# Contextualising the Comprehensive Approach
The elements of a Comprehensive Intervention

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Cover: Relativity Lithograph by M.C. Escher

Sammanfattning

Denna rapport är skriven inom ramen för FOI Försvarsanalys stöd till Försvarsmaktens konceptutveckling inom området effektbaserad ledning i fredsfrämjande insatser. I flera tidigare rapporter har Comprehensive Approach, Integrated Missions och liknande koncept för multifunktionella insatser kartlagts och problematiserat.

I denna avslutande rapport har syftet varit att göra en detaljerad redogörelse för hur koncept som Comprehensive Approach kan implementeras i komplexa konflikter. Genom att introducera begreppet 'Comprehensive Intervention' görs en ansats att överbrygga den diskrepans som funnits mellan teori och praktik inom området.

Nyckelord: Comprehensive Approach, Complex conflicts, Peace Support Operations, Multifunctional operations, Effects-Based Approach to Operations

Summary

The report is part of a Swedish Defence Research Agency project aiming at supporting the Swedish Armed Forces' development of effects-based command in Peace Support Operations. The report is part of a series of studies focusing on Comprehensive Approaches, their implementation and the future development of concepts for multifunctional operations.

The report seeks to provide a detailed account of how a Comprehensive Approach could actually be applied in a complex intervention, in an effort to start bridging the gap between concepts and practice in the field of comprehensive approaches. The report tries to bring together different findings in a single framework: 'The Comprehensive Intervention'. Our aim is to reach to a point where not only the challenges of multifunctionality are known, but also to be able to give recommendations on potential solutions to alleviate the problems associated with those challenges.

Keywords: Comprehensive Approach, Complex conflicts, Peace Support Operations, Multifunctional operations, Effects-Based Approach to Operations

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Executive Summary

Actors engaged in contemporary Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have for years been searching for more effective responses to the highly complex conflicts that they have encountered over the last decades. Past failures have forced policy makers and practitioners to develop new and often more ambitious ways to deal with the enormous challenges facing many conflict-ridden countries and regions. One of the major challenges in today's PSOs is how to coordinate and cooperate with other actors. It is now accepted amongst most actors that some form of coordination is necessary in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness, avoid duplication and ease some of the burdens. In order to achieve far-reaching goals like state-building and sustainable peace, coordination is said to be a prerequisite because security and development, amongst others, are interrelated tasks, impossible to achieve separately.

Efforts towards more integrated and coordinated PSOs have been made by organisations like the UN and the EU, as well as by single countries. As a result, concepts like 'Whole-of-Government', 'Integrated Missions' and 'Comprehensive Approach' have been developed. The Comprehensive Approach concept shares several of its underpinnings with other concepts for coordination and can be used as a starting point to exemplify how these types of concepts could be applied in a complex PSO. In an effort to start bridging the gap between concepts and practice in the field of multifunctional operations we introduce a single framework: 'The Comprehensive Intervention'. The intention is to provide a generic supportive structure, tentatively applicable in more than one setting.[1]

The Comprehensive Approach, as depictured in Swedish CD&E, is a cross-government, multifunctional approach to PSOs. Our starting point is the military instrument; nonetheless, we also address security from other than strictly military points of view. The notion of a Comprehensive Approach inherently forces us to look beyond such boundaries and focus on total outcome instead of the efforts of single actors. Any PSO has the potential of becoming a CI, given that it:

- has a 'system-wide' approach throughout the processes of analysis, planning, execution and evaluation;
- considers all actors of importance and seeks to reinforce and be reinforced by these;
- promotes flexible solutions to cooperation and coordination; and
- strives for sustainable solutions in collaboration with local actors.

Becoming 'comprehensive' is thus not as much a matter of the instrument and resources you apply, as is it about the attitudes and approach you adopt towards the operation and other actors.

In order to describe a CI, an understanding of the environment in which contemporary PSOs are likely to be engaged is necessary. This includes the actors and activities engaged in such environments, as well as the importance of, and challenges to, coordination in such environments. In order to facilitate the further development of the general concept of CA, the report is not centred on a single mission or organisation – which would narrow such opportunities – but uses a conflict environment and situation that is both generic and very complex, as the backdrop for the intervention. Such an intervention environment is used to stimulate the broad range of questions, challenges and opportunities that comes with a Comprehensive Intervention. Examples of what such a complex conflict situation may look like can be found using 'real-life' examples. Specifically, the existence of fragile institutions and deteriorating security, as well as an acute humanitarian situation with large movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and occurrence of gender-based violence, are common in complex conflicts. An understanding of these complex environments is necessary to clarify not only that coordination is needed, but also the typical issues on which coordination is required.

Furthermore, to explore the potential benefits and promises of a CA, the report also explores the approaches of the main multilateral organisations of today. Our Intervention is not bound by the specific structures, processes and approaches in existence in the multilateral organisations normally involved in PSOs today. We have used the opportunity to freely discuss potential enhancements and alternative approaches to meet the challenges of the contemporary strategic context that can be applied to all these organisations. Nonetheless, coordination and the measures, through which comprehensive approaches are applied, vary from organisation to organisation in accordance with each organisation's character and structure. There are clear strengths and weaknesses associated with all potential actors in modern PSOs and understanding each organisation's particular nature, culture and goals are important to facilitate coherence. The main difference in organisational context, in terms of impact on a Comprehensive Intervention, is whether the organisation conducting the intervention has any built-in civilian functions (such as a UN mission for example) or is a mainly military organisation (like NATO or a Coalition of the Willing).

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Due to the different organisational structures or cultures, the degree to which coordination can be applied in any PSO will vary. Cooperation and coordination with actors from different organisations needs to be handled in a flexible manner. The processes of coordination need to be open-minded and flexible in order to provide incentives for effective collaboration throughout an operation. There are four main types of inter-organisational interaction – coherence; coordination and cooperation; collaboration; and coexistence – all of which might be applicable in a CI.

The key areas any PSO needs to address are e.g. security, development assistance, humanitarian relief, and political and reconciliation processes. There are key actors in each of these areas, such as military and police actors, development organisations, humanitarian agencies and diplomats/political envoys, yet the fulfilment of each task requires coordination with other actors. Challenges such as differing time-perspectives, organisational culture and organisational structures, and an asymmetry of resources are frequently recognised as hampering coordination and needs to be overcome. The environment depictured in this report is based on a set of generic challenges that actors often face in contemporary PSOs. As every conflict is unique, these challenges are merely a description of *possible* challenges that a Comprehensive Intervention might deal with. Here, they serve the dual purpose of framing 'our' Comprehensive Intervention, and functioning as a reminder of the need for pragmatic and flexible solutions to complex conflicts. Furthermore, since every mission is unique, the report's account of a 'Comprehensive Intervention' is theoretically based.

Having generated a better understanding of complex conflict environments we can move on to investigate how concepts like the Comprehensive Approach can be implemented. To do so we study the CI in relation to the generic steps of analysis, planning, execution and monitoring/evaluation. In the report, the challenges and opportunities for coordination and cooperation are described and recommendations are made of how this could be done. A brief summary of each of these discussions follows below:

Analysis:
Analysis is the baseline for which progress can be measured during the implementation of the intervention. Analysis for PSOs tends to be, at best, a combination of inputs, rather than a collaborative analysis of different inputs. Often each actor has conducted their own analysis separately from the others and only afterwards tried to combine their results. Such analysis has proven insufficient and ineffective. Whilst both the need and incentives for deeper collaborative analysis exist, they need to be further highlighted and a greater understanding of analysis

as a vital step in the strategic process should be created. Recent Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E) efforts indicate that relatively straightforward and sector-neutral overlay methodologies, based on for example simplistic questions or checklists allowing different actors to provide inputs based on their respective approaches, are key in creating shared understanding. Similarly, CD&E has shown that strategic level analysis cannot simply be passed on to lower levels of planning without making sure that core assumptions are shared with those that are 'closer' to the field. The need for joint understanding and analysis is thus both horizontal and vertical in a Comprehensive Intervention.

Planning:

CI is based on the assumption that a high degree of coordination and cooperation can and should be achieved in planning. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to achieve coordination in the field if the strategic direction upon which coordination is to be based, is missing. Thus, the agreement on a strategic level of the ends, ways and means of the intervention – i.e. planning – is essential. Planning with a comprehensive mindset is not only important to generate an understanding of the conflict situation, but also to achieve consensus amongst relevant actors for what the overarching aim of the intervention should be. There is an asymmetry of resources amongst the actors needed to conduct appropriate planning. As a result, no single method for planning will fit everybody; yet, planning always need to reach an agreement on overarching outcomes that subsequent 'actor-specific' planning can use as a framework for planning. CI planning can thus be seen as a framework for connecting different plans towards a set of high-level outcomes. Every outcome may not be affected by every actor; the important thing is rather to keep a long-term and multifunctional focus in the planning phase. Building on experiences from CD&E, we propose that a planning forum encompassing three traits need to be created to be acceptable to a range of actors from different countries, organisations and instruments:

Firstly, the planning needs to be flexible and inclusive regarding to cooperation to generate an atmosphere where all participants feel they can affect the discussion, without which there is little incentive to attempt joint planning;

Secondly, the planning team should be led by skilled facilitators that need to be familiar with the diverse range of issues affecting a Comprehensive Intervention. Yet it should remain small and 'neutral', i.e. not seen by anyone as favouring any of the involved actors;

Thirdly, the planning process needs to be iterative, allowing continuous dialogue between different levels (strategic, operational and field level) to ensure that planning is responsive to changes in the local environment.

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Execution:

The implementation of CA principles has to date been both premeditated and ad hoc. Since CA is an evolving concept, and to avoid 'one size fits all' approaches, there is great validity to execution approaches being informal and improvised. Calculated and well-planned efforts are important and often sound, but CA still requires a great deal of flexibility and ad hoc arrangements can be positive since they are generally designed to meet specific field-level needs. For coordination mechanisms to be able to fulfil such flexibility the decision-making authority needs to be decentralised to field-level – facilitating swift and appropriate responses in tune with the situation at hand. Nonetheless, far from all compre-hensive mechanisms are ad hoc, even though their form and function may vary slightly between different missions. We recommend a range of field-coordination mechanisms that could be applied as appropriate in accordance with the specific nature of the organisations between which coordination needs to take place. Some possible mechanisms for field-level coordination include; regular consultations between the head offices of different organisations conducting activities in the field (or where appropriate, the co-location of offices); a range of mechanisms for regulated information exchange (such as joint coordination bodies and extensive use of liaisons); the establishment of joint field-level implementation plans (drawing on the strategic guidance); as well as joint coordination of press and information activities.

Monitoring and Evaluation:

Given the far-reaching and intangible aims of contemporary operations it is very difficult to reach consensus on how positive and negative effects of an interven-tion should be measured. Yet, just as with planning and execution, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by one actor only will always fail to portray the whole picture of a PSO. Few actors are likely to commit to one grand evaluation model, but agreed objectives and baselines would increase effectiveness in comprehen-sive interventions. Few, if any, frameworks for M&E in the area of PSOs that have proven to be efficient in contemporary operations exist. Still, much as in the planning phase, there needs to be agreed objectives that most actors can use and strive for, so that M&E tells a more comprehensive story, meeting the needs of planners, practitioners and policy-makers.

Any PSO should be seen as a continuous cycle – ranging from analysis, through planning and execution and, lastly, evaluation, with ongoing M&E to support the other phases throughout an intervention. M&E needs to feed into this cycle and not just be a short-term management tool or a lessons learned process. If so, evaluations will rightfully gain more importance as their results form the analysis and base-line for future planning and implementation. The planning for M&E

should start at the very beginning of an operation, drawing on the results from the analysis, and M&E should be seen as an integral part of the planning-stages of a PSO. In the planning phase, indicators should be set to mirror the planning stages but should be reviewed continuously so that they are still relevant in dynamic environments. Since it is not feasible that actors would commit their M&E efforts to one overarching 'CI-framework', there is a need to create flexible ways of managing and incorporating different types of M&E products. Agreements between different actors at the strategic level could facilitate this.

We make the following general recommendations:

- The Comprehensive Intervention should not be seen as a model for all contemporary PSOs, but as a set of principles that can guide policy-makers and practitioners in their analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of operations. Contemporary conflicts are often highly dynamic and no 'PSO-model' will fit every situation. Rather, flexibility is required in Comprehensive Interventions in order to be able to adjust to rapidly changing conditions in the environment.
- The Intervention should have a complementary approach. This means that no actor engaged in a PSO can limit themselves to think about and plan for their own sector or programme. As a military operation deploys into a conflict area it will presumably have a huge impact on the environment. In order to create sustainable objectives of peace and development, a military intervention should seek to complement and facilitate the work of other actors involved in e.g. development, state-building, diplomacy, SSR, etc.
- Cooperation and coordination with actors and instruments from different organisations needs to be handled in a flexible manner. Some actors are not necessary to coordinate with and may only require 'coexistence' whilst collaboration with other actors will be absolutely vital in order to reach one's objectives. The processes for getting this coordination 'right' needs to be open-minded and flexible in order to provide incentives for effective collaboration throughout an operation.
- However hard to accomplish, a Comprehensive Intervention needs to be closely coordinated with local actors. Depending on the situation this might be extremely hard, but the principle of local ownership should guide all PSOs. This is one issue that we need to develop further within the CA.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Driven by the challenges and possibilities emerging from a changing security environment, the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) are currently focusing concept development and experimentation (CD&E) on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) and associated concepts.[2] Swedish national development of EBAO is based on the assumption that the concept is the military contribution to a strategic Comprehensive Approach (CA) which seeks to bring together a broad spectrum of influential and relevant actors and instruments. This follows naturally from what seems to be a broad, international understanding – signified by developments within international organisations as well as in individual nations – that the new security environment requires multifunctional engagements, and that such engagements demand new and enhanced arrangements of command and coordination.

Civil-military relations and multi-functional coordination are core elements of EBAO, and arguably represent both the greatest unexploited potential and the major source of challenges to the concept. Since 2007 a project studying effects-based command and EBAO has been conducted by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, on behalf of the SwAF. This report is the last in a series of studies focusing on CA, its implementation and the future development of the concept, within this project and is based on the findings of this particular project branch.

As for EBAO, various definitions and interpretations of CA exist. It is generally used to describe both a general 'collaborative culture' between a multitude of actors engaged in complex emergencies, and the wide scope of 'coordinated and collaborative actions' undertaken by them to achieve greater harmonisation in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of that engagement. Within a national perspective, CA is generally associated with terms such as 'interagency', interdepartmental cooperation or 'Whole of Government' approaches. In multinational and regional organisations, similar perspectives include words such as 'multidimensional' and 'multifunctional'. Regardless of origin, these terms and concepts are all resting on the notion that a higher degree of integration, coordination and cooperation amongst the plethora of actors involved in the contem-

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[2] For further reading on Swedish CD&E, see e.g. SwAF. 2007. *Swedish EBAO Development After the Autumn Experiment 2006*, and SwAF. 2008. An Analytical Concept for an Effects-Based Approach to Operations within the Swedish Armed Forces

porary security environment will lead to greater efficiency – in terms of attaining desired ends and sustained effect.

1.2   Previous Work and Key Findings

The fundamental assumption guiding our research effort is that any military conceptual development of EBAO associated areas must be placed within the context of a larger strategic process and similar non-military concepts in existence, in order to be applicable and effective. The purpose of this and previous work has thus been to provide an understanding of this context and make recommendations on how this context should affect the SwAF's concept development. Overall, the work conducted has followed a general approach to the area at hand, including:

- data collection and synthesis of the related policies, procedures and experiences of major international and regional organisations, such as the UN, EU and NATO;
- a focus on one of the least explored, but most relevant, areas, i.e. multifunctional implementation planning, and how it is currently undertaken in international settings; and
- continuous synthesis of related experimentation and exercise lessons from 2004 and onwards.

