Abandoning Frontline Trenches?
Capabilities for Peace and Security in the SADC region

CECILIA HULL, MARKUS DERBLOM

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FOI
Swedish Defence Research Agency
Defence Analysis
SE-164 90 Stockholm

Phone: +46 8 55 50 30 00
Fax: +46 8 55 50 31 00

www.foi.se

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Cecilia Hull, Markus Derblom

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FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut
Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys

164 90 Stockholm

FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Division of Defence Analysis

SE-164 90 Stockholm

Sammanfattning

Södra Afrikas utvecklingssamfund (SADC) är en viktig aktör inom området ’fred och säkerhet’, både i södra Afrika och på hela den afrikanska kontinenten genom sitt Organ för politik, försvar och säkerhet. Denna rapport ger en översikt över SADC:s strukturer och organisation jämte samfundets historia och utveckling. Den förklarar också den politiska dynamik som existerar i regionen och som ligger till grund för SADC:s politik, hållning och agerande samt analyserar hur denna påverkar förutsättningarna för fred och säkerhet i regionen, såväl som inom den bredare Afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen. Rapporten för även också en diskussion om möjliga områden för partnerskap och annat stöd från externa givare för uppbyggnaden av SADC:s politiska och säkerhetsstrukturer.

Nyckelord: Södra Afrikas utvecklingssamfund, SADC, fred och säkerhet, APSA, AU, befrielserörelsen, södra Afrika, Afrika

Summary

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an important actor within the area of peace and security both in southern Africa and on the African continent as a whole, acting through its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.

This report outlines SADCs organisational structure and the history and background of the organisation. It also explains the political dynamics existing in the region, guiding SADCs policy and actions, and analyses how this dynamic affects the pre-conditions for peace and security in the region, as well as the construction of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

In addition, the report also explores the potential for support from external donors to SADC political and security structures, seeking to inform discussions about such partnerships.

Keywords: SADC, SADC Organ, SADC OPDS, Regional Economic Communities (REC), SADC Standby Force, SADCBRIG, APSA, African Standby Force (ASF), Frontline States, southern Africa, Africa, Peace and Security, Liberation Movements, AU

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

The aim of this report is to increase the level of knowledge about the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as an organisation and actor within the field of peace and security in Africa. To this end, it traces the history of the organisation, its track record, its contemporary structures and ambitions, and the challenges to its future evolution. In addition, it seeks to inform discussions about potential support from external partners to SADCs peace and security efforts, in itself as well as within the wider African Peace and Security Architecture.

SADC – overview

SADC is an organisation of currently 15 member states, originally established to support economic growth and development amongst its members, and to promote trade liberalisation and economic integration. Increasingly, SADC has also begun to take on a political role, transcending the area of development activities to more peace and security related issues and defence cooperation. Today, SADC is one of the prominent regional cooperation bodies in Africa. It also constitutes the southern African building block of the African Peace and Security Architecture, for which it is currently developing regional capabilities, including e.g. a regional standby brigade and an early warning system.

SADC – history

The current formation of SADC is founded on the *Frontline States* (FLS) and the *Southern African Development Coordination Conference* (SADCC); two organisations established in the 1970s and 1980s to deal with security cooperation and socio-economic development respectively. The FLS was a political organisation supporting anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements in southern Africa, and the SADCC an arrangement promoting trade and economic growth in southern Africa through development initiatives such as investment in joint infrastructure. At the end of apartheid, these two were integrated and transformed into SADC, even though the organisations political and security wing came to be relatively inactive until 2001.

The FLS had been an informal structure without a treaty, headquarters or secretariat and disagreement arose amongst member states regarding how formal SADCs political and defence forum should be, and how closely integrated it should become with the rest of SADC. The matter was eventually resolved in 2001, and the relationship between the so-called *Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation* and ‘SADC Proper’ was formalised subordinating the Organ to the SADC summit and establishing a formal Protocol guiding the

workings of the Organ. The rift that had existed between member states on the issue during the late 1990s had meant that SADCs peace and security activities during the 90s were makeshift and poorly represented a united SADC.

SADCs track record in the field of Peace and Security

SADC member states have intervened militarily in regional conflicts on two occasions in 1998: In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho. Both these have been ad-hoc interventions, undertaken by a small number of member states, with questionable legal mandates due to disagreement regarding whether they constituted 'SADC' peacekeeping operations or merely military interventions by coalition forces made up of SADC states. Neither were formally authorised by the SADC Summit, but rather unofficially approved by the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), a mechanism within the Organ inherited from the FLS and made up of the defence ministers from the SADC member states. The Organ's support structures are two legged; one leg – represented by the ISDSC deals with 'hard power' issues such as security and defence, and the other – the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) – with 'soft power' issues such as diplomatic initiatives.

Since 2001, SADC has refrained from military operations, rather engaging in conflicts through diplomatic initiatives, particularly in relation to the situation in Zimbabwe. However, SADCs track record on political initiatives for promoting human rights and democracy in the region, despite governance and the succession of governments being one of the fundamental challenges facing southern Africa, remains meagre. The political culture and pragmatic approach within the SADC region have resulted in, for example, a strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe. SADC, through its official mediator Thabo Mbeki, has been involved in seeking a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Zimbabwe for some time. Mbeki, and SADC as a whole, has chosen the line of muting its criticism of Mugabe's regime, refusing to openly condemn Zimbabwe's state sponsored violence; a strategy heavily criticised by many African and international elements, notably including SADC member Botswana. This strategy can be explained by common aversion to interference in domestic conflicts amongst SADC states, as well as common political norms and cultures of avoiding public criticism of a fellow African leader, dating back to the anti-apartheid and liberation struggles.

The liberation legacy carried by many SADC states is still evident in the political life within the region. Many member states still have governments constituted of the political parties that led the liberation struggle. These actors still enjoy a great deal of legitimacy but their presence has in many cases blurred the boundaries between the party in government and independent state institutions, creating so-called 'party-states' and 'dominant-party systems', examples of which include

Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF and South Africa's ANC. This legacy is a potential impediment to multi-party democracy and a primary challenge facing SADC is how to make a peaceful transition to consolidated democracy.

SADC – policies, frameworks and plans

The main objective of SADC is to facilitate and support economic growth and development in southern Africa, with the aim of alleviating and eradicating poverty in the region. In addition to promoting socio-economic co-operation and integration, SADC is increasingly taking on the tasks of enhancing political and security cooperation amongst its member states, acknowledging that without peace and security, socio-economic development is impossible.[1]

The most important SADC legal documents guiding the organisation's role in peace and security in the region are the *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation*; the *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Security Defence and Co-operation* (SIPO), and the *Mutual Defence Pact*. The Protocol outlines the Organ's objectives, the structure of the Organ, and its jurisdiction in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as the methods and procedures for addressing these issues. The SIPO is a broad five-year plan setting out strategies and activities for the implementation of the objectives set out in the Protocol. Together with the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), focusing on the implementation of SADCs socio–economic objectives, the SIPO forms a key SADC documental policy instrument. Whilst being ambitious and inclusive plans, both the SIPO and RISDP have been accused of being unattainable and as the SIPO is being revised this year, expectations are that it will be reduced to prioritise only certain objectives and strategies for their implementation hopefully further concretised.

The *Mutual Defence Pact* provides a framework for defence cooperation and represents a tangible move towards establishing a security community. The Pact lists, amongst other things, areas in which defence cooperation should be undertaken; e.g. training, joint research and intelligence exchange; principles for collective action against armed attack; and provides for confidentiality regarding classified information amongst the Pact's signatories.

SADC and the African Peace and Security Architecture

Even though SADC has not undertaken any joint military operations since the formalisation of the Organ, many of SADCs peace and security endeavours have been military-related. As part of the AU strategy of establishing an African Peace

[1] Van Niuwkerk, Antoni. 2001. 'Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared'. *African Security Review* 10: 2 2001, p 5

and Security Architecture, SADC has decided to establish a SADC standby brigade (SADCBRIG) to fulfil SADCs obligation to the African Standby Force (ASF), which constitutes a part of APSA.

The ASF – intended to be capable of rapid deployment of six types of scenarios, ranging from observation missions; peacekeeping and peace-building to complex multidimensional peace operations, as well as peace-enforcement – is to stand fully ready by 2010, and the development of the SADC component in this structure is currently under way. The establishment of the ASF takes place in two stages. The first phase finished in mid-2005 and aimed to have the standby brigades ready for the deployment of a multidimensional mission that could operate in a complex environment. In 2008, SADCBRIG had achieved capabilities to fulfil missions undertaken in the first four envisaged scenarios, but did not yet meet the requirements of sustaining a complex mission. Assessments by outsiders suggest that SADCBRIG can easily undertake observer-like missions and less complex peacekeeping and peace-building operations, but that is does not yet have the capacity for multidimensional peacekeeping in less permissive environments. The second phase, which runs until 2010, envisages the standby forces to be able to undertake not only robust peace support operations but peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions in grave circumstances.

Staff within the SADC secretariat and Organ claim to currently be working hard to undertake the last measures to ensure the brigade will be fully operable and ready in accordance with the timeline; the main challenge at present is perceived to be interoperability and a series of training exercises are being undertaken to ensure SADCBRIGs readiness.

The SADC Standby Force is supposed to include a permanent planning element (PLANELM); a standby brigade (SADCBRIG); a police component (SADCPOL); and civilian components. The PLANELM has been in place since 2005, the requisite 3,500 troops for the brigade has been pledged, and SADC has agreed on a common peace support doctrine. The brigade was formally launched in August 2007, and a regional peacekeeping training centre has been established in Harare to support the standby force.

Whilst the police elements are more or less in place the civilian components of the multidimensional brigade is lacking and SADC has only recently begun to discuss these civilian dimensions. Also, SADC has not managed to finalise the details around a logistics concept for the brigade and has not managed to establish a logistics depot, meaning that SADCBRIG is currently lacking a central regional facility for maintenance, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of the brigade. In addition, SADCBRIG lacks the finances, logistics and strategic airlift to actually deploy any available troops, making SADCBRIG effectively undeployable without such support from external partners. These shortcomings have led outside observers to question the

readiness of the brigade and many are hesitant regarding the capability of SADCBRIG to stand ready in little more than a year in accordance with the timeline.

The Continental Early Warning System is one of the central support structures within APSA. Linking up to its continental equivalent, SADC is in the process of setting up Regional Early Warning System with a centrally located situation room in Botswana. In turn, this is to be connected to the member states to gather information about a commonly agreed set of conflict indicators (such as food security and energy, for example). The SADC situation room is physically in place, but amounts to little more than an empty shell at present. The aspiration is, however, to have it up and running by the end of 2009. One concern is that even if SADC managed to establish the early warning structures centrally, the member states are experiencing difficulties in establishing the structures at national level. A lack of finances and resources is impeding the development of the system and assistance by outside agents in building these structures has been blocked by member states.

SADC and partnerships

Whilst SADC receives a great deal of support and funding from external partners in its socio-economic activities, the area of politics and security has so far predominantly been excluded from such partnership arrangements. The history of the SADC states has made them sensitive to external influence in foreign policy and related matters, seeking to preserve political self-determination. SADC has therefore emphasised organisational liberty and freedom from donors directing SADC political policy. Nonetheless, SADC is also a pragmatic organisation, at least at secretarial level, and there are indications that the organisation might be opening up to partnership in some peace and security related matters as well; not the least because of an acute need for support. SADC has a clear policy and record of monitoring elections around the region. SADC is faced with no less than seven elections in the region throughout 2009 and the secretariat is severely concerned about its financial and managerial ability to oversee all of these without donor support.

Conclusions

The transformation of SADC from a liberation movement to a modern, regional security organisation with shared politico-security values is incomplete and staggering. The legacy from the FLS is still affecting decisions, internal member state relations, and sometimes renders the regional institutions inefficient. It is of core importance to understand the enduring impact of the liberation legacy in order to assess the regional capabilities for peace and security in SADC.

The SADC institutions for peace and security are still underdeveloped and fragile. On the formal, explicit level SADC has worked swiftly in producing policies, agreements and a range of framework documents but implementation and observance of these frameworks are indeed questionable, both on the regional and the national levels.

The slow progress in the field of peace and security in SADC is linked to the prerequisites for regional integration. SADC has quite descriptively been designated as a "regional community in the making" – hence not always matching external partner perceptions of the organisation's efficiency, or partner ambitions in terms of supporting its development. The predominant reason for the slow progress is the fragile foundations for integration in the southern Africa region.

An overlap in agreements and institutional arrangements threatens to undermine SADC. Several SADC member states are also members of competing organisations and some also have obligations towards other Regional Economic Communities. The amount of bilateral agreements made by member states with partners undermines the role of SADC as a platform for regional integration as member states seem to emphasise such agreements.

The regionalisation process is moving forward in the right direction – but slowly. The SADC secretariat is smaller and less potent than what would be required to take on the full task expected of SADC both from within and outside the region. This situation renders it powerless in relation to strong member states in the region. The need to supply more power and authority to secretariat is formally acknowledged – but so is the fact that SADC will only have as much power as its member states will allow, and the pooling of sovereignty is still a sensitive issue in southern Africa. This dualism affects the organisation's efficiency today, and will likely continue to do so.

SADC has ambitious and well-crafted policies and programs, but implementation staggers and observance and adherence to signed frameworks is neither monitored nor pushed. Political will and capabilities within the member states to implement in addition to ratification are questionable**.** Observance is not monitored, and deviation is rarely criticised.

SADC comparative advantages include Frontline States credibility, gradual and consistent approaches, mediation experience, and well-crafted policy frameworks. While the liberation movement legacy is a potential risk for the political development within the member states, it also constitutes an asset for influence and mediation in the region. The Frontline States credibility and respect for liberation elders still carry a lot of weight. The fact that SADCs peace and security structures are built on the legacy of the Frontline States, though, also influences the organisation negatively as it places potential constraints on the political manoeuvring in the region.

A SADC challenge over the next years is the issue of unconstitutional changes or maintenance of government in the region. Democratisation and succession issues in the member states seem to be coupled with risks of violent power struggles and resulting turmoil. The transformation from liberation movement rule to multi-party democratic systems in the member states must be closely followed by SADC, as set-backs can be expected.

Other identified regional challenges include food insecurity, energy crises (impedes development, and energy supply needs infrastructure), **and trans-border issues** (including light weapons flows, migration, trans-border crime, and drug trade). Contingency plans and capabilities for management of natural disasters and phenomena have yet to be developed.

Priority areas for capability development is to strengthen the secretariat, operationalise the African Standby Force and the Regional Early Warning System, and to strengthen institutional capacity for election monitoring, mediation, and regional disaster management.

There are remaining concerns that SADCBRIG will not be operational by 2010 as intended, mainly due to issues of availability of pledged forces, interoperability, lack of a logistics concept and depot, and the slow progress in the development of civilian capabilities.

SADC will not be eligible for partnerships in the field of peace and security to *any greater extent*. Within SADC, Politics, Defence and Security have traditionally been areas exempted from external partnerships. Whilst the Secretariat and Organ recognise both a need and desire to receive more funding and support for its political endeavours, many member states still emphasise organisational liberty and freedom from donors directing SADC policy.

There may be entry points for external partnership in smaller sub-areas of SADC peace and security emerging. There are indications that SADC might be opening up to partnerships in some peace and security related areas. Matching suggestions for partnerships and support to needs portrayed by SADC, priority areas for potential partners include support for election monitoring, support for the development of the Mediation Unit, and support for regional contingency planning for disasters and migration flows. External offers to support military capability development and early warning systems are likely to be declined.

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

The emerging structures for peace and security in Africa continue to evolve. International partners seeking to cooperatively engage with these structures benefit from a thorough understanding of the context, challenges and opportunities that lie ahead of this evolution. A comprehensive grasp of the African politico-security context, and the *African Peace and Security Architecture* (APSA) in particular, cannot be obtained without understanding the regional mechanisms which constitute it. This study has been conducted to obtain and promote knowledge about one of these regional agents: The *Southern African Development Community* (SADC).

SADC is an inter-governmental regional organisation based in southern Africa and likewise one of the continent's prominent regional co-operation bodies. The organisation plays an important role in this area of peace and security within both the southern African region and on the African continent as a whole.

SADC has 15 member states – Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – and has three different official working languages.[2] SADC headquarters and secretariat are located in Gaborone, Botswana.

