


Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan

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Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan

Cover photos:

PRT Tarin Kowt: The District Chief of Deh Rawod, sitting next to a female Mission Team Deputy Commander, at a meeting in the village Dorshanak to intervene in a local dispute between two village elders. Photo by: Captain Steffie Groothedde.

PRT Mazar-e Sharif: The Swedish PRT Commander and Gender Field Adviser. Photo by Louise Olsson.

PRT Meymaneh: A girls' school outside Meymaneh. The teaching facilities consisted of tents. Photo by Synne Holan.

Kabul: Meeting the Director of Training, his staff and the highest ranked female military officer in ANA at the Afghan Ministry of Defence. Photo by Johan Tejpar.

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Sammanfattning

Den 12 december 2007 beslutade det Nordatlantiska rådet att utveckla gemensamma koncept och policydirektiv avseende FN Resolution 1325. Som del i detta arbete har åtta experter från fyra länder gjort denna studie om hur Resolution 1325 har integrerats i NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) i Afghanistan. I studien utvecklas ett ramverk som används för att analysera arbetet med Resolution 1325 i fem fallstudier av lika många besökta PRT. Dessa är det Nederländernas PRT i Tarin Kowt, Italiens PRT i Herat, Nya Zeelands PRT i Bamyán, Norges PRT i Meymaneh och Sveriges PRT i Mazar-e Sharif.

Studiens analytiska ramverk bygger på en modell där Resolution 1325 innehåll bryts ner i *representation* (manligt och kvinnligt deltagande) och *integration* (hur resolutionen används för att uppnå önskad effekt). Dessa teman analyseras i dimensionerna *internt* (hur missioner och operationer är organiserade) och *externt* (hur missionerna eller operationerna bemöter situationen i det geografiska ansvarsområdet för att uppnå önskat resultat).

I arbetet med att analysera arbetsområdena framkom att de olika PRT hade skiftande kunskaper såväl om Resolution 1325 som om kvinnors och mäns olika säkerhetssituation och behov. Det framgick att PRT i studien såg hur Resolution 1325 kunde vara användbar i deras dagliga arbete, bland annat genom att ha: fler kvinnliga soldater för att öka kontaktytan och därmed få mer underrättelse (Meymaneh), experthjälp i planeringen av operationer (Mazar-e Sharif), kunskap om hur man kan hantera könsrelaterat våld (Bamyán), bättre kunskap om kvinnors behov i CIMIC-projekt (Tarin Kowt), och effektivare 'force protection' (Herat). I studien visar det sig också att *ledarskap* och *expertfunktioner* är centrala för att genomdriva förändringar mot fullständig integrering av Resolution 1325.

Tre områden som krävs för att integrera Resolution 1325 i NATO operationer identifieras slutligen. Dessa är 1) vikten av att använda en allomfattande strategi för att integrera Resolution 1325; 2) vikten av att hålla ledarskapet ansvariga för att integrering av resolutionen genomdrivs; samt att 3) skapa expertfunktioner för att lyfta upp och effektivisera integreringen. Dessa tre råd beskrivs mer djuplodande i expertgruppens policyrekommendationer som överlämnades och presenterades för NATO och Euroatlantiska partnerskapsrådet i maj 2009.

Nyckelord: FN Resolution 1325, NATO, ISAF, PRT, Afghanistan, gender, operationell effektivitet

Summary

On December 12, 2007, the North Atlantic Council decided to develop common concepts and a Policy Directive on UN Resolution 1325. As part of this process, eight independent experts from four countries have conducted this study, identifying best practices and lessons learned from the implementation of Resolution 1325 in NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Practices and lessons relate both to effectiveness and the process to integrate Resolution 1325 in operations. An analytical framework has been developed and applied on five different PRTs; the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt, the Italian PRT in Herat, The New Zealand PRT in Bamyán, the Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh and the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif.

The analytical framework is based on a model in which the content of Resolution 1325 is broken down into *representation* (male and female participation) and *integration* (the use of the content of Resolution 1325 in the process to achieve a desired output). These themes are analyzed *internally* (how NATO Operations are organized) and *externally* (how Operations address the situation in the area of responsibility to obtain the desired output). Using this model, a set of work areas are identified and analyzed.

When analyzing the work areas in the PRTs, it showed that the awareness of Resolution 1325 and of women's and men's different security situation and needs varied. However, PRT personnel agreed that a substantial part of the Resolution's content is, or could be, helpful in their day-to-day operations. Examples given include: having more female soldiers to better reach the local population and collect intelligence (Meymaneh), having expert support in the planning of operations (Mazar-e Sharif), better handling issues of gender-based violence (Bamyán), better addressing women in CIMIC-projects (Tarin Kowt) and having women to better handle force protection issues (Herat). It was also apparent that the *leadership*, supported by *expert functions*, plays a crucial part to drive change towards a complete integration of Resolution 1325.

To fully integrate Resolution 1325 in NATO Operations, three principle actions are identified: These are 1) use a comprehensive strategy to integrate Resolution 1325, 2) hold commanders accountable for progress, and 3) establish expert functions to enhance integration. These actions are specified in the expert group's policy recommendations which were handed to NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in May, 2009.

Keywords: UN Resolution 1325, NATO, ISAF, Afghanistan, PRT, gender, operational effectiveness, women and men

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Right Commission
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
CEDAW	UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HQ	Head Quarters
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MOT	Military Observation Teams (Norway) Mobile Observation Teams (Sweden)
MP	Military Police
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
NZAID	New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
Psyops	Psychological Operations
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
USAID	US Agency for International Development

1 Introduction

By Louise Olsson, Johan Tejpar and Johanna Valenius

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

UN Resolution 1325(2000)

The threat against Afghan women participating in public life is steadily growing. This has resulted in a drastic decrease of Afghan women working outside the home from 2005 to 2008.¹ To be able to address this violence it is central to understand why targeting women is important for the Taliban's objective of winning the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, as Afghan women stand to lose much from a radicalization of politics toward fundamentalism, it should be considered central to ensure that women vote in the upcoming Afghan 2009 elections. Special considerations should also be made to the fact that violence against women practicing their right to vote can be expected. The ability to professionally address these issues lies in making use of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) on 'Women, Peace and Security' (henceforth 'Resolution 1325').² This ability, however, remains limited in NATO Operations.³

This report is part of the project *NATO in Afghanistan: Resolution 1325 as a Tool for Enhanced Effectiveness*.⁴ On December 12, 2007, the North Atlantic Council⁵ decided to develop common concepts, to ensure interoperability, and a Policy Directive to enhance integration of Resolution 1325.⁶ The purpose was to come to terms with the limited ability to integrate Resolution 1325 in NATO Operations. The same North Atlantic Council decision is at the basis of this project as it encourages a study which should identify best practices and lessons learned from the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT); lessons and practices which can support the work of NATO Allies and Partners when they strive to implement Resolution 1325. To achieve policy relevant results, this project collected information during field work in five PRTs in Afghanistan: PRT Tarin Kowt (the Netherlands), PRT Herat (Italy), PRT Bamyán (New Zealand), PRT Meymaneh (Norway) and PRT Mazar-e Sharif (Sweden).⁷ In the project, the focus is on the work of the PRT's military components. In addition to producing this report, the project has formulated Policy Recommendations based on the results of the field work in Afghanistan. The Recommendations focus on how to integrate Resolution 1325 in NATO Operations (see Annex 1).

¹ UNHCR (2009), *Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary General: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights*. UN document A/HRC/10/23, January 16, 2009

² UNSCR 1325 (2000), *UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security*. UN document S/RES/1325 (2000), (October 31, 2000)

³ NATO Missions and Operations will hereinafter be referred to as NATO Operations or Operations.

⁴ The project is funded by Finland, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, supported by Denmark, Italy and New Zealand.

⁵ See Annex 3 for an explanation.

⁶ The result was NATO (2009b), *Draft NATO's Bi-SC Directive on Advancing women's perspectives in NATO Military Organizations, Gender Mainstreaming, and Special Measures to Protect Women and Girls in Situations of Armed Conflict*. Released by NATO in March 2009

⁷ PRT lead nation in parenthesis

1.1 Contribution of the Report

The purpose of this report is twofold. 1) To identify relevant aspects of how Resolution 1325 has been used to improve the effectiveness in the five selected PRTs in Afghanistan. This part of the purpose is addressed by identifying empirical examples of ongoing day-to-day operations in these PRTs. Resolution 1325 states that women are both actors and victims of armed conflict and it reaffirms the important role of women in creating peace and security.⁸ In NATO's Bi-SC Directive, gender equality is considered a key factor for operational effectiveness and creating sustainable peace.⁹ In this study, effectiveness is primarily considered in terms of day-to-day military operations. In the analysis, these examples are connected to different tasks. For example, the study identifies winning 'hearts and minds' and 'force protection' as two important aspects for effectiveness. In order to enhance effectiveness, the Resolution must be systematically integrated throughout Operations. Systematic here means to include the content of Resolution 1325 in an aware and consistent manner, for example through Standard Operating Procedures. Therefore, the main emphasis of the study is on the second part of the purpose. 2) To study the process of integrating Resolution 1325 by the military components in the selected PRTs in order to identify practices and lessons learned to assist future NATO Operations. In order to draw out policy relevant results, a tool to focus and structure this study is needed. Hence, an analytical framework is developed and applied to the analysis of the examined PRTs. The analysis and conclusions are expressed in terms of policy-relevant implications.

The selected PRTs in this project – PRT Bamyan, PRT Herat, PRT Mazar-e Sharif, PRT Meymaneh and PRT Tarin Kowt¹⁰ – were located under four different ISAF Regional Commands. They all displayed a wide variation in terms of approach to Resolution 1325 and the circumstances under which the work relating to the Resolution was undertaken. PRT assignments were based on the mandate of the ISAF to assist the Government of Afghanistan to extend its authority and create a secure environment by conducting *stability and security* operations in coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The PRT mission is narrowly focused to help firmly establish *government* and *governance* in a conflict or post-conflict environment. In other words, the PRTs exist to help the Government of Afghanistan gain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (i.e., to extend its reach throughout the country). The role of the state is to monopolize the use of force, because if a monopoly does not exist, the structure of law and order breaks down into smaller units resulting in anarchy, or in the case of Afghanistan, decades of fighting between various factions of warlords, traffickers of weapons and narcotics and tribes.¹¹ Regarding security and stability operations, the PRT HQ operates under the operational command of ISAF HQ and the Afghan government. To help the Government of Afghanistan gaining control over the use of force is only part of the PRT mission; the other parts involve increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Government within its constituency. Considering the goal of achieving stability, the PRT must create an environment in which an authority is both legitimate and effective in the use of force. Stated another way, the mission of a PRT is to work with all available stakeholders and resources to generate stability by enabling the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance and government institutions. In relation to extending the authority of the Afghan government through development and reconstruction, the PRTs primarily report back to

⁸ In June 2008 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 in which the Council further develop the need for protection of women victim of violence. While this report primarily refers to Resolution 1325, it should be understood to incorporate the contents of Resolution 1820.

⁹ NATO (2009b)

¹⁰ Each field study used the same structure in terms of interviewees and interview questions. Each PRT was visited for about 6-10 days by the authors. The exception was the PRT Tarin Kowt which was too dangerous to visit for any longer period of time. The main interviews were therefore conducted in the Netherlands, complemented with a shorter field visit to the Uruzgan province.

¹¹ Force in this definition includes the basic functions of any state: armed forces, policing, judiciary, taxation, public infrastructure and social services.

their home governments.¹² This work mainly relates to CIMIC¹³ and is often conducted through Quick Impact Projects. To accomplish all of these tasks, the PRTs hold regular meetings with members of the local Government Authorities in the provinces where they operate.

1.2 Structure of the Report

The report begins with developing an analytical framework based on Louise Olsson's previous research that will assist in guiding the collection, and structure the analysis, of material collected at the PRTs. Louise Olsson and Johanna Valenius develops the framework in order for it to contribute to identifying relevant practices and lessons, both for effectiveness and for day-to-day work to integrate Resolution 1325.

Thereafter, the report proceeds to give a short background to Afghanistan and NATO's role through ISAF and its PRTs. This section is written by Johan Tejpar, Jos Hoenen, Birgith Andreassen, Synne Holan and Johanna Valenius putting their combined expertise together to provide information relevant for understanding the ongoing developments in Afghanistan. Further details can be found in the Annex II. After this background, the report proceeds to the five case-studies.

The Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt is written by Sophie Kesselaar and Joseph Hoenen. The case-study displays many examples of how a PRT can integrate Resolution 1325 in analysis, planning and reporting. The case also shows the need for applying a systematic approach in order to maintain the progress on Resolution 1325.

The Italian PRT in Herat is written by Louise Olsson and Johanna Valenius. The case-study brings out the issue of CIMIC and adapting to the difference in situation for men and women although the PRT does not apply Resolution 1325 systematically. The study also shows the strategic use of mixed personnel groups.

The New Zealand PRT in Bamyan is written by Birgith Andreassen, Synne Holan and Bjørg Skotnes. The case-study provides examples of the serious cases of gender-based violence that PRT personnel can encounter. The PRT Bamyan was the only PRT that operated in an area with a female governor. The PRT had an awareness of difference in situation for men and women but had not addressed Resolution 1325 in its work.

The Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh is written by Birgith Andreassen, Synne Holan and Bjørg Skotnes. The case-study shows the need for an inclusive and systematic approach to bring the Afghan national plans into the work of the PRTs. The case also displays the use of mixed units in Psyops and the gains of addressing both men and women in the population.

The Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif is written by Louise Olsson and Johan Tejpar. The Swedish PRT is applying a systematic approach to Resolution 1325, based on Standard Operating Procedures. The PRT also makes use of a Gender Field Adviser and a network of Gender Focal Points to enhance integration.

The study then proceeds to the analysis of the material from the PRTs by Louise Olsson and Johan Tejpar. The analysis begins by presenting a short overview of the material from

¹² Due to limitations in time and access to PRTs, the study does not look at the SSR process although it can be relevant regarding its different effects for men and women. It is, however, central to consider SSR and DDR processes from a gender perspective in countries where women have been an active part of the military organizations, as for example was the case in Liberia. See Coulter, Chris C. (2006), *Being a bush wife: women's lives through war and peace in Northern Sierra Leone*, Doctoral theses. Uppsala: Uppsala University 2006.

¹³ CIMIC, or Civil-Military Cooperation/ Coordination, is defined as: 'The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.' (AJP-9, NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE. June 2003) p. 1-1.

the five PRTs. In the continued analysis, the report examines the twofold purpose. Firstly, the analysis discusses relevant aspects of how Resolution 1325 has been used to improve the effectiveness in the studied PRTs in Afghanistan. This builds on empirical examples of the use of Resolution 1325. In the analysis, these examples are connected to different tasks. Secondly, the analysis will identify best practices and lessons learned from the process of integrating Resolution 1325 by the military components in the selected PRTs. The emphasis of the analysis is on the latter part of the purpose. In order to be directly applicable, the analysis and conclusions are expressed in terms of policy-relevant implications.

In the final concluding remarks, the three main findings are formulated into pertinent actions. The report ends with looking at the way forward as perceived by all the authors of the project.

2 How to Address Resolution 1325: The Framework

By Louise Olsson and Johanna Valenius

2.1 Point of Departure

In the previous chapter of this report, NATO's ongoing process to enhance the integration of Resolution 1325 in its Operations was described. While this process incorporates a normative dimension such as strengthening Human Rights, the primary focus is on the practical implications for day-to-day operations. At the core of this study, to discuss effectiveness and the process of integration, is the detailed content of Resolution 1325. The Resolution is broad in its identification of important issue areas – all of which potentially have several substantial and detailed policy implications – and it gives little guidance as to how the specific goals are to be achieved in the daily work of an operation.¹⁴ To come to terms with this problem, this report makes use of a framework first developed by Olsson (2008) in a study of the Nordic Battlegroup. Olsson's study structured the Nordic Battlegroup's work to integrate Resolution 1325 into four different work areas. This enabled the identification of key issues (labeled as target issues in this study) for each work area.¹⁵ Applying this framework to Afghanistan will allow us to identify practices and lessons as well as to obtain a more detailed understanding of the implications of integrating Resolution 1325.

¹⁴ For example, Resolution 1325 underlines the use of mainstreaming, which prescribes that all parts of operational policies and their implementation should be reconsidered in terms of how they affect men and women respectively. Resolution 1325 was preceded by a project headed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in cooperation with Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden. The project resulted in the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, formulated at a seminar in Windhoek organized by the Lessons Learned Unit in May 2000. The Namibia Plan of Action is referred to in Resolution 1325 and calls for; the incorporation of gender mainstreaming in the mandates of international missions; the target of 50 percent women in managerial and decision-making positions; gender units to be a standard component of all missions; lessons learned from current and previous missions to be incorporated at the planning stage of new missions; Member States to increase the number of women in their armed forces and civilian police while potential troop-contributing nations should be encouraged to develop long-term strategies to increase the number and rank of female personnel in their forces; as well as monitoring, reporting and evaluation mechanisms. This process strengthened the parallel work conducted by the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and women's non-governmental organizations (NGO). The turning point came at the Windhoek seminar when Namibia promised to bring up the issue of women, peace and security when assuming the presidency of the Security Council in October 2000. During the Namibian presidency, women's organizations from countries experiencing armed conflict were given the opportunity to bring forth their concerns to the Council Members. The text for Resolution 1325 was then drafted based on these concerns as well as the lessons and practices established in two projects, the one driven by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the one by UNIFEM. The main background to Resolution 1325 was to come to terms with deficiencies and take advantage of previously overlooked opportunities.

¹⁵ See Olsson, Louise (2008), "Resolution 1325 och den Nordiska snabbinsatsstyrkan", in [Ed.] Anders W. Berggrens *Föresättningar för att verka internationellt – Slutrapport från temaområdet Människan i NBF 2004-2008*, Stockholm: Swedish Defence College. The document can be downloaded at [http://www.fhs.se/upload/NBG_och_1325.pdf]. During the last few years, various organizations have tasked studies on Resolution 1325 and peace support operations although few have focused on the direct use of the Resolution for the military components of such missions. For an overview of previous research, see for example: Valenius, Johanna (2007): *Gender mainstreaming in ESDP missions*. Chaillot Paper 101. EU Institute for Security Studies 2007; Olsson, Louise (2007), *Equal Peace. United Nations Peace Operations and the Power-Relations between men and women in Timor-Leste*. Report 76. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala: Uppsala University and Louise Olsson (2009) *Gender Equality and the United Nations Peace Operations in Timor-Leste*. Brill Publishers: Leiden

The framework builds on the fact that the Resolution identifies gender as a cross-cutting issue which means that it has to be considered and integrated in all parts of Operations – *internally* in how they are organized and *externally* in terms of how they address the situation in the area of responsibility to obtain the desired output. Two main themes cut across the internal and external dimensions, *representation* (male and female participation) and *integration* (the use of the content of Resolution 1325 in the process to achieve a desired output). Building on existing policy and research, a number of target issues were then identified within each work area. In sum, the framework suggests the structure as outlined in Figure 1.

Figure 1: *Work areas of NATO Operations relating to Resolution 1325*

	Representation	Integration
Internal (i.e. internal military organization of the Mission/ Operation)	Manning policies and equal opportunities: • Male and female personnel –all functions and levels • Work environment • Access to resources and material	Work structure of NATO Missions and Operations: • Training • Analysis • Planning • Reporting • Evaluation and policy development
External (i.e. how the operation/mission addresses the situation in the area of responsibility to obtain its objective)	Liaison, intelligence and support: • Interaction with local women and men • Cooperation and promotion of local partners, including women’s organizations	Mandate interpretation and execution: • How the main assignments are selected and prioritized • Execution of selected and prioritized assignments • Adaption to local developments

Apart from these work areas where we can expect to find lessons and practices of relevance for integrating Resolution 1325 into NATO Operations, Olsson identifies two categories of staff that are particularly relevant for driving change: **operation leadership** and **expert functions**¹⁶ These categories will be further discussed after we have deliberated in more detail on the content of the four different work areas that relate to representation and integration.

¹⁶ The more overarching conclusion of the Nordic Battlegroup study was that implementing Resolution 1325 in an organization appeared to require three components. One needs to 1) identify in detail what a new policy entails for the day-to-day operations of each individual part and level of the organization. It, thus, becomes a question of moving from the visionary to the practical aspects by integrating a number of relevant and concrete areas of the Resolution into daily work. In addition, it is important to 2) decide the organizational structure required for the implementation of the new policy (bearing in mind of course the resources available). For example, where in the organization would the expert function have the largest effects and what form of expertise is required? The final area that needs to be addressed to ensure effective implementation of the new policy throughout the organization involves 3) deciding the actual competencies needed in the various parts and at the various levels of the organization to drive change. Training appears to be key in developing those competencies and to allow the personnel to most effectively carry out decisions by the leadership. The Nordic Battlegroup engaged actively in all three areas which makes it particularly interesting as the Battlegroup planned for an enforcement mission. See Olsson, Louise (2008) for further discussions.

2.2 Representation

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Operations. Internal representation primarily concerns ‘manning policies and equal opportunities’ such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization. External representation relates to how Operations are conducted in terms of ‘liaison, intelligence and support’ vis-à-vis the population and parties in the area of responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women’s organizations? This is important as it would provide the military with information about women’s security.

2.2.1 Internal Representation

Internal representation focuses on **manning policies** and **equal opportunities**. Representation includes the personnel in terms of numbers as well as position and function. For example, the leadership should contain both men and women. Equal opportunities also relate to the work environment and access to resources and material. Negative attitudes toward female soldiers and sexual harassment are obstacles to women’s career advancement and to retaining them in the military. Hence, the work environment must be such that both men and women can fulfill their potential and advance within the organization. The reason is that the operation is able to obtain more diversified information about the host society since local women are more willing to talk to female soldiers about recent developments in their communities. The presence of female soldiers at road blocks is known to have a calming effect and in some cultures only female soldiers are allowed to perform body searches on local women.

2.2.2 External Representation

External representation relates to how Operations are conducted in terms of **liaison, intelligence** and **support**. This encompasses two aspects of military practice: a) how military personnel interact with the civilian population when carrying out their tasks and b) how Operations select local parties and organizations in the host society for provision of support and the exchange of information and.¹⁷ This study examines if the PRT works with women’s organizations in the PRT area and if it is in contact with local or provincial governmental structures working with women’s issues. If the PRT is not in contact with any groups working with women’s issues or have problems communicating with local women, the study examines what the obstacles are to such interactions. Finally, the study discusses what the soldiers working in the field consider to be problems and benefits from working with women and women’s issues in the PRT area of responsibility.

2.3 Integration

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective. Internal integration means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of ‘organizing and conducting Operations’, e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. External integration refers to the ‘interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed’ in the area of responsibility. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments, in terms of day-to-day operations, executed in the area of responsibility? For example, in male-dominated societies, how does the military handle situations when the arrest of a male household head means that women and children are left on their own and potentially put in danger?

¹⁷ Olsson, Louise (2007)

2.3.1 Internal Integration

Internal integration concerns the **organization of NATO Operations**. The NATO Bi-SC Directive underlines the need to consider Resolution 1325 as an integral part of operations, not as a separate issue; it should permeate all activities. This means integrating the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of organizing NATO Operations, e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. Training, both pre-deployment and in-mission, is a prerequisite for effectively integrating Resolution 1325 into NATO Operations. The subsequent increase in competence must then be integrated into analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation procedures. The importance of the different issues related to Resolution 1325 can be further specified in training, analysis and planning.

2.3.2 External Integration

The most complex part of the analytical framework and where we had very little previous research to guide a strict analysis relates to the integration of Resolution 1325 into the work in the specific area of responsibility. More specifically, external integration refers to the **mandate interpretation and execution** in the area of responsibility. Firstly, the daily work of achieving the objectives of the mandate and OPLAN results in continuous selection and prioritizing from a multitude of assignments. Hence, interpretation entails the selection and prioritization process of main assignments. Secondly, external integration concerns how assignments are executed in the area of responsibility in terms of day-to-day military operations. This work should be both need- and context-based – relating directly to the difference in (security) situations for men and women during an armed conflict. Focusing on the output, Resolution 1325 is, thus, important in the execution of the selected and prioritized assignments as they can have different effects for men and women. Thirdly, the situation in the area of responsibility continuously changes. Thus, it is central that the interpretation and execution of the mandate is revised on a regular basis in order to meet new needs and demands. Currently, this is the most underdeveloped work area in existing NATO Operations.

2.4 Staff Functions that Drive Change

The above described work areas are where we can expect to find lessons and practices of relevance for integrating Resolution 1325 into NATO Operations. In addition, Olsson's earlier research identified two categories of staff functions that are considered particularly relevant for driving change: operation leadership and expert functions.¹⁸

2.4.1 Operation Leadership

Research and experience show that in order to successfully integrate Resolution 1325 into military operations, it is central to have a top-down approach. Hence, the leadership is central for driving change. If the leadership is not aware of the content of Resolution 1325 or not actively working to ensure its inclusion, the process is often slow, if not outright stopped. Thus, this report's in-depth studies will consider how PRT personnel perceive the role of the PRT leadership in integrating Resolution 1325 and the effect the leadership has on the work to integrate Resolution 1325.

2.4.2 Expert Functions

In order to enhance staff competencies on Resolution 1325 in NATO Operations, research and policy suggests that it is necessary to establish expert functions. The two most

¹⁸ See Olsson, Louise (2007) for an overview of the role of leadership and expert functions in large scale Peace Operations.

common forms of experts are Gender Advisers (or Gender Field Advisers) and Gender Focal Points.¹⁹ Similar to other military functions, these need to be well integrated into the existing organization to avoid creating parallel structures. If experts and networks become parallel functions to the rest of the organization it will result in a marginalization of 1325-related issues and be an ineffective use of resources. Hence, this report's in-depth studies draw from the lessons and practices of PRTs that have assigned experts to enhance the integration of Resolution 1325 into the day-to-day work of the PRT.

¹⁹ The Gender Focal Point network consists of regular personnel who have received specialist training on Resolution 1325. Thereby they can strengthen the integration of Resolution 1325 in the work of their respective units while carrying out their daily tasks.

3 How to Study Resolution 1325: Method and Design

By Louise Olsson

The study makes use of a structured qualitative method, addressing the selected PRTs in a focused and in-depth manner during field-work. The information collected for the study primarily consists of interview material. In all studied PRTs, the project team made use of standard interview format of semi-structured interviews where the interview questions had been developed based on the analytical framework. Moreover, to obtain comparable empiric material from all PRTs while still being able to collect a broad span of information, the interviews targeted specific personnel functions within the military organization (see Annex 2 for interview questions and interviewed personnel functions). The material was collected from the PRT rotation in the field during the field visit. The study has thereby sought to capture practical ongoing experiences of working with Resolution 1325. Follow-up with preceding or following rotations were conducted in relation to specific identified practices or lessons to complete the picture received at the PRT. Hence, it is important to note that the study does not claim to provide a complete picture of ongoing developments at the PRTs. Rather; it has sought to make visible and problematize policy relevant implications.

In order to obtain a broader spectrum of practices and lessons, the selected PRT's areas of responsibility have different levels of conflict violence and have different ethnic compositions.²⁰ Furthermore, the study considered both the PRT HQ level and the PRT tactical level where suitable.

Five different PRTs were selected for study:

- **Chapter 5: The Dutch PRT Tarin Kowt;** Uruzgan province (Regional Command South). The main part of the study was conducted in the Netherlands as the situation in the PRT area of responsibility was too insecure to conduct extensive field work. A field visit by one of the authors was possible in April 2009 which focused on interviewing external parties. The focus of the PRT was on stability and CIMIC during rotation PRT 5. The level of security was low (but improving).
- **Chapter 6: The Italian PRT Herat;** Herat province (Regional Command West). A field visit of 10 days was conducted by authors in November 2008.²¹ The focus of the PRT was on CIMIC. The level of security was deteriorating.
- **Chapter 7: The New Zealand PRT Bamyar;** Bamyar province (Regional Command East) The field visit of approximately eight days was conducted by the authors in February 2009. The focus of the PRT was on stability and CIMIC. The level of security was good.

²⁰ Given the large differences between the provinces, it was considered important to also receive information from all PRTs in Afghanistan. Therefore, a general survey was sent out to all PRTs but this did not receive any replies. There was also attempts made to include some of the countries with a large number of troops in the Afghanistan but that was not possible to do within this project.

²¹ Interviews were conducted in English which was not the first language for the researchers or the interviewees. For all other PRTs the interviews were conducted in the first language of the interviewees.

- **Chapter 8: The Norwegian PRT Meymaneh;** Faryab province (Regional Command North). A field visit of approximately six days was conducted by the authors in November 2008. The focus of the PRT was on stability and security. The level of security was good.
- **Chapter 9: The Swedish PRT Mazar-e Sharif;** Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan and Sar-e Pol provinces (Regional Command North). A field visit of approximately seven days was conducted by the authors in February 2009. The focus of the PRT was on stability and security. The level of security was relatively good.

In addition, the study conducted interviews with representatives of Government institutions of Afghanistan as well as with local and international organizations working in Afghanistan (in the PRT areas, during a visit to Kabul by the entire project team in November 2008 and ISAF HQ in which was visited by Johanna Valenius in January 2009).²² The purpose with those interviews was to obtain a more nuanced view of practices and lessons and to identify overlooked important issues. These interviews also made use of a standard interview format for semi-structured interviews.

²² It is important to note that the aim of the project is not to discuss the PRT concept or its benefits or disadvantages. The focus is on identifying practical practices and lessons by the military component of the PRT which can be of value also for Operations in general.

4 Background: Afghanistan and NATO

By Johan Tejpar, Birgith Andreassen, Synne Holan and Joseph Hoenen

4.1 Afghanistan

Afghanistan was created in 1747 when Ahmad Shah Durrani unified Pashtun tribes in the area. Today, this landlocked country borders to six countries (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The Hindu Kush Mountains run through Afghanistan from the north-east to the south-west. The majority of Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, Pashtuns, is mainly found south of the mountain range. In the north, the ethnic composition is primarily a reflection of the bordering former Soviet states.

After being torn between the Russian and British empires, Afghanistan finally broke free from the British in 1919. However, the independency only lasted until 1979 when the country was invaded by the Soviet Union. Ten years later, the USSR was driven out of Afghanistan and after a series of civil wars the Taliban took power in 1996. After the September 11 bombings of World Trade Center in New York, the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan. In December that same year, the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference established a process for political reconstruction and adopted a new constitution. The initial transitional government was replaced when Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected Afghan President in December 2004. One year later democratic elections resulted in the inauguration of a new National Assembly. After almost 30 years of war and several natural disasters such as drought, Afghanistan has much economic recovery left to do. As one of the world's most impoverished countries, Afghanistan is very dependant on foreign aid and on trade with regional neighbors. The largest sectors of the economy are industry, agriculture and services, each constituting a third of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In addition, substantial poppy cultivation and a growing trade in opium generated roughly an additional 3 billion USD in 2008.²³ In general, organized criminality – especially poppy growing and trafficking of

Box 1: Facts about Afghanistan

Official name: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Area: 647.500 sq km (equivalent to France)

Capital: Kabul

Provinces: 34

Population: 24 million (Afghan official doc); 33.6 million (CIA Factbook, July 2009 est.)

Religion: Islam (80% Sunni and 19% Shia)

Literacy: Total 28% (Men 43%, Women 13%)

Ethnic groups Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Balouch 2%, other 4%

Languages : Afghan Persian or Dari (50%), Pashto (35%), Turkic languages (11%), 30 minor languages.

GDP per capita: 800 USD (2008 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: 45 years

Infant Mortality Rate: 152 per 1000 live birth

Maternal Mortality: 1600 per 100 000 live birth

Source: CIA (2009)

²³ CIA (2009), *The World Factbook 2009*.

[<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>] (accessed April 27, 2009)

drugs and weapons – constitutes a serious threat to security and development. In addition to organized crime, or perhaps related to it, corruption is widespread in most Afghan institutions. Budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, strengthening government capacity and rebuilding a war-torn infrastructure are commonly mentioned among several challenges that the people of Afghanistan stand before.

Numerous international and national initiatives that aim to reduce poverty, strengthen the government and improve security have been launched since 2001. Among these are the Afghan National Development Strategy, the Afghan National Solidarity Program and Provincial Development Plans.²⁴ Even though the country's situation has improved since 2001, many Afghans still live in extreme poverty. There are approximately five million Afghan refugees around the world and approximately 500,000 persons are internally displaced – most of them in Kabul. The poverty factor is commonly linked to security as it constitutes a recruitment basis for criminal activities. It is difficult to separate religious fundamentalists like the Taliban from opportunity seekers such as criminal networks, the latter thriving on the state of disorder and a weak security sector.²⁵

4.1.1 Women and the Conflict

Equal rights for women and men are proclaimed in the Constitution of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan is obligated to follow several conventions on Discrimination against Women. For example, the Bonn agreement from December 2001 declares that a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government has been established. A National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan was adopted by the Government of Afghanistan in 2008 and the Afghan National Development Strategy recognizes gender as a cross-cutting issue with the objective of establishing gender equality.

The Constitution guarantees equal rights for men and women, such as the rights to education and work. However, the existence of a three-tier justice system – secular law, Sharia and local traditions - makes it very difficult for women to receive equal treatment. Chapter One Art. 3 states that 'no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam',²⁶ i.e. religion supersedes the Constitution. For example, Art. 131 of the Constitution guarantees Shias the right to their own legislation in family matters.²⁷ Another obstacle to the rule of law is the existence of both local traditions and Sharia Law in addition to secular law. Many judges are, more or less, only trained in Sharia.

The greatest concern regarding women's security in Afghanistan relates to the overall security situation.²⁸ When security deteriorates across the board, both men and women are affected negatively. Women will, however, to a greater extent be targeted on the basis of gender. This will affect their mobility and, thus, their ability to participate as professionals and politically while their private spheres are reduced. Put differently, women's human rights will be severely violated. With this in mind, it is widely recognized today that the conflict cannot be overcome by military means alone. Economic development, security and governance are all important and the International Community's ambition is to implement an all-encompassing approach to move forward in these areas in Afghanistan. Since 2001, there have been significant improvements in health care and immunization, a

²⁴ Today most provinces have adopted a Provincial Development Plan in order to implement the objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy.

²⁵ Tejpar, Johan (2009). How do Peace Support Operations Impact on Conflict Regions' Economies? Stockholm: FOI; Grare, Fredric (2009) Anatomy of a Fallacy: The Senlis Council and Narcotics in Afghanistan, CIGI working paper # 34,

²⁶ Afghanistan Online, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Chapter 1, Article 3. [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html], (accessed April 24, 2009)

²⁷ Afghanistan online, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Chapter 7, Article 16. [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html] (accessed April 24, 2009)

²⁸ Interview with AIHRC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, NGO representatives, UNAMA representatives

major expansion of primary education, construction of roads and transport infrastructure, economic growth and the formation of national security forces.

After having seen a continuously improving security situation, the armed conflict in Afghanistan intensified throughout 2008. Between January 1 and November 30, 2,014 civilian casualties were reported.²⁹ This was the highest number reported since the armed conflict began in 2001. Out of these casualties, 55 percent were reported to have been caused by insurgents and 39 percent by pro-government forces. The remaining part occurred under unclear circumstances. The majority of casualties took place in southern Afghanistan.³⁰ It is also here that the murder of an Afghan female police officer and acid attacks on school girls took place. These attacks were symptomatic of the lately deteriorating security situation.

Violence against women such as rape, "honor killings", early and forced marriage, sexual abuse, and slavery remains widespread. Violence against women is commonly tolerated or condoned within the family and community. It receives support from both traditional and religious leadership circles as well as the formal and informal justice system. In this regard, the Government of Afghanistan has failed to adequately protect the rights of women despite their constitutional guarantees. The true extent of violence against women is most likely concealed by underreporting and perpetrators continue to go unpunished.³¹

The increase in threats and attacks on women working outside the house and women in public life has lead to women leaving their work and reducing their role in society. Nonetheless, the security situation is better today compared to 2001. Still, more and better protection of women is needed. An important indicator of security and development is school enrolment, especially for girls. Before 2001, there were less than 1 million schoolchildren and very few girls. Today there are more than 6 millions enrolled in basic education (grades 1-12) and almost 35 percent are girls. The Ministry of Education has developed a National Education Strategy Plan and together with a new curriculum, textbooks and teacher training, the outcome has been positive. In Faryab, 120000 boys and 80000 girls were at the time of writing enrolled in primary school. The equivalent figures for Kabul were 250000 boys and 200000 girls.³²

4.2 ISAF: NATO in Afghanistan

NATO is present in Afghanistan predominately in the form of UN-mandated ISAF. ISAF's goals are to assist the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising their authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilization, reconstruction and effective governance. Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission. From having been present in Kabul, ISAF now covers Afghanistan's whole territory. The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000 to approximately 61,960 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 26 NATO members.³³

The North Atlantic Council provides overall coordination and political direction for ISAF. It does so in close consultation with non-NATO ISAF troop-contributing nations. The strategic command and control is exercised by NATO's top operational headquarters –

²⁹ UNHCR (2009), Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary General: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights. UN document A/HRC/10/23, January 16, 2009

³⁰ UNHCHR (2009)

³¹ UNHCR (2009)

³² NPS (2009), Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Afghanistan, *Provincial Overviews* [http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ExecSumm.html#_ftn1], (accessed April 24, 2009)

³³ Current as of 13 March 2009 NATO (2009d), *ISAF Troops* [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf] (Accessed March 13, 2009)

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. Under SHAPE, the Joint Force Command in Brunssum, Netherlands, serves as the operational-level headquarters at a level between the ISAF HQ in Kabul and the strategic command at SHAPE. This “reach-back” capability enables the ISAF Commander in Afghanistan to draw on expertise in areas such as strategic planning without having to deploy all assets to Afghanistan. ISAF HQ is the multinational operational-level military headquarters based in Kabul. It is responsible for assisting the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment of a safe and secure environment. Under ISAF HQ, there are five subordinate Regional Commands (RC): RC North in Mazar-e Sharif, RC West in Herat, RC South in Kandahar, RC East in Bagram and RC Capital in Kabul City. The Regional Commands act as tactical military headquarters providing military command and support to the PRTs and other military force elements.



Map of Afghanistan with provinces and PRT Lead Nations³⁴

4.2.1 The Evolution of ISAF³⁵

On October 7, 2001 the United States, with support from the United Kingdom, launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This military operation was part of the “War on Terror” declared by President George W. Bush as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on World Trade Center. The stated purpose of Operation Enduring Freedom was to capture Osama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which had provided support and shelter to al-Qaeda. After the Taliban regime had been ousted from power, ISAF was created following the Bonn Conference in December 2001. The conference paved the way for a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF.

³⁴ The Bamiyan province (New Zealand PRT) has here been misspelled to Bayman. MeS stands for Mazar-e Sharif (Swedish PRT).

³⁵ NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2008), NATO Afghanistan briefing. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division [http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/briefing/afghanistan/afghanistan2008-e.pdf] (accessed April 27, 2009)

ISAF's initial role was to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority, secure the environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Today, ISAF's mandate has broadened to include the entire Afghanistan. Alongside ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom is a US-led operation that primarily operates in the eastern and southern parts of the country, along the border to Pakistan.

ISAF is not a UN force but a coalition of the willing with a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.³⁶ Initially, ISAF was commanded by individual allies on a six month rotational basis. On August 11, 2003, NATO assumed leadership over ISAF, turning the six month national rotations to an end. ISAF's new leadership thus solved the problem of the continual search for new lead nations and, the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months. By October 2006, ISAF was responsible for all the PRTs and security across the whole country. A detailed Military Technical Agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority provided further guidance for ISAF operations.³⁷ ISAF has the mandate to, in conjunction with the ANSF, conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations. The focus is on establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment with full engagement of the ANSF. The purpose is to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan's reconstruction and enabling the Government of Afghanistan to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country.

4.2.2 ISAF: The PRT Concept

ISAF decided to follow Operation Enduring Freedom's lead and base its expansion on the concept of the PRT. PRTs grew out of the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (or "Chiclets") established in 2002 in the immediate aftermath of the ousting of the Taliban. The PRTs are at the leading edge of the Alliance's commitments in Afghanistan. Through the PRTs, ISAF supports reconstruction and development, secures areas where reconstruction work is conducted, supports Security Sector Reform (SSR) and encourages good governance. Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, the PRTs support humanitarian and development efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations and NGOs.

Currently, there are 26 PRTs operating throughout Afghanistan. The PRTs commonly consist of a combination of military and civilian elements. Some PRTs have military forces and civilian personnel from a single nation; others are multinational. Each PRT, inclusive the multinational ones, is commanded by one nation – normally the country providing the bulk of the PRT's personnel and funds. The military components, however, also answer to ISAF Command and are coordinated by the relevant Regional Command. In short, the PRT mission statement says:³⁸

Provincial Reconstruction Teams will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts.

ISAF's mandate stipulates that ISAF (particularly the PRTs) should assist Government of Afghanistan in three areas: providing security, strengthening government structures, and contributing to development and reconstruction. This setup provides the PRTs with a set of options in how to organize and conduct their daily tasks. Furthermore, all operations should be carried out in coordination or conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan

³⁶ Nine UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833.

³⁷ NATO (2009c), *ISAF Mandate* [<http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html>] (accessed April 27, 2009) and NATO (2009d).

³⁸ ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 3 (3 Feb 07)

and the ANSF. Thus, it is the Afghan authorities who are the owner of operations and ISAF provides additional capacity. The purpose of this chapter is to break down ISAF's mandate into a contextual toolbox that constitutes the options a PRT has to choose from in its daily operations. The aim is to show how working with 1325 is both necessary in order to attain the mandate goals of supporting Government of Afghanistan and the Constitution and to increase efficiency in the PRTs' operations. The PRT Guiding Principles are very broad. For example, they state that a PRT should:³⁹

- Focus upon improving stability.
- Operate as an integrated military-civilian organization.
- Work to a common purpose or end-state with unity of effort.
- Lead from behind and underneath, ensuring Afghan ownership. Promote Afghan primacy and legitimacy. (Remembering and respecting that an Afghan Face = Afghan Pace.)
- Actively engage with the Governor, Government of Afghanistan officials, the local communities and population through Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees, Shuras and other established and traditional bodies.
- Facilitate the visibility of Government of Afghanistan presence in the Province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g. transports, communications, etc).
- Ensure that interventions at the provincial level support national Government of Afghanistan processes and the Afghan National Development Strategy.
- Be aware of and respect civil military sensitivities - lives may depend on it.

Decisions on the size and nature of a PRT, based on the mandate and the guiding principles, are primarily a matter for the PRT's lead nation. Such decisions are, however, naturally taken in coordination with contributing states (partner nations) and organizations. The format and core functions of the PRTs depend on the situation in their area of responsibilities. Important factors are for example the security situation, the status of reconstruction and development, effectiveness of governance institutions, and the presence of other International Organizations and agencies.⁴⁰ The PRTs' civilian components have the lead on political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of the PRTs' work.⁴¹ The military components focus on increasing security and stability in their area of responsibility and on building security sector capacity. PRTs' military components are also in charge of directing assistance to the civilian elements, in particular at the levels of transport, medical assistance and engineering. The subsequent section describes further why Resolution 1325 is needed to achieve ISAF's mandated objectives and elaborates on how Resolution 1325 can increase operational effectiveness.

4.3 ISAF and Resolution 1325

It is the mandate of ISAF to support the Afghan governmental structures which are established by the Constitution. The mandate is also to provide security assistance and while security is not equivalent to equality, security is needed to realize the Afghan Constitution in which gender equality and human rights are clear parts. The importance of Resolution 1325 is shown in the need for gender-aware assessments and is reinforced by the different security needs of men and women. Men and women have different gender-specific security needs in addition to shared ones and it is impossible to reach a state of security if systematic inequality and human rights abuse exist. It is recognized that ISAF

³⁹ ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 3 (3 Feb 07)

⁴⁰ Swedish PRT Commander FS16

⁴¹ Normally in support of the Government of Afghanistan's national development priorities. Example of projects being implemented are: schools being rebuilt; irrigation ditches, pipelines, reservoirs and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local population and farmers; infrastructure is being repaired and/or built to facilitate mobility and communication; and local people are provided with greater access to medical assistance.

troops are not in Afghanistan to bring equality of the sexes; that is not the military's responsibility. The ISAF HQ in Kabul maintains situational awareness of the whole country and has the PRTs under its operational command. This means that the HQ can relocate resources and ask the PRTs to perform security operations. In other respects, the PRTs are quite independent; the civilian components in particular respond only to their respective capitals. Located in Kabul and having a coordinating role with regard to the PRTs, ISAF HQ plays a central role in the national assessment of women's needs. ISAF HQ also has direct access to Government of Afghanistan and organizations such as UNAMA which are valuable contacts for information and when interpreting the Constitution. Gender awareness at ISAF HQ was, however, low.⁴² Resolution 1325 was not a priority and the understanding of its content and usability was low.