In a previous report, aimed at placing EBAO within its wider CA, several findings were high-lighted, as recommendations of where to focus research, analysis and CD&E-efforts for 2008-2009.[3] Of most relevance for this report, was the conclusion that there is a problematic **gap between available concepts and organisational practice**: concepts such as 'Integrated Missions' (IM) and CA are often referred to, but there is very limited empirical experience regarding their application. The lack of knowledge about the implementation of these concepts has had negative effects on the further development of EBAO. To ease and overturn this deficiency some strategies for where to go next were suggested:

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[3] Derblom, Markus, R. Egnell & C. Nilsson. 2007. *The impact of strategic concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations - A Baseline Collective Assessment Report* .Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

- Direct efforts towards finding the common denominators, generic principles and shared aspirations of the many and varied frameworks for CA. These could then be useful in informing further military conceptual development of EBAO, making the approach resilient and applicable in more then one strategic context.
- Undertake further studies of multifunctional implementation processes. Where the strategic concepts lack firm ground, such studies can better inform military concept development by providing an understanding of concrete mechanisms for multifunctional coordination actually in existence.

In addition, the report advocated a general need of systematic empirical exploration of the contemporary, multi-actor security environments in which these concepts are to be applied, the purpose of which was to evaluate the solutions provided in various concepts such as CA, IM or equivalent in relation to their context.

Furthermore, three main areas on which the conceptual development should focus emerged:

- The need for enhanced **strategic guidance**. Such guidance, which provides the foundation for coordination, is often lacking and has negative consequences for the prospect of coordinating at field level.
- The need for better and more efficient coordinating structures and processes, referred to as **'multifunctional implementation',** to fill the gap between the political-strategic level and field level. Though an initial focus has been put on analysis and planning, an increasingly important element of implementation are **mechanisms for multifunctional monitoring and evaluation of progress**
- The strengthening of multifunctional in-theatre coordination arrangements

In the latest report,[4] building on these findings, some of the main challenges in implementing comprehensive approaches were identified and highlighted. To answer the question of why these concepts are so hard to implement and apply, a number of issues were raised, e.g. pertaining to the differences in organisational cultures involved, ends, approaches, time perspectives, and a far from universal acceptance of the fundamental assumptions of comprehensive approaches. These challenges will be addressed again in this report.

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[4] Nilsson, Claes (ed). 2008. Challenges in Multifunctional Approaches. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

1.3   Aim of the Report

This report seeks to provide a detailed account of how a Comprehensive Approach could actually be applied in a complex intervention, in an effort to start bridging the gap between concepts and practice in the field of comprehensive approaches. The intention is to provide a generic supportive structure, tentatively applicable in more than one setting. To do so, the report tries to bring together different findings in a single framework – 'The Comprehensive Intervention'. Our aim is to reach to a point where not only the challenges of multifunctionality are known, but also to be able to give recommendations on potential solutions to alleviate the problems associated with those challenges.

1.4   Scope and Delimitations

The report builds on a number of previous project findings. It seeks to bring together lessons learned from CD&E, previous research and case-studies from a variety of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Our starting point has been previous CD&E findings, mainly from the SwAF's participation in national and multinational engagements such as Multinational Experiment (MNE 4 & 5) and Demonstration exercises (such as DEMO 06). This report can thus be seen as a summary of previous studies and large sections are based on previous project reports by the authors, such as ' The Impact of Strategic Concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations', 'Challenges in Multifunctional Implementation' and 'Integrated Missions: A Liberia Case Study', amongst others.[5]

The Comprehensive Approach, as depictured in Swedish CD&E, is a cross-government, multifunctional approach to PSOs. In this report our starting point has been its military instrument. It does not, however, mean that we have limited ourselves to issues regarding security from a strict military point of view. The notion of a Comprehensive Approach inherently forces us to look beyond such borders and focus on total outcome instead of single actors or efforts. Still, it should be noted that the development of multifunctional concepts for PSOs generally stems from military CD&E and thus might carry denotations of military approaches.

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[5] Nilsson, Claes (ed). 2008. Challenges in Multifunctional Approaches. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm; Derblom, Markus, R. Egnell & C. Nilsson. 2007. The impact of strategic concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations - A Baseline Collective Assessment Report .Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm; Hull, Cecilia. 2008. *Integrated Missions: a Liberia Case Study*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

In order to look forward and focus on possible developments, the report will not be centred on a single, plausible mission or organisational context, but rather to use a very complex environment and situation to stimulate the broad range of questions, challenges and opportunities that comes with a Comprehensive Approach. To explore the potential benefits and promises of a comprehensive approach, the discussion will relate to the approaches of the main multilateral organisations of today. However, we will not be bound by the specific structures, processes and approaches in existence in the multilateral organisations normally involved in PSOs today. Instead, we will use the opportunity to freely discuss potential enhancements and alternative approaches to meet the challenges of the contemporary strategic context. Furthermore, since every mission is unique, the report's account of a 'Comprehensive Intervention' will be theoretically based.

1.5 Starting Point: Conceptualising the 'Comprehensive Intervention'

The environment depictured in this report is based on a set of generic challenges that actors involved in contemporary PSOs often face. As every conflict is unique, these challenges are merely a description of possible challenges that a PSO might deal with. Here it serves the dual purpose of framing 'our' Intervention, as well as a reminder of the need for pragmatic and flexible solutions to complex conflicts. It is important to note that the intervention depicted here is a military intervention; which nonetheless intervenes in a multi-actor environment and has to relate to a range of non-military actors. The assumption is that it will succeed in establishing appropriate relations to the other actors and activities present in the conflict environment, and go through the strategic process of analysis, planning, execution and evaluation with a comprehensive mind-set, thus making it a Comprehensive Intervention.

The context of the intervention is a fragile, conflict-ridden country, where the conflict can be described as complex: an intrastate conflict that severely affects civilian populations and involves several armed groups (see section 2.1). Experience from conflict areas such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan point to the need to focus research on this type of environments, where there are no easy solutions to the challenges that governments and organisations are faced with.

This report is concerned with trying to create an understanding of a Comprehensive Intervention by conceptualising and contextualising it. Below is a generic and abstract sketch outlining the environment into which a Comprehensive Intervention would deploy. In the next section and throughout the report we will seek

to explain the characteristics of the various elements in the figure. The underlying assumptions in the figure and in the report are based on previous research and broad discourse on coordination in complex, multidimensional environments.

Figure 1.The intervention and its environment

Even though CA is based on bringing together a range of actors in PSOs, this report, as stated previously, investigates the implementation of CA from a military perspective. The box in the above sketch represents the military intervention, typically supported by diplomatic efforts and possibly police units. The box also represents an 'intervention approach', in the sense that it depictures the need to apply a system-wide approach to conflicts and the need for coordination. The military intervention – existing inside the box but not encompassing all of it – intervenes in a context of a range of other separate operations by for example humanitarian, development and political actors. These elements (depictured outside the box) represent these programmes and actors in existence prior to and after the military intervention. Whilst these are also 'interventions' we will hereby distinguish them from the military intervention by calling them 'programmes'. A CI, however, necessitates close coordination between the military intervention and the programmes, uniting them in one comprehensive approach. The Comprehensive Intervention thus means the approach to, and the implementation of, a PSO in coordination with other actors as described in chapter 3 in this report. Accordingly, any PSO can be a CI, given that it:

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- has a system-wide approach throughout the process of analysis, planning, execution and evaluation;
- considers all actors of importance and seeks to reinforce and be reinforced by these;
- promotes flexible solution to cooperation and coordination; and
- strives for sustainable solutions in collaboration with international and local actors

During the (military) intervention period – normally dictated by a *specific* and *separate* mandate – some existing programmes will cease to operate, others will continue their undertakings and yet others will commence their activities. Amongst the programmes and actors present in the intervention environment some will merely co-exist with the intervention whilst others will find a relationship of some degree of coordination with the intervention. Hence, the box, whilst depicting a CI, does not imply that the intervention takes precedence and control over all existing or new activities during its execution. Instead, it represents an approach or view of interventions that encompass the following traits:

a) Our intervention is set in *time*. It is initiated during a situation of deteriorating human, military, economic, and judicial security; conducted to achieve a specific set of objectives; and envisioned to be withdrawn and dissolved when the desired changes have been accomplished. The intervention has the legitimacy provided for by a UN mandate during its implementation.

b) Our intervention takes place in an environment of fragile security and need for both humanitarian aid and long-term development. In this environment other programmes, support activities and long-term efforts are already taking place. These are negatively affected by the deteriorating security situation. Hence, our intervention must be viewed as *complementary* to these programmes, *facilitating* their delivery where possible. The intervention must find a way to relate to these existing programmes and actors, but the nature of the relationship will vary. The intervention must also take into account both the short-term and long-term effects of the actions undertaken during its implementation.

c) When the intervention has reached the conditions stipulated in its exit strategy, and thus withdrawn, there will be a *transition of responsibility to self-sustaining programmes*. These may be the ones already in existence pre-intervention, but also new programmes, to capitalise on progress made and to provide conditions conducive to long-term, peaceful development. Some programmes will start to scale down roughly at the same time as our comprehensive intervention ends (e.g. humanitarian aid), due to an enhanced security situation. Others will remain in existence for a long time after the

comprehensive intervention is dismantled (e.g. poverty reduction programmes).

In sum, when referring to 'intervention' in this report, we mean the external military response to a conflict or crisis, launched in the suffering region to stabilise and bring about change to the situation. In the context of contemporary peace support operations (PSO), such responses also need to be strengthened by political, development, military and humanitarian means and activities. To denote the desire for better integration and coordination among these instruments, we use the term 'Comprehensive Intervention' to reflect the intent and potential application of the Comprehensive Approach concept.

1.6   Outline of the Report

The outline of the report follows the abstract sketch introduced above and describes and concretises the different elements of the sketch throughout its chapters.

Our intervention, though comprehensive in nature, will be discussed from *a military perspective*, addressing questions of coordination with actors and programmes already in existence. These actors will have a variable degree of interaction with and influence on the military instruments; both of which will be further explored in the second section of the report. This second chapter will set the stage for a multifunctional approach. It begins with describing a *typical environment* in which a comprehensive intervention is likely to deploy with the intent of describing both the environmental challenges such an intervention will be faced with as well as outlining the incentives for coordination and a comprehensive approach. The chapter then introduces the *strategic context* of an intervention, the potential actors involved, and the challenges of bringing about a higher degree of coordination in such environments. It gives an account of the various organisations and functions that would normally be involved in peace and humanitarian efforts, as well as a general description of the major organisations' roles in this setting. The discussion reiterates *some of the major challenges to integration and coordination*, revolving around issues such as differences in organisational culture, aims, and approaches. The second chapter thus describes the nature of different existing programmes and activities undertaken outside and before CI, as well as their relation to the CI. The description of the environment provides the stage for the intervention and, in a sense, the requirements for how the intervention should be designed. It includes a description of conditions that could require an external intervention, and outlines the range of existing programmes and actors in the conflict environment that a potential intervention would have to relate to.

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In contrast the third chapter centres its discussion on *the comprehensive intervention itself.* The framework for the Comprehensive Intervention is applied, through a discussion centred on the generic steps of the strategic process for the intervention: Analysis, Planning, Execution/Implementation, and Monitoring & Evaluation. Each of these subsections will provide recommendations for how the comprehensive approach should be implemented. The latter two sections are more elaborated on than the first ones; the reason for this is that throughout the study series of which this report is a final part, lesser attention has been paid to the execution and evaluation of CA. This report thus seeks to concentrate much of its effort on exploring these areas as well.

2 The Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Actors

This chapter seeks to set the stage for an intervention by explaining the environment in which any Comprehensive Intervention is likely to deploy, including conflict dynamics, the need to coordinate and the various tasks and actors in relation to which coordination will have to take place. It also outlines the challenges to coordination. To this end, section 2.1 can be read by those who wish to gain a greater understanding of some of the characteristics and consequentially challenges, of a conflict environment which requires an intervention based on CA. The second section (2.2) outlines the need for a Comprehensive Approach and the various categories of coordination. Section 2.3 exemplifies the different activity areas of a CI and identifies key actors for each. Section 2.4 gives a brief example of some of the fundamental challenges to coordination. The last section (2.5) then explores the potential for coordination depending on the organisational context of intervening mission, i.e. whether mechanisms for coordination with civilian actors are inherent in the organisational structures or not.

2.1 The Intervention Environment – Complex Conflicts

Most contemporary conflicts are not *interstate* wars – wars between states with two or mote national armies clashing, but *intrastate* conflicts – civil wars.[6] Furthermore, these contemporary conflicts are often described as 'complex'; referring to e.g. them taking place in fragile or failed states, involvement of irregular forces, predatory and criminal groups with links to smuggling and trafficking, and the targeting of civilian populations etc. Conflicts along ethnic or religious lines, with complex historic patterns of violence as well as historical processes including colonial heritages, makes this picture even more multi-faceted. A case of outright 'war' is not the norm in these complex conflicts, which are rather defined by low-intensive insurgency type of warfare, often involving several fractions of rebel groups with different interests. As a consequence, many older and previously successful military doctrines are now rendered insufficient. Almost all contemporary interventions take place in these types of conflict zones and the operations thus need to include a wide range of

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[6] Heldt and Wallensteen. 2006. *Peacekeeping operations: Global patterns of intervention and success, 1948-2004*, Second edition, p. 20

goals beyond the traditional aims of stabilisation and humanitarian relief, to address this complexity: democratisation, economic development and respect for human rights, for example. In situations of incomplete or fragile peace the inter-linked nature of security and development is inescapable, and a wide range of actors and actions are necessary to achieve the ambitious aims. Whilst complex conflicts can be defined by many characteristics, their nature is such that they cannot be addressed solely military means and need to be dealt with through a Comprehensive Approach.

Below we give two examples of characteristics that tend to be present in complex conflicts – fragile institutions and deteriorating security, and a deteriorating humanitarian situation – to create a general understanding of a situation that an intervention potentially could be faced with, and also to highlight why a compre-hensive approach is necessary.

2.1.1   Fragile Institutions and Deteriorating Security

Complex conflicts are often interlinked with poor governance, a declining economy, social exclusion, corruption or a collapse of civil infrastructure, and an increasing numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. The states in which these conflicts occur are often labelled 'weak', 'fragile', or 'failed', depending on how grave the challenges are and what resources there are to meet them. On the scale ranging from strong to failed states, a state can be labelled weak or failed for a number of social, economical or political reasons.[7] Some of the challenges are root causes of conflict, while others are merely symptoms. An operation that seeks to intervene in civil strife needs more than military means to address both the causes and the symptoms of the conflict. A solution to such a conflict situation must be comprehensive, encompassing appropriate use of force but also economic, social and political action to address its complexity.

Lack of good governance (or the abundance of bad governance) is often a key factor in violent conflicts. Governance has been a heavily debated concept but here it marks the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented.[8] Governments are central governance actors but there are other influential actors like the media, international actors, private companies, civil society, local actors like landlords etc, that influence decision making and implementation.

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[7] See e.g. The Fund For Peace, 'Failed states index', http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php
[8] For a more extensive discussion regarding governance see e.g. Pierre (e.d.)2000. *Debating governance, Authority, Steering, and Democracy*. Oxford University Press: New York

From a security perspective, the occurrence of weak and ineffective institutions has several implications; the most serious is perhaps when a country lacks democratic and effective control over its security sector and specifically its own security forces. In many fragile states, governments would not be able to stay in power without the support of the armed forces, presidential guards and/or the police force. When revenues start to decrease, when the inflation is high and external investments cease or diminish, governments might face great challenges in controlling the (often costly) security forces. Fragile states and fragile governments rarely enjoy legitimacy without paying for it in some sense (through military budgets, ethnic favouritism, political influence etc) and without these incentives loyalty from the security forces may be hard to sustain. For example, the poorly-paid Indonesian military forces (TNI) are notoriously out of control.