Originally an organisation primarily aiming to promote socio-economic co-operation and integration, SADC is also increasingly taking on the tasks of enhancing political and security cooperation amongst its member states, acknowledging that without peace and security, further socio-economic development of the region is impossible.[3]

SADC works to promote common goals for its member states on a range of issues, including in the fields of economics, environment, politics, peace and security.[4] The main objective of SADC is to facilitate and support economic growth and development in southern Africa, with the aim of alleviating and eradicating poverty in the region. In addition, the organisation has sought to make an effort to combat and prevent HIV/AIDS, which is highly prevalent in the region (some member states have the highest ratio of HIV/AIDS infected populations in the world) and a major threat to achieving the overarching aims of

[2] Van Niuwkerk, Antoni. 2001. 'Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared'. *African Security Review* 10: 2 2001, p 5
[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid, p 4

the organisation. The SADC treaty[5] emphasises that the socio-economic development of the region must be self-reliant, that is, without long-term dependency on foreign nations, organisations or resources, as well as being environmentally sustainable. It also emphasises regional solidarity, the equitable integration of its member states, and the harmonisation of national and regional strategies and programmes as essential in bringing about such socio-economic development. The common political values and historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region is acknowledged in the Treaty, which in addition lists the promotion and strengthening of these commonalities, as well as the consolidation and defence of democracy, peace and security as further overarching objectives of the organisation.

1.2 Aim and Method

The aim of this report is to increase the level of knowledge about SADC as an organisation and actor within the field of peace and security in Africa. It also seeks to inform discussions about potential partnerships and support from external donors to SADCs peace and security structures.

The report seeks to discuss and problematise the development of the *SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security* as a key component of the organisation's peace and security capabilities, as well as the role of SADC within the wider *African Peace and Security Architecture* (APSA).

The study is partly descriptive as it contains a general overview of the background and organisation of SADC, leading up to its contemporary structures. The study also focuses on SADCs frameworks for and activities in the area of politics and security, forming a more detailed study of SADCs means and mandates for conflict prevention and management, as well as its track record in this field. The report seeks to analyse the political context of SADCs peace and security endeavours as well as SADCs endeavour to build a SADC standby brigade (SADCBRIG) for the African Union's African Standby Force (ASF).

The research for this study was conducted using a range of both primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources are scholarly books and articles, and the primary sources include official documents such as treaties and doctrines, amongst others. In addition, several interviews with officials from SADC, the EU and the South African Ministry of Defence, as well as a range of other relevant think-tanks and institutes in southern Africa, have been carried out. The interviews were conducted during a research trip to South Africa and Botswana in February-March 2009.

[5] Southern African Development Community. 2001. *Amended Declaration and Treaty of SADC*
Southern African Development Community. 1992. *Declaration and Treaty of SADC*

This report is part of a series of studies on the existing and emerging capabilities and structures for peace and security in Africa, conducted within the FOI Studies in African Security programme on commission from the Swedish Ministry of Defence. [6]

1.3 Outline of the report

The report starts with describing the organisational context of SADC; its background and heritage as well as the structures of the present day organisation. The first chapter then subsequently explains the formation of the 'two wings' of SADC: The socio-economic development structures of 'SADC proper' and the politics and security related mechanisms in the 'SADC Organ'. The first section also describes the regional context and SADCs role in relation to other multilateral organisations within southern Africa.

The second chapter continues exploring SADCs role in peace and security exclusively, to create a better understanding of its past achievements as well as future potentials and challenges in this area. The chapter begins by exploring the framework documents which outlines SADCs mandate and authority to act in the field of peace and security. These documents include the *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation*, the *Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ* (SIPO) and the *Mutual Defence Pact* (MDP), amongst others. The report then outlines SADCs track record in peacekeeping and conflict resolution initiatives to generate an understanding of the organisations experiences and capacities.

The political context of southern Africa, and its impact on SADC as a peace and security actor, is explored in chapter three. The concept of a 'liberation legacy' is introduced as having a key impact on SADC politics, and the chapter explores the role of powerful states in the furtherance of the organisation's agenda. The chapter also discusses some of the major perceived challenges to SADC integration.

[6] Previous reports from the FOI Studies in African Security Programme in this series include Bogland et al. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management*. Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475; Svensson, E. 2008. *The African Mission in Burundi – Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation*, Swedish defence Research Agency, FOI report 2561; Ekengard, A. 2008. *The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – Experiences and Lessons Learned,* Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI report 2559; Svensson, E. 2008. *The African Union's Operations in the Comoros – MAES and Operation Democracy*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI report 2659; Hull, C, and Svensson, E. 2009. *African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – Exemplifying AU Peacekeeping Challenges* , Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI report 2596; Schmidt, J. 2008. *Capacity-building of AU Peace Support Operations – the Civilian Dimension* , Swedish defence Research Agency, FOI report 2601 and Derblom, M et a . 2008.*UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa*, Swedish defence Research Agency, FOI report 2602

In the fifth chapter, SADCs direct role within APSA is described, focusing particularly on the organisations relation to the AU and the establishment of SADCBRIG. The status and aim of the standby brigade is illustrated along with the major challenges to fulfilling SADCs responsibilities to the ASF according within the established timeline.

In the sixth chapter, SADCs attitudes towards outside assistance and donors are briefly explained. Some of the existing partners and areas of potential partnership are also outlined.

In the final and concluding section, the report ends with a presentation of the key conclusions regarding the status and future of SADC. Recommendations and suggestions for how to deal with present and upcoming challenges are also made, together with advice on areas of potential partnerships.

2 SADC organisational context

The contemporary SADC can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s and two particular organisations: The *Frontline States* (FLS) and the *Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference* (SADCC), respectively representing the forerunners to the political and security cooperation wing, and the socio-economic cooperation segment of SADC.

2.1 Background: The FLS and the SADCC

The FLS was formed in the mid 1970s by Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana, as an informal collective security regime to assist in the anti-colonial liberation struggles of states such as Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia (South West Africa). It also dealt with the political (and occasionally military) problems commonly facing newly independent governments such as Angola, who joined the organisation immediately after gaining independence. [7]

The FLS was constituted as an informal entity and included both representatives from national governments as well as from various liberation movements in its meetings. Within the FLS, a forum where defence and security ministers from the frontline states could meet regularly was established.[8] This forum – the *Inter-State Defence and Security Committee* (ISDSC) – became an institutionalised, yet informal, setting for discussing issues relating to national and collective security and defence, and the FLS as a whole came to serve as an important barricade against apartheid South Africa.[9]

In 1980, following the election of Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe joined the FLS in its continued de-colonisation efforts. Namibia followed suit in 1990 and in 1994, with the end of apartheid, South Africa also became a member.[10] Upon this, the primary motifs for its existence had diminished to the degree that the FLS was dissolved.[11] In reality, the FLS had played its most important role in promoting de-colonisation in the years before the end of white-rule in Rhodesia, and began loosing effect after 1980.

[7] Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. *Monograph* No.19
[8] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 158
[9] Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems, p 188
[10] Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. 'Building Security in southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture'. Monograph 43
[11] Ibid

Instead, the economic difficulties facing the alliance's member states became a primary challenge, as indicated by the founding of the SADCC in 1980.[12] SADCC was a loose organisation seeking to promote co-operation and co-ordination rather than formal integration and operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. It existed as an alliance between Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[13] The aim was to reduce the economic and transportation dependency on external actors, particularly South Africa. In practice, this meant coordinating the development initiatives of its member states, as well as coordinating foreign assistance and investment coming into the region, e.g., in the field of infrastructure development.[14] In 1989, a decision was finally taken to formalise SADCC and the process that would result in the establishment of the *South African Development Community* (SADC) in 1992 was initiated.[15] As the FLS was dissolved in 1994 it was decided that the ISDSC structure would remain, and be expanded to embrace all SADC states. However, the ISDSC operated outside of the formal SADC framework. Just as the FLS and SADCC (but unlike SADC) the ISDSC had no charter or constitution; neither did it have any formalised physical structures such as a headquarters or a secretariat. [16]

2.2 The 'Two SADCs'

SADCC and the FLS had remained detached structures with separate responsibilities in the respective fields of development and economics; and politics and security. The post-colonial and post-apartheid era was thought to bring renewed possibility for cooperation in a peaceful and secure environment.[17] The *Declaration and Treaty on SADC*, signed in 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, stated that the newfound stability was a prerequisite for cooperation, and, in its turn, development. Therefore, frameworks and mechanisms needed to be established to strengthen and support regional solidarity, peace and security. To do so, it was envisaged, the approaches of both SADCC and the FLS needed to change. SADCC became SADC in that same year and a greater emphasis was placed on 'integration' rather than mere 'cooperation'. Staying with the objective of enhancing development, SADC became a promoter of trade liberalisation and economic integration in the region.

[12] Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. 'Building Security in southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture'. *Monograph* 43
[13] Southern African Development Community, Homepage – *Profile*, http://www.sadc.int/
[14] Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. *Monograph* No.19
[15] Ibid
[16] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, p 188
[17] Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. *Monograph* No.19

Though the economic and development aspirations remained in the forefront, SADCs role as a political organisation grew larger and transcended the area of developmental activities.[18] A new mechanism for maintaining democracy and strengthening peace and security at the regional level was needed. One major question, however, was whether the mechanism should exist within the SADC framework or not.[19] When the FLS was dissolved, its informal structures were incorporated as the political and security wing of SADC. Yet, at this time these structures were only loosely and informally associated.[20] As a result, foreign policy and security issues were still dealt with in an ad-hoc fashion and kept separate from the economic development tasks otherwise undertaken by SADC and its Secretariat.[21]

In 1996 it was suggested that a permanent arrangement to deal specifically with political and defence issues within SADC should be created. The proposal for a *SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security* (OPDS), commonly referred to simply as 'the Organ', caused much wrangling and led to a small crisis within SADC as different opinions arose regarding what the structural relationship between 'SADC proper' and the Organ should look like. Whilst the then President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, chaired SADC proper, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became the first Chairperson of the Organ. Mandela and Mugabe greatly differed in their opinion of how the Organ should be structured. Reportedly, this clash had as much to do with their individual roles as people of importance in Southern Africa as the actual structure of SADC.[22] The proposal stipulated that the Organ would function independently of the rest of SADC and have its own summit level body with authority over political and defence related matters. The opinion of South Africa, based on the provisions of the SADC treaty, was that the SADC summit was the supreme policy making institution of SADC. Even though the Organ could be a separate structure at lower levels, the 'two legs' of SADC would have to meet at Summit level and the Organ be

[18] Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. *Monograph* No.19

[19] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8, p 45

[20] Bam, Sivuile. 2006. 'SADC's Security Architecture: Policy-based Research and Capacity Building', in C.Hendricks (ed), 'From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges', Monograph 122; Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. Monograph No.19; Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 2, p158

[21] Cilliers, Jakkie. 1996. The *SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security*. ISS Occasional paper No. 10. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

[22] Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. *Monograph* No.19

subordinate the decision-making authority of the Summit of SADC proper. [23] Zimbabwe, on the other hand, argued that the Organ ought to maintain much of the informality of the FLS and that keeping the Organ separate from other SADC structures would allow for more informal and confidential consultations, better serving its purpose. [24] Zimbabwe insisted that the Organ should have its own summit, chairperson and mandate, and argued that the Chair of the Organ should be held by the longest serving head of state in the region (which at the time was Mugabe himself). [25]

In addition, an argument was made that SADC was a highly donor-funded organisation and if the Organ operated out of the Gaborone secretariat it would risk making sensitive security information available to donors, or make the Organ a pawn to the funding of those states who's political influence on the continent the FLS had so long fought against.[26] This strategy of attempting to keep donors and outside partners out of SADCs political and security activities has been practiced within the Organ even until today. Yet, Mandela opposed, and threatened to have South Africa resign as SADC chair if a separate Organ Summit was created.[27] The different viewpoints on the Organ came to somewhat polarise the region. As a result of the bickering, the Organ was left largely inoperable until a final protocol for the Organ could be agreed upon. The only framework for defence and security co-operation in Southern Africa at ministerial level that was working up until 2001, as the other structures of the SADC Organ laid dormant, was the ISDSC.

In 2001, at the SADC Summit in Blantyre, the *SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*[28] ('the Protocol') was finally adopted. At this stage it was decided that the Organ would be integrated into the overall SADC structures and placed under the authority of the SADC Summit. The informality

[23] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC. University of Pretoria, p 163

[24] Centre for Conflict resolution. 2004. *The AU/NEPAD and Africa's evolving governance and security architecture*. Policy Advisory Meeting Report, 11-12 December Johannesburg South Africa; Malan, Mark. 1998. 'SADC and Sub-regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?'. *Monograph* No.19

[25] Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems, p 204

[26] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 2, p 164

[27] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 2 , p 158

[28] SADC. 2001. *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,* Blantyre

inherited from the FLS was abandoned.[29] Whilst SADC had been a strong organisation in the respect of economic cooperation and the promotion of free trade, it had made little advancement in the field of peace and security.[30] With the signing of the Protocol, SADC was finally established as a 'security community'. The Protocol addressed the issues on which the leaders had previously failed to reach consensus and made the Organ operational.[31] It also paved the way for SADC to develop regional capabilities for peacekeeping operations.[32] In addition, the Protocol mentioned a greater future collective security arrangement through the suggested formation of a Mutual Defence Pact.[33]

The organisations heritage, particularly from the FLS, has a range of implications for SADC, generating a lot of credibility and weight to the organisation but also constraining its political manoeuvring and posing a risk to the political development of the member states. The affect this history has on the current organisation will also be explored later in the report.[34]

2.3 Organisation and Structure

This section describes the organisational structure of SADC as a whole, including SADCs 'two legs' – the main structure as well as the organ – in addition to briefly portraying the organisations executive arm: the secretariat. Whilst the peace and security structures of the Organ are of primary concern to this report, the structures of SADC proper will also be outlined for purpose generating a better overview of the entire organisation. The different offices of the secretariat will be illustrated to outlined its general administrative areas but will not be described to any greater extent.

[29] Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems, p193
[30] Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm
[31] Ngoma, Naison. 2003. 'SADC: Towards a Security Community?' *African Security Review* 12(3)
[32] Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm
[33] Ngoma, Naison. 2003. 'SADC: Towards a Security Community?' *African Security Review* 12(3)
[34] See also Adolfo, Eldridge. Forthcoming 2009. *SADC Liberation movement mentality – Insights into why it is influential: A Case study on SADC and Zimbabwe*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI



Figure 1: SADC organisational overview

2.3.1 SADC Proper

The *SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government* is the top policy-making mechanism of SADC with responsibility for the overall policy direction and structural functions of the organisation. It meets for two days once a year, in late summer or early autumn, in one of the SADC Member States. At these events, a new Chairperson and Deputy are elected. Extra-Ordinary Summits can be called at any time when necessary throughout the year. Below the Summit is the *Troika*, which is made up of the elected chair (a SADC Head of State or Government), as well as his/her predecessor and successor. The Troika rotates on an annual basis. The Troika system allows SADC to execute tasks and implementing important decisions, as well as provide policy direction to SADC institutions, in between regular SADC meetings.[35]

The *Council of Ministers*, consisting of one minister per member state, is the body responsible for overseeing the functioning and development of SADC and ensuring that its policies are properly implemented. The Council usually meets at the beginning of each year and in August or September, just before the annual SADC Summit. The Council is supported by the *Standing Committee of Officials*. The Standing Committee is made up of a Permanent Secretary or equivalent official from each Member State, preferably from the ministries for economic planning or finance, and functions as a technical advisory to the Council. [36]

Since 2003 a structure for overseeing the work of the Secretariat has been in existence: the *Integrated Committee of Officials*. Reporting directly to the Council of Ministers, the Integrated Committee serves as an umbrella policy organ for all SADC Programmes of Action activities and bears responsibility for the implementation of them. It meets once a year, and is attended by at least two ministers from each Member State.[37] *National Committees*, composed of key stakeholders such as governments, private sector and civil society in Member States, also carry a responsibility for the initiation of projects in line with the agreed plans. The main function of the National Committees is to provide national inputs into the formulation of regional policies and strategies, as well as to coordinate and oversee the implementation of regional programmes at national levels.