When talking to government ministries, NGOs and International Organizations, their biggest concern was the overall security situation.⁴³ With deteriorating security in general, the whole population is affected negatively but women are affected before men and, especially, their mobility becomes restricted. In line with the needs to safeguard women's mobility, external actors pointed at several areas where ISAF and the PRTs could assist. These areas – all in line with the Constitution – were both conceptual, such as women's political, educational and human rights, and hands on, e.g. safe voter registration. ISAF HQ had provided security for some conferences and similar events but participation had still been limited as a consequence of other gender-related cultural factors not being considered. For instance, the time of the day was important to make sure that the conference did not impede on the women's daily tasks in the home (i.e. cooking, getting water, caring for the children). Increasing the gender awareness enhances women's possibility to participate in society and their Human Rights. Furthermore, information can be collected at these kinds of meetings and if the turnout would be low, it would probably be an indication of bad or worsening security. The implementation of Resolution 1325 is, thus, an important tool to enhance operational effectiveness and realize the mandate of safeguarding the Constitution. ISAF HQ and the Regional Commands play an important role in coordinating the PRTs but also to make sure that the PRTs receive complete information about the general security situation and any developments. In addition to operational effectiveness, Resolution 1325 is crucial to win the hearts and minds of the local population, both by showing respect to traditions and by ameliorating the living situation for more than half of the population. If you improve the situation for women, you also improve the living conditions for children and for the whole family. More than in theatre of operations, actively working for women's rights also increases the legitimacy and credibility of NATO operations in troop-contributing countries. It can also work as an incentive for more women to work in the military, increasing the resource base and evening out the numbers of female and male employees.

4.3.1 Access to Female Military Personnel

In the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, it was agreed to set up a Task Force on how to improve the gender balance in NATO. The Task Force's aim was to make recommendations to the North Atlantic Council on ways to increase the number of women in the NATO International Staff (International Military Staff and civilian workforce). The Task Force sought achievable goals by focusing on diversity issues and it concluded that there should be no quotas set. Instead, it was agreed that the aim was:

1. To increase the overall number of women employed in the International Staff
2. To increase the overall number of women applying
3. To increase the overall number of women in managerial positions

⁴² Interviews made at ISAF HQ

⁴³ Interviews with e.g. AIHRC, Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Swedish Afghan Committee

Table 1: *Women in the International Staff and International Military Staff in NATO*

Year	IS		IMS
	Total (%)	management (A5-A7)	Total
2003	34.2	12.5	52.4
2004	34.5	10.8	52.4
2005	34.7	14.9	49.4
2006	35.2	15.2	44.7
2007	35.7	20.7	44.7

Source: NATO, *Diversity Annual Report 2007*

Table 2: *Share of female soldiers in NATO countries' Armed Forces*

COUNTRY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Belgium	7,6	7,9	8,2	8,26	8,3	8,3	8,25
Bulgaria	-	-	-	4,2	6,0	6	-
Canada	11,4	11,8	12,4	12,3	12,6	12,8	17,3
Czech Republic	3,7	10,0	10,0	12,3	12,21	12,21	-
Denmark	5,0	N.A.	5,0	5,0	5,0	5,3	5,4
France	8,5	10,8	11,2	12,79	12,8	13,28	7,4
Germany	2,8	3,7	4,4	5,2	6,0	6	7,5
Greece	3,8	3,8	3,8	4,2	16,0	5,4	5,6
Hungary	9,6	16,0	10,0	10	4,3	17,56	17,3
Italy 1	0,1	0,1	0,5	0,53	1,0	1,6	2,6
Latvia	-	-	-	13,5	20,0	--	23
Lithuania	-	-	-	6,04	9,07	12,5	12
Luxembourg	--	--	--	--	---	5,71	-
The Netherlands	8,0	8,4	8,5	8,65	9,0	9	9
Norway 1	3,2	3,3	5,7	6,3	6,3	7	7,1
Poland	0,1	0,3	0,3	0,47	0,47	0,52	1
Portugal	6,6	6,6	8,4	8,4	8,4	12	13
Romania	-	-	-	3,99	5,0	5	6,37
Slovakia	-	-	-	6,1	7,06	7,7	8,65
Slovenia	-	-	-	19,2	15,38	--	15,3
Spain	5,8	9,0	10,0	10,5	10,7	13,47	12
Turkey	0,1	0,1	0,1	3,95	3,95	3,1	-
United Kingdom	8,1	8,3	8,6	8,8	9,0	9,1	9,3
United States	14,0	14,0	15,0	15,0	15,5	10,49	-

Source: NATO, *Diversity Annual Report 2007*

Table 1 and 2 displays the trends of the female recruitment in NATO Members. As can be seen in the tables, NATO Staff is doing quite well while the share of women in the national Armed Forces rarely exceeds fifteen percent.

The Task Force assessed the trends on gender balance (as well as the balance in age and nationality) within NATO. Overall results show that a slight increase has been reached in the number of women employed in NATO International Staff in 2007, in particular in managerial (A5-A7) positions. On the other hand, the number of women in NATO International Military Staff decreased from 52.4 percent to 44.7 percent in the same period. Data available within NATO⁴⁴ for 2001-2007 reveal that Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, US and especially Latvia (23 percent) have more than ten percent women in their armed forces. Italy is found on the other side of the spectrum with less than three percent women in the military ranks. These numbers constitute the recruitment base for NATO Operations. The five succeeding chapters describe and analyze the PRTs visited and examined in this report.

List of Interviewees, Kabul

ISAF HQ

Shakila Azziada Cultural Adviser CJ9
 Florin Cotet, CJ35
 Robert Cowell, STRATCOM
 Bruno van Damme CJ3
 Hugues Esquerre CJ35
 Mary Fontaine, Advisor for Crosscutting Issues, USAID
 Rolf Helenius CJ9
 Sigurd Iversen CJ9
 Pepe Leon CJ9
 LtC Leshinsky CJ1
 Angela Love, STRATCOM
 Michail Ploumis CJ9
 Megan Minnion, Political Adviser
 Michael Roach, STRATCOM
 Skogestad CJ9
 Mimi van Spijker, STRATCOM
 Thomas Tristl CJ3
 Math Weijers CJ9
 Nicholas Williamsson, Senior Political Adviser, CJ9
 Attaullah Ziarmal, Country Adviser to CJ9

Ministries, International Organizations, NGOs

Gen. Gul Nabi Ahmadzai, DG Training & Education, Ministry of Interior and Focal Point
 Mr. Raffie Azizi, Director of Afghan Civil Society Forum
 Mr. Petr Kosthryz, Program Director, Norwegian Church Aid
 Ms. Theresa de Langis, Program Manager Governance and peace Program UNIFEM

⁴⁴ NATO (2009e), *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces*
 [http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/index.html] (accessed April 24, 2009)

Ms Stella Makanya, Gender Affairs Officer, Office of the Deputy SRSG, UNAMA

Mr. Hashim Mayar, Deputy Director, ACBAR

Ms. Mezghan Mustafawi, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Women Affairs

Gen. Mohammed Ameen Noristani, Director General of Rights, Ministry of Defense

Ms. Zhura Rasikh, Director for Human Rights & Women and International Affairs Desk,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Representatives for ACTED, Kabul

Dr. Sima Samar, Chairperson of AIHRC

Ms. Sheila Samimi, Afghan Women Network (AWN)

Col. Shafiq, Head of Gender mainstreaming Unit, Interior Ministry

Mr Mark Skidmore, Senior Military Adviser, UNAMA

Mr. Andreas Stefanson, Swedish Commission in Afghanistan.

Mr. Reto Stocker, Head of Delegation, ICRC Afghanistan

Ms. Gul Maky Siawash, Afghan Women Network (AWN)

Ms. Suraiya Subhrang, Commissioner AIHRC on Women's Development

5 The Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt

By Sophie Kesselaar and Joseph Hoenen

5.1 National Context

The Netherlands has had the responsibility for the PRT in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan province, since August 2006.⁴⁵ In its international work, the Dutch government has committed itself to implementing Resolution 1325. On 4 December 2007, the Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 was launched. The Action Plan adopts a joint approach to women, peace and security, involving the Dutch government – represented by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior & Kingdom Relations, civil society (NGOs and women's organizations) and knowledge institutions (universities and think tanks). The Action Plan states that in all operations supported or conducted by the Netherlands, Resolution 1325 must be included. Members of international missions must have appropriate gender expertise at their disposal and male-female relations within the operation must be in balance.⁴⁶ Prior to the Action Plan, in December 2005, the Dutch Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces issued instructions on gender policy within the Ministry of Defense (Guideline A-104). In it, he specified that gender issues should be given due consideration at the various stages of an assignment: during the formation phase, the preparatory phase as well as during and after the mission. Thus, work on gender-related issues by the PRT in Tarin Kowt has a national framework to rely on when operating in the Uruzgan province.

The Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt is one of the four PRTs falling under Regional Command South (RC-S) and its area of responsibility borders Zabul and Kandahar in the south, Helmand in the east, Daikundy in the north and Ghazni in the west. The Uruzgan province is about two-thirds the size of the Netherlands and is divided into six districts (Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod, Khas Uruzgan, Char Chineh, Chora and Gizab). The provincial capital Tarin Kowt is perceived as being more developed and modern as well as less conservative than the rural areas. Uruzgan has a population of around 320,000 people and the most dominant ethnic group in the province is the Pashtun. Within the Pashtun there are many different tribes, several of whom now occupy much of Uruzgan. The province also has a population of Kuchis, or nomads, whose numbers vary from season to season.⁴⁷

This study focuses on PRT 5 (March-September 2008) and complements with interviews from PRT 7 (March-September 2009). Research conditions for the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt differed to those for other case studies referred to in this report. Due to the fragile

⁴⁵ This study focuses on PRT 5 (March-September 2008) and complements with interviews from PRT 7 (March-September 2009). Research conditions for the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan differed to those for other case studies referred to in this report. Due to the fragile security situation in Uruzgan, research was not conducted in situ; the majority of the interviews (with members of PRT 5) were conducted between January and March 2009, after they returned to the Netherlands. Interviews with the local authorities, NGOs and other local stakeholders were held in the mission area itself in April 2009.

⁴⁶ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), *Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325: Taking a stand for women, peace and security*. December 2007. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs This integrated approach, which also takes shape in the Dutch PRT where the military cooperates closely with civilians from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is for example reconfirmed in the targets set by both parties for 2009 e.g. acquiring gender knowledge through gender courses for civilians and military personnel working in fragile states, and for gender experts to be sent to the mission area. ('Symposium on Gender in Operations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs', 9 December 2008).

⁴⁷ Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, *Provincial Profile Uruzgan* [<http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Uruzgan%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf>] (accessed April 21, 2009)

security situation in Uruzgan, research was not conducted in situ; the majority of the interviews (with members of PRT 5) were conducted between January and March 2009, after they had returned to the Netherlands. Interviews with the local authorities, NGOs and other local stakeholders were held in the mission area itself in April 2009.

5.2 Situation in the PRT Area⁴⁸

The main economic activities in the province are agriculture (40 percent of households) and cattle farming (37 percent of households). Practically the entire population of Uruzgan lives in rural districts (97 percent), with only 3 percent living in urban areas.⁴⁹ The province is renowned for its almonds, but also for the major role it plays in cultivating poppies for opium production.⁵⁰ Around one sixth of all households (16 percent) earn their income through non-farm-related labor and about the same proportion through trade and services (14 percent). Very few women work in the public sector, however, the exact numbers are unknown.⁵¹ Women are excluded from the community decision-making process and do not participate in Shuras or Jirgas arranged by men.⁵² Exclusion of women is evident with regard to official government positions – of the 2,846 persons holding government posts in Uruzgan, 99 percent are men.⁵³ Uruzgan has a very low primary school attendance and the low attendance of girls is considered to be particularly problematic.⁵⁴ However, improvements are being made. Whereas in 2006, only 0.6 percent of women and 7 percent of men could read and write,⁵⁵ schools are now being opened and reopened. Currently, 15 schools have opened in Uruzgan and a further 24 schools are under construction.⁵⁶ As a result, as of early 2009 4,500 girls were going to school provincially-wide.⁵⁷ Basic health services infrastructure exists in Uruzgan but the province has extremely high maternal mortality rates. Nevertheless, while in 2004 only 2.5 percent of the births took place in the hospitals, in early 2009 this had increased to 12 percent. Furthermore, according to the health specialist within the PRT, a high percentage of local women suffer from depression or psychic traumas and/or are addicted to opium.⁵⁸ Around 92 percent can access their main source of drinking water in their community and on average 8 percent of all households in Uruzgan province have access to electricity.⁵⁹

In Uruzgan, the Taliban control large parts of the local population. Although the areas in which Dutch troops were most active were considered to be relatively safe, other regions in the area, such as Mirabad and the Baluchi Valley, remained Taliban strongholds.⁶⁰ The Taliban's pressure on the population in the entire province remains strong, including improvised explosive devices, kidnappings and extortion to exert control. In the Dutch

⁴⁸ Accurate and specific data about the Uruzgan province was lacking at the time of writing, especially at household level.

⁴⁹ Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, *Provincial Profile Uruzgan*

⁵⁰ The factor most conducive for opium production is the lack of alternative sources of income; many farmers keep producing opium as it is their only means of survival.

⁵¹ Interview with Public Health Adviser for Governor of Uruzgan

⁵² Article Gender in Uruzgan, Task Force Uruzgan staff

⁵³ Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, *Provincial Profile Uruzgan*

⁵⁴ Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2004), *Afghan Rural Poverty and Service Access Overview*.

[<http://www.mrrd.gov.af/vau/N-tree/NRVA%202003%20Policy%20Brief%20summary%20November%202004.doc>] (accessed April 21, 2009)

⁵⁵ Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, *Provincial Profile Uruzgan*

⁵⁶ Factsheet on Education in Uruzgan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 2009.

[<http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistan-pdf/maart09/fact-sheet-preparing-for-future-uruzgan-march09.pdf>] (accessed April 21, 2009)

⁵⁷ Interview with Local NGO staff member

⁵⁸ Interview with Functional Health Specialist

⁵⁹ Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, *Provincial Profile Uruzgan*

⁶⁰ Recently there has been successful operations in both districts to combat the Taliban as a result of which the influence of the Taliban in those areas has diminished (especially in the Baluchi Valley) (Correspondence with policy officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

area of responsibility there is the constant threat of suicide bombings against anybody seen to be linked to the government (Afghan and international).⁶¹ According to the intelligence officer of PRT 5, the number of attacks involving improvised explosive devices in Uruzgan increased in 2008 in comparison to previous years.⁶² Nonetheless, during the deployment of PRT 5, the security situation in Uruzgan was considered to be relatively stable.⁶³ This was confirmed by an Afghan NGO-coordinator in Uruzgan who contrasted Uruzgan with the worsening security situation in other parts of Afghanistan.⁶⁴

However, the security situation for Afghan women in Uruzgan was, on the whole, very precarious. Domestic violence remains a common problem and threats and intimidations against women working outside the home sphere are everyday occurrences. Yet, the poor security situation and social position of women in Uruzgan is not just a matter of physical threats and insecurity but must be seen in the wider context of discrimination against women in all (public) spheres.⁶⁵ A PRT member said it was rather difficult to judge whether the ISAF's efforts have had a positive or negative effect on the local gender situation as women do not figure much in Uruzgan public life and as there is a lack of information on gender-related offences.⁶⁶ However, local stakeholders acknowledged the positive effect generated by ISAF's work on the situation of local women, especially in the health sector and by providing a secure environment in which girls were able to go to school.⁶⁷

5.3 PRT Mandate and Organization

The PRT is part of the overarching structure of the Task Force Uruzgan which consists of approximately 1,200 people. During PRT 5, the military forces were split up into three locations: Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod and Chora. The main camp (Camp Holland) is stationed near Tarin Kowt, the province capital, in the south of Uruzgan. The Australian Reconstruction Task Force is also located at Camp Holland. Task Force Uruzgan cooperates with soldiers from the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Besides the PRT, the Task Force Uruzgan consists of other units such as a Battlegroup, fighting and support units, logistics etc. The main task of the core of the Task Force Uruzgan, the Battlegroup (infantry), is to provide security, not only for the local Afghan population but also in terms of force protection. The Battlegroup is a strictly military unit. The Provincial Reconstruction Team, on the contrary, is a relatively small group which is deployed particularly to support tasks concerning the reconstruction process in Uruzgan. CIMIC capacities are not concentrated in one CIMIC Support Element within the PRT, but integrated into both the HQ staff and the Mission Teams.⁶⁸

The 'whole-of-government thinking', also called '3-D approach' in reference to the incorporation of Diplomacy, Development and Defense tasks, has from the beginning been clearly manifested in the Dutch PRTs. This integrated and interdepartmental approach of the Dutch intervention in Uruzgan entails the cooperation of military staff from the Ministry of Defense and civilians from the Ministry of Foreign affairs in order to achieve the common goal of providing security and supporting reconstruction and development in

⁶¹ Interview with Political Adviser (deployed during PRT 7)

⁶² Correspondence with S2 (intelligence)

⁶³ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning). However the PRT HQ considered the security situation too precarious to conduct the research in the mission area itself.

⁶⁴ Interview with local NGO-coordinator

⁶⁵ The gender policy of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs is based on the accomplishment of 7 priority objectives in order to achieve MDG3 ('promote gender-equality and empower women') as exemplified here (except for property rights). Therefore, in order to examine women's situation one has to examine this in terms of: education, (maternal) health, infrastructure, employment, property ownership, political participation and reductions in violence.

⁶⁶ Interview with PRT HQ member; Police Gender Specialist

⁶⁷ Interview with Public Health Adviser for Governor of Uruzgan; local NGO-staff

⁶⁸ Dutch Ministry of Defence (2008), Joint Doctrine Bulletin 2008/01 "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" *inset in Afghanistan*. The Hague: Ministry of Defence 2008.

Uruzgan as well as strengthening the Kabul government.⁶⁹ The PRT has lately expanded its capacities in police mentoring personnel to focus more on the training of the ANP and on mentoring in the field. Accordingly, the number of personnel employed in the PRT has increased from 65 persons in PRT 5 (March-September 2008) to approximately 110 people in PRT 7 (March-September 2009).⁷⁰

The Task Force Uruzgan and the PRT 5 were led by military commanders. While both Commanders worked very closely with the civilian components of the mission, the Task Force Uruzgan and the PRT 5 were officially headed by the military.⁷¹ The PRT-HQ consisted of both a military and a civilian component. Development Advisers, a Tribal Adviser⁷² and interpreters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were officially part of the PRT HQ.⁷³ The military section of the PRT-HQ constituted, besides the Commander PRT, a Deputy Commander PRT/Chief of Staff; a Regimental Sergeant Major; the head of S2 (intelligence); the head of S3/5 (operations and planning); the head of S8 (finance); the head of S9 (CIMIC);⁷⁴ the head of CIMIC Support Element and the Commander of police trainers. Each section consisted of a few auxiliary section personnel. At the tactical level, the PRT personnel were organized into Mission Teams, functional specialists, and police mentors. PRT 5 had five Mission Teams, each consisting of between six and nine persons. For example, the Mission Team responsible for the centre of Tarin Kowt consisted of two military officers supplemented by PRT civilians and military personnel from the PRT HQ. The Mission Team at Deh Rawod, on the other hand, had nine members because it included an intelligence officer and staff from the Military Police. Four (military) functional specialists were deployed for their expertise in agriculture, infrastructure, health and justice. In PRT 5 the Police Mentoring Team consisted of 12 police officers from the Dutch Military Police. This unit guided and trained Afghan police trainers from the ANP.

5.4 Representation and Resolution 1325

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Operations. Internal representation primarily concerns ‘manning policies and equal opportunities’ such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization. External representation relates to how Operations are conducted in terms of ‘liaison, information and support’ vis-à-vis the population and parties in the area of responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women’s organizations?

⁶⁹ As a result of the improved security situation, the past PRT’s have been able to work more and more towards the ‘civilianization’ of the PRT-structure. In PRT 6 the number of civilians in the PRT was doubled (Interview with Development Adviser). The civilianization has been further enhanced by the deployment of the civilian representative as the executive director of PRT 7 in March 2009. This is in line with the statement made at the Afghanistan conference held on March 31 2009 in The Hague: a stronger civil face of the intervention is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable reconstruction. The conference also emphasized the importance of strengthening the Afghan National Army as well as for the Afghan National Police. (Chairmen’s Statement of the International Conference on Afghanistan The Hague, 31 March 2009)

⁷⁰ In the extended Police Mentoring Team of PRT 7 both personnel from the Dutch Military Police as well as the Land Forces are deployed (Interview with Commander of police trainers, also deployed in PRT 7).

⁷¹ At the top-level of the Task Force Uruzgan a civilian representative of the Dutch Ministry of foreign Affairs was deployed. The Task Force Uruzgan Commander and the Civilian Representatives constituted the Management Board of the Task Force Uruzgan. They planned the course of the Dutch intervention jointly and supervised the military- and civilian-integrated action of the task force. The Civilian Representatives was also in charge of leading the civilian team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the PRT. Furthermore, the Civilian Representatives also served as an intermediate between the Dutch Embassy in Kabul and several development projects (Interview with Development Adviser).

⁷² In PRT 7 the Tribal Adviser is called ‘Cultural Adviser’

⁷³ Among the civilians the Political Adviser (who played an important role in advising both commanders) stood under the direct command of the Task Force Uruzgan Commander (Correspondence with PRT Commander).

⁷⁴ Head of S9 (CIMIC) initially collaborated closely with the CIMIC Support Element in PRT 5 but this function was later on integrated in the Task Force Uruzgan command structure

5.4.1 Internal Representation

PRT 5 was composed of a mixed group of men and women distributed across the military and civil components. Nine of the 65 PRT members were women. Compared to earlier PRTs, PRT 5 had a high proportion of female team members. However, its composition was considered to be a minimal basis for implementing Resolution 1325. There are no guidelines on the number of women a PRT must include. The Ministry of Defense's choice of unit (forming the main military component of the team) depends on the availability of female staff and the personal vision of the Commander to acquire a certain percentage of women in the unit.

Six women served in the military component of PRT 5, three of whom were officers. A woman was assigned to each of the five Mission Teams to make it easier to establish contact with local women. The PRT Commander made a conscious decision to appoint a woman as commanding officer of the Mission Team for the town of Tarin Kowt so as to send a clear message to the Afghan people – the task of the mission was to contribute to the situation of the ‘other’ fifty percent of the Afghan population as well. There was also a female officer on the PRT's Military Staff. Three women served in the civil component of the PRT: two Development Advisers and one of the three Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreters. By contrast, the military component officially did not have a female interpreter deployed in the mission area; instead they mostly made use of local male interpreters. Within the Police Mentoring Team, all 12 mentors were male.⁷⁵ However, looking forward, female police mentors will need to be assigned to the PRT in order to facilitate the capacity to train and mentor female police officers.⁷⁶

In spite of the above-average number of female members of PRT 5, interviewees underlined the need for additional female security guards. Access to female security guards was, for example, a prerequisite for female Development Advisers who wanted to go outside the camp to get in contact with Afghan women, e.g. in hospitals. Civilians were protected by a special personal protection force.⁷⁷ Only one of the eight security guards was female, while a visit to the hospital required at least three security guards.⁷⁸ Because only women were allowed to enter the women's section in the hospital, this caused some logistical problems.⁷⁹ The freedom of movement of civilians of the PRT was also restricted because of the general shortage of soldiers available for deployment for security assignments outside the camp.⁸⁰ Also within the Battlegroup there was a general shortage of female militaries. For some assignments where the Battlegroup could possibly encounter local women, for example when conducting house searches, the assistance of female PRT-members was requested.⁸¹

All interviewed PRT members felt that the fact that the team was mixed was an advantage. The female soldiers said they were used to working with male colleagues and that they did not have any problems with doing so.⁸² One male source said: “I really liked the fact that there were also female PRT members. That's a big advantage: it's much more fun and you can exchange useful information”.⁸³ Moreover, being able to draw on both male and female competencies was seen as an advantage. According to a female Mission Team Commander “Men and women have different competences and I really think deploying both men and women is a good mix. After all, women focus on different things, which

⁷⁵ Also in the Police Mentoring Team of PRT 7 all 54 members were male (Interview with Commander of police trainers, also deployed in PRT 7)

⁷⁶ This was stated by the Commander of police trainers: when all requirements are fulfilled to be able to train local women, female Police Mentor Team members need to be deployed (Interview with Commander of police trainers, also deployed in PRT 7)

⁷⁷ Not to be confused with the Battlegroup.

⁷⁸ Interview with Development Adviser

⁷⁹ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning)

⁸⁰ Interview with Development Adviser

⁸¹ Interview with member Mission Team

⁸² Interview with Mission Team member; Mission Team Commander

⁸³ Interview with Functional Specialist Health

men totally miss. But everywhere it's like this, in every company".⁸⁴ However, one female source said some soldiers (mostly the younger ones) acted in a macho way to attract the women soldiers' attention.⁸⁵

The fact that the PRT was a mixed team, and that every Mission Team that was sent out included a woman, made it relatively easier to connect with local women. While male PRT members could only speak with local men, female PRT members could establish contact with men and women alike. Female military PRT members were accepted by the local men because they were seen as soldiers rather than women. Women soldiers could also talk with Afghan women after having received their husbands' permission, something which was usually not a problem. Women soldiers from the Mission Teams were sometimes even invited by the men to visit their homes to talk to their wives. They think they were allowed to speak to local women because the men thought they would just talk about 'women's things'.⁸⁶

Female PRT members were also able to 'consult' Afghan women, but only indirectly and the moments were very scarce. Approaching women directly to ask their advice on, for example, where to sink a well was considered counterproductive. If a soldier would address an Afghan woman directly and in public it was said that one could be "assured they will never let you speak to them or see them again".⁸⁷ So any consultation had to take place when the women were not supervised by male family members, for example at the hospital. The female Mission Team Deputy Commander⁸⁸ stationed at Deh Rawod asked the military doctor to inform her whenever a woman was admitted. She would then talk to the woman about how things were with her and her family and issues that affected her. This allowed the team member to gain an impression of which issues mattered to local women and to hear their opinions.⁸⁹ It was strictly forbidden for male soldiers to do so because Afghan men found it confrontational and embarrassing to be asked about such matters by Western men. According to the PRT Commander, raising such issues could cause relations with discussion partners to become strained: "Afghan men just don't accept it".⁹⁰ The rule of thumb was therefore: 'if they raise the subject, fine; otherwise, don't ask'.⁹¹ The feeling of the Commander was that having female soldiers in the team meant that conversations about women would arise of their own accord.⁹²

In addition, female soldiers on patrol were not necessarily considered role models (since the local men consider Western women, especially those in a military function, totally different than Afghan women), but more as an eye-opener for the local population. Although these effects are hard to measure, almost all female PRT soldiers felt they had an impact, for example when they were approached by young girls who wanted to shake their hands, or during visits to the women-section of the hospital, or, simply, by their sheer presence.⁹³

Actively deploying women in leading positions had other, less obvious, advantages for the implementation of PRT 5's mandate. It proved to be an effective strategy for getting local men to volunteer specific information. The team had the impression that many Afghan men found Western women to be interesting. Informants were, according to the Commander of police trainers, prone to be more open and more accepting to female staff.⁹⁴ According to the Commander PRT, talking to a female officer even "loosened

⁸⁴ Interview with Mission Team Commander

⁸⁵ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

⁸⁶ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

⁸⁷ Interview with PRT HQ member

⁸⁸ The female Mission Team Deputy Commander actually took the lead over the Mission Team for a large period due to the absence of the Mission Team Commander Deh Rawod.

⁸⁹ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

⁹⁰ Interview with PRT Commander

⁹¹ Interview with PRT Commander

⁹² Interview with PRT Commander

⁹³ Interviews with female Military Staff

⁹⁴ Interview with Commander of police trainers

men's tongues" which provided the PRT with very useful information about the area of responsibility among other things.⁹⁵ A number of sources confirmed that negotiations conducted by female PRT members were sometimes more successful than those conducted by their male counterparts.⁹⁶ As a result, women were chosen to represent the PRT at certain meetings, including those with local administrators. They were also in a better position to raise, when possible, certain women's issues at these meetings. Consequently, women's contribution in terms of establishing contact with the local male population in the mission area was seen as effective.⁹⁷

Even if female PRT members did not experience a lot of problems establishing initial contact with local women, it was often impossible to conduct a proper conversation because of the lack of female interpreters. The effect was that when women soldiers were talking to a group of Afghan women conversation tended to be limited to topics such as their appearance (earrings, blonde hair, and uniforms.) However, a number of solutions were devised to allow female soldiers to talk to Afghan women even if no female interpreter was available. One way was for the women (who would be sitting in the qala) to talk loudly so that the male interpreter – who had to stay outside or behind a curtain – could hear them.⁹⁸ Another way of overcoming this problem (e.g. during a house search or when women had to be interrogated in connection with the detention of Taliban leaders) was to have the male interpreter face the interior wall of the qala so that he could interpret for women being questioned and searched (by women soldiers) without seeing their faces.⁹⁹ However, PRT members said that this solution was 'not ideal' because they felt that women held back certain information if a man was present. A female deputy commander of a Mission Team said that "really contentious issues are never discussed in front of a man, or through a male interpreter." She had experienced this at a dinner for women organized at the home of the head of the Deh Rawod police force. Because a man was present, they were, according to the female deputy Mission Team Commander, only able to talk about 'insignificant things'.¹⁰⁰

Despite the presence of women in the PRT, the lack of female interpreters made it very difficult to communicate effectively with Afghan women, ensuring that their full needs and views were taken into account in the implementation of the mandate. The military PRT members agreed unanimously that employing more female interpreters would make it possible to implement Resolution 1325 more broadly and more effectively. The importance of female interpreters was also reaffirmed by a governor's Adviser.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the CIMIC Support Element Commander pointed out that given their knowledge of local culture, female interpreters could be employed to assess the value of information obtained and put it into a local perspective for the PRT members.¹⁰² There was a need for female interpreters to work for both military and civilian personnel at the PRT. Yet, female interpreters were lacking in numbers and considered very difficult to recruit. According to one interviewee, this had partly to do with the way the Dutch camp was organized logistically.¹⁰³ A demand expressed by most female Afghan interpreters was separate accommodation and sanitation facilities for men and women (i.e. separate toilets and bathrooms.) That separate sanitation facilities did not exist at the Dutch part of the camp was conceived as problematic by some female civilian and military staff

⁹⁵ Interview with PRT Commander

⁹⁶ Interviews with CIMIC Support Element Commander; member of CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point; Mission Team Deputy Commander

⁹⁷ Interview with PRT Commander

⁹⁸ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning)

⁹⁹ Interview with Mission Team Commander

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

¹⁰¹ Interview with Public Health Adviser for Governor of Uruzgan

¹⁰² Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹⁰³ Interview with PRT HQ member

members.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, one interviewee reasoned, potential interpreters turned down contract offers because of this structural lack of privacy.¹⁰⁵

In terms of internal representation one can conclude that Resolution 1325 was well established within PRT 5; there was a reasonable, although minimal, share of female personnel with some women in leadership positions. Nevertheless, this was an exception rather than the rule since there were no guidelines on the number of women units must include. The deployment of female PRT members resulted in positive outcomes; both internally and externally. A missed opportunity was the scarcity of female interpreters in the PRT, which prevented more profound conversations with local women.

5.4.2 External Representation

Several female PRT-members tried to identify women in the public sphere but were not very successful in doing so.¹⁰⁶ PRT 5 worked initially with the Ministry of Women Affairs but this Ministry was not very active in Uruzgan and its representatives were not deployed in the different districts. This created a situation in which it was more difficult to reach the majority of the local female population.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the cooperation was plagued by bureaucratic problems. Neither did the PRT work with women's organizations in its Area of responsibility because, according to PRT 5's Development Advisers and surveys conducted by PRT 6, there were simply no women's organizations active in the province of Uruzgan.¹⁰⁸ The PRT did have contact with NGOs which were engaged in projects that targeted women, for example through healthcare and agricultural programs or by providing education for girls. Yet, the NGOs of the Dutch Consortium Uruzgan (which consists of several Dutch NGOs active in Uruzgan)¹⁰⁹ did not work closely with the PRT on Resolution 1325 issues.¹¹⁰ Other Afghan NGO-staff members stated that there was no close cooperation on this theme because "if we work too close with ISAF or the PRT, we become a target for the Taliban".¹¹¹ The arrival of UNAMA to Uruzgan was on the agenda during the deployment of PRT 5.¹¹² UNAMA promised in July 2008 to open an office in Tarin Kowt, something which happened mid-March 2009.¹¹³

Nevertheless, the PRT did carry out some activities to increase the participation of local women in the public sphere. This was considered a long-term process and difficult to achieve within the deployment period of a single PRT. In an interview for this report, the Commander of the police trainers mentioned, for instance, the ongoing efforts of the PRT to include local women in the police training.¹¹⁴ The Afghan female Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreter had told him that there were women willing to join the police force. When contacting the Dutch embassy in Kabul, the Political Adviser obtained the permission to pay (four) new female police officers extra money as a way of attracting women to the police force. Yet, although several conditions¹¹⁵ were met to make it

¹⁰⁴ Interview with PRT HQ member; Mission Team Deputy Commander

¹⁰⁵ Interview with PRT HQ member

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Development Adviser; member of CIMIC Support Element/Gender Focal Point

¹⁰⁷ Survey on gender in Afghanistan, Taskforce Uruzgan, Provincial Reconstruction Team 6

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Development Advisers; Survey on gender in Afghanistan, Taskforce Uruzgan, Provincial Reconstruction Team 6

¹⁰⁹ Dutch Consortium Uruzgan: Save the Children, Cordaid, Healthnet TPO, ZOA Refugee Care and the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan cooperating with local relief organizations.

¹¹⁰ Interview with local NGO coordinator

¹¹¹ Interview with local NGO coordinator; local NGO-staff

¹¹² Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹¹³ The UNAMA office has the responsibility to coordinate the various donors and UN-agencies in Uruzgan as well as to build the capacity of the government structures. The official inauguration is planned in May 2009 (Interview with Development Adviser, deployed in PRT 7).

¹¹⁴ Interview with Commander of police trainers

¹¹⁵ I.e. separate housing and sanitary facilities; agreement from local mullah; available female police officers from Kandahar to act as role models etc. (Interview with Commander of police trainers).

possible, PRT 5 did not succeed in this project due to the lack of a female interpreter.¹¹⁶ The Mission Team in Deh Rawod was also actively engaged in creating opportunities for the social inclusion and participation of local women.¹¹⁷ During their deployment they were able to convince the district chief, who was considered an ‘open minded’ man, to admit women to the district centre. As a result of this, women are now able to at least express their concerns at the district centre. In order to be able to search female visitors to the district centre, the Mission Team recommended employing a woman instead of purchasing expensive detectors. This ultimately led to the appointment of the first woman in the district centre which also had some administrative duties. The same Mission Team also took the initiative to convene the first women’s meeting (Women’s Association)¹¹⁸ in Deh Rawod, which took place after the PRT’s departure. In Tarin Kowt, PRT 5 was involved in the decision-making on constructing a women’s park near the hospital. This park would be protected by walls and security guards and was a place where women could meet in a secure environment. In order to involve local women in this project, the Development Advisers and the military Gender Focal Point consulted women at the women section of the hospital, assisted by the female Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreter.¹¹⁹

The Dutch PRT also provided assistance to the local population through the ‘PRT house’, where the local population could go to in order to express their concerns. Women were, however, rarely seen at this facility at the Dutch camp.¹²⁰ The reason, said local NGO-staff, was that women who contacted the PRT were seen by the local population as spies.¹²¹ According to a deputy Mission Team Commander, women only showed up at the PRT house when the Mission Team explicitly requested them to come there to resolve an issue, or when they needed medical treatment.¹²²

As a result, the PRT’s focus was primarily to target women individually in their home environment. However, dealing with women as public representatives or as a group enables them to play a more active role in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Reaching out to women as individuals – with the exception of widows – can potentially have adverse effects and put them in great danger.¹²³ But women were not seen as the only target group for implementing Resolution 1325. Efforts targeting men were also considered to have an emancipatory effect. For example, men who have received a good education are more prone to send their daughters to school.¹²⁴ According to local stakeholders, there is a need to use radio and television to broadcast educational programs to create awareness, especially among men.¹²⁵ Furthermore, engaging in discussions with Mullahs on this topic was considered to be a constructive approach to address women’s situation today in Afghanistan compared to the (respected) position of women portrayed in the Koran.¹²⁶ But this idea of approaching men as a target group for Resolution 1325 implementation was not yet well developed, and moreover, was considered ‘risky’.

¹¹⁶ Since PRT 5 left nothing has changed in this situation because still no female interpreter had been found (Interview with Commander of police trainers, also deployed in PRT 7).

¹¹⁷ Interview with deputy Mission Team Commander

¹¹⁸ Previously it was called a Shura, but now it is called a Women’s Association as the word Shura has a formal status, which raised problems for the women participating

¹¹⁹ Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander; member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point. This project has not materialized as the idea was not considered as a culturally-wise activity. Instead, a tea corner was added to the women’s wing in the hospital as that is an accepted place for women to meet. Also a new library has been constructed with a separate women’s section/room (Interview with Development Adviser, deployed in PRT 7)

¹²⁰ Interview with Mission Team member

¹²¹ Interview with local NGO-staff

¹²² Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

¹²³ Interview with local NGO-coordinator; local NGO-staff

¹²⁴ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning); PRT HQ member

¹²⁵ Interview with local NGO coordinator; Public Health Adviser for Governor Uruzgan

¹²⁶ Interview with Public Health Adviser for Governor of Uruzgan

In brief, PRT 5 did make an effort to include local women in their assignments. Nevertheless, this was considered very hard because of the conservative culture and male-dominated society; and, therefore, only small things could be achieved. Approaching men on the subject was considered hazardous. Neither did active cooperation with NGOs on Resolution 1325 take place at the time. The PRT attributed the problems with involving women as public actors partly to the limited cooperation with Ministry of Women's Affairs and the lack of female representatives in Uruzgan. Therefore, the PRT focused on Afghan women as individuals in their homebound situation, which made the inclusion of Afghan women as a group in society much more difficult.

5.5 Integration and Resolution 1325

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective. Internal integration means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of 'organizing and conducting Operations', e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. External integration refers to the 'interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed' in the area of responsibility. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments executed in the area of responsibility, in terms of daily military operations? Relevant practices and lessons can be observed at both PRT HQ and PRT tactical levels.

5.5.1 Internal Integration

The integration of Resolution 1325 in the work of PRT 5 should be considered in view of general Dutch military operations in which gender is an integral part of the analysis and planning process. As a result of the Ministry of Defense's instructions on gender policy – Guideline A-104 – a so called 'gender checklist' has been developed, setting out the need to: identify beforehand the gendered effects of an operation; consider whether deploying female personnel and using a gender-approach can improve the execution of the mandate, and if so, determine which further measures need to be taken in the Operational Planning Process.¹²⁷ Yet, it needs to be mentioned that this checklist is only used by the Ministry of Defense prior to an operation and not by the civilian part of the mission. Moreover, this checklist was not used for the Uruzgan mission (which started in 2006) as the document was only approved officially in 2008.

PRT 5's Commander chose to actively include Resolution 1325 and gender issues among his specific priorities.¹²⁸ He was not formally instructed to focus on Resolution 1325 but did so by personal choice as he felt it was an important issue. The PRT Commander referred to the situation as "another case of disconnect between policymaking and reality".¹²⁹ In the pre-deployment phase, the PRT Commander himself appointed a female lieutenant as Project Officer Gender.¹³⁰ This officer was to learn more about Resolution 1325 and gender issues in the mission area and communicate that information to the PRT. The objective was to ensure that PRT soldiers became 'gender-aware', i.e. would understand the different gender roles of men and women in the mission area and be able to

¹²⁷ The checklist gender identifies different phases within the planning process of an operation where gender issues need to be scrutinized: initiation phase; orientation phase and concept development. In both documents 'Resolution 1325' is not mentioned explicitly but the content of Resolution 1325 on the whole is broadly covered in the respective documents.

¹²⁸ The PRT Commander 5 who initially would be deployed in the mission area (and who chose gender as one of his priorities) was at a later stage of the preparation replaced by a different Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Hubregtse (who adopted the already chosen priorities of the mission).

¹²⁹ Interview with PRT Commander

¹³⁰ During the deployment she was posted as Mission Team Deputy Commander Deh Rawod. She actually took the lead over the Mission Team for a large period due to the absence of the Mission Team Commander Deh Rawod.

act properly, as a military force, with respect to these existing gender roles, hereby making it possible to connect with ‘the other 50 percent of the population’. After having discussed with different specialists,¹³¹ the Project Officer Gender presented her findings to the military PRT members. Although the information she derived was not specific to the situation in Uruzgan, all soldiers could recall her presentation and stated that their consciousness about the topic had been raised. However, the Project Officer emphasized that, in her eyes, the efforts to highlight Resolution 1325 were limited, seeing as it was the first PRT that had explicitly focused on this issue and that, therefore, no related information had up till then been collected.¹³² In her preparatory work, she did not receive any guidance from the Operations Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. Because gender/Resolution 1325 is assigned to a J-9 (CIMIC) post within the Operations Directorate (which is already a demanding position), this topic received little attention when operations were planned.¹³³ This task should instead be allocated to a full-time Gender Officer at the Operations Directorate,¹³⁴ who already during the preparation phase would help the PRT Commander to integrate Resolution 1325 into the mission.

PRT 5’s active approach to gender-awareness is not to say that it is standard practice in all PRTs. The Ministry of Defense’s guideline A-104 on gender policy does not constitute a direct instruction to PRT Commanders to include gender issues in their missions. Consequently, their success in doing so is not evaluated. The Commander is expected to focus on other political issues as well as gender, often more than she/ he can realistically manage, said the PRT Commander.¹³⁵ She/ he therefore needs to prioritize, selecting from a large number of issues. Without the necessary means (a relatively high proportion of women in the team and a female interpreter) there are fewer opportunities for implementing Resolution 1325 and, accordingly, the Commander will be less likely to designate it a priority. Because of the scarcity of women deployed in PRT 7,¹³⁶ following up on the Resolution 1325 initiatives of former PRTs is considered to be difficult.¹³⁷ Deputy Mission Team Commander Deh Rawod, who has been very active on local women issues, expressed this fear, pointing to the current lack of female soldiers in her former Mission Team.¹³⁸

The crucial role that the PRT Commander plays in the implementation of Resolution 1325 is, so to speak, both a weakness and an asset. To eliminate the aspect of weakness, the PRT Commander must be held responsible for implementing Resolution 1325 in the mission area. This responsibility should be laid down in personal instructions for PRT operational commanders.¹³⁹ The PRT Commander said: “If the PRT Commander drafts guidelines, there is in fact an obligation [on the team] to follow them – Thou shalt consider opportunities for women. The team will observe them to the best of its ability”.¹⁴⁰ Integrating the Resolution into the Commander’s range of duties would generate a Resolution 1325 reporting mechanism within the PRT’s internal organization and towards the higher echelons of command. Furthermore, Resolution 1325 instructions would increase continuity across the PRTs in terms of knowledge and duties involving local

¹³¹ The Project Officer Gender spoke to Afghan women and Afghan women’s organizations in the Netherlands, and other specialists from NGOs.

¹³² Interview with deputy Mission Team Commander

¹³³ Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander; member CIMIC Support Element / Gender Focal Point

¹³⁴ On 9 December 2008 during the ‘Gender in Operations’ symposium, the Ministry of Defense pledged to assign a full-time gender officer to the Operations Directorate in 2009. This person will be responsible for integrating gender into the mission and planning of the operational commanders. What progress has been made in this direction is unknown at the time of writing.

¹³⁵ Interview with PRT Commander

¹³⁶ Only 5 of the 110 PRT 7 members are female: 4 female soldiers (in 3 different Mission Teams) and a female Development Adviser.

¹³⁷ Also PRT 6 had a ‘reasonable’ share of female staff: 10% were women

¹³⁸ Interview with deputy Mission Team Commander

¹³⁹ On 9 December 2008 during the ‘Gender in Operations’ symposium, the Ministry of Defense pledged to issue a gender directive for operational commanders in 2009. The precise content and status of this directive is unknown at the time of writing.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with PRT Commander

women. This is crucial because, as a local stakeholder said about the PRT: “New people start again from zero regarding knowledge and understanding of the Afghan society, and in Uruzgan [in particular]: there is no learning process”.¹⁴¹ Ensuring continuity in the PRT’s tasks is especially important in order to maintain the population’s trust, particularly with respect to this sensitive matter.

