenditures.¹⁷⁹ The current situation, which risks promoting corruption and straining other AU assets, is not sustainable. Rather than donations, the AU has requested more tangible contributions: donors could for example ensure that hospitals, or whatever is needed, are built themselves, either by own means or by the hiring of contractors.¹⁸⁰

Hence, it could be argued that other states should do more to assist the AU to build the institutional capacity needed to properly administer its PSOs. Such support is important and efforts to strengthening AU institutional capacity are

¹⁷⁵ Telephone interview, former Head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008

¹⁷⁶ Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/178, 14 March 2008

¹⁷⁷ Utrikesdepartementet. 2007. Pressmeddelande 07 December, 'Utbetalning av stöd till den Afrikanska Unionens insats i Somalia'

¹⁷⁸ Telephone interview, former Head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008.

¹⁷⁹ Telephone interview, Defence Attaché, Swedish Embassy Addis Ababa, 22 August 2008

¹⁸⁰ Telephone interview, Defence Attaché, Swedish Embassy Addis Ababa, 22 August 2008

currently underway.¹⁸¹ However, the sentiment within the AU is that the lack of AU institutional capacity is not a problem which can be solved by having outside actors throwing money at it. The former head of the AU Peace Support Operations Division, for example, argues that most of the AU's problems are completely internal and cannot be solved by the direct means of outside actors.¹⁸² Issues such as organisational infrastructure, rules, internal procedures, management of funding, decision-making procedures and poor availability of required competences within Africa face the organisation. These are essentially not financial and need to be worked out with and between member states. The UN has had some 60+ years to find solutions to the same kind of issues. The AU now needs to do the same thing, but officials within the organisation argue that the AU has a responsibility to the African continent to do it much faster.¹⁸³ In the meantime the emphasis of the AU is on having other states help it provide the mission support it itself is unable to provide.

5.2.4 Supporting the Burundi model through bilateral arrangements

Based on the findings above, the Burundi model is the only pragmatic alternative for the AU; however, improvements could be made by the provision of more reliable and predictable support from AU partners. Other than logistic support and sustenance during the mission, pre-deployment training and equipment can be supplied to individual member states by one or several international partners, as a result of bilateral agreements. A suggestion presented to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs outlines a proposal for such direct support to selected African states in support of its participation in PSOs.¹⁸⁴ It argues that one or several international partners could supply equipment and training to a particular unit. Once the unit has been verified ready for deployment it should be used within the framework of an AU/or UN mission.¹⁸⁵ The proposal also states that such bilateral agreements are an important way of substantially supporting

¹⁸¹ See for example the European Union's support programme to the AU: African Union Commission-European Union Commission, 'Support programme to the African Union (55M €)', <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2006/October/EU-AU/060828%20AU%20Supp%20Prog%20summary%5Bfinal%5D.pdf>

¹⁸² Telephone interview, former head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008.

¹⁸³ Ibid

¹⁸⁴ See Hansson, Percy. 2007. *Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet*, nr 14. 'AU, TCCs och Sverige: förslag om intensifierat samarbete inom fred och säkerhet'. 27 February 2007; Hansson, Percy. 2007. *Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet*, nr 14. Bilaga, 'Burundimodellen'. 27 February 2007

¹⁸⁵ Hansson, Percy. 2007. *Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet*, nr 14. Bilaga, 'Burundimodellen'. 27 February 2007

African peace efforts and will give international partners an increased standing and status within African communities and greater influence in African peace and security matters.¹⁸⁶ Many programmes are already in place to support African peace operations capacities: the US Global Peace Operations Initiative aimed at training 40,000 African peacekeepers by 2009, the EU's African Peace Facility, and a range of other programmes run by states such as the UK, France and Canada.¹⁸⁷ Yet, only few states have directly supported the upholding of the Burundi model.¹⁸⁸

Considering this dependency on external assistance, the phrasing "African Solutions to African Problems" might not be suitable to describe the AU's peacekeeping capacity. One fear is that sustaining AU PSOs might become someone's tool for furthering a national agenda.¹⁸⁹ Commentators have argued that external actors should limit themselves to provide finance, logistics, capacity building and political support without seeking to control the mission. If they want to become more involved in PSOs in Africa, they could commit troops directly to a UN operation.¹⁹⁰ The issue of hiding agendas is something to be aware of. Yet, without such bilateral donations few African states would be able to participate in AU PSOs at all. The African Union's role as a peace and security actor is rapidly expanding, along with requests for AU PSOs. The AU nurses the concept of 'African solutions' and therefore requires that PSOs are undertaken by African TCCs. The Burundi model has been portrayed as a way for otherwise inadequately resourced states to undertake peace support missions with assistance from external actors, but still maintain operational responsibility of the mission. In that view the advantage of the Burundi model is the safeguarding of African ownership and that Africans conduct PSOs on their own soil; with the benefit that command corresponds to the norms, terminology and tactic that is appropriate in the context of an African environment.