[35] Institute for Security Studies, website. Profile: South African development Community (SADC), http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3069&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid

2.3.2 The Organ

The Organ is situated under the SADC Summit, which it reports to, and is headed by the SADC *Organ Troika* – current, outgoing and incoming chair of the Organ. The SADC Organ chair (a Head of State or Government) is elected by the SADC summit and cannot be the same person as the chair of the SADC Troika.[38] Whilst both situated under the SADC summit, the SADC Troika and the SADC Organ Troika are mutually exclusive.[39] The Organ is a security mechanism similar to that of the Security Council within the United Nations (UN), or the AU's *Peace and Security Council*. It is mandated to deal with inter and intra-state conflicts and can use means such as preventative diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and – as a means of last resort – force; its powers and functions are thus consistent with Chapter VI and VII of the UN charter. [40]

Reporting to the Organ Chairperson is a Ministerial Committee comprised of the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each Member State, responsible for the co-ordination of all the work of the Organ, as well as its related structures. These ministers are then split into two separate sub-structures within the Organ: The *Inter-State Defence and Security Committee* (ISDSC) and the *Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee* (ISPDC). The ISDSC brings together the ministers for Defence, Public Security and State Security to deal with 'hard security' issues such as military cooperation. The ISPDC in its turn is responsible for softer issues such as good governance and human rights, dealt with by the Foreign Ministers of each member state. [41] The Ministerial Committee, as well as the ISPDC and ISDSC are chaired by ministers from the country holding the Organ Chair, rotating on a similar annual basis.[42]

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[38] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 162

[39] Institute for Security Studies, website. *Profile: South African development Community (SADC)*, http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3069&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3

[40] Centre for Conflict resolution. 2004. *The AU/NEPAD and Africa's evolving governance and security architecture*. Policy Advisory Meeting Report, 11-12 December Johannesburg South Africa, p 27

[41] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC. University of Pretoria, p 165; Institute for Security Studies, website. *Profile: South African development Community (SADC)*, http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3069&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3; Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2

[42] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 163

2.3.3 The secretariat

The principal executive institution of SADC is its *Secretariat*. Based in Gaborone, Botswana, the secretariat is responsible for the strategic planning, coordination and management of SADC programmes. [43] The green boxes in the figure below imply the offices most directly dealing with peace and security related matters.



Figure 2: SADC Secretariat organisational overview.

2.4 Southern African Regional Integration

Several other regional integration initiatives exist in southern Africa, addressing various issues on which integration is needed. As memberships in these organisations often overlap, on occasion conflicts of interest arise and the overlapping membership can constitute both opportunities and impediments to promote further integration within SADC. The southern African region has been accused of having "the largest number of regional groupings in the world" but

[43] Institute for Security Studies, website. *Profile: South African development Community (SADC)*, http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3069&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3

also “the largest number of ineffective or dormant arrangements”.[44] The region is particularly overstretched in the economical area with, for example, a number of overlapping customs unions in existence.[45] In addition, a few SADC member states have membership in other Regional Economic Communities (REC), creating multiple responsibilities for contributing to Regional Early Warning capabilities and standby brigades for the ASF within the overall APSA[46] (see also chapter 5).



Figure 3: Some of the most important regional arrangements and memberships existing in Southern Africa or linked to SADC member states.

[44] McCarthy, Colin. 2004. ‘The new Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACUIA): Challenges and Prospects’. In D. Hansohm et al (ED) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa*, vol 4, p158

[45] European Commission, SADC. 2008. Regional Strategy Paper & Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2010. Strasbourg, p18

[46] The DRC and Angola are members of SADC as well as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), whilst Tanzania and Madagascar are simultaneously members of SADC and the East Africa Peace and Security Mechanism

Within SADC, a free trade area was envisaged to have been established 2008, a common customs union by 2010, a common market by 2015 and a monetary union and a common SADC currency by 2016 and 2018 respectively.[47] The overlapping membership arrangements raise questions about the viability of such economic integration in the SADC region. The truth is that several member states already form part of various such arrangements and occasionally discussions of whether or not to abandon old arrangements in favour of new, SADC common, ones have led to conflict between those states seeking to preserve old institutions and those favouring the establishment of joint SADC economic mechanisms. [48] SACU, the *Southern Africa Customs Union*, whose members include Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, is one such case in point.[49] As the oldest customs union in the world, and often described as one of the most effectively operating ones as well, SACU has the potential to expand its membership to include other SADC states.[50]

Another important regional free trade institution is COMESA – the *Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa*, which includes some key SADC states but also expands it membership beyond the southern African region to the wider African continent. COMESA was formed in 1994 to replace a Preferential Trade Agreement that had existed since 1981. As the post-apartheid South African governments sought to, for the first time, join in on African integration schemes, much pressure was put on South Africa to join COMESA. The South African government eventually opted to join SADC instead, for two primary reasons: the recognition of owning a debt to the former Frontline States for pursuing the anti-apartheid struggle; and a perception that COMESA was too large an organisation that might prove unmanageable. The decision to join SADC was perceived by parts of COMESA as undermining continental unity in favour of regional integration. Several SADC members, such as the DRC, Malawi, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Zambia, are also members of COMESA. [51]

[47] SAIIA, SIDA. Draft 2007. *South Africa in Africa.* South African Institute of International Affairs
[48] SAIIA, SIDA. Draft 2007. *South Africa in Africa.* South African Institute of International Affairs.
[49] For further discussuin on this conflict see section 4.5
[50] Ibid
[51] Ibid; COMESA. Homepage Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. http://about.comesa.int/

3 SADC Peace and Security

It has been argued that the Organ, the politico-security wing of SADC, has yet to manifest itself to match its envisioned task. The Organ's support structures can be described as being two legged: One leg, represented by the ISPDC, dealing with political 'soft power' issues, and the other, the ISDSC, with defence and 'hard power' related matters. As argued earlier, the Organ was for many years defunct and inoperable. Its defence and security leg, nonetheless, managed to at least somewhat keep on track during the 1990s due to the fact that it had inherited most of its informal structures from the FLS. In contrast, the political leg was weakly conceptualised, poorly institutionalised and is still, despite being active since the beginning of this decade, lacking some of the staff and capabilities that exist within the defence related structures. [52]

The SADC track record in the area of peace and security must be examined in the light of these realities, as well as the fact that though the Organ was launched in 1996, it was not until 2001 that it became a formal SADC device and that its previous existence had been clouded in disagreement over its role in relation to SADC proper. In addition, SADC peace and security efforts cannot be considered without taking into account the broader context of the UN, the AU and its predecessor the OAU, which provide the international and continental backdrop to peace efforts in Southern Africa. The Organ protocol makes explicit reference to these two organisations stating that the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and also acknowledging the role of the (then) OAU in this area.[53]

This section will first look at the most important SADC legal documents guiding the organisation's role in peace and security on the African continent – their textual context as well as implementation. Then, SADCs actual track record in the field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping will be explored.

[52]Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC. University of Pretoria, p 165

[53] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2

3.1 Documents and Frameworks

3.1.1 The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,

The *SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation* was adopted in 2001 to provide a mechanism for harmonising the foreign policies of the member states, as well as a framework for implementing peace and security initiatives such as conflict prevention and peace-building. The Protocol outlines the objectives and structures of the Organ, including the chairmanship; the ministerial committee; the ISPDC and ISDSC, and the Secretariat; relations to other non-state parties and International Organisations; and the jurisdiction and obligations of the Organ in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as the methods and procedures for addressing this issue.[54]

The Protocol stresses the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aggression, as well as a primary approach to inter- and intra-state conflict through peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The Protocol nevertheless reserves the right of the Organ to consider enforcement actions, in accordance with international law, as a matter of last resort where all peaceful means have failed.[55] The Protocol reconfirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, while at the same time declaring its own role as a regional security mechanism, referring to Chapter VIII of the UN charter. It states that the Organ constitutes the institutional framework within which SADC member states could coordinate their defence and foreign policies to the benefit of the whole region.[56] To this end, the Protocol envisages the development of common foreign policies, a mutual defence pact, the promotion of democracy, the monitoring of universal human rights, and the establishment of an early warning system, under the auspice of SADC.[57]

When the Organ was launched in 1996 it was evident that it was intended to promote *security* in the wider meaning of the word: i.e. *human security*. The 1996 communiqué establishing the Organ committed it to "promote the political,

[54] SADC. 2001. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre
[55] SADC. 2001. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre, article 2 d, e,
[56] Ibid
[57] Van Niuwkerk, Antoni. 2001. 'Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared'. *African Security Review* 10: 2 2001, p 6

economical, social and environmental dimensions of security", thus abandoning the narrow concept of military security which had long been the dominant understanding of the term worldwide.[58] Though omitted in the 2001 Protocol, the wider approach to security was likely to re-emerge by default due to the Organ's integration into overall SADC structures. [59] The efforts of the political leg of the Organ in promoting a range of protocols on issues falling into the category of human security are evidence of such an approach.

The Protocol has been signed by all SADC member states except Angola, which has nonetheless ratified and acceded to the protocol.[60]

3.1.2 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Security and Defence Co-Operation (SIPO)

In 2004, SADC consolidated its peace and security strategies in a *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Security Defence and Co-operation* (SIPO). Intended as a broad five-year plan, the SIPO contains guidelines for the implementation of the 28 objectives set out in the Protocol.[61] In addition, it makes recommendations on how the Organ support structures and Secretariat should be devised. The SIPO suggests general strategies and activities for implementation in the areas of politics, defence, state security, and public security, touching ouches upon 'hard' security provisions – such as the mobilisation of regional peacekeeping capabilities, countering trafficking of small arms and finalising a Mutual Defence pact; as well as on broader human security issues – such as emphasizing good governance and democratic elections, HIV/AIDS, poverty and gender-related issues. Civil Society actors have criticised the SIPO for failing to clearly define mechanisms for addressing human security challenges in favour of strategies to address the more defence and 'narrow' security related issues. [62]

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[58] SADC. 2001. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre; Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 156

[59] SADC. 2001. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre; Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 2, p 162

[60] SADC. 2001. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre; SADC. 2003. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/toc.htm

[61] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC. University of Pretoria, p 165; Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2005. *Whither SADC?: Southern Africa's post-apartheid security agenda.* Seminar Report, Cape Town South Africa 18-19 June 2005, p 16

[62] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2005. *Whither SADC?: Southern Africa's post-apartheid security agenda.* Seminar Report, Cape Town South Africa 18-19 June 2005, p 10

The SIPO is one of two key SADC documental policy instruments. The second is the *Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan* (RISDP), written in 2001. The RISDP was to provide a clear strategic direction for SADC policies, programmes and activities over the long term. Both the SIPO and the RISDP aim to promote peace and security in southern Africa through integration. However, whilst SIPO focuses on political and defence related integration, the RISDP concentrates on SADCs economic and social policies.[63] Even though there is a relatively clear divide between the issue areas dealt with in the SIPO and the RISDP, it has been argued that the lines of division become unclear on areas such as politics and governance, touched upon in both documents. A possible explanation is the different origins of the two documents, [64] and a lack of sufficient coordination between their authors.[65]

Both the SIPO and RISDP are generally perceived as well-crafted, highly ambitious and inclusive plans, but criticism has been voiced that the many far-ranging objectives are just too ambitious and that they have little chance of attainment within the foreseeable future. Implementation staggers, and the lack of clarity as to the relative sequence and priority of objectives is negatively affecting the process. Due to lack of relevant expertise, as well as human and financial resources, the SADC Secretariat has been unable to fully implement either of the documents; however, implementation of the RISDP has advanced far further than that of the SIPO, which has not yet made any major advances in operationalising the goals and objectives.[66] There are several possible explanations for this, including e.g. lack of practical implementation strategies,[67] need for greater consolidation and streamlining of objectives and priorities.[68] In addition, the strategies and activities listed are uneven in specificity, varying in detail among the different sectors. [69]

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[63] SADC. 2003. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/toc.htm

[64] The RISDP was written by a team of consultants and officials from the SADC Secretariat and member states, and the SIPO was formulated by government officials from the member states under the auspice of the Organ Chairperson. See e.g. Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 5, p 176

[65] Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 5, p 176

[66] Ibid; Interview Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009

[67] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2005. Whither SADC?: Southern Africa's post-apartheid security agenda. Seminar Report, Cape Town South Africa 18-19 June 2005, p 6; Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 5, p 176

[68] Interview at SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26 2009.

[69] Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 5, p 176

The SIPO is currently undergoing revision, commenced in March 2009. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria has a key role in this along with member states and the SADC Secretariat, though some concerns are raised that the revision should be a much more inclusive process, for example that it should civil society actors in southern Africa.[70] Opinions from within SADC state that the aim of the revision should be to create a new plan with implementation activities linked to priority objectives and cross-cutting issues. The SIPO revision should also be complemented with changes in the RISDP to bring peace and security and other developments closer to each other. [71]

3.1.3 The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP)

The *Mutual Defence Pact* (MDP), signed at the SADC summit in August 2003 and linked to objectives in the SIPO and the Protocol, provides the framework for security cooperation and represents a tangible move towards the creation of a security community. It lists, among other things, areas in which defence cooperation should be undertaken, e.g. training, joint-research and intelligence exchange; principles for collective action against armed attack; and provides for confidentiality regarding classified information amongst the Pact's signatories.[72] The adoption of the MDP is part of the strand of protecting against external acts of aggression. Thus, the SADC Organ might be interpreted as a collective security body with defence pact components. [73]

The formulation of the Pact had commenced long before 2003 and included a number of earlier drafts. The slow formulation process was essentially due to a concern amongst some member states regarding Article 6 dealing with the nature of state parties' reactions to a military attack on a fellow signatory.[74] Article 6 (1) states that an "[armed] attack shall be met with immediate collective action".[75] The sentence generated a lot of controversy because it bound signatories to collective action, interpreted as military action, in the case of armed attack. After objections from some SADC states Article 6 (3) was added: "each State party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate", leaving room for states to provide minimum action, or even none at all, should it

[70] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2005. *Whither SADC?: Southern Africa's post-apartheid security agenda.* Seminar Report, Cape Town South Africa 18-19 June 2005, p 8
[71] Interview at SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26 2009.
[72] SADC.2003. Mutual Defence Pact, http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/defpact.pdf
[73] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 2 ,p 156, 161
[74] Ngoma, Naison. 2004. 'SADC'S Mutual Defence Pact: A Final Move to a Security Community?' *The Round Table*, Vol. 93, No. 375, p, 414
[75] SADC. 2003. Mutual defence pact, article 6 (1)

judge participation in such collective arrangements hazardous.[76] The clause also provides for collective action other than the use of force, such as diplomatic measures and sanctions, for example. Some have argued that article 6 (3) has lowered the effectiveness of the collective security arrangement[77], in reality the MDP goes no further to commit signatories to the defence of fellow state parties than the Protocol already did, but exclusion of the clause had probably resulted in the refusal of several states to sign the pact. The DRC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe had already previously signed a Mutual Defence Pact in 1999 to formalise the joint action taken by the latter three when they had intervened in the DRC, at the request of President Kabila Senior, the previous year to defend the state against what they considered 'armed attack' by Rwanda and Uganda.[78] These four states had preferred to simply extend their MDP to include the rest of the SADC states, without the addition of the 6 (3) clause; however, states like Botswana and South Africa pursued an opposing agenda in the South African tradition of favouring diplomatic initiatives – such as mediation, negotiation, and possibly peacekeeping – to military intervention.[79]

The formulation of the defence pact led to a contest between a South African-led 'peace-making' block and a Zimbabwe-led 'defence-treaty' grouping where Zimbabwe wanted a defence pact legally obliging SADC states to assist fellow member states against aggression and threats by both internal and external actors. The South African standpoint was rather that such obligatory and automatic military involvement prevented SADC states from adopting other, possibly more appropriate, conflict resolution strategies, for example taking a role as an outside peace mediator and facilitator. The formulation endorsed peacekeeping interventions but left little room for SADC hosting multilateral negotiations. Depending on the context, both means could be important in promoting peace and stability, but the suggested defence pact would make any diplomatic involvement impossible, immediately making the whole of SADC a party to the conflict. In addition, interventionist actions required much larger and costly commitments than other peace-making means. [80] Finally, the envisaged defence pact would reduce the potential for engagement by such multilateral institutions

[76] Ibid, article 6 (3); Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. 2003. 'The SADC Mutual Defence Pact: Si vis pacem, para bellum?'. *Global Insight* 26 (1)

[77] Ngoma, Naison. 2004. SADCS Mutual Defence Pact: A Final Move to a Security Community? The Round Table, Vol. 93, No. 375, 411–423, July 2004, 417

[78] Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems

[79] Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. 2003. 'The SADC Mutual Defence Pact: Si vis pacem, para bellum?'. Global Insight 26 (1); Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems; Ngoma, Naison. 2003. 'SADC: Towards a Security Community?'. African Security Review 12(3), p 414

[80] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC. University of Pretoria, p 187-188

as the UN, which, according to the SADC treaty, still carried the primary responsibility for international peace and security. The peace-making block considered the primacy of the UN important whilst the defence-pact states wanted to ensure SADC could operate freely. The role of the UN and AU in the defence pact became another important drafting issue. After discussions the last draft of the Pact had Article 6 (4) altered from stating that no military intervention could take place without the UNs approval, to saying that any such measures should immediately be reported to the UN Security Council and the AU PSC. The provision left the signatories with a great deal of flexibility in working in accordance with the groupings' own preference.[81] Yet some analysts have noted that the article suggests that the Pact might be used to protect illegitimate rulers against 'internal threats' or other interventions the Security Council would be unlikely to give support to.[82]

3.1.4 Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections

A common challenge amongst SADC states is that of governance. Many states in southern Africa experience problems with weak institutional capacity; poor election quality; poor participation in politics and poorly delivering states. Another important challenge is the issue of unconstitutional changes or maintenance of government in the region. Democratisation and succession issues in the member states are real challenges in the region, particularly in relation to the liberation movement legacy.[83] There are several SADC frameworks dealing with the issue of governance, democracy and approaches to unconstitutional changes of government, seeking to strengthen public institutions; strengthening and deepening democracy; and strengthening checks and balances within and outside states. In addition to the SIPO and RISDP, SADC has adopted its *Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections in southern Africa*[84]. This charter, with links to the PSC protocol, the SADC Protocol, and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, is an emerging, modern framework, signed and ratified by several member states. However, ratification does not necessarily mean implementation, and the potential impact and member state observance of the principles is still unclear.