At the time of deployment neither the PRT nor Task Force Uruzgan had a fulltime gender expert. The Commander was not instructed to allocate responsibility for Resolution 1325 during the mission. Responsibility was shared by a number of different people. On the civil side, a Development Adviser was allocated responsibility for Resolution 1325. The female interpreter acted as deputy and gender adviser. Nevertheless, the civilians were not given a context-specific preparation or operational plan with regard to Resolution 1325 before being posted to the mission area. On the military side, a female officer on the Military Staff, who was officially responsible for managing finances for CIMIC projects,¹⁴² was also given the responsibility for gender-related issues on the initiative of the PRT Commander.¹⁴³ However, gender issues were not part of her official duties and she did not afford them any greater priority than her other tasks.¹⁴⁴



*A Dutch female soldier is disbursing for CIMIC-activities*¹⁴⁵

Several military interviewees mentioned the need for a fulltime gender expert during the mission in order to intensify field activities relating to the implementation of Resolution 1325.¹⁴⁶ Mission Team Deputy Commander Deh Rawod said that although shared knowledge on this topic was available, there was no guidance from experienced senior officers. She would have liked there to have been a fulltime gender expert available during the mission, who she could have consulted when encountering problems. She felt the problem was that although Resolution 1325 formed part of a number of people’s job descriptions, no one person felt fully responsible for its implementation.¹⁴⁷ Not only was gender expertise at the Task Force Uruzgan level lacking, but guidance on gender and

¹⁴¹ Interview with Public Health Adviser for Governor of Uruzgan

¹⁴² Therefore, it is referred to: ‘member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point’

¹⁴³ Interview with PRT Commander

¹⁴⁴ Interview with member CIMIC Support Element / Gender Focal Point

¹⁴⁵ Photo by Stakelbeek/ FMAX

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander; CIMIC Support Element Commander; member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

Resolution 1325 from ISAF HQ and the Dutch embassy was seen to be needed in order to ensure a proper assessment of Resolution 1325 projects proposed by the PRT.¹⁴⁸

In order to prepare the PRT team for the mission, the Ministry of Defense's School for Peace Missions organizes mission-oriented training for the duration of two weeks. As part of the program, all military personnel, from private soldier to commander, learn about the local population and attend cultural awareness lessons.¹⁴⁹ The majority of the military PRT-personnel are taught about the roles of men and women in the mission area and how they should approach the local population. But in the training, no reference was made to Resolution 1325. The impression of those attending the course and the way in which they were instructed to interact with Afghan people were afterwards described by several members of the PRT as 'exaggerated' and 'too dogmatic'. One source referred to the description of the local population as 'clichéd'.¹⁵⁰ Various interviewees said, for example, that while the training course had suggested that the local population had as a rule not to let the soles of their shoes be seen, in reality this was not something they were particularly concerned about. A functional specialist said the program had suggested that women were treated very badly in the Afghan culture and were considered to be lowlier than camels. He called this 'rubbish' after having discussed this, in an informal manner, with some local men during a two-day ANP course.¹⁵¹

In terms of establishing contact with women, soldiers were instructed not to look at women or pay them any attention. The idea behind this was, 'that way, nothing can go wrong.' Although these instructions did, on the whole, prove to be valid for male soldiers, female soldiers were not given any useful tips on how they might approach local women. They were, however, told that they should avoid certain subjects when talking with local men; that they would not be able to talk with key local leaders, and that local men would not want to shake their hand.¹⁵² But all female military interviewees refuted this and stated that, on the contrary, the opposite had been the case most of the time. They did not consider the local men's attitude towards women soldiers at all patronizing.¹⁵³ One Mission Team Commander mentioned an example when a female soldier from his Mission Team had been handing out ballots for the district chief elections and marking the thumbs of voters to prevent them from voting more than once. He said that of all 2,600 voters, not a single man had refused to give her his hand. The same officer had also told him that in seven months only one man had had problems talking to her.¹⁵⁴

The rigid impression given by the training program of the School for Peace Missions had an impact on initial contacts with the local population. Many PRT members were nervous because they were worried about 'getting the rules right'. According to one source, the training program made the soldiers unnecessarily anxious, resulting in that the first few times they met people they focused more on the rules than the matter in hand.¹⁵⁵ Once the soldiers had settled and realized that the reality was different from that which the training material had depicted the first (crucial) months had already passed and there was a relatively short time left to act.

In addition to the mission-oriented training of the School for Peace Missions, the PRT itself helped to boost knowledge about gender-related issues by holding non-military briefings. This was not a Ministry of Defense initiative. The team organized, on their own initiative, a number of briefings given by external parties and by PRT members on

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Development Adviser

¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, some PRT-members due to the fragmented formation-procedure only got a shortened mission preparation training.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Functional Specialist Health

¹⁵¹ Interview with Functional Specialist Health

¹⁵² Interview with deputy Mission Team Commander; member Mission Team ; Mission Team Commander

¹⁵³ Interview with member CIMIC Support Element / Gender Focal Point; Mission Team Commander; Mission Team Deputy Commander; Mission Team member

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Mission Team Commander

¹⁵⁵ Interview with PRT HQ member

subjects that they perceived to be relevant to their work in the mission area: e.g. briefings on the tribe-based culture; the work of NGOs; gender¹⁵⁶ and Afghan women.¹⁵⁷ The PRT members stated that they learnt a lot from these briefings. Also the Commander PRT considered the briefings by external speakers as ‘very informative’ and, in fact, ‘more useful’ than ‘their own’ Ministry of Defense mission-oriented training.¹⁵⁸ In general, what was considered to be missing by the PRT members throughout the preparatory program was up-to-date information and briefings about real-life experiences by former PRT members, for example on how the implementation of Resolution 1325 could be improved. According to most interviewees, the official pre-deployment training program did not take this sufficiently into account. The preparation should focus on possible ways of involving women rather than the impossibilities, especially since the deployment period of PRT staff is relatively short, allowing for limited time to put lessons learned into practice. The civilians working in PRT 5 did not participate in any of these briefings or other training together with the military. This preparatory phase is, however, crucial in order to ensure that the military and civilian members and their respective duties and responsibilities are coordinated effectively in the mission area.¹⁵⁹

Members of the PRT did not receive any training in, or special briefings on, aspects of Resolution 1325 while in the mission area. They did not think this was necessary as they could not have done more at that time than what they were already doing. None of the PRT members said they felt they lacked general information on Resolution 1325 issues during the deployment. PRT members believed that such training should be given in advance. Most PRT members felt that only Resolution 1325-related training that included new information or new opportunities would have been useful once they were in the mission area.

Reporting specifically on Resolution 1325 issues was not a formally integrated element in the PRT organization. The PRT Commander was not asked to report on these issues to the ISAF HQ.¹⁶⁰ In fact, communication with the ISAF HQ was considered by the CIMIC Support Element Commander as rather minimal.¹⁶¹ Neither the PRT Commander was asked to report back to the Dutch Ministry of Defense on Resolution 1325 issues. Within the PRT organization no reporting system on Resolution 1325 issues was institutionalized. However, on the military side of the PRT, reporting back to a higher level about activities and achievements was considered part of the daily routine. Besides this, the Gender Focal Point within the military PRT HQ collected information from female Mission Team members about women-related issues in the field. She then compiled this information and reported back to the PRT Commander, who used this as an input for meetings with the Task Force Uruzgan Commander.¹⁶² The civilian PRT members were, according to one Development Adviser, only obliged to report on women issues when Parliament had questions related to the Afghan female population.¹⁶³ Another Development Adviser stated that she had never had any instructions from the Civilian Representative, PRT Commander or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on gender or Resolution 1325 issues.¹⁶⁴

Summarizing, it can be stated that the integration of Resolution 1325 in this particular PRT was very good (in the analyses, planning, training and to a more limited degree in the

¹⁵⁶ As mentioned before: this briefing about gender was given by the appointed Project Officer Gender.

¹⁵⁷ This briefing was only meant for the PRT HQ-staff and the commanders of the mission teams and was given by Afghan women themselves. Yet, these women came from Kabul and could not provide accurate information about the more conservative setting of Uruzgan. Besides these briefings the women soldiers in the PRT, particularly those in the mission teams, have been informed by the same Afghan women separately about the tips and tricks on how to approach the female population.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with PRT Commander

¹⁵⁹ Interview with PRT Deputy Commander

¹⁶⁰ Interview with PRT Commander

¹⁶¹ Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹⁶² Interview with member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point

¹⁶³ Interview with Development Adviser

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Development Adviser

reporting), with the exception of the civilian component. But the implementation of Resolution 1325 as a natural part of the PRT organization remains highly dependent on variable factors, such as the commitment of the Commander. Therefore, the continuation of PRT efforts with a Resolution 1325 approach is not guaranteed. Because the PRT 5 Commander was committed to this as it led to enhanced attention in the mission to Resolution 1325 affairs. However, since the responsibility for Resolution 1325 affairs was scattered within PRT 5, no one felt they were fully accountable for implementation.

5.5.2 External Integration at the PRT HQ level

During operations, the PRT drafted a new Operational Order every two months, with input from civilian PRT members. Gender aspects were incorporated into these operation plans but only to a very limited degree.¹⁶⁵ That it happened at all was down to the initiative of the PRT Commander; he was not instructed to perform any specific tasks in relation to Resolution 1325 by ISAF HQ, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The PRT Commander used a metaphor when explaining PRT 5's approach to implementing the Resolution in the field: "It is a question of keeping your eyes open and responding immediately to opportunities [e.g. when locals start to talk about women's issues]. It's rather like the fire service: fire-fighters are always prepared for anything. We didn't have a pre-arranged plan or approach".¹⁶⁶ The Gender Focal Point on the military staff confirmed that this was the prevailing attitude at the PRT HQ level. According to her, other units at the HQ level, such as the head of S2 (intelligence) and S3/5 (operations and planning), showed a continuous interest in the topic of gender. In order to bring related issues forward among her colleagues, she frequently consulted the female interpreter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (who also advised on gender issues) and the Development Advisers regarding options and methods of integrating gender into the assignments.¹⁶⁷ Despite the PRT's high level of commitment to the women of Afghanistan and drive to be of service to them, many members were frustrated by the lack of embedded structures and resources at the mid-level needed to implement Resolution 1325 in the mission area in a lasting way. As the head of S3/5 said, "We want to do more, but we can't do more".¹⁶⁸

In the field, the majority of the CIMIC projects and activities carried out by the PRT were demand-based, selected on basis of the wishes of the local population, and, as much as possible, addressing women's wishes.¹⁶⁹ According to the PRT Commander, a different course of action would have been counterproductive to the PRT mandate.¹⁷⁰ This is not to say that the PRT indiscriminately accepted all initiatives based on local ideas. According to the CIMIC Support Element Commander, the population realized in the course of time that the PRT was willing to finance projects involving women, which prompted locals to indicate needs concerning women, hoping for financial assistance.¹⁷¹ Thus, the PRT learned that inviting specific projects could produce unwanted side-effects.

Various elements of Resolution 1325 were incorporated in the execution of the mandate objectives, for example 'providing security for the local population'. The PRT-members perceived the overall security situation in Uruzgan mainly in terms of 'war-type violence' and therefore, in a way, addressed women's security situation from the perspective of whether their physical security was lacking or threatened by war. In the execution of this particular mandate objective they were primarily focused on increasing related security. For example, the Mission Team in Deh Rawod became actively involved in increasing women's security through the renovation of a dilapidated former men's prison into a 'new'

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Development Adviser; CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹⁶⁶ Interview with PRT Commander

¹⁶⁷ Interview and correspondence with member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point; interview with Development Adviser

¹⁶⁸ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning)

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

¹⁷⁰ Interview with PRT Commander

¹⁷¹ Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander

women's prison. The situation of female detainees in Uruzgan was unknown and there were no special public detention centers for women.¹⁷² The PRT wanted to protect women against illegal punitive measures and provide them with a relatively secure detention environment. Through the Functional Specialist Justice the PRT was involved in the construction of a new prison (National Directorate for Security's detention facility) in Tarin Kowt, which would have a special women's section. This was still a point of discussion when PRT 5 left.¹⁷³ A small-scale, practical project to increase women's safety was the PRT's building of walls around two girls' schools to protect the pupils from exposure and attacks. Parents were unfavorably disposed towards sending their daughters to schools without any walls.¹⁷⁴ However, these projects had to be executed with care since, according to a local NGO coordinator, highlighting women's security more than the general security situation warranted could provoke resistance to the foreign intervention among the male population.¹⁷⁵

More indirectly targeting physical security but certainly as important, the Police Mentoring Team within the PRT made efforts to increase the general security situation by bringing in female police officers from the neighboring province of Kandahar, who were to instruct potential female police recruits in Uruzgan, and to provide separate housing and sanitary facilities for local women who were partaking in this training. The provincial Chief of Police had called for female police officers in the ANP and Afghan National Highway Authority to search women (or people disguised as women) at checkpoints in cities and along the highway. The local police suspected that bombs, weapons and other components for the use in attacks were being smuggled under women's burkhas.¹⁷⁶

Yet, on the other hand, the security situation was considered 'better' for women than for men since women principally stayed inside their houses, thus at less risk of being killed by improvised explosive devices and suicide bombs. According to the PRT Commander, within the households women did not necessarily occupy a subordinate position.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the PRT members found it difficult to gain insight into what happened inside the houses. Taking into account the risks of women's homebound situation and other less visible factors of insecurity, it is very important to grasp all aspects that the term 'security' implies. Accordingly, what is perceived as security differs per person and per setting. As a local stakeholders said; "Women have a problem when they are forced to leave the house. For example, when they have to deliver in a hospital and the man is away for whatever reason, they cannot leave".¹⁷⁸ PRT 5 considered the security situation for widows to be more vulnerable than that of married women (unless they had remarried or been taken in by their families) because they had lost their source of income and support base. An NGO office manager reaffirmed the need for special attention to widows' security situation because: "When many men die because of the war women are without income and support, which means they have to beg or go into prostitution".¹⁷⁹

In the PRT's work on the second operational line – supporting reconstruction and development – widows was therefore a special target group, also because they were not under the control of any man and were therefore easier for PRT members to approach. PRT 5 carried out projects focused not only on improving women's social participation but also on enhancing women's economic situation. One project involved distributing

¹⁷² Interview with Functional Specialist Justice; Afghan Human Development Report, UNDP and Kabul University 2007: *Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice*.

¹⁷³ Interview with Functional Specialist Justice. In April 2009 it was decided that the NDS-prison will be constructed including a special section for female detainees.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning)

¹⁷⁵ Interview with local NGO coordinator

¹⁷⁶ As mentioned before, during PRT 5 (neither during PRT 6) the Mission Team did not succeed in arranging an available female interpreter to actually train female police recruits (Interview with Commander of police trainers, also deployed in PRT 7).

¹⁷⁷ Interview with PRT Commander

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Chair of Independent Election Commission Secretariat of Uruzgan Province

¹⁷⁹ Interview with NGO office manager

sewing machines so that women could earn money by sewing and selling their products. This project was requested by the Tarin Kowt village elders and approved by the women of the village.¹⁸⁰ The PRT also distributed hens to women and provided some women with small loans through a microcredit project. According to a Development Adviser, all HQ members were aware of the fact that in the Afghan National Development Strategy, the inclusion of women is a priority.¹⁸¹ One Development Adviser felt that more could be done on implementing Resolution 1325 if quick and flexible funding was made available for a range of civilian PRT activities. This would have enabled civilian PRT members to respond more quickly to unforeseen needs of the local population and start Resolution 1325-related projects because they would not have to go through the procedural and time-consuming mill at the embassy in Kabul.¹⁸²

All these assignments and projects were executed in agreement with local authorities and were aimed at improving the living conditions of the local population. According to the PRT Commander and the head of S3/5 (operations and planning), preparation in the pre-deployment phase is crucial to create the conditions for Resolution 1325-related activities in the field during the operational phase.¹⁸³ PRT members were of the opinion that the efforts to implement Resolution 1325 mentioned here represented the maximum PRT 5 could have achieved at the time in this specific province. Although they tried to ensure Afghan involvement in these projects, they acknowledged that it was difficult to influence local governmental structures.¹⁸⁴

Most PRT members did not significantly adapt their work in order to include women's situations. They stated that their continuous focus in the field on possibilities for Resolution 1325 implementation was the best they could do. The CIMIC Support Element Commander said: "I don't think it's a matter of 'adjusting'. Instead, it is just something that we continuously kept in the back of our minds: in everything you did you looked for the openings and opportunities [to include women or their perspective]. It is not like: Well! Let's today think about gender!"¹⁸⁵ As a result of briefings at Camp Holland, information on activities and projects underway, including those involving local women, were shared among all staff members. Assessments of those projects were also made and communicated during deployment. This once led the Mission Team Commander Chora to adapt his work to include women's situation: when he heard about the relative success of the sewing machine project implemented by the PRT in Tarin Kowt, he decided to set up a similar project in Chora.¹⁸⁶

5.5.3 External Integration at the PRT Tactical Level

Because the CIMIC capacities were integrated in both the HQ staff and the Mission Teams, the way the selection of assignments took place can be seen as 'very interlinked'. Since the Mission Teams operated very independently and were able to initiate small projects, their activities provided a large part of the output of this military-led PRT. Nevertheless, the output was not the same for every Mission Team. Some Mission Teams were considered more gender-focused than other teams. It must be mentioned that all along the line, from PRT HQ to the PRT tactical level, the attitude towards possibilities of involving women in PRT assignments were rather consistent.

The clear vision of the Commander PRT seems to have reached the Mission Teams and was reflected in their projects, activities and ways of approaching the local population.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with CIMIC Support Element member/ Gender Focal Point

¹⁸¹ Correspondence with Development Adviser

¹⁸² Interview with Development Adviser

¹⁸³ Interview with PRT Commander; head of S3/5 (operations and planning)

¹⁸⁴ Interview with PRT Commander; CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹⁸⁵ Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹⁸⁶ This sewing machine was not yet running when his Mission Team left, however, he handed this project over to his successors (Interview with Mission Team Commander).

According to a female Mission Team member: “the Mission Team members were always looking whether the PRT could benefit from the presence of women.” When they encountered something they said: “I got something for you [female staff members]!”¹⁸⁷ A female Mission Team Commander thought it was necessary to put the Resolution 1325 approach of PRT 5 in a realistic perspective: “Of course the Commander has a goal for which we all make our efforts, but talking to women was not the most important thing to do. [...] Gender was a theme in our work, but we were still thinking about what the possibilities were when we encountered a woman”.¹⁸⁸ The Mission Teams thus focused continuously on opportunities where they effectively could make use of their female personnel to reach out to the female population, but the exact outlines for such contact and involvement were still to be shaped.

The perception of an ambiguous security position of women was shared among the PRT personnel at the tactical level. Besides the conviction of restricted, housebound and sometimes harsh living circumstances of Afghan women, the female Mission Team members who were able to communicate with the local female population and entered their houses, were of the opinion that inside the private sphere, a lot of women were respected and cherished.¹⁸⁹ An Afghan NGO coordinator confirmed this. According to him, especially mothers and mothers-in-law occupy a notably strong position and can be very influential within the household.¹⁹⁰ Nevertheless, the Mission Teams kept an eye open for discrimination against women and acted upon such cases carefully. The team took, for example, into account the needs of women in construction projects. In addition to building walls around girls’ schools, they made a local mosque accessible to women by constructing a special entrance and washing facilities and by building a partition between the women’s and men’s sections.¹⁹¹ Also a Mission Team Commander recalled one time when the local men of the village of Chora requested the construction of a shelter against the burning sun and a waiting space at their hospital. The Mission Team Commander agreed to do this but only if the Mission Team could also construct the same facility for women.

On another occasion, a Mission Team offered financial support for the care of a discriminated woman: “One time we experienced that a woman was really being threatened, the spouse of an ANP officer. She was being chased away from the village and they said to her: ‘Your husband is dead, so you must go as well’. [...] Eventually she was taken in by a nomad tribe and stayed there for a few weeks. We paid this nomad tribe some money in order to take care of her”.¹⁹²

The Mission Team members also took into consideration that it was impossible for them to engage in projects for women in a way in which the local population could actually take offence. For example, when the Mission Team in Chora wanted to develop a project proposal of their predecessors - setting up a women bazaar (a market space where women could sell and buy products) - they were advised not to by the second man of a local tribe. The project was considered too progressive and was foredoomed to failure since Afghan men would take over the business. The Mission Team was told: “It’s not good for your name and credibility if you engage in this project too actively”.¹⁹³ Therefore, they decided not to implement the project, which showed their awareness of having to be very careful with initiatives for women and of conforming to the instructions of the Commander (i.e. act only when the local population judge the initiative as acceptable).

Although the PRT members did not receive any additional training or briefings on Resolution 1325 during the mission, transfer of knowledge did take place. At the camp,

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Mission Team member

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Mission Team Commander

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander; Mission Team member

¹⁹⁰ Interview with local NGO coordinator

¹⁹¹ Interview with head of S3/5 (operations and planning)

¹⁹² Interview with Mission Team Commander

¹⁹³ Interview with Mission Team Commander; Mission Team Deputy Commander

soldiers from different units and civilians intermingled and spoke with each other about experiences they had gained during the mission. Also topics relating to local women were discussed, especially among women at the camp.¹⁹⁴ One female soldier declared that she was very unsure about the approaches of her Mission Team towards the female population. During informal chats she could use her PRT colleagues as a sounding board.¹⁹⁵ Another female soldier recalled one occasion when she for the first time had been drinking tea with an Afghan woman. She was so happy and enthusiastic about it that, according to her: “Everybody at Camp Holland must have noticed it”.¹⁹⁶

Female soldiers also tried through these internal discussions to change the mindset of some not yet convinced male soldiers in terms of gender-awareness. In the beginning especially the military engineers were considered to in the beginning have been rather skeptical about women’s issues as a tool for enhanced effectiveness of the mission.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the female soldiers tried to convey their perspective by entering into discussions with them. But it was not considered ‘an easy thing to do’. Yet, the military Gender Focal Point believed that as a result of these discussions, everybody in the PRT realized that gender-issues must not be overlooked.¹⁹⁸

5.6 Conclusions

Internal Representation: In terms of internal representation one can conclude that Resolution 1325 was well established within PRT 5. There was a reasonable, although minimal, share of female personnel with some women in leadership positions. However, there were no guidelines on the number of women units must include. The mixed PRT team resulted in positive outcomes; both internally (good atmosphere and exchange of information) and externally (by deploying women soldiers, local men and women could be accessed; female PRT members acted as ‘eye-openers’ for the local population; and it was strategically beneficial in terms of information collection and negotiations). Male PRT members were instructed not to initiate conversations about gender-related topics with locals as this could be counterproductive. A missed opportunity was the scarcity of female interpreters in the PRT organization to enable more profound conversations with local women.

External Representation: PRT 5 did make an effort to include local women as participants in their assignments. However, this was considered very hard to do because of the conservative culture and male-dominated society and, therefore, only small things could be achieved. Approaching men on this subject was considered hazardous. Neither did at the time active cooperation on Resolution 1325 take place with NGOs. The problems with involving women as public actors were partly attributed to limited cooperation with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and a lack of women representatives in Uruzgan. Therefore, the PRT focused on Afghan women as individuals in their homebound situation, which made the inclusion of the Afghan women as a group in society much more difficult.

Internal Integration: It can be stated that the integration of Resolution 1325 in this particular PRT was good (in the analysis, planning, training and, to a more limited degree, the reporting) – with the exception of the civilian component. The reason for this was that the PRT 5 Commander was committed to the cause which led to enhanced attention to gender/ Resolution 1325 affairs in the preparatory and operational phases of the mission. Yet, the current structures at the highest military and civilian level do not specify where the responsibility for implementation of Resolution 1325 lies (although the PRT-leadership has a crucial role) and, therefore; one could say that Resolution 1325 as such is

¹⁹⁴ Interview with member of CIMIC Support Element member/ Gender Focal Point

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Mission Team Deputy Commander

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Mission Team member

¹⁹⁷ Interview with CIMIC Support Element Commander

¹⁹⁸ Interview with member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point

not an integral part of all Dutch PRTs. Neither do the Ministry of Defense's standard mission training or the guidelines of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces on Ministry of Defense's gender policy give practical 'know-how' about the implementation of Resolution 1325 in the field. Moreover, the mission-oriented training of the Ministry of Defense included inaccurate information, which initially constrained PRT members in conducting their work properly.

External Integration: Although the responsibility for Resolution 1325-implementation was not officially allocated within the PRT organization, Resolution 1325 was integrated into the assignments of PRT 5 both at the HQ-level and at the tactical level by the Mission Teams. In the execution of the mandate objectives, the PRT did not consider the local population as a homogeneous group and was aware of the different needs of men and women. Within the female population some groups (like widows) were considered more vulnerable than others but also easier to approach. According to the PRT members themselves, women's perspectives and needs were taken into account as much as possible given the conservative context and available resources. Even though PRT 5 incorporated Resolution 1325 in its assignments to a fairly broad extent, the efforts of the Dutch PRT to influence the position of local women succeeded only on a minor scale.¹⁹⁹ Working with related projects in Uruzgan was considered to be walking on the edge of local norms and values. Therefore, in order not to act counterproductively to the objectives of the mandate, the PRT's approach and assignments had to be well-considered, without foregoing possibilities to improve women's situation. The small steps made by PRT 5 can, to a large extent, be attributed to the instructions of the Commander PRT: "Keep your eyes open for Resolution 1325 opportunities and respond immediately when they open up."

Leadership was not instructed directly to implement Resolution 1325. It was up to the Commander to decide to include Resolution 1325 issues in his range of priorities. Because the Commander of PRT 5 was committed to this cause he chose Resolution 1325 as a priority. This has led to enhanced attention for Resolution 1325 affairs in the preparatory and operational phase of the mission during the deployment of PRT 5. Military Commanders (as well as civilian executive directors) thus play a crucial role in the implementation of Resolution 1325.

Expert functions: Neither during the preparation, nor during the deployment, the Dutch Armed Forces had a fulltime gender expert at their disposal. The Commander PRT was not instructed directly to allocate responsibility for Resolution 1325 during the mission and therefore gender-expertise was shared by a number of people from both the military and civilian staff. As a result, no one felt fully responsible for its implementation. Nevertheless, the need for a fulltime gender expert at different levels was expressed to intensify the implementation of Resolution 1325 in the field.

5.7 Suggestions

The responsibility for implementing Resolution 1325 should be specified in the instructions for operational PRT commanders (military and civilian), ensuring the continuation of efforts and a Resolution 1325 reporting mechanism.

Checklists need to be developed for the PRT's civilian component.

The deployment of at least one woman in every Mission Team, preferably in leadership positions, besides deploying female staff in PRT management functions (military and civilian) is needed.

¹⁹⁹ PRT's work is being evaluated by local stakeholders in relation to other units working under ISAF's command in the province, and not as an organization with own goals and achievements (Interview with Chair of Independent Election Commission Secretariat of Uruzgan Province; Public Health Adviser for Governor of Uruzgan; local NGO staff). E.g. providing a secure environment for girls' schools (which were formerly being plagued by night letters and produced school absence) is a common achievement in which also the Battlegroup play a major role (Interview with Development Adviser).

The deployment of female interpreters for both military and civilian PRT staff is needed. Making sure required separated accommodation and sanitary facilities are available at the camp is preferable.

The deployment of women in support units, such as the Battlegroup, and the personal protection service for civilian personnel is needed.

Deploy female trainers in the Police Mentoring Team to train and mentor local female recruits.

Gender expertise should be available before and during the mission (at the ISAF HQ, Task Force Uruzgan and embassy levels) and these should be fulltime jobs.

Both military and civilian PRT staff should be provided with training on Resolution 1325 matters prior to the mission. The training should foster gender awareness, involve role-play scenarios with context-specific true-to-life situations and provide useful tips and instructions (ideally, through briefings by colleagues with experience from the mission area).

The PRT leadership should make sure that civilian members of the PRT participate actively in preparations for the mission and, once the mission begins, ensure smooth coordination of Resolution 1325-related tasks carried out by military and civilian staff.

The setting up of a special PRT fund to finance e.g. ad hoc Resolution 1325-related projects/ activities is preferable.

The PRT should support and focus more on women as public actors rather than view them as housebound individuals.

Focus should not be exclusively on women as a target group for implementing Resolution 1325: efforts through men have an emancipatory effect.

List of Interviewees

PRT 5 members

Lieutenant Colonel Hubregste, Commander PRT

Major Smid, Deputy Commander PRT/ Chief of Staff

Interview with Head of S2 (intelligence)

Captain Groothedde, Mission Team Deputy Commander / Project Officer Gender

Sergeant Plaggenmars, Mission Team member

Major Van der Klaauw, CIMIC Support Element Commander

First lieutenant Verdonschot, member CIMIC Support Element/ Gender Focal Point

Major Bloemendaal, Functional Specialist Health

Major Berg, Functional Specialist Justice

Major Janse, Mission Team Commander

Captain Heijmans, Mission Team Deputy Commander

Major Bams, Head of S3/5 (planning and operations)

First lieutenant Huijs, Commander Mission Team

Captain Schutten, Commander of Police Trainers

Ms. Korzelijs, Development Adviser

Ms. Paardekooper, Development Adviser

Interview with interpreter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Local stakeholders in Uruzgan Province

Interview with local NGO-coordinator

Mr. Obaidullah Osmani, Chair Independent Election Commission Secretariat of Uruzgan Province

Mr. Sayed Mirwais, Public Health Adviser for Governor

Interview with local NGO-staff (3 x)

Other interviewees

Interview with Police Gender Specialist

Interview with Political Adviser (PRT 7)

Interview with Development Adviser (PRT 7)

Policy Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

6 The Italian PRT in Herat

By Louise Olsson and Johanna Valenius

6.1 National Context

*Italy had always supported the implementation of Resolution 1325 on “women, peace and security”, through its development assistance and by making it one of its priorities during its two-year term as an elected member of the Security Council. We have already stated clearly and we profoundly believe that the Security Council and the international community should shift gears from a mere annual celebration of Resolution 1325 to its actual everyday implementation. Only if we see concrete results in the status of women in conflict and post-conflict situations will we be able to say that we have fulfilled our obligations under Resolution 1325.*²⁰⁰

Italy has had the responsibility of the PRT Herat since 2006. According to Colonel Covelli, the Commander of PRT Herat in November 2008, the image of the PRT among the local population is positive and the PRT is well integrated in the society.²⁰¹ The mission of PRT Herat is to assist the Government of Afghanistan to extend its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts. The Italian PRT has its primary focus on CIMIC activities and coordinates its work with the civilian Italian Cooperation, operating out of the same PRT compound. Italy does not have a National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 to guide its work in the province. As the initial quotes displays, the Italian Government has, however, repeatedly expressed its support for the Resolution.

6.2 Situation in the PRT Area

The city of Herat is located close to the Iranian border, a fact that has had substantial influence on the city’s development. Herat, together with Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif and Kandahar, is one of largest cities in Afghanistan and also one of the wealthiest and most liberal. Even though the city of Herat is the most affluent one in Afghanistan, the region has, even in an Afghan context, a high number of rural poor. The poorest households tend to be single-parent – more precisely female-headed – or they have a high proportion of family members with disabilities. According to the Afghan Government, 67 percent of female-headed households and 58 percent of households with a member with a disability are poor.²⁰²

Until 2008, the security situation in the Herat Province was stable and calm. By 2008, however, the security situation in Herat Province (and the entire Region West) had seriously deteriorated. Suicide attack alerts are common and according to some

²⁰⁰ Statement by Italy at Discussion Session of 52nd Commission on the Status of Women, 2008 Theme: Resolution 1325 & related women, peace and security issues.

²⁰¹ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁰² Afghan National Development Strategy, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, p. 47.

interviewees, the Taliban is steadily gaining ground in the eastern parts of the province.²⁰³ One of the most common security threats for the people of Herat, however, is that related to organized crime. Kidnappings of male members of wealthy families for ransom are a problem the Afghan police are unable, or unwilling to stop. In November 2008, 20 high ranking Herat police officers were fired as a response to the high crime rate.²⁰⁴ Drug addiction, prostitution, rape of women and other forms of violence against women are common. Although the burkha is no longer obligatory, the majority of women are still wearing them. Their families may expect the Taliban-era clothing but some women may also wear it for their own protection. There are, however, a growing number of women who wear a scarf or a chador. As one person interviewed suggested, women or families are afraid of the Taliban's return and wear the burkha as a safety measure.²⁰⁵

In populated provinces like Herat (similar as in Kabul, Nangahar, Badghis, etc.), over half of the girls are married off as young as 10-12 years old because of economic reasons. Households accumulate debts and in order to alleviate their financial burdens, girls are given to marriage to pay off debts or collect 'bride-price'.²⁰⁶ Moreover, there is such a tradition that when two families have a dispute one of the families can give a girl to the other family. Families can also sell girls to buy houses, goats, poppy, etc. or they can exchange girls. Once these girls are married off they are often treated badly, even as slaves by their husbands and in-laws. Women are not given enough food, access to medical care or to mid-wives, and they often die in child birth as they are too young to have children.²⁰⁷ One other problem affecting women's security is related to this problematic: self-immolation.²⁰⁸ Self-immolation – often in the form of the woman pouring cooking oil or gasoline over her body and setting it on fire to shame her family and take her own life – is common in Herat because it is a custom 'imported' from neighboring Iran. Herat also deals with women who earlier fled from Afghanistan to Iran, often to avoid a forced marriage or escape from an abusive domestic situation. Iran is currently deporting these women who do not have anywhere to go after returning to Herat. When picked up by the police, the women are often handed over to a women's shelter, for example organized by 'Voices of Women' or the Ministry of Women's Affairs.²⁰⁹

As CIMIC is at the center of the PRTs work, the level of development in the area is in focus. For example, illiteracy and lack of education are substantial impediments when attempting to address the problems for women. According to the Department of Women's Affairs, 95 percent of women in the Herat Province are illiterate.²¹⁰ Especially in the villages and countryside, parents often do not allow girls to study. The lack of education then decreases girls' ability to gain employment which is particular concern to families under economic constraints.²¹¹ As the Taliban regime banned schooling for girls during their years in power (1996-2001), many adult women are also illiterate. An advantage for the progress on Human Rights in the Herat area is that many current Heratians have been refugees in Iran where they adopted the Iranian lifestyle. When returning to Afghanistan, these families tended to be more open to women's rights, such as the right to education.

²⁰³ The escalating level of threat has forced the Italian Cooperation civilian personnel living in a guesthouse outside the PRT compound to resort to transportation in vehicles while previously they were able to walk the short distance

²⁰⁴ Quqnoos.com (2008), "High ranking Herat police officers fired". 13 November, 2008. [http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2023&Itemid=48] (accessed December 16, 2008).

²⁰⁵ Interview with civil society, Herat

²⁰⁶ ANDS, p.52

²⁰⁷ Interview with Sima Sher Muhammadi, Head of Ministry of Women's Affairs in Herat

²⁰⁸ Qureshi, Ahmad (2008). *Graph of self-immolation among Afghan women shows rise in Herat*. [http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/08/30/self-immolation-graph-shows-rise-in-herat_0394.html] (accessed December 2008)

²⁰⁹ Interview with Voices of Women

²¹⁰ In 2000, adult literacy rate (15 + yr) was 12.6 % for females and 43.1 % for males. See UN Statistics Division (2007), *Gender Info 2007*. United Nations Statistics Division [http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A49#GenderStat] (Accessed December 11, 2008)

²¹¹ Interview with Sima Sher Muhammadi, Head of Ministry of Women's Affairs in Herat.

According to the Herat Education Department, as of 2007, 50 percent of the more than 600 000 school children were girls. At the same period, in the southern parts of the country girls made up only about ten percent of children attending school.²¹² For example, in November 2008, two men attacked five girls in Kandahar in the south of Afghanistan and sprayed battery acid on their faces in order to deter them from going to school. This was an incident much discussed in the Herat Province. According to Mario Barberini at the Italian Cooperation, incidents like that are not likely to occur in Herat due to its more liberal culture.²¹³ The percent of women in higher education is also relatively high. Herat University has 29 percent female students and 71 percent male students enrolled.²¹⁴

To come to terms with the high level of female illiteracy, both the Department of Women's Affairs in Herat and Herat's Education Department have organized literacy classes for adults. There are now 6000 literacy centers in the Herat Province. Almost 80 percent of the students are women; over 50 000 women and 15 000 men participated in the courses in 2005-2007. The low numbers of males are explained by the fact that men have to earn living for their families. The Department of Women's Affairs has offered incentives for women to attend classes by giving essential foodstuffs to those who attend. According to the Head of the Department Sima Sher Muhammadi, the literary classes also cover women's rights and criminal law. Moreover, women's groups, such as 'Voices of Women', conduct seminars on women's rights and the negative effects of self-immolation to raise awareness.²¹⁵ This combined work has had positive effects. In the period of 2005 – 2007, the cases of self-immolation went down by 60 percent, and the number of forced marriages decreased.²¹⁶

6.3 PRT Mandate and Organization

PRT Herat is organized under Regional Command West (RC West). Under RC West, there are three additional PRTs – PRT Farah, PRT Chagncharan, PRT Qual-e Naw – and the Forward Support Base Herat. The Italian area of responsibility consists of 16 districts and has an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants. The Italian PRT Compound, Camp Vianini, is located amongst private houses in the middle of Herat. Unlike most PRTs' central camps, Camp Vianini makes use of Afghan houses for accommodation and offices for the primarily military personnel.²¹⁷ The Head of the Civilian Component, an Italian diplomat, is hierarchically at the same level as the military Commander. The latter is, however, the Commander of the entire PRT. EUPOL Afghanistan²¹⁸ and USAID are also located within Camp Vianini.

RC West handles security in the region and the PRT has a primary focus on CIMIC activities.²¹⁹ The PRT's military component did, however, conduct road patrols prior to CIMIC assessments or when the Commander visits local authorities in the Province.²²⁰ To

²¹² IWPR, *Herat Women Thirst for Education*. Institute for War and Peace Reporting [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=337188&apc_state=henh] (accessed December 11, 2008).

²¹³ Interview with Italian Cooperation in Herat. The international community and Afghan officials are currently drafting a law on elimination of violence against women. It has been proposed that throwing acid on women and girls is considered also as an act of terrorism in addition to a form of violence.

²¹⁴ Compare to, for example, Kabul University which has under 25 percent female students enrolled. Herat University, [http://www.heratuniversity.org/index.php/plans.html] (accessed December 11, 2008).

²¹⁵ Interview with 'Voices of Women', Herat.

²¹⁶ IWPR, *Herat Women Thirst for Education*.

²¹⁷ There are plans to move the PRT at the vicinity of the airport.

²¹⁸ European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

²¹⁹ In that work, the CIMIC coordinated its activities with the Italian Cooperation. The Civilian Component had in November 2008 four Italian Cooperation employees. One of them was a woman who returned to Italy in November. In addition to Italian nationals there were also local personnel, drivers, an engineer, a secretary and a female assistant. It is possible for the local female assistant to continue working in the PRT even though the other one leaves Afghanistan (Interview with Italian Cooperation).

²²⁰ Security arrangement for the civilian Italian Cooperation are taken care by local security companies.

that purpose, it has about 200 soldiers. The military CIMIC Unit at the Italian PRT works after the following definition:²²¹

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

The CIMIC Unit consists of a Liaison Team, an Assessment Team and a Project Team and has about seven employees, all men. The Liaison Team “enhances cooperation and coordination with all the “actors” in order to promote legitimacy of the mission through transparency and to economize available resources by avoiding overlapping.” This is the primary team for meeting and cooperating with Afghan and international partners in the Herat Province. The Assessment Team is instead focused on “providing the military Commander the CIMIC reports on the status of the area of responsibility; identifying critical shortfalls or capability gaps in the civil environment, evaluate the impact of the civilian environment on Military Mission; plan future activities.” The Project Team then develops projects in support of identified Afghan Departments.²²²

The Civilian Component, headed by a diplomatic officer, reports on political issues and security to the Italian Ministry of Foreign affairs, provides analysis of effectiveness and impact of the civilian and military projects, and liaises between Italian civilian and military actors. The Civilian Component engages in medium- and long-term development projects together with the Italian Cooperation, third countries diplomats, NGOs and International Organizations. In 2008, the focus areas were the health sector (33 percent of the total budget), hydro-geological sector (15 percent) and education and support to vulnerable groups (55 percent). CIMIC worked in similar areas but focused on short-term projects and Quick Impact Projects. The budget was quite similar for the military CIMIC unit and for the Italian Cooperation. Each had annual budget of about 15 million Euros.

6.4 Representation and Resolution 1325

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Operations. Internal representation primarily concerns ‘manning policies and equal opportunities’ such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization. External representation relates to how Operations are conducted in terms of ‘liaison, information and support’ vis-à-vis the population and parties in the area of responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women’s organizations?

6.4.1 Internal Representation

Male conscription for the Italian Armed Forces was ended in 2004. Of the about 200 military personnel at the PRT, 14-20 (depending on rotation) are female soldiers. In the Battlegroup at RC West, located by the Herat airport, there are approximately 20-25 additional female soldiers as part of the about 2000 regular Italian troops based there.²²³ As the Italian Armed Forces admitted women in their ranks as late as the year 2000, there are yet very few women in the Armed Forces and very few in the officer corps. The highest ranked female in the Italian Armed Forces is a lieutenant.²²⁴ As a result of the fact that having women in the Armed Forces is a new phenomenon, the military is going through a transition period where procedures have yet to be reviewed. Thus, for example,

²²¹ Briefing by Commander of CIMIC Unit, Herat

²²² Briefing by Commander of CIMIC Unit, Herat

²²³ Interviews with PRT Commander and Head of S1

²²⁴ Interview with Head of S1. See also Carreiras, Helena (2006). *Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies*. Cass Military Studies, Routledge: London, p. 136

the military has not yet adapted to the fact that women may need maternity leave or what procedures need to be followed for pregnant soldiers. These are practical issues which have to be reviewed in order to accommodate the new situation.²²⁵ Female and male soldiers did not share quarters or showers and lived in separate houses at the PRT compound.

Attitudes towards female soldiers were in general positive and their need was recognized. For instance, the previous PRT regiment had established the practice of having only female staff to guard the outer perimeters of the PRT compound where the guards could see into the gardens and houses of neighboring households. The families of these houses did not want any male soldiers to see the women of the family and, therefore, it was decided that only female soldiers should man these positions.²²⁶ This practice, of course, required an adequate number of female military personnel in the PRT. The PRT also assigned women to perform body searches on female visitors while the male soldiers would perform body searches of male visitors.²²⁷ No women had high enough rank to communicate with the Afghan leaders and the PRT therefore had no experience from using female soldiers with that purpose.

In November 2008, the CIMIC Center had a staff of seven people and was expecting Serbia to send two more persons. In the CIMIC Unit, there were no female personnel. This constituted a problem, according to the CIMIC Commander Radi, when conducting project assessment. The unit would have liked to have female CIMIC personnel, particularly for meetings including female officials.²²⁸ In spite of not having experience, some of the interviewees, however, believed that the presence of female soldiers could in some situations be a handicap, for instance when dealing with local Elders. In addition, they did not have any experience of even local women addressing female soldiers. One interviewee referred to the very common argument used against women in the military, or as he narrowed it – in the Special Forces, which was that in battle men would want to protect their female colleagues and that this, consequently, would put the whole group at risk. He nevertheless pointed out that this argument was not heard often among regular troops.²²⁹ Attitudes and expectations not based on facts is thus a central area to address when continuing to create an equal work environment.

6.4.2 External Representation

During [2007] the Taliban increasingly distributed threatening letters at night in villages to intimidate and attempt to curtail development activities. During the year the leader of a women's NGO in Herat reported that the Taliban had sent several 'night letters' telling her to cease her activities on fear of death for herself and her children.²³⁰

In the PRT province, there is a Women's Affairs Unit that is a part of the Women Affairs Department in Kabul. The Unit has five sections: 1) laws and rights, 2) economic problems, 3) health section, 4) TV programs for women, and 5) education section. The Women's Affairs Unit has a staff of 20, of which 14 are women and six are men. The Women's Affairs Unit finds it very difficult to work in Herat Province due to the extent of the problems of security and organized crime. The Unit cooperates with PRT Herat, primarily with CIMIC, for example concerning access to food, clothes, and material for the Unit. The building for the Women's Affairs Unit was also constructed as part of a

²²⁵ Interview with Head of S1

²²⁶ Interview with PRT Commander

²²⁷ Interview with S3

²²⁸ Interview with Commander of CIMIC Unit

²²⁹ Interview with PRT staff

²³⁰ US Department of State (2008), *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2007, March 11, 2008. [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm>] (accessed February 19, 2009).