5.2.5 African solutions, worldly means

Amongst some observers the model has, however, reinforced the perception that there is an international division of labour forming in relation to PSOs. In recent

¹⁸⁶ Hansson, Percy. 2007. *Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet, nr 14. 'AU, TCCs och Sverige: förslag om intensifierat samarbete inom fred och säkerhet'*. 27 February 2007

¹⁸⁷ Ekengard, Arvid. 2008. *African Union Mission in Sudan: experiences and lessons learnt*. FOI Report 2559

¹⁸⁸ Telephone interview, former Head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008; Hansson, Percy. 2007. *Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet, nr 14. 'AU, TCCs och Sverige: förslag om intensifierat samarbete inom fred och säkerhet'*. 27 February 2007.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ Von Gienanth. 2007. *Asian, European and African policies*.

years, UN peacekeeping missions have noticed a trend of peacekeeping more often being performed by peacekeepers from underequipped, ill-prepared developing countries whilst the nations with the best equipped and skilled armies have been reluctant to put their soldiers at risk, rather choosing to provide equipment and other resources, or just covering the costs for the operation.¹⁹¹ Whilst some applaud the support given, primarily by Western countries, to the AU and its member states to help overcome the significant challenges and gaps facing the organisation, others view the support differently. Some observers have, for example, argued that Western states have merely encouraged the AU “to take on the burden of peacekeeping in places where Western forces are not willing to deploy and to take on tasks beyond the AUs capabilities”.¹⁹²

If African states have the political will to undertake PSOs in Africa, as well as troops available to do it, then that is the most appropriate way of addressing African conflicts. However, the basis of this division of labour, where Africans undertake missions supported by outside states, is that partners assist African states in supplying the same kind of equipment and develop the same kind of standards needed to ensure the same kind of safety as they would to their own troops. The idea is that bilateral partners place the same requirements on African troops as they would place on their own, but that they also supply them with the same resources and proficiency as their national armies. This would be the case not just in terms of logistics, but also in areas such as human rights training and gender issues.¹⁹³ To argue then, as some have, that Western states merely sit back whilst Africans take all the risks, a Swedish military representative in Africa argues, is an immature argument. If the same standards can be achieved then there is no reason for Western states themselves to act. Rather, if they would insist on intervening themselves, he states, it would merely constitute another impingement of Africa.¹⁹⁴ In that sense the aspiration that African problems are to be dealt with by Africans is not to be argued with. If the standard of African units can be guaranteed to reach certain benchmarks then ‘African solutions’ is clearly the best approach. Intervention by non-African states always risks being accused of neo-colonialism, and by supporting the Burundi model, external states can at least disprove the allegation that there is no political will to engage in Africa. If such support does not exist, however, states like Sweden can do little to defend against the claims that they are merely sending African peacekeepers into ‘the lion’s den’. It is clear that the burden of keeping the peace

¹⁹¹ Singer, Peter. 2003. ‘Peacekeepers, Inc.’ *Policy Review*.

¹⁹² Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007, pp. 8-9

¹⁹³ Telephone interview, Defence Attaché, Swedish Embassy Addis Ababa, 22 August 2008

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

in Africa is a responsibility to be shared amongst many states, yet it is vitally important to maintain African ownership of AU peace and security structures.