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[81] Ngoma, Naison. 2003. 'SADC: Towards a Security Community?'. African Security Review 12(3), p 417

[82] Van Schalkwyk, G and Cilliers, J. 2004. 'Civil Society and the SADC agenda', in D.Hansohm et al (ed) Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook. Volume 4, p 108

[83] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2007. Southern Africa: Building and Effective Security and Governamce Architecture for the 21st Century. Policy advisory group seminar report. 29-30 may 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, pp 16-18

[84] SADC. 2004. *Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections*. http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/elecprinciples.pdf

3.2 Track Record

From 1998 onwards the Southern African region was faced with a series of violent conflicts within its member states: Full-blown war in the DRC, state repression and political violence in Zimbabwe, election disputes in Malawi and Zanzibar (Tanzania), election disputes and mutiny in Lesotho, a failed secessionist bid in Namibia, constitutional crisis in Zambia and civil war in Angola.[85] Despite the SADC Organ not being functional for another few years, individual member states, with varying SADC legitimacy, still embarked on a variety of peace and security initiatives ranging from mediation efforts or the use of sanctions to direct military operations, some of which also involved the efforts of the UN and the OAU (see table below).[86]

Since the 2001 signing of the Protocol, SADC has not been involved in any military operations, but has rather been preoccupied with diplomatic initiatives, particularly in relation to the situation in Zimbabwe. Yet, many of SADCs peace and security endeavours have been military-related. A recurring discussion, prevalent even during the 1990s, has been that of creating a SADC standing peacekeeping force to ensure that its member states have sufficient capabilities to undertake peacekeeping missions whenever needed. To strengthen such capacity, SADC began conducting peacekeeping exercises already in 1997 at its Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, and in 2001 in South Africa.[87] From fear that military intervention might overshadow preventative diplomacy, and peacekeeping becoming an avenue for militarisation, SADC member states initially agreed not to develop a separate peacekeeping force of its own, but rather to strengthen the already existing militaries of its member states' capacity for conducting peace operations. [88] Nonetheless, SADC caved to this agreement in 1999 with the decision to create a brigade–size common peacekeeping force. The endeavour initially moved slowly but picked up pace as the OAU became the AU in 2002 and a decision was taken the following year to establish an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF would draw its components from the sub-regional structures and it was decided that a SADC standby brigade would be developed overtime until 2010 to fulfil SADC obligations to the AU and the

[85] Nathan, Laurie. 2004. *The absence of common values and failure of common security in southern Africa 1992-2003*. Crisis States Research Centre: London School of Economics. Working Paper No 50, p 11

[86] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 156, 166

[87] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8, p 47

[88] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8, p 48

ASF. The development of a SADC standby brigade is currently under way (see section 5.1).

Concerns have been expressed from within and outside SADC regarding its tendency to over-rely on military approaches, particularly to deal with issues that are technically non-military in nature. These are partly based on a misconception since, as described in following section 'SADC' as such has never reacted militarily; rather some groupings of its member states have carried out operations that have occasionally (but illegitimately) been described as 'SADC' interventions. Nonetheless, these interventions show that some member states have chosen to react with military means even in situations where other tools might have been appropriate. The Centre for Conflict Resolution notes that a lot of steam within SADC is created talking about defence cooperation and the SADCBRIG when the greatest amount of security challenges in the region concerns human security and might be addresses through political and civilian cooperation.[89] Apart from a few diplomatic efforts, such as the 'quiet diplomacy' strategy practiced in Zimbabwe, SADC has done little to intervene on human rights and democracy issues in the region, despite governance and the succession of governments being one of the fundamental challenges facing southern Africa.[90] One reason for why the development of defence structures might take precedence within SADC is simply that SADCs own structures for defence and security cooperation are better developed than those dealing with political issues. The ISDSC, the structure inherited from the FLS, has for example been described as one of few SADC structures that can claim to have shown any success in its functional area of cooperation. Unlike its corresponding structure, the ISPDC, dealing with politics and diplomacy, the ISDSC is stronger and more established with a greater number of personnel and a longer history of operating. [91]

The following sections will examine SADCs track record broken down into the issue areas of peacekeeping and military interventions; diplomacy and conflict resolution; and elections.

[89] Centre for Conflict resolution. 2004. *The AU/NEPAD and Africa's evolving governance and security architecture*. Policy Advisory Meeting Report, 11-12 December Johannesburg South Africa, p 28
[90] Ibid
[91] Ibid

Table: Conflicts in the SADC region and Resolution efforts 1998/99-2002.[92]

	D R C	Lesotho	Angola	Zimbabwe
Type of Conflict	Intra-state + inter-state conflict (Africa's first Great War)	Intra-state conflict (following disputed elections)	Intra-state conflict (renewed warfare after collapse of peace process)	Intra-state conflict (breakdown of law and order over land issue and power struggle)
Duration	August 1998 - ongoing	September 1998-May 2002	1998/99- April 2002	1999 - ongoing
Call for Support	Yes, by government, for military assistance	Yes, by government, for military assistance and political mediation	Yes, by government, for political backing	Yes, by opposition, for political intervention
SADC peace efforts	Support for ad hoc mediation by Zambia (Ceasefire Agreement, july 1999)	SADC Troika (mid-mediation 1990s) SADC extended Troika (1998-2002)	No (Savimbi proclaimed "war criminal" in 1998); ad hoc committee to back UN sanctions in 2001	Task force (to engage in dialogue in view of democratic governance)
Military intervention	Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia at President Kabila's request	South Africa, Botswana at Prime Minister Mosisili's request	No	No
OAU involvement	Active diplomatic involvement in Zambian peace mediation (Joint Military Commission; Inter Congolese Dialogue)	Support for SADC mediation efforst	No	Proclamation of elections "transparent, credible, free and fair"
UN involvement	Active dimplomatic involvement in Zambian peace mediation (peacekeeping force MONUC as from early 2000)	No	After end of MONUA mission in early 1999, only token presence (UNOA); sanctions against UNITA rebels	No

[92] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 156, 166

3.2.1 Peacekeeping and Military Intervention

The Protocol states that any peace enforcing actions should only take place as a measure of last resort, where peaceful means have failed; be conducted in accordance with chapter VII of the UN charter and only with the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Where enforcement action might be needed, the chairperson of the Organ Troika can recommend to the SADC Summit that a peacemaking force be deployed, but any such decision rests entirely with the Summit.[93]

SADCs role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution has been of mixed results. In 1998 SADC member states collectively responded to situations of insecurity and turmoil in both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho.[94] Both these were ad-hoc interventions undertaken by a small number of member states, and with questionable legal mandates.

3.2.1.1 The DRC

In 1995, the ISDSC adopted a resolution stating that member states had agreed to take collective action against any unconstitutional changes of government and military coups. In reference to the above mentioned resolution the ISDSC, in 1998, received a request of assistance from the DRC through the chairperson of the Organ (Robert Mugabe). The President of the DRC asked for SADC to protect his regime against territorial aggression from Uganda and Rwanda, who had violated the DRCs sovereignty by refusing to withdraw its military forces from Congolese territory.[95] The committee decided in response to the request that "those SADC countries able to do so should give assistance to President Kabila". The ISDSC thus did not commit to a SADC intervention as such, but sanctioned any intervention by individual member states.[96] Subsequently, armed forces from Angola, Namibia and Zambia were deployed to the DRC, constituting 'Operation Sovereign Legitimacy'. Because the scale of the war called for more broad peacekeeping efforts than SADC could provide, the involvement of the

[93] Ibid, p 162; SADC. 2001. *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,* articles 2,2 (f), 11 (3c,3d)
[94] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. *International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8,* p 46
[95] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems,* p 196
[96] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 167

OAU and UN was necessary.[97] The UN, OAU and others sought to negotiate a ceasefire or peace settlement between Kabila and the rebel forces. [98] In addition to providing troops, SADC member states, particularly Zambia and Tanzania, were also involved in attempting to mediate the crisis. During the negotiations, financial assistance was provided from the European Union (EU) in support of the SADC mediation process.[99]

Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia had decided to intervene in support of Kabila's rule on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, allowing for individual or collective self-defence against armed aggression. [100] The conflict was thus comprehended as an inter-state dispute and the intervening states understood their role as one of defending one state against the illegitimate aggression of another. The Zimbabwe-led operation was a 'coalition-of-the-willing' type intervention, repeatedly and misleadingly talked about as the 'SADC- AAF (Allied Assistance Force)'. Despite often referred to as a SADC intervention, the DRC operation is commonly understood as an independent multilateral intervention by SADC member states outside of SADC jurisdiction. There is no legal foundation on which one could formulate the intervention as a SADC operation: The ISDSC did not have the power to authorise such an intervention, and even had the Organ been fully functional at that time, the decision to authorise a military operation could still only have been taken at SADC Summit level, to which the Organ could merely make recommendations. [101] Neither had there been a sufficient number of member states at the ISDSC meeting to properly provide a legitimate intervention mandate.[102] Not only did the intervention lack consensual authority at SADC summit level, but it also lacked authorisation by the UN, making it illegal under chapter VII of the UN charter.[103] The UK and US governments therefore imposed sanctions on the intervening

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[97] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 167

[98] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. *International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8,* p 46; IRIN. 1998. *DRC chronology of current crisis 30 Sep 1998,* http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_93098.html

[99] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. *International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8,* p 46

[100] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 167; United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.

[101] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 168

[102] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems,* p 197

[103] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, *The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC*. University of Pretoria, p 171

allies, who found themselves defending their position within SADC and the OAU, as well as the UN.[104]

The coalition force initially took a defensive stance, assuming that a quick military victory could be attained. This would prove wrong as the situation eventually expanded to require extensive military deployment of an estimated 66,000 soldiers, and would lead to all-out fighting between the armed forces of six states taking place within the DRC's borders.[105] The conflict engulfed the majority of states in the southern and central Africa, and particularly those in the Great Lakes region, and came to involve multinational corporations, private military companies and western governments in proxy positions.[106] The DRC conflict affected so many parties and neighbouring states that it has come to be referred to as 'Africa's Great War'. The increased military commitment of the intervening forces eventually led to a mutually hurting military stalemate, allowing for a political resolution of the conflict as involved states started to seek an exit strategy.[107]

In contrast to the intervening states, SADC as a whole took a different conflict resolution approach. As the intervention was launched, a SADC extraordinary summit was convened at which a decision was made to call for an immediate cease-fire and initiate a peace-process aimed at resolving the conflict peacefully and through dialogue.[108] Invitations to the Summit had also been extended to Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, and the approach adopted at the meeting was based on a completely different interpretation of the conflict than had guided the decision to form an intervening coalition, namely that the conflict included both inter-state and intra-state elements.[109] Peace efforts supported by SADC, the OAU and the UN, and coordinated by Zambia were therefore initiated and eventually resulted in the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire and peace-agreement in 1999 by the Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola, as well as the Movement for the Liberation of Congo and Rally for a Democratic Congo.[110] The peace agreement required that all foreign forces should withdraw before a UN peacekeeping operation would be deployed to the DRC.

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[104] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems,* p 204
[105] Ibid, p 200
[106] Ibid, p 201
[107] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems,* p 201
[108] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 168
[109] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 168
[110] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. *International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8,* p 46

The different opinions regarding how to deal with the DRC are indicative of the different approaches towards conflict resolution taken by South Africa (Nelson Mandela) and Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe) and of the rift between Mandela's SADC and Mugabe's Organ at the time of the intervention.[111] Mandela and South Africa had made clear their preference for a peaceful settlement in the DRC rather than a military intervention, even though Mandela accepted the defending of the DRC's territorial integrity and recognised its contribution to the facilitating humanitarian relief operations. It was also generally acknowledged within SADC that, even though the military operation was not considered a strictly SADC operation, the intervention was complimentary contribution to the mediation efforts. Mandela was therefore forced to retroactively approve of Operation Sovereign Legitimacy's contribution and welcome the initiative of the intervening states, even though he stopped short of endorsing the intervention.[112] SADC leaders have nonetheless never reached official consensus of the legitimacy of the intervention or whether it truly was a SADC operation.[113] In addition, a UN deployment would probably not have been possible without the initial stabilisation role of the Allied intervention.

The South African response to the DRC conflict was to seek to negotiate a political settlement, a position supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania. However, realising that SADC had few means to assume the responsibility for prolonged diplomatic initiatives, and was further hampered by the rift between member states, Mandela called on the involvement of the OAU.[114] The mediation process had come to include a range of stakeholders, both internal and external to the conflict, and these were also included in the peace agreement. The mediation effort was led by President Chiluba of Zambia who had chaired the ISDSC and its meetings at the time when the war in Congo broke out. Zimbabwe had indicated it would like to keep South Africa as far away from any conflict resolving efforts as possible and South Africa therefore also accepted Zambia's mediatory role.[115] Despite SADC playing a great role in the brokering of the ceasefire and peace agreement and Chiluba seeming to

[111] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 167

[112] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 169

[113] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, *The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC*. University of Pretoria, p 178

[114] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems,* p 197

[115] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 168

represent SADCs combined effort, he had never been formally appointed as an official SADC mediator. Rather, Chiluba's role in the negotiation effort seemed to have been a result of his own personality and availability. SADCs mediatory role in the DRC was thus in some ways as makeshift as its military intervention and the argument that it was an official SADC strategy in many ways similarly forged – even though Chiluba was not the only mediator representing SADC. The experience shows that SADC has not always managed to adopt one coherent official policy.