CIMIC project.²³¹ Regarding contact with and promotion of prominent women in the Herat Province, it is the province which has Afghanistan's only female Attorney General. During her two years in office, 60 cases of gender-based violence had been brought to her attention. These cases were followed up and several men were sentenced to jail – an unusual outcome in Afghanistan. For engaging in this work, she and her family have paid a high price. Every day she receives threats and because of these, her three children cannot attend school due to the risk of them being kidnapped or killed. A bomb was even thrown at her house. She thought that the international community's presence had increased security but that gender should receive an augmented role in their work – in accordance with Afghanistan's new Constitution, which guarantees equality between men and women. For example, there were no women in powerful positions in the Government or the Supreme Court – even though this would not be contrary to Islam. However, bringing change into the minds of the people will not happen overnight and she was still hopeful for a brighter future. To create change, she called for more efforts in the field of women's education to improve women's opportunities. This was imperative so that women could be a part of the skilled workforce in Afghanistan, for instance as police officers. She believed that security and legal reforms were central. In this way, she stated, 80 percent of women's problems could be solved.²³²



*Attorney General Maria Bashir in her Office in Herat*²³³

The PRT Herat has assisted the Attorney General with security. Apart from a few women in prominent positions in the legal institutions, the Herat Province has a strong women's group, 'Voice of Women', which works with the Italian Cooperation. There are also a number of female teachers and female representatives in the Provincial Council. For CIMIC and the PRT Commander, it was also only possible to talk to women in official positions. However, many of the Afghan men of higher authority did not like when the PRT leadership diverted their attention to the women and discussed with them. Sometimes the women were told: "shut up, you are a woman" but some men did not mind.²³⁴

Apart from the CIMIC Unit, which worked with the Women's Affairs Unit, the remaining parts of the military organization had found few Afghan women in the public sector to

²³¹ Interview with Sima Sher Muhammadi, Head of Ministry of Women's Affairs in Herat

²³² Interview with Attorney General Maria Bashir, Herat

²³³ Photo by Louise Olsson

²³⁴ Interview with the Commander of CIMIC Unit

work with. The Attorney General and the Women's Affair Unit do sometimes asked for meetings with the Commander but most often he did not deal with these sections of society. This was due to the distribution of labor between the military and the civilian PRT components as well as between CIMIC and the Commander's security-focused units. Most often the security-focused units did not even see any Afghan women. On the rare occasions that the Commander had met with Afghan women in public functions, he felt that they appeared more constructive, open-minded and cooperative than the male participants. For example, the Commander had recently spoken at a school. Most of the leadership of the society and the school were present and the absolute majority was male, all apart from the leader of the female teachers. In order to spice up his short speech, the Commander included references to his personal life. Therefore, he spoke of his wife who was a teacher back in Italy. He also referred to his three kids who went to school back home and how glad he was that Afghan children now had the same opportunity. On these parts of his speech, he received no recognition from the men in the audience but got good response from the female teacher who came up to him afterwards and talked about the school and how it needed to be developed etc.²³⁵ The inability to communicate with local women was considered a problem. For the personnel responsible for the security of the compound, the difficulty in collecting information from Afghan women meant that the mission only had access to information from 50 percent of the population, complicating efforts to ensure protection and security.²³⁶

6.5 Integrating Resolution 1325

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective. Internal integration means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of 'organizing and conducting Operations', e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. External integration refers to the 'interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed' in the area of responsibility. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments executed in the area of responsibility, in terms of daily military operations?

6.5.1 Internal Integration

To begin to internally address Resolution 1325 means collecting sufficient material to make a gender-aware analysis of the situation and that the planning of the operation ensures that both men's and women's situations and needs are considered. In the case of the Italian PRT, there were no specific documents on Resolution 1325 or gender that guided the military's work at the PRT. However, there was awareness in the PRT of the differences in situations between Afghan men and women in the area of responsibility. The fact that the PRT Herat compound was integrated into the city, unlike most regular military missions which are separated from the surrounding society, contributed to this awareness. In addition, the awareness arose from the fact that the PRT focused primarily on CIMIC and support to the local society where the different situations of women and men were apparent. In spite of this growing awareness, there was no Gender Adviser employed at the PRT who could support the integration of Resolution 1325 into the PRT's organization. Instead, there was a Legal Adviser at Regional Command West who was responsible for gender issues.

Awareness of differences in situations for men and women can be transferred to the staff through training. With expanded mandates of the military and increased civil-military cooperation, increasing awareness becomes the more important. For the Italian PRT, pre-deployment training consisted of general military training for the type of mission that they

²³⁵ Interview with PRT Commander

²³⁶ Interview with S2

might be sent out to perform. Once the regiment had received orders for a specific mission, they received four months of specific training on that area of operations. The specific training comprised an overview of a number of issues, such as cultural, social, etc., presented by university teachers. The same training modules were given to everyone in the regiment, from the soldiers to the Commander. After that, they had specific training modules for key personnel in leadership functions. This training involved briefings from military personnel who had recently returned from the operational area. In addition, existing training material was reviewed by returning personnel in order to continuously correct and improve the training.²³⁷

During the training that looked at the customs and culture of the Afghan population, the Italian soldiers were informed not to approach, address or look at Afghan women to avoid causing serious security effects for the woman but also for the military in terms of force protection. One interviewee even put it as '[...] everyone here is armed – insult a woman by looking at her too long or by whistling after her, and her whole family would soon show up, knocking at the gate'.²³⁸ The training contained no modules on Resolution 1325 but the interviewed PRT personnel were positive to the idea of introducing it. The short time available for mission-specific training was, however, seen to be a problem.²³⁹ A suggestion could be that as the Italian soldiers are sent out by their specific regiments, there was the possibility of using general training to provide the soldiers with a basic understanding of the content of Resolution 1325. That information could then be further developed in the mission specific pre-deployment training.

6.5.2 External Integration

The main work of the PRT is conducted through the CIMIC Unit at the HQ level. The priorities of the CIMIC are formed one year in advance to implementation. The PRT is in touch with the Governor and Provincial Council and these provide the CIMIC with a list of priorities. The CIMIC Unit prioritizes among these requests taking both budget and military considerations into account. CIMIC then hands the list back to the Provincial Council and the Governor. They, in turn, consult with the affected Afghan Ministry Departments, after which a final list of prioritized projects is produced. The projects are also communicated to the Italian Cooperation. The final list is then submitted to the Afghan authorities and to the Italian Government, which approves the budget. The military mainly carries out Quick Impact Projects, i.e. short-term projects of relevance also for the military objectives of the PRT. But with the extended CIMIC work, there has been an increase in development work benefitting the society. The work of the civilian structure is more long-term. It was seen to be a problem that there were few women in the public sector who could contribute to ensuring that women's situation was incorporated correctly.²⁴⁰

Even if the PRT did not systematically collect gender-related information, the differences in the situation of men and women in Afghanistan had affected how the CIMIC Unit conducted its work. For example, it identified the need to build a new correction center for women, girl orphanages (along with a boy orphanage) and several girl schools in order to provide girls' equal opportunities to education. Moreover, they constructed the building for the Department of Women's Affairs and a burn unit at the hospital. The CIMIC personnel both conducted projects and supported projects managed by international organizations. In order to improve effectiveness, the CIMIC Unit identified the need for more female personnel at all levels and positions. For instance, when the team included a female architect, she was the one who could visit the women's prison and thereby establish the need for a new one. During the building process, she could also ask Afghan

²³⁷ Interview with PRT staff

²³⁸ Interview with PRT staff

²³⁹ Interview with PRT staff

²⁴⁰ Interview with PRT Commander; briefing at CIMIC Uni.

women for their views on how to best construct the prison.²⁴¹ The organization 'Voices of Women' is now to conduct training for the female staff of the female correction center. It will be a modern correction center to where women will be able to bring their children.²⁴²

The obvious and considerable gap between men and women in terms of social and labor roles and the resulting difference in access to resources such as education thereby affected the military work. The purpose of Quick Impact Projects is, in addition to supporting the stabilization and reconstruction process, to help to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population by providing quick solutions to their needs. The PRT's implementation of projects was done through the hiring of local contractors. The fees were not paid until the contractor, local authorities and the local Shura confirmed that the project was in progress. If the Shura reported that the project was not showing any progress, payment was stopped until a technician from the CIMIC Unit could carry out an inspection. By 2008, however, such inspections had become very dangerous as the security situation had worsened considerably.²⁴³ Other activities of the PRT included supporting the voter registration process for the 2009 Presidential elections. The Presidential elections of 2009 were said to be more adjusted to women's situation with separate registration for women and men. The female registration sections also had female Afghan staff. This allowed Afghan women to have their photos taken and register without any problems.²⁴⁴ This made the registration more reliable as the identity of the women could be properly established. Female soldiers were used at meetings to conduct patrols if there were Afghan women moving in the area.²⁴⁵

The approach of the PRT's Military Component with regard to including issues related to Resolution 1325 was that visions and symbols were important and that you needed to take an indirect approach and very small steps. In addition, the situation for women was different in different social layers of society and for different ethnic groups. A step which was seen to be central was work to improve the living situation and education in the province. The situation under which support was provided to reconstruction and development was very special as efforts were affected by criminal and Taliban activities, the general lack of rule of law related to poppy cultivation and the sale of opium, and different layers of political actors.²⁴⁶ The PRT Herat did not meet resistance when raising issues connected to the participation of women and women's situation in Herat with local authorities. However, there was not a feeling that the local authorities agreed or that it made an impression on them. Therefore, an indirect approach to these issues was applied as a direct approach was expected to have failed. Instead, the PRT was taking small steps such as confidence building measures, for example, by letting the population come to see a PRT doctor. It was mostly women and children who made use of this opportunity. During their first visits, women consulted the doctor only on the health of their children but gradually they started to ask about their own medical problems. The women appreciated particularly the female nurse. However, neighbors of the PRT pointed out that it was not looked upon positively that women entered the military compound, which resulted in a kind of trade-off between helping some of the local women and causing some alarm in the local community.²⁴⁷ Cultural restrictions made it difficult for the military to work on issues related to women's security. For instance, as the example from the female correction center showed, when there was a female architect she was the one who could visit the women's prison. In addition, hiring local female staff was very difficult, even impossible if the PRT only had male staff.²⁴⁸ The CIMIC Unit expressed the need for more female staff. Without female team members it was very difficult to identify projects for women

²⁴¹ Interviews with PRT Commander, Alberto Vecchi, Head of Civilian Component and briefing at CIMIC Unit

²⁴² Interview with the Commander of CIMIC Unit; briefing at CIMIC Unit

²⁴³ Interview with the Commander of CIMIC Unit; briefing at CIMIC Unit

²⁴⁴ Interview with the PRT Liaison Officer and 'Voices of Women', Herat

²⁴⁵ Interview with S3

²⁴⁶ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁴⁷ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁴⁸ Interview with Mario Barberini, Italian Cooperation

and to assess and evaluate ongoing and completed women's projects.²⁴⁹ In 2009, CIMIC planned to build a women's social center as one of three projects for the year. The other two projects were a boy's orphanage and a disability center. When the CIMIC Unit built a school without being able to build a second one in the same area, they demanded that the local authorities ensured that the school could be used for both boys and girls (for example, girls can go to school between 8-12 in the morning and boys between 12-16 in the afternoon) – the demand of the Italian PRT is for both girls and boys to get access to education.²⁵⁰

6.6 Conclusions

The interviewed PRT personnel were open to the implementation of Resolution 1325 and a gender perspective in their daily operations. However, there is no National Action Plan or regular integration of the contents of the Resolution (for example, in relation to supporting Afghan national plans).

Internal Representation: The need for more female soldiers was recognized, especially in the CIMIC Unit that was more in contact with the local community than the rest of the Military Component. Female personnel were especially needed in project assessment. This was crucial at PRT Herat as it is CIMIC focused. Since Italy admitted women in the military only in 2000, there were currently two obstacles to military women's participation; there were not yet many female soldiers, in particular in the officer corps, and there were no procedures to address pregnancy and maternity leaves.

External Representation: Local female officials and civil society felt that while security had improved by the presence of ISAF, gender issues were still not addressed with appropriate vigor. This was unfortunate since the rights of women were one of the motives for the international intervention in the first place and the subsequent expectations among the women of Afghanistan were high. The International Community should focus especially on the education of girls and on the reform of the legal system. The PRT and CIMIC Unit cooperated with the Women's Affairs Unit but otherwise it was quite difficult for the Military Component to identify ways to work with local women's organizations. This was due to the nature of the tasks of the military, on the one hand, and the social segregation of Afghan men and women, on the other. Women's organizations were involved in activities that were the focus of the Italian Cooperation.

Internal Integration: In PRT Herat, Resolution 1325 was not officially implemented; there were no specific documents providing guidelines on the implementation of Resolution 1325 such as a National Action Plan. The PRT did not systematically collect gender-disaggregated data which could provide the basis for a strategic integration of Resolution 1325. The pre-deployment training included modules which addressed Afghan culture and the roles of men and women but there was no specific module on Resolution 1325.

External Integration: The PRT personnel were not familiar with Resolution 1325 as such but they were aware of the different roles and situations of men and women of Afghanistan. The personnel also did their best to respect the Afghan culture to make their work more effective and to not risk causing force protection problems. At the same time, the importance of education, especially the education of girls, was recognized and supported. Some of the projects, such as the construction of the hospital burn unit and the building for the Women's Affairs Department in Herat as well as allowing the locals to visit the PRT doctor were for the benefit of women and children in particular. The CIMIC Unit had also identified a need to build a new correctional center for women and orphanages and schools for boys and girls. The PRT had thus adopted an indirect approach and made small steps to improve the situation of women and girls because they were

²⁴⁹ Interview with the Commander of CIMIC Unit; briefing at CIMIC Unit

²⁵⁰ Interview with the Commander of CIMIC Unit; briefing at CIMIC Unit

afraid that a more direct approach would meet resistance. It can thus be said that the military to some extent practiced gender sensitivity in the spirit of Resolution 1325.

Leadership: Since Italy has not provided any Resolution 1325 guidelines to its military forces in Afghanistan there are no formal channels for the Commander to integrate the Resolution. International and national leadership should provide the leadership with information, resources and qualified staff, especially when there exist positive attitudes towards the implementation of Resolution 1325. In the case of the PRT Herat, the Commander was attuned to the differences between men's and women's security and did his best to address those questions by taking a personal and symbolic approach. However, integration of Resolution 1325 becomes very vulnerable if it depends solely on the personal interests of the Commander and his/her staff.

Expert functions: There is no Gender Adviser employed at the PRT who can support the integration of Resolution 1325 in the PRT's organization. Instead, there is a legal adviser at Regional Command West responsible for gender issues.

6.7 Suggestions

Create guidelines to implement the Resolution 1325 especially in the CIMIC unit. There already exists willingness to adopt gender perspective. This should be supported by official documents and guidelines.

Consider the need for a Gender Adviser who could help in the implementation of Resolution 1325.

Create modules for Resolution 1325 in regular training and for mission specific pre-deployment training.

Install manning and personal policies to have and retain more women in the Italian Armed Forces, for instance campaigns directed to women and family policies for maternity and paternity leaves.

When recruiting female soldiers prioritize CIMIC, which is in urgent need to have female personnel.

List of Interviewees

Mario Barberini, Italian Cooperation in Herat.

Maria Bashir, Attorney General, Herat

Chief Bernardi, S3 (operations)

Chief Bosa, S1 (personnel)

Carmine Colucci, EUPOL Afghanistan

Colonel Covelli, PRT Commander

Chief Dellasorte, S4

PRT Deputy Commander Dovera

Surrayya Mosawi, Italian Cooperation

Sima Sher Muhammadi, Head of Ministry of Women's Affairs in Herat

CIMIC Unit Commander Radi

Chief Sabattini, S2 (security and intelligence)

Chief Santoro, Force Protection

Dr. Marco Urago, Italian Cooperation

Alberto Vecchi, Head of the Civilian Component

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission representatives

Civil society representatives, Herat

Voices of Women representatives

7 The New Zealand PRT in Bamyan

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7.1 National Context

New Zealand has signed UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and stated their support for the Resolution in a UN Security Council open debate in June 2008:²⁵¹

New Zealand is committed to seeking ways to enhance and strengthen the implementation of Resolution 1325 through its development cooperation program, peacekeeping and domestic policies'. The New Zealand spokesperson further stated; In addition, NZAID Conflict and Peace building policy identifies women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas as a priority group for attention and specifically includes the need to provide support for the full implementation of SCR 1325. It highlights the gendered impact of conflict and the role of women in peace building.

The New Zealand government does not have any National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 to guide their work.

7.2 Situation in the PRT Area

The NZ PRT is one of 13 PRTs under the US-led Regional Command East (RC East) and its area of responsibility is the Bamyan province. The Kiwi Base is located outside the township of Bamyan. Bamyan province has an area of 6,757 square miles and is located in central Afghanistan in the Hazarajat region. Bamyan borders the provinces of Daikundi, Wardak, Ghazni, Sar-e Pol, Ghowr, Parwan, Baghlan and Samarghan. The population of approximately 400,000 is primarily Hazara, with 16 percent Sadat, 15 percent Tajik as well as a variety of other ethnicities. People mainly work in agriculture and animal husbandry, with wheat, barley and potatoes being the active crops. There is some coal mining in the north-eastern part of the province.²⁵²

All interviewees agreed that the security situation in Bamyan is good and that the situation has been stable the last six years. Interviewees from the PRT said that the north-eastern part of the province was more unstable than the center and the south. It was difficult for the PRT staff to judge if this instability was because of criminal activities or insurgency. The PRT Bamyan contingents had at the time never been engaged in armed battle during their six years in command.²⁵³ There had been a few incidents of Improvised Explosive Devices during this contingent; one in the north east close to a PRT vehicle, and one in Bamyan Bazaar, but no one was injured. There is no Afghan army presence in Bamyan and the Afghan National Police (ANP) is not perceived strong enough to function in all the districts.²⁵⁴ The PRT police trains and mentors the ANP to increase their capacity and quality of work, but people were said not to trust the ANP. The main reason for the good

²⁵¹ Graham, Kirsty (2008), Deputy Permanent Representative, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Statement to the United Nation Security Council, June 2008

²⁵² Wikipedia.com (2009a), *Bamyan Province* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bamyan_Province] (accessed April 24, 2009)

²⁵³ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁵⁴ Interview with PRT Commander

security in the province was reportedly that the Hazara people did not want the Taliban there and monitored newcomers to make sure that they were not insurgents.²⁵⁵

Women from Bamyan said in interviews that the security was generally good both for women and men. As an example of this they said girls can go to school and women can study and work outside the house. They were happy with the new female police officers in Bamyan city because women could approach them, 'women talk to women'. The interviewees said they wanted ISAF and the PRT to stay at least five more years to ensure the security as Afghan authorities were not strong enough and needed to build up their capacity.²⁵⁶

Security in the private sphere was not good for women. They were vulnerable because of traditions, lacking knowledge about their legal rights and a weak legal system. The PRT police and the Family Response Unit in ANP in Bamyan reported about four to five cases of domestic violence every month.²⁵⁷ UNAMA's Gender Focal Point reported that they had 46 cases of domestic violence, including forced marriages in 2008.²⁵⁸ The Afghan Independent Human Right Commission (AIHRC) representatives in Bamyan described women's situation as follows: "One cannot compare men and women. [Women] have always been oppressed. Women are killed by men here – it's like a civil war between men and women. Women are sold like livestock".²⁵⁹ The research team found different definitions of oppression of women. Foreigners measured women's situation according to if women were wearing Burkha or not when they saw them in the streets. Afghan women measured their situation from whether or not women and girls could go to school, study, work and/ or attend meetings.

All of those interviewed from the PRT told us about the sad case of a 14-year-old girl that had taken place a few months before the arrival of the research team. The girl had been raped and become pregnant. When she was approximately eight months into her pregnancy, her brother, with some help from their mother, performed a kind of cesarean section on her at home. The brother killed the baby and buried it. He sutured his sister together with some thread from the house. Her father found her after a few days and got help from the PRT patrols to send her to Bamyan hospital. The Commander discussed the case with the Governor and asked for advice, she told him to move the girl to get her the best medical help. She was then taken to the PRT health clinic where she was watched over until she was transported to an American hospital in Baghram. The medical staff took care and ensured that female staff was present at all time. Her father accompanied her. The brother and the rapist have since been arrested and are awaiting prosecution. The girl is physically healed and is still in Baghram. Nobody knows what will happen to her now. Because she is involved in a criminal case where two men have been arrested and has been treated by female and male foreign medical staff, most of the people we talked to were convinced that she could not go back to the village as she would most probably be killed there.²⁶⁰

This dramatic incident shocked all PRT personnel. It demonstrated what could happen to girls and women in Afghanistan. The PRT staff was faced with ethical and moral dilemmas. First it was an emergency situation where they had to save the girl's life. But this implied that she had to be treated by foreign female and male medical staff. This alone could destroy her reputation and mean she would not be allowed to return to her family and village. To save her life physically meant risking her life at a later stage. This was why the Commander discussed the case with the Governor and asked for advice. She advised the PRT to give the girl the best possible medical treatment, which was done. The staff at the PRT felt uncertain and helpless in the aftermath and asked; what is the right thing to do

²⁵⁵ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁵⁶ Interview with Ministry of Women's Affairs

²⁵⁷ Interview with PRT New Zealand Police

²⁵⁸ Interview with UNAMA Gender focal point

²⁵⁹ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

²⁶⁰ Interview with PRT staff

now? What is our responsibility? Is the girl's fate still in our hands? This was a brutal and extraordinary case, but the Annual Report from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees shows that similar cases do occur in other places in Afghanistan.²⁶¹ All foreign troops and other foreigners working in Afghanistan should be prepared to handle such dilemmas.

7.3 PRT Mandate and Organization

The New Zealand Defense Force took over command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan in September 2003. The current, 13th, contingent arrived in October 2008. The PRT Bamyan consisted of 201 staff of which around 130 are New Zealand Defence Force personnel.²⁶² Soldiers from the 2nd Land Force Group in Linton constitute the majority of the contingent, but also personnel from other army units as well as the Navy and Air Force participate. In addition to the New Zealand Defence Force, the PRT comprises representatives from the New Zealand Police, New Zealand International Aid & Development Agency, US Departments of State and Agriculture, US Agency for International Development (USAID), US Commanders Emergency Response Program and US Armed Forces. The entire New Zealand personnel rotate every six months and have no leave during their deployment.²⁶³

The current organization of the PRT follows a basic structure. The HQ level constitutes the military Commander and his leader group. Besides the Commander and the Chief of Staff, there is one representative each from Personnel (S1), Intelligence (S2), Operations (S3), Logistics (S4), CIMIC/ Development (S5), Communications (S6), Training (S7) and Finance (S8) respectively. In the PRT Bamyan, S3 is responsible for the different operations conducted by the Liaison teams /patrols. The CIMIC/ Development Group, which includes the CIMIC Liaison Officers, is responsible for planning and coordinating the different reconstruction projects. The Liaison teams/patrols consist of a CIMIC Liaison Officer supported by infantry soldiers who provide security and coordinate the activities of the Liaison Officer and civil society. The Liaison teams provide a conduit for information throughout the region and facilitate aid efforts, monitor disarmament and assist in the reconstruction of Afghan institutions.²⁶⁴

The PRT Bamyan has three operational lines; providing security, supporting reconstruction and development, and strengthening the government. Security is maintained by frequent patrols throughout the province. The patrols, together with the CIMIC Liaison Officer, liaise in the district area and meet for instance with the villages elders or the Community Development Committees on a regular basis.²⁶⁵ Some areas might be difficult to access, especially during the winter when heavy snow can close roads and mountain passes.

The PRT is partly responsible for the Provincial Development Plan. Each of the project sectors has working groups that consist of representatives from the line ministries, UNAMA, NGOs and the PRT. Their priorities are infrastructure (mainly roads), health, education and they have just started projects on agriculture. The PRT contracts Afghan companies which hire local workers to carry out their projects. The PRT did not want to be the lead agency of humanitarian projects; that role was given to the Provincial Disaster Management team and UNAMA. The PRT can distribute, move, secure and monitor equipment, but it is the lead agency which should decide who is provided support. In the words of the Commander: 'We soft-hearted military would give it to the first ones that

²⁶¹ UNHCR (2009)

²⁶² Interview with Chief of Staff

²⁶³ Interview with Chief of Staff

²⁶⁴ Informers in PRT Bamyan(2009); New Zealand Defence Force (2008): *PRT BamyanFAQ* [<http://www.NewZealandDefenceForce.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/faq.htm>] (accessed April 24, 2009)

²⁶⁵ A positive step in including women in decision making is the Community Development Council of the National Solidarity Programme

asked us – it is better with the more hard-hearted NGOs'.²⁶⁶ The PRT receives their main support for development programs from New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency (NZAID). In addition, they have two American aid organizations embedded in the PRT which support projects in the PRT area; USAID and Commanders Emergency Response Program. Strengthening the Afghan government is done by providing advice and assistance to the Provincial Governor and the district sub-governors.

The PRT leadership also liaises regularly with UNAMA and NGOs.²⁶⁷ The aim is to make the Afghan leadership strong and independent. The governor, who is a woman, was respected as a good and competent leader but the quality of leadership in the line ministries and out in the district was more diverse.²⁶⁸ The New Zealand Police cooperates and works with police training and mentoring. The female New Zealand police officer concentrated on women's issues, for instance in the training of female police officers and detectives dealing with the Family Response Unit. These projects were sponsored by NZAID.²⁶⁹

7.4 Representation and Resolution 1325

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Operations. Internal representation primarily concerns 'manning policies and equal opportunities' such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization. External representation relates to how Operations are conducted in terms of 'liaison, information and support' vis-à-vis the population and parties in the area of responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women's organizations?

7.4.1 Internal Representation

Women account for almost 17 percent of the regular New Zealand Defence Force.²⁷⁰ All services and branches are open for both sexes. The integration of women into the New Zealand Defense Force began in 1997. A number of initiatives have resulted in a steady increase of women personnel since 1998. The number of women has grown, both in terms of more diverse roles and at higher levels. Initially, the focus was on preventing sexual harassment and other unacceptable behavior. This has later shifted towards focus on traditional features of military life that presented obstacles to women's full participation.²⁷¹

The PRT Bamyān's total personnel are 201, of whom 12 are women (6 percent). Three of these 12 women are officers. They work in intelligence, logistics and in the medical teams. Two of the female officers are members of the Commander's Leader Group. There are no women in the PRT Development Group or working as CIMIC Liaison Officers. Two of the patrols which went out in the Afghan society were mixed; with one female medic each. On some patrols the female nurse occasionally joined. Most interviewees agreed that this gave them a possibility to interact with Afghan women, but said the lack of female interpreters was a constraint. In the New Zealand Police there were one female and two male police officers.

²⁶⁶ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁶⁷ Interview with PRT Commander; Interview with Chief of Staff

²⁶⁸ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁶⁹ Interview with PRT New Zealand Police

²⁷⁰ Numbers as of January 1 2009. New Zealand Defense Force (2009). *Personnel Summary*. [<http://www.NewZealandDefenceForce.mil.nz/at-a-glance/personnel-composition.htm>] (accessed April 24, 2009)).

²⁷¹ New Zealand Defense Force (2007). "Defense acknowledged for support of diversity". [<http://www.NewZealandDefenceForce.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20070831-dafsod.htm>] (accessed April 24, 2009).

Men and women have separate toilets and showers in the camp, allowing for privacy for the personnel. There are also separate sleeping accommodations. Regarding equipment, the female staff was satisfied. Both uniforms and body armor came in suitable sizes. There was zero alcohol tolerance, both for officers and soldiers.



*A patrol arrives in Dragon Valley*²⁷²

None of the female soldiers had experienced any negative reaction in the PRT for being a female soldier. The female medics took part in all the duties of the patrols and “pulled their weight” together with the men.²⁷³ The general opinion was that the teams would gain from having more female staff and female interpreters because they could talk to Afghan women. In spite of these comments, none of the interviewees saw it as a priority to recruit more women for future contingents.

The female officers told us that they had to deal with rude jokes and tough talk from their male colleagues. But they also felt men became less bragging with women in the teams. They said that as a woman you constantly had to prove yourself in the military; prove that you could handle the job even if you are a woman. If a female soldier or officer cried, she could in some situations see this as being a normal reaction. However, the men would possibly see it as a weakness and a sign that she was not handling the situation well. Emotions might be frowned upon whoever shows them; one of the male interviewees told us that when he wanted some help in how to aid a woman who had asked him how she could get away from a forced marriage, he was told that he should not be so emotionally involved. He wanted information on how to handle a situation in his work but was rebuffed and labeled as too emotional.²⁷⁴

Another interviewee said it was a positive thing with mixed groups and that there were no problems with that. But he added that maybe female soldiers attracted more attention among local people. They might not get more information even though they have female soldiers. He thought that local women who wanted to talk to the soldiers would come anyway and, as they missed out on a lot of information anyway, it did not really matter.²⁷⁵

²⁷² Photo by Synne Holan

²⁷³ Interview with Nursing Officer

²⁷⁴ Interview with one soldier in PRT Bamyan

²⁷⁵ Interview with Patrol Commander Kiwi 1

7.4.2 External Representation

The external dimension of representation focuses on to what extent women are involved in the PRT's local contacts and as cooperation partners in different operations in the host country. Security Resolution 1325 was not known by the members of the PRT and therefore not used in any planning or execution of its different operations. Special protection or empowerment of women had never been formally discussed within the PRT, neither before deployment nor after arrival in the area. None of those interviewed at the PRT knew or mentioned any women's organizations. But they did cooperate with other organizations like the AIHRC, which works on women's rights, and with the Aga Khan Foundation, which runs a number of women's projects.

The patrols rarely saw women and reportedly did not engage with women except for on a few occasions. According to regulations, and as they perceived the culture, the male soldiers could not talk to or meet with local women.²⁷⁶ Only two patrols had female members (medics) and they did not have any female interpreters. They were not aware that the District councils, Community Development Committees and Shuras had female members, so they did not ask to meet with them in the villages. When we asked questions on women's participation and inclusion in the PRT's work one of the responses was:²⁷⁷

Yes, women are half of the population. Do we need to influence them? Probably not. We need to influence the head of the Shura. Women will not kill us. Female soldiers and interpreters would be nice to have, but we don't want to impose our standards here. It would be waste of effort and time.

The Governor of Bamyan is a woman and the only female governor in Afghanistan. The PRT leadership had regular meetings with her as a part of its work on security and the strengthening of local government structures. To all of our questions on gender awareness and support of Afghan women they referred back to this fact and assumed she would deal with and take the lead on all women's questions.²⁷⁸ The Governor was seen as a competent leader with a high work ethic who had built a robust governmental institution in central Bamyan.²⁷⁹ The PRT was also in contact with the Ministry of Women's Affairs led by a female director, described as strong and competent by those interviewed at the PRT.

The New Zealand Police cooperated and worked with women's security, for instance in the training of female police officers/detectives and with the Family Response Unit. There was close cooperation between AIHRC and the Family Response Unit. In order to get a good understanding of women participation and inclusion the research team met with representatives from the local public arena.²⁸⁰ All the civilian interviewees agreed that security was good in Bamyan and nobody saw that as a topic worth further discussion. They were all asked if there had been any cases of wrongdoing by the foreign troops, but there were no reports of complaints about the international soldiers' attitudes and behavior. The female Shura leader in Dragon Valley asked the PRT specifically to talk to women's Shuras and female members of the Community Development Committees when

²⁷⁶ Interview with Staff Officer

²⁷⁷ Interview with S3/ Operation Officer for the patrols

²⁷⁸ The research team did not meet the Governor as she was travelling outside the Province during our stay in Bamyan

²⁷⁹ Interview with Commander

²⁸⁰ To be specific, this included Department of Work and Social Affairs (Male director. Staff: 59 in total/10 female). Department of Women's Affairs (Female director. Staff: 10 in total/6 female (4 vacant)). The Governmental line ministry follow the same program as the ministry in Kabul; Female leader of local Shura in Dragon Valley. She was one of two reported female leaders of Shuras or Community Development Committees in Bamyan. She was leader of both the female and the mixed Shura. UNAMA Bamyan: Gender Focal point, Human Rights, Political Affairs; Afghan Independent Human Right Commission, Bamyan. The national leader and the leader in Bamyan are women. The office in Bamyan was also responsible for three districts in Wardak and two districts in Daikundi; Agha Khans Foundation (Staff: 330 in total/47 female), is an NGO that has a wide range of projects; in health, reconstruction and culture, and were responsible for implementing the National Solidarity Plan and partly responsible for the Health program in the entire province. The administration and female staff at the Bamyan Provincial Hospital (Staff: 126 in total/22 female).

they came to a village. She also stressed that women should be invited to meetings about development. As an example, she mentioned the annual conference for the Provincial Development Plan. She had gone to it without an invitation, to make sure that women's issues were brought up.

All external partners interviewed had met PRT representatives at meetings, mainly concerning development work, and they were not negative to cooperating with them. Their main concern was the lack of development in the province and they were disappointed over what they saw as being a low level of project activities by the PRT. They wanted more attention to women's rights and paid work for women. They were also critical of what they believed was a lack of follow-up and control of projects by the PRT. There was a general opinion among many of the external Afghan interviewees that Bamyan did not get the support and aid it should have. It was implied that because Bamyan is a Hazara area and its population has been oppressed and underprivileged, they should get more support today to be able to rise to the standards of the central (Pashtun) areas. All external interviewees meant the good security situation was an opportunity for development. People asked why a poor province as Bamyan got a PRT with low capacities, or a PRT with a smaller budget than others.²⁸¹ Their conclusion was that the money goes to insecure areas and provinces, and that it does not pay to be a safe area.

7.5 Integration and Resolution 1325

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective. Internal integration means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of 'organizing and conducting Operations', e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. External integration refers to the 'interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed' in the area of responsibility. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments executed in the area of responsibility, in terms of daily military operations? Relevant practices and lessons can be observed at both PRT HQ and PRT tactical levels.

7.5.1 Internal Integration

Women's situation was described by the PRT staff as being a part of the overall situation. If something was reported on the situation of women, the information would be handed over to the most appropriate organization or actor. One of the interviewed at HQ level said: 'We have to focus – we are few. There are more important things. We have no reports on women and security. Women do not approach us – not now'.²⁸²

The PRT had no gender-specific information on the situation in the area and there were no indications that men's and women's needs were considered as factors in the analysis and planning of the operations. Women were not considered in the planning and collection of information when it came to providing security. The reason given by interviewees was that women were not seen as threats, perpetrators or as targets for the insurgents.

Women projects were not prioritized by the military in their support for reconstruction and development. The Provincial Development Plan was developed by the person in the PRT responsible for development work. The S5/ CIMIC officer explained that the projects were discussed with all the main players in a democratic way, but no priority was given to women projects:²⁸³

This project list was discussed with the head of the Shuras (male), stakeholders in New Zealand, the line ministries and the Governor and

²⁸¹ Interview with UNAMA Gender focal point

²⁸² Interview with Staff Officer

²⁸³ Interview with S5/CIMIC

they were asked to prioritize. This list ended with 68 projects from 427, and I have made a three-year plan. But this can change; The ISAF Commander wants roads and we do not have funding for all the projects now. The Governor thinks that we did her a favor by setting up this more prioritized list.

From discussions with the PRT we found that there was no analysis or understanding that giving priority to women could increase the effectiveness of the operation. As long as women were not seen as a security threat, they were not a necessary or important part for the operation to focus on. The PRT had not reflected on or discussed that 50 percent of the population should have an impact on the building of peace and security.

The PRT was represented at all the meetings with the line ministries. When it came to the Community Development Committees or the local Shura system they never asked to see the female representatives as they were not aware that female representation was part of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). According to what they had learned, to talk or meet with women would have been a breach of Afghan culture. Afghan women were seen only as part of a private context. This is in contrast with the view held by the female Shura leader who wanted to be contacted and viewed as an important part of the new Afghan political system.²⁸⁴ Women in official positions are all at risk of being threatened or even killed by people who are against changes in the Afghan society. It might be an increased risk to be acknowledged and contacted by the PRT, but women we met saw it as a protection.

The PRT had no gender adviser function in its organizational structure. The role of a gender adviser is to support the Commander and his/her staff in working with gender issues in the operational area. An understanding of international conventions and resolutions on gender equality and the protection of vulnerable groups during armed conflicts is central in this work. The ANDS has gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue for promoting gender equality in all areas of the Afghan society. The Afghan Government has signed a number of international agreements and laws that support women's rights. The Commander told us that he was responsible for gender equality in his civilian role as an administrator at a University in New Zealand, so he was well informed on gender. He took female soldiers/officers with him when he went to meetings where Afghan women would be present, but not to meetings with the Governor as they knew each other well. Other responses from the PRT leadership were that posts especially concerned with gender were not needed. They used the female soldiers and officers when the situation demanded it: 'If we had a gender person, that person would be frustrated. There is no wish to change here. It will take generations and we have a short mandate'.²⁸⁵ Another expressed view was:²⁸⁶

The Afghan leadership has a strong woman as a Governor and as leader of the department of women's affairs. It's perhaps not good that this male-centered organization deals with a male-orientated society. But the PRT is one of many players here – should we be the leader on gender issues? UNAMA has a much better gender balance and may have a better intellectual capacity.

As members of the PRT did not know about Resolution 1325 or the Afghan gender equality strategy they could not promote related issues in their work throughout the province. A gender adviser would help to increase gender awareness and support gender mainstreaming in the mandate. A gender adviser could potentially expand the position from covering the needs of female soldiers and facilitating sporadic contact with women to also gain deeper understanding of how security, supporting the Afghan government and women's role could be met by the PRT.

²⁸⁴ Interview with head of female Shura and acting head of male Shura in Dragon Valley

²⁸⁵ Interview with Chief of Staff

²⁸⁶ Interview with PRT Commander

Awareness of differences in the situations of men and women can be transferred to the staff through training. The pre-deployment training was nine weeks long. It consisted approximately of 60 percent battle training and 40 percent language and cultural training. The cultural training focused on how to conduct oneself in meetings with Afghan officials and civilians and how to behave towards women and religious leaders (Mullahs). Part of the information was given by earlier contingents and part from Afghans living in New Zealand. The training was quite specific in how to act towards women (do/ do not). Men should never talk to women. Men cannot search women, except in very extreme situations. They would then have to make sure that Afghan men were present, observing that nothing inappropriate was done to the women (these situations had never occurred). They should not look at women, not greet them from their vehicle and never offer their hand first to a woman. Their ensuing experiences confirmed that these rules were in line with the traditions and reality in Bamyan. Resolution 1325 was not part of any training. The interviewees said that women were mentioned in the course work on 'Law of armed conflicts' and women as non-combatants.²⁸⁷

The training was perceived as useful and the personnel followed the rules, except that they waved back if women or girls waved to them. Some of those interviewed from the tactical level would have liked more cultural training and more practice with scenarios like meetings and negotiations. They found that the culture and this kind of dealings were more different than expected from their work in New Zealand. Information on women's situation was not seen as very relevant. There were very few examples of interaction with women in the field. One example was a visit to a village where a woman was very anxious to give information to the patrol after a Shura meeting. Another situation was when a girl came to a patrol asking for advice on how to avoid a forced marriage. The third was the case with the 14-year-old girl who had been raped; referred to earlier.

The pre-deployment training on culture and interaction with local people formed the PRT's view and practices. For this PRT contingent, it meant that they did not engage with women, believing it would be harmful. The pre-deployment training gave no, or little, room for understanding that Afghan women increasingly are taking part in the society and that the PRT should include this as part of the mandate in all the three lines of operations. Women were regarded as private persons and therefore not reachable. They were not seen as participants in the political and public life that wanted and needed to be acknowledged and respected as their male counterparts.

7.5.2 External Integration at the PRT HQ Level

The Commander and others were clear on their role to support, mentor and lead from behind. This meant that Afghans was to lead the way and the PRT would follow the policies of the Governor, or in other cases possibly the UN. They agreed that in reality, the military had to take the lead in security matters. Bamyan has no ANA presence as they are denied access to the province because of a conflict a few years back. The ANP is therefore meant to serve both as a police and security force. At the time of writing, the PRT viewed the ANP as being too small and too weak to handle all these assignments.²⁸⁸

The main focus of the PRT mandate contains aspects of both women's and men's situations. On the questions of if the PRT had specifically considered women and security in the operations, the answer was uniformly 'no'.²⁸⁹ The situation of women was seen as part of the overall situation. They had no information, reports or knowledge about women playing a significant role as insurgents or threats to society.²⁹⁰ However, they did support some women's projects such as the Women Peace Park outside Bamyan City. An international NGO had there created a park with a restaurant and shops. This had given

²⁸⁷ Interview with Bamyan representatives

²⁸⁸ Interview with PRT Commander

²⁸⁹ Interviews with PRT Commander and Staff Officer

²⁹⁰ Interview with Staff Officer

work to 17 people from the nearest villages. Some girl schools were built, but women projects were not given any priority in the development work.²⁹¹

The interviewees from Bamyan agreed that the presence of ISAF was still necessary. Without support from the international forces they believed that the security situation would get worse:²⁹²

Thank God, Taliban is finished and out. We are lucky here in Bamyan. But ISAF is not doing a good job in development. In other places/provinces they have more reconstruction and scholarships, up to 345 000 USD in some provinces. Why not here in Bamyan? There are no poppy growing, no suicide bombers, no enemies, no Explosive Ordnance Disposals. So why not do any construction here?

Some said they were happy about ISAF/ the PRT and that female soldiers were good role models for Afghan girls.²⁹³

In general terms the interviewees from the PRT did not remember having adapted their work in order to include women's situation. The reason for not working specially with women's situation was that it was not seen to be relevant for their mandate. They also had a very conservative and pessimistic view on the possibilities to interact and cooperate with women or women's organizations, as they felt that people were not interested in change or development in this area.²⁹⁴ As the patrols mainly met with Afghan men, their view of the society must have been 'all male'; something which was not discussed or questioned by anyone at the PRT.

7.5.3 External Integration at the PRT Tactical Level

Some of the interviewees in the civil society of Bamyan had lived part of their life outside Afghanistan as refugees in Iran and Pakistan, where they had experienced a life with more freedom and rights for women. These women were educated, strong and spoke freely with us. We also met with a few uneducated women in a group at the hospital; they were shy and did not want to talk in the company of educated women and female foreigners.

All female external interviewees were clear on the need for special protection for women, especially in the private sphere. These needs for special protection for women were due to domestic violence and lack of rights in areas such as forced marriages and rapes. Some of the NGOs, e.g. AIHRC, worked to improve women's rights by informing the population through workshops as well as radio and TV programs. They had meetings with mullahs and Shuras to inform on and discuss human rights and to influence practices and traditions that were in conflict with these rights. One example of the discussions the AIHRC had in villages when campaigning on human rights was:²⁹⁵

A man was asked by the female leader what his wife was doing. He answered that she was at home doing nothing. The AIHRC representative said that as a housewife, she was cooking food for him and the rest of the family, looking after their children, washing clothes, cleaning the house etc. Then she explained what it would cost him to hire people to do this work. In the end he said that he understood that his wife did important work for him and all the family at home.

Our interviewees explained that men and women have different roles in Muslim societies; women are subordinate to men and cannot do what they want without asking the male head of the family. A married woman needs permission from her husband to finish her

²⁹¹ Interview with S5

²⁹² Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

²⁹³ Interview with Ministry of Women's Affairs

²⁹⁴ Interview with Patrol Commander Kiwi 1; Interview with Chief of Staff; Interview with Staff Officer

²⁹⁵ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

education. Often, he would not permit her to leave the house and the children.²⁹⁶ They said that as in many villages where people live isolated, society was conservative, but today girls (and boys) were allowed to go to school.²⁹⁷

On two occasions we were told that having female personnel had made a difference. Once, in a mixed Shura meeting, the CIMIC Liaison Officer saw that a woman wanted to talk to them. He sent the female medic and a male interpreter to meet with the woman at a discreet place. She gave them information that was different from the information from the Shura and they later found out that she had been correct. It would have taken a long time for them to find out about this without her information. When we asked why he thought she came forward with this, he said it could be because women are tired of conflicts and that she cared about her children. Another time, when they had a US/Afghan female interpreter with them, all the Shura members in the villages wanted to talk to her. The Liaison Officer meant she was a big resource for the team.²⁹⁸

Issues of women and security were not a part of the tasks assigned by the PRT HQ. Information about voter registration for women was the only example where they had been asked to report back. The officers and soldiers saw neither problems nor benefits with working with women's security. It was not seen as their mandate. They worked within a male society in which men talked to men, so they were not aware of the women's situation and could not envision how it would be if women had a more active role. They described it as having 'blind spots'. In discussions with the research team, they said that they would need gender training and more female staff to be able to work with women.²⁹⁹ One officer did not see any benefits: 'It's pretty fair for women here. The corruption and the general attitude against the development are more important'.³⁰⁰ However, the New Zealand police who worked on education for female officers and the Family Response unit saw it as important. If there were no female police officers present, women could not come forward with their cases.