Abusive, corrupt and above the law, several of the military's enterprises serve to benefit only the troops endeavour of raising money outside of the governments budget. The TNI has had a financial interest in the extraction of natural resources in the Aceh and Papua (Irian Jaya) provinces and have often safeguarded this interest rather than protecting and providing security to civilian populations, repeatedly leading to severe human rights abuses by the TNI, which have fuelled the conflicts in the regions.[9]

When governments can no longer provide for soldiers and police, security forces will look for other sources of income and influence, which could mean preying on the civil population or turning to criminal activity such as smuggling and arms trade. Human rights violations could easily become endemic and the targeting of ethnic groups may further fuel an already instable situation. There are many cases where civil authorities, to some extent, no longer manage or oversee its security forces. Armed forces in Sierra Leone have operated simultaneously as both soldiers and rebels[10] and in Sudan, the distinction between the military, police and paramilitary is so hard to make, the government is no longer able to count on the obedience of either side.[11] Situations where the security force is a party in internal conflicts are not uncommon and the same forces are often involved in internal repression and are characterised by lack of responsiveness, corruption and brutality. Inadequate public security often lead people who can afford it to acquire own private security or, if unable to hire contractors, apply

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[9] Misol, Lisa. 2006. *Too High a Price: The human rights cost of the Indonesian military's economic activities*. Human Rights Watch. June 2006   Volume 18, No. 5(C)

[10] USAID. Issue paper no 11, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3200.pdf, p 3

[11] GobalSecurity.Org. 2004. 'Tensions rise in Sudan as rebels and government begins to loose control, UN says'. UN News Service, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/11/mil-041104-unnews01.htm

their own justice; which , for example, was the case with the creation of the Bakassi Boys in Abu, Nigeria, created to fill a policing void.[12] In such situations the state loses its monopoly on violence and violent conflict often ensues. If state structures such as the military and police are weakened to the point that the monopoly on violence is broken, the state can no longer guarantee obedience to, and respect for, rule of law. Such shifts might lead to coups and civil war as state authority is challenged. In the worst case scenario, the state could cease to exist.[13]

Furthermore, loss of control over security forces means loss of control over the state's territory. This could provide a fertile ground for smuggling and trafficking, as well as threaten to draw neighbouring countries into the conflict. The loss of territorial control also provides internal or regional rebel groups with an opportunity to establish control in conflict zones. This could further desta-bilise regions and often leads to tremendous suffering for the civilian population. In Nigeria, military rule which could no longer be supported financially, led to institutional decay and was followed by exploding insecurity across the country, resulting in multiple violent conflicts arising within the state at the turn of the century. Vigilantism in the south-eastern areas of the country has led the federal government to loose effective territorial control and authority in these areas.[14] Similarly, the paramilitary groups in Colombia, such as the FARC guerrilla, have long been very difficult to tell apart from the drug cartels operating in the country. In result, the military power of the drug cartels has often become so great that the Colombian military has been unable to enforce sovereignty in some areas of the country, losing its territories to the cartels which have in turn provided an opportunity for the guerrillas to make an income of the narcotics.[15] Loss of territorial control can also lead to regional instability, as spill-over effects might threaten neighbouring countries whose government and institutions are often already fragile. Should intrastate conflict escalate into regional conflicts the complexity will multiply and any intervention will have to deal with an even

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[12] USAID. Issue paper no 11, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3200.pdf, p 3

[13] Andersson, M. 2005. *Private Military Companies and the Effect of Control on Force in the Developing World*. Lund University, p 5 ; Jose, J. 2006. *Transformations in Sovereignty, Political authority and Capacity in the Governance of State*. Australia National University: University of Newcastle, p 7.

[14] Bach, D. 2004. 'Nigeria: Towards a Country Without a State?', paper presented at conference on Nigeria : Maximizing Pro-Poor Growth: Regenerating the Socio-Economic Database, organized by Overseas Development Institute in collaboration with Nigeria Economic Summit Group, London, 16-17 June 2004. http://www.odi.org.uk/events/nigeria_2004/Bach%20paper.pdf

[15] Andersson, M. 2005. *Private Military Companies and the Effect of Control on Force in the Developing World*. Lund University, p 25

greater number of actors and challenges, as seen in the first and second Congo wars or in the Mano River region during the 1990's and onwards.

2.1.2 Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation

PSOs are almost exclusively deployed to countries or regions where the humanitarian situation is already pressing. Lack of food security, the violation of human rights, spread of HIV/AIDS, overwhelming urbanisation without supporting infrastructure, and environmental degradation are all major issues that signify many contemporary conflicts. In some cases a deteriorating humanitarian situation (e.g. droughts or natural disasters) might be a cause of conflict and in some cases it might be the other way around (e.g. targeting of civilians, causing forced displacement which in turn worsens an already severe humanitarian emergency). Whatever comes first, humanitarian emergencies in conflict areas are often worse and certainly more difficult to handle than disasters in non-conflict areas.

A major challenge in today's conflicts is that the principles of humanitarian access are often violated. Withholding humanitarian aid from civilians has become a weapon in many intrastate wars. This is a major concern for humanitarian actors who might find that governments or rebel groups are not willing to allow aid to reach groups that they consider to be an adversary. Also, humanitarian aid workers are frequently being attacked, further limiting access to people in need. Comprehensive interventions will thus deploy to regions generally suffering from extreme poverty and hunger, forced displacement, environmental degradation etc, where humanitarian agencies may be forced to rely on the military to gain access to those in need of humanitarian assistance. The primary responsibility for humanitarian aid rests with civilian organisations and agencies; however, the challenges described in this chapter underline the need for a more effective coordination between security actors and humanitarian actors in conflict-ridden states.

In this report we highlight two areas of particular challenge to security actors in complex emergencies: issues concerning IDPs and refugees and issues concerning gender based violence. This is by no means an exhaustive list but should rather be seen as examples of complex issues that will have to be addressed in a comprehensive manner.

IDPs and Refugees

The problem of IDPs in intrastate conflicts has gained increasing attention over the last years. In Sudan, the UN estimated that Darfur alone had nearly 2.5 million IDPs in July 2008, a situation which the international community simply

does not have the capacity to cope with.[16] IDPs are vulnerable for a number of reasons: they lack basic security; they have few possibilities of finding livelihood; they lack the possibility or the skills to participate in the political process; they are often already targeted and excluded minority groups, etc.[17] IDPs may also become a source of further conflict, for instance upon an eventual return, if property and land have been confiscated or taken over or by rival groups. Furthermore, people who are displaced within their own borders do not have the same legal status as refugees and are thus not protected by international refugee law, making these groups even harder to protect. In order to provide for the immediate needs and, in the long run, facilitate the sustainable return of IDPs, security must be restored and larger groups of IDPs need to be considered in peace agreements and reconciliation processes. IDP and refugee camps are furthermore often a thriving ground for new conflict dynamics such as sexual violence and other forms of coercion and intimidation. These camps might also function as storage point for weapons and training facilities for militias, as well as grounds for, mainly forced, recruitment and re-recruitment to armed groups.[18] Establishing security in these camps is of great importance when re-introducing stability to societies which have been at war.

The occurrence of large groups of refugees poses another major challenge in most contemporary intrastate conflicts. Sharing many of the difficulties described above, refugee issues is a mark of regional instability. Large refugee groups will be a burden for the local population in the receiving country. Without the proper international (or if possible, national) support this burden might lead to violent clashes. Refugee movements may also be a cause of conflict in border regions: between refugees and the forces that drove them away from their country of origin or between refugees and security forces in the country they seek refuge in.

The great lakes refugee crisis after the Rwandan genocide destabilised the Great Lakes region as the genocidarés who had fled Rwanda used refugee camps in neighbouring states to build up the remnants of Hutu armies. Particularly the DRC (then Zaire), which hosted the largest camp in Goma in the North Kivu region of eastern DRC, was badly affected. The same militias that ran the genocidal regime also ran the camp, they were never disarmed and the refugee

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[16] Office of UN Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. 2008. *Darfur Humanitarian profile no 32*

[17] The Brookings Institution—University of Bern, 2007. *Project on Internal Displacement: Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building*,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2007/09peaceprocesses/2007_peaceprocesses.pdf

[18] Robert Muggah. 2003. *.A crisis turning inwards: refugee and IDP militarisation in Uganda .* Humanitarian practice network, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2574

camp increasingly started looking like a military base. In time, the militia began to launch attacks into Rwanda, as well as carrying out systematic killings across the Kivus. The ethnic conflict that had caused the genocide spilled over into the Kivus and soon the situation expired leading to the toppling of the Zairean government by a rebel army supported by Rwanda and Uganda and two civil wars that destabilised the whole of the DRC.[19] The situation in the Kivus still remains volatile.

Gender Based Violence

Gender based violence is another major issue in conflicts that need to be taken into account in contemporary PSOs. Gender based violence refers to the targeting of individuals or groups of individuals because of their gender. Sexual violence is part of the wider definition of gender based violence and denotes sexual acts or threats of sexual nature.[20] IDPs and refugees are already vulnerable and women are often even more so in refugee camps where they have to rely on others for food and shelter. Trafficking is another huge problem and people in conflict areas often suffer the worst.

Gender based violence has become a perverted tool in many contemporary conflicts. Even though gender based violence has been the subject of little quantitative research, figures available tell some horrific stories.[21] Rape is a cheaper weapon of war than bullets, and violence against women are in many conflicts seen as a way to take revenge on or demoralise opposing forces, with devastating social, physical and psychological consequences for the victims. Sexual violence during conflict thus has many effects on PSOs as any peace effort needs to mind for victims, providing physical and mental health assistance as well as care for orphans, but also combating the established spirit of bestiality and psychological destruction by providing appropriate assistance (e.g. counselling) to the perpetrators. Perhaps most importantly, gender-based violence constitutes a rule of law task that a PSO will be required to address. Civil society, and particularly women, can be empowered by addressing the climate of impunity that often surrounds sexual violence in a conflict zone where civilians often are at the mercy of militias. However, to address these issues, PSOs need to have stronger mandates, appropriate training for peacekeepers, more civilian police and ability to better train and screen local armed forces. In addition, PSOs

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[19] UNHCR. 2000. 'The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath', in *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty years of humanitarian action*, p. 254, 262-263, 272-273.

[20] IRIN. 2004. 'Our bodies – their battleground: Gender based violence in conflict zones', http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?IndepthId=20&ReportId=62814

[21] UNIFEM, *Crimes agains women in situations of armed conflicts*, http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/violence_against_women/facts_figures.php?page=7

need to improve training programmes and programmes for enforcing guidelines to ensure that its own personnel does not become part of the problem, as on several occasions intervening peacekeeping forces have been involved in cases of rape and prostitution in conflict areas.[22]

In the Kivus in the DRC rape has been a tool of warfare committed against both women and children so common it constitutes the norm; causing the UN to call it the worst instance of sexual violence in the world.[23] As an estimated 60% of all combatants are infected with HIV/AIDS rape is often an automatic death sentence for women and children unable to access antiretroviral drugs.[24] Further-more, Human Rights Watch reports that as often as 30 % of the times the victim is not only raped but also sexually tortured and mutilated during assaults.[25] Systematic rape was recently included as definition of a war crime in the Geneva Convention; it is also now considered a form of genocide. [26]

2.2 Coordination and the Comprehensive Approach

2.2.1 Why Coordinate? – Incentives for Coordination

'Multi-actor environments' have existed for a long time, but the recognition that coherence among these actors is a main driver for change has only recently emerged as a consequence of a new strategic understanding of the type of conflicts in which these actors operate. The failures of past isolated military, diplomatic and humanitarian efforts have created a push towards multifunctional and integrated types of interventions, in which coherence and coordination between the different instruments of power is described as essential. Coherence is supposedly achieved through harmonisation of the strategic processes, planning and objectives across all instruments and agencies. The end result is assumed to be more efficient and effective operations.

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[22] IRIN. 2004. 'UN peacekeeping - working towards a no-tolerance environment', http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=20&ReportId=62822

[23] IRIN. 2007. 'DRC:Sexual Violence- The Scourge of the East', http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=74801

[24] Goodwin, Jane. 2004. 'Silence= Rape', *The Nation*, 8 March, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040308/goodwin

[25] Goodwin, Jane. 2004. 'Silence= Rape', *The Nation*, 8 March, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040308/goodwin

[26] Goodwin, Jane. 2004. 'Silence= Rape', *The Nation*, 8 March, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040308/goodwin

The concept of CA is part of a larger conceptual family that broadly speaking seeks to achieve coherence and coordination in complex peace support operations. Whilst coordination can have negative consequences, such as inter-agency rivalry, and the supposed increased effectiveness due to coordination has been questioned by some as being under-theorised and under-tested, this report begins with the assumption that coordination is not only good, but necessary. There are several evident drivers behind the increased demand for coordination in PSOs. As argued in the previous section, complex conflicts cannot be dealt with by one agent within one discipline solely, firstly because there is never one single reason for the conflict in the first place and secondly because the effect of such conflicts on local populations and institution is so widespread it cannot be dealt with solely as a military, political or humanitarian task. In addition, the current nature, scope and frequency of international peace engagements have left international and regional organisations in a situation of 'overstretch' where available resources do not correspond to the increased demand, and hence complementary partners are sought. Such resource dependency has – together with features as neutralising competition and organisational survival – are referred to as 'materialist' motives for inter-organisational coordination.[27] Other incentives can also be put forwards: traits such as (cost-) efficiency, consistency, need for alternative strategies, need for someone else to provide security, common political agenda, and legitimacy.[28]

2.2.2 Categories of Actor Relationships

There are several generic categories of relations in multi-actor environments. Encompassing the trend towards integration and increased coordination, various labels are used, such as 'whole-of-government approach' – addressing the relationship between the various national institutions of a country; 'intra-agency' – in which the concern is the interrelationship between individual departments of a larger agency; and 'inter-agency' – generally used to denote collaboration, cooperation, and coordination among a plethora of actors.[29] In this report, revolving around the theme of a broad comprehensive intervention, the focus will be on inter-agency relationships in an area of crisis.

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[27] Haugevik, K. M. 2007. *New Partners, new possibilities, The evolution of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace operations.* Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

[28] Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds). 2008. 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management'. NUPI Report, *Security in Practice* no. 11.

[29] Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds). 2008. 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management'. NUPI Report, *Security in Practice* no. 11.

Another categorisation may be directed towards the nature and quality of relations in multi-actor environments. The relationship between various actors vary significantly and is in general a consequence of the actors different mandates, time perspectives, approaches, resources etc, but also the degree of inter-dependency – the *need* to coordinate – between the actors.[30] The different categories of inter-agency relationships can be described as:

- *Coherence*, which denotes a relationship where a set of partners act upon a shared mandate, strategic vision and objectives. While not being a unitary, single entity, they will conduct analysis, planning, management, and evaluation together.
- *Coordination and Cooperation*, in which actors with complementary or over-lapping mandates and objectives operate together, with retained organisational independence but with a will to organise activities with the complementary partners.
- *Collaboration*, which could be used to describe activities taking place between actors with different mandates or between actors that need strong organisational independence, but who share some similar interests or strategic vision, and see the need for a degree of coordination with others.
- *Coexistence*, describing the relationship between actors with limited ambitions concerning cooperation, based in e.g. the concern or direct opposition towards political and military ambitions. Between such actors, consultation and de-confliction may take place. [31]

While these categories may, at best, be theoretically distinct, the reality is that some actors would be dynamically transitioning to and from different categories as the situation evolves, as the landscape of actors change and as a need to coordinate arises. An important borderline – and one that is not easily transgressed – exists between independence and coexistence on one hand, and the various cooperative arrangements towards coherence on the other. However, whether donors, militaries, development and humanitarian relief agencies choose to work together or not, they must work "side by side" in the same settings and the effects of their efforts are inevitably intertwined.[32]

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[30] Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds.). 2008, 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management'. NUPI Report, *Security in Practice* no. 11.

[31] Based on Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds.). 2008, 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management'. NUPI Report, *Security in Practice* no. 11.