3.2.1.2 Lesotho

Shortly after war erupted in the DRC, violent unrest occurred also in Lesotho. An electoral-results dispute had arisen in the country three months after the May 1998 general elections, causing a political uprising and an attempted coup d'état. The Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, requested assistance from SADC member states. Botswana and South Africa, in consultation with Zimbabwe and Mozambique, decided to launch a military operation in response to the appeal of the Lesotho government: The South African led 'Operation Boleas'. A similar dispute had occurred in Lesotho a few years earlier, due to the same dissatisfaction with the electoral system that instigated the crisis in 1998. At that time Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa had succeeded in resolving the conflict peacefully through mediation. The aim of the new operation was to prevent the overthrow of the elected government and restore law and order, but reportedly also to protect South African interests and valuable projects in Lesotho.[116] The intervention was coupled with diplomatic negotiations resulting in holding of new elections and SADC oversaw the election process and reviewed the electoral system. The intervention forces faced tough resistance and suffered some injuries but, after eventually being reinforced by additional troops, managed to restore law and order. [117]

Like the DRC operation, the Lesotho intervention cannot be considered a 'SADC response' since no official decision to intervene had been taken at the SADC summit. Neither was it authorised by the UN Security Council and thus breached international law. Nonetheless, the SADC summit of the following year referred to the intervention as "a SADC military intervention in the form of Botswana and South Africa forces" and this has been argued to reflect the broad consensus

[116] Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 172

[117] Mbuende, Kaire. 2001. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the South African Development'. *International Journal on Minority Groups Rights 8,* p 47: Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook.* Volume 2, p 172

within SADC regarding the legitimacy of the peace enforcement mission.[118] In Lesotho, however, many within the population did not perceive of the mission as a SADC operation, but regarded it as an invasion by South Africa.[119] Even though the legal legitimacy of the intervention was questioned, Operation Boleas managed to stabilise the security situation in Lesotho, preventing a coup d'état and allowed for the political parties to resume negotiations on the governance issue. [120]

3.2.1.3 Remarks on SADC peacekeeping

It is questionable to analyse the track record of SADCs peacekeeping interventions in the sense that SADC as a collective has not undertaken any peacekeeping at all. Interventions have rather been undertaken by a handful of SADC states with self-interest in the given conflict. Yet, despite the small number of interventions, and their particular circumstances, a few tentative conclusions may be made:

- The interventions have been ad-hoc, reactive, and poorly institutionalised;
- They have been driven by powerful states, particularly the Organ chair, leaving little role for the Secretariat;
- They have suffered from questionable legitimacy.

Because they have not been institutional responses per se, the lessons learnt and experiences have not been institutionally harnessed either. Improvised, ad-hoc, and merely reactive in their nature, the interventions display a lack of common doctrine and consensus amongst SADC member states on the appropriate response to such crises and what situations legitimately call for military intervention. Driven by the intervening states' national interest and geo-politics instead of established principles, some have argued, the SADC experience reinforces the perception that regional security arrangements mainly are about protecting the status quo and regime survival.[121] Whether or not this is true, it is evident that lack of institutional doctrine has resulted in a failure to capitalise on

[118]Meyns, Peter. 2002. 'The ongoing search for a security structure in the SADC region'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 2, p 172; F rancis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*., p 208

[119] Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. 'Building Security in southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture'. *Monograph* 43

[120] Hwang, K D. 2006. 'The Remaking of SADC politico- security regionalism in the post cold war era'. Chapter 7 in K.D Hwang, *The Mechansisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC*. University of Pretoria, p 161

[121] Francis, David. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, p 212

the full military capability and effectiveness that some states in southern Africa, such as Zimbabwe, actually possess. Instead the regional interventions have been poorly organised and lacked the training and resources needed to be fully effective.[122]

Institutionalising SADC peacekeeping (such as through the creation of SADCBRIG, see chapter 5), has the potential to exploit the advantage of the skills and expertise existing within the region to create an effective peacekeeping force.[123] Another important reason for why the peacekeeping experiences have not been institutionalised is that the interventions have been state-driven instead of administered by the SADC secretariat. This has left the institutional memory solely at the level of member state instead of SADC. The peacekeeping/peace-building activities undertaken have been driven and dictated by the current chair of the Organ in accordance with his/hers own opinions and interests. As chair of the SADC Organ, Mugabe insisted on the right to intervene in the DRC, attempting to dictate SADC policy. Whilst he did not succeed, SADC policy was still influenced by the power struggle between the largest states in the region. The secretariat is supposed to have at least a technical role in policy formulation, but institutional weakness of the secretariat leaves it at the mercy of the capitals of the member states, particularly the Troika (incoming, current, and out-going chair).[124] Since the Chairmanship of the Organ began rotating the troika has come be moderate, consisting of a wider opinion base than was the case before 2001. The power plays and lack of consensus have, as stated, lead some observers to see the interventions as illegitimate. Questionable legitimacy has undermined the credibility of the interventions in the eyes of the local populations and host governments, as well as the international community.[125] Acting on dubious mandates and creating rifts within SADC will, despite some achievements, result in weakening SADCs position in the international community. It will also likely hamper further integration, and could undermine SADCs role in dictating regional policy.

SADCs effectiveness and its structures for peace and security are showing very slow progress. Considering that sustained military interventions require sustained and durable funding, and considering the economic status of many of the states in southern Africa, SADC is likely to require financial support from the UN, EU or

[122] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2007. *Southern Africa: Building and Effective Security and Governamce Architecture for the 21st Century*. Policy advisory group seminar report. 29-30 may 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, p 22

[123] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2008. *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, Policy advisory group seminar report, 8-10 June 2008, Johannesburg, South Africa, p 16

[124] Interview at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord), Durban, South Africa. 24 February 2009

[125] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2007. *Southern Africa: Building and Effective Security and Governamce Architecture for the 21st Century*. Policy advisory group seminar report. 29-30 may 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, p 22

through bilateral agreements with western states. These are far less likely to be willing to provide such assistance to interventions considered ad hoc and dubious. In addition, the traditional reluctance of SADC to accept assistance from donors towards peace and security matters and the exclusion of politics from a potential area of partnership further complicates the ability to meet this need.

3.2.2 Diplomatic and Conflict Resolution Initiatives

SADCs diplomatic efforts are probably most well known in relation to the political violence in Zimbabwe. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki has been the official mediator in the conflict since 2007, trying to negotiate a settlement between Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the opposition party, the *Movement for Democratic Change* (MDC), led by opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Mbeki, in line with South African policy, has practiced a strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' in relation to Mugabe, refusing to openly speak out against ZANU-PF and Mugabe's state sponsored violence. In fact, this is the policy of the collective SADC, from which criticism of Mugabe's regime has been noticeably muted, and something for which Mbeki and SADC have been heavily criticised by many African and international elements.[126] SADC has also mediated in other conflicts, it has, for example, had a long and sustained diplomatic presence in Lesotho, currently through the efforts of the former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire.[127] Masire, before focusing his efforts on Lesotho from 2001, also mediated in the DRC conflict under the auspice of SADC.[128] Currently, SADC is investigating how to best engage in the conflict in Madagascar, having sent a fact-finding mission led by the Chairperson of the Organ (Swaziland) there in February 2009.[129]

Even though encompassing experience of diplomatic initiatives such as mediation, SADCs track record in preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution has been varying, and its strategies inconsistent, particularly where the conflict concerned has been of intra-state nature and a situation of political instability.[130] Mbeki's efforts in Zimbabwe, for example, have received mixed assessments. The initial mediation efforts seemingly succeeded in establishing conditions for free and fair elections in March 2008 but the elections resulted in the

[126] For a broader discussion on SADCs stance towards Zimbabwe, see section 4.4
[127] Interview at the SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26 2009
[128] News24. 2007. 'Masire to mediate in Lesotho.' 21 June, http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_2134400,00.html
[129] Interview at the SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26 2009
[130] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, p 206

return of President Robert Mugabe to power for another five-year term, despite ruled by all African observers as neither free nor fair.[131]

The election result proved a great failure for SADCs strategy of attempting to foster democracy and economic recovery in Zimbabwe, and SADCs handling of the election impasse and post-elections crisis has come under severe criticism by some camps in the region. Not only did SADC refuse to criticise the actions of ZANU-PF, despite obvious violations of its own *Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections*, but its efforts following the violent post-election period have been characterised by some as bullying Tsvangirai, who's party won 47,2 % against Mugabe's 43,2% in the primary elections[132], to accept a power-sharing agreement. SADC hosted several negotiations between Mugabe and Tsvangirai after calling for the rivals to form a unity government jointly overlooking the disputed Home Affairs ministry, which oversees the police – a call initially rejected by Tsvangirai.[133] Tsvangirai long reproached SADC for not condemning Mugabe and for asking a party that rightly won an election to compromise its position and share government with a party that lost.[134] Yet, Mbeki eventually managed to negotiate the *Global Political Agreement* (GPA) of 2008, leading to the formation of the new *Government of National Unity* (GNU) where Mugabe would serve as President of Zimbabwe and Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. The GNU was finally inaugurated in February 2009.

Due to the failure of criticising Mugabe's actions, Tsvangirai long rejected Mbeki as a mediator, as well as refusing the involvement of other mediators under SADC patronage.[135] SADCs decision to practice 'quiet diplomacy' may be explained by a common aversion to interference in domestic conflicts amongst SADC states, as well as common political norms and cultures of avoiding public criticism of each other, dating back to the anti-apartheid and liberation struggles. In addition, it has been pointed out that several SADC leaders have similar records of human rights violations and undemocratic tendencies – pointing fingers could thus set a dangerous precedent to which they themselves would not want to conform.[136]

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[131] Africa Policy Institute. 2008. *Saving Zimbabwe: and Agenda for Democratic Peace.* Africa Policy Report. Nairobi/Pretoria, p 4, 6

[132] Badza, Simon. 2008.' Zimbabwe's 2008 elections and their implications for Africa'. *African Security review* 17:4. Institute for Security Studies

[133] NewZimbabwe.com. 2008.'SADC leaders fail to break Zimbabwe impasse'. 10 November, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/mbeki224.18996.html

[134] NewZimbabwe.com. 2008.'SADC leaders fail to break Zimbabwe impasse'. 10 November, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/mbeki224.18996.html

[135]Africa Policy Institute. 2008. *Saving Zimbabwe: and Agenda for Democratic Peace.* Africa Policy Report. Nairobi/Pretoria, p 16; The Zimbabwean. 2006. 'Mkapa mediation effort doomed', 13 July http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7953&Itemid=107

[136] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, p 206

The inconsistency in approaches and unwillingness severely risks undermining SADC as a credible regional actor in the field of peace and diplomacy.[137] Nonetheless, both parties to the conflict have put a great deal of emphasis on the SADC efforts, looking to SADC as the central vehicle for resolving the issue – which indicates that there is some form of recognition for the legitimacy of the organisation. SADC, South Africa and Mbeki were also appointed guarantors of the GPA and there has been broad consistency between SADCs approach and that of the AU: suggesting that there is general consensus on the African continent regarding the approach. In response to the argument that Tsvangirai was 'bullied' into the GNU, a South African government representative argues that whilst the peace agreement might have been a 'forced marriage' there was little alternative for reaching an agreement and establishing some kind of peace in Zimbabwe. The GPA and the GNU was the best option for the opposition as well as the general population of Zimbabwe and was considered the absolute last measure and final beacon of hope. There are no other alternatives for Zimbabwe and therefore, the representative adds, it is fortunately a forced *catholic* marriage: without any possibility of divorce.[138] In that sense, SADC can be understood as a pragmatic and realistic actor acting on the basis of logic and not ideology as such in its mediation efforts.

3.2.2.1 The Mediation Unit

The Protocol gives SADC a formal mandate to engage in mediation and other forms of conciliation and arbitration. Despite mediation and negotiation initiatives being widely used as conflict resolving mechanisms in Africa, neither the AU nor the regional organisations has any institutionalised specialist expertise in mediation.[139] Some organisations, such as the AU and ECOWAS, have established panels of highly respected elders whose statures and 'good offices' can be used as mediatory tools leading conflict resolution efforts in accordance with widespread African traditions. The existence of such tools can help African organisations to deliver on its commitments to conflict resolution, but they still tend to be insufficient for the organisations to deliver on their mandates.

In a report commissioned by SADC on deficiencies in African mediation, Laurie Nathan points out that the diplomatic peace initiatives consequently suffers from chronic lack of skill, capacity and support. This, he argues, is particularly due to insufficient expertise in mediation; inadequate institutional support for

[137] Africa Policy Institute. 2008. *Saving Zimbabwe: and Agenda for Democratic Peace.* Africa Policy Report. Nairobi/Pretoria, p 6
[138] Interview Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. February 18 2009.
[139] Nathan, Laurie. 2007. *Building SADC's capacity for mediation*. Report prepared for the SADC secretariat and the directorate for politics, defence and security cooperation.

mediators; no institutional memory and learning; and no viable concept of mediation.[140] The recommendations he makes to SADC include the establishment of a specialist 'Mediation Unit' within the organisation to create consistency in efforts, record lessons learnt and gradually accumulate knowledge and experience. Each new mediation initiative has relied on the personal experience of the individuals involved in it, for example Mbeki in the DRC and Zimbabwe and Masire in the DRC and Lesotho, but generates little institutional capacity for mediation within SADC. In addition, when mediation is solely built on strong individuals the objective assessment of what strategies have worked and which have not is effectively lost resulting in a failure to secure important lessons.[141] The envisaged Mediation Unit for SADC, Nathan argues, would have two primary functions: conflict prevention and conflict resolution; in addition to four secondary tasks: dispute resolution; liaison and consultation; early warning; and gathering information and lessons.[142]

SADC has since decided that a Mediation Unit shall be established within the organisation, under the authority of the ISPDC and located as a sub-unit within the Directorate of Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation along with the Peace-Building Unit.[143] SADC has recognised that it has an advantage in being able to provide sustained engagement over the long-term, which could prove effective even if SADCs mediation efforts to date have been of highly varied quality and success. The process of establishing a mediation unit was commenced in 2007; progress is slowly being made in this area.[144] A commissioner for the unit has been appointed at the secretariat and a decision has been made for SADC to establish its own panel elders, similar to the AU's Panel of the Wise and ECOWAS's Council of Elders.

A few names have come up in regards to people who might be suitable to form part of such a panel, but nothing has yet materialised.[145] The support of the heads of the SADC member states in the establishment of the Mediation Unit and the selection of such a panel is especially important. Unlike the case within ECOWAS, Laurie Nathan points out that the SADC heads of states and government (HoS) have been hesitant to have the Executive Secretary engage in high-level mediation and have a preference for participating in mediatory

[140] Ibid
[141] Ibid
[142] Nathan, Laurie. 2007. *Building SADC's capacity for mediation*. Report prepared for the SADC secretariat and the directorate for politics, defence and security cooperation.
[143] Interview at SADC Secretariat, Gaborone. Botswana. February 26 2009; SADC. 2009. *Post-Council media briefing by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the SADC Council of Ministers*.27 February, http://www.polity.org.za/article/sadc-dlamini-zuma-post-council-media-briefing-by-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-of-the-sadc-council-of-ministers-27022009-2009-02-27
[144] Interview at SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26, 2009
[145] Interview at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009.

engagements without involving the secretariat.[146] SADC HoS might prefer to keep the option open of engaging by their own means in situations of personal or national interests, and would not wish for such responsibility and authority to rest entirely with a predefined panel.

Another reason for why such a panel might be controversial is that it assumes the right of SADC to engage in member states, even if solely by diplomatic means, at all times it considers appropriate – and this is a sensitive issue. Thabo Mbeki's appointment by the extra-ordinary summit in March 2007 to continue to facilitate dialogue in Zimbabwe as the official SADC mediator has been considered historic because it was the first time SADC authorised an outsider to take on the internal matters of a member state. The rights and responsibilities of a SADC mediatory unit vis-à-vis the HoS of the member states might thus be questioned both by state leaders and the panel itself should it not be clearly qualified.

The future for the Mediation Unit seems uncertain both in terms of the Secretariat's ability – financial and resource-wise – to establish such a unit, as well as its the actual operability without the full support of member states, even if the physical structures could be assembled. Nonetheless, the decision to form such a unit is innovative, and could prove important for the whole African continent, not the least because the Protocol also states that the Organ may, in consultation with the UN Security Council and the AU, offer to mediate in significant inter- or intra state conflict occurring outside of the SADC region.[147]

3.2.2.2 Election monitoring and observation

SADC has a clear policy and record of monitoring elections around the region. Since 1992, the SADC region has held on average 3,5 elections every year. Even if not all meet international norms of what constitutes free and fair elections, the principle of democracy is widely accepted and at least formally appears to be endorsed among SADC states[148] (as indicated e.g. by the principles and guidelines outlined in the SADC Protocol on elections and governance).

The SADC Council of Ministers has emphasised the importance of monitoring elections in the region, which it argues in turn will help to ensure compliance of member states in holding regular and democratic elections. To this end, a decision was made at a ministerial meeting between SADC and the EU in Lesotho in November 2006 to establish a SADC 'Elections Advisory Council'

[146] E-mail Correspondence with Laurie Nathan, 21 March 2009
[147] SADC. 2001. *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation*, Blantyre
[148] SAIIA, SIDA. Draft 2007. *South Africa in Africa.* South African Institute of International Affairs.