The external interviewees did not see much concrete activity from the PRT with regards to providing security, reconstruction and development and strengthening good governance. Most of them only met the PRT representatives at meetings. They were pleased with the general security situation and the few examples of women's programs supported by the PRT. The police projects for women got a positive response. A case where the PRT had helped a woman, Amina, to get to Kabul to have her criminal case reopened was referred to; she was later released. The other case mentioned was 'the 14-year old girl'. Both cases were seen as important and positive examples of support to women.³⁰¹

The external interviewees did not see any problems with working on women's security in Bamyan because the general security was so good. There had been no complaints against the foreign troops here as opposed to other provinces in the South and the East. The PRT Bamyan was seen as taking care of the civilians and nobody was hurt or killed. For security, the PRT needed female soldiers to be able to search houses and women. The research team was told about a 'promotion picture' from the ISAF/ PRT that showed a female soldier searching an Afghan woman. The female soldier was wearing a helmet, not a scarf, making it difficult to see that she was a woman. This was used by the Taliban who claimed foreign male soldiers touched Afghan women.³⁰²

²⁹⁶ Interview with Ministry of Women's Affairs

²⁹⁷ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

²⁹⁸ Interview with CIMIC Liaison Officer Kiwi 2

²⁹⁹ Interview with CIMIC Liaison Officer; Interview with Nursing Officer

³⁰⁰ Interview with Patrol Commander Kiwi 1

³⁰¹ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

³⁰² Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

7.6 Conclusions

Resolution 1325 was not known among the personnel in the Bamyan PRT commanded by New Zealand. New Zealand has no National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 to guide their work. The planning and preparation for the PRT mission did not include gender perspectives and the leadership saw no need for a gender adviser or an active use of gender in their operations.

Internal Representation: There was no special recruitment of women for specific positions in the PRT. Two of three patrols had one female member, both were medics. When the male officers went to meetings where Afghan women were present, they sometimes took a female officer or soldier with them as a way of ensuring that cultural rules were followed. There was one female officer in the PRT leadership.

External Representation: The PRT leadership had close and good cooperation with the female governor of Bamyan. Since the Governor was a woman, the PRT perceived her as the one responsible for guiding them on gender issues. There was a New Zealand-run police project aimed at promoting female police officers and at supporting the Family Protection Unit. This was a successful project and it was praised by women in the province.³⁰³ The PRT did not have any information of women's organizations in Bamyan and they did not give priority to women's political or economic rights in their development work.³⁰⁴ On the tactical level, the soldiers had very few contacts with the female population. They did not see it as important for their work and goals; they did not have any female interpreters; and they had never been tasked to contact or talk to women. However, in one village the PRT worked with the female leader of the Community Development Committees and even if the patrol had no female members, cooperation was good. If the PRT had had an active gender policy, they could have used the Governor and the Community Development Committees leader as examples of women's new possibilities when visiting other districts and villages, and could have asked for their female representatives.³⁰⁵

Internal Integration: There was no gender mainstreaming in the PRT's work. The pre-deployment training on gender was based on experiences from previous PRTs and Afghan refugees living in New Zealand. Information about changes since 2001, the new constitution and the international conventions on women's rights signed by the Karzai Government was not part of this training. Focus was on explaining what a male soldier could, or could not, do towards Afghan women in the traditional Afghan society. Furthermore, the PRT personnel lacked awareness and knowledge about differences between men and women in the public sphere. A very traditional and outdated picture minimized the possibilities for the PRT to contact the officially appointed women in the society. A dramatic incidence of a young woman being molested by her brother (and mother), was a wake-up call showing the dire situation girls and women could experience in the domestic sphere.

External Integration: The general security situation was good and had been stable during all the six years that New Zealand commanded the PRT in Bamyan. All operational lines were seen as gender neutral and issues of women and security were not included in the information or tasks that the PRT received from the ISAF HQ. The PRT saw no need to change or adapt their work to include women's situation. An incident with a molested girl made many realize that gender issues could be important. In that case, the PRT acted in a good and proper way but after having solved the acute medical and security problems for the girl, they felt unsure about what would happen to the girl and how they should address the situation.

³⁰³ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

³⁰⁴ Interview with personnel belonging to CIMIC

³⁰⁵ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

Leadership The leadership of the PRT is responsible for the interpretation, planning and implementation of the mandate and operations. The leadership saw no need for a gender perspective or analysis in their operations as these were regarded gender neutral. There was one female officer in the PRT leadership.

Expert Functions: Gender Advisers provide knowledge and capacity for the analysis and implementation of gender issues in operations. The New Zealand PRT did not have a gender adviser. The leadership did not see the need for a gender adviser or any special recruitment of women for specific positions in the PRT. A gender adviser function could have strengthened the analyses of the total situation in the area, increased the internal information about Afghanistan and informed women and others in the society about possibilities and constraints for projects.

7.7 Suggestions

The research team cannot see any obstacles for the PRT to work more effectively with gender issues. This work should be based on New Zealand's and the Afghan government's commitment towards Resolution 1325 and the Afghan national strategies and goals for gender equality and women's participation. A comprehensive plan for the PRT operations with gender expertise and a clear role for the leadership would lay the foundation encompassing both women's and men's security needs in Afghanistan.

Is it possible for foreign military troops to make contact and discuss with Afghan women? Yes, in today's Afghanistan women have formal positions on all levels in the governmental structures. In the provinces, they are represented in provincial, district and community development councils as part of the National Solidarity Plan. Women in these formal positions are important spokespersons, able to inform about situations, needs and priorities of women, children and families in their society. To be asked for and be acknowledged by the PRT elevate women's position to that of political actors and will add to political and military stabilization. It will also strengthen efforts to attain the goals of Afghan national plans where gender is a cross-cutting issue.

The traditional way of meeting women – or rather not meeting, seeing, or greeting them – might be suitable in a private setting and in private meetings. But to maintain this position towards all women in all situations will be will contribute to a policy in which women should be at home and not be seen or heard. If the pre-deployment training can give updated information on women's situation, rights and positions in today's Afghanistan and ISAF could give orders on the implementation of Resolution 1325, the PRT Bamyan would benefit from a wider range of information and knowledge about the situation in the province.

List of Interviewees

Bronwyn Bamfield, Nursing officer, New Zealand PRT

Carsten Grimm, CIMIC LO, New Zealand PRT

David Thims, CIMIC LO Kiwi 2, New Zealand PRT

Hamish Gibbons, S3 Operation officer for the patrols, New Zealand PRT

Ian Marshall, S3 CIMIC Development Group, New Zealand PRT

Ian McKnight, Patrol Commander Kiwi 1, New Zealand PRT

John A. Wecker, Political Officer, US Embassy United States of America, Kabul Afghanistan & New Zealand PRT

John Howard, Chief of Staff, New Zealand PRT

Maggie Windle, Police Inspector, NZ Police, New Zealand PRT

Mike Pettersen, S5 CIMIC Development Group, New Zealand PRT

Richard Hall, Commander, New Zealand PRT

Staff Officer, New Zealand PRT

Interviewees in Bamyan Province

Amina Hassanpour, Ministry of Women's Affairs

Elisabeth Haynes-Sageder, Human Rights, UNAMA

Emily Wall, Agha Khan Foundation (AKF)

Fatima, Agha Khan Foundation (AKF)

Fatima Kozimyan, Director of Ministry of Women's Affairs

Kyoshi Harada, Political Adviser, UNAMA

Nazira Kaveer, Political Affairs assistant/Gender focal point, UNAMA

Rahimi Parwin, Judge, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)

Representative, Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, Disabled and Martyrs

Sharifa Azizi, Lawer in women development, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)

Tahira Razen, Agha Khan Foundation (AKF)

Zainab, Head of female Shura and acting head of male Shura, Dragon Valley

Other interviewees

Chris Purdie, Padre New Zealand PRT Group meeting with 22 Afghan female hospital staff, Bamyan Hospital

Group meeting with three female police officers Bamyan Police headquarter

Ian Dovey, Forward Media Team Leader Bamyan, Combined Joint PSYOPS Task Force, ISAF

Mathew Roderick, Director Bamyan Hospital, Agha Khan Foundation (AKF)

8 The Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh

By Birgith Andreassen, Synne Holan and Bjørg Skotnes

8.1 National Context

*The Government will intensify its efforts both to increase women's participation in civil and military peace operations, peacemaking and peace building and to enhance the protection of the human rights of women in conflict areas. Norway will pursue a policy that promotes gender equality at home and in the global context.*³⁰⁶

Norway has had the responsibility for the PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab province, since September 2005. The PRT had up to recently not included Resolution 1325 in its work despite the fact that the Norwegian government in 2006 launched its Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. The plan had been drawn up by the Ministry of Justice and the Police, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Children and Equality. The Action Plan states among other things that; "Norway will seek to increase the proportion of women participation in NATO-led peace support operations, particularly in areas where this is important because of local religious and cultural factors".³⁰⁷ Moreover, "[t]he Ministry of Defense and the Norwegian armed forces must integrate gender perspectives into the planning of all international activities, including all operational plans for international operations"³⁰⁸, and "Norway will maintain regular contact with locally-based women's groups and will support formal and informal meetings for women and their networks in conflict areas".³⁰⁹ In November 2008, in the midst of this study, the Chief of Defense of Norway decided to increase efforts to integrate the Resolution into operations of the armed forces and also to appoint a Gender Adviser to the PRT contingent. A Gender Adviser had at the time of writing already been trained and was expected to be deployed together with PRT 13 to Meymaneh in late May 2009.³¹⁰ This is a positive and crucial step to realizing the Norwegian Government's Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325.

8.2 Situation in the PRT Area

PRT Meymaneh is one of five PRTs under the Regional Command North (RC North). The PRT's area of responsibility is Faryab province, which lies in northwest Afghanistan. The province measures approximately 250 km from north to south and 170 km from east to west and has a population of around 1 000 000³¹¹ people, consisting of Uzbeks (56.8 percent), Tajiks (21.4 percent), Pashtuns (14.1 percent) and Turkmens (4.5 percent).³¹² The Faryab province is a traditional agricultural society, which has been affected by long dry spells in recent years. Economic insecurity was the main concern of the population and

³⁰⁶ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), *The Norwegian Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security*. March 2006. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.9

³⁰⁷ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p.9

³⁰⁸ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p.6

³⁰⁹ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p.4

³¹⁰ Forsvarssjefens beslutningsnotat nr 11/2008 - Økt kvinnerepresentasjon i internasjonale operasjoner – understøttet av et fagmiljø innen gender og militærmakt. Ref. 2008/003964-014/FORSVARET/UFAN/02. (Norwegian Armed Forces, November 2008).

³¹¹ Wikipedia.com (2009b), *Faryab Province* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faryab_Province] (accessed April 24, 2009)

³¹² Wikipedia.com (2009b)

the topic that came up first in all discussions, especially with the women in the area. Poverty levels are high and work opportunities for both men and women are very few.³¹³ Apart from agriculture, there are also reports of some opium cultivation and extensive smuggling playing a part in the area's economy.³¹⁴ The society is characterized by a high illiteracy rate as well as a lack of health facilities. Not all villages have schools, medical clinics and electricity. Maternal mortality is high and there is a great need for improving maternity care.³¹⁵

The threat of military hostilities is not considered to be high in Meymaneh or the nearest districts as incidences of open acts of war are few. This assessment was supported by interviews with women in the villages and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Faryab.³¹⁶ Interviewees outside the PRT described the security situation as good and as being the same for men and women. On the issue of security for women the general reply was that the security situation was better than before and better than in other provinces. Interviewees felt that the fact that girls could go to school and that women and girls could participate in projects run by NGOs was a sign of the improved security situation. Moreover, women could now be together and walk around in the village. However, it was underlined that women could not go outside the village without the permission of men. The men also had to agree for women to go to work. The women interviewed said they hoped women in the future would be able to go out freely and that their husbands would let them do so.³¹⁷ While this concerned security for women and men when moving about in society, the NGOs described a situation where women lack security also in the private sphere; most women still need to receive information about their rights and protection from human rights violations. This was additionally problematic as women were reportedly in a weak position in relation to the legal system. For example, women who report rape are imprisoned. Imprisonment is partly supposed to protect the victim from the attacker, but the victim is also later being convicted because she is perceived to have participated in an act considered to constitute infidelity or immoral conduct. There were no women holding legal positions in the Faryab courts and who women could turn to for help. Moreover, threats against the courts appeared to be commonplace, resulting in few judges wanting to work out in the provinces. Constant threats were also said to reduce the willingness of the prosecuting authority and courts to pursue certain cases.³¹⁸ Such threats were not only made against the court and legal system but were also directed against all women holding public positions. Women in Parliament and Government were subject to serious threats and have even been killed, one example being a female police officer killed in Kandahar in the autumn of 2008. This environment of threat and intimidation limits women's participation in public life and the possibility for them to exercise their human rights.

8.3 PRT Mandate and Organization

The Norwegian-led PRT (Camp Meymaneh) is located by the airport on the outskirts of Meymaneh, the capital city of Faryab province. Norway has made contributions to the PRT since the summer of 2004 and took over the role of lead nation for PRT Meymaneh from the United Kingdom on 1 September 2005. The PRT is led by a Norwegian Commanding Officer, who is under the command of the Regional Command North (RC North), which has its headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif. The Regional Command North reports directly to the ISAF Commander-in-Chief and is in charge of all NATO forces in the northern region. The RC North's task is to carry out military operations in close

³¹³ NGOs, Governmental structures, women in three villages around Meymaneh

³¹⁴ Interview with Development Adviser and police in the PRT

³¹⁵ NGOs, Governmental structures, women in three villages around Meymaneh

³¹⁶ Women in three villages around Meymaneh

³¹⁷ NGOs, Governmental structures, women in three villages around Meymaneh

³¹⁸ Interviews with PRT staff, interview with UNAMA representative in Meymaneh and meeting with NGOs active in Faryab; NCA, NPA, the DACAAR, ACTED

cooperation with civilian actors and Afghan security forces in the area of operations, which covers all of Afghanistan's northern provinces.³¹⁹ Furthermore, the Norwegian PRT is supported by the Norwegian National Contingent Command in Mazar-e Sharif. The National Contingent Command staff takes care of national responsibilities in the areas of personnel management, logistics, communications and financial administration. An additional role of the National Contingent Command is acting as a link between the Norwegian units in Afghanistan and the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters in Stavanger, which are responsible for all Norwegian operations abroad.³²⁰

The PRT's main task is to "[a]ssist Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Faryab province in building security, governance and promote development in order to establish a safe and well governed Afghanistan".³²¹ The PRT's main function is to support the elected central Government in Kabul, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) and assisting them in the development of the provinces. The PRT also plays an important role in the efforts to disarm unlawful armed groups, identify drug-related activity, and weaken the power of regional warlords.³²² The work is divided into three operational areas: Security; Reconstruction and development; and supporting the Afghan Government's ability to govern in the province (good governance). The Norwegian PRT model maintains a strict distinction between the tasks of the military and those of the civilian elements. The military effort is primarily to support the Afghan security forces in their efforts to establish security and stability, thus enabling the facilitation of the other operational areas.

The PRT personnel include both military and civilian elements, with the military force totaling approximately 400 ISAF soldiers. The military contingent is primarily from Norway but also includes a contribution from Latvia, whose contingent numbers around 100 soldiers. The military force includes among other capabilities Military Observation Teams. Their task is to link up with different parts of the population at the district level. They have contact with, among others, village councils, local politicians and the police. The Military Observation Teams observe and gather information about various matters, such as sympathies and the needs and requests for aid from various groups. This work helps to keep the PRT informed of the situation in the province. The well-trained teams include experts in various specialist areas.³²³

The civilian contribution to the PRT numbers a mere 15 people and consists of advisers in the areas of politics, development and justice. The civilian elements of the PRT are subject to the authority of the Commander only with regards to their personal security but they are given their mandates by, and report to, their respective line ministries.³²⁴ The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police are responsible for the mandate for, and specialist follow-up of, efforts in the police, prison and justice sector.³²⁵ The Political Adviser and Development Adviser are both Secretaries at the Norwegian embassy in Kabul and, thus, receive their assignments from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³²⁶ The civilian elements' tasks primarily fall into the operational areas of reconstruction and development and good governance. As well as serving as advisers to and coordinators for the PRT's Commanding Officer, the civilians are to support democracy-building and community development in their respective specialist fields. They therefore cooperate closely with the Afghan authorities and international organizations at several levels.³²⁷

³¹⁹ Norwegian Armed Forces (2008a), *De norske avdelingene i Afghanistan* [<http://www.mil.no/fol/afg/start/styrken/#2>] (accessed January 11, 2009)

³²⁰ Norwegian Armed Forces (2008a)

³²¹ Brief for the Norwegian research team in October 2008 from Chief Of Staff in PRT 10

³²² Norwegian Armed Forces (2008a)

³²³ Norwegian Armed Forces (2008a)

³²⁴ Interviews with PRT civilian staff

³²⁵ Interviews with PRT civilian staff

³²⁶ Interviews with PRT civilian staff

³²⁷ Interviews with PRT civilian staff

Police and prison officers and the Legal Adviser mentor their local Afghan colleagues. For the Police, this means acting as instructors and mentors to the Afghan Police. They facilitate and conduct activities ranging from physical training to general police and investigative work. The Prison Adviser is in contact with the local women's prison and mentors her colleagues with regard to the treatment of prisoners and prisoners' rights. The Legal Adviser's task is to act as a supplement to the Police and intensify efforts in the justice sector. His/her role is to survey the situation, cooperate with the prosecuting authority and courts, and help to ensure that more cases are processed through the legal system.³²⁸

The primary task of the Development Advisers is to assess future projects and follow up on the Norwegian development assistance portfolio, which is implemented by NGOs, UN organizations and Afghan authorities. The Development Adviser thus has regular meetings with local representatives relating to this area of work.³²⁹ The Political Adviser is the PRT Commanding Officer's adviser on political matters and activities in the province. She/ he consequently has contact with political parties, UNAMA and NGOs. The Political Adviser also makes sure that the PRT adheres to its civilian mandate.³³⁰ While the military element of the PRT rotates every six months, the civilian advisers serve for at least one year, and often longer. The civilian development assistance effort has a planning horizon of at least three years and its projects are implemented on the basis of an overall assessment of the area. This seemed to have created some challenges in the working relation between the military and the civilian sides, something one source from the civilian side elaborated on:³³¹

An important role is to act as a brake in relation to quick impact projects when the military wants projects to win the hearts and minds of the local population. This is seen particularly in relation to the RC North. This is a tiring discussion, which has to be held repeatedly due to the frequent rotation on the military side. Development assistance is long-term – it is too slow for the military pace.

This implies the need for better coordination between the different military and civilian actors that are supposed to act as a joint and coordinated group to fulfill the mandate in the area of operations. This was seen by those interviewed in the PRT as being of special importance during the pre-deployment period when different kinds of scenarios can be discussed and decided on prior to deployment.³³²

8.4 Representation and Resolution 1325

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Operations. Internal representation primarily concerns 'manning policies and equal opportunities' such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization. External representation relates to how Operations are conducted in terms of 'liaison, information and support' vis-à-vis the population and parties in the area of responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women's organizations?

8.4.1 Internal Representation

In terms of internal representation, the number of female soldiers in the PRT at the time of the study was 7 percent. There were no women in the leadership of the PRT. Out of 26

³²⁸ Interview with Legal Adviser

³²⁹ Interview with Development Adviser

³³⁰ Interview with Political Adviser

³³¹ Interview with Development Adviser

³³² Interview with PRT staff

employed in the headquarters staff section, three were women and two of them were interpreters. The highest-ranking woman in the PRT was a lieutenant. Even if the number of female soldiers was low it was emphasized in the personnel group that it had been unconditionally positive to have women soldiers working in all areas from the civilian part of the PRT, the Mobile Operation Teams or in meetings with the Afghan population. The reason was that women had access to and could talk to both women and men. Contact with Afghan men was said to also have improved through having female staff. Some sources reported that it seemed that particularly older Afghan men were more relaxed and open when communicating with Norwegian female soldiers. Male soldiers on patrol also said that having women on patrol was positive because local men used less coarse language when women were present.³³³

That said, the opinions on having a more equal balance of female and male soldiers varied among the different interviewees; from mixed thoughts on women's capabilities to do the job to quite positive views in one of the field teams. For example, the Psyops Team had very positive experiences from having had a female soldier in the team. The soldier herself expressed her experience as follows;³³⁴

I have heard that since you are a girl, you have to watch out because you are not well-received. But I have benefited from being a girl. Old men like to talk to me and tell stories. The only drawback can be that people flock around me on the street.

One of her male colleagues confirmed this view by stating; "Having girls for the work is a prerequisite".³³⁵ The Military Observation Teams consisted only of men and for that reason they did not interact with any Afghan women when on patrol. However, the soldiers believed they got the information they wanted from the Afghan men as; "Security is a given priority. We are concerned with those who can carry out attacks".³³⁶ Women were regarded to only have 'humanitarian' information. From time to time the MOT had added to their group women from the civilian side of the PRT. This was not received negatively by the people in the village. When a female soldier was part of the field visit, the MOT experienced no problems but they did get a lot of attention because the woman carried a weapon.³³⁷

On the issue of equal opportunities such as respect for female soldiers among colleagues a female soldier said: "It is fine inside the PRT, I am used to being the only girl. I have occasionally experienced some unwanted attention from Italian and French soldiers." She added that in some individual cases, soldiers in the PRT could have a negative attitude towards female soldiers; "[t]hey are not always equally nice".³³⁸

8.4.2 External Representation

The interviewees within the PRT, both at the tactical and leadership level, classified the local culture as traditional and old-fashioned, with more conservative attitudes towards women than in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif. The PRT staff did not see Afghan women as having a visible part in the society or the authority structure. They also felt that women were not permitted to organize themselves or participate in activities outside the home. Women in the province generally wear the Burkha, and have to be accompanied by a male guardian when they are outside their home. There are few opportunities for paid work for women. Some weave carpets at home, often under very poor conditions that impose a heavy strain. One source mentioned reports of large-scale opium use by this group. Teaching posts in the new schools are a possibility for women. However, women teachers

³³³ Interview with Military Observation Teams

³³⁴ Interview with Psyops officer

³³⁵ Interview with Psyops officer

³³⁶ Interview with Military Observation Teams

³³⁷ Interview with Military Observation Teams

³³⁸ Interview with Psyops officer

in the villages reportedly lack formal training. A further problem is that their freedom of movement is limited. To come to terms with this, local NGOs have therefore started mobile training for women in the villages.³³⁹

The Norwegian PRT held regular meetings with the local authority structure and NGOs, at which the roles between the military and civilian personnel were distributed. The military worked with security issues and strengthening the Government's position in the province and therefore mainly had contact with leaders at the provincial level and with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). No women participated in these arenas. In the Faryab province, there were some women who had a position of influence in their local community. For example, the Head of the Ministry of Social Affairs is a woman, as is the Head of the Ministry of Women's Affairs. In addition, interviewees knew of a female head teacher who was particularly renowned for her good work.

The civilian elements of the PRT, which worked on issues related to reconstruction and development, had contact with a number of actors within the local authority structure. Very few of these were women. There were exchanges with the senior women staff of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Women's Affairs. There were also four female members of the Provincial Council who could be contacted in official contexts. The main (indirect) contact with women occurred through local NGOs. These had hired several local women in order to be able to reach out to the women in the province. Contact was also maintained with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). While the organization was headed by a man in Faryab, a woman was in charge of the Northern provinces. The AIHRC actively brings to attention issues related to the human rights of women and children. They have, among other things, reported about warlords who purchase very young girls from widows who are in difficult economic and social positions.³⁴⁰ The PRT also maintained contact with women's projects organized by the administration of justice, the Police and the prison service. This was done by female personnel from the civilian side of the PRT.

The understanding and interpretation of the PRT's mandate is that it is to provide security together with the Afghan army. In concrete terms this is understood to involve patrolling, upholding contact with authorities, in most cases male, and male village leaders on issues of insurgency and crimes related to armed incidents. All these activities are viewed as gender neutral even though it only involves men as actors and very seldom brings up issues relating to differences in the situation of men and women. It is also stated that the PRT shall assist Afghan authorities with their outreach in the provinces. This was seen by some of the interviewees in the PRT to be in conflict with efforts to change the situation of Afghan women. Changing the situation of the female population was not believed to be part of the Government of Afghanistan's political goals, and the interviewees did not know that Government of Afghanistan has stated that it will improve women's situation and strengthen women's position and rights in the society. The male PRT personnel were very concerned about creating problems for the women they met. They regarded having contact with Afghan women as difficult because they were afraid of dishonoring the women. This fear was based on the information they had received during the pre-deployment training. All in all, it is clear that the PRT met very few women, including women in official positions. Examples of women in official positions were a female headmaster, a female Shura representative and the Head of the provincial Ministry of Social Affairs. Those they met were viewed as educated and well informed.³⁴¹

The reluctance from the PRT's side to meet women is in contradiction to the view held by NGOs, governmental representatives and the women in the villages. One illustrating example of a missed opportunity for the PRT to meet with local women was when the researchers had a meeting with the District Development Assembly just outside of

³³⁹ Interview with Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development and Norwegian Church Aid

³⁴⁰ Interview with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

³⁴¹ Interviews with PRT staff

Meymaneh in connection with a school project for girls. Even though this Assembly had 16 members – eight men and eight women – only men turned up for the meeting. The explanation given for the women's absence was that the female representatives had not been specifically asked for. This appeared to be praxis for all meetings called for by the PRT. There is reason to believe that an active request for female representation from different local institutions at the PRT's meetings would be positive for women's status. It would also be beneficial for the PRT as it would provide the mission with additional information and, thus, a more complete picture of the situation on the ground.³⁴² Local government structures in Afghanistan are supposed to include women as part of National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Women in all villages where interviews were conducted expressed a willingness to inform the PRT and discuss their situation, especially in relation to women's economic security, health and education. They said in all the villages that they were happy to meet with female soldiers or other women from the PRT. It was suggested that the women soldiers should wear a scarf as it could sometimes be difficult to distinguish between male and female soldiers when they were in full uniform. The women proposed that the PRT should make contact with women through NGOs in order to be sure that they reached the women of the community.³⁴³

During the research field visit, the research team met with 20-30 women and young girls in villages around Meymaneh. In each of the villages the team met women who were elected members of the Community Development Councils linked to the NSP. Interesting conversations were held with the women on issues relating to security, the economy, education, women's role and the upcoming Afghan election. The research team listened to descriptions of life before and after the Taliban. The women were very concerned about the proposed negotiations between President Karzai and the Taliban, and feared that their newly-won rights would be in danger of being sold off during the negotiation process.

8.5 Integration and Resolution 1325

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective. Internal integration means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of 'organizing and conducting Operations', e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. External integration refers to the 'interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed' in the area of responsibility. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments executed in the area of responsibility, in terms of daily military operations? Relevant practices and lessons can be observed at both PRT HQ and PRT tactical levels.

8.5.1 Internal Integration

No expert functions, such as a Gender Adviser, had been established at the Norwegian PRT to support the integration of Resolution 1325 into the work of the military or the civilian functions. There was also no gender focal point network created or any other position which included in its job description the support of gender integration.³⁴⁴ Concerning the leadership of the PRT, the situation for women were said to never be discussed by the leadership group. One of those interviewed stated in this context that "More women are needed in the military leadership group; it is very traditionally military and macho".³⁴⁵ People interviewed within the PRT said there was, in general, little

³⁴² Interview with women in three villages around Meymaneh and school visit to Juma Bazar

³⁴³ Interview with women in three villages around Meymaneh

³⁴⁴ In the 13th PRT contingent that will be deployed in Afghanistan at the end of May 2009, there is one gender adviser. Norwegian Armed Forces (2009), "Vil inkludere afghanske kvinner". [<http://www.mil.no/start/article.jhtml?articleID=175631>] (accessed March 26, 2009).

³⁴⁵ Interview with Development Adviser

reporting about women within the PRT and stated that it was as if half of the population did not exist.³⁴⁶

None of the military personnel had received information or assignments related especially to women which could be included in analysis or planning. Nor were there any procedures for reporting information about women and their security situation to superiors or colleagues, whether within ISAF or to national military authorities. The interviewees felt that it would be difficult to introduce such reporting procedures as women were largely absent from community life, making it difficult to obtain information about their situation. One soldier stated that although reports were made about school projects for girls, such reports had never been requested. Indeed, a common feature at all levels was that no reports were requested nor prepared on the situation of women or on issues related to women's security. The only time this had occurred were in connection with special incidents, for example if threats have been received against girls' schools.

The Psyops Team is an exception; it has on its own initiative prepared reports for the leadership: "We are not asked to focus on women. We initiated [this] ourselves when we were given the task of improving the PRT's situational awareness. We thought; 'How should we do this? How can we meet women?' We do meet men and children on the street. The women are at home or can be seen at the hospital." They have arranged Focus groups with girls and boys at the University. Concerning feedback on information they said: "The leadership of the PRT has not altered its behavior on the basis of information about women. We get no special response. We report to the intelligence cell, but do not know how they use this. There is no focus on women".³⁴⁷

The level of knowledge about Resolution 1325 is very low. None of those interviewed within the PRT, whether civilian or military, were familiar with the contents of Resolution 1325, and none reported having received training on the subject neither before they were deployed nor while working in the area of responsibility. This goes against the content and aims of the Norwegian Action Plan for the implementation of the Resolution. The ministries that have contributed personnel to the PRT expressly require that training on Resolution 1325 must be given to all personnel who are to participate in international operations. The same requirement is found in the Norwegian Armed Forces' training directive, which expressly states such training is to be provided in connection with deployment.

The training of military personnel primarily involved basic soldiering skills and military interaction in the field. The training also included information about Afghanistan's geography, demographic profile, culture, history, everyday life, tribal culture and on the Taliban and other parties to the conflict. In this training, the position of women in the Afghan society was briefly covered from a cultural and traditional perspective but women's situation in relation to the content of Resolution 1325 was not mentioned specifically. The main point in this part of the training was a warning against contact between Western men and Afghan women. The soldiers were informed that Western men should neither look at nor talk to Afghan women. A practical example mentioned by several of those interviewed was how soldiers were told to act if a patrol hit and injured an Afghan woman with its vehicle. The appropriate procedure in such a situation was not to start giving first aid without first having obtained permission from a male relative. Breaching these rules was said to potentially put at risk the assignment, the soldiers and the woman. The role of women in the conflict, whether as victims or as participants, was thus not clearly discussed but the military personnel was advised to read fiction on the subject. Novels like '*Afghanistan, Where God Only Comes to Weep*'³⁴⁸ and '*A Thousand*

³⁴⁶ Interview with PRT staff

³⁴⁷ Interview with Psyops Team

³⁴⁸ Shakib, Siba (2008), *Der Gud gråter: en afghansk kvinnes mot og livskamp i en brennende region* (Original title: Nach Afghanistan kommt Gott nur noch zum Weinen). Tårnåsen: Ganesa

Splendid Suns,³⁴⁹ were recommended.³⁵⁰ These books present a very one-dimensional view of the Afghan society as well as of women's situations and social roles.

At the tactical level, it was reported that training had been provided on how to talk to local Afghans in both official and unofficial contexts. The training emphasized that a smiling, polite and soft approach was required. To strengthen the message, body language had to indicate the same attitude. It was important to demonstrate that one was there for the sake of the Afghan people and that one was not an occupying power or enemy, as the Taliban portray the international forces.³⁵¹ It was not clear whether these training scenarios included both Afghan men and women. On the civilian side, only the personnel from the justice sector had received any training at all before deployment. The cultural training had touched on women's position in society but matters related to 1325 were not covered. Personnel sent out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not received any specific training but one of the interviewees reported that he had overlapped with his predecessor.³⁵²

8.5.2 External Integration

*We do what we are told and trained to do. We need to know; what is actually the Norwegian government's goal for Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan?*³⁵³

Concerning external integration, the task of the military forces is to stabilize and establish security in Afghan society generally. The PRT did not make any distinction between the security situation of men and women. One of the interviewees stated that the PRT was probably not very conscious of any such differences in its military analysis and planning, as there had been no discussion of, or reflection on, the fact that women and men may have differing security needs. Accordingly, no gender focus was incorporated into either the planning or the implementation of stabilization and security operations. Instead, women were described as being almost invisible in the official Afghan society and absent from parts of the official authority structure. The role and situation of women were considered part of the private sphere, to which the international forces do not have access. PRT personnel were very careful not to approach or talk to women in interactions with the local community. A breach of these rules could put both the soldiers and the women at risk. It was therefore difficult to ask security-related questions to Afghan women. Contact with the community and the collection of information took place through open liaising with regular visits to villages and persons in authority. One of the sources stated that the choices they made regarding whom to meet or not did of course influence which information was gathered. But they nonetheless saw it as being impossible to change as Afghan women could not talk to Western men.³⁵⁴

The civilian element of the PRT – which is primarily responsible for the operational areas of reconstruction, development and good governance – had no explicit focus on women and security or on any other aspect of Resolution 1325. This is interesting as their focus is on projects and contributions which can improve the living conditions of the population at large and which should promote development. As women's security is linked to areas such as education, economic growth and health, one can say that these projects might in themselves have stabilizing effects on the society. In the context of building and establishing girls' schools, which was being done on a large scale in Faryab province by the PRT, the necessity of building walls around the schools to protect the girls from exposure, harassment and kidnapping had been recognized. Investing in the education of

³⁴⁹ Hosseini, Khaled (2007). *A Thousand Splendid Suns*. New York: Riverhead Books

³⁵⁰ Interview with Chief of Staff

³⁵¹ Interview with Military Observation Teams

³⁵² Interview with Political Adviser

³⁵³ From interview with one of the soldiers in the PRT

³⁵⁴ Interview with the Chief of Staff

girls was considered to be of fundamental importance to the lasting and stable development of the country. It was also seen to be important to get girls to complete their first five years of schooling as this had been found to reduce the likelihood of them being married off at an early age.³⁵⁵ Thus, also there is no conscious approach to Resolution 1325 which addresses systematically both Afghan women's and Afghan men's situation. Questions related to violence against women were not a priority but had been discussed with NGOs and authority structures that focus on women's issues. It was not a topic in talks with the Governor and one of the interviewees stated that; "[i]t is not natural to bring it up with the Governor because he works at a higher level".³⁵⁶ Efforts to support and guide the prosecuting authority and courts included contact with a number of cases involving women. A source from the civilian part of the PRT said:³⁵⁷

We come across many cases in which women are married off when they are 11 or 12 years old, sometimes as young as four. When they get older they want a divorce, sometimes because their husbands have gone to work outside the country for years. Divorced women are dependent on their families [...]. However, the expertise within the legal system relating to this area is very poor and following up on such cases is therefore difficult, even though the legislation is there. Women and girls have a hard time here.

Despite such cases and observations; the situation of women was not included in information or tasks received by the civilian personnel in the PRT from the Norwegian line ministries or the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul. One of the interviewees stated that he would like to see the inclusion of a gender perspective in the assessment and recommendation of development projects. But it was not a report topic that was requested for, neither by the Embassy nor by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, no specific requests had ever been made for reports on the situation of women in the PRT area.³⁵⁸ One of the persons interviewed stated the following: "No one would mind if I reported on women's issues but I have done so to a very limited degree. It is not the area on which I have focused and I have not felt that it has been a hot topic".³⁵⁹ The civilian sources reported that they had never received any information about the situation of women from the military part of the PRT, including the Mobile Operation Teams or others working in the field.

None of the sources at HQ level could recall situations in which they had adapted their tasks to include Afghan women. The reason for not including specific concerns of women was that the PRT lacked female personnel, rendering it impossible to set up places to meet the women. One of the interviewed believed that meetings with women or women's groups could help to increase the status of women in the community. However, he also said:³⁶⁰

But once again we would also be endangering them as we are seen as disbelievers. And there are some people in this society who do not wish us well, and they could take revenge by taking action against those who are perceived to be our allies. These factors are viewed as problems by those who plan operations.

Moreover, the PRT's mandate was not considered to include influencing the position of women in the Afghan society. In this connection, it must be mentioned that those interviewed in the PRT leadership were not aware of the Afghan Constitution or for instance the National Solidarity Plan and its requirement regarding female representation

³⁵⁵ Interview with Development Adviser

³⁵⁶ Interview with Development Adviser

³⁵⁷ Interview with Legal Adviser

³⁵⁸ Interview with Political Adviser

³⁵⁹ Interview with Political Adviser

³⁶⁰ Interview with Chief of Staff

in local Shuras. When the situation of women was discussed, it was often in the context of exasperation about how absent women were from Afghan society and that they seemed to have no rights. No one reported any discussions about the position and role of women in Afghan society that had resulted in a change in the PRT's work.

At the tactical level, there was generally little knowledge and awareness of the security situation of women and the need for adaptation at the tactical level. The general situation of women was described in terms of clothing (Burkha or not), freedom of movement, education and to a certain degree women's exposure to violence. Women's lack of freedom of movement and the control by husbands and families were mentioned often. The importance of education in changing the position of women and giving them greater influence was emphasized. It was also in this area that the security issue became most apparent. One dimension in particular was emphasized: the need to protect female teachers and girls who go to school. The Norwegian PRT has built walls around girls' schools to protect the girls from being seen and/or harassed by adult men. The soldiers were ambivalent about having to 'wall the girls in' but felt that it was acceptable if it would provide the girls safety.

On the tactical level, the overall view was that the general situation of women was not part of the PRT's mandate and that the security aspect relates to society as a whole. The view of society was one-dimensional in that no consideration was given to different groups within the population and there was no analysis by reference to gender or other societal categories. The reasoning of one interviewee included illustrative aspects: "Women are not a part of my work. Women are not interesting in this picture, neither as threats nor as a factor that affects threats". However, in response to a follow-up question concerning the collection of information, he said:³⁶¹

[The women] have knowledge about the threat picture, but we do not talk to them. We have no opportunities as we are only men. The women we have, after all, do manage to establish communications with women. After all, there is no sense in believing that the women do not have information.

The soldiers had to set up special meetings if they wanted to come into contact with Afghan women as they mostly came into contact with men during their patrols and operations. One female soldier had established contact with an Afghan woman who worked in the public administration. The female soldier tried to have regular conversations with the Afghan woman to discuss events, including armed clashes or bombings, in order to gain her perspective. She also said that she noted limitations in her contact with women when her male colleagues were present.

Very few of those interviewed had discussed the problem of women and security. One described the situation as follows: "Internal cooperation could probably be better. Let me put it this way; we do not have the same mandate as the Development Adviser or the Political Adviser. As regards the PRT, I have not spoken to anyone, and do not know of anyone, who is working with women".³⁶² Again, in practice, the teams had in some ways adapted their work to women's needs; The Military Observation Teams said that they had experienced situations in which women or children were subjected to violence. As a team, they had talked about spousal or child abuse they had witnessed or may witness in the future. The soldiers could not intervene physically, but by stopping and watching, indicate that they are aware of the situation. One such incident occurred when a woman without a burkha came out of a house to throw out washing water as the soldiers passed by. Her husband took her into the house and the soldiers saw that she was being beaten up. They did not intervene. The reason was that they were afraid the man would 'lose face' – and what would then happen to the woman once they had left?³⁶³

³⁶¹ Interview with J2 (intelligence)

³⁶² Interview with police officer in the PRT

³⁶³ Interview with Military Observation Team

The Psyops Team was the only one that had reflected thoroughly on including women's situation in their work. The reason for this was two-fold: Firstly, the team includes a female staff member, and it was therefore natural to use her as a means of contact. Secondly, the woman soldier, who is trained in Psyops, raised the potential technical benefits of such efforts: "We need opinions from the girls (...) we knew little about how 'the woman mechanisms' work. It is easier to focus on men to prevent smuggling, insurgency, but the women might also know about this and when and where it takes place".³⁶⁴ This implied that a lot of information and knowledge could be gathered by being in contact with the women.

Several of those interviewed referred to the part of the mandate which calls for support to the Afghan Government, but it is unclear how this was operationalized. The most common example was contributing to training and other support for the ANA. Women's issues were not included in any part of that training or in contacts with ANA. Interviewees emphasized that the Norwegian forces were only lending support to the cooperation with ANA and that it was ANA that played the leading role in safeguarding security. This meant, for example, that when they patrolled together the Norwegian soldiers and vehicles were in a minority.³⁶⁵ The Norwegian police trained and mentored their Afghan colleagues in the ANP. When the PRT's female police officer arrived at the PRT she was told that she was to be responsible for the 'women's project', i.e. training/follow-up of female members of the Faryab police. She had worked and conducted follow-up with nine women during the time that she had been stationed at the PRT. Her work had consisted of teaching basic skills like reading, writing and first aid, and covered matters such as laws and regulations, prisoner's rights, arrest, etc. The project would not continue if there was no woman in the next police contingent. The interviewed police reported that no gender perspective was included in the teaching that the police had provided.³⁶⁶

What is very interesting and worth underlining is that none of the sources stated of their own accord that the Afghan Government's policy on the situation of women was to be included in their work. On the contrary, it was stated that doing anything related to the rights and situation of women would be to advance an independent agenda, which was interpreted as going against the Afghan Government and Afghan policy and tradition.

8.6 Conclusions

Internal Representation: There were 28 women in the PRT, constituting 7 percent of the total staff. One of the out-reach teams, Psyops, had a female member and there were also women in other units, not least in the medical service. There were two female interpreters in the PRT. The opinions in the PRT on having female soldiers varied from very positive in the tactical team that had a female soldier, to a more mixed attitude among other military parts of the PRT.

External Representation: The military leadership of the PRT did not aim to work with women's organizations, nor did they do so. Neither did they work with local authorities, gender institutions or female representatives at the provincial level. The civilian part of the PRT had some contact with the female Head of the Ministry for Social Affairs and the female Head of the Ministry of Women's Affairs. The police project had contact with female police officers. On the tactical level, the soldiers in the Military Observation Teams, had very limited contact with the female population. They had contact with male village leaders but not with the female representatives in the village Community Development Committees. The exception was the Psyops Team that had regular contact with mixed focus groups and other female stakeholders. The tactical teams were not asked by the PRT leadership to establish contact with women in particular.

³⁶⁴ Interview with Psyops Team

³⁶⁵ Interview with Military Observation Team

³⁶⁶ Interview with police officer in the PRT

Internal Integration: Resolution 1325 was not mentioned nor known to the PRT staff. Gender issues were not considered in any part of the planning and preparation for the PRT by the leadership or the tactical level. Information about political changes since 2001, the new Constitution and international conventions, among them the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which had been signed by the Afghan Government, seemed not to have been a part of the education and training. The training gave a traditional and dated picture of the situation of women and girls and hampered PRT contact with the female part of the population. There was, however, awareness and knowledge at all levels about differences between the situation of men and women related to violence against women, living conditions and women's position.

External Integration: The operational lines were mainly seen as gender neutral. Issues of women and security were addressed in relation to securing education for girls and female teacher's ability to work. Gender issues were not included in the information and tasks that the PRT received from the ISAF HQ nor were they perceived as part of the mandates from their respective ministries in Norway. It had not been considered or seen necessary to change or adapt the operation and work to women's situation, but this seemed to be changing towards an interest and eagerness to include gender issues in the operation.

Leadership: Integrating a gender perspective in operations lies with the responsibility of the leadership, on both the military and civilian side. In the PRT the mandate were seen as being 'gender neutral'; in reality this meant men having contact with men. Gender issues were not considered in any part of the planning and preparation for the PRT by the leadership. There were no women in the leadership

Expert functions: There was no recruitment for a special gender expert function in the Norwegian PRT. However, both the military and civilian side saw this as one function that could potentially increase the PRT competence and capacity in regard to Resolution 1325.

8.7 Suggestions

The research team asked all the interviewees in the PRT to suggest what they would need in order to include gender issues and women in their work.