[32] Olson, L & H. sGregorian. 2007. *Side By Side or Together?: Working for Security, Development & Peace in Afghanistan and Liberia*, The Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, p. 81

2.3   Intervention Activities and Actors

Regardless of the organisational context of operations, the activities involved in a successful comprehensive intervention will largely be the same, even though the importance of, and resources put into, different components will vary with the nature of the crisis. In much the same way as the activities cannot be rigidly defined, neither can the actors that will partake in a CI be fully pinpointed; every situation and intervention is unique, and the number and nature of the actors involved is dictated by this unique nature, together with intangibles such as political will and legacy. Nonetheless, this section seeks to provide an overview of the overarching activity areas of a CI, divided into the fields of security, development assistance, political processes and reconciliation, and humanitarian relief. It will also identify and provide a generic description of the key actors involved in these activities. The purpose is to create an understanding of the different activities that need to be dealt with in a comprehensive intervention and the challenge of coordination between the actors that need to undertake them. Since this is a report outlining a comprehensive intervention it is important to state that these key actors are dependent on other actors, and their activities, in undertaking their own tasks. However, they all carry the lead responsibility for their respective activity.

2.3.1   Security

The first and foremost task of any military intervention is to establish security and stability in order to provide an environment within which all other tasks can take place. It must not necessarily be completed before other activities can take place, but the failure to provide security will seriously hamper all other activi-ties.[33]

Security involves both external and internal aspects. The external boarders of the host country must be secured not only in order to defend the territorial integrity of the state, but also to avoid the establishment of war economies – involving smuggling of drugs, weapons and people. The military tasks can include external security, the enforcement of cease-fire agreements, counter-insurgency type operations, securing essential infrastructure and state institutions, provide transports and logistics, provide freedom of movement, and demining. More non-traditional military tasks in comprehensive interventions may involve providing

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[33] Etzioni, Amitai. 2007. *Security First: For a Muscular Moral Foreign Policy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

security for developmental and humanitarian activities, conducting disarmament and demobilisation, and protecting refugees and IDPs.

While the line between military and policing activities are often blurred in obtaining security tasks, some tasks clearly fall within the realm of the police and the justice sector. These include law enforcement, maintaining rule of law, providing detention facilities, police training and police observation. In reality, the limited number of police officers ready for international service means that they often perform support and training functions rather than law enforcement. This means that the task of enforcing law and order sometimes falls on the military, generally without the proper training, mandate and rules of engagement.

An activity that deserves some extra attention is Security Sector Reform (SSR). The security sector not only involves military and police institutions, but also the ministries for defence, justice and finance. It also includes civilian democratic oversight mechanisms of parliament, ombudsmen and civil society organisations.[34] The activities involved under the heading of SSR are thereby many, but most importantly it refers to reforming and down-sizing the military and police, reforming the justice sector, provide good governance training throughout the sector, as well as the creation of democratic oversight mechanisms. Even though often falling within the realm of security, SSR could just as well be included in the activity areas of political process and reconciliation, and development assistance. Worth noting is that SSR is a concept created and 'owned' by the development sector, in contrast to concepts such as Comprehensive Approach and Effects-Based Approach to Operations that were coined and developed within military circles.[35]

Key actors and their organisation: Military and Police Organisations

Military units have a long tradition of engagement in different forms of peace support operations. Lately, as the nature of interventions and other types of peace operations have changed from consent-based blue-beret type operations to highly complex and multifunctional operations with far-reaching political aims such as democratisation, economic development and respect for human rights, the

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[34] OECD. 2007. *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justic.* Paris: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf.

[35] Egnell, Robert & P. Haldén. 2008. 'Laudable, ahistorical and overambitious: Security Sector Reform meets state formation theory', *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts*, Aug 28, 2008, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p281106_index.html

number of involved actors have increased substantially, and the role of the military contributions has changed.[36]

As regards cooperation and coordination, the military has stressed the need for closer multifunctional cooperation in PSOs for some time. Military components have witnessed first hand, in conflicts such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, the very limited impact the military instrument has had in isolation from other actors. However, military and civilian/humanitarian cultures and structures are not always easily compatible. For instance, military actors often tend to dominate co-operation and coordination meetings – not least since the military representatives in coordination cells are often relatively high-ranking officers with many years of leadership positions within the organisation, while the civilian counterpart is usually younger and far more diverse, working in an organisational structure with far less evident chain of command.[37] Another problematic aspect of civil-military co-operation, is the fact that intelligence materiel and sources tend to be confidential and the military therefore often only reluctantly, if at all, shares information with other nations or civilian organisations.

The military mainly performs security activities but has increasingly become involved in political, humanitarian and developmental type activities as well.[38] Military components, generally in control of substantial resources which can be used in areas such as logistics, transportation, reconstruction etc, are often engaged in areas where no other actors are able to provide assistance to the local population and therefore assume this role. The reasons for military expansion into traditionally civilian activities are partly a needs-based response to humanitarian organisations experiencing increased insecurity, limiting their access to crisis-affected populations; and partly tactical – based on 'heart and minds' approaches aimed at generating local support for the intervention.[39] In the humanitarian community the latter reason has often been criticised. Some actors argue that the value of such activities should be seriously questioned; not only do might they fail to make a substantial impact for improving the lives of local populations but they also have the potential to wreck the credibility of humanitarian principles by politicising humanitarian aid. As a result they could endanger

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[36] Dandeker, C & J. Gow. 2000. 'Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping', in Erwin A. Schmidl (ed.), *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*, London: Frank Cass; Smith, Rupert. 2005. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane

[37] Smith, Rupert. 2005. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane

[38] Egnell, Robert. 2008. 'Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military Force in Humanitarian and Development Operations'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 29, No. 6

[39] Egnell, Robert. 2008. 'Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military Force in Humanitarian and Development Operations'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 29, No. 6

the lives of humanitarian actors by destroying their perceived neutrality – which has traditionally provided security for humanitarian organisation operating in conflict zones.[40] Furthermore, committing military resources to support humanitarian and developmental tasks have also been questioned as these types of activities always – and rightly so – come in second after the core tasks of providing security.[41]

Police units are often extremely overstretched in the field of operations as they, unlike the military, rarely have national or international standby forces and the police often have limited resources in the field. A UN report has noted that the slow and limited deployment of police contingents has marred many PSOs since successful operations require policing and other law and order functions.[42] As a result, as stated before, police tasks are often limited to training responsibilities rather than law enforcement tasks.[43] The police units in UNMIK in Kosovo provided an exception as they had the dual task of training a new local police while enforcing the law in Kosovo. The problem of lacking standby capabilities and resources is not limited to the police, but is equally valid for the entire justice sector – involving the criminal court systems, attorneys and prosecutors, as well as detention centres and prison guards.[44] This was evident in Kosovo where the justice system could not deal with the detainees that the police enforcement activities brought to them. A further problem is that the justice sector often suffers from poor coordination between police, prosecutors, courts and detention centres.[45]

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[40] On lacking data regarding civil-military effectiveness see: Gordon, Stuart. 2004. 'Military-Humanitarian Relationships and the Invasion of Iraq (2003): Re-forging Certainties?'. *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*; Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. 2008. 'The Effectiveness of Intervention Instruments in Armed Conflict: Conflict Resolution is the Only Solution?'. In *Peace, Security and Development in an Era of Globalization: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Process of Peace Building after Armed Conflict*, (ed). G. Molier and E. Nieuwenhuys. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers

[41] Brigety II, Reuben E. 2004. 'From Three to One: Rethinking the "Three Block War" and Humanitarian Operations in Combat'. *The Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics*, Springfield, VA, 29 and 30 January 2004.

[42] United Nations. 2004. *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.* http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.

[43] Lewis, William, E.Marks & R. Perito .2002. *Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations,* USIP Special Report No. 85, April 22, 2002, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html.

[44] United Nations. 2004. *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.* http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.

[45] Lewis, William, E.Marks & R. Perito .2002. *Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, USIP Special Report No. 85, April 22, 2002, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html.

2.3.2   Development Assistance

Activities within development assistance have often been conducted in the host country long before the military intervention sets ground. However, development functions are particularly important in the context of post-conflict situations; when war has ravaged the country's finances and infrastructure and post-conflict and long-term development activities, such as government capacity-building and training, are needed.

The different sectors of development assistance essentially include all aspect of state-building and economic development. As an example, the area of government capacity building includes the sectors of health, education, justice, infrastructure and essential services, agriculture, security sector reforms, technical assistance, etc. An important aspect involves technical support and financial assistance in the national budget processes, so called budget support.

The development tool is important as it has the potential to create long-term stabilisation by addressing a number of grievances amongst the local population. There are plenty of research and policy documents that highlight the correlation between security and economic development, and poverty and insecurity.[46] While the causation of these concepts in relation to each other are harder to establish, it is clear that development assistance is an important factor in avoiding a relapse into conflict. Mere financial assistance and humanitarian support may affect immediate problems, but long-term solutions generally require reforms of government bureaucracies and governance improvements.

Key actors and their organisation: Development Organisations
Development organisations represent a group of actors working in the field of international development assistance. The largest actors involved in development assistance are the World Bank, bilateral donors, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other UN Agencies, accompanied by an almost infinite number of NGOs and International NGOs (INGOs). Their aims and mandates vary, as do their political underpinnings. Much focus within the development community is placed on the Millennium Development Goals, including the over-arching goal of halving poverty by 2015. The idea is to help countries build capacity in the areas of democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention, environment and energy and health. Another important tool is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Introduced by IMF and the World Bank at the end of the 1990s as a means to improve strategy formulation and debt relief

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[46] See as an example, DfID. 2005. *Fighting poverty to build a safer world: A strategy for security and development*, March, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/securityforall.pdf.

programmes, the PRSPs have since evolved to include the wider donor community and have been endorsed as the main framework for achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals. The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) is supposed to be a country-driven process which, among other things, stresses the importance of tackling the multifaceted challenges to development.[47] The PRS process has, however, been the subject of much criticism, e.g. for not being driven by the recipient countries, for using standard solutions for unique challenges, lack of civil society participation and too much dictation by the IMF and the World Bank.[48] Still, it is imperative for PSOs to coordinate with actors driving PRS processes, and similar frameworks, in conflict areas. Major donors act in many cases through or in coherence with the PRS, thus making the PRS network highly valuable to security actors coming in to a new environment. Furthermore, there will already be donor strategies for e.g. rule of law activities or (re)building of infrastructure in a PRS, areas that are sure to be a concern also for any comprehensive PSO. PRSPs are conflict-sensitive and address several challenges that are crucial to sustain peace. To coordinate with and strengthen these and equivalent processes could be a fundamental step towards transition and stability.

Development actors are involved in a broad spectrum of policy areas such as trade, poverty reduction, good governance, democratisation, gender and rule of law. Thus, even though it might be difficult to cooperate and coordinate with such a heterogeneous group of actors it is of great importance that any comprehensive intervention supports, and is supported by development actors. While humanitarian actors adhere to the humanitarian principles, development actors more often have an (implicit or explicit) political agenda; exemplified by requirements for democratisation and economic-liberalism in for example PRSPs. When it comes to civil-military coordination, this means that development actors do not have the same restrictions regarding coordination with the military as do humanitarian actors.

Coordination among development actors themselves has been a widely discussed topic in the development community for some time now. Through the Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, countries and organisations committed to continue to increase efforts in harmonising, aligning and managing aid.[49] If this will have any implications for civil-military cooperation remains to be seen

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[47] Sida, 2005. *Poverty Reduction Strategy*, Position paper
[48] Hök. 2006. *Förändrat ledarskap viktigast i PRS-processen*,
http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=169&a=24037
[49] OECD/DAC. 2005. *The Paris Declaration*,
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html.

but it will certainly facilitate cooperation between development actors, which in turn could facilitate and make coherence with non-development actors easier.

2.3.3   Humanitarian Relief

Just as the development sector, humanitarian relief tasks are required in a conflict environment long before military organisations deploy. Humanitarian relief and assistance is a wide category that can include almost anything that is needed to ensure survival and protection as well as establishing dignity of life. However, Humanitarian Assistance can be divided in three categories which define the different types of humanitarian activities;

- Direct assistance which is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services
- Indirect assistance is one step removed from the population and includes activities such as logistic and transportation of goods and relief personnel
- Infrastructure support which involves providing general services such as road repair, power generators, etc

In addition to immediate relief humanitarian assistance also includes evacuations, search and rescue, handling of mortal remains (recovering bodies), psycho-social support, restoring family links, family reunification, etc; all of which are important humanitarian tasks to be undertaken in pre and post-conflict environments.

There is no clear line of separation between long-term development assistance and humanitarian relief although humanitarian assistance should always be non-political and conducted according to humanitarian principles rather than political aims.[50]

Key actors and their organisation: Humanitarian Organisations
The humanitarian community is a very heterogeneous group of actors with different aims, mandates and ways of operating. Describing and analysing the range of actors in this group is beyond the scope of this report, but they can be divided into three categories; the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC); UN humanitarian agencies (e.g. World Food Program – WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR); and International organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While they all subscribe to the same humanitarian principles, there are significant differences in the interpretation and application of these principles in the field. Three of these core principles are 'impartiality', 'neutrality' and

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[50] ICRC. 2008. *The Code of Conduct for the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JMNB, p. 1.

'independence': meaning that the provision of humanitarian aid should be based on need alone and humanitarian organisations should not take sides in any conflict. As a result humanitarian organisations aspire to have complete independence from all actors that can be seen as exerting political influence over the distribution of aid. These principles have been promoted by ICRC, are adhered to by many humanitarian organisations and can create difficulties for coordination with both military and development organisations, as well as political actors. Nonetheless, a clear trend amongst NGOs is that this narrow and apolitical approach is being replaced by a much broader and more politicised interpretation of the humanitarian principles. Many NGOs believe that they have a responsibility not only to alleviate suffering, but also to influence the political context that caused the conflict in the first place.[51] Thus, while many humanitarian organisations avoid civil-military cooperation, this does not apply to all of them. Many organisations, especially those within the UN system, have been more open to such cooperation, as long as the humanitarian principles can be held intact.

Due to the multitude of actors involved in this sector, humanitarian actors have developed better mechanisms for coordination amongst themselves than most other actors. One example is the newly adopted 'Cluster Approach' which is a way of co-ordinating the provision of some essential services needed to guarantee survival for populations affected by disasters and emergencies. The Cluster Approach is based on ensuring effective delivery of assistance through appointing predetermined lead agencies in the different categories of tasks.[52]

Humanitarian NGOs often have flat network-centric organisational structures, involving a number of autonomous agents that co-operate through voluntary coordination bodies. The lack of clear hierarchical structures can be difficult to relate to for military counterparts. This is particularly prevalent in the planning phase where military staffs are used to relating to a higher central command, which does not exist in many NGOs. This is exacerbated by the fact that most humanitarian organisations work with immediate relief rather than long term planning and development. Sometimes short-term and long-term activities are at odds with each other. Similarly, the military and other actors often perceive of NGO responses to emergencies as chaotic and disorganised since such responses are often voluntary, self-organised or disorganised efforts that do not always

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[51] Erin A. Weir. 2006. *Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative*, KAIPTC Monograph, No. 4, June 2006, pp. 27-31.