6 Concluding remarks

AMISOM has clearly displayed the challenges facing the AU in terms of establishing and supporting African PSOs. It has been plagued not only by a failure to obtain pledges of participation from member states, but also by an inability to swiftly deploy the troops available. As a result AMISOM has remained far too small to actually accomplish its task or have a real effect on the security situation in Somalia. Most of the challenges facing AMISOM have been present in the AUs previous peacekeeping experiences as well. Lack of resources, capacity and funding, leading to poor mission and institutional capacity to manage operations have prevented AMISOM, just as AMIB and AMIS, from fully implementing its mandate.¹⁹⁵ Experiences from AMIB also point out the pragmatics behind the Burundi Model, as well as the challenges of its unintended consequences. Furthermore, AMIB displayed the AUs intent of acting like a bridge before the larger international community, embodied by the UN, was able to take over responsibility.¹⁹⁶ This intended division of labour was reiterated during both AMIS and AMISOM, displaying a clear pattern in AU thinking regarding its ambition and capacity. The balances between tasks and resources mandated to AMISOM and AMIS might have been reasonable had all resources been accessible and the missions relived by a UN operations within the recommended time-period. Since neither happened, the operations remained too small to accomplish their tasks.¹⁹⁷ Nonetheless, like its previous missions AMISOM is also a sign of the AUs ambition to engage in complex conflicts on its own continent. In Somalia it has ventured into a situation most other peace and security organisations have sought to avoid.

The experiences tell that structural weaknesses have remained throughout the first three missions conducted by the AU. They also present a bleak perspective on the next chapter of the evolvement of AU peacekeeping. Lessons may have been both noted and learnt, but the AU still has not generated the ability to appropriately address them.

It is obvious that one of the biggest issues is the inability of the AU to sustain troops participating in its mission. As a result, it has struggled with obtaining pledges for the authorised troops as well as deploying troops volunteered. The biggest lesson learnt from AMISOM within the AU is that AU institutional capacity needs to improve quicker or future PSOs undertaken by the Union risks merely being repeats of AMISOM. The second biggest lesson learnt is that

¹⁹⁵ Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Burundi*, p. 16.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 17

¹⁹⁷ Ekengard, Arvid. 2008. *African Union Mission in Sudan*, p. 43

funding for peacekeeping is not easy to obtain, especially when the recipient institution is weak.¹⁹⁸ To sustain and develop AU capacity to conduct PSOs two things need to happen. Firstly the organisations institutional capacity needs to be strengthened in the long-term and secondly, AU member states need to be provided with the resources needed to enable their successful participation in AU PSOs. The task of developing AU institutional capacity is a difficult one. Because many of the challenges impeding the development of the AU are internal to the organisation they need to be principally dealt with from within. Assistance from outside states can therefore be a sensitive issue and a task that might be better placed at the hands of the UN, which has undergone similar transformation.

Whilst the development of institutional capacity is a priority, little can be done in this area by terms of external support. Rather the AU is asking for the international community to support countries deploying to AU PSOs with funding, equipment and sustenance. The ability of TCCs to deploy reinforces the AUs agenda and is the pragmatic way of supporting the Union in its peace and security endeavour. Long-term institution building is important but the priority within the organisation now is simply to make TCCs deployable.¹⁹⁹ The AU has not received the support requested from the UN. Assistance from other states, although well-meaning, has sometimes also been misguided. It needs to be ensured that the aid given to the AU is the most appropriate for its current needs. To this end, the best way for other states wishing to support the AU is to outline and implement support for TCCs and/or provide direct mission support. The existence of available African military units that are well-equipped, trained, mobile and otherwise resourced is essential for AU PSOs and an urgent need in Somalia, as well as Darfur for example. The AU is idealised as an 'African Solution to African problems'. In reality, nonetheless, external support is needed to create such qualified and modern units which are required but otherwise lacking. With such assistance from external states, the AU may be able to maintain the concept of 'African solutions to African problems' whilst at the same time successfully undertake PSOs. This would require a great commitment from states that possess the financial resources as well as military skills and capability required to provide the needed support. Yet, with the existence of such units, there is a great potential of African troops saving many lives in places like Somalia and in and around Darfur. States with these resources, either alone or jointly, need to identify suitable partners, explore the needs and requirements for forming a peacekeeping unit or component, and plan and implement the

¹⁹⁸ Telephone interview, former head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

support needed to reinforce the unit to the standard required. At the present time, this is the most appropriate way of supporting African Union PSOs.