The civilian side highlighted the need for more women in the PRT and particularly in the leadership group, in which no women were represented for that particular contingent. One of the civilian sources believed that women would contribute a focus on soft values and that women would be more able than men to identify various negative effects of military operations.

The military side also highlighted the need for more women at all levels of the PRT. Several sources stated that it would be advantageous to include women in the Military Observation Teams as they would be able to establish contact with local women and were better at communicating with people and, therefore, would gain access to more valuable information. At the same time it was clear that this was a somewhat controversial topic. One of the staff sources said the following in this context: "Even if I'm now going to irritate the other officers – there should be women in the Military Observation Teams. But then we need woman interpreters and woman liaison officers too".³⁶⁷

Several of the sources were keen to see a joint set-up period, during which military and civilian actors came together and discussed all kinds of scenarios they might face. Also, the lack of continuity on the military side was seen as a weakness. Both the civilian and military elements of the PRT felt that efforts would be dependent on personnel with gender expertise to lead the work and give advice on the subject. The function should be placed either in the PRT or in the Regional Command North. The need for analytical work at the higher level – also at the Norwegian ministries – to operationalize the

³⁶⁷ Interview with J2

Resolution 1325 in the Afghan context was underlined. Such initiative seems to be in the hands of the Norwegian Government responsible for the PRT operation.

List of Interviewees

Daniel, Military Observation Team, Norwegian PRT
 Egil Thorsås, Political Adviser, Norwegian PRT
 Hans Diset, Development Adviser, Norwegian PRT
 Heidi Benham Grundstad, Police Chief Inspector, Norwegian PRT
 Lars Fossberg, J3,5,7, Norwegian PRT
 Morten Henriksen, Chief of Staff, Norwegian PRT
 Nils Kvilvang, J2, Norwegian PRT
 Ronny Fladseth, Psyops Team, Norwegian PRT
 Stephan Torp, Legal Adviser, Norwegian PRT
 Stig, Military Observation Team, Norwegian PRT
 V. Kodors, Deputy Commander, Norwegian PRT
 Åshild Heide, Psyops Team, Norwegian PRT.

Interviewees in Faryab Province

Abdul Satar Barez, Deputy Provincial Governor, Faryab
 Abdullah High Jashim, Department of Education, Meymaneh/Faryab
 Aziza Joya, Head of Department, Department for Labour and Social affairs
 Bismillah, Engineer, DACAAR
 Group interview with women in three villages around Meymaneh. The groups constituted approximately 20 women of all ages in each of the different villages. There were also 2-3 female representatives of the Community Development Council in each group
 Hashem Ashpory, Director, Department of Economy
 Ismail Mohamood, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. UNDP
 Kanishka Haya, Norwegian Church Aid Sabha Olker, Program Officer, Faryab
 Margareth Roy, Leader UNAMA of North
 Saki Mohammed, Head of the office, UNAMA, Meymaneh
 Sharifa Azizi, Head of department, Department of Women's Affairs
 Tahmas Wafi, Provincial knowledge officer, Norwegian Refugee Council
 The District Governor of Juma Bazar
 USAID representative, Badakshan
 Zabi Issa, Afghan Sub Governance Program
 8 male members, District Development Assembly, Juma Bazar

9 The Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif

By Louise Olsson and Johan Tejpar

9.1 National Context

Sweden took command of the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif in 2006, succeeding the United Kingdom. 2006 was also the year that Sweden, based on international recommendations for realizing Resolution 1325, adopted a National Action Plan to guide the work of its ministries and government institutions.³⁶⁸ The Swedish Armed Forces were identified as a central actor to achieve these goals for Sweden's international undertakings. The integration of a gender perspective in the forces' international work; efforts to ensure the full participation of women; the inclusion of women's security; and women's human rights are key aspects in these efforts. In February 2009, a revised Swedish National Action Plan (2009-2012) was adopted. Resolution 1820, which strengthens the 'protection component' in Resolution 1325, was integrated into the revised text.³⁶⁹ Two main points have been at the center of the process to integrate the Resolution in the work of the Swedish Armed Forces. Firstly, they have worked to strategically raise the awareness and competence on how to work with Resolution 1325; for example through the 'Gender Force's Gender Coaching Program'. Secondly, there has been a strategic approach to dissect the contents of Resolution 1325 with the purpose to define operational and tactical tasks. The aim with the Swedish process has been to use the content of Resolution 1325 to strengthen operational effectiveness. For specific Missions and Operations, such as leading a PRT in Afghanistan, the Senior Gender Adviser at the Swedish Armed Forces' Directorate of Operations supports the integration of 1325 into the Swedish Armed Forces operations. The approach at the national level has been systematic, continuously developing Standard Operating Procedures etc. In addition, a study has been conducted to identify relevant areas and improve the ability to enforce Resolution 1325 in the Afghanistan context.³⁷⁰

9.2 Situation in the PRT Area

The PRT Mazar-e Sharif area of responsibility covers four provinces: Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol and Samangan. The size of the total area is approximately equivalent to four times the size of Kosovo. The PRT Mazar-e Sharif is one of five PRTs under the German-led Regional Command North (RC-North). The PRT Mazar-e Sharif's main camp, Camp Northern Light, is situated in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh. Apart from Camp Northern Light, the PRT has three Provincial Offices; one in Sheberghan, one in Sar-e Pol and one in Aybak. The PRT Mazar-e Sharif borders to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Its population mainly consists of Tadjiks, Turkmens and Hazaras and in addition, a small group of Pashtuns. In general, the population is poor and has suffered from severe droughts and very cold winters. The main occupation is agriculture. The level of industrialization is very low but the city of Mazar-e Sharif is a regional business center.

All four provinces of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif are characterized as relatively secure. There was an increase in activity in the spring of 2009 but most incidents are still primarily

³⁶⁸ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Swedish Government's action plan to implement Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) on Women, peace and security*. Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

³⁶⁹ Launching of the New Swedish National Action Plan; Meeting at Ministry for Foreign Affairs; March 18, 2009.

³⁷⁰ See Isaksson, Charlotte and Saidi, Javid (2008). *Dags för Handling - Time for Action*. Suggestions for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan, Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces

related to improvised explosive devices or unexploded ordinances, commonly mines or ammunition from the Soviet and Mujahidin eras. The principal high risk area for military threats was along Route 5 (the Afghan national ring road) in a Pashtun-dominated area near Aqchah between Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh and Sheberghan, Jowzjan. These attacks could be aimed at ISAF but more commonly targeted the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). While attacks against the PRT and the ANSF were relatively few, the main cause of insecurity related to criminality and poverty. Trade routes used to traffic drugs and weapons went through the area of responsibility. Widespread poverty gave locals the incentive to engage in criminal activities or at least not to stop them.³⁷¹ Using women in such activities was reported as uncommon.³⁷²

Women's security when moving in society is in general relatively good although there are threats against women who participate in public functions. Girls can go to school and women are found in official positions, for example at the Provincial Councils.³⁷³ The greatest reason for women's insecurity relates to domestic violence and the lack of legal rights of women (resulting from a combination of tradition and a weak legal system).³⁷⁴ According to a local human rights organization, the most problematic areas are family members' violence against women, women's suicides, rape (also against children), and forced marriages.³⁷⁵ An UNAMA representative stated that women as a group are not being targeted in the warfare in the northern provinces unless they participate in society, but that women's political and cultural rights are being violated and that poverty is one of the greatest threats to women's security.³⁷⁶

9.3 PRT Mandate and Organization

The PRT personnel group of FS16 (rotation November 2008-April 2009) consisted of both Swedish and Finnish personnel of about 490 persons.³⁷⁷ Out of these, 90 percent were male. The leadership and the majority of personnel were military and contracted, as both Sweden and Finland rely on conscription.³⁷⁸ The military staff included a Gender Field Adviser and a Legal Adviser. Every Commander could adjust the composition of the military organization of the PRT. The basic structure has, however, remained similar over time: directly under the PRT Commander, there was a Command Group which included the civilian advisers, the Legal Adviser and Gender Field Adviser.³⁷⁹ There are no women in the highest military leadership.³⁸⁰ The PRT consisted of a Headquarters Company³⁸¹ and a Rifle Company. There are six Mobile Observation Teams that operate from PRT Mazar-e Sharif and another seven Mobile Observation Teams operate out of the three Provincial Offices. The entire military personnel rotate on six months during which they receive two two-week leaves. The number of civilian advisers is low with just one or two in each of the positions of Development Adviser, Police Adviser and Political Adviser.³⁸²

³⁷¹ See e.g. Tejpar, Johan (2009)

³⁷² Interview with G2

³⁷³ Interview with Provincial Office Sheberghan

³⁷⁴ Interview with PRT Commander; Gender Field Adviser; Human Rights Officer at UNAMA

³⁷⁵ The head of the organization was interviewed at the Provincial Office Sheberghan

³⁷⁶ Interview with Human Rights Officer at UNAMA

³⁷⁷ The researchers visited the PRT in February/March 2009.

³⁷⁸ Sweden is currently reforming its recruitment policies and moving toward removing conscription in peace time.

³⁷⁹ As an overview: G1 (Personnel); G2 (Intelligence and security); G3 (Short term planning); G4 (Logistics); G5 (Long term planning); G6 (Communication); and G9 (CIMIC)

³⁸⁰ The 'highest leadership' is here defined to consist of persons leading the G1-6, 9 or Commander or Chief of Staff.

³⁸¹ The HQ level consists of a Logistics Platoon, a Medic Platoon, an Electronic Warfare Platoon, an Improvised Explosive Devices Disarmament Team and a Tactical Psyops Team

³⁸² The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) will expand the number of Swedish Development Advisers from one to four during 2009 (Sara Gustafsson, 2009-03-11, meeting at SIDA's head office in Stockholm). In addition, a US Political Adviser from the US State Department is stationed at Camp Northern Light.

The general mandate of the PRT is threefold and entails providing security and stability, strengthening governance and supporting development and reconstruction.³⁸³ The focus of PRT Mazar-e Sharif is currently on providing security and stability, cooperating with ANSF and strengthening (the partnership with) governance structures in the four provinces.³⁸⁴ The Rifle Company was responsible for force protection and security related operations. Its personnel conducted both patrols and training together with the ANSF as well as carried out patrols by themselves. Tactical Psyops Team works to create awareness and support of the local population as well as build relations and collect information about local relations. The Mobile Observation Teams' task is to collect information, liaison with power holders on the local level and mentoring, interacting with both civilian and security actors.³⁸⁵ Regarding development and reconstruction, the focus of the small G9 (CIMIC) unit and the Mobile Observation Teams was on civil society needs assessments. There was also cooperation with the Development Advisers. In particular the Finnish Development Adviser had a (small) budget which it could use for different projects. The CIMIC unit then functioned as a project management resource.³⁸⁶

9.4 Representation and Resolution 1325

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Missions and Operations. Internal representation primarily concerns 'manning policies and equal opportunities' such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization. External representation relates to how Missions and Operations are conducted in terms of 'liaison, information and support' vis-à-vis the population and parties in the area of responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women's organizations?

9.4.1 Internal Representation

The Swedish Armed Forces received a direct task in the 2006-2008 National Action Plan on Resolution 1325. This concerned to double the number of women participating in international interventions compared to the number of women working in the national military organization as a total. The number in the total Swedish Armed Forces is about 4.7 percent. In the personnel group FS16, 90 percent are male and 10 percent are female. Female personnel were primarily found at Camp Northern Light and a few were placed in the Provincial Offices. Some of the staff units, for example G1 (personnel) and G2 (intelligence and security), had made some efforts to employ female staff but with varying degrees of success. Out of a staff of six, G1 had three women (among them, the first female cleric deployed at the PRT in Afghanistan by Sweden) while G2 had only three women out of a staff of 16 (working as head of Information Security, as an analyst at a Provincial Office and as Security Information Officer at Camp Northern Light). The military personnel who primarily had contact with the Afghan society – the Rifle Company, the Tactical Psyops Team and the Mobile Observation Teams – all consisted almost entirely of men. Among the civilian personnel, there were women who had more external roles, such as the Development Advisers and the Police Liaison Officers.³⁸⁷ The CIMIC unit, led by Finnish staff, was primarily male. The medical units had a high degree of female personnel, both as physicians and nurses.

³⁸³ Interview with PRT Commander FS16

³⁸⁴ Interview with PRT Commander FS16

³⁸⁵ The Mobile Observation Teams consists of two officers, four operational staff and interpreters. The teams operate in a specific area as building local contacts takes time. The teams are based either at Camp Northern Light or at one of the Provincial Offices and go on short or long ranges, lasting between 3-7 days.

³⁸⁶ Interview with Liaison Officer G9. According to Finnish Development Adviser (2009), the Development Advisers' primary mission was to forward information to Afghan development institutions, UNAMA, their national development cooperation agencies, etc. It is then the responsibility of these actors to instigate and implement different development projects.

³⁸⁷ Briefing, Camp Northern Light, March 25, 2009.

In terms of creating a productive work environment, there existed several forms of issues which needed to be addressed. Given the extremely poor living conditions of the local population, working to create a good work environment required handling emotions that personnel might experience from seeing such deep poverty. To G1 (personnel), it seemed as if men and women had different verbal forms of expressing this form of stress even though both groups were equally affected. Women were often more direct about their feelings while men tended to be less prepared to talk and thereby carried the stress within them to a higher degree.³⁸⁸ Unless the frustration about not being able to directly alleviate the suffering among the local population was addressed by the leadership, the moral in the group was affected negatively. A few projects had therefore been conducted, such as distributing clothes to the poorest during the winter months, when soldiers daily encountered children standing barefoot in the snow.³⁸⁹ In addition, several individuals from the PRT had launched projects. This included initiatives such as donating sewing machines to women's training, donating money to an orphanage, and collecting and distributing clothes brought from Sweden.³⁹⁰

Aware handling of issues that could result in normative shifts or negative developments in the personnel group is also at the basis for creating a good work environment in terms of decreasing the risk of harassment and personnel problems. The question of equal opportunities is thus naturally related to the question of creating a constructive and effective work environment. At the Swedish PRT, the Commander and G1 (Personnel) have made strong statements underlining the professional behavior of PRT personnel. Any member of the personnel found guilty of harassment would directly be sent home.³⁹¹ The base for this is the Swedish Armed Forces directives such as Code of Conduct. No cases of harassment between personnel had been reported so far during FS16.³⁹² The question of equal opportunities is, however, broader than just eradicating obverse harassment – it also has to remove informal impediments. This question is discussed in the Swedish Armed Forces but there is a substantive amount of work still to be done. For example, in 2008, the Swedish Armed Forces conducted a study, together with Gothenburg University, on the situation of Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan and Kosovo.³⁹³ The survey showed that women were more likely to leave due to problems in the work environment. This was the result in spite of the Swedish Armed Forces had engaged in projects to address the normative standpoints of the organization.³⁹⁴ The survey underlined the presence of work-related issues connected to the interpretation of gender roles, for example, women personnel had to work much harder to receive recognition for the same job. This problem was reported to be present at the PRT. If left unaddressed, the result can be losing competent personnel, both male and female.³⁹⁵ The head of G1 (personnel) thought it was time for the Swedish Armed Forces to seriously engage in creating a work place that takes

³⁸⁸ Interview with G1

³⁸⁹ Interview at Camp Northern Light and observations

³⁹⁰ Conducting individual projects were, however, not unproblematic as it can result in expectations from the population that the mission does not have a mandate to fulfill. It can also result in conflicts between local families that receive help and those that are left without.

³⁹¹ Interview with G1

³⁹² Interview with PRT Commander and G1. In April 2009 a case of sexual harassment of one of the male personnel involving a local employee was officially filed. See Swedish Armed Forces (2009-04-13), "Anmälan om sexuellt ofredande" [<http://www.mil.se/sv/Nyheter/Nyheter-fran-varlden/Afghanistan/Anmalan-om-sexuellt-ofredande/?page=11693>] (accessed April 26, 2009) It is interesting that the Afghan case brings up the issue of harassment in relation to both male and female personnel.

³⁹³ In order to be able to compare missions with different levels of threat

³⁹⁴ Reserve officers' was the group with the highest probability of ending their participation before the end of the rotation. For an overview of the study, see Svenska Dagbladet (2009-02-29), "Utlandstjänst ger soldater problem". Stockholm: Svenska Dagbladet or Swedish Armed Forces, "En uppföljning av rekryteringsutfallet vid internationella insatser – Öppet seminarium"

[http://www.mil.se/upload/dokumentfiler/Nyhetsdokument/Presentation_US_Rekrytutfall_090213.pdf] (accessed March 15, 2009). The Swedish National Defence College have done continuous follow-up of the degree of sexual harassment and the Swedish Armed Forces has done a mapping of differences in salaries relating to gender. Both display different aspects of the problems that have to be addressed.

³⁹⁵ Interviews at Camp Northern Light

equally good care of its male and female personnel. Furthermore, the Swedish Armed Forces should intensify its efforts to recruit more women. Mixed work places have shown to be more efficient and there is a need for more women at all levels of the Swedish military. To accomplish this, there is a need to look over both recruitment and training in detail. When, he asked, will we see the first female Commander of a Swedish Armed Forces unit sent out on an international mission?³⁹⁶

Concerning practical arrangements at the camp, male and female personnel shared all public areas, including shower rooms and toilets. There had been a few efforts to make some shower areas more private. Relationships between personnel who are professionally dependent on each other were forbidden. There were strict rules on alcohol consumption. The Swedish Armed Forces has a system of Ombudsman which could be used to detect and inform on negative behavior or personnel problems in the group. In the PRT Mazar-e Sharif, there was a network for female soldiers; the first meeting at Camp Northern Light was attended by the Commander and compulsory for all female personnel.³⁹⁷ In spite of the Swedish Armed Forces having had female soldiers since 1980 (29 years), several issues remained to be solved. There still exist problems with regard to cloth sizes fitting women as well as access to suitable body armor.³⁹⁸

9.4.2 External Representation

The external dimension of representation focuses on to what extent women are included in the PRT's local contacts and in cooperation partners in the host country. In the case of PRT Mazar-e Sharif, these activities could be categorized into four different types of activities: key leader engagement (strengthening official government structures); security-related operations such as joint patrols with the ANSF; specific projects such as CIMIC; and patrols and ad hoc meetings with the civilian population. While the results of key leader engagements and security-related operations affect women, they have mainly been conducted as 'man-to-man' engagements. The CIMIC projects have the potential to directly address women's situation. Interaction with local women during the Rifle Company's daily patrols is highly related to the presence of female personnel; male personnel had at rare occasions been addressed by women seeking assistance. In addition, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif had established a network which enabled reaching local women and women's organizations. This will be discussed further in section 9.5.1.

Key leader engagement meant having regular meetings with the Governors, the Provincial Councils, Government Departments and more traditional institutions such as Jirgas, Shuras and Village Elders. In the PRT's assessment, all these structures are mainly represented by men. On the higher level, meaning Governor and Provincial Government High Representatives, meetings were conducted by the PRT Command-level representatives. At this level, PRT representatives only met Afghan women in the Provincial Councils and when women held official positions, e.g. women working in the Ministry of Women's Affairs or being head teachers.³⁹⁹ Lower level governance structures were primarily covered by Mobile Observation Teams, Provincial Offices' personnel and occasionally by the Rifle Company. With very few exceptions, these structures were perceived as entirely male dominated. It was not known whether there had been any inquiry into if any local authorities were headed by women, for example female Shuras as was the case in other PRT areas. At PRT Mazar-e Sharif, the view among certain staff members was that the PRT could do little to ensure women's participation. The Gender Field Adviser did, however, work to raise awareness and there were a few examples of active support to Afghan women in public functions. For example, the Commander of the Provincial Office

³⁹⁶ Interview with G1

³⁹⁷ Interviews with PRT Commander; Gender Field Adviser; and G1

³⁹⁸ Interview with Gender Field Adviser; and G1. There are efforts made to purchase body armor that is adapted to the difference in form of male and female bodies.

³⁹⁹ Interview with PRT Commander FS16

in Sheberghan maintained contact with the female members at the Provincial Council.⁴⁰⁰ This support had resulted in giving the female members increased legitimacy among the majority of men. Another example of supporting women related to the protection of a woman who was the head of a local Human Rights organization. As a consequence of her engagements with protecting women who had been forced into marriage, this woman and her family had been subject to threats and suffered physical abuse. In addition, the Gender Field Adviser and G9 (CIMIC) had had contact with women's groups arranging education on Human Rights. The Provincial Office in Sheberghan also arranged a public celebration on the International Women's Day. The Gender Field Adviser was central in supporting this work.

Daily ad hoc meetings with the Afghan population mostly took place when the Psyops Team, Mobile Observation Teams and the Rifle Company conducted patrols. At FS16,



*The Commander of the Provincial Office in Sar-e Pol and his interpreter discuss with two women (widows) who are seeking assistance.*⁴⁰¹

these groups consisted entirely of men. As civilian Afghan women (meaning those not part of official structures) normally are not able to approach male soldiers, such meetings were clearly affected by the lack of female soldiers and interpreters. Female soldiers, on the other hand, could speak and cooperate with both Afghan men and women. Male soldiers noticed a significant difference in the possibility and number of contacts with Afghan women when female PRT personnel joined patrols. For example, the Psyops Team had been approached by Afghan women only once or twice. However, when accompanied by the Gender Field Adviser during a visit to Aqchah, the Gender Field Adviser met with and spoke to more than 15 women. The need for a female interpreter was, however, apparent. There were exceptions to Afghan women not being able to address male soldiers. Most often, this concerned women who were in a difficult position, such as widows. For example during our field visit to the Provincial Office (though stayed outside) to talk to the Commander with the help of a male interpreter. These women, both widows, were

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Provincial Office Sheberghan

⁴⁰¹ Photo by Louise Olsson

desperately seeking to provide for their families. They had previously been turned away by the local authorities several times and were not able to find any form of job to support their children.

9.5 Integration and Resolution 1325

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective. Internal integration means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of ‘organizing and conducting Missions and Operations’, e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. External integration refers to the ‘interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed’ in the area of responsibility. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments executed in the area of responsibility, in terms of daily military operations? Relevant practices and lessons can be observed at both PRT HQ and PRT tactical levels.

9.5.1 Internal Integration

Internal integration depends on the personnel’s competence concerning the contents of Resolution 1325. The majority of the Swedish personnel recruited for FS16 had previously worked in the EU force ‘Nordic Battlegroup’.⁴⁰² In the Nordic Battlegroup, conscious training efforts were made to raise the personnel’s competence on integrating the contents of Resolution 1325 in order to improve operational effectiveness.⁴⁰³ The knowledge of Resolution 1325 was thus relatively high in FS16.

The FS16’s pre-deployment training contained cultural components that included issues relating to how to address and interact with men and women in Afghanistan. There were no women involved in this training.⁴⁰⁴ In addition to this training, the Gender Field Adviser educated the personnel on gender and Resolution 1325.⁴⁰⁵ This training consisted of several components, such as:

- Background and reason for Resolutions 1325 and 1820.
- Examples of assumed gender neutral situations and how these actually resulted in separate effects for women and men. These examples served to create awareness of the complexity of the issue and how analysis and evaluation of assignments can discover how men and women are affected differently by the same operational decision. In this component, arguments that are usually used against Resolution 1325 or gender are brought up and addressed.
- Explanations of concepts to allow everyone to understand the issue.
- Group work based on questions relating to women as victims, women as actors and women as targets in armed conflict.

The PRT leadership participated in some parts of the training while allowing the participants to discuss without the leadership during other sections. The training was built up around concrete examples and real cases. In addition, it addressed emotional as well as rational aspects of discussing and consciously dealing with issues relating to Resolutions 1325. Dialogue and interaction was a central part of the training aiming to obtain a deeper understanding.

In future trainings on Resolution 1325, the interviewed Mobile Observation Team and the head of the Rifle Company felt it would be productive if the contents of Resolution 1325

⁴⁰² On standby January 1 – June 30 2008

⁴⁰³ See Olsson (2008)

⁴⁰⁴ Interviews with personnel at PRT

⁴⁰⁵ The present Gender Field Adviser had also been involved in parts of the training for the Nordic Battlegroup.

were specified into more concrete components. This specification should relate to expected assignments to executing the mandate, as is most other pre-deployment training modules. Thereby, it could assist in precluding negative perceptions of working with Resolution 1325.⁴⁰⁶ Properly used, knowledge about Resolution 1325 gives the personnel a tool that can sharpen their analysis of developments in the area of responsibility.⁴⁰⁷ The Gender Field Adviser collected such practical lessons learned from the FS16 rotation to be used in continued training of personnel.⁴⁰⁸

To begin working with Resolution 1325 in a mission implies collecting sufficient material to make a gender aware analysis of the situation. Thereafter, the planning of the operation should ensure that both men's and women's situations and needs are considered.⁴⁰⁹ From ISAF HQ and the Regional Command North, there were no instructions on how to handle the difference in situation for Afghan men and women.⁴¹⁰ In the PRT, the awareness of Resolution 1325 affected the view on the necessity to collect gender-disaggregated data varied among the staff. For example, the collection of information handled by G2 was said to be on the level of detail where including the differences between men and women was not needed. If such data was to be collected, it was perceived that a practical obstacle would be not having enough female personnel.⁴¹¹ It was felt that all aspects of using Resolution 1325 should be connected to the mandate objectives and ensuring both long term and short term security consideration.⁴¹² Such an evaluation had not been conducted. At the PRT in general, there were still many implicit assumptions made relating personnel's own interpretations of Resolution 1325 and women – the most dominant theme was that this 'area' appeared dangerous from a force protection perspective or that the Resolution was about creating 'Swedish equality' in Afghanistan. Concerning analysis, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif had thus not managed to realize the systematic approach to integrating Resolution 1325 as had been decided.

With regard to planning, G3 (short-term planning) had a more direct and needs-based approach to integrate Resolution 1325. This unit expressed a wish to have the Gender Field Adviser involved in operation planning in order to ensure awareness and proper handling of gender aspects. The perspective was that Resolution 1325 competence could potentially decrease the risk of unintended effects of operations that, in turn, could result in higher risks for the PRT.⁴¹³ According to the Standard Operating Procedures, this was supposed to be enforced by the Gender Focal Point of the Unit and it should be examined why this did not take place with the purpose to strengthen the integration. For G5 (long-term planning) the use of Resolution 1325 was primarily a question of starting to identify what the PRT sought to achieve, based on the OPLAN and PRT mandate. The Gender Field Adviser gave input in this planning process. The understanding of the value of Resolution 1325 was also less developed in G5 compared to G3. Apart from G3 having received more training on Resolution 1325, G5's confusion could be connected to the lack of concrete interpretation of the Resolution 1325 for its daily tasks – G5 received no guidance from the OPLAN or the PRT mandate. Given the interrelationship between G2, G3 and G5, should the Resolution be fully integrated in the planning of operations, the demand on G2 to provide gender-disaggregated information would naturally increase. To reach this level of integration, the Commander needed to include the content of Resolution

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with Rifle Company and Mobile Observation Team G, Sheberghan

⁴⁰⁷ Interview with Rifle Company

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with Gender Field Adviser

⁴⁰⁹ This sections is also in close contact with the national units for collecting and analyzing information. It is therefore central that this unit has a good understanding of Resolution 1325. Lars Gerhardsson, Swedish Defence Forces, Folke Bernadotte Academy and Department of Peace Keeping Operations' Gender Adviser Seminar: Increasing dialogue and collaboration', New York, April 23 2009.

⁴¹⁰ Interview with G2

⁴¹¹ The rifle company does, however, include some such aspects in their reports which are handed in to the G2 and Tactical Operations Centre. There, 1325 is deemed as potentially providing the group with a more nuanced and detailed tool to analyze its environment. Interview with Rifle Company

⁴¹² Interview with G2

⁴¹³ Interview with G3

1325 in daily orders and intents of the PRT operations. Support from a Gender Field Adviser is here crucial.

It was obvious that the PRT leadership (from the PRT Commander down to the heads of the staff units) is a key in the process to integrate Resolution 1325. At the PRT Mazar-e Sharif, the Commander and the Chief of Staff were both supportive of the integration of Resolution 1325 as well as creating an expert function in the form of a Gender Field Adviser in the staff group. In addition to the Gender Field Adviser, the Commander ordered the creation of a network of Gender Focal Points throughout the PRT organization.⁴¹⁴

The first Gender Field Adviser in the PRT Mazar-e Sharif was deployed during FS15 (May-November 2008) and the function has remained during FS16 (November 2008-April 2009). Both these rotations have had female Gender Field Advisers. In the succeeding FS17, the Gender Field Adviser function will be held by a man. The work process to integrate this new function illuminates many of the organizational opportunities and challenges of using an expert function to strengthen the integration of Resolution 1325 in military Missions and Operations. Integrating the Gender Field Adviser function has not always been a smooth process. At times, staff members in FS16 have questioned the role and function of the Gender Field Adviser. This has had to be handled firmly by the Commander.⁴¹⁵ During FS15, there was not any resistance from staff, more a question of educating them in what the Gender Field Adviser should do, but there was resistance from other involved PRT actors.⁴¹⁶

When the Gender Field Adviser function was first introduced in the Swedish PRT a few months into the FS15 (May-November 2008) rotation, there were many question marks among the staff for what this would entail. Partly, these question marks concerned the role of the new function. What was the aim and purpose? In addition, the Political adviser was very hesitant to the PRT being able to work on Resolution 1325 and gender in the Afghan society. In a worst case-scenario, he expected that the PRT would offend the Afghan leadership and population. Another question mark concerned the possibility of integrating a new function into the organization during an ongoing mission. To integrate the Gender Field Adviser function required an active leadership. When the first Gender Field Adviser arrived in July 2008 to FS15, the Commander and the adviser sat down and discussed what they wanted to achieve and what they wanted to hand over to the next rotation. The work also required reviewing previous contributions in the area of Resolution 1325 and to estimate possibilities and potential obstacles to continuing the integration of Resolution 1325. It was decided that the focus would be placed on organizing a network of women and women's organizations in the PRT area. Although it worked out very well in FS15, the Commander for FS15 considered it an advantage for the next rotation (FS16) that the Gender Field Adviser could train together with the rest of the personnel and be integrated into the staff group from the outset.

The project to organize a network of women and women's organizations in the PRT area was started by the Commander informing the Afghan governors in the PRT area of these plans. It was described in terms of Sweden's stand point on Resolution 1325 and was thus placed in relation to Sweden's work in the PRT. The decision was met with positive response by the Afghan authorities. Organizing the network demanded a lot of work but passed relatively smoothly in political terms. The Commander took an active part in setting up meetings in the PRT with local women's organizations and the Ministry of Women's Affairs. This was extended to more social events. For example, at the Iftar dinner,⁴¹⁷ representatives of women's organizations were invited along with the male leadership of the local authorities. Also this was well received by the Afghan society.

⁴¹⁴ Interview with PRT Commander FS16

⁴¹⁵ Interview with PRT Commander FS16

⁴¹⁶ Interview with Commander FS15

⁴¹⁷ Iftar is the name for meals during the month of Ramadan

Another project to make possible the work of the Gender Field Adviser was employment of a local female interpreter. The process was the following: the PRT first made inquiries at the university in Mazar-e Sharif. When they had identified the best of the applicants, the PRT, including the Commander, met with the female interpreter's family on several occasions. The Commander had to promise to take good care of the 'daughter' before she was allowed to work at the PRT. The female interpreter then worked together with the Gender Field Adviser.⁴¹⁸ The hiring of female staff has since continued. For example, there were two local female guards working at the Camp Northern Light during FS16.

The work of the Swedish Gender Field Adviser is based in a Standard Operating Procedure. The function uses the mandate of ISAF, international conventions as well as Afghan Government documents to identify how to incorporate gender aspects into the daily work of the PRT. Apart from Resolutions 1325 and 1820, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)⁴¹⁹ was signed by the Government of Afghanistan in March 2003⁴²⁰ and constitutes a central document together with the Afghan Constitution. The latter establishes that discrimination between men and women is illegal.⁴²¹ Organizationally, in both FS15 and FS16, the gender expert function was placed as an adviser to the Commander and was part of the Command Group. As such, the function was not part of the Military Staff Group. However, the Gender Field Adviser did provide input into the analysis and planning as part of the meetings in which the Commander was informed and operations discussed. In addition, the expert function deliberated on issues related to Resolution 1325 directly with the Commander.⁴²²

In both FS15 and FS16, the Gender Field Adviser worked both internally and externally. For the Commander of FS16, it was considered central that the adviser could be mobile within the area of responsibility as it made possible interaction with, and raising the awareness of, the personnel working in the field. Continuous contact with women's organizations also allowed effective channeling of information from the women of the PRT area to the Commander.⁴²³ As the expert function was still developing, the Gender Field Adviser of FS16 has also communicated with the Chief of Staff on how to develop the different internal dimensions of the function in relation to the staff group.⁴²⁴ It is important to note that the responsibility to handle harassment, create and uphold rules for behavior among PRT personnel and the behavior of personnel toward the local population does not rest with the Gender Field Adviser (neither in training or in practice); this is the responsibility of the PRT Commander with the support of G1 (personnel). The expert function should be allowed to support and strengthen the organization without being considered as a 'police' function that monitors his/her colleagues. Such assumptions and feelings among the personnel could decrease the effectiveness of the expert function.

From the ongoing work of the Swedish military organization on Resolution 1325, the study can identify a number of professional areas where there is a need for an expert function: 1) advising the Commander, 2) expert input to the staff group, 3) external information and liaison work with the host community, 4) supporting external activities to ensure the sensitivity of the mission relating to women's situation and 5) interaction and training with staff in the field to increase awareness. If not properly thought through in terms of personnel resources and organization, it can place an enormous workload on one person. Naturally, the demand for increased input by the Gender Field Adviser develops

⁴¹⁸ Interview with Commander FS15

⁴¹⁹ UN (1979), *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)*, UN document A/RES/34/180 December 18, 1979

⁴²⁰ Signed without reservations. See also UN Press Release (2004-01-08), "CEDAW Chairperson applauds new Afghan constitution", *UN Press Release*, AFG/242, WOM/1420, January 8, 2004 [<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afg242.doc.htm>] (accessed March 19, 2009).

⁴²¹ Interview with Gender Field Adviser

⁴²² Interview with Commander FS15

⁴²³ Interview with PRT Commander FS16. See further discussions under Gender Field Adviser on Gender Focal Points.

⁴²⁴ Interview with Gender Field Adviser

with growing awareness. The Gender Field Adviser's role of working both internally and with external tasks in field could make it difficult to access the expert. While the Commander of FS15 was hesitant to increasing the number of staff in expert functions and suggested an increased emphasis on training to increase the competence of all staff,⁴²⁵ it could still become necessary to enlarge the function until such level of knowledge is obtained. Most probably, there will be a continued need for some assignments to be supported by an expert even after Resolution 1325 has been fully integrated in the organization.

During FS16, a Network of Gender Focal Points was created. The network was created on the order of the PRT Commander and it was organized by the Gender Field Adviser.⁴²⁶ The basis for this order was a Standard Operating Procedure from the Swedish Armed Forces HQ. The Gender Focal Points were trained in-mission by the Gender Field Adviser who continuously also coach the Gender Focal Points. Part of the training consisted of interactive observation in the Afghan society and allowed the participants to work with interpreters out in the surrounding society.⁴²⁷ It was apparent in the meetings we had with Gender Focal Points that this training had resulted in an increased awareness. The Gender Focal Point function was used to strengthen the monitoring and reporting from the field on gender issues relevant for operational work.⁴²⁸ The Focal Point also functioned as an enforcer of Resolution 1325 in terms of contributing to the increased understanding and knowledge within the personnel group in which it worked.⁴²⁹ The integration of the function required considerations both in terms of the organization of labor within a group and in relation to the main organization on the collection of information, the Tactical Operations Centre and G2 (intelligence and security). An interesting observation was the positive dynamic achieved by the combination of a responsible and positive leadership strengthened through a Gender Focal Point.⁴³⁰

In sum, there was an understanding among a growing number of the PRT personnel that women's security and situation differed from those of men. Even though this could be successfully considered by the PRT's operations, resistance to work with Resolution 1325 remained among certain PRT personnel while integration progressed in other areas.⁴³¹

9.5.2 External Integration at the PRT HQ Level

Prioritization and selection of main assignments relate to how PRTs, and the higher levels at ISAF HQ and RCNorth, perceive and focus their work. The assignments at the PRT Mazar-e Sharif were focused towards strengthening Government and stability. Hence, unless properly considering men's and women's different security situations, this alignment risks resulting in a low level of interaction with Afghan women. The awareness of this was growing at the PRT level, much supported by the work of the Gender Field Adviser, and enforced by the leadership at different levels. There were areas where the PRT could expect a high degree of threat against Afghan women. For example, in the planning for the upcoming 2009 elections, women's voting offices were expected to be specifically targeted. Moreover, women moving to and from the voting offices also risked being specifically targeted. This can be one reason for why fewer women than men had

⁴²⁵ Interview with Commander of FS15

⁴²⁶ Interview with Gender Field Adviser and PRT Commander FS16

⁴²⁷ Interview with Gender Field Adviser

⁴²⁸ "Rational and background", informal work document, PRT

⁴²⁹ Interviews with G2; Gender Field Adviser; Gender Focal Point and Mobile Observation Team G, Sheberghan

⁴³⁰ For example, an interview with the Mobile Observation Team G and his Gender Focal Point (both male) brought out many practical suggestions on how to organize and work with Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan. Such well-functioning units should with benefit be used in training of new Mobile Observation Teams. Similar dynamics could be seen in interviews with head of the Provincial Office and his Gender Focal Point. Lessons on the role of leadership on middle and lower levels of the organizations should be systematically collected as this might provide the key to how to ensure the integration of Resolution 1325 from the highest HQ level down to the daily operations in the field.

⁴³¹ We will discuss this more in detail when we prioritization and execution of the mandate.

registered to vote.⁴³² It was underlined that in order to integrate these considerations in the PRT personnel group as a whole, there needed to be specific and written orders giving such issues priority. An obstacle here was that it was difficult to transfer information relating to Resolution 1325 within the ISAF structures to the ISAF HQ or RC North. For example, when the Swedish PRT tried to forward such information, they were just transferred around within the ISAF organization without being able to identify a person in charge of handling such information. This negatively affects interoperability and decreases effectiveness.

The issue of considering the content of Resolution 1325 is relevant for most units but the level of integration varies. For example, G9 (CIMIC) is a unit whose operations have direct effects for the host population. In FS16, this unit implemented a few projects but was unclear as to how its work differentiated between men and women's situations. G9 had, for example, distributed medical packages to clinics, arranged a carpenter course, repaired wells and supported the ANSF with protection barriers. G9 had also conducted a few humanitarian projects such as distributing blankets and clothes. Some of these projects were specifically directed toward men. This was not a problem as long as there were projects directed at women as well and the effects on women and men were considered for each project.

As regards the execution of selected and prioritized assignments relating to security issues, this was ordered by the Commander, organized by the Chief of Staff and planned and executed by the military staff group. The main part of the work was thus conducted and formed by the staff group where the Gender Field Adviser was not automatically present and integration was supposed to be handled by the Gender Focal Points. The reason why G3 (operation planning), wished to see an integration of the adviser function into the military staff group was to provide a more direct input into their work. An example was given of planning and conducting the arrest of suspected insurgents residing in a village. Under such circumstances, there were several issues to consider. The entering of a home will affect the women living in this household. When the man was arrested, the security for the women of the household decreases drastically. If the man has enemies, there is a risk the women and children will be killed. The threat to the family might be even higher if the man has been involved in local criminality, for example, illegal road blocks with 'taxes' on other villagers.⁴³³ In Afghanistan, there have been several examples of this kind.⁴³⁴ The Gender Field Adviser was an identified function that could give support on how to handle such effects and dimensions.⁴³⁵

The type of considerations described above always needs to be born in mind in daily operations by all personnel. For example, during a search of a house, there are several other gender aspects to consider such as how to address women and their personal belongings. The Gender Field Adviser could serve to ensure that these dimensions were thoroughly considered in planning and execution until such knowledge was well integrated into the organization. This has been addressed during FS16, by the Gender Field Adviser and the leadership of the Rifle Company in relation to the development of Tactical procedures of searches of persons and houses. The Gender Field Adviser consulted with women's organizations to obtain knowledge about women's movements and where in the house they are most likely to be staying. This information could then be used to ensure that the developing procedures considered women's security in order to avoid force protection problems and doing additional harm to the women of the family. For example, there are areas in the house where women do not wear the burkha, something which needs to be considered. Moreover, it is good to search the kitchen or toilets first and then hold the women and children in these rooms (where they can remain for a longer period of time) while the rest of the house is being searched. As male soldiers are never allowed to

⁴³² Interview with representatives from the staff group

⁴³³ Interview with UNAMA

⁴³⁴ Interviews with G3 and UNAMA

⁴³⁵ Interview with G3

body search women, the protocol considers how soldiers can still ensure that the women are not hiding items – such as weapons – under their clothing. For example, the women could be asked to flatten their clothing with their hands to reveal any larger items. The procedures also establish that male soldiers are to search men and female soldiers are to search women. It is not advisable for female soldiers to search men as that can be misunderstood to mean that the female soldier has ‘offered’ herself to the man resulting in an increased risk of harassment.⁴³⁶ For male and female soldiers alike, it is a question of appearance and creating trust. For example, mothers are often focused on the security of their children. Should children find improvised explosive devices, it is important that these are properly disarmed. In a reasonably stable environment where it is possible to ‘win the hearts and mind’, it is possible to create a situation where mothers would report the improvised explosive devices their children have found as they care for her children’s safety.⁴³⁷ Any contacts with Afghan women must also consider their safety.⁴³⁸

Similar proceedings relates to when an intervention needs to make an assessment based on a gender-aware analysis to adapt to a new situation. The PRT, both Camp Northern Light and the Provincial Offices, was to support government structures throughout the area of responsibility. The military operation was, thus, placed in a situation where it supported the political development and the growth of a judicial system until the civilian functions were strong enough to take over.⁴³⁹ This meant that the PRT personnel needed to follow local political developments. With regard to Resolution 1325, an interesting case was when reports of rape came to the attention of the Provincial Offices in Sheberghan and Sar-e Pol. Their approach and interpretation were different. In both Provincial Offices, the local view presented to the office by local authorities was that these were only cases of slander in family disputes. The Office in Sar-e Pol (which encountered a number of such accusations and reports), made a strong argument to the local authorities that regardless of if it would turn out to be slander, it was a serious charge that needed to be properly examined by the judicial authorities. The Office in Sheberghan (which encountered one report), took a more cautious approach.⁴⁴⁰ There did not appear to have been any discussions between the Provincial Offices about how to handle cases of violence being reported to them. This issue related directly to the contents of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 as well as CEDAW and the Afghan Constitution. The above case should also not be seen as a case of less awareness in Sheberghan as the Provincial Office, for example, directly assisted a Human Rights advocate, through daily visits to demonstrate that she was under international protection.⁴⁴¹ Instead, it is a clear example of the complexity of the integration of Resolution 1325 and the need for clearly developed procedures for how to handle such issues.

9.5.3 External Integration at the PRT Tactical Level

Apart from the HQ level, there are several direct implications of carrying out the practical work in the field that relate to Resolution 1325 and 1820. The study observed this at the PRT, primarily with regard to the Psyops Team, the Rifle Company and the Mobile Observation Teams.

The Psyops Team worked to weaken the will of the insurgents, improve cooperation with allied target groups, influence the population that has not yet taken sides in order to make them cooperate, and to counteract insurgency propaganda. To that purpose, it carried out its own operations, supported regular and special units as well as the collection of intelligence. The team consisted of four persons, all men, and was based at Camp Northern

⁴³⁶ Interview with Gender Field Adviser

⁴³⁷ Interview with personnel at PRT

⁴³⁸ Interview with Gender Field Adviser

⁴³⁹ The international police are now being strengthened and will take over the latter part of the issue.

⁴⁴⁰ Interviews at Sheberghan and Sar-e Pol. The more cautious approach can be the result of only one case being reported while it was a repeated phenomenon in Sar-e Pol.

⁴⁴¹ Interviews PRT personnel and civilian society representatives

Light. It was the first Swedish Psyops Team to be sent out on an international mission. The subsequent Pysops Team (in rotation FS17) will consist of two men and two women as a conscious attempt to improve outreach. The reason was that the Psyops Team in FS16 only had been able to address or contacted by Afghan women at very few occasions and in their analysis of target groups, women constituted an important part. An assessment of the effect and outreach will be made after the next mission with regard to reaching the objectives. Examples of tasks conducted by the group involved distribution of information, for examples through papers, fliers and loudspeakers. Interpersonal communication was done through continuous foot patrols visiting markets, streets, schools, hospitals, etc. The team had an awareness of differences in security situation between men and women but no details of women's situation in the area. Unlike many other units in Afghanistan, this group did not consider it a force protection issue to talk to women but they could not approach women directly. The team's principle was not to approach women unless they were approached by the women on the women's own initiative.⁴⁴² Awareness was growing and it will be interesting to see how Resolution 1325 is handled in the continuous work to develop Psyops. New units have the potential to be inventive and make use of new ideas which could speak in favor of a constructive use of Resolution 1325.