(SEAC), a unit of the Organ looking into elections issues.[149] Along with a Human Rights Commission, the establishment of SEAC sought to strengthen democratisation processes in southern Africa and further developing and entrenching good governance.[150] The main role of the SEAC is to function as an advisor to SADC structures and to electoral commissions of member states on election observation missions.[151]

Upon invitation by member states holding elections, SADC regularly invites its member states to send ad-hoc observer teams to serve as election monitors in the concerned states. The year 2008 was an extraordinarily intense and difficult year for SADC with the Zimbabwe elections (SADC sent about 400 monitors) and the aftermath crisis consuming all its energy.[152] Since all contributing states are paying for their own observers the number of monitors sent is not fixed but rather dependent on the choice contributing states make in regards to how many they feel they can afford.[153]

Even though 2008 was a challenge, 2009 is unlikely to be much easier as no less than seven member states (Angola, Botswana, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa) are holding elections. The SADC secretariat expects to be invited to oversee all of these but is concerned about its financial and managerial ability to do so.[154] According to a SADC Secretariat representative, support for elections monitoring, e.g. training and equipment, is at present the greatest need of SADC within the area of peace and security. However, as stated earlier, SADC member states have long been hesitant to accept involvement of donors in the peace and security field.

3.3 Summary

This chapter has outlined the main features of the SADC Organ, looking at its most important documents and frameworks for handling political, defence and security related issues, as well as SADCs track record in the area of peace and security, in addition to exploring some of the current and future challenges.

It has shown that SADCs peace and security related endeavours are now well-founded on ambitious and soundly crafted policies and programs, yet

[149] SADC. 2009. *Post-Council media briefing by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the SADC Council of Ministers*.27 February, http://www.polity.org.za/article/sadc-dlamini-zuma-post-council-media-briefing-by-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-of-the-sadc-council-of-ministers-27022009-2009-02-27

[150] Ngwawi, Joseph.2006. 'Elections advisory body planned for southern Africa'. Southern Africa News Feature, November http://www.sardc.net/editorial/NewsFeature/061031106.htm

[151] Ibid

[152] Interview at SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26, 2009

[153] Ibid

[154] Ibid

implementation has staggered and SADC has neither managed to observe nor ensure adherence to signed frameworks. Mediation and election monitoring are emphasised as areas where SADC is attempting to generate a comparative advantage and extend its capacities. In regards to peacekeeping interventions, the chapter has explained that whilst SADC member states have conducted such operations in the DRC and Lesotho, it can hardly be argued that the missions were conducted by a united SADC. In general there seems to be poor unity amongst the organisations member states in relation to the more military aspects of its track record, but in many instances this can be attributed to the informal processes and structures inherited by the FLS. In present time, SADCs political endeavours have been focused on conflict resolution and mediation in relation to Zimbabwe, and also here its chosen ‘quiet diplomacy’ strategy seems to be a result of the organisation’s heritage. The following section will further explore the political context which has guided SADCs policies and actions.

4 Politics and member states

SADC is a heterogeneous grouping at an early stage of regional integration. It includes an array of states varying in many ways; with contrasting capabilities and divergent will to integrate. SADC includes some of the economically strongest states in Africa (e.g. South Africa, Botswana and Namibia), but there is great disparity in the region. The Seychelles ranks, as the single state in southern Africa, as 'highly developed' on the Human Development Index scale. Six SADC states fall into the medium category and the rest have only achieved a limited level of human development. The GNP of all SADC states, with a collective population of 150 million people, roughly equals that of Belgium with 10 million inhabitants, and it is important to remember that 45% of SADCs GNP comes from South Africa.[155]

Even though the various member states rank very differently in terms of economic and human development, the region as a whole has a relatively high standard of development. A widespread perception is that all SADC states are better off than ten years ago, except for Zimbabwe.[156] The economic disparity between member states is an example of the challenges facing SADC integration. In addition to this, the region is the worst hit by HIV/AIDS in the world, and it is challenged by proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the presence of private security companies, increasing unemployment and organised criminal networks, mainly operating from South Africa.[157] Nonetheless, the SADC region is also considered a stable one, allegedly having had the largest number of democratic elections and changes of government in Africa, even though the current situations in Madagascar, Zimbabwe and the DRC are volatile.

In accordance with their other differences, the political will to integrate further varies among the 15 member states. Certain groupings exist within SADC. In general, countries such as South Africa, DRC, and Mozambique seem to advocate cautious advancement, together with (to some extent) Namibia and Angola. Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Lesotho seem more inclined to move ahead at a higher pace. Some dominant member states are dictating the political agenda of the organisation, most notably South Africa. However, South Africa is very sensitive to perceptions of it being a 'big brother' or 'hegemon' and prefers being referred to as 'partner'. A tension exists between South Africa and Botswana, often portrayed as two 'opposing forces' within SADC, indicated e.g. through different stands on Zimbabwe, as well as on international trade agreements, resulting in a testy relationship between the two states.[158] Another

[155] Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. 'Building Security in southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture'. Monograph 43
[156] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, pp 184-185
[157] Ibid
[158] Interview Department of Defence, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, February 17, 2009

perceived split is the militarist pose of Zimbabwe and the diplomatic stance of South Africa, which often seem pitched against each other.

These divergent perceptions are partly founded on some states regarding SADC as primarily an economic grouping and others a security and defence forum. It is also reflected in the division amongst member states concerning the role of the Organ within SADC, and the divergent positions taken by South Africa and Zimbabwe on that matter during the 1990s. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have been regarded as 'hawks', leading the military intervention into the DRC in 1998, whilst South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana are perceived as 'doves', preferring SADC to take a more peaceful approach and seeing the Organ as a forum for multilateral security cooperation and peace making through diplomatic means. However, as Francis notes, describing South Africa as 'dovish' is a misinterpretation of events: Whilst opposing violence in the particular case of the DRC, it did lead a military intervention into Lesotho. He sardonically adds that "it is safe to say that 'pacifism' is not a foreign and security policy of South Africa".[159] Yet the different stances of South Africa and Zimbabwe reflect the fundamentally different notions if what SADC is and what it is for.

Despite successful integration in some areas, there are still some basic problems to finding common approaches to regional peace and security threats: SADC states have, for example, been unable to find a common strategy to deal with HIV/AIDS. Whilst SADC has officially managed to agree on a common foreign policy towards the situation in Zimbabwe, there is reason to question the actual adherence of this policy.[160] The following sections will look into the divergent factors and common denominators impeding and promoting integration within SADC, for example the political context in the region, the role of powerful states in SADC and the divergent approaches of member states towards SADCs integration.

4.1 Political culture in the SADC region: the case of Zimbabwe and the 'liberation legacy'

The membership of both the FLS and SADC was, at the time of their establishment, not so much determined by terms of geographic location, but by common ideals and the liberation struggle against colonialism and apartheid. One example of this is Tanzania – geographically located in east Africa, but

[159] Francis, David J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, p 206
[160] Ibid, p 186

politically belonging to the region of southern Africa.[161] The legacy of this ideal is still evident in southern Africa, affecting political life within the region, including within SADC. The effect, often called the 'liberation movement mentality' or 'liberation legacy' is that most SADC states still have governments constituted of the political parties that led the liberation struggles, for example the ANC in South Africa and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. These actors enjoy a great deal of legitimacy and mutual support due to old ties, but their presence have in some countries led to a notion of 'party-states' or 'dominant party-systems' ; the natural allegiance and gratitude towards the liberation party potentially impeding democratic consolidation and evolution towards multi-party democracy.

The liberation mentality has had effects not only on domestic politics but also on international relations in southern Africa; the most obvious example being SADCs attitude towards the situation in Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe is hailed as an elder amongst the liberation movements, at the same time as he recognised by many as a harsh dictator. In another report by FOI, focusing specifically on the impact of the liberation movement legacy on how SADC has dealt with Zimbabwe, Eldridge Adolfo lists several key areas affecting SADCs approach, all linked to this mentality. These include '*Comradeship*' between ruling groups that commonly fought for the anti-colonialist cause; *African solidarity* (ideas of pan-Africanism and "African solutions to African problems", including resentment against western actors attempt to influence or dictate African politics); *Legitimacy to rule* (based on the sacrifices made in the liberation struggle and the idea that the party that founded the nation is, in fact, the nation); *Self-preservation* (criticising Mugabe might lead to criticism of own regime); national democratic deficits (many SADC states do not even desire to pursue democratic principles); *Resource redistribution* (a notion that the land reform in Zimbabwe is a legitimate attempt to create socio-economic justice and a realisation that criticising the reform could have undermined political stability in other SADC states facing similar problems); The *'racial' framing* of the Zimbabwe crisis (the related notion that the land-reform in Zimbabwe is a legitimate attempt to address a racist system); A *pragmatic rather than principled approach* (SADC did not have any other strategies: military intervention was excluded due to principles of sovereignty and strength of Zimbabwe's defence forces. Solidarity contained the situation and preserved stability in the region).[162]

[161] Centre for Conflict resolution. 2004. *The AU/NEPAD and Africa's evolving governance and security architecture*. Policy Advisory Meeting Report, 11-12 December Johannesburg South Africa, p 26

[162] See Adolfo, Eldridge: *The Collision of Liberation and Post-Liberation Politics within SADC - A Study on SADC and the Zimbabwean Crisis*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—2770-SE

The situation in Zimbabwe is indicative of the challenge of transitioning beyond the party-state and the legacy of the liberation movements. Some SADC states, primarily Botswana, have taken a critical stance towards SADCs overall approach. What can be noted is that the few countries that have been willing to openly criticise Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party have either never had a liberation party in government – Botswana – or have in fact managed to remove such a party from office – Zambia and Malawi.[163] This willingness to criticise has not been shared by the other SADC members, sticking to the official policy of 'quiet diplomacy'. [164]

Even when peripheral on the organisations agenda, Zimbabwe has been a pressing issue for SADC. The current developments in the country have exposed divisions amongst its member states and kept SADCs eyes closely focused on Zimbabwe at a time when it should have been able to pay greater attention to other matters. The situation has also damaged the international reputation of SADC and undermined the credibility of some of its lead politicians. The consequence of a continued liberation movement mentality is pressing within the SADC region and is likely to be an important issue over the next year to come. The recent election in South Africa was for example the first election where a generation of 'born frees' – that is, those who have never experienced apartheid – were allowed to vote. Their relation to the liberation legacy differs from that of the older generation: they may not have the same natural allegiance to the ANC as the older generations and may easier look to other parties to satisfy their political needs. Such new dynamics could have an impact on politics in the SADC region. Criticism of Mugabe is not non-existent. Reportedly, voices of concern and dislike have been expressed at those SADC summits when Mugabe has not been attending, albeit also quickly silenced in his presence. Many people agree that Zimbabwe is ready to move on beyond Mugabe, but also think it better to let time have its toll and for change to come slowly; expressing a feeling that regime-change and democracy can only come once Mugabe has passed away, along with the likes of his generation.[165] As generations are evolving, prospects for a new wave of democratisation might also arise.

The contradiction between SADCs stated aim of preserving sovereignty and independence on the one hand, and its commitment to democracy on the other is evident in its relation to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe and Mugabe have, despite violations of SADCs Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections

[163] Adolfo, Eldridge: *The Collision of Liberation and Post-Liberation Politics within SADC - A Study on SADC and the Zimbabwean Crisis*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—2770-SE

[164] SAIIA, SIDA. Draft 2007. South Africa in Africa. South African Institute of International Affairs.

[165] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009.

as well as a range of international conventions, officially enjoyed unqualified support from its peer states. [166] Culture is a dynamic notion and the southern African liberation movement legacy is neither predestined nor fixed. The particularities of the southern African political culture, nonetheless, has interesting affects on the region and, as shown, poses some fundamental challenges to how SADC and the Organ deals with politics and security; sometimes causing the organisation to contradict itself on its own policies.

4.2 Powerful states and hegemony within SADC

Realist theories of international relations would argue that any collective security efforts need a single dominant power – a so-called hegemon – to lead the joint effort. It is based on the idea that cooperation on equal terms, whilst perhaps desirable, is very difficult, if not impossible. Where everyone shares an equal burden in implementation, innovation and enterprise, progress is slow and the collective becomes, at best, an unmanageable splodge. Where there are several powerful states attempting to take lead but failing, the situation risks becoming a worst case scenario, devolving into outright conflict. Realist theories therefore advocate the presence of a single strong leader willing to set rules and precedence, and make others follow them. This is envisaged as the most conducive environment in which strong international regimes can develop.[167] The alleged success of ECOWAS, the primary regional community in west Africa, is often accredited the role of Nigeria within the region. By the same token, the failure of establishing well-built organisations in other regions is considered a consequence of either a lack of potential hegemons, or the presence of a number of hegemonic pretenders of similar power, preventing any one from assuming the leadership role.

Within southern Africa, despite a stated unwillingness to be considered as such, South Africa has been portrayed as the regional hegemon. South Africa has a population of 40 million people, the strongest economy in the region and encompasses large military capabilities, giving it serious economic and political leverage in the region. South Africa is a giant not only within SADC but on the African continent as a whole.[168] Nonetheless, South Africa has been reluctant to assert itself as a leader and has been careful not to represent itself as the regional

[166] Makoa, Francis. 2005. 'Managing Conflict in an Integrating Southern Africa: Peace, Security and Stability in Lieu of Democracy?', in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 5, p 122
[167] Francis, David. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*, p 133-134
[168] Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. 'Building Security in southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture'. *Monograph* 43

hegemon. Such a 'big brother' attitude could result in frictions with neighbouring states, impeding trade and the export of South African goods. From an economic perspective South Africa is also careful to make too many individual commitments within regional arrangements. South Africa is the largest economy in the region, but faces economic issues of its own and is desperate to avoid a situation where its relative wealth is spent seeking to satisfy the development needs of its neighbours: another reason for South Africa's hesitance to be the regional driver and its decision to rather pursue common ownership of regional efforts. Former President Thabo Mbeki was a great advocate of the 'African Renaissance' and practiced a foreign policy extended beyond South Africa's immediate interests to that of the broader continent. Yet, Mbeki and South Africa has struggled to achieve acceptance by its neighbours, who have often greeted South African initiatives with suspicion and accused South Africa of being a pawn of the West.[169] South Africa has therefore not wanted to be portrayed as imposing its interests on others, but has rather sought consensus amongst its fellow member states.