[52] Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds.). 2008, 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management'. NUPI Report, *Security in Practice* no. 11. p. 13

require the same degree of central authority for planning and deployment.[53] However, the recently adopted Humanitarian Reform and the associated Cluster Approach has helped create increased predictability and accountability amongst these organisations as well as strengthened partnerships in the humanitarian sector.[54]

2.3.4   Political and Reconciliation Processes

Security activities alone generally do not solve conflicts as they do not address its root causes. The political activity category involves both the conflict termination peace process and the post-conflict political processes. This means a number of undertakings related to the creation or reconstruction of local political processes, as well as reconciliation – most often aimed towards Western normative frameworks of democracy and liberal market economy. In addition, these may be supported by high-level political efforts, such as diplomacy. Diplomatic and political activities may include everything from negotiations in the peace process, via the creation of conducive conditions for dialogue between warring parties, to census voter registration and holding elections. Along the way there are also civil society enhancing processes, the establishment of transitional governments and electoral commissions, as well as the repatriation, return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs. Further tasks involve establishing truth and reconciliation commissions, as well as war crimes tribunals.[55]

Key Actors: the intervention, the 'host' and local dynamics
It should be noted that even though an intervention may include diplomatic envoys and such, the range of political actors in an intervention is very broad and all the actors mentioned in above sections, with few exceptions, are instruments of policy, working in various ways towards political or humanitarian objectives. Particularly, many of the political processes and reforms takes place under development assistance conditionality – at least in theory, since without adherence to democratic principles of good governance, assistance can be withdrawn.[56]

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[53] Friis, Karsten and Pia Jarmyr (eds.). 2008, 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management'. NUPI Report, *Security in Practice* no. 11. p. 13
[54] IASC. 2005. 'The Global Cluster Leads', http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=217
[55] For more information on these activities see the UN Peacebuilding fund website at http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml
[56] *Koeberle, Stefan, H. Bedoya, P. Silarsky & G. Verheyen (eds). 2005. Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons. The World Bank.*

Other than the political pressure for peace imposed by the intervention itself, the attitudes of the host government and the local population is vital for establishing peace and reconciliation. The chance of success for a PSO will rely heavily on the conditions for entry. The word 'consent' and the extent to which it can be applied in relation to a host government and local actors is an important basis for how any intervention should be formulated. Most PSOs, albeit not all, are deployed in situations where there is a relatively benevolent host government. A PSO that is deployed without the consent of the host government, or other important parties in a conflict, will presumably face harder challenges and will therefore need another set up. Consent is usually based on the existence of a peace agreement, between the main warring parties, which also request the presence of an international military force to observe and support the implementation of the agreement. However, the existence of a peace agreement do not always guarantee a genuine commitment to peace, particularly if the parties have been compelled to reach agreement by pressure from the international community rather than by their own constituency, or if the peace process has not included all relevant parties.[57] That a seemingly benevolent host is not a guarantee for a smooth PSO can be exemplified by recent interventions in Darfur, by the African Union led AMIS and the following AU-UN hybrid intervention UNAMID. AMIS was deployed with the consent of the major parties, yet it was clear that 'consent' was a relative term. Without going into the deficiencies particular to AMIS it was clear that both the existing ceasefire agreements and peace agreements were being violated by those who had signed them.[58] Furthermore, the Government of Sudan had its own interests and managed to affect the different mandates, and the subsequent composition of the interventions to such an extent that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for AMIS to keep the peace.[59]

Since any intervention can be seen as a political tool, the local perception of the intervention – by both the local government and parties to the conflict, as well as civil society – might differ but the underlying interests that guide this view might have fundamental consequences for how a PSO is able to undertake its tasks and the level of support or resistance it will obtain from the host state and general host environment. If the intervention is perceived as being biased or supporting certain actors, whether it actually is or not, this will affect how all actors

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[57] United Nations. 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine). United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support, p. 49

[58] Large parts of SLM/A were for instance not part of the process.

[59] Ekengard, A. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), Experiences and Lessons Learned*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

involved relate to the intervention. This might mean decreased or increased, access to sensitive areas and vulnerable populations; less, or more, confidence in the mission by local populations; and decreased, or increased, consent from relative parties.

Whether or not the local parties adhere to a reached peace agreement such an agreement is a crucial framework, bound to shape any PSO. Not only is a PSO often deployed to help create the conditions for a lasting peace agreement but the peace agreement itself often creates the conditions for how a PSO is undertaken. What activities a PSO will pursue is also usually more formalised under a peace agreement. Reform of the security sector and supplementary systems, and conducting demobilisation and disarmament are standardised tasks outlined for a PSO in a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA). Nonetheless, peace agreements provide a framework for other, not so obviously military tasks for the intervening force, as well as outlining areas that require cooperation with other actors. A peace agreement is a framework that stretches over both the short and the long-term covering immediate needs and rehabilitation as well as post-conflict recon-struction and peace-building. Assisting with the delivery of humanitarian aid and supporting reconciliation processes is but two of the many areas of assistance that might be assigned to a PSO under a CPA, but a CPA is a framework of action not only for the PSO itself but also its wider coalition and non associated agents. Strengthening civil society after conflict is a task for peacekeepers as well as a multitude of other actors. Intervening military forces should therefore be fully aware of how their activities may impact the workings of other agents in supporting the implementation of a peace agreement. There is also usually a connection between various frameworks, such as peace agreements and PRSPs. DDR programmes, for example, come with great social, economic and political implications. They must therefore be integrated into a wider institutional development strategy.[60]

2.3.5   Other Actors of Significance

The business sector, involving multinational corporations, private security companies (PSCs), different contractors, the mining industry and the defence industry might play essential roles in post-conflict settings. Many of them are

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[60] Fitz-Gerald, Ann. 2003 'Linkages between Security Sector Reform (SSR), Peace Support operations (PSO), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)', concept Paper for Whitehall Policy Seminar, London 9 January 2003

crucial for long term economic development, as well as for security and the initial provision of essential goods.[61]

Another important set of actors that an intervention need to cooperate with, are the local actors. These include the wide range of individuals, organisations and companies such as, local informal networks, religious institutions, traditional leadership and justice systems, unions, local NGOs, women's groups and private companies. In this report, such actors will be dealt with as being part of the intervention environment. Here it is sufficient to say that cooperation will much depend on context, and the fundamental objective of sustainability and local ownership will be realised in different ways depending on e.g. the type of conflict and levels of violence.

2.4   Challenges

The challenges of coordination and integration related to the Comprehensive Approach are numerous.[62] Some of these are of overarching character, e.g. pertaining to civil-military cultural differences or the differences in ends, ways and means of actors in multifunctional environments. Others are more specific, addressing elements of structures and processes such as methodology for analysis or terminology in planning processes. Certain characteristics may hamper coordination and need to be overcome. Whilst these cannot be changed, awareness and consideration of them can facilitate smoother cooperation. For purposes of the discussion in this report, some of the key challenges are highlighted in short below.

Time perspectives: Military actors tend to operate within different time frames than many civilian-actors. Military missions often take a long time to plan, with a lengthy process leading up to deployment. Humanitarian organisations, mainly concerned with immediate relief, on the other hand need to be operable within an extremely short time-frame. However, military actors often take a shorter time-perspective than development actors. Unlike both humanitarian and development agents a military operation generally work according to a given time-line, with the end of an operation often constituting an 'End-date' instead of an 'End-state', to which many civilian organisations aspire. As a consequence many civilian organisations, particularly those in the developmental sector, are likely to remain present in a post-conflict situation long after the military actors have left.

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[61] Rosenau, William, P. Chalk & A. Rabasa. Fortcoming. *Corporate Counterinsurgency*, RAND Corporation.

[62] See Nilsson, Claes (ed). 2008. *Challenges in Multifunctional Approaches*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

In any intervention you will have some actors working on short-term emergency relief, others on medium-term rehabilitation and yet others on long-term development projects. There are often obvious tensions between those with a short-term focus (e.g. humanitarians) and those with a long-term focus (e.g. development and SSR actors).[63] One of the more critical issues in a CI is therefore to mitigate the differing time perspectives and accommodate a balance of incentives for short-term action with the need for long-term, sustainable effects.[64] In order to set up and facilitate effective multifunctional dialogue and planning, differing time-frames should be taken into account early on in the process, i.e., already in pre-intervention analysis.

Cultural clashes: The variety of aims and approaches of actors can hamper coordination and lead to so called 'turf wars' if not appropriately dealt with. Amongst the cultural challenges is difference in organisational goals; e.g. organisational values and basic assumptions – such as approaches to violence and linkages to governments and states – and decision-making styles etc. It also includes the functional imperatives of the respective organisations, e.g. to 'alleviate suffering' vs. being an 'instrument of defence', and issues of neutrality and impartiality. The biggest contrast is often found in the interface between humanitarians and political missions.

One manifestation of differences in culture is use of terminology. Even though the different organisations are likely to literally understand the terminology used by other organisations, the use of certain types of language can often result in misinterpretations. Experiences from experimentation have shown that particularly the use of military terminology in relation to civilian actors tend to add to already negative views of coordination as military 'owned' processes where these views already exist. Military language in for example planning can thus increase suspiciousness amongst civilians that coordination is merely a tool for the military to 'command' more than military components.

Organisational structure: The challenge of organisational structure and composition is of course related to the organisational culture, but poses an entirely different set of practical challenges. Misunderstandings regarding each others formal (or informal) structures often impede communication and cause confusion regarding how to make contact with each other. This is particularly the case between military organisations and civilian organisations such as humanitarian

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[63] Hull, Cecilia. 2008. *Integrated Missions: a Liberia Case Study*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

[64] Nilsson, Claes (ed). 2008. *Challenges in Multifunctional Approaches*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

agencies and NGOs. For example; the military is culturally and structurally hierarchical and is generally disciplined and well trained in its core tasks of increasing and maintaining security. It has clear lines of authority and chain of command, which has sometimes caused confusion regarding how to relate to more informal civilian organisations in the field because of their often flatter and less clear organisational structures.[65]. Another important factor in concept development is the general lack of inter-organisational knowledge and under-standing, signified by enduring conflicts of roles, responsibilities and termi-nology. This leads to misunderstandings in multifunctional environments, and a seemingly constant flow of new inventions in terms of inter-organisational approaches, planning processes and suggested coordination mechanisms. There is a need to underpin the conceptual and practical development of multifunc-tional approaches with a more thorough under-standing of how different organi-sations can interact, and what the incentives for such interaction may be.

Resources and means: Resource asymmetry is another major obstacle for coordi-nation efforts. State actors will in most cases have substantial economic as well as administrative resources that only very few IOs or NGOs can match. Also, the resources that many state actors can dedicate to analysis and planning greatly outmatch those of non-state actors. Many organisations devote only a very limited set of resources to strategic or operational planning and they are used to flexible and ad hoc planning approaches. Awareness of this asymmetric relation-ship is an important step towards greater cooperation. Many actors will not be able to attend meetings for analysis and planning as often as would be desired because of lack of resources, not lack of will.

The substandard of civilian technology is also a field level resource issue. NATO and UN military units are likely to possess more technologically advanced communications equipment than many humanitarian organisations and NGOs. Civilian and military technology is often incompatible, making communication, and thus cooperation and coordination, very difficult, or even impossible.[66] It is therefore important to ensure that communication equipment is technologically compatible, simple and designed to function in low-tech and chaotic field environments.

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[65] Winslow, Donna. 2005. 'Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian Crisis: NGOs and the Military'. In *Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective,* (eds) N. Mychajlyszyn, & T.D. Shaw, 113–28. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate

[66] Beauregard, A. 1998. 'Civil-military Cooperation: Lessons from Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda'. *The Ploughshares Monitor* 19 (4)

2.5 The Organisational Context

While this report develops a generic scenario of a comprehensive intervention, it is of importance to acknowledge that organisational settings of the intervention will have an impact on the nature of operations, not least the mandate, legitimacy, leadership, and actors involved in intervention operations, and will vary between different organisations. The purpose of this section is not to seek to describe all potential differences, but to highlight a number of important aspects that provides the reader with an appreciation of the main differences, as well as a foundation for more detailed study in relation to specific cases.

2.5.1 The European Union

The strength of the European Union is the ability to deploy a wide range of civil-military instruments in support of its operations and its conceptual development of the comprehensive approach. All instruments and actors needed for comprehensive interventions are available to the strategic leadership. However, the EU-system does not contain the same width in terms of operational mechanisms for humanitarian and development activities as the UN, there is therefore nonetheless a great need for close coordination and cooperation with UN agencies and other civilian actors in future comprehensive operations within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework.

Operations taking place within an ESDP context are well funded and their staffs are generally well trained. The organisation therefore also has great potential in terms of providing a single strategic-level body that sets the context for the operation as a whole.[67] However, the EU as it stands today cannot provide such a single strategic-level body as civilian and military arrangements are split between the different pillars and programmes of the EU. This means separate chains of command and bureaucratic complexity in the planning and implementation of operations. The available resources for military and police operations are also limited within Europe, and most troops are assigned to rosters both in the NATO and in the EU, if not also the UN.

The EU has a range of concepts for civil-military cooperation, ranging from CIMIC at the tactical level to the adherence to several of the UN guidelines for civil-military cooperation. The EU's strategic concept for multifunctional opera-

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[67] Smith, Rupert. *2005. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane, p. 389.

tions is the Comprehensive Approach.[68] In 2005 and 2006 the EU adopted the British conceptual development of Comprehensive Approaches, which serves to create 'holistic' views of conflicts/post-conflict situations, a treatment of the instruments at the organisation's disposal as 'tools in a toolbox', emphasis on integrated, civil-military planning, and focus on the desired outcomes rather than processes of operations.[69] In general terms, the main objective of this Comprehensive Approach is to identify *what* needs to be done, *when* and by *whom*, in order to create a lasting solution in complex theatres.

2.5.2 The United Nations

The UN is a broad organisation that encompasses an impressive range of actors – political, developmental, humanitarian and military—that deploy in multifunctional operations. Due to its wide organisation, the UN is the only organisation that could undertake a comprehensive intervention all by itself. The Comprehensive Approach operated within the UN system is referred to as 'Integrated Missions' (IM).[70] Despite IM being the most developed comprehensive approach and the UN such an encompassing entity, different UN agencies still struggle to sufficiently coordinate their activities.

Another issue is that whilst the UN has surprisingly swift internal structure, bureaucracy on the part of the member states usually results in slow responses to immediate crises, causing delays and increased crisis before the deployment of operations. After passing resolutions that mandate interventions or peace operations, member states are often reluctant to contribute sufficient resources for effective operations. This is particularly clear when looking at the military side, and specifically units beyond the abundant light infantry. UN operations therefore tend to have insufficient resources for effective operations and fulfilment of the mandate.

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[68] Derblom, Markus, R. Egnell & C. Nilsson. 2007. *The impact of strategic concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations - A Baseline Collective Assessment Report*. Swedish defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

[69] Derblom, Markus, R. Egnell & C. Nilsson. 2007. *The impact of strategic concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations - A Baseline Collective Assessment Report*. Swedish defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm, p. 5.

[70] See, Hull, Cecilia. 2008. *Integrated Missions: a Liberia Case Study*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm; Derblom, Markus, R. Egnell & C. Nilsson. 2007. *The impact of strategic concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations - A Baseline Collective Assessment Report*. Swedish defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

Beyond this the UN enjoys great global legitimacy as the only body that can legally intervene in countries, as well as authorise other organisations or actors to do so. In addition, the organisation has vast experience of undertaking a wide range of peace support operations.

2.5.3   NATO

The strengths of NATO as an intervening organisation are the military resources available and the well-established command and control structures that ensure good coordination despite a multinational setting. NATO is probably the only organisation that can engage in large-scale peace enforcement operations over a longer period of time. The organisation nevertheless suffers from serious limitations on the civilian side, and despite the development of a Comprehensive Approach concept it is essentially a military organisation that will always require support from civilian agencies and organisations in order to engage in comprehensive interventions. Moreover, NATO, as a Western defence organisation, does not always have the same legitimacy in the developing world as some other inter-governmental organisations.

2.5.4   Coalitions of the Willing

'Coalition of willing'-type of interventions have the benefit of involving a strong lead nation. This often means plenty of military resources as well as efficient command and control structures. However, coalitions of willing often suffer from limited geographic participation which means less legitimacy. This is exacerbated in those cases when coalitions act unilaterally without authorisation from a UNSC resolution. In fact, the presence of a coalition of willing often indicates that there is no consensus within the international community about a common response to a crisis. Furthermore, individual states have limited development and humanitarian resources and have to rely on the UN to provide these, something that might be problematic in those cases when there is no UNSC resolution to mandate the operation.