Regarding the interaction with local women, the leadership of the Rifle Company had given its male soldiers similar forms of instructions when on patrol as those under which the Psyops Team operated. The soldiers were not to address women or approach them but, when approached by Afghan women, soldiers were to politely respond. This was to be done with respect, keeping a distance and ensuring that it was in a public place with witnesses, recognizing the risk that the women were taking when approaching male soldiers. There were also practical arrangements made. In the setting of arranged meetings to collect information it was considered important to think about the inner and outer spheres of the meeting. The inner sphere concerned the actual meeting, for example between the head of the unit and a local power holder. The outer collection of information concerned exchanges of the soldiers on guard outside the meeting room. There would often be a gathering of local people outside of the meeting room as the population was curious about the outcome of the meeting. These people had interesting information and provided the guarding soldiers with opportunities to talk and exchange information. The Rifle Company therefore often operated with two interpreters, one in the meeting and one outside in order not to miss these opportunities of interaction.⁴⁴³ Other examples of such opportunities were for example when a female Gender Focal Point at the Provincial Office in Sheberghan guarded meetings and women sought contact with her. The women were often curious as to her role as a soldier but as she did not have a female interpreter present, communication was difficult.⁴⁴⁴

Thus, tactically increasing the communication with Afghan women on their own initiative by using already existing opportunities seem possible. Group/squad leaders were identified by the head of the FS16 Rifle Company as a key target group for successfully increasing awareness of Resolution 1325 in the organization, and also to continue identifying relevant aspects of effectiveness as a result of working with the contents of Resolution 1325. If this group had an awareness, relevant Resolution 1325 aspects were likely to be integrated in the reports handed to the Tactical Operations Centre and G2 (intelligence and security). In addition, awareness would provide group leaders with a complementing tool to analyze the situation and make even more accurate judgments of risks and opportunities in their working environment. This could make their work more effective as it would decrease "blind spots" in their analysis and make the assessment more complete. In order for this to

⁴⁴² Discussions with Tactical Psyops Team and Gender Field Adviser on accompanying them to the market in Aqchah on February 26, 2009; brief by David Bergman, Tactical Psyops Team.

⁴⁴³ Interview with Rifle Company

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with Gender Focal Point, Provincial Office Sheberghan

be possible, the contents of Resolution 1325 must be made more concrete and turned into practical objectives of the group leaders' every day work.⁴⁴⁵

Mobile Observation Teams with both male and female personnel were considered as an advantage by G2 (intelligence and security) and by the interviewed Mobile Observation Team. The reason was that information flows in different manners in both male and female networks and a mixed team could better tap into both these channels. A practical need for mixed Mobile Observation Teams appeared during the last parts of the FS16 rotation. In a village, the Mobile Observation Team heard about women who were selling their merchandise at an open market being robbed. The Mobile Observation Team, being all male, could not talk to the women. Thus, a female police liaison officer and the Gender Field Adviser went out with the Mobile Observation Team to this village. The female staff communicated with the women and a suggestion was drawn up to have a house where the women could have their shops. The Mobile Observation Team brought this suggestion to the village leader who was positive to the women having a place to sell their products and the women's shop was arranged. The conclusion from this is that it is necessary to have well-educated personnel (male and female); to have female staff and personnel in order to increase contacts with local women and handle daily operation in a smooth and effective manner; and the need of having female interpreters. Female military interpreters from Sweden is, however, not easy to recruit.⁴⁴⁶ An exception is the female interpreter of the FS16 Commander. He also lent his interpreter assist the Gender Field Adviser for some of her assignments.

9.6 Conclusions

In line with the Swedish National Action Plan on Resolution 1325, the Swedish Armed Forces has commenced to integrate Resolution 1325 in national regiments as well as in the PRT Mazar-e Sharif. Sweden took command of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif in 2006. The PRT consists of approximately 70 percent Swedish and 30 percent Finnish personnel. Regarding Resolution 1325, the strongest focus has been on training, installing expert functions and institutionalizing a systematic approach.

Internal Representation: At the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, approximately ten percent of the Swedish PRT personnel were female. Increasing numbers of female personnel is part of the Swedish National Action Plan of 1325 but it is also one of the areas still in need of further efforts. The representation was higher within the PRT HQ Staff than at the tactical level. In fact, there were no women in the Mobile Observation Teams or the Rifle Company – the units having the most contact with the local population. Some of the Staff units had actively aimed at having an equal balance of men and women with varying success. However, it was widely recognized that more women were needed in the PRT, not least in order to reach out more efficiently to Afghan women. The discussions in the Swedish Armed Forces on equal opportunities were also prevalent at the PRT, mainly relating to the creation of a work environment where both male and female personnel can contribute to the organization. For example, the leadership had taken a strong and public stand against harassment. Equal opportunities were also relevant to the question back to the access to material and resources. For example, body armor was not adapted to fit both male and female personnel.

External Representation: During rotation FS15 (May-November 2008), a network of women's organizations was been set up by the Commander and the Gender Field Adviser. The Gender Field Adviser for FS16 (November-April) has, with the support of the Commander, kept close contact with these organizations, allowing for a more complete information collection. For the PRT as a whole, the lack of female soldiers and interpreters was prevailing in the liaison with women's organizations. Concerning the PRT's small

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with Rifle Company

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with G2

CIMIC unit, the aim was rather to gather information than to implement projects and the lack of women was also here an obstacle to the collection of relevant information on women's needs. The PRT did provide security, specifically, for a female lawyer working on women's rights.

Internal Integration: In the pre-deployment training, all PRT personnel had taken part in mandatory sessions on Resolution 1325. A Gender Field Adviser has been installed in the Command Group with the role of supporting the Commander and implementing or supporting projects related to women's security. In order to increase awareness of Resolution 1325 across the PRT organization and to carry out the work on related issues, a network of Gender Focal Points has been set up. The persons selected to this network receive special training by the Gender Field Adviser. The Gender Field Adviser provides input on planning and the development of tactical procedures. Reporting and evaluation does not contain considerations to 1325.

External Integration: The need for awareness about Resolution 1325 when selecting and carrying out missions was recognized among some members of the staff. Still, the personnel were struggling with how to realize Resolution 1325 in their daily activities as the understanding of differences in men's and women's situations was new, albeit growing. This was relevant to the selection and prioritizing of daily tasks. For example, assessing differences in security for men and women is now part of the preparations for the upcoming elections as women conducting work or participating in society have been particularly threatened. This has involved both the HQ level and tactical operations.

9.7 Suggestions

Develop manning policies and force generation procedures that ensure representation of both male and female personnel in all functions and at all levels. In evaluation procedures, include the ability of force generation and manning policies to obtain a gender balanced work force.

Identify whether there are any personnel functions that require a specific gender representation. For example in Afghanistan, female interpreters are often a prerequisite for effective interaction between the operational staff and local women.

Guarantee a supply of equipment, such as uniforms and body armor, in sizes and shapes that fit both men and women.

Make sure that existing information channels are used to also reach women. In addition, include specific information in newspapers and radio (depending on the level of female literacy rates) that target women.

Collect sex-disaggregated data. This includes material that identify men's and women's patterns of mobility, divisions of labor, political standing, access to resources, participation in the conflict and risks of being targeted by violence. This information will allow a gender-aware analysis. To obtain this information, it is crucial to have contact with different local actors including women's organizations and women from the political elite.

List of Interviewees

Bengt Alexandersson, PRT Commander FS15 (May-November 2008)

Björn Andersson, Rifle Company

David Bergman, Tactical Psyops Team

Andreas Davidsson, Mobile Observation Team G, Sheberghan

Michael Engdahl, Provincial Office Sheberghan

Anna Gerborn, Gender Focal Point, Provincial Office Sheberghan

Head of NGO working for Human Rights, Sheberghan

Håkan Hedlund, PRT Commander FS16 (November 2008-April 2009)

Linda Johansson, Gender Field Adviser

Rick Johansson, G2

Jan Mathiesen, G1

Katrin Lindén, Liaison Officer G9

Paul Lundkvist, Provincial Office Sar-e Pol

Kristian Fasth, Gender Focal Point in Mobile Observation Team G, Sheberghan

Anders Norén, G5

Anja Paajanen, Finnish Development Adviser

Eric Pütsep, G3

UNAMA, Mazar-e Sharif

Interviews and discussion during patrols and field visits (to Aqchah, Mazar-e Sharif, Sheberghan and Sar-e Pol) for example with Quebec Lima, Tactical Psyops Team, civil society representatives, etc.

10 How to Implement Resolution 1325: The Analysis

By Louise Olsson and Johan Tejpar

The analysis will begin by presenting a short overview of the material from the five PRTs, summarizing the central developments. In the continued analysis, the report will examine the twofold purpose. Firstly, the analysis will discuss relevant aspects of how Resolution 1325 has been used to improve the effectiveness in the studied PRTs in Afghanistan. This builds on empirical examples of the use of Resolution 1325. In the analysis, these examples are connected to different tasks. Secondly, the analysis will identify best practices and lessons learned from the process of integrating Resolution 1325 by the military components in the selected PRTs. In this analysis, the developed analytical framework is applied to the material collected at the PRTs in Afghanistan. The emphasis of the analysis is on the latter part of the purpose. In order to be applicable, the analysis and conclusions are expressed in terms of policy-relevant implications complemented by concrete examples from the examined PRTs.

10.1 Overview

All PRTs in this study had to adapt to the fact that the situation for Afghan women and men differed, both in terms of security and practical conditions. Their approach varied greatly, however, and Resolution 1325 was rarely considered systematically when the PRTs carried out their daily tasks. Three of the studied PRTs had the national support present in order to be able to undertake a systematic approach. As figure 2 displays, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway all have National Action Plans which could have guided their work. Of these, Sweden was the only country which applied a more systematic approach (based on directives from the National HQ) and made use of both a Gender Field Adviser and a network of Gender Focal Points. Training for all staff and personnel contained modules of Resolution 1325. While the work to integrate Resolution 1325 has the potential to gain additional pace, Sweden's remaining weakness is recruitment and the low number of female personnel. The Netherlands has a National Action Plan and conducted important work on Resolution 1325. However, the initiative remained with the leadership of the PRT rather than constituting a systematic approach. In order to avoid being dependent on the will of individual leaders, the way forward appears to be to formalize the responsibility of the leadership through specified instructions. There is also a need for training of personnel on how to practically work with integrating the Resolution in a systematic manner. That also applies to Norway. Having adopted its National Action Plan in 2006, it is a strong supporter of Resolution 1325 internationally. At the examined Norwegian PRT, however, there was a lack of knowledge on Resolution 1325 and there was no Gender Adviser who could serve to enhance competence. Norway has since decided to appoint a Gender Adviser who will begin to work at the PRT. All of these three countries, only the Netherlands had in its PRT a woman among the highest leadership staff. The two countries without any National Action Plans, Italy and New Zealand, both adapted their work to the factual situation on the ground in Afghanistan in terms of the differences in situations for men and women. Italy made conscious use of its mixed personnel in force protection and New Zealand tried to cooperate with the female governor to handle problems relating to a case of gender-based violence. Concerning Italy, its use of CIMIC projects to support women's situation in the Herat Province has a potential to develop into systematic practice. New Zealand has a larger number of female staff in their national military organization than the other examined PRT countries, which provides a larger basis for recruitment.

Figure 2: Overview of the examined PRTs

PRT Commanding country in parenthesis	National Action Plan	Awareness of differences in situation for local men and women	Adaptation to differences in situation for local men and women	Knowledge of 1325 among PRT Staff	Strategic use of 1325 at the PRT to handle differences in situation for local men and women	Gender Adviser	Gender Focal Point network	Percentage of female representation in PRT personnel⁴⁴⁷	Conscious use of mixed personnel group in daily work	Female staff among highest military PRT leadership	Regular contact with women's organizations
Herat (Italy)	No	Yes	Force protection CIMIC	No	No	No	No	10% (3%)	Force protection CIMIC	No	No
Bamyan (New Zealand)	No	Yes	Force protection	No	No	No	No	6% (17%)	Force protection	No	No
Meymaneh (Norway)	Yes (2006)	Yes	Force protection	No	No	No	No	7% (8.3%)	Force protection Collection of intelligence	No	No
Tarin Kowt (The Netherlands)	Yes (2007)	Yes	Force protection, CIMIC Collection of intelligence	Yes	Yes	No	No	14% (9%)	Force protection Collection of intelligence CIMIC	Yes	No
Mazar-e Sharif (Sweden)	Yes (2006)	Yes	Force protection, liaison, collection of intelligence , mandate interpretation and execution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10% (4.7%)	Force protection Liaison and collection of intelligence	No	Yes

⁴⁴⁷ Total percentage of female participation in national military in parenthesis

10.2 Practice and Lessons for Effectiveness

The first part of the purpose of the study was to consider effectiveness and Resolution 1325 in terms of day-to-day operations. Knowledge about differences in women's and men's situations and their respective behavior during an armed conflict directly relates to the ability to understand and successfully conduct a peace operation in a conflict area. This is a message in Resolution 1325. The study observes that the PRTs in several respects used the content of Resolution 1325 in relation to improving effectiveness in their different tasks:

- *In strategies on how to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population.* In this respect, using the content of the Resolution expands the outreach of NATO Operations and provides more detailed tools with which to address and understand developments in the area of responsibility. For example, the Norwegian Psyops Team worked consistently to reach both men and women in the population.
- *To collect intelligence and information from more actors in society.* The greater outreach resulting from communication with both men and women means Operations receive a more complete and nuanced intelligence picture. Using Resolution 1325 could therefore, for example, translate into more effective protection of the civilian population against violence. These ideas were present at all studied PRTs, though with varying degrees of systematic thinking.
- *To enhance security and force protection.* For NATO Operations, understanding and implementation of Resolution 1325 serve to enhance force protection and strengthen security. For example, Italy used their mixed units to avoid doing harm to the local society, also taking into account that such negative effects could have provoked a lash back against the PRT.
- *To include women in decision-making processes.* By widening the target group in terms of liaison and support, new venues to address conflict-related problems will appear. This is likely to result in the addition of more institutions, for example, in health and education, thereby creating more stable societies and a sustainable peace. Including and promoting women's participation is also a direct normative goal of Resolution 1325 in its own right.
- *To actively improve the situation of women in the country.* This will contribute to fulfilling the civilian population's expectations that NATO's presence will bring progress. In addition, such progress has the potential to affect the credibility and legitimacy of Operations in the troop-contributing countries.

Thus, when addressing these tasks, male staff benefit from using Resolution 1325 as much as female staff do. It is also important to note that the ability to use the Resolution does not come automatically with the inclusion of female staff. Instead, the identified tasks could be further strengthened by a conscious approach to applying the content of Resolution 1325. This would require defining the objectives and means of using the Resolution in military operations (including a division of labor between military and civilian actors) and developing and reviewing Standard Operating Procedures, Rules of Engagement, Tactical Procedures, developing training modules etc. Such progress should consider that the work with integrating Resolution 1325 consists of several interrelated work areas. Thus, the analysis will now go into what the study has discovered in terms of 'representation' and 'integration' together with staff functions that drive change: 'leadership' and 'expert functions'.

10.3 Representation

In order to conduct a detailed analysis that allows us to compare the work of the different PRTs, the study will now apply the analytical framework to the material from the PRTs relating to representation and integration. Beginning with representation, as seen in figure 1 (in section 2.1) this should be divided into internal and external representation and consist of a number of target issues (such as ‘male and female personnel – all functions and levels’ under internal integration).

Work areas of NATO Operations relating to Resolution 1325 (see section 2.1)

	Representation	Integration
Internal (i.e. internal military organization of the Mission/ Operation)	Manning policies and equal opportunities: • Male and female personnel –all functions and levels • Work environment • Access to resources and material	
External (i.e. how the operation/mission addresses the situation in the area of responsibility to obtain its objective)	Liaison, intelligence and support: • Interaction with local women and men • Cooperation and promotion of local partners, including women’s organizations	

10.3.1 Internal Representation

Internal representation concerns **manning policies** and **equal opportunities**. Representation includes the number of employees in the personnel group as a total as well as in relation to specific positions and functions. The studied PRTs particularly relate this work area to effectiveness. For example, female soldiers often have access to both male and female local networks and can therefore more easily incorporate female perspectives as specified in the NATO Bi-SC Directive. Equal opportunities relate to the work environment and access to resources and material. Negative attitudes toward female soldiers and sexual harassment are obstacles to women’s career advancement and to retaining women in the military. Hence, the work environment must be such that both men and women can fulfill their full potentials and advance within the organization.

At the basis of the issue is the question of **male and female personnel in all functions and at all levels**. All PRTs saw the need for female soldiers in order to be able to communicate with Afghan women (those who were not in public functions). For example, at the Italian PRT, the need for more female soldiers was recognized, especially in the CIMIC Unit which was more in contact with the local community than the rest of the military component. Female personnel were especially needed in project assessments. While all PRTs recognized the need for more female staff, they all had a low number of female staff from which to recruit. Sweden, for example, might have an active approach to 1325 but has a lowest percentage of female personnel in its national military. At the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, the representation is higher within the Staff than at the

tactical level. In fact, there were no women in the Mobile Observation Teams, the Psyops Team or in the Rifle Company – the units which had the most contact with the Afghan population. Thus, an active and conscious approach to recruitment is central. In general, the study points to the importance of reviewing and developing manning policies and force generation procedures to ensure a fair representation of both male and female personnel in all functions and at all levels. For example, it is important that the leadership consist of both male and female personnel. This should also include consideration on whether the operation or mission has any functions that require a specific gender representation. In the case of Afghanistan, female interpreters are often a prerequisite for the effective interaction between the PRT and local women. The Dutch, for example, employed mixed units to attain a more effective outreach but opportunities were often missed due to the scarcity of female interpreters, hindering more profound conversations with local women. To come to terms with these problems, there is a need for continuous review and improvement. Evaluation procedures should therefore examine the ability of force generation and manning policies to attain a gender-balanced work force.

In order to recruit and keep a good mix of male and female personnel, it is central to establish **work environment** policies, procedures and practices that enforce equal treatment to ensure that all personnel can perform their best. We know that there is much to be done in this area. For example at the Norwegian PRT, opinions on having female soldiers varied from very positive in the one tactical team that included a female soldier, to a more mixed view in other parts of the PRT. It is central that there is a zero-tolerance of sexual harassment but also less obvious issues relating to a fair and equal workplace need to be considered, as shown by the Swedish PRT. For countries where the presence of female personnel is new, as was the case at the Italian PRT, the development of a well-functioning work environment needs to include also basic policies considering e.g. pregnant soldiers and parental rights for both men and women. Parental policies should facilitate equal parenting rights for men and women. In order to enforce a work environment of equal opportunities, one suggestion is to install Ombudsman functions that can facilitate the reporting of misconduct. It is also important that the Commander is held responsible for ensuring progress. The leadership should be evaluated based on its ability to create and uphold a functioning and effective work environment for both men and women. It is also central that an active leadership is rewarded for progress achieved in this area. For example, the public and consistent stand point of the Swedish Commander of zero tolerance based in National Codes of Conduct was of essential value.

Last but not least, there has to be equal **access to resources and material**. Missions and operations have to guarantee that material, such as uniforms, are available in sizes for women. Body armor, etc., must to be developed to fit both men and women. At the Swedish and Norwegian PRTs the most fundamental aspects of having mixed personnel were lacking: there were no uniforms and no body armor in sizes and models for their female personnel. The study also suggests that it is important to consider the adaption of facilities, e.g. showers and changing rooms, to suit both men and women, taking into consideration both privacy needs and military effectiveness.

10.3.2 External Representation

External representation relates to how missions and operations are conducted in terms of **liaison, intelligence** and **support**. This encompasses two aspects of military practice: a) how military personnel interact with the civilian population when carrying out their tasks; b) how missions and operations select local parties and organizations in the host society for the exchange of information and provision of support. The most central observation from this study is that with regard to this practice, the missions and operations in Afghanistan tended to consider women as ‘private’ persons who were highly restricted by cultural practice. In contrast, local women rather identified themselves in terms of their public functions and, consequently, expressed their right to be included as relevant partners. This view is supported in the NATO Bi-SC Directive which states that women’s

perspectives should be included. This study examines if the PRTs were working with women's organizations in the PRT area or if they were in contact with local and provincial governmental structures working with women's issues.

Concerning **interaction with local women**, the PRT personnel had different approaches. This could vary also within the same PRT. At PRT Meymaneh, the soldiers of the Military Observation Teams had very limited contact with the female population. They were in contact with male village leaders but did not have any contact with the female representatives in the village Community Development Committees. The Psyops Team was, contrary to the Military Observation Teams, acting strategically to reach local women. The Psyops Team had regular contact with mixed focus groups and other female stakeholders. The Psyops Team was not tasked to establish and maintain contact with women but did so as they felt it would enhance their work. The connection here to 'win hearts and minds' is obvious – existing information channels should be used to also reach women, including newspapers and radio (depending on female literacy rates). For example, NATO missions and operations could distribute information on what is being done to improve women's security.

It is important to note that all PRTs had contact with a few women in the local society with varying degrees of success and potential. To achieve a more all-encompassing and thought-through interaction, it can be important to develop procedures to identify women in public functions who can be consulted. The study points to relevant functions apart from government functionaries, including police officers, teachers etc. There also has to be a conscious development of procedures on how to interact with local women in general. This should be done in close cooperation with local women's organizations in order to ensure that the procedures enhance women's position while ensuring their security and possibility to participate. Such collaboration and support could also be used to improving existing work procedures. This was seen in PRT Mazar-e Sharif where the Gender Adviser collected information from women's organizations on what to consider in terms of tactical procedures when searching persons or houses. Moreover, in Afghanistan it is important to bear in mind that in full uniform, women and men are not easily distinguished. This potential complication needs to be taken into account in procedures on how to interact with local women and men.

Concerning **cooperation with and promotion of local partners, including women's organizations**, to improve the exchange of information and provision of support, procedures for the selection of local parties and organizations in the host society must consider the contents of Resolution 1325. Of the examined PRTs, only Sweden and the Netherlands had attempted a more systematic approach to widen the nets of contact to include women's organizations. Of these two, the Netherlands had failed to identify any women's organization in spite of having conducted a survey. At the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, a network with women's organizations was set up by the Commander and the Gender Adviser of rotation FS15 (May-November 2008). The Gender Adviser of FS16 (November 2008-April 2009) continued, with the support of the Commander, to maintain close contact with local women's organizations, allowing a broader collection of information.

All PRTs did have contact with the Department of Women's Affairs though none of them appeared to have had a clear idea on how to systematically support this often marginalized institution. Italy had, however, supported the Department practically by arranging for the construction of the Department's office building and its social center for women. The study would therefore like to suggest the importance of actively promoting and strengthening contacts with government functions and organizations working on issues relating to women's situation. For example, the Department of Women's Affairs, human rights organizations, women's organizations and security institutions such as the police are all relevant partners. Formal structures and rules on representation to interact with and promote women should be made use of to this purpose. For example, in Afghanistan, Provincial Councils have female representation by law. NATO operation and mission

personnel should request to specifically meet female representatives. If this is not done, evidence shows that female representatives are often not invited to the meetings.

10.4 Integration

In the analytical framework, integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the mandate objectives in the area of responsibility. Similar to representation, integration can be divided into internal integration and external integration. Both these are work areas in which the PRTs can integrate Resolution 1325.

Work areas of NATO Operations relating to Resolution 1325 (see section 2.1)

	Representation	Integration
Internal (i.e. internal military organization of the Mission/Operation)		10.3.1 Work structure of NATO Missions and Operations: • Training • Analysis • Planning • Reporting • Evaluation and policy development
External (i.e. how the operation/mission addresses the situation in the area of responsibility to obtain its objective)		10.3.2 Mandate interpretation and execution: • How the main assignments are selected and prioritized • Execution of selected and prioritized assignments • Adaption to local developments

10.4.1 Internal Integration

Internal integration concerns the **organization of NATO missions and operations**. The NATO Bi-SC Directive underlines the need to see Resolution 1325 as an integral component which should permeate all activity. This means the content of Resolution 1325 should be integrated into the process of organizing NATO missions and operations, e.g. in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation.

Concerning **training**, mission personnel should be given basic information on how to use Resolution 1325. All PRT personnel interviewed in connection with this study had received information about women's and men's situation in Afghanistan in the form of being told that male soldiers could not address or even look at Afghan women. However, apart from Swedish personnel, none had received training on the contents of Resolution 1325 which is more constructive. The pre-deployment training of the Swedish military personnel was built on concrete examples and real cases. Dialogue and interaction were also a central part. For the most recent mission, training was conducted by the Gender Adviser and comprised several components, e.g. the background of Resolution 1325 and group work looking at questions relating to a) women as victims, b) women as actors and c) women as targets in armed conflict. The leadership took an active part in the training sessions which set a good example for the personnel to follow.

In order to obtain maximum utility from Resolution 1325, all military personnel should be given the opportunity to receive detailed training that relates to their specific tasks and assignments. All mission-specific training must be built on ongoing developments in the mission area. To ensure accuracy and relevance, the training should involve women and men from the mission area, for example women's organizations. The training should include elements of interaction (role play, group discussions etc.) and be an integrated part of already established training. Many countries and organizations have developed training material on Resolution 1325. Lessons learned from this work should be exchanged.

Another central target issue concerns **analysis**. None of the PRTs systematically collected gender-disaggregated data. A gender-aware analysis would require information on men's and women's, for example, patterns of mobility, divisions of labor, political standing, access to resources, participation in the conflict (and relation to those participating) and risks of being targeted by violence. To obtain such information, it is crucial to establish contact with different local actors, including women's organizations and women from the political elite. Although they did not systematically collect material, most PRTs did gather related information in order to be able to handle some of the differences in situations for men and women. New Zealand was here the odd one out by not considering the differences in situations as relevant or part of their mandate. As a contrast, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif made an attempt to strengthen the collection of information through the establishment of a network of Gender Focal Points. If the demand to consider Resolution 1325 in daily operations increase and develop, integration could pick up speed.

In **planning**, there was no systematic integration of the contents of Resolution 1325 by any of the PRTs. In order to attain gains in effectiveness, all staff must consider the contents of Resolution 1325 in the daily planning processes of missions and operations. Gender expertise should be included in the planning process to ensure the integration of Resolutions 1325. Such expertise is important as it guarantees the inclusion of women's needs and the avoidance of unintended negative consequences. Operational planning checklists, e.g. as outlined in the NATO Bi-SC Directive, should be developed in order to systemize and strengthen the integration.

To ensure effective analysis and planning, **reporting** must be considered. Existing reporting routines should be evaluated and developed in order to assure that sex-disaggregated data is collected. There are beginnings of such collection even if it is not integrated into regular structures for the collection of information. For example, at the PRT in Tarin Kowt, reporting back to a higher level about activities and achievements is part of the daily routine. In addition, information from female Mobile Team members about the state of affairs concerning women issues in the field was reported to the HQ, which used this as input for meetings with Task Force Uruzgan.

To attain effective integration of the Resolution into missions and operations, efforts need to be followed up by **evaluation** and **policy development**. Existing evaluation routines should be developed to assure that lessons learned on the integration of Resolution 1325 are collected. Lessons learned on working with Resolution 1325 must be included in training and in the development of ongoing missions. Furthermore, it is important to provide feedback to the political level that manages and revises the mandate. There is a need for more research with the purpose to support policy development. Such studies have to be based on empirical information and systematically collected gender-disaggregated information.

10.4.2 External Integration

External integration refers to the **mandate interpretation and execution** in the area of responsibility. Firstly, the daily work to achieve the objectives of the mandate and OPLAN entails a continuous selection and prioritization from a multitude of assignments. Hence, interpretation affects the selection and prioritization process of main assignments. Secondly, external integration concerns how assignments are executed in terms of daily

military operations. Focusing on the output, Resolution 1325 is important in the execution of assignments as these can have different effects for men and women. Thirdly, the situation in the area of responsibility continuously changes. Thus, it is central that the interpretation and execution of the mandate is revised on a regular basis in order to meet new conditions and demands.

Firstly, **the selection and prioritization of main assignments** point strongly to the fact that NATO (and other international organizations) needs to define the use of Resolution 1325 for its international undertakings. Consequently, Resolution 1325 should be included in the mandate and OPLAN. Such inclusion should not be problematic as most NATO missions operate in countries already subscribing to it by way of their Constitution or by being signatories to international agreements such as the 'Conventions on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women'. All the examined contributing countries have stated their strong support for the Resolution. Italy in 2008 said that there was a need to move from an annual celebration of the Resolution to "everyday implementation" with concrete effects for women in conflict and post-conflict zones. While this was stated by the highest political level, it has not been translated into a National Action Plan. At the PRT in Herat, however, there was a growing awareness of the effects of the different situations of men and women. This had resulted in an adaption of the everyday work, even if the Resolution had not been thoroughly integrated into the execution of the mandate. New Zealand declared in June 2008 that it was committed to finding ways to enhance and strengthen the implementation of Resolution 1325, not least in peacekeeping. New Zealand also stated that it recognized the gendered impact of conflict and the role of women in peacebuilding. The country's PRT, however, did not have a conscious and integrated approach to Resolution 1325. There was also the misunderstanding at the PRT that 1325 was about creating "Western" equality. Again, however, the factual differences in the situation between local men and women had led to the beginning of an adaption to local circumstances.

Norway was the one of the first countries to adopt a National Action Plan. It also strongly supports the international work on the Resolution, both in the UN and NATO. At the Norwegian PRT, however, knowledge of the Resolution and the National Action Plan was low. For the Netherlands, there was a growing, though 'leadership dependent', application and use of the Resolution. The PRT found it difficult to identify women's organizations to cooperate with in spite of a survey but initiated a few projects that aimed directly to support women in the area. Sweden was the one country which attempted to define how Resolution 1325 fit into the mandate and how to systematically integrate it into the daily work of the PRT through Standard Operating Procedures etc. The Swedish PRT yet has a long way to go but it was interesting to study its conscious and strategic considerations of the Resolution and what that meant for how personnel perceived and re-evaluated assignments.

All PRTs had cautious approaches. For example, the small steps made by the Dutch PRT 5 could, to a large extent, be attributed to the instruction of the Commander PRT: "Keep your eyes open for 1325 opportunities and respond immediately when they are opening up." At the Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh, the operational lines were instead mainly perceived as 'gender neutral'. Studying the **execution of selected and prioritized assignments**, here also considering NATO's Bi-SC Directive, it is clear that the contents of Resolution 1325 should instead be an integral component of the execution of daily assignments. The rationale is that women and men are affected differently by NATO's presence in general and by specific operations and assignments in particular. For example, the Dutch Mobile Team in Deh Rawood was actively engaged in creating opportunities for the social inclusion and participation of local women. During their deployment they were able to convince the District Chief to admit women to the district center. As a result of this, women were now able to at least express their concerns at the district center. In order to be able to search the female visitors of the district center, the Mobile Team recommended that a woman should be employed instead of purchasing expensive detectors. This ultimately led to the appointment of the first woman in the district center

and who also had some administrative duties. At the Swedish PRT, information obtained from the communication with Afghan women was used to develop tactical procedures to ensure the safety of local women during searches of houses and persons.

Adaption to local developments is central as the situation in the area of responsibility continuously transforms, affecting men and women differently. In terms of Resolution 1325, this means that changes in patterns of violence affecting women's security, mobility and access to recourse must be considered. For example, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif observed that the threat against women participating in society had increased. It was consequently seen as central to include this information in preparations for the upcoming elections. This involved both the HQ level and tactical operations.

10.5 Staff Functions That Drive Change

Apart from the work areas where we found important lessons and practices of relevance to the integration of Resolution 1325 into NATO missions and operations, the framework identifies two categories of staff functions which are considered particularly relevant for driving change: operational leadership and expert functions.

10.5.1 Operation Leadership: The Commander

Research and experience show that in order to successfully integrate Resolution 1325 into military missions and operations, it is central to have a top-down approach. It is imperative that key actors in the NATO leadership (both political and military) support mission Commanders who work towards integrating Resolution 1325 into daily operations. It is also the responsibility of the NATO leadership to ensure that Resolution 1325 is included in the interpretation of mandate formulations and the OPLAN. The Operational Commander of a specific mission, e.g. ISAF, needs to promote Resolution 1325 in the mission's daily tasks and operations. On the national level, NATO Members and Partners should receive support and encouragement to develop plans on how to integrate Resolution 1325 in their contributions to NATO missions and operations. Developing and reviewing standard operating procedures as well as establishing policies for equal opportunities for male and female staff are two key aspects.

While intimately connected, this study primarily studied the Commanders of the PRTs, or the equivalent in other forms of missions and operations. The Commander has the main responsibility for integrating Resolution 1325. However, in order to fulfill this responsibility the Commander is dependent on international and national leadership. NATO and national governments need to provide Commanders with information, resources and qualified staff to be able to integrate the contents of 1325 into operations. Commanders actively working with Resolution 1325 should be given due recognition, especially for increasing the military effectiveness by using this tool. The case studies show that **the role of the Commanders** is central. Mission commanders are responsible for the integration of Resolution 1325 but also for creating an environment that provides equal opportunities for male and female staff alike. PRT Mazar-e Sharif showed the importance of the leadership taking a decisive stand against harassment and discrimination.

To be able to do their job in a consistent and focused manner (ensuring inter-operability and follow through), Commanders should be given national instructions on the integration of, reporting on, and evaluation of efforts to integrate Resolution 1325. The receiver of those documents should be appointed at the national level. The Dutch PRT at Tarin Kowt is a case in point. PRT 5's first Commander designated Resolution 1325 and gender issues special priority. He was not formally instructed to do so but felt it was an



Interview with Italian PRT Commander (both military and civilian)⁴⁴⁸

important issue that he wanted to raise. There was also a connection to the national leadership. In 2005, the Dutch Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces had issued instructions on gender policy within the Ministry of Defense. In the instructions, he specified that gender issues should be given due consideration at various stages of the mission: during the formation phase, the preparatory phase as well as during and after the mission. However, as those instructions did not constitute a direct order for the Commanders to include gender issues in their mission, their success in doing so was not evaluated. Thus, it was up to the initiative of each Commander to integrate Resolution 1325. In addition, these instructions did not provide any practical suggestions on how 1325 could be implemented during the mission or how to prioritize. The study could see similar trends in the Italian PRT where the Commander worked to integrate Resolution 1325.

It was pointed out that if the goals of Resolution 1325 are to be met, the Commander has to have the appropriate means addition to information on lessons learned, Commanders must be provided with experts, such as Gender Advisers, and resources, such as funds to establish a system of Gender Focal Points. It is important that Commanders are trained on Resolution 1325 prior to mission deployment. Training should be mission specific as well as part of a long-term national strategy such as the Swedish Gender Force coaching program. The Commander needs to set a positive example by supporting and actively participating in training on Resolution 1325.

10.5.2 Expert Functions: Gender Advisers and Gender Focal Points

In order to enhance staff competencies on Resolution 1325 in NATO missions and operations, it is necessary to establish expert functions. The two most common forms of experts are a Gender Advisers and Gender Focal Points. Similar to other military functions, these need to be well-integrated into the existing organization to avoid creating parallel structures. If expert functions and networks become parallel it can result in a marginalization of gender issues and an ineffective use of resources. What we learn from this study is that the level of knowledge on and competencies from working with Resolution 1325 is important when formulating the work descriptions for Gender Experts. Many missions and operations might, for example, benefit from having both a Gender

⁴⁴⁸ Photo by Cpt. Carli

Adviser at the mission HQ and a Gender Field Adviser who supports staff operating in the field

When there is little or no knowledge about 1325 issues, the **Gender Adviser's** primary tasks should be to advise the Commander. As competences and methods develop over time and throughout the military organization, the Gender Adviser function needs to be continuously adapted to meet new needs and demands. For example, there might be a need for the Gender Adviser to work closer with the Chief of Staff in daily operations. Under such circumstances, there might be a need to have a Gender Adviser at HQ level and establish a Gender Field Adviser at the tactical level. The latter can then to a greater extent give direct support to the daily work of field staff, for example in establishing contact with women's organizations and women representatives. The study points to the need to have an expert function responsible exclusively for gender issues. For example, the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt had a female officer on the Military Staff who was responsible for managing finances for CIMIC projects. The same officer was also allocated responsibility for gender-related issues but, as this was not officially part of her duties, she did not afford gender issues any greater priority than her other tasks.

The example of a PRT which used a Gender Adviser to enhance integration of Resolution 1325, PRT Mazar-e Sharif, displayed how the integration of the new function needs to include proper organizational considerations and an active leadership to fully benefit from the function. Based on the mandate of ISAF and nationally developed Standard Operating Procedures, the Gender Adviser relied on international conventions and resolutions as well as the guiding documents of Afghanistan to identify ways of incorporating Resolution 1325 into the everyday work of the PRT. The function was placed as an adviser to the Commander and was part of the Command Group. In addition, the function established external contacts with women of the Afghan society, which allowed Afghan women to forward their concerns to the PRT. The responsibility for handling cases of harassment, creating equal opportunities and establishing norms of behavior for interactions with the local population **does not** rest with the Gender Adviser (neither in training nor in practice). These issues are the responsibility of the leadership. This division of labor means the adviser is free to support and strengthen the organization without being considered a 'police' function, there to monitor the behavior of her/his colleagues. In the same line of thinking, the gender experts from previous missions and operations should be involved in developing the pre-deployment training, contributing input based on their experiences in the field. Expert functions should also participate in educating and transferring knowledge to their successors and any new mission leadership. Recognition of the importance of having an expert function among staff is growing. Norway has now appointed an adviser and the Dutch PRT had expressed a need for such a function.

There is the possibility of using a network of **Gender Focal Points** to strengthen the work of the Gender Adviser and to further the process of integrating Resolution 1325. The Gender Focal Point networks consist of regular personnel who receive specialist training on Resolution 1325. Pre-deployment training is needed to establish basic knowledge and allow them to perform their expert function in their respective units. In addition, in-mission training permits the Gender Focal Points to deepen their expertise in their area of responsibility. The Gender Focal Points should be appointed prior to deployment. It is important that they can commence their focal point tasks on the day of deployment.

10.6 Conclusions

This study of the PRTs in Afghanistan addressed the twofold purpose of this report. Regarding effectiveness, it indicates that this was improved in several areas when the content of Resolution 1325 was incorporated in day-to-day operations. Potential benefits included winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population, the gaining of more nuanced information about the area of operations as well as increased security. The normative aspects underlined in Resolution 1325 on improved participation and on

avoiding discrimination could simultaneously be addressed. It is particularly important to note that the PRT working in the most violent area – PRT Tarin Kowt – was as progressive on Resolution 1325 as the PRT working in one of the calmest areas – PRT Mazar-e Sharif. Both Afghan women and men should, thus, be considered in the work to establish stability and security in Afghanistan.

In relation to security, a recurring concern was if it is possible for foreign military troops to contact and talk with Afghan women. The study states a univocal “Yes” to that question. In today’s Afghanistan, women have formal positions at all levels in the governmental structures. In the provinces, they are represented in Provincial, District and Community Development Councils as part of the Afghan National Development Strategy. Women in these formal positions are important sources of information about situational developments as well as the needs and priorities of women. To be asked for and acknowledged strengthen women as political actors and contribute to political and military stabilization. If such recognition is done correctly, it will also serve to promote the role of women in their societies. Local women who do not hold official positions are also interested in contact, which, in turn, speaks for mixed personnel groups and female interpreters. Knowledge on how to make contact with women and under what circumstances to avoid it can be acquired by consulting local women’s organizations. The military personnel should understand that the traditional way of meeting Afghan women – or rather, not seeing, meeting or greeting them – might be suitable in a private setting and in private meetings.

Regarding the process to integrate Resolution 1325 in NATO Operations, Allies and Partners need to continue to strengthen its ability to systematically address the content of Resolution 1325. This was not least evident in the fact that ISAF HQ often was more conservative and less informed in its approach to Resolution 1325 than most of the examined PRTs. From the more detailed analysis of the four work areas and the staff functions, we can observe that the work with integrating Resolution 1325 still needs to be prioritized. However, to assist in advancing this work, we can identify three main conclusions of relevance to all NATO missions and operations. Firstly, the integration of Resolution 1325 is a multidimensional process that requires a comprehensive strategy. The need for such a strategy stems from the fact that the different work areas appear to be inter-connected. For example, in order to integrate Resolution 1325 into operations, it is important to define objectives. To fulfill these, you need to improve the competence of personnel through training and then integrate the improved awareness into analysis, planning and reporting. To collect the information needed for such integration in Afghanistan, you need to have a mix of male and female personnel and establish communication with both male and female representatives of the population. Secondly, the leadership (both political and military) plays a crucial role in promoting and assuming responsibility for integrating Resolution 1325. In NATO missions and operations, this means the Commander is responsible. The leadership is important to ensure progress in work, to create a productive work environment for the staff (working under difficult situations) and to ensure that operations consider both men and women in the Afghan population. For such work, Commanders must also be granted due recognition. Thirdly, the study clearly shows that expert functions are needed to support the use of Resolution 1325. Gender Advisers, Gender Field Adviser and Networks of Gender Focal Points serve to support the integration of the Resolution into daily operations.

To bring these conclusions into practice, there is a need for NATO and its Allies and Partners to take decisive action.

11 Actions to Undertake and the Way Forward

This report is part of the project *NATO in Afghanistan: Resolution 1325 as a Tool for Enhanced Effectiveness* which stems from a decision taken in the North Atlantic Council in December 2007. In addition to this report, the project has delivered a set of Policy Recommendations on how to integrate Resolution 1325 in NATO Operations (see Annex 1). The results of the project, both this report and the Policy Recommendations, are based on findings from field work at five PRTs in Afghanistan.

In this report, we identify three main conclusions of relevance to all NATO Operations on how to integrate Resolution 1325. Firstly, integration of Resolution 1325 is a multidimensional process that requires a comprehensive strategy. As we have seen from the overview (figure 2), the different work areas relate to each other for successful execution. Secondly, the leadership (both political and military) plays a crucial role in promoting and assuming responsibility for integrating Resolution 1325. Hence, a clear system of accountability – established through a top-down approach – is imperative. Thirdly, the study clearly shows that expert functions are needed to enhance competence and support the use of Resolution 1325. These three conclusions are here converted into three recommended actions. In short, these actions stipulate what to do, who is responsible and who can assist:

- **Action 1:** Use a comprehensive strategy for integrating Resolution 1325.
- **Action 2:** Hold commanders accountable for progress.
- **Action 3:** Establish expert functions to enhance integration.

In realizing these actions, the decision in December 2007 by the North Atlantic Council clearly states the organization's commitment to 'women, peace and security'. Such a commitment is crucial in order to succeed.

In the continued work on integrating Resolution 1325, it is important to note that while research and policy have advanced since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, the need for further development remains immense. Two areas stand out. The first concerns external integration. That is, how the contents of Resolution 1325 are used in relation to the interpretation and execution of the mandate. NATO needs to in more detail develop and specify its interpretation of the Resolution. This relates both to what NATO's missions and operations want to accomplish in their areas of responsibility and to what obligations NATO has to enforce the UN Security Council Resolution. NATO's missions and operations also need to consider the implementation. Studying NATO's work on Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan has given many useful insights, knowledge that should be further developed by studying additional missions. For example, Kosovo can assist in formulating lessons learned for how the military can operate in a country where sexual violence has been systematically used by the warring parties and where the level of female organization in society is more vocal. The second area in need of development relates to how to best make use of the three identified expert functions: Gender Advisers, Gender Field Advisers and Gender Focal Points, to increase effectiveness. As stated in the Bi-SC Directive, it is important to exchange information on best practices between national military organizations within the NATO framework as well as to learn from other organizations (e.g. UN, EU, etc.) on how they have organized and used these functions.

The leadership of NATO and its Member and Partnership states play a central role in the continued work to bridge these gaps and in achieving a successful integration of Resolution 1325 in its Operations.