Abbreviations

AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EASBRIG	Eastern African Standby Brigade
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
FLS	Front Line States
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority for Development
IGASOM	IGAD Mission in Somalia
LAS	League of Arab States
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSSP	National Security and Stabilisation Plan
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PSC	AU Peace and Security Council
PSO	AU Peace Support Operations
PSOD	AU Peace and Security Operations Division

SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCIC	Supreme Council of Islamic Courts
SICC	Supreme Islamic Courts Council
SICS	Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia
SMPU	Support Management and Planning Unit
SNA	Somali National Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SMSG	UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TFG	Transitional Federal government
TFI	Transitional Federal Institution
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNG	Transitional National Government
TOR	Terms of Reference
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress

References

Aboagye, F. 2004. 'The African Mission in Burundi: lessons learnt from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation'. *Conflict Trends* 2:2004

African Union, 'AU Member States', <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/memberstates/map.htm>

African Union, 'Constitutive Act of the African Union', Article 4h. http://www.africa-union.org/about_AU/abConstitutive_Act.htm#Article4

African Union, 'Peace and Security Directorate', http://www.africa-union.org/Structure_of_the_commission/depPEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20Directorate.htm

African Union Commission – European Union Commission, 'Support programme to the African Union (55M €)', <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2006/October/EU-AU/060828%20AU%20Supp%20Prog%20summary%5Bfinal%5D.pdf>

Andrew, K & V. Holt. 2007. *United Nations- African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*. Henry L. Stimson Centre, Issue Brief August 2007

Amnesty International, 'Somalia: protection of civilians must be priority', Public Statement, AFR 52/009/2007 (Public), 24 April 2007

APF. 2008. 'AU extends Somalia mission but asks UN to take over'. *Daily Star*, 2 July.

Baxter, Z. 'Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts', http://www.clocksandclouds.org/issue_two_articles/ITC%20Somalia%20and%20the%20UIC.pdf

BBC News, 'Aid groups mull leaving Somalia', 14 July 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7505135.stm>

BBC News, 'Burundi delays Somali deployment', 7 August 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6935033.stm>

BBC News, 'AU peacekeepers mired in Somalia', 24 September 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7633625.stm>

Bogland, K et al. 2008. '*The African Union – A study Focusing on Conflict Management*'. FOI Report FOI-R- -2475- SE

Botha, A. 2007. 'Somalia: Africa's Iraq?'. *ISS Today*, 15 March 2007

- Cornwell, R. 2006. 'Somalia: Distorting Reality?' *African Security Review*. 15:12
- De Coning, C. 2004. 'Refining the African Standby Concept'. *Conflict Trends* 2:2004
- Doyle, M & N. Sambanis. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton University Press: Princeton
- Ekengard, Arvid. 2008. *African Union Mission in Sudan: experiences and lessons learnt*. FOI Report 2559
- Elmi, A.A & A. Barise. 2006. 'The Somali conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peacebuilding Strategies'. *African Security Review* 15.1
- Francis, David. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Ashgate
- General Assembly, 'Resolution on Cooperation between the United Nations and African Union', A/RES/61/296. 5 October 2007
- Von Gienanth, T. 2007. *Asian, European and African Policies, Practices and Lessons Learned in Peace Operations in Africa: An Indian-European Dialogue in the Context of the German EU Presidency 2007*. Centre for International Peace Operations Report
- Hansson, Percy. 2007. Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet, nr 14. 'AU, TCCs och Sverige: förslag om intensifierat samarbete inom fred och säkerhet'. 27 February 2007. Ref Tomas Wiklund
- Hansson, Percy. 2007. Telemeddelande Utrikesdepartementet, nr 14. Bilaga, 'Burundimodellen'. 27 February 2007.
- Heitman, R. 2007. 'South Africa too stretched to send troops to Somalia'. *Janes's Defence Weekly*. 44:5
- High Level Panel of the Audit of the African Union, 'Audit of the African Union', African Union Addis Ababa 18 December 2007.
- History World, 'History of Somalia', <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad20>
- Holt, V & M, Shanahan. 2005. *African Capacity Building for Peace Operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC

- Human Rights Watch, 'HRW Letter to UN Security Council on Upcoming Mission to Africa', 12 June 2007, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/12/africa16144.htm>
- IGAD, 'Communiqué on Somalia'. 31 January 2005
- IGAD, 'Joint Communiqué'. 12 June 2005
- IGAD, 'Communiqué'. 5 September 2006
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2008. 'Conflict in Somalia: Faint Hope of Resolution'. *Strategic Comments* 15:4
- IRIN, 'Somalia: A turtous road ahead in search of peace', 13 March 2007, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/157f219de83e61803c7259d3c256f0fe.htm>
- Levine, D. 2008. *African Civilian police Capacity for International Peacekeeping Operations*. Henry L. Stimson Centre: Washington DC, p. 17
- Mulugeta, A. 2008. 'Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa', *International Peacekeeping*
- Murithi, Tim. 2008. 'The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia'. *African Security Review* 17:1
- NATO. 'Nato's assistance to the African Union in Somalia', 2 April 2008, <http://www.nato.int/issues/au-somalia/index.html>
- NATO, 'NATO supporting African Union's missions' Press Release (2008)018, 1 February 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-018e.html>
- Organization of African Unity, 'Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter', <http://www.oau-creation.com/OAU%20Charter.htm>
- Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (XXII), 5 January 2005
- Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXII), 5 January 2005
- Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), 7 February 2005
- Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (XXIX), 12 May 2005

- Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIX), 12 May 2005
- Peace and Security Council, 'Information Note on the Situation in Somalia', PSC/PR/2(LV), 17 June 2006
- Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2(LXIX), 19 January 2007
- Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007
- Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (LXXX) 18 July 2007
- Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXX), 18 July 2007
- Peace and Security Council, 'Report of the Chairperson', PSC/PR/2 (CV), 18 January 2008
- Peace and Security Council, 'Communiqué', PSC/HSG/Comm. (CXXXIX), 29 June 2008
- Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the United Nations, 'Declaration enhancing AU-UN cooperation', <http://aumission-ny.org/declaration.htm>
- Peter-Baker, D. 2007. 'The AU standby Force and the Challenge of Somalia'. *African Security Review* 16:2
- Reuters, 'Convoy Ambushed as Peacekeepers Deploy to Somalia', 12 October 2008, <http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnLC005811.html>
- Reuters, 'Insurgents Attack African Union Troops in Mogadishu', 13 October 2008, <http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnLD336065.html>
- Security Council Resolution S/RES 733(1992), 'Imposition of Arms Embargo'. 23 January 1992.
- Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1725(2006), 6 December 2006
- Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1744 (2007), 21 February 2007
- Security Council Resolution S/RES/1772 (2007), 20 August 2007
- Security Council Resolution S/RES/1801/2008, 20 February 2008
- Security Council Resolution S/RES/1809 (2008), 16 April 2008.

Security Council Resolution S/RES/1816 (2008), 2 June 2008

Security Council. 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2005/89 18 February 2005

Security Council. 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2005/392, 16 June 2005

Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2005/32, 14 July 2005

Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2006/11, 15 March 2006

Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2008/33, 4 September 2008

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2006/418, 20 June 2006

Security Council. 'Report of the Secretary-General'. S/2006/838. 23 October 2006

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/115 28 February 2007

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/204, 20 April 2007

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/381, 25 June 2007

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2007/499, 21 August 2007

Security Council, 'Letter dated 20 September 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council', s/2007/566

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/178, 14 March 2008

Security Council, 'Meeting Records', S/PV/5858, 20 March 2008

Security Council, 'Letter from Secretary-General to President of Security Council', S/2008/309, 8 May 2008

Security Council, 'Report of the Security Council mission', S/2008/460, 15 July 2008

Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/2008/466, 16 July 2008

Security Council Report.org, Somalia, Chronology,
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2876199/>

Security Council Report.org, Somalia January 2006,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.1313241/k.EFBA/January_2006BRSomalia.htm

Security Council Report.org, Somalia, July 2006,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.1816671/k.B3AC/July_2006BRSomalia.htm

Security Council Report.org, Somalia, April 2007,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2620663/k.B79E/April_2007BRSomalia.htm

Security Council Report.org, Somalia, 2 May 2008,
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.4096805/>

Singer, Peter. 2003. 'Peacekeepers, Inc.' *Policy Review*.

Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Burundi: Lessons learnt from the African Union's First Peace Operation*. FOI Report 2562

Säkerhetspolitik.se, 'Fördjupning Somalia',
http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page_460.aspx

United Nations, 'Charter of the United Nations',
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

United Nations, 'UNOSOM',
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>

Utrikesdepartementet. 2007. Pressmeddelande 10 December, 'Utbetalning av stöd till den Afrikanska Unionens insats i Somalia'.

Wallis, D. 'US helping deploy Nigeria, Burundi troops in Somalia', 01 July 2008, Reuters Africa

Interviews:

E-mail correspondence with the head of the AU Operations and Support Unit, 9 July 2008

Telephone interview, former head of AU Peace Support Operations Division, 20 August 2008.

Telephone interview, Defence Attaché, Swedish Embassy Addis Ababa, 22 August 2008