This approach has been met both with respect and gratitude, as well as criticism from those arguing that a strong region needs a strong leader and that South Africa is failing to take its leadership role seriously.[170]

Table: Sub-regional hegemons and hegemonic pretenders in Africa[171]

Region	Hegemon/ Hegemonic Pretender	Size of Country (million sq km)	Population 2001 (million)	Military spending (as % of GDP)	GDP 2001 (US$ billions)
West Africa	Nigeria	0.9	117.8	1.1	41.4
Southern Africa	South Africa	1.2	44.4	1.6	113.3
Horn of Africa	Ethiopia	1.1	67.3	6.2	6.2
North Africa	Egypt	1.0	69.1	2.6	98.5
Central Africa	Cameroon	0.5	15.4	1.4	8.5
Great Lakes	Uganda	0.2	24.2	2.1	5.7
East Africa	Kenya	0.6	31.1	1.8	11.4

[169] Adolfo, Eldridge: *The Collision of Liberation and Post-Liberation Politics within SADC - A Study on SADC and the Zimbabwean Crisis*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—2770-SE

[170] Interview Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. February 18 2009

[171] Francis, David . 2006., p 136

In situations where hegemonic leadership has not been exercised, the vacuum is often filled by the hegemonic pretenders in an ad hoc fashion, an example being the 1998 military intervention into the DRC, led by Zimbabwe. [172] Zimbabwe has long been a pivotal state within SADC, especially in the area of peace and security, considering Mugabe's role within the Organ. The state has had a large economy, a strategic location and a powerful and efficient defence force – which many argues is even still superior to the South African National Defence Force (SNDF). In addition, Zimbabwe has openly portrayed itself as a hegemonic contender, making clear political commitments within SADC, but also doing so whilst pursing its own national interest.[173] Despite being a state of great influence, recent events in Zimbabwe has left the state too preoccupied with internal matters to seriously contest the South African hegemony. In contrast, South Africa has been careful not to act unilaterally on national interest, afraid that doing so will actually weaken its role within SADC and impede regional integration.[174] South Africa has therefore chosen to take on the role of preserving and promoting 'African' interests. South Africa's actions whilst sitting as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council were met with disappointment from a range of actors, particularly its role in rejecting draft resolutions on Myanmar and Zimbabwe. South Africa in its turn has argued its position to have been more principled than critics have comprehended.[175]A representative from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs argues that South Africa's actions on the Security Council was an expression of a fear that Africa is being marginalised in international relations and a calculated strategy of articulating policies that belonged to SADC and Africa as such, instead of merely reflecting South African interests.[176]

South Africa has chosen not to play the role of hegemon within SADC, yet its relative power places it in a situation of influence within the region as well as on the African continent. Whilst Mbeki placed great emphasis on international matters and South African foreign policy, ensuring that South Africa took an active role in international matters, some of the drivers for this policy were lost when Mbeki was replaced by President Mothlante. With the recent elections in South Africa, observers speculate whether the installation of the new President,

[172] Ibid, p 133-134
[173] Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 5, p 182
[174] Kinzel, Wolf. 2008. The African Standby Force and the African Union- Ambitious Plans, Wide Regional Disparities: An intermediate Appraisal. German Institute for International and Security Affairs: Berlin
[175] Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa. 2008. *South Africa in the United Nations Security Council (2007-2008)*
[176] Interview Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. February 18 2009

Zuma, will mean a withdrawal of South Africa from the international scene.[177] The new ANC leadership has argued that its foreign policy will not be drastically changed and that continued emphasis will be placed on acting through multilateral channels, such as SADC. Nonetheless, due to factors such as the global economic crisis – the effects of which are likely to be felt in the region in the next year – South Africa might be forced to focus inwards and take on a lesser international profile.[178] Such events would likely have an impact on the SADC integration endeavour. The organisation is already lacking a natural leader, but the withdrawal of South Africa might leave room for other states to take on a greater role within SADC. Botswana, for example, is often portrayed as an anti-pole to South Africa, expressing opposing opinions and desires for the direct evolution of SADC. Described by a South African Foreign Affairs official as suffering from a 'second child syndrome'[179], less involvement by South Africa might allow Botswana's voice to become stronger within the organisation. The likelihood is that, as Zimbabwe remains focused on its internal matters, a withdrawal of South Africa from the international scene could result in SADC becoming more irrelevant. Since South Africa is powerful also on the African continent, it provides SADC with a lot of weight and relevance vis-à-vis the AU and other REC's, which would be reduced should South Africa take a step back. Angola is another hegemonic contender that could begin to take a stronger leadership role within SADC, but its internal situation and recent instability makes it unlikely to be able to do so in the near future.[180]

4.3 Challenges to SADC integration

Laurie Nathan argues that SADC is facing three substantial problems inhibiting the creation of SADC as an effective security regime:

- Absence of common values among member states;
- Unwillingness of member states to surrender national sovereignty;
- The economic and administrative weakness of its member states. [181]

Nathan argues that one major problem within SADC is that cooperation in the areas of security and politics should be based on common security-political values. In contrast, within SADC, the common values seem to be the desired

[177] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009
[178] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009
[179] Interview Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. February 18 2009
[180] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009
[181] Nathan, Laurie. 2004. *The absence of common values and failure of common security in southern Africa 1992-2003*. Crisis States Research Centre: London School of Economics. Working Paper No 50, pp 2-3

outcome of cooperation. The evolution of common values in the interest of peace and security is a stated primary goal of SADC. Much of SADC political and security cooperation is based on the idea that the southern African states have similar security concerns and therefore naturally should share common security strategies. The problem is that whilst SADC does face similar security challenges, its member states are so fundamentally different that their approaches to addressing these varies greatly. In this regard, Nathan argues, there are two fundamental lines of division between the SADC states. These are a) the division between the democratic and authoritarian tendencies in the domestic policies of the member states, and b) the division between pacifist and militarist orientations in their foreign policies.[182] These divisions, Nathan argues, are so wide that the strategies for addressing the security challenges are almost impossible to harmonise.[183] In fact, they for long resulted in the notion of 'two SADCs' and have, as previously argued created disagreement on the legitimacy of past SADC peacekeeping experiences; the formulation of the Mutual Defence Pact; a common approach to Zimbabwe; and resulted in frequent breaches of declared SADC norms. A basis for the success of any collective security regime is that each state must feel that its own interests, problems and goals will be addressed through institutionalised cooperation. Common values, or perhaps the lack of contradicting values, are therefore essential to the viability of a regional regime. Where such commonality is lacking, Nathan argues, there is insufficient affinity and trust for states to surrender a measure of their sovereignty to multilateral organisations that are intended to place constraints on their behaviour. [184]

David Francis discusses the potential of SADC developing a common foreign and security policy, and agrees with Nathan that the development of such a common policy has been thwarted by the member states' absence of common political values.[185] Nonetheless, Francis argues that the claim that there is an absence of common political values amongst SADC cannot be applied to all member states. As also noted earlier in this report, Francis points out, that there is a dominant common culture amongst many of the member states based on the history of the FLS and their common aim of promoting the anti-apartheid struggle and the political liberation of southern Africa from colonial rule.[186] Nathan also agrees with the argument that the FLS achieved cohesion on the basis of its member's common opposition to apartheid and colonialism, but notes the FLS informal structure and the fact that there were no binding rules to regulate how members conducted their opposition. Whilst states might accept

[182] Nathan, Laurie. 2004. *The absence of common values and failure of common security in southern Africa 1992-2003*. Crisis States Research Centre: London School of Economics. Working Paper No 50, pp 2-3
[183] Ibid, pp 2-3, 14-15
[184] Ibid, pp 2-3, 14-17
[185] Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems, p 192
[186] Ibid

non-legally binding cooperation with other states even when such cooperation might contradict its own preferences, few will allow its sovereignty and individual decision-making ability to be constrained in situations where the pursuance of its goals and needs cannot be guaranteed. Even though states can understand the logic of regional integration, they will unlikely be bound by rules if they do not support the underlying norms and principles guiding these rules.[187] Nathan states that the surrendering of sovereignty is a particularly sensitive matter in southern Africa because most states there only achieved sovereignty relatively recently, and usually at great cost. In addition, few of them actually enjoy full sovereignty – they tend not to have full monopoly on violence within their territories, they have weak administrative reach into rural areas; and they tend to be economically dependent on financial organisations and foreign donors that impose prescriptive programmes on them. Nathan argues that given their weak de facto sovereignty, these states are understandably hesitant to surrender what little sovereignty they have to regional mechanisms that can bind their own decision-making and heighten the possibility of interference in their own domestic affairs. [188]

Other than a lack of political will to allow further integration, most SADC states are also bound by economic and administrative deficiencies that weaken their capacity to integrate and undermine the effectiveness of all SADCs forums and programmes. Characterised by small economies, weak capacity in the public sector and a lack of resources and technical and managerial skills to sufficiently perform many state functions, the SADC membership is less than ideal for furthering SADCs vision.

> *"Their weakness undermines SADC in three ways: states that cannot affect proper coordination between their own departments struggle to meet the vastly more complicated challenge of coordination between countries; states that are unable to attend adequately to their domestic priorities devote scant attention and resources to regional projects; and the skills deficit impairs the efficacy of all multilateral programmes and forums."* [189]

These three problems; common values, sovereignty and weak states, Nathan further argues, cannot be solved at regional level. They are fundamentally not deficiencies of SADC, but of its member states and SADC cannot generate a capacity that its member states are lacking. Therefore the challenge of common security in southern Africa is less a regional than a national challenge.[190] SADC

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[187] Nathan, Laurie. 2004. *The absence of common values and failure of common security in southern Africa 1992-2003*. Crisis States Research Centre: London School of Economics. Working Paper No 50, pp 15-17
[188] Ibid, p 19
[189] Ibid, p 20
[190] Ibid, p 3

cannot transform without a transformation of its member states. Until then, he believes, SADCs agenda is generally too ambitious: based on unrealistic organisational and political expectations of states.[191]

It might be true that SADCs agenda is too ambitious at the present. It may also be true that change will have to come from within the member states and, as Nathan argues, such change and harmonisation of common values does not come easily and may not even develop over decades. Nonetheless, the current divisions are not immutable. Many SADC states are at present at or near a critical state where there political environment might be changing. As argued in the previous section, many of them are experiencing tendencies towards a second stage of democratic evolution, which could lead to such harmonisation. One should not underestimate either, the normative impact SADC could have in promoting the development of common values in times of such change. SADC is setting standards and principles that, even though not adhered to by all member states, set important precedents. Change can bring about both further divergence and convergence, but the existence of a common regime, albeit one as weak as SADC, does support the development of the latter in favour of the first.

[191] Ibid, p 23

5 SADC and the AU

As part of the effort of the African Union to promote peace and security in Africa, the decision has been taken to try and implement an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), consisting of several elements for conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction support. The notion of an 'architecture' in support of African peace and security has gained momentum over the last few years, at least in the continental-level AU and among international partners. It is actually not mentioned specifically in the core policy frameworks, though there are some linkages to paragraphs in the PSC Protocol speaking of "an overall architecture for peace and security".[192]

One of the major linkages between SADC and AU can be found in the evolution of APSA. SADC is one of the designated Regional Economic Communities in this structure, tasked to build-up several important future capabilities such as stand-by forces, including civilian and police elements and a regional early warning system.

In 2008, the AU and the RECs adopted a Memorandum of Understanding on the relationship between the AU and the RECs in relation to peace and security.[193] The MoU, together with some provisions in the Constitutive Act, defines the specific roles of the AU and the RECs within the APSA and each organisation's powers, functions and responsibilities towards this architecture. [194] AU intends to "coordinate and harmonize policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities" to ensure these are consistent with the aims and principles of the union.[195] The Peace and Security Protocol of the AU also provides for the relationship between the AU and the RECs stating that whilst the AU carries the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs are part of the overall strategy of the Union.[196] The Protocol states that the AU shall seek to make sure that the activities of the RECs are

[192] African Union. 2002. *Peace and Security Council Protocol;* An established list of components of this structure, however, is not readily available. Some accounts point to the relation between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities as being the architecture. Others add the core institutions surrounding the AU Peace and Security Council, as stated in other articles of the PSC Protocol. Yet others include the policies and treaties constituting the platform for the security arrangements, such as the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and subsequent protocols and decisions.

[193] African Union. 2008. Memorandum of Understanding on *Cooperation in Peace and Security Between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa*.

[194] Abass, Ademola. Forthcoming. 'The African Peace and Security Architecture: The African union and Regional Economic Communitie's. In M.Derblom (ed) *Inside APSA*. FOI report Draft, p 1

[195] African Union. 2000. *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, article 3 (1)

[196] African Union. 2002. *Peace and Security Council Protocol*, Article 16 – Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention.

consistent with AU policy, and that the AU shall work closely with the RECs to certify an effective partnership based on the idea that each organisation takes the lead in situations where it has a *comparative advantage* over the other. [197]

The principle of comparative advantage is based on the recognition of the fact that some of the RECs had been around much longer and were far more advanced than the AU in certain areas regarding conflict resolution and peace operations. [198] SADCs lead on Zimbabwe is an example of this. It was active in Zimbabwe before the AU engaged, and the AU has therefore sat back whilst SADC has taken the lead, saying that it would harmonise its policies according to the decisions taken by SADC. Should the AU seek to circumvent SADC, it would find it very difficult to implement any position taken without the support of the regional organisation. Rather the AU has in this case preferred SADC to take a position first, and then request the AU to help implement that policy.[199] Should SADC, however, fail to reach common policy, it could always hand the matter over to the AU.

The principle of comparative advantage and acknowledgement of the roles and responsibilities of the RECs in their particular areas of jurisdiction is also recognised in the MoU.[200] SADCs comparative advantage is considered to be, amongst other things, credibility inherited from the Frontline States; gradual and consistent approaches to peace and security; its mediation experience; and a range of well-crafted policy documents.[201] Whilst the liberation legacy constitutes a risk for certain future political developments within the member states it also represents a great asset for the organisations assertion of influence in the region and generates a lot of credibility for the organisations involvement in mediation for example. The heritage from the FLS along with a respect for liberation elders still active in the region thus lends a lot of potential weight to SADC.[202] In addition, SADC has displayed a consistent, gradual and orchestrated approach to various peace and security matters rather than merely rushing ahead. In the face of divergent opinions, it has tended to take a pragmatic, consensus-oriented approach to decision-making, thus often avoided major frictions. As a result it has formed an ability to sustain its policy and engagement over the long-term, on its own generating a lot of credibility for SADC.[203] SADCs track record

[197] African Union. 2002. *Peace and Security Council Protocol*, Article 16 – Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention.
[198] Abass, Ademola. Forthcoming. 'The African Peace and Security Architecture: The African union and Regional Economic Communitie's. In M.Derblom (ed) *Inside APSA*. FOI report Draft, p 5
[199] SW Radio Africa. 2009. '*SADC has failed Zimbabwe – Journalist Violet Gonda interviews Phandu Skelemani the Foreign Minister of Botswana'*, Transcript of a SW Radio Africa broadcast on January 23, 2009, http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=10462
[200] SADC. 2001. *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,* article 4 (3, 4)
[201] Interview Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. February 18 2009
[202] Interview Department of Defence, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, February 17, 2009
[203] SADC 26/2

in areas such as mediation and diplomacy is in parts problematic, yet the organisation has shown great presence in conflicts and political occurrences such as elections, which has generated a great deal of admiration from other, much larger, organisations that may not have the energy to engage so wholeheartedly.[204]

Despite having an important and evident role within APSA, SADC employs a gradual approach to African unity, prioritising regional integration before that on the continental level. The geographic and security links between neighbouring countries in the southern African region is of higher priority to SADC and its member states than continental integration.[205] SADC is constituted to facilitate integration in the economic and social fields, including addressing freedom of movement in the region. It also is considered to have a duty to address the potential consequences and risks of such integration, an example being that of increased migration, which is an area of great concern amongst some SADC states. Whilst many of these issues are important at the continental level as well, it is generally considered that solutions to these problems must emanate from bottom-up rather than top-down and should thus primarily be dealt with at regional level before reaching the continental. Such an approach is important to ensure legitimacy and sustainability in regional integration, without which integration at the continental level would only be made more difficult.

5.1 SADC and the African Standby Force

As part of the APSA the AU seeks to develop an African Standby Force (ASF) ready to deploy swiftly in Africa to help preserve peace and security in times of instability. The ASF concept was formalised in 2003 with the adoption of the *ASF Policy Framework*.[206] The ASF is supposed to be constituted of five multinational brigades, each hosted by one of five African regions through their respective RECs (or in the case of eastern and northern Africa, especially set up coordination mechanisms).[207] As one of the pillars of the ASF, SADC has agreed to establish the southern standby brigade. The SADC Standby Force is intended to have a wide range of components: A permanent Planning Element

[204] Interview at the SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26 2009; Interview EU Commission delegation to Botswana and SADC. February 27, 2009
[205] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009
[206] African Union. 2003. *ASF Policy Framework for the establishment of the African Standby Force.* May 2003, adopted by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defence Staff on 15-16 May 2003 and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Maputo Summit in July 2003
[207] Bogland et all. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management*. Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475, p 26

(PLANELM); the actual SADC Brigade – SADCBRIG; a police component – SADCPOL; and civilian components.[208] Today SADC member states have committed the requisite 3,500 troops to form the SADCBRIG and agreed on a SADC common Peace support doctrine. [209]

The idea of a common peacekeeping force in southern Africa pre-dates the APSA efforts, and plans for a joint peacekeeping force and a common defence and security policy had existed previously both within SADC and at the continental level.[210] Because SADC had held a couple of brigade-level peacekeeping exercises, starting with 'Blue Hungwe' in 1996 and continued with 'Blue Crane' in 1999, along with the activities of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, it was considered as having a leading role on African regional peacekeeping efforts. The formation of the AU[211] combined with the success of the exercises significantly contributed to the decision to create a SADC peacekeeping brigade for the ASF. [212]

The provisions for the SADC Standby Force can be found in the Constitutive Act of the AU, article 4 (d); The PSC Protocol, article 3 (e); the SADC Mutual Defence Pact; and the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. In 2005 a planning element for the brigade – SADCBRIGs only permanent structure – was established in Gaborone within the structures of the SADC Secretariat, but in functional terms the planning element (PLANELM) is linked to the Organ.[213] The PLANELM is composed of regional military and civilian staff on secondment from SADC member states on rotation.[214] It is an autonomous mechanism not intended to form part of the SADCBRIG structure during an actual mission but rather established to work as a day-to-day tool of the Organ in structuring the brigade. The PLANELM receives its guidance from the, for this purpose specifically created, SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence

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[208] Yelko, Gordon M. PowerPoint presentation: 'The Status and the Way forward for the SADC Standby force'.