2.5.5   Regional Alternatives

In terms of local legitimacy, cultural understanding and rapid reaction, regional security organisations like the African Union (AU) or ECOWAS can be the best option for interventions as the closer geographical proximity to the conflict may provide a number of positive aspects. As an example, troops from the region are

likely to enjoy higher local legitimacy, knowledge of local culture and language, as well as an understanding of the conflict dynamic in the specific case.[71]

The EU is not included in this section, even though it is a regional organisation, because it capabilities as an international security agent goes far beyond that of regular regional organisations. The types of regional organisations referred to here are traditionally regional security organisations existing in less developed regions. Their troops tend to be insufficiently trained and lacking essential equipment and the organisations themselves tend to have limited resources for planning and command and control.[72] In addition, in general these organisations have limited civilian capacity, meaning that their operations are less likely to be comprehensive. The financial situation of regional organisations in the developing world is generally such that these require extensive support in terms of funding, equipment and transportation.

2.5.6 Organisational context in sum

There are clear strengths and weaknesses associated with every actor and the important thing is to understand the particular organisational nature, culture and strategic concepts of each operational setting. Most non-UN operations will still rely on UNSC resolutions for international legality and legitimacy. They will also need to co-ordinate with those UN agencies that are likely to be operating side by side with the intervening organisation or coalition.

The main differences that the organisational context has in terms of impact on a Comprehensive Intervention is whether the 'organisation' conducting the intervention has any built-in civilian functions (such as a UN mission for example) or is a mainly military organisation (like NATO or a Coalition of the Willing). The Intervention will also be dependent on the extent of integration between the military and civilian components, in UN missions for example the civil-military relationship is already so predetermined by the organisational structure of the UN that additional and mission specific civil-military coordination mechanisms are not widely relied on. In EU missions, conducted by an organisation that still have a lot of civilian functions but which are not as widely integrated, coordination

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[71] Bogland, Karin, R. Egnell & M. Lagerström. 2008. *The African Union - A Study Focusing on Conflict Management*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

[72] Hull, Cecilia & E. Svensson. *The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) - Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm.; Svensson, Emma. 2008. *The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) - Lessons learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation*. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm; Ekengard, Arvid. 2008. *The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) - Experiences and lessons learned.* Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

becomes more important. It is ever more so in missions conducted by organisations like the AU. AU missions, as well as those conducted by NATO and Coalitions of the Willing, exist as separate legal and organisational entities from civilian efforts active in any given country and are therefore very dependent on establishing coordination mechanisms through which interactions with these are made possible.

3 The Comprehensive Intervention

Figure 2. The Intervention Focus

In this section the framework for a Comprehensive Intervention is applied through a general discussion and recommendations for how CA could be implemented. The discussion is focused on the generic steps of the strategic process – Analysis, Planning, Execution/Implementation, and Monitoring & Evaluation – and describes and gives recommendations for how a Comprehensive Intervention should be conducted in relation to each. The four steps are part of a generic process used by military actors when conducting an intervention, they mirror the military perspective we have taken when describing a CI in this report, and the recommendations made are based on the context that was described in chapter 2. The four steps express the relationship between high-level strategies, intervention planning and field-level coordination. With a comprehensive outset there must be coherence in the whole of this process – from the strategic analysis phase, through decisions on desired outcomes and the choice of instruments, to operational functional planning and the decision on specific activities to manage the crisis, including monitoring and evaluation. The steps will be dealt with individually below, however, it is important to note that CA must be sufficiently applied to each of these steps as they are mutually reinforcing and failure to implement the approach in relation to one will impede coherence regarding the others. As stated earlier, this report elaborates more on the latter two steps since 'analysis' and, particularly, 'planning' have been relatively well covered in previous reports from this study series.

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3.1 Analysis in a Comprehensive Intervention

All planning approaches rely on thorough input in terms of information about the current situation. Sufficient analysis and assessment of a situation entails the development of a shared understanding amongst the planners regarding the nature of the conflict situation, the actors involved, their interests and inter-dependencies, and the identification of root causes of the prevailing circum-stances as well as the opportunities at hand.

Today, analysis for PSOs is at best a combination of inputs rather than a collabo-rative analysis of different inputs. It is clear that collaborative analysis presumes a greater understanding of the need for multi-actor participation. The general incentives for coordination, such as resource-dependency, sharing of values, organisational impact, work towards this end. However, additional efforts for highlighting the incentives for coordination need to be made by key actors of an intervention; efforts such as emphasising information sharing, resource syner-gies, and an opportunity to exert influence over the design of the intervention.

Analysis is often viewed as a separate, distinct step in the strategic process. However, analysis should be conducted regularly, and have clear links to the monitoring and evaluation of the situation and progress made during the course of the intervention. The analysis result is the baseline for measuring progress during the implementation of the intervention.

Depending on the organisational context and the actors involved, the methodo-logy for analysing the situation varies significantly. In multifunctional and multi-national settings, the variation is exacerbated by the fact that individual actors may be reluctant to share information and intelligence when and where its sources can be identified and potentially questioned. Additionally, individual actors may want to retain freedom of action as long as possible and commitments at an early stage are generally avoided. Typically, the organisational structure of actors in crisis management is not designed for collaboration and smooth infor-mation sharing. Instead, organisations are often structured to reflect their vision, mission and activities. However, attempts to conduct analysis separately and then combine the results are not sufficient. A study by the World Bank has shown that analysing a situation collaboratively is a key precursor to coherent action later on. [73]

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[73] World Bank. 2006. 'Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational Challenges'. Report No. 36446-GLB, 21 June

Combining different methodologies for analysis is challenging. Recent CD&E efforts indicate that relatively straight-forward and sector-neutral overlay methodologies, based on e.g. simplistic questions or checklists and allowing different actors to provide inputs based on their own respective approaches, are key in creating shared understanding.[74] To conduct collaborative analysis, a process that adequately considers different analysis inputs of varying maturity must exist and complex, rigid processes emanating from a single domain (e.g. military) will not allow for this kind of inclusiveness. Instead, analysis methodologies that constitute a mixture of different processes and inputs should be designed and applied. This includes inputs from actors already engaged in the environment as well as the ones tentatively involved in the Comprehensive Intervention. These inputs may range from expert participation to reviews of frameworks and plans of other actors. This also entails a stakeholder analysis, in which different actors are assessed in terms of the relevance and degree of support for the intervention.[75]

It is also important to ensure that there is an appropriate relationship between strategic and field levels during the course of the intervention, as well as a continuous flow of relevant information passing between these. Recent CD&E has shown that strategic level analysis can not simply be passed on to lower levels of planning without making sure that core assumptions are shared with those that are 'closer' to the field. The need for a joint understanding of the situation is thus both horizontal and vertical in a Comprehensive Intervention.

It is always difficult to reach generate enough understanding regarding the root causes of conflict in an analysis. In a multi-actor environment, differences in approach and organisational culture affect the perception of what constitutes both the problems and causes. It is not likely that one 'perfect' analysis, corresponding to everyone's perception of reality, can ever be made, but just because of this, collaborative analysis must allow for these differences of opinion to be recognised, in order to attain the widest and deepest understanding of the intervention environment as possible.

Another benefit of collaborative analysis, at all stages of an intervention, is that it tentatively provides an opportunity for dialogue among disparate actors. This promotes mutual understanding of the different perspectives, approaches and activities of other actors. Ideally, it could also lead to subsequent integration or facilitate coordination of planning, implementation and evaluation. The analysis

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[74] The Swedish National Defence College is currently working on methods for increased coordination in strategic analysis.

[75] Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5). 2008. Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation – Outline Concept, Draft, Version 2.5

should ideally include the perspectives of local actors. No one will be better suited to provide in-depth knowledge about complex conflict dynamics than local actors. Here, just as with international actors, it is vital to collaborate with several groups, representing the views of as many parties and groups as possible.

3.2 Planning

3.2.1 Planning Challenges

Comprehensive Interventions are based on the assumption that a high degree of coordination and cooperation is achievable in planning. This, then, entails the challenge of how to get relevant actors to the planning table and how to get them to strive for common objectives without necessarily having any form of control or command. This is perhaps the core theme in the development efforts regarding CA, and most challenges highlighted throughout this report are affected by the success or failure in bringing the right people with the right authority and resources together for multifunctional planning.

The 'strategic deficit' of contemporary operations addressed in chapter 1, will inevitably be a challenge in the planning phase. Strategic direction is often deemed to be too vague and overarching when planning for tangible activities and effective mechanisms for transforming these directions are rarely found in multifunctional, multinational settings. Both research and lessons from CD&E indicate a high relevance and importance of joint, multifunctional implementation planning for both 'filling in the blanks' and achieving better strategic linkage, agility and coordination prospects. Such processes set the scene for actual agreement and coordination of ends, ways and means and it provides the foundation for the requisite long-term thinking needed in contemporary crises management and peace-building. Serving as a link between direction from the strategic level and the activities at field level, implementation planning can facilitate the transition from often far reaching visions and end-states, into concrete mission plans. To make best use of the information flows and input from both strategic level and field level, planning in a Comprehensive Intervention should be dynamic, allowing for bottom-up input and adjustments, and ongoing throughout the scope of the engagement. Joint monitoring and evaluation is in this respect imperative.

Although development efforts linked to multifunctional approaches have been able to provide the foundation for the requisite long-term thinking needed in crises management, a conceptual challenge still lies in showing how interventions takes existing programmes and strategies of actors already involved into

account as well as how these and entering actors could 'best' interact. Any multi-functional intervention should form a reinforcing and complementary approach to the situation at hand – i.e. based on initial questions such as which programmes are already in place?, Which programmes need additional support in their implementation?, What actors are responsible, and how do we interact with, or support, these actors?, How does this impact our own approach and plans?

3.2.2   Planning for a Comprehensive Intervention

Planning is the agreement on the ends, ways, and means of the intervention. As for analysis, planning approaches and methodologies vary significantly, depending on the organisational context and the actors involved. In the intervention environment, there will also be a range of potential plans and planning initiatives available as different actors have different time perspectives in their engagement.

Besides the analysis, the overall strategic guidance dictates the starting point for the intervention planning process. As UN Security Council Resolutions normally mandates tasks rather than desired objectives, a key challenge is to translate this into desired outcomes or effects of the intervention, through clear objectives and conditions marking their attainment. Once the common objectives have been agreed, a strategy for achieving them needs to be worked out between the actors seeking to achieve them. The many actors operating in a crisis zone need to carry out their own missions and mandates successfully, yet none of their activities is undertaken in isolation. Rather, their activities affect one another and for all to be effective they should be conducted as part of an overall strategy so that they support and reinforce one another. For the intervention, already existing plans and programmes in the intervention environment should be considered a core planning input. Coordinated efforts also open up the opportunity of making use of everyone's assets and resources, combining various types of instruments, whether civilian or military.

Military forces which seek to undertake its operations with a CA cannot merely focus on its own core functions, but must also seek to do so in a way that supports and reinforces the activities of the other actors. Planning with a comprehensive mindset is not only important to generate an understanding of the conflict situation, but also to achieve consensus amongst relevant actors for what the overarching aim of the intervention should be.

To accommodate the different time-perspectives and focus of actors in or outside the intervention, collaborative planning must allow for different maturity and different types of inputs to planning. As already mentioned, there is an

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asymmetry of resources available for planning, which means all actors will have to engage with an open mind-set. We have argued that no single method for planning will fit everybody. The most central issue here is that we need to reach an agreement on overarching outcomes that subsequent 'actor-specific' planning can use as a framework for planning. Thus, Comprehensive Intervention planning can be seen as a framework for connecting different plans towards a set of high-level outcomes. Every outcome might not be affected by every actor; indeed, some outcomes may be envisioned to occur after some actors have left the area.[76] The important thing here is to keep a long-term, multifunctional focus in the planning-phase. If outcomes are agreed upon, it will also be easier to identify supporting-supported relationships, i.e. where one actor might be 'lead' for achieving one outcome, other actors might be able to support.

To conduct this proposed multifunctional implementation planning there is a need to find 'forums' that are acceptable to actors from different countries, organisations and instruments, and that are able to create incentives for coordination. The UK's Stabilisation Unit's approach to planning is one example of in-theatre implementation planning which brings together actors from defence, development and diplomacy, in order to create a shared plan and strategy for the UK in complex environments. Building on the experiences from these efforts, together with CD&E within MNE 5, we propose some general traits of such a forum:

Firstly, there is a huge need for flexible methods and inclusiveness in cooperative planning. If actors do not feel that they can affect the discussions they will have very little incentive to stay in the forum.

Secondly, a planning team with skilled facilitators encompassing multi-domain familiarity is highly valuable. The planning team should be small (3-5 persons) and should be seen by the other actors as neutral, i.e. not favouring any of the involved actors.

Thirdly, the planning process needs to be iterative, in that it should allow continuous dialogue between the different levels (strategic, operational and field-level) to ensure that planning is responsive to changes in the environment. In the complex, multi-actor environments described in chapter 2, it will not be possible to create plans that will be relevant throughout the course of a Comprehensive Intervention.

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[76] For instance, the military term end-state has proven to be problematic in multi-actor environments as the military end-state is likely to occur long before e.g. development or state-building efforts are sustainable. Therefore, it is proposed that military forces should not only focus on the end-state but also consider longer term actions and programmes implemented by other actors and the effect these will have when planning for Comprehensive Interventions.

Lastly, the importance of planning for in-theatre coordination as well as monitoring and evaluation is highlighted. These issues will be further elaborated in the next two sections and it is sufficient to say that these activities will be fundamental in creating the conditions for a Comprehensive Intervention.

3.3 Execution

3.3.1 Execution Challenges

We have argued that without strategic and operational level cooperation and coordination, the effects of in-theatre coordination efforts will be hampered – 'It is impossible to achieve coherence if the framework, with which individual agents have to be coherent, is missing'.[77]

Taking note of the arrangements that have been attempted and lessons learnt is one of the most important tasks at this stage of CA concept development. The nature of multifunctional interventions requires mechanisms for coordination to be flexible and avoid a 'one size fits all' approach, which would likely impede coordination. Different organisations have different criteria for what effective coordination looks like. For 'neutrality minded' IOs and NGOs sharing of relevant, reliable and quality information can often constitute valuable coordination. Information sharing is therefore a crucial aspect of joint operations. However, not just any information can be shared between military and civilian actors. NGOs are also often concerned about the fact that sensitive information provided to military organisations might be used as intelligence in the pursuit of military aims, and that the independence and impartiality of the NGOs will be compromised. NGOs generally have a wealth of information, which they can share, but they will be uncomfortable to do so if they are treated as intelligence sources. Several organisations might be prepared to share information about vulnerable populations, but might be unwilling to share other sensitive information with a peace operation in general, and the military in particular; especially information regarding the host government or other belligerents, from fear that it would jeopardise the conditions under which they have access to vulnerable people.[78]

Moreover, there is a huge challenge related to leadership and management. Who is in charge of ensuring the achievement of multifunctional and comprehensive

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[77] DeConing. 2007. Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peace building and Integrated Missions, p 23.

[78] Abiew. 2003. *From Civil Strife to Civic Society: NGO-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations.* Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Occasional Paper No. 39, p. 16

approaches? Who would be the lead agent or lead nation? The one with the most influence/power or the one with the most legitimacy?[79] Despite having argued that it is highly unlikely that any actor will be able to efficiently be in charge of the coordination of a multitude of civilian and military actors in complex emergencies, we must find some form of incentive for creating coherence.

Lastly, CA implies a top-down approach where aims and objectives and how to implement these are established at a strategic level and implemented at the local level. This raises issues regarding local ownership and how multifunctional approaches can relate to decentralization and local authority. The more comprehensive an intervention is the more actors it involves and this might make the transition of authority back to the locals and therefore also exit strategies more difficult to achieve.[80]

3.3.2   Executing a Comprehensive Intervention

The previous sections have outlined the various motives for co-ordination and adopting a Comprehensive Approach. Whilst most actors today acknowledge the need for better coordinated and comprehensive efforts there is no single model for how a Comprehensive Intervention should be conducted. This section will point to measures and mechanisms supporting comprehensive approaches and promoting coordination that have proven effective in the field. It does not seek to prescribe a guaranteed formula; rather it will sketch out the main requirements needed to conduct a Comprehensive Intervention and give examples of how these have been applied. As described in earlier sections of this report some organisations, particularly humanitarian ones, are independence minded and do not wish to be associated with the political or military objectives of an intervention. This standpoint needs to be respected and the relationship with these organisations should be kept at an appropriate level of collaboration or mere coexistence. This section, however, is concerned with the actors that are both willing and able to partake in a comprehensive intervention and seek cooperation and to coordinate their activities in pursuit of a coherent approach.