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Annex 1: Policy Recommendations – Resolution 1325 as a Tool for Enhanced Effectiveness

Policy recommendations on implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in NATO Missions and Operations and developing the Bi-SC Directive on Advancing women's perspectives in NATO Military Organizations, Gender Mainstreaming, and Special Measures to Protect Women and Girls in Situations of Armed Conflict.ⁱ

The recommendations specified in this policy document are part of the project '*NATO in Afghanistan: Resolution 1325 as a tool for enhanced effectiveness*'.ⁱⁱ The project was conducted subsequent to a decision taken in the North Atlantic Council in December 2007. As part of the project, a study was conducted with the purpose of identifying lessons learned and best practices on how the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000), henceforth Resolution 1325, can be used as a tool to enhance operational effectiveness in NATO Missions and Operations. The study was conducted by eight independent researchers and experts from Finland, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden and it was supported by Denmark, Italy and New Zealand. The material was collected from ISAF HQ in Kabul and the PRTs in Bamyán, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Meymaneh and Tarin-Kowt.ⁱⁱⁱ

Contribution to NATO Missions and Operations

The study draws three main conclusions on how to integrate Resolution 1325 of relevance to all NATO Missions and Operations. Firstly, integration of Resolutions 1325 is a multidimensional process that requires a comprehensive strategy. Secondly, the leadership (both political and military) plays a crucial role in promoting and taking responsibility for integrating Resolution 1325, hence, a clear system of accountability – established through a top-down approach – is imperative. In NATO Missions and Operations, this means that Commanders are responsible. Thirdly, the study clearly shows that to enhance effectiveness in NATO Missions and Operations using Resolution 1325 as a tool, expert functions are needed to enhance competence. Thus, these three conclusions state the need to undertake three actions:

- **Action 1: Use a Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Resolution 1325**
- **Action 2: Hold Commanders Accountable for Progress**
- **Action 3: Establish Expert functions to Enhance Effectiveness**

The Relevance of the Recommendations for Effectiveness

Resolution 1325 states that women are both actors and victims of armed conflict and that gender equality is important in creating peace and security. In NATO's Bi-SC Directive, gender equality is considered as a key factor for operational effectiveness and creating sustainable peace. In this study, effectiveness is prim-

AFGHANISTAN: Women as actors and victims

A prominent woman in Afghanistan stated that during her two years in office, 60 cases of gender-based-violence had been brought to her attention. These cases were followed up and several men were sentenced to jail – an unusual outcome in Afghanistan. For engaging in this work, she and her family have paid a high price. Every day she receives threats and because of these, her three children cannot attend school due to the risk of them being kidnapped or killed. A bomb was even thrown at her house. She thinks that the international community has increased the security but that gender should receive an augmented role in their work, which would be in accordance with Afghanistan's new Constitution. For example, there are no women in powerful positions in the Government or the Supreme Court – even though this is not in opposition to Islam. However, bringing change into the minds of the people will not happen overnight and she still believes in a brighter future. To create change, she calls for more efforts in the field of women's education so as to improve their opportunities. This is imperative so that women can be a part of the skilled workforce, for instance as police officers, in the Afghan society. She believes that security and legal reform are central. In this way, she states, we can take care of 80 % of women's problems.

arily considered in terms of daily military operations to establish and maintain security and stability. Support to projects related to reconstruction and development (often referred to as Civil-Military

Cooperation) and strengthening the Governmental authorities constitute two other mandate objectives additionally considered.^{iv} On this level, the study indicates that applying Resolution 1325 enhances effectiveness in several concrete ways. An important issue concerns how to win the hearts and minds of the local population without compromising force protection. In this respect, using the content of the Resolution expands the outreach of NATO Missions and Operations. In addition, information collection from more actors, following from this greater outreach, provides the Operation and Mission with a more complete and nuanced intelligence picture. Resolution 1325 is useful for effectively protecting the civilian population against violence including gender-based violence. Using Resolution 1325 supports the inclusion of women in decision making processes and is thus likely to result in the inclusion of more institutions, such as those in the fields of health and education, being able to help create more stable societies and a sustainable peace. Furthermore, actively improving the situation of women in the country contributes to fulfilling the civilian population's expectations of progress derived from the presence of NATO. Such progress also affects the credibility and legitimacy of Missions and Operations in troop providing countries. To summarize, the implementation of the Resolution 1325 is crucial because it:

- Enhances effectiveness and security of the NATO Missions and Operations. For example, Resolution 1325 advances strategies to 'win hearts and minds'.
- Enhances the credibility and legitimacy of the NATO both in the local society and in the troop contributing countries.

The study also shows that gender awareness does not automatically come with the inclusion of female staff. Knowledge of both women's and men's situations and behavior during a conflict are competence skills for which one needs training and information. Male staff benefit from using Resolution 1325 in their work as much as female staff do.

PRT MEYMANEH: Gender-based violence - a question of security

During a patrol, the soldiers saw a woman coming out of her house to throw out washing water. As she was not wearing a burkha, her husband came out and brought her back into the house. The soldiers could see that the husband was beating her up. Not having received clear instructions for such situation of gender-based violence, the soldiers did not intervene physically. Instead, they stopped and made sure that their presence was noted by the husband and that they were observing and reporting on the situation. The reason for not physically intervening is that the soldiers are afraid that the man would 'lose face' and that the woman then would pay an even higher price once the soldiers have left. Such situations were much discussed by personnel. There is currently no official NATO position on addressing different forms of gender-based violence which, for instance, negatively affects interoperability between the different PRTs. Thus, this example raises several important questions that were prevalent at most PRTs in the study:

1. What right or obligation do soldiers have to intervene in situations of gender-based violence?
2. Are there effects related to force protection by physically intervening?
3. What are long term versus short term effects in terms of achieving the Mission mandate when intervening or not intervening?
4. What would NATO guidelines and procedures on gender-based violence need to contain in order to increase effectiveness of Missions and Operations?

Among the PRT personnel in Meymaneh, there was a strong wish to be able to do more in situations similar to this one. The results of the study indicate that for example, closer contact with police or women's rights groups would provide opportunities to channel collected intelligence. However, in order to handle this and similar security incidents in the best possible manner, soldiers require training as well as effective tools, such as instructions and procedures.

In the following sections, we will go into detail about the three actions identified. Specified recommendations on how to effectively undertake each action are given under each strategy. Action 1 is specified in recommendations 1-13, Action 2 in recommendation 14, and Action 3 in recommendations 15-16. Recommendations are supplemented by illustrative examples encountered during the course of the study. We conclude with some observations about actions and work areas that particularly require further policy development.

Action 1: Use a Comprehensive Strategy to Integrate Resolution 1325

Enhancing operational effectiveness in NATO Missions and Operations requires working in different areas simultaneously, that is, applying a comprehensive strategy to integrate Resolution 1325. Based on the results of the study, the comprehensive strategy was identified as consisting of four work areas that relate to representation and integration of both the internal and external work of NATO Missions and Operations.

Representation concerns the involvement of men and women in NATO Missions and Operations:

- **Internal representation** primarily concerns ‘**manning policies and equal opportunities**’ such as improving the balance between the number of men and women in the military organization (figure 1, box A).
- **External representation** relates to how Missions and Operations are conducted in terms of ‘**liaison, intelligence and support**’ vis-à-vis the population and parties in the Area Of Responsibility. For example, does the mission have regular contact with women’s organizations? This is important as it would provide the military with information about women’s security (figure 1, box B).

Integration concerns the different components that make up the process of achieving the desired output as stated in the mandate objective.

- **Internal integration** means the integration of the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of ‘**organizing and conducting Missions and Operations**’, e.g. including it in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation (figure 1, box C).
- **External integration** refers to the ‘**interpretation of the mandate and how it is executed**’ in the AOR. Firstly, how are main assignments selected and prioritized. Secondly, how are assignments executed in the AOR, in terms of daily military operations? For example in male dominated societies, how do the military handle leaving women and children behind when arresting the male head of the household (figure 1, box D)?

These four work areas contain 13 target issues with recommendations. Target issues for internal representation are, for example, ‘1. Male and female personnel in all functions and at all levels’ and ‘2. Work environment’. As an overview, Figure 1 outlines the work areas and target issues identified in the study.

Figure 1: Work Areas and Target Issues of the Comprehensive Strategy^v

	Representation	Integration
Internal (i.e. organization of operation)	A. Manning policies and equal opportunities: 1. Male and female personnel in all functions and at all levels 2. Work environment 3. Access to resources and material	C. Organization of NATO Missions and Operations: 6. Training 7. Analysis 8. Planning 9. Reporting 10. Evaluation and policy development
External (i.e. how the intervention works in the AOR to obtain its objective)	B. Liaison, intelligence and support: 4. Interaction with local women and men 5. Cooperation and promotion of local partners, including women’s organizations	D. Mandate interpretation and execution: 11. How the main assignments are selected and prioritized 12. Execution of selected and prioritized assignments 13. Adaption to local developments

The subsequent subsections develop recommendations for each of these target issues. When working with the comprehensive strategy, it is important that the inter-relationship between the four work areas and their adherent recommendations are taken into consideration.

A. Internal Representation

Internal representation concerns **manning policies and equal opportunities**. Representation includes the personnel group as a total as well as position and function. For example, the leadership should contain both men and women. A more balanced distribution of male and female staff contributes to better gender dynamics and increases operational effectiveness. For example, female soldiers often have access to both male and female local networks and might thus be better at incorporating female perspectives. Equal opportunities relate to the work environment and the access to resources and material. Negative attitudes toward female soldiers and sexual harassment are obstacles to women's career advancement and to retaining them in the military. Thus, the work environment must be such that both men and women can fulfill their potential and advance within the organization. Based on the results of the study, here are the recommendations for internal representation:

1. Male and Female Personnel in all Functions and at all Levels

- Develop manning policies and force generation procedures that ensure representation of both male and female personnel in all functions and at all levels. For example, it is important that the leadership consist of both male and female personnel.
- Identify whether the Operation and Mission have any functions that require a specific gender representation. For example in Afghanistan, female interpreters are a prerequisite for effective interaction between the operational staff and local women.
- In evaluation procedures, include the ability of force generation and manning policies to obtain a gender balanced work force.

2. Work Environment

- Install work environment policies, procedures and practices that enforce equal treatment to ensure that all personnel can perform at their best.
- There has to be zero-tolerance of sexual harassment. Install ombudsman functions that can facilitate the reporting of misconduct. The Commander is responsible for ensuring the progress.
- Parental policies should facilitate equal parenting for men and women. Policies should take into consideration pregnant soldiers.
- Leadership should be evaluated based on its ability to create and maintain a functioning and effective work environment for both men and women. Leadership should be rewarded for progress made in this area.

3. Access to Resources and Material

- Guarantee material, such as uniforms etc., in sizes for women.
- Body armor, etc. must be developed to fit both men and women.
- Facilities, e.g. showers and changing rooms, should be adapted for both men and women considering privacy needs while taking military effectiveness into consideration.

PRT HERAT: The need for both male and female soldiers for force protection

The Italian military at the PRT in Herat had approximately 20 female soldiers (and 20-25 female soldiers as part of the regular Battlegroup at Regional Command West). The attitudes towards female soldiers are positive and their contribution to increased effectiveness is recognized. For instance, there were complaints from the local population that guarding soldiers could see into civilian homes. Therefore, they wanted female soldiers to man those positions. Consequently, the regiment decided to only have female soldiers guarding the outer perimeter of the PRT compound in the areas where the guards can see into the gardens and houses of the neighboring Afghan families. Another situation where the gender of the soldiers mattered for force protection was when conducting body searches of visitors; male soldiers performed these on male visitors and female soldiers on female visitors. To get maximum from all personnel, the military must ensure equal opportunities. As the Italian Armed Forces was opened to female soldiers as late as 2000, PRT personnel stated that the military still needs to revise its work policies and regulations. For example, they need to review the rules for parental leave as well as for pregnant soldiers.

B. External Representation

External representation relates to how Missions and Operations are conducted in terms of **liaison, intelligence and support**. This encompasses two aspects of military practice: a) how military personnel interact with the civilian population when carrying out their tasks; b) how Missions and Operations select local parties and organizations in the host society for exchange of information and provision of support. With regard to this practice, current Missions and Operations tend to consider ‘women’ as ‘private’ persons who are highly regulated by cultural practice. In contrast, local women identify themselves in terms of their public functions and, consequently, they express their right to be included as relevant partners. This view is supported in the NATO Bi-SC Directive which states that women’s perspectives should be included. The relevance is that talking to both women and men will provide a more complete picture of the information flow in the society. Talking to women is needed to ensure that their security situation can be properly understood. In addition, women and men might have different incentives. For example, women with children may be more negative to IEDs and weapon caches as they fear for their children. Based on the results of the study, here are the recommendations for external representation:

4. Interaction with Local Women:

- Develop procedures to identify women in positions of public responsibility who can be consulted. Relevant positions include government functionaries, police officers, teachers, etc.
- Create procedures to interact with local women. This should be done in close cooperation with local women’s organizations. The purpose of the cooperation is to ensure that the procedures enhance women’s position while ensuring their security and ability to participate.
- Make sure that existing information channels are also used to reach women. In addition, include specific information in newspapers and radio (depending on the level of female literacy rates) that target women. For example, write about what the NATO Missions and Operations are doing to improve women’s security.
- In some countries, gender affects the interaction between soldiers and the local population. This can be problematic as full uniformed women and men are not easily distinguished. In such circumstances, procedures relating to local interaction with women and men need to take this complication into consideration.

ISAF HQ: Reaching local women

ISAF’s Strategic Communication in theatre (StratCom) aims at advancing ISAF’s objectives. As illiteracy is widespread, particularly among women, StratCom has distributed grind radios in rural areas of Afghanistan. ISAF then uses radio programs to inform the population of the work of ISAF. Another mean to reach out to the local population is by arranging meetings and conferences. For example, StratCom has organized meetings in Kabul where female Members of Parliament, business women and women’s groups have been invited to meet with ISAF personnel. These meetings provide an arena where women can forward their concerns to ISAF. In return, ISAF can inform them about its activities. Choosing the right and secure venue is crucial. Resolution 1325 is a tool that states the need to consider men’s and women’s specific security situation and labor roles. For example, women are responsible for preparing meals for their families and, thus, the time of when the meeting is held has to be carefully considered. Furthermore, if the husbands do not feel that sufficient security is provided, they might not allow their wives to attend meetings (the turn out for the events can then be an indicator of the security situation).

5. Cooperation and Promotion of Local Partners, Including Women’s Organizations

- For improved exchange of information and provision of support, selection procedures of local parties and organizations in the host society must consider the contents of Resolution 1325.
- Establish contact and actively support government functions and organizations working on issues relating to women. For example, the Department of Women’s Affairs, human rights organizations, women’s organization and security institutions such as the police are all relevant partners.
- Make use of the formal structures and rules of representation to interact with and promote women. For example, in Afghanistan, Provincial Councils have female representation by law. NATO Operation and Mission personnel should specifically request to meet female representatives. It is often the case that if this is not done, female representatives are not invited to meetings.

PRT MEYMANEH and BAMYAN: Women's participation must be asked for

Examples of the missed opportunities to meet local women, resulting from not considering the contents of Resolution 1325, was seen in Meymaneh and Bamyan. In Meymaneh, the researchers had a meeting with the District Development Assembly (DDA) in connection with a school project for girls. Even though this DDA had 16 members – eight men and eight women – only men turned up for the meeting. The explanation given for the women's absence was that they had not been specifically asked for. This appeared to be praxis for all meetings called for by the PRT. There is reason to believe that an active demand for female representation for the PRT's meetings with different local institutions would be positive for women's status. It would also be beneficial for the PRT as it would provide additional information and, thus, a more complete picture of the situation. In Bamyan, when the New Zealand PRT met with the women's Shura leader from Dragon valley, she was very concerned about women representatives in the Shuras not being recognized. She advised: "The PRT should ask for the women's Shura when they have meetings in the villages." While the PRT considered Afghan women as private persons, the women's Shura leader wanted to be recognized as an important part of the new Afghan political system.

C. Internal Integration

Internal Integration concerns the **organization of NATO Missions and Operations**. The NATO Bi-SC Directive underlines the need to see Resolution 1325 as an integral dimension, not as a separate issue. It should permeate all activity. This means integrating the content of Resolution 1325 into the process of organizing NATO Missions and Operations, e.g. including it in training, analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation. Training, both pre-deployment and in-mission, is a prerequisite for effectively integrating Resolution 1325 in NATO Missions and Operations. The training provides personnel with a tool to better analyze the environment in which they operate, that is, give them a more complete picture. The use of this increase in competence must then be integrated in analysis, planning, reporting and evaluation procedures. The political structures and military organizations must allocate resources to ensure successful integration. Based on the results of the study, here are the recommendations for internal integration:

6. Training

- All mission personnel must have knowledge of the content of Resolution 1325. If such knowledge is missing, mission personnel should be given basic information on how to use the Resolution.
- In order to obtain maximum utility from Resolution 1325, all military personnel should be given the opportunity to receive more detailed training that specifically relates to their tasks and assignments.
- Successfully integrating Resolution 1325 in the military's work in a specific AOR is dependent on properly understanding the local culture and society. Thus, all mission-specific training must be built on the ongoing developments in the mission area. This training ought to involve women and men from the mission area such as women's organizations.
- The training should include elements of interaction (role play, group discussions etc.). The training should be integrated in established training procedures.
- Training material need to include information for both male and female soldiers on how to relate to both local women and local men.
- Many countries and organizations have developed training material for Resolution 1325. Exchange lessons learned in order to improve inter-operability.

7. Analysis

- The contents of Resolution 1325 must be used in the daily analyses. In this work, Missions and Operations benefit from making use of information based on local women's competence.
- Collect sex-disaggregated data. This includes material that identify men's and women's patterns of mobility, divisions of labor, political standing, access to resources, participation in the conflict and risks of being targeted by violence. This information will allow a gender-aware analysis. To obtain this information, it is crucial to have contact with different local actors including women's organizations and women from the political elite.

8. Planning

- All staff must consider the contents of Resolution 1325 in the daily planning processes of Missions and Operations.
- Gender expertise should be included in the planning process to ensure the integration of Resolutions 1325. This is important as it guarantees the inclusion of women's needs and the avoidance of unintended negative consequences.
- Develop operation planning checklists, e.g. as outlined in the NATO Bi-SC Directive, in order to systematize and strengthen the implementation of the comprehensive strategy.

9. Reporting

- Evaluate and develop existing reporting routines in order to assure that sex-disaggregated data is collected (see also 'analysis').

10. Evaluation and policy development

- Develop existing evaluation routines in order to assure that lessons learned on the integration of Resolution 1325 are collected.
- Ensure that lessons learned on working with Resolution 1325 are enclosed in the training for, and in the development of, ongoing missions. Furthermore, it is important to provide feedback to the political processes that manage and revise the mandate.
- There is a need for more research with the purpose of supporting policy development. Such studies have to be based on empirical information and systematically collected gender disaggregated data.

PRT MAZAR-E SHARIF: Training on Resolution 1325

The pre-deployment training of the Swedish military staff included sections on Resolution 1325. The training is built on concrete examples and real cases; it tries to lift up both the emotional and rational aspects of discussing and consciously dealing with issues relating to resolution 1325. Dialogue and interaction is a central part of the training aiming to give participants a deeper understanding. For the latest mission, training was conducted by the Gender Adviser and consisted of several components. For example; background and reason for Resolutions 1325; concepts and stipulations to allow everyone to follow discussions; examples of assumed gender-neutral situations to create and understanding of how an analysis and evaluation of assignments can unveil how men and women are affected differently by the same operational decision; group work based on questions relating to a) women as victims, b) women as actors and c) women as targets in armed conflict. The leadership took an active part in the training sessions which set a good example for the personnel to follow.

D. External Integration

External integration refers to the **mandate interpretation and execution** in the AOR. Firstly, the daily work to achieve the objective of the mandate and OPLAN results in a continuous selection and prioritization of a multitude of assignments. Hence, interpretation entails the selection and prioritization process of main assignments. This process must integrate Resolution 1325 to ensure that women also benefit from NATO Missions and Operations. Consequently, Resolution 1325 should be included in the mandate and OPLAN. Including such formulations should not be problematic as most NATO Missions and Operations operate in areas where Constitutions and international agreements, such as the 'Conventions on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women', subscribe to these objectives. Secondly, external integration concerns how assignments are executed in the AOR, in terms of daily military operations. Focusing on the output, Resolution 1325 is important in the execution of the selected and prioritized assignments as it can result in different effects for men and women. For example in male dominated societies, how do the military handle leaving women and children behind when arresting the male head of the household? Under such circumstances, there is a substantial risk that the woman will be abused or killed. In addition, the situation in the AOR continuously alters. Thus, it is vital that the interpretation and execution of the mandate is revised on a regular basis. For example in Afghanistan, violence against women working outside the household has increased sharply during 2008 and the beginning of 2009 but there has been no change in ISAF's instructions to the PRTs. Currently, external integration is the most underdeveloped work area in existing NATO Missions and Operations. Based on the results of the study, here are the recommendations for external integration:

11. How Main Assignments are Selected and Prioritized

- The mandate and OPLAN of NATO Missions and Operations must include the content of Resolutions 1325.
- Elevate the content of Resolution 1325 as a priority when interpreting the objectives of the mandate. This encompasses, for example, both security and CIMIC assignments.
- The content of Resolution 1325 must be incorporated as a central component in the process of selecting and prioritizing daily assignments.

PRT HERAT: CIMIC and Resolution 1325

The differences in situation for men and women in Afghanistan affected how the CIMIC-unit conducted its work. For example, it identified a need to build a new correction center for women, girl orphanages (along with a boy orphanage) and several girl schools in order to provide girls equal educational opportunities. Moreover, they constructed the building for the Department of Women's Affairs and a burn unit at the hospital. The CIMIC personnel both conducted projects and supported projects managed by international civilian organizations. In order to improve efficiency, the CIMIC unit identified the need for more female personnel at all levels and positions. For instance, when there was a female architect, she was the one who could visit the women's prison and thereby establish the need for a new one. In the building process, she could also collect the views of the Afghan women on how to best construct the prison.

12. Execution of Selected and Prioritized Assignments

- The contents of Resolution 1325 should be an integral component when executing daily assignments. The rationale is that women and men are affected differently by the NATO presence in general and by specific operations and assignments in particular. For example, this could entail a reassessment of tactical procedures and rules of engagement.

13. Adaption to Local Developments

- The situation in the AOR is continuously changing, affecting men and women differently. It is crucial that the interpretation and execution of the mandate is revised on a regular basis. In terms of Resolution 1325, this means that changes in patterns of violence affecting women's security, mobility and access to resources (such as water, food, shelter etc.) must be included.

PRT MAZAR-E SHARIF: Security and Resolution 1325

The head of operations could identify a need to integrate the Gender Adviser in the short time planning and execution of operations. He demonstrated this with a practical example: If there is a report of insurgents operating out of a house in a village and the decision is taken to apprehend these men, this will directly place the women in the house at risk. If these men have been involved in "taxing" or harassing other villagers, or if these men are in a feud with a neighboring family, there is a substantial risk that the wives and the rest of the family of the apprehended men will be abused or killed once the men have been removed. To avoid such and similar scenarios, the military wanted to better integrate knowledge relating to gender and Resolution 1325 in analyzing and conducting operations.

Action 2: Hold Commanders Accountable for Progress

The Commander has the main responsibility for integrating Resolution 1325. In order to carry out this responsibility, the Commander is dependent on international and national leadership (both political and military). NATO, national governments and their respective armed forces need to provide the Commanders with information, resources and qualified staff. It is the responsibility of the NATO leadership to ensure that Resolution 1325 is included in the interpretation of mandate formulations and the OPLAN. The Operation Commander of a specific mission, e.g. ISAF, needs to promote Resolution 1325 in the Mission's daily tasks and operations. On the national level, governments of NATO Members and Partners should develop plans on how to integrate Resolution 1325 in their contributions to NATO Missions and Operations. Developing and reviewing Standard Operating Procedures as well as establishing policies for equal opportunities for male and female staff are two key aspects. It is important that the national armed forces promote Resolution 1325 as a central competence. Accordingly, Commanders actively working with Resolution 1325 should be given due recognition, especially for increasing the military effectiveness by using this tool.

While a top-down approach is central at all levels, these recommendations primarily refer to the Commanders of PRTs, or the equivalent in other forms of Missions and Operations. Based on the results of the study, these are the recommendations for Action 2:

14. The role of the Mission Commanders

- Mission Commanders are responsible for the integration of Resolution 1325.
- Mission Commanders are responsible for creating an environment that provides equal opportunities for male and female staff.
- The Mission Commanders should be given nationally developed instructions on reporting and evaluation on the progress of integrating Resolution 1325. The receiver of these documents should be appointed at the national level. When possible, this information should be shared with NATO Members and Partners with the purpose of identifying lessons learned.
- The Mission Commanders have to be provided with experts and resources. Experts, such as a Gender Adviser, can assist the Commander in increasing the competences of Resolution 1325. Additional resources, such as funds to establish a system of Gender Focal Points, are needed for the integration of Resolution 1325.
- It is important that Commanders are being trained in Resolution 1325 prior to Mission deployment. Training should be Mission specific as well as part of a long term national strategy such as the (Swedish) Gender Force coaching program.
- The Commander needs to set a positive example by supporting and actively participating in training on resolution 1325.

PRT TARIN KOWT: The role of an active leadership

PRT 5's first Commander actively included Resolution 1325 and gender issues as a specific priority in his range of duties. He was not formally instructed to do so; it was his own choice, as it was an issue that he wanted to raise. In 2005 the Dutch Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces issued instructions on gender policy within the Ministry of Defense. In it he specified that gender issues should be given due consideration at various stages of implementing the mission assignments: during the formation phase, the preparatory phase, in addition to during and after the mission. However, as these instructions do not constitute a direct instruction to the Commanders to include gender issues in their mission, the Commanders success in doing so is not evaluated. In addition, these instructions do not provide practical suggestions on how 1325 can be implemented during the mission and how to prioritize. It was also pointed out that if the goals of resolution 1325 are to be met, the Commander has to have appropriate means, such as access to female interpreters. There are now plans to develop more detailed guidelines for PRT, and other operational, Commanders on the integration of Resolution 1325 in their assignments.

Action 3: Establish Expert Functions to Enhance Effectiveness

In order to enhance staff competencies regarding Resolution 1325 in NATO Missions and Operations, it is necessary to establish expert functions. The two most common forms of experts are a Gender Adviser and Gender Focal Points.^{vi} Similar to other military functions, these need to be well-integrated in the existing organization to avoid creating parallel structures. If expert functions and networks become parallel structures, this results in a marginalization of gender issues and an ineffective use of resources.

When there is little or no knowledge of 1325 issues, the Gender Advisers primary tasks should be to advise the Commander. As competencies and methods develops over time and throughout the military organization, the Gender Adviser function need to be continuously adapted to meet new needs and demands from the military organization. For example, there might be a need for the Gender Adviser to work with both the Commander and the Chief of Staff during daily operations. Under such circumstances, there might be a need to have two expert functions; one Gender Adviser at PRT HQ level and one Gender Field Adviser to work at the tactical level. The latter can then to a greater extent give direct support to the daily work of field staff, for example in establishing contacts with women's organizations and representatives. One method of broadening the Commander's and Gender Adviser's influence is to appoint a network of Gender Focal Points. This network should be spread throughout the Mission's

organization. The Gender Focal Point network consists of regular personnel who have received specialist training on Resolution 1325. They can thereby strengthen the integration of Resolution 1325 in the work of their respective units while carrying out their daily tasks. Based on the results of the study, these are the recommendations for Action 3:

15. Gender Adviser

- The Gender Adviser function must be situated close to the Commander.
- Maximum effectiveness is reached when all Gender expert functions are well integrated in the NATO Mission organization.
- The level of knowledge and competencies of working with Resolution 1325 in the Operation or Mission is important when formulating the work descriptions for Gender experts. For example, many Missions and Operations might benefit from having two expert functions; one Gender Adviser at the Mission HQ and one Gender Field Adviser who can support staff carrying out field operations.
- The Gender experts from previous Missions and Operations should be involved in developing the pre-deployment training. Feedback from their experiences is important. Gender experts should also participate in educating their successors and the new Mission leadership.

16. Gender Focal Points

- To strengthen the integration process of Resolution 1325, it is beneficial to establish a network of Gender Focal Points.
- The Gender Focal Points should be appointed prior to deployment. It is important that they can commence their focal point tasks on the day of deployment.
- The Gender Focal Point networks consist of regular personnel who receive specialist training on Resolution 1325. Pre-deployment training is needed to establish basic knowledge and perform their expert function in their respective units. In addition, in-mission training allows the Gender Focal Points to deepen their expertise of the AOR.

PRT MAZAR-E SHARIF: The use of a Gender Adviser

The Swedish Armed Forces established a Gender Adviser function in the PRT during FS15 (May-November 2008) which has been continued under FS16 (November 2008-April 2009). Both these functions have been held by women. In FS17, the Gender Adviser function will be held by a man. The work to integrate this new function has illuminated many of the organizational opportunities and considerations needed when using Gender Advisers to strengthen the integration of resolution 1325. Based in the mandate of ISAF, the Gender Adviser uses international conventions and resolutions as well as the guiding documents of Afghanistan to identify how to incorporate gender aspects into the everyday work of the PRT. The function is placed as an advisor to the Commander and is part of the Command group. In addition, the function establishes external contacts with women of the Afghan society, which makes it possible to forward their concerns to the PRT. The responsibility for handling cases of harassment, creating equal opportunities and establishing norms of behavior with the local population does not rest with the Gender Adviser (neither in training nor in practice). These issues are the responsibility of the leadership. This division makes the adviser free to positively support and strengthen the organization, without being considered as a 'police' function, there to monitor the behavior of her/his colleagues. To broaden the outreach of the Gender Adviser in this supportive work, a system of Gender Focal Points was established in FS16.

Conclusions and the Work Ahead

The December 2007 NAC decision on strengthening NATO's ability on working with Resolution 1325 in its Missions and Operations clearly states the organization's commitment to 'women, peace and security'. Following this NAC decision, the project '*NATO in Afghanistan: Resolution 1325 as a tool for enhanced effectiveness*' was instigated in July 2008 and a study on the topic was conducted. The results of the study pointed to the need to undertake three main actions: Action 1 – Use a comprehensive strategy to Resolution 1325; Action 2 – Hold Commanders accountable for progress; and Action 3 – Establish expert functions to enhance integration. In short, these actions stipulate what to do, who is responsible and who can assist. An overarching conclusion from the entire project is that the three actions are interrelated. This

should be considered when using the recommendations made in this document. It also stands clear that while research and policy have advanced since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, the need for further development is still significant. Two areas stand out. The first concerns external integration. That is, how the content of Resolution 1325 is used in relation to the interpretation and execution of the mandate. NATO needs to develop in more detail how it interprets the resolution. This relates both to what NATO Operations and Missions want to accomplish in the area of responsibility and to what obligations NATO has to enforce the content of the UN Security Council Resolution. NATO Operations and Missions also need to consider the execution. Studying NATO's work on Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan has given many useful insights, knowledge that should be further developed. For example, Kosovo could teach us how the military can operate in a country where sexual violence has been systematically used by the warring parties and where the level of female organization in society is strong. The second area in need of development relates to how to best make use of the three expert functions: Gender Advisers, Gender Field Advisers and Gender Focal Points to increase effectiveness. As stated in the Bi-SC directive, it is important to exchange knowledge of best practices between national military organizations in the NATO framework as well as to learn from other organizations (e.g. UN, EU, etc.) and how they have organized and used these functions. The leadership in NATO and its Member and Partnership states plays a central role in bridging these gaps.

End notes

ⁱ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) on 'Women, Peace and Security' focuses on women as actors and victims during armed conflicts. In June 2008 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 in which the Council further develop the need for protection of women victim of violence. While these policy recommendations only refer to Resolution 1325, it should be understood to incorporate the contents of Resolution 1820.

ⁱⁱ The full report is available at the Swedish Defense Research Agency's homepage: www.fors.se. It is authored by Dr. Louise Olsson (The Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden), Mr. Johan Tejpar (Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden), Dr. Johanna Valenius (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland), LtCol. Birgith Andreassen (Norwegian Defence University College, Norway), Ms. Synne Holan (Vestfold University College, Norway), Ms. Bjørg Skotnes (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Norway), Mr. Joseph Hoenen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands) and Ms. Sophie Kesselaar (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands). The project was additionally supported by Denmark, Italy and New Zealand. The authors wishes to thank everyone who has contributed to the project.

ⁱⁱⁱ PRT Meymaneh is commanded by Norway and operates in the Faryab province; PRT Mazar-e Sharif is commanded by Sweden and operates in Balkh, Samangan, Jowzjan and Sar-e Pol provinces; PRT Tarin Kowt is commanded by the Netherlands and operates in the Uruzgan province; PRT Herat is commanded by Italy and operates in the Herat province; and PRT Bamyan is commanded by New Zealand and operates in the Bamyan province. Comparing these five PRT areas provided the study with examples of areas with different levels of violence and different ethnic compositions. Interviews were also conducted with government officials and personnel at ISAF HQ in Kabul. Efforts were made to visit PRTs belonging to other dominant contributing countries but that was not possible during this project.

^{iv} The reason to include the mandate assignments relating to CIMIC local ownership is that such tasks are increasingly becoming part of the military responsibility.

^v Developed based on Olsson, Louise (forthcoming): *Resolution 1325 and the Nordic Battlegroup*, Swedish version (2008) retrievable from http://www.fhs.se/upload/NBG_och_1325.pdf. Kristin Valasek uses a similar form of divisions of internal and external for analyzing Security Sector Reform processes. See 'Tool 1: Security Sector Reform and Gender' in *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*, published in 2008 by UN INSTRAW and DECAF.

^{vi} Identification of its importance and the specific tasks of a Gender Adviser are particularly noted and developed in the Bi-SC Directive (Chapter I).

Annex 2: Interview Structure

Interviewee Selection

The field research consists of two parts. Primarily, the researchers conducted field research in five different PRTs. However, the research team also made two trips to Kabul where they carried out interviews with the civil society (Government Representatives, International Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations) and ISAF HQ. In the PRTs, interviewee selection was divided between the PRT HQ level, tactical level and interviews were also conducted with civil society representatives. The structure of the interviewees is outlined as follows:

Categories of interviewees for PRT HQ level are:

- Commanding Officers
- Civilian leadership
 - Development Adviser
 - Political Adviser
 - Legal Adviser
- J1-J9 leadership representatives and selected parts of the staff
- Gender Adviser/Gender focal point/functions responsible for gender or equality issues for the PRT

The study of the PRTs' tactical level focuses on the implementation of the resolution in the PRT's area of responsibility. What form of information do they collect, what form of work do they conduct and how is 1325 related to that in terms of gains in effectiveness? Interviews are primarily conducted with:

- Mobile/ Military Observation Teams (preferably two different teams)
- Personnel conducting patrols

When conducting field visits at the PRTs, the researchers have met with representatives from the civil society. Categories of interest here have been: Political leadership, International Organizations, Women's organizations and public institutions such as schools and clinics.

Interview Questions

A semi-structured interview technique was used when conducting the interviews. The purpose of having a structure is in order to compare interviews between the PRTs. The template that was used is reproduced below:

PRT Interview Questions: HQ Level

Background Questions

- When we start this interview it is important for me to get a good understanding of your work in the PRT area. It would therefore be interesting if you can tell me about what your assignments consist of? Can you give me concrete examples of what that looks like during a working day?
- In your pre-deployment training, how was the local population portrayed? Was their situation included in the training scenarios? Can you give me some examples? Do you feel that it was useful for what you are working on now?

Women and Security

1. What are men and women's situations like in the PRT area? Can you give me some examples?
2. What does UN resolution 1325 mean to you? What does it mean for your work in Afghanistan?
3. Do you have someone in the personnel who is responsible for 1325/gender issues? For example, a gender adviser or a focal point?
4. Have you and your personnel received any training on women's situation during armed conflict? If so, who conducted it and what did it consist of?
5. What practical implications does women's security situation in the area have for your work? What can you do to improve this?
 - A. Are there certain phases of the operation where you think women and security issues are more important than in others?
 - B. How do you work with this in the different mandate areas:
 - providing security
 - supporting reconstruction and development,
 - strengthening the Kabul government?

Could you give me a few practical examples? How is it included in your planning, collection of information etc.

 - C. Has there been situations where you have adapted your work in order to be able to include also women's situation in your work?
 - D. If you do not work with this, why is that? What are the problems that you see? Would there be any benefits of including these issues?
6. Are issues of women and security included in the information and tasks that you receive from the leadership of the PRT HQ/ISAF HQ (the latter when interviewing the CO)? If yes, could you give examples? What does this mean to your work?
7. Have you discussed questions of women and security with your colleagues? In that case, what questions and what was the result of the discussions? Did it result in changes?
8. Are you working with women's organizations in your PRT area? If so, what does that work consist of? Could you give examples? If not, what are the obstacles to working with women's organizations? Are there other organizations working with 1325 in your area?
9. What problems and benefits do you see in working with issues concerning women and security in your PRT area when implementing the mandate?
10. Could you give me some concrete examples of what you would need in order to work successfully with issues of women and security in your daily work?

PRT Interview Questions: Tactical Level

Background Questions

1. When we start this interview it is important for me to get a good understanding of your work in the PRT area. It would therefore be interesting if you can tell me about what your assignments consist of? Can you give me concrete examples of what that looks like during a working day?

2. In your pre-deployment training, how was the local population portrayed? Was their situation included in the training scenarios? Can you give me some examples? Do you feel that it was useful for what you are working on now?

Women and Security

3. What is women's security situation like in the PRT area? Can you give me some examples of the most usual threats and problems? Does it differ from men's situation? Could you tell me about certain situations that you have met when moving in the PRT area?
4. Does the knowledge about men and women's situations have any practical implications for your work? A) If yes, can you give me a few examples of how? Have you adapted your work and tasks to include also women's situations at some point? Can you see any difficulties with working with women and security? B) If you do not feel that it has any implications, why is that?
5. What does UN resolution 1325 mean to you? Can there be situations where it is important for you in that capacity to know about 1325? A) If yes, can you give me concrete examples? B) If no, why not?
6. Have you received any pre-deployment training on women's security situations during armed conflict? If so, who conducted it and what did it consist of?
7. Did you find the training useful for your work? A) If yes, what was best and how have you used it? Could you give examples? B) If no, what would you have needed in order for it to be useful? Can you give me concrete examples?
8. Are issues of women and security included in the tasks that you receive from the PRT HQ? If yes, could you give examples? How has that then been used in your work (how did you implement it)? Do you report to them on issues of women and security and how do they respond to that? Could you give examples?
9. Have you discussed questions of women and security in your platoon/section/team? In that case, what questions and what was the result of the discussions?
10. Is your group mixed or is it only male? What benefits and problems do you see in one-gendered/mixed groups when working in Afghanistan?
11. What are the benefits and problems of being a male/female soldier when working in the PRT area?
12. What problems and benefits do you see in working with issues concerning women and security in your PRT area when implementing the mandate?
13. Could you give me a few concrete examples of what you would need in order to work even more successfully with women's security in your daily work?

Interview Questions: External Parties (Ministries/ IOs/ NGOs)

1. When we start this interview it is important for me to get a good understanding of your work in this Ministry/IO/NGO. It would therefore be interesting if you can tell us more about this.
2. How do you see women's situation in Afghanistan today? How has it developed?

3. Do you think that women have different needs of protection from that of men? How would that need to address in order to improve women's security? Could you give concrete examples of what that would look like?
4. How do you see ISAF's work regarding women and security? Can you identify certain effects that has become better or worse for women as an effect of ISAF's interventions?
5. What about the PRTs, how do you see their work in terms of women and security or resolution 1325? How is this related to
 - providing security
 - supporting reconstruction and development,
 - strengthening the Kabul government?

Could you give concrete examples?

6. Can you identify problems or benefits for the international military in the PRTs to work with women's security in Afghanistan?
7. Have your ministry/organization cooperated with ISAF/the PRT on 1325 issues?
8. Is there some action that you feel would improve the PRTs work with women's security in Afghanistan? Do you have concrete advises that you would like to give the PRT/ISAF on this issue?
9. Is there something that you would like to bring up that we have not covered?

Annex 3: NATO

The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) is an alliance constituting of 26 countries from North America and Europe. The Allies are committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty from April 4, 1949. Its role is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. With its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, it provides a forum, in which the United States, Canada and the European countries can consult together on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has attempted to refocus on new challenges and take on new operations and missions. These entail bringing stability to Afghanistan and Iraq, protection against terrorism in the Mediterranean and assisting the African union to bring peace to the Darfur region of Sudan. In August 2003, NATO commenced its first mission ever outside Europe when it assumed control over **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)** in Afghanistan.

NATO Organization

The **North Atlantic Council** is the principal decision-making body within NATO. It is the only body that was established by the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article 9. It is vested with the authority to set up "such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary" for the purposes of implementing the Treaty.⁴⁴⁹ It brings together high-level representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. Representatives of all member countries of NATO have a seat at the North Atlantic Council. It can meet at the level of Permanent Representatives (or Ambassadors), at the level of Foreign and Defense Ministers, and at the level of Heads of State and Government. It is chaired by the Secretary General. Decisions are agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. This means that policies decided upon by the North Atlantic Council are supported by and are the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance and are accepted by all of them.

The **Military Committee** is the senior military authority in NATO, providing NATO's civilian decision-making bodies, e.g. the North Atlantic Council, with military advice. The Military Committee's principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It is responsible for recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for the implementation of decisions regarding NATO's operations and missions.

In 1997, the **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council** was created to bring together 26 NATO and 24 Partner countries). It was set up to match the increasingly sophisticated relationships being developed with Partners under the Partnership for Peace program and in the context of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where in 1996 troops from 14 Partners were deployed alongside NATO troops. It provides the overall political framework for NATO's cooperation with Partner countries and serves as a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues. These include, but are not limited to: crisis-management, peace-support operations, regional issues, arms control and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, defense issues such as planning, budgeting, policy and strategy; civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness, armaments cooperation, nuclear safety; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and scientific cooperation.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁹ The North Atlantic Council: NATO's key political decision-making body
[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm]

⁴⁵⁰ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [<http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html>]

NATO Resolution 1325 Developments

NATO's Justification for Gender Mainstreaming

Since the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has become more complex. The focus has shifted from fighting high-intensity wars of national territorial defense to a wider spectrum of lower-intensity operations such as crisis management, peace support operations and humanitarian operations. Such diverse tasks demand a broad spectrum of skills. Contemporary conflicts not only call for military responses, but need “greater” military capacity and close cooperation with civilian resources. Only an organization that truly respects and fully exploits the diversity of backgrounds, skills and experience of its members (men and women) can operate effectively in a complex security environment. Gender mainstreaming is therefore an issue at the core of security.⁴⁵¹

NATO & Women

In 1961 the first NATO Conference of Senior Women Officers with Delegates from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States took place in Copenhagen. It focused on issues concerning the status, organization, and conditions of employment and career possibilities of women in the military forces of NATO. However, significant improvements did not occur until a conference at NATO HQ in 1973. Here, a resolution was adopted agreeing that women should have the opportunity to serve in all job specialties. The exception was combat positions where national policy should apply. On July 19, 1976, the MC endorsed formal recognition of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces.⁴⁵² In March 1997 the Military Committee approved also the establishment of the advisory Office on Women in the NATO Forces within the International Military Staff. The Committee on Women in the NATO Forces now meets once a year, every second year the meeting takes the form of a conference.

The Committee on Women in the NATO Forces is a consultative body. Its principal mission is advising NATO's military leadership and member nations on critical issues and policies affecting service women in the NATO Forces. Furthermore, it supports NATO nations by providing informed guidance on gender-related and diversity issues and more specifically, operations-related lessons learnt from service women. Their work provides recommendations to NATO members and authorities on identifying gender issues and integrating the gender perspective into all aspects of NATO operations.⁴⁵³ In 2008, Committee on Women in the NATO Forces started a process to expand its mandate to include Resolution 1325.

⁴⁵¹ CWINF GUIDANCE FOR NATO GENDER MAINSTREAMING

⁴⁵² Document MC 249, updated in 2003 in Document MC 249/1

⁴⁵³ See e.g. *Best practices to improve the gender balance and Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming*

Annex 4: UN Resolution 1325 (2000)

On Women, Peace and Security

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls, *Recognizing* the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, *Noting* the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. **Expresses** its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and **urges** the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, **invites** Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and **further requests** the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. **Urges** Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. **Calls on** all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. **Calls upon** all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. **Calls on** all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. **Emphasizes** the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard **stresses** the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. **Calls upon** all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. **Encourages** all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. **Reaffirms** its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. **Expresses** its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. **Invites** the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and **further invites** him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. **Requests** the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.