Types of mechanisms for conducting CI
Once a planning process has pinpointed joint desired outcomes of an intervention, a comprehensive intervention needs a range of mechanisms for coordination at the field-level, in support of these commonly established objectives. Such

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[79] Friis, K & P. Jarmyr (eds). 2008. ' Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Opportunities in Complex Crisis Management'. NUPI Report, Security in Practice No.11, pp. 16-17

[80] Friis & Jarmyr (eds). 2008. 'Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Opportunities in Complex Crisis Management'. NUPI report, *Security in Practice* No 11, pp. 18-19

coordination mechanisms are evidentially important but many ask what type of mechanisms they are and what type of coordination they facilitate.

To a great extent many coordination mechanisms have been ad hoc functions and here is a great validity to them being informal and improvised; after all, most comprehensive approaches are still evolving concepts, responding to emerging challenges and their implementation therefore often needs to be of an improvised nature. Mechanisms for coordination are essential but development of a CA concept and finding the most appropriate forms of coordination is still a work in progress, and has to a great extent been a case of trial and error. Particularly where limited strategic direction has existed, comprehensive arrangements tend to include a high degree of ad-hocism. Whilst not *always* desirable, such approaches can be positive since they are generally designed to meet specific field-level needs. For coordination mechanisms to fulfil such flexibility the decision-making authority needs to be decentralised to field-level – facilitating swift and appropriate responses in tune with the situation at hand. Nonetheless, far from all comprehensive mechanisms are ad hoc, even though their form and function may vary slightly between different missions. Field-coordination requirements for executing a comprehensive intervention for example include; mechanisms for regulated information exchange; an extensive use of liaisons; and regular consultations between – or where appropriate co-location of – the head offices of the different organisations conducting activities in the intervention environment. In addition the establishment of joint coordination bodies and joint field-level implementation plans, as well as joint coordination of press and information activities, is of great importance.

Specific Mechanisms and Tools[81]

'One Office': In inter-organisational coordination arrangements there tends to be a number of sources from which political direction is given, the number increasing in accordance with the amount of participating organisations. Too close coupling of these organisations may be sensitive but, where possible, the prospects for well-coordinated field activities will be enhanced if the political direction comes from one joint office in the field. One joint office means a single focal point for coordination and information exchange in the field, which will dramatically enhance the prospects for in-field coordination. The comprehensive approach that has come the furthest in implementing the use of such an 'common office' is the UN concept of 'Integrated Missions', which with some progress has integrated the UN system in the field under the authority of the Special Repre-

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[81] This section is based on Derblom. M, E, Hagström-Frisell & J. Schmidt.2008. *UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa.* Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

sentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), mandated to coordinate all UN activities in the country of the intervention.[82] Integrated Missions are characterised by an integrated chain of command structure blurring the lines between the military and the civilian peace support effort. Most importantly, the traditional division between the humanitarian and developmental efforts of the UN Country Team and the politico-military effort of the UN is overturned and is integrated through the combination of the previously separate functions of the Deputy SRSG (political), the Humanitarian Coordinator (humanitarian) and the Resident Coordinator (development), into the function of the DSRSG/HC/RC with the overall responsibility for all. Such an integration of UN efforts has made the division between UN military and civilian efforts difficult to distinguish, but combine the defence, diplomacy and development entities of the UN effectively in a Comprehensive Approach.[83] Few organisations are as 'wide' as the UN, encompassing a great range of military and civilian actors under the 'UN' umbrella. The creation of 'one office' with an integrated command, as in Integrated Missions, may therefore not be appropriate in many interventions led by other organisations; however, joint political direction is important and should be applied where appropriate, in other situations different measures such as the co-location of offices may be more suitable.

Co-location of offices: Where direct joint political direction is not possible, coherence can be promoted through a range of other measures aimed at facilitating interaction and easy access to organisations with which joint strategies need to be developed. Depending on the nature of the intervention and the organisations involved, the establishment of one common office may not be appropriate. Nonetheless, the co-location of field offices can facilitate multifunctional coordination through regular consultation between concerned organisations, such co-location would also promote, if not a unified office, at least a geographic centre from which political and strategic direction is given. Co-location and easy access, if politically viable, can be key to facilitate better coordination and should be considered where appropriate to maintain regular personal and institutional contacts between actors; where not applicable, greater emphasis must be placed on establishing other forums and bodies for such regular interaction.

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[82] United Nations Security Council. 2003. *Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.* S/2003/695, p 1.

[83] Hull, Cecilia. 2008. *Integrated Missions- A Liberia Case Study.* Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm

Joint Coordination bodies and forums for information exchange: One of the most important factors for field coordination is to provide venues for the different organisations active in an area of crisis to meet and share information. Whether or not the benefits of being co-located in the field can be adhered to, provisions needs to be made for easy access and contact in formal and informal settings. The creation of joint coordination bodies should be established to undertake regular meetings, as often as required, to exchange information and coordinate activities. These should be formalised forums with stipulated agendas, benefitting from being convened around an overall implementation plan. Other, more informal, forums facilitating information exchange are also important. These should set the stage for consultation between different organisations and could take various forms, from ad-hoc telephone calls to regular video/teleconferencing etc.

Cells such as CIMIC units are important to coordinate civil-military and humanitarian activities in the field. Often Civil-Military Operations Centres – forums for day-to-day communication and first point of contact to coordinate civil-military and humanitarian activities at field level – have played a crucial role in information exchange and mutual support.[84] Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs) and Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) are also standard mechanisms for civil-military information-sharing and analysis in UN Integrated Missions.[85] Operating out of mission headquarters they are staffed by military, police and civilian staff and provide support to the whole mission and the UN Country Team, as well as non-UN entities as appropriate.[86] These entities have not always operated to their full potential but remain useful functions.

In addition, seemingly simple things such as the use of common geographical references and maps are also important information to be shared. Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs), led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), provides products and services such mapping systems, including cartographic maps and maps tracing geographical distributions of interventions within the countries in which it operates.[87] It also produces

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[84] Lipson, Michael. 2005. 'Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Peacekeeping', paper prepared for presentation at the *annual meeting of the International Studies Association*, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1-5, p 13.

[85] DeConing. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations'. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*. Vol 10:1, p. 6

[86] Eriksen, Bjørnar. 2007. Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command. Master Thesis. Norwegian Defence Staff College, p 38

[87] Olson, L & H. Gregorian. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination: lessons from a survey of Afghanistan and Liberia'. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*. Vol 10:1, p 103; Frerks. George, et al. 2006. *Principles and pragmatism: Civil-military action in Afghanistan and Liberia.* Study commissioned by Cordaid, p 80

meeting schedules through which information about days and times when coordination meetings are planned to facilitate the attendance of a range of organisations.[88] In addition, the HIC provides internet access to organisations which would otherwise not have such access. Such forums are important in any comprehensive intervention since they serve as a starting point for coordination by making information, which would otherwise not be accessible by all, publicly available.[89]

Common implementation plan and reliance on common frameworks: Even though a Comprehensive Intervention requires multi-dimensional planning in the pre-deployment stages, it is unlikely, even when well-conducted, that such integrated planning has included all relevant actors with which the operation will need to coordinate in the field. These actors should be brought together at field level in a number of ways to support a comprehensive approach. The most effective ways of delineating each actors area of responsibility, avoid overlap and strengthen a coherent approach is to establish a joint implementation plan: a plan encompassing all mandated tasks in a mission area and that has been jointly agreed upon by the different stakeholders in the field. This plan should, where possible, have strong links to the initial planning at strategic level but must also be adaptable and flexible in face of the mission environment as the situation on the ground can change rapidly. A joint coordination body should facilitate such planning, as well as its implementation. Such a joint implementation plan may not be possible in many other operations than those by the UN, however, using common frameworks could assist in promoting coherence even when 'joint implementation' as such does not exist.

Many civilian actors, particularly development actors and those within the UN family, work (as previously mentioned) in accordance with a few key strategy and planning documents; including a series of frameworks for reconstruction, development and other efforts of assistance actors.[90] These include, for example, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, Common Humanitarian Action Plans and the 'cluster approach' of the UN. Most of such frameworks set out long and/or short term goals and objectives, as well as identifying roles and responsibilities of various organisations and exists as

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[88] UNOCHA. 2006. 'HCS-UNMIL & HIC Liberia, briefing pack April 4, 2006'. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[89] Sida, Lewis & C. Szpak. 2004. An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers: including Case Studies of HICs for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia, commissioned by DFID and USAID

[90] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'UN Complex Peace Operations,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), p. 105.

frameworks for cohesion that applies to a range of actors in a zone of crisis.[91] Such frameworks will exist in any intervention environment and a Comprehensive Intervention should seek to tap into these and coordinate in accordance with these strategies.

In Liberia so called 'County Support Teams' (CSTs) were established in 2006 by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as a key mechanism for implementing two such frameworks – the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and a PRSP. [92] The CSTs were formed with the intention of bringing together the knowledge, expertise and resources of the UN in support of local government and provide an on-the-ground UN presence to assist in the restoration of civil authority and build capacity at county level.[93] Each of the fifteen local-level based CSTs are comprised of UN actors – from both UNMIL and the UN Country Team – , county administration and sometimes NGOs. Each team is coordinated by an appointed CST facilitator, drawn from amongst the UN representatives present.[94] The CSTs are supported by a management structure at national level made-up of the UN, the Liberian Ministry of Internal Affairs and other governmental ministries, county representatives and NGOs.[95] The coordination is effectively undertaken by the hosting of regular County Assessment and Action Meetings between the UN Country Team, local authorities and NGOs. These meetings are usually organized around four peace-building pillars identified in the interim PRSP. Based on the issues covered in the meetings a monthly County Assessment and Action Report is produced. These reports were initially used primarily for UN purposes but have increasingly become a tool for central government planning.[96] The CSTs provide a good example of inter-organisational coordination and coherence at the local, in-country level, bringing together a wide range of actors – international institu-

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[91] Olson, L & H. Gregorian. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination: lessons from a survey of Afghanistan and Liberia'. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*. Vol 10:1, p 103

[92] United Nations in Liberia. 2007. *United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012: Consolidating Peace and National Recovery for Sustainable Development*. Monrovia: United Nations in Liberia.

[93] United Nations in Liberia. 2006. *At Work together*. Monrovia: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations in Liberia

[94] Harvey. J, Karl. J, Motsi. M & Golakai, N. 2007. *The example of 'County Support Teams' as an integrated mission approach at the local level in Liberia*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO & UNDP, p 7

[95] Harvey. J, Karl. J, Motsi. M & Golakai, N. 2007. *The example of 'County Support Teams' as an integrated mission approach at the local level in Liberia*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO & UNDP, p 7

[96] Olson, L & H. Gregorian. 2007. 'Inter-agency and Civil-Military Coordination: lessons from a survey of Afghanistan and Liberia'. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*. Vol 10:1, p 39; Harvey et all. 2007. *The example of 'County Support Teams' as an integrated mission approach at the local level in Liberia*, p 8.

tions, donors, NGOs and other relevant actors – in a coherent peace effort.[97] The creation of the CSTs was completely ad hoc, but has been hailed as a good innovation and possible model for future operations.

Liaisons: The use of mutual liaisons – individuals empowered with quick access to appropriate levels of authority and decision-making in the organisation they represent – will also facilitate needed information exchanges and field-level contacts. They can promote inter-organisational understanding by providing information about the own organisation as well as being trained and educated about the organisation to which he or she is seconded. An important role for a liaison is to increase awareness of the different processes, cultures and operational rhythms of the different actors involved in the intervention environment and by doing so break down some of the institutional barriers to cooperation. Civil-military liaisons are essential in any intervention seeking to generate an understanding amongst civilian and military organisations of the other and facilitate cooperation between these. CIMIC units, for example, may as stated earlier establish it own civil-military cooperation cells, at other times, the CIMIC liaison officers may rather participate in operational level coordination mechanisms established by other agencies.[98] Other forms of liaisons are also common; even though NATO is a military organisation it has established a civilian function within its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, to facilitate interaction with civilian agents. The Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) is based at the ISAF Kabul HQ and works closely with the ISAF Commander to ensure that ISAF is undertaken with a comprehensive approach, for example by cooperating closely with the Afghani government as well as civil society, IOs and NGOs engaged in Afghanistan and neighbouring states.[99] Another attempt at increasing NATO's civilian capabilities was the 2006 addition of two development advisors (DEVADs) to the staff of the ISAF commander. The DEVADs were an ad hoc arrangement that has not been institutionalised and at the present, only one DEVAD remains.[100] The implementation of the SCR has not worked ideally either, the SCR and ISAF commander

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[97] United Nations. 2006. *Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination, 17 January 2006.*

[98] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'CIMIC Structure and Organization,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), p. 179.

[99] Jakobsen, V.P. Forthcoming. *NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations, First draft 19 August 2008*, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; NATO, 'NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan', http://www.nato.int/issues/scr_afghanistan/index.html

[100] Jakobsen, V.P. Forthcoming. *NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations, First draft 19 August 2008*, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

reportedly struggling to speak with one voice.[101] However, their presence has aided the concretisation of a comprehensive approach and their presence has provided ISAF with representation from all the three D's: Defence, Diplomacy and Development.

Joint Communication Strategies: The joint coordination of press and information activities may also be useful to formulate and distribute joint messages to support the overall objectives of the mission. In complex environments, any operation is highly sensitive to public perception of it. Coherence in public relations and spreading common messages can only assist in preventing false rumours and inaccurate information.

Pooling of resources and cells for common action: Mechanisms that allow for pooling of resources play a crucial role in a comprehensive intervention. Whether they are concerned with the pooling of administrative functions, medial services or equipment and transportation, for example, they support the fundamental CA objective of making use of all available resources in support of a coherent approach.

The UN DPKO's Civil-Military Coordination guidelines state that the integration of UN missions has allowed for the interaction also in non-security related fields.[102] Whilst the primary role of the military in a UN mission always is to provide security and ensure a safe environment in which civilian actors can operate, its secondary role is to support other actors in implementing the overall mission objectives. This is often done by the lending of military resources and skills to civilian actors. The military can, and according to the UN DPKO Civil-Military Coordination policy should, contribute towards development and humanitarian activities – such as relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation projects – where able and needed.[103] UN Civil-Military Coordination policy essentially deals with military support to civilians. The support is provided either in terms of security – military escort of humanitarian convoys, for example – or as a non-security related provision of military assets – the use of equipment such as trucks or helicopters for instance, or sharing of skills, knowledge or manpower.[104]

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[101] Jakobsen, V.P. Forthcoming. NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations, First draft 19 August 2008, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

[102] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2002. Civil-Military Coordination Policy. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/DPKO_CMCOORD_Policy.pdf, p 1

[103] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2002. Civil-Military Coordination Policy. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/DPKO_CMCOORD_Policy.pdf, p. 2

[104] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2002. Civil-Military Coordination Policy, p 1; IASC. 2008. Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies. United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); UNOCHA. 2008. United Nations Civil-Military coordination Officer Field Handbook, Version E 1.1. Geneva

DPKO's Civil-Military Coordination policy is an example of the newfound understanding that the interface between peace and security, and relief and reconstruction is narrow when addressing a complex conflict system through a comprehensive approach, and that the military can not do it alone.[105] A Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) functions as the coordinating body for logistical support in a UN mission, maintaining a database of all logistics assets in the mission, whether they belong to the military, civilian or police components.[106] The JLOCs bring together logistics officers from all components of the military mission and the UN Country Team, as well as external actors such as NGOs, at regular meetings.[107] It provides an opportunity to share information, as well as conduct joint planning and preparation for joint operations and facilitate cooperation on logistics and support issues. The JLOC, for example, facilitates the joint use of airfields, access routes and seaports, and coordinates the planning and provision of logistical support from and to all mission components, as well as humanitarian organisations on the basis that the logistics support is consistent with mission objectives.[108] The integration of UN missions has opened up the access to UN logistics by humanitarian organisation and put more pressure on UN logistics resources, such as transportation assets. The JLOC has therefore become an important feature of sustaining Integrated Missions.[109]

3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

3.4.1 Monitoring and Evaluation Challenges

Given the far-reaching and intangible aims of contemporary operations (stabilisation, democratisation, economic development etc), an important field of study is what to measure in terms of positive and negative effects. Evaluation of the impacts and outcomes of a single sector programme is difficult enough, and the

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[105] DeConing, Cedric. 2006. 'Overview and Introduction,' in C. DeConing (ed), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, p 11; Eriksen. B. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*. Master Thesis. Norwegian Defence Staff College, p 69

[106] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) 2: Structure of United Nations Peace Operations. New York: Training and Evaluation Service, DPKO, p 12

[107] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) 2: Structure of United Nations Peace Operations. New York: Training and Evaluation Service, DPKO, p 12

[108] United Nations General Assembly. 2006. **'**Division of Administration'. A/60/696

[109] Eriksen. B. 2007. *Integrated Missions: The Challenge of Planning and Command*. Master Thesis. Norwegian Defence Staff College, p. 40

challenges facing those evaluating multifunctional crisis management are vast. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are necessary parts of any comprehensive approach and should therefore be further developed – conceptually and practically. Challenges that are likely to occur in this area relate to e.g., what evaluation and monitoring should report against; how to merge multiple perspectives on planning and evaluating in one, mission-wide framework; how to link evaluation frameworks to strategic and operational (implementation) planning, and; how to develop methodologies for data collection and processing that are acceptable to a wide variety of civilian and military actors.

3.4.2   Monitoring and Evaluating a Comprehensive Intervention

Monitoring and evaluation are fundamental building blocks in contemporary PSOs. M&E is needed to manage plans as an operation is under way, providing policy makers, commanders (or equivalent) and planners with information needed to determine what course of action an operation should take, and is imperative in the longer term to provide lessons that pave the way for more effective operations to come.[110]

To develop good and efficient methods for evaluation is a common objective for many agencies and organisations, be it within the development community or within the military/security community. To monitor progress is fundamental and every organisation needs to show results as well as improve by learning from past experiences. Furthermore, civilian and military actors engaged in conflict areas often face similar challenges when it comes to evaluation since the objectives are often abstract and involves outcomes such as 'stability' and 'sustainability'. How does one define and measure the impact an intervention has had on 'stabilisation'? Stabilisation can mean different things to different actors and thus evaluations might give differing results. While it might be possible to turn such goals into measurable entities it will be very difficult to establish what has caused possible changes in the environment.

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[110] Here, monitoring is defined as an ongoing process with the purpose of following up on the progress of an operation in order to be able to exercise control over and manage the operation as it moves along. It is primarily an operational activity and is conducted throughout an operation. Evaluations are usually done at the end of an operation but midterm evaluations (or reviews) are also common in PSOs. Evaluations tells a broader story of what has worked and what has not, what impact an operations has had, how effective and efficient it has been, makes recommendations on course of action (if midterm), strengthens accountability and forms the basis of subsequent lessons learned processes

M&E in Conflicts

Conflict M&E is a relatively new and 'under-theorised' area, leaving practitioners to struggle with models that are largely ac-hoc and rarely correspond to the need for dynamic M&E. Furthermore, up to recently, there has not been proper training for evaluation practitioners within the area of conflict resolution.[111] M&E is generally more difficult in PSOs than in other types of international interventions. The dynamics of a conflict is hard to understand for outsiders and even harder to measure. There are such vast numbers of variables that any outcome will be immensely hard to trace back to a single programme or activity. Also, the pressure is often extremely high on actors in PSOs to produce quick and visible results since so much money and resources usually are invested. To conduct in-depth and thorough evaluations in such an environment, where the pressure from politicians, the public and the media is great, might prove extremely difficult.

For some time now both civilian and military evaluation processes are outcome-based (also called results-oriented or effects-based). This means that what is the focus of monitoring and evaluation is the outcome of a certain operation, programme or project, rather than the output or the activity in itself. Donors around the world are attempting to streamline evaluation-processes in order to enhance effectiveness in the area of evaluation. OECD/DAC has developed evaluation guidelines that many donors look to for direction[112] and generally, the donor community seems to have come further in the field of conflict M&E.

The US government has initiated a project called Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) to increase its ability to measure outcome instead of output in conflict transformation and stabilisation.[113] The MPICE framework highlights the need for including M&E early in the process, and proposes that measures and indicators of success should be used to help planners to produce and articulate relevant and measurable objectives in multifunctional operations. MPICE builds on a dual approach and advocates the need to 1) decrease the means and motivation of violent conflict and 2) increase local and state institu-

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[111] Church & Shouldice. 2003. The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions: Framing the state of play. Incore, p. 5, 14. On the gap between policy and outcome, see also Utenriksdepartementet. 2004. Towards a Sterategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together – Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding. Oslo

[112] OECD/DAC (2005), The Paris Declaration, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html.

[113] The MPICE project is a DoD, USAID and US Army jointly funded initiative to improve measurements in PSOs.

tions' capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully.[114] The MPICE framework has been used in MNE5, and has shown to be a valuable tool in multifunctional settings that should be considered in further development efforts.

OECD recently highlighted the gap between donor policy and actual outcome on the ground within the area of conflict prevention and peace building and pointed to the fact that the lack of coherence amongst donors and the lack of common strategic guidance heavily contribute to this problem.[115] While there may be differences between donor strategies in the areas of prevention and peace building, and wider strategies for comprehensive interventions, much of the same challenges apply to both. The OECD guidelines for M&E in conflict state that:

> *Given the gaps between donor intentions and outcomes in the field, coordination problems, and newly emerging aid instruments (especially in the security sector), donors should continue considering how best to adopt more coordinated and "whole of government" approaches to evaluation itself. For instance, when planning evaluation strategies or calendars it is important to plan not only to cover individual peace-building activities but to look at overall contributions to peace both in and across conflict areas.[116]*

The argument here is that M&E performed by one single actor, evaluating one programme or project, can only tell a limited part of the story and might prove to be of little use when working in multi-actor operations with broad and complex objectives. The argument is not that all actors should commit to one grand evaluation model, but rather that agreed objectives and an agreed baseline for evaluation of outcomes would increase effectiveness in comprehensive interventions. There are few, if any, frameworks for M&E in the area of PSOs that have proven to be efficient in contemporary operations.[117] Different actors will bring different methods and processes to multifunctional operations and without a common view on what a system-wide approach should look like it will be a big challenge to develop methods for the evaluation of impact and progress.

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[114] Dziedzic, Sotirin & Agoglia (eds). 2008. *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) - A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization*, Version 1.0, Draft

[115] OECD. 2008. *Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities*, Working draft, p. 12.

[116] OECD. 2008. *Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities*, Working draft, p. 12, 13

[117] OECD. 2008. Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, Working draft, p. 12, 13

However, as stated above, it is not suggested that all actors should commit to one single M&E process. This would not be beneficial in operations as complex as today's PSOs, where no single model will be able to 'tell the whole story'. Still, much as in the planning phase, there needs to be agreed objectives that most actors can use and strive for, so that M&E tells a more comprehensive story than before, meeting the needs of planners, practitioners and policy-makers. If a 'multifunctional' evaluation framework could be produced, it would allow evaluators from different sectors to perform their sector-M&E while the 'intervention' could glean insights from several efforts through effective information sharing. As stated above, this will be challenging for a number of reasons. Practically, it will involve practitioners and evaluators from a wide range of policy areas, presumably with limited knowledge of each others processes, terminology and culture. Furthermore, as conflict M&E is an underdeveloped field, there are few methods to turn to. Thus, evaluators will need to create ad hoc methods for multifunctional M&E, adapted to the situation at hand.

Conducting multifunctional M&E
Any PSO should be seen as a continuous cycle – ranging from analysis, through planning and execution and, lastly, evaluation, with ongoing M&E to support the other phases throughout an intervention. M&E needs to feed into this cycle and not just be a short-term management tool or a lessons learned process. If so, evaluators will gain much more influence as their results form the analysis and base-line for future planning and implementation. This should boost the area and give it much needed credibility and importance. [118] One important lesson is that we need to invest more time and resources in evaluation processes.

The planning for M&E should start at the very beginning of an operation, drawing on the results from the analysis, and M&E should be seen as an integral part of the planning-stages of a PSO. The reason for this is twofold:

Firstly, as objectives and activities are being identified, there is an excellent opportunity to locate indicators to the planned output and outcome. In a compre-hensive intervention, indicators that point to success for one instrument could prove to be an indicator of failure in another, or detriment to the system-wide approach. Early repatriation of IDPs could for instance be a top priority for security actors while it might prove devastating to long-term recovery efforts amongst development actors if the conditions for sustainable repatriation are not

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[118] Church & Shouldice. 2003. The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions: Framing the state of play. Incore, p. 13; OECD. 2008. Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, Working draft

in place. When M&E is considered early in the planning stages this type of problems can be mitigated much more easily than if they occur in the execution phase.

Secondly, there will be an element of reality-check as planning for M&E might help planners to spot weaknesses, duplications or gaps in the plan. As security-related activities are bound to have impact on development or humanitarian affairs, and vice versa, a multifunctional 'check' of the plan by M&E experts is highly valuable. In a Comprehensive Intervention, a mix of civilian and military expertise will plan for the M&E, which hopefully will ensure that all aspects of the conflict are taken into account when M&E activities and goals are planned for. Experience from previous experimentation shows that making sure that planners take M&E into account forces planners to consider possible conse-quences of their actions in a way that existing planning processes rarely do.

In the planning phase, indicators should be set to mirror the planning stages. A big challenge in multifunctional operation is to turn often vague and abstract strategic goals into more tangible objectives that planners can work with. If evaluators are not brought in at the initial stages of the process they will have to spend a lot of their time clarifying objectives like 'stability'. By asking how an objective or end-state like 'sustainable peace' will be evaluated, planners will need to describe more precisely what it is they want to achieve and how this should be achieved.

Monitoring throughout the intervention should provide HQ staff with reports on the attainment of output. Monitoring should also have an internal dimension, i.e. indicators should be reviewed so that they are still relevant in dynamic environ-ments. Since it is not feasible that actors would commit their M&E efforts to one overarching 'CI-framework', there is a need to create flexible ways of managing and incorporating different types of monitoring products. Some form of agree-ment between different actors at the strategic level could facilitate this. Further-more, by looking at the management of PSOs as a continuing cycle, there needs to be a counterpart for evaluators at HQ level that is able to use M&E results and adapt the plan and its execution accordingly throughout the intervention.

Midterm-reviews and evaluations in a Comprehensive Intervention should focus on changes in the environment in relation to the situation at the start of the inter-vention and how they have occurred (because of, in spite of, or in isolation from, the intervention). While a military intervention will have to focus parts of both monitoring and evaluation on the military instrument's outputs and outcome, it should also take an intervention-wide approach in order to assess the overall changes in conflict dynamics. In line with the core ascertains of the comprehen-

sive approach, the success or failure of one project, programme or even policy area might have little impact on a PSO as a whole.

Important to consider is the very political nature of M&E. As stated above, evaluators, both internal and external, might have strong incentives to highlight successes rather than failures. In a Comprehensive intervention this might be an even bigger issue since such a broad range of actors will be involved, all with different demands from funders and capitals. Also, actors might be reluctant to share information about the own organisation's progress (or failure). Again, these issues needs to be dealt with at an early stage but are likely to affect this type of intervention regardless.

This report does not aim to propose new M&E methodologies, rather the focus is on how monitoring and evaluation fits into to the larger process of a Comprehensive Intervention and how multifunctional M&E can be used to overcome some of the challenges described throughout this report. Still, some initial remarks on multifunctional M&E methodology could be made. It is clear that evaluators will have to use a wide range of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to answer fundamental questions about outcome and impact in conflict environments. While qualitative methods might be more difficult and costly to explore they are needed to supplement quantitative measurements when engaged in complex PSOs. It should also be noted that quantitative methods for evaluation in conflict areas pose specific challenges and difficulties that needs to be taken into account. For instance, while all methods need to be conflict-sensitive, local groups interacting with evaluators might be put at risk. This is also true for the evaluators themselves.

Also, interaction with people who might have been traumatised from ongoing conflict needs to be thoroughly thought through so that victims of e.g. forced displacement or gender based violence are being treated in an appropriate and professional manner. Lastly, comprehensive interventions will need experienced evaluators, accustomed to the particular challenges that come with the field of PSOs. Evaluators do not need to be experts in every area of an operation but will need to be knowledgeable about the particularities of working in a comprehensive intervention and the challenges and possibilities that comes with it.

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4   Concluding Remarks

The aim of this report has been to provide a detailed account of how a Comprehensive Approach could be applied in a complex conflict. Throughout the study and experimentation of comprehensive approaches, it seems clear that while we have come a long way theoretically, we still have a long way to go before these concepts can be fully implemented in the complex and highly dynamic conflicts peacekeepers face today.

This report has sought to draw conclusions for how to implement and contextualise CA by:

- Describing a complex security environment which required the adoption of CA when conducting a PSO.
- Describing the tasks of such a Comprehensive Intervention as well as the actors involved in undertaking these tasks and outlined the challenges and opportunities of coordination between these actors and tasks.
- Describing how CA could be implemented in relation to four generic phases: Analysis, Planning, Execution and Monitoring and Evaluation.

The introduction of the Comprehensive Intervention is our attempt to start bridging the gap between theory and practice, as we have started to look at more specific requirements and challenges when implementing CA. The recommendations made in chapter 3 should guide further research efforts within the SwAF. It should also be made clear that several of these recommendations will need to be further elaborated and, ultimately, put to the test in contemporary PSOs in order to provide us with much needed insights about comprehensive approaches.

Some central traits of the Comprehensive Intervention described in the report are highlighted here:

- The Comprehensive Intervention should not be seen as a model for all contemporary PSOs, but as a set of principles that can guide policy-makers and practitioners in their analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of operations. As shown in chapter 2, contemporary conflicts are often highly dynamic and no PSO-model will fit every situation. Here, we have highlighted the need for flexibility in Comprehensive Interventions in order to be able to adjust to rapidly changing conditions in the environment.
- The Intervention should have a complementary approach. This means that no actor engaged in a PSO can limit themselves to think about and plan for their own sector or programme. As a military operation comes into a conflict area it will presumably have a huge impact on the environment. In order to create sustainable objectives of peace and development, a military intervention

should seek to complement and facilitate the work of other actors, involved in e.g. development, state-building, diplomacy, SSR, etc.

- Cooperation and coordination with actors and instruments from different organisations needs to be handled in a flexible manner. Some actors are not necessary to coordinate with and may only require 'coexistence', whilst collaboration with others will be absolutely vital in order to reach one's objectives. The processes for getting this coordination 'right' needs to be open-minded and flexible in order to provide incentives for effective collabo-ration throughout an operation.

- However hard to accomplish, a Comprehensive Intervention needs to be closely coordinated with local actors. Depending on the situation this might be extremely hard, as shown in chapter 2, but the principle of local ownership should guide all PSOs. This is one issue that we need to develop further within the CA.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AU	African Union
AMIS	African Union Mission in Somalia
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination Policy
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CI	Comprehensive Intervention
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
DRC	Democratic Republic Congo
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration
EBAO	Effects-Based Approach to Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
IM	Integrated Missions
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO	International organisation
MNE	Multinational Experiment MNE
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PSO	Peace Support operation
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy

PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	Private Security Company
RO	Regional organisation
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SRSG	Special Representative of the Security General
SwAF	Swedish Armed Forces
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Armed Forces Indonesia)
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations/ African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WFP	World Food Program

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