[209] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2007. *Southern Africa: Building and Effective Security and Governamce Architecture for the 21st Century*. Policy advisory group seminar report. 29-30 may 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, p 10

[210] SADC. Modality report on the Establishment of the SADC Standby force Brigade (SADCBRIG) Reference A: Minutes of the OSSC Technical Workgroup Held over the Period 18 to 21 May 2004 to Consider the Proposed SADC Contribution to the African Union African Standby Force

[211] Ibid

[212] Chissano, J.A. 2002. 'Political Stability, Conflict Resolution and Development in Southern Africa'. Speech by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique Delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Washington DC, Wednesday February 27, 2002

[213] Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm

[214] SADC. Modality report on the Establishment of the SADC Standby force Brigade (SADCBRIG) Reference A: Minutes of the OSSC Technical Workgroup Held over the Period 18 to 21 May 2004 to Consider the Proposed SADC Contribution to the African Union African Standby Force

Staff – an instrument under the ISDSC functioning as an advisory to the Ministerial Committee and to oversee, direct, and manage the PLANELM.[215] Any contribution to AU peace operations by SADCBRIG must be approved by the SADC Summit – which is the supreme and mandating authority of SADCBRIG – on the recommendation of the SADC Organ. The strategic management structure of the brigade thus consists of the SADC Summit; The Chairperson of the Organ; The Ministerial Committee of the Organ; the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff; and the PLANELM.[216] The funding of the SADCBRIG is based on the UNs financial procedures meaning that TCCs will be entitled to receive reimbursements from the mandating authority for the cost of personnel and transportation, as well as for major equipment and material used during the mission.[217]

Since its establishment in 2005, the PLANELM has developed a SADCBRIG doctrine and operational guidelines for the brigade, as well as conducted assessments and verifications on the individual member states assets and capabilities that could be dedicated to the brigade, in addition training exercises have been conducted on a regular basis. [218] The Brigade was formally launched in August 2007 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the SADC Member States, which provided the legal framework to make SADCBRIG operational.[219] Another MoU was signed in 2005 between the Government of Zimbabwe and the SADC secretariat on behalf of its Member States to allow for the establishment of a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare.[220] [221]

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[215] SADC. Modality report on the Establishment of the SADC Standby force Brigade (SADCBRIG) Reference A: Minutes of the OSSC Technical Workgroup Held over the Period 18 to 21 May 2004 to Consider the Proposed SADC Contribution to the African Union African Standby Force

[216] Ibid

[217] SADC 2007. Memorandum of Understanding amongst the [SADC] Member States on the Establishment of a [SADC] Standby Brigade (SADC/CM/2007/3.3.3D)

[218] Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm

[219] SADC 2007. Memorandum of Understanding amongst the [SADC] Member States on the Establishment of a [SADC] Standby Brigade (SADC/CM/2007/3.3.3D)

[220] Institute for Security Studies, website. *Profile: South African development Community (SADC)*, http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3069&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3

[221] The Training Centre had been operable as early as the 1990s but then mainly existed to train individual SADC Member State's for participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. It was closed in 2001 when the European Union withdrew its support in protest of political upheavals in Zimbabwe but was re-opened to facilitate SADCs maintenance of a regional brigade. In line with the MoU, Zimbabwe handed over the administration of the centre to SADC whilst remaining its host. See IRIN News. 2005. 'Peacekeeper Training Centre Re-opens'. 8 August; Department of Defence, Republic of South Africa. 2005. *Official Statement: Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota visit to Zimbabwe*, 5 August, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05080810551001.htm.

The autonomous stance of the SADCBRIG PLANELM differs from that of the other brigades. The SADC PLANELM is responsible for managing the pledged troop 'pools' up to the point where preparations for a mission begin. Once planning for a specific mission begins, the commanding role is assumed by a staff nominated on a case-by-case basis. The commanding staff then puts together a purpose-specific mission configured from the whole or parts of the standby pools.[222] This has two specific consequences that are attractive to SADC:

Firstly, such arrangements allow for a SADCBRIG mission to go ahead even if one or two member states choose not to participate on this particular occasion. The SADCBRIG modalities state that the brigade must in its composition include robust capacity for self-defence and use of force should a mission otherwise become untenable. The use of force must, however, be approved by each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) for its own particular contingent. There therefore needs to be provisions in the establishment arrangement of an operation to ensure that the SADCBRIG does not become undeployable should any TCC have reservations about allowing the use of force, for example. [223] The unstable situations in member states such as Zimbabwe and the DRC may suddenly result in their inability to partake in any mission as well, also justifying and explaining the chosen approach. [224]

Secondly, the structure of SADCBRIG permits strong states, such as South Africa, to take a lead-nation approach guiding the structuring of the mission and facilitating the establishment of an effective brigade despite the lack or resources possessed by SADC and some of its member states. This opportunity is obviously also important in relation to the possibility that one or more TCCs will be unable to partake in a certain mission, allowing for a lead-state to ensure the execution of the mission. [225]

5.1.1 Aim and Status of the SADC standby force

SADCBRIG, as the other regional stand-by capabilities in the ASF, is supposed to be equipped and ready for rapid deployment of six types of missions (scenarios), ranging from observation missions to peace-enforcement. The force will be deployed in member states at the request of the host state itself. The

[222] Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm
[223] SADC. Modality report on the Establishment of the SADC Standby force Brigade (SADCBRIG) Reference A: Minutes of the OSSC Technical Workgroup Held over the Period 18 to 21 May 2004 to Consider the Proposed SADC Contribution to the African Union African Standby Force
[224] Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm
[225] Ibid

mandate for these missions shall be obtained from the AU PSC or the UN Security Council.[226]

Scenario	Description	Deployment requirement
1	AU/ Regional military advice to political missions	**30 days**
2	AU/ Regional observers co-deployed with UN mission	**30 days**
3	Stand alone AU/ Regional observer mission	**30 days**
4	AU/ Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventative deployment missions (and peace-building)	**30 days**
5	AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers	**90 days** with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days
6	AU intervention, e.g. in situations of genocide where the international community does not act promptly	**14 days** with a robust military force

The establishment of the ASF is undertaken in two stages. Phase one, which ran until 30 June 2005, was intended to result in the AU having sufficient capacity to enable strategic level management for scenarios 1 and 2 missions. The five regional organisations (RECs) were during the same period also to establish standby forces, up to brigade size, with capacity to conduct missions as advanced as scenario 4.[227] During phase two, 1 July 2005 until 30 June 2010, the AU is to have developed capacity to undertake missions in accordance with the first five scenarios, including complex 'Chapter VII' peacekeeping missions.[228] By 30 June 2010, the RECs are also to have developed capacity to establish a mission HQ for scenario 4 and continue to develop the brigades and support elements for these.[229]

The Department of Security and Strategy at the Swedish National Defence College has conducted a study on the progress of the establishment of the ASF.

[226] Bogland et all. 2008. The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management. Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475, p 26
[227] Ibid, p 26
[228] Ibid, p 27
[229] Ibid, p 27

The study found that SADCBRIG could easily undertake such missions as outlined in scenario 1-3, and, if the mission was designed on a 'lead nation' basis, with South Africa in the lead, also encompassed the capacity to undertake chapter VI missions as outlined in scenario 4.[230]

The ASF brigades are all supposed to be multidimensional, incorporating police and civilian as well as military elements. The military component of SADCBRIG is supposed to include a full-time PLANELM, pledged formed units on standby (land, air, maritime and support elements such as health and engineer components, military police, intelligence, forward logistics support, specialist capabilities and signals/communication), and a rapid reaction/early entry force.[231] SADCPOL is to include its own permanent planning element, a pool of individual police officers, and formed police units. [232] The civilian component of the standby force shall in its turn be composed of capacities for human resource handling, financial and administrative management; humanitarian liaisons; legal advice functions; and human rights functions. [233]

5.1.2 Problems and Challenges

The SADC PLANELM has been functional since 2005. It has an active training centre in Harare, a brigade headquarters in place and has received pledges of forces and support elements.[234] The undertakings for the first phase, i.e. the development of policies, plans, doctrines and arrangements etc, have been cleared. Nonetheless, there is mixed assessment regarding the state of SADCBRIG in relation to phase two – implementation, operability, training, etc. Officially SADCBRIG is intended to be operational by 2010, which is the date the ASF is to be officially launched.

[230] Patoka, Witold. 2008. African Standby Forces: A field report. Department of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm
[231] Yelko, Gordon M. PowerPoint presentation: 'The Status and the Way forward for the SADC Standby force'
[232] Ibid
[233] SADC. 2007. Memorandum of Understanding amongst the [SADC] Member States on the Establishment of a [SADC] Standby Brigade (SADC/CM/2007/3.3.3D)
[234] Cilliers, Jakkie. 2008. *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*. Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 160, March 2008.

SADC Standby Force Developments	
Brigade HQ (Botswana)	✓
PLANELM (Botswana)	✓
Training Centre	✓
Framework Documents, including MoU	✓
Troop Pledges	✓
Standby Arrangement	✓
Police Component	✓
Main logistics Depot	✗
Civilian Component	✗

Table: SADC Standby Force Developments [235]

Some, mainly people within SADC itself, recognise challenges but argue that SADC is currently working hard to undertake the last measures to ensure its brigade will be fully operational and ready in accordance with the timeline (2010). The main challenge perceived by SADC is interoperability. Several SADC states have experience of partaking in peacekeeping operations, facilitating their readiness to participate in SADCBRIG. The various member states, however, greatly varies in terms of standards in their operational procedures, approaches, equipment and training – making interoperability a key concern for the formation of the joint brigade. Joint training is thus the main strategy of SADC to ensure the readiness of the brigade and it is conducting several combined peacekeeping exercises' around the region this year.[236] In the long-term, standardisation of procedures and equipment amongst the SADC states is envisaged but in the short term training to the same standards is considered sufficient.[237]

A number of observers outside of SADC are arguing that the brigade has too long to go before becoming sufficiently operational. Whilst the military parts of

[235] Yelko, Gordon M. PowerPoint presentation: 'The Status and the Way forward for the SADC Standby force'
[236] SADC. 2007. Memorandum of Understanding amongst the [SADC] Member States on the Establishment of a [SADC] Standby Brigade (SADC/CM/2007/3.3.3D)
[237] SADC. Modality report on the Establishment of the SADC Standby force Brigade (SADCBRIG) Reference A: Minutes of the OSSC Technical Workgroup Held over the Period 18 to 21 May 2004 to Consider the Proposed SADC Contribution to the African Union African Standby Force; Cilliers, Jakkie. 2008. *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*. Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 160, March 2008

SADCBRIG might stand ready, the police and civilian functions are less advanced; in particular, the civilian component is lagging and SADC is only just now beginning to discuss the civilian dimensions.[238] Neither has SADC finalised the details around a logistics concept and has not managed to establish a logistics depot meaning that SADCBRIG is currently lacking a central regional facility for maintenance, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of the brigade.[239] In addition, SADCBRIG lacks the finances, logistics and strategic airlift to actually deploy any available troops, making SADCBRIG effectively undeployable without such support from external partners. [240] Outside perception is that the pace is moving slow and that not much progress is being made – even in terms if training. However, observers have stated that SADC is sensitive and secretive about the real status of SADCBRIG, and that assessment of its true capabilities therefore is difficult to make. [241] Troop pledges, for example, are supposedly complete, but have not been fully disclosed.

The questionable availability of 'standby' troop pledges is one of the greatest impediments to ensuring SADCBRIG capacity. It is difficult to assess the capability and operationalisation of the brigade as very limited information is available on its composition. Member states contributions are dedicated on 'capability' and 'force number' levels, not specific earmarked units. Examining the armed forces of the southern African states, the pledged troop numbers rarely seem available. South Africa, for example, has to have about 3000 troops available for international deployments; however, all of these tend to be preoccupied with allocations to UN and AU missions.[242] outh Africa has reportedly pledged a battalion (constituted of primarily infantry, engineers and military police), which is the largest single contribution to SADCBRIG. Political and defence analysts within South Africa, however, state that domestic security issues for which the National Defence Forces might be needed (such as the need to increase border control missions and preparations for contingencies for South Africa's hosting of the World Cup next year) could overstretch the SNDF and prevent South Africa from fulfilling its commitment to SADC during 2010.[243]

A major and widely, if albeit unofficially, recognised contributing reason to why member states are finding it difficult to generate sufficient troops for

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[238] Interview at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord), Durban, South Africa. 24 February 2009

[239]Patoka, Witold. 2008. *African Standby Forces: A field report.* Departmemt of Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm Kinzel, Wolf. 2008. *The African Standby Force and the African Union- Ambitious Plans, Wide Regional Disparities: An intermediate Appraisal*. German Institute for International and Security Affairs: Berlin

[240] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009

[241] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009

[242] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009

[243] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009

SADCBRIG is the challenge of HIV/AIDS. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS amongst southern African defence forces is making it difficult for member states to have dedicated troops on the standby roster as most member states have a policy of not sending HIV positives on missions abroad and thus do simply not know how many troops they have available.[244] E. Tjønneland argues that it is much easier to obtain information regarding the status of the standby forces being established in east and west Africa. He states that given the traditional hesitance within SADC regarding sharing sensitive information on political and defence related matter, the secrecy surrounding SADCBRIG is not surprising, even though it contrasts the aspiration of institutional SADC reform, including greater transparency, openness and improved collaboration with civil society and external partners. [245]

5.1.2.1 Early Warning System

One of the central supporting-structures within APSA is the *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS), established to detect and support the prevention of conflicts. The AU is in the process of establishing a centrally located, continentally-wide, CEWS which will be linked to *Regional Early Warning Systems* (REWS) in each of the five RECs, of which SADC is one.[246] Two other regional communities – ECOWAS and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – already have such systems in place. [247]

The establishment of the SADC REWS is provided for in the SIPO, and is an endeavour currently occupying the organisation. The framework is officially in place, but external observers are concerned about its actual efficiency and it is perceived as far less advanced than that the early warning system of ECOWAS.[248] SADC has come to agree on a set of conflict indicators (such as food security and energy, for example) on which the early warning analysis is to be based. A 'Situation Room' has been established, but constitutes little more than an empty shell with a few screens and additional equipment is needed. Expectations are, however, that this acquisition will be undertaken later this year. Interviews for analysts for the situation room are ongoing and SADC aims to have the REWS fully staffed within the next two years, as finances become

[244] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009
[245] Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 5, p 181
[246] Bogland et all. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management*. Swedish Defence Research Agency. FOI report 2475
[247] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2007. *Southern Africa: Building and Effective Security and Governamce Architecture for the 21st Century*. Policy advisory group seminar report. 29-30 may 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, p 22
[248] Interview Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa. February 23, 2009

available. The envisaged recruitment is approximately 10 people, including both analysts and IT-support personnel.[249] In general, the development of an Early Warning system has lacked a conceptual mind-set and instead focused on hardware such as computers and offices. SADC officials seem to believe the REW will be workable and usable as soon as equipment and staff arrive but some outside observers fear that too much reliance is being placed on technique and not analysis. Sweden was approached by SADC seeking donor support in developing the REW through donations for purchasing computers; any such partnership is pending SADC providing a comprehensive plan for how the intend to operationalise the REW, which it has so far failed to do.[250]

South Africa has taken a lead on supporting the REWS development, including devising necessary analysis baselines (e.g. country stability profiles), and information processing structures (e.g. clearance panel for assessments). Until the REWS is operational, the South Africa *National Intelligence Coordination Cell* (NICOC) is standing in for SADC.[251] The establishment of the REWS is suffering from a lack of finances, but one particularity is that the SADC member states have decided that it shall be funded entirely among themselves,[252] raising questions about the ability, as well as political will, of member states to make the system operational. In addition to funding, information sharing within the REWS is still a challenge. A unique feature of the SADC REWS is that it is based on national governmental inputs at member state level rather than inputs from local SADC offices situated around the region. This has a range of positive and negative consequences. One concerns has been voiced over the fact that the process of developing early warning reports are supposed to go through so many stages, desks and member states that when it reaches those supposed to analyse and act upon them, they risk having been so washed out and politicised to render them useless. [253] The unwillingness of member states to share sensitive information could therefore severely hamper the whole early warning system.

The early warning system at continental level is not yet operational, thus limiting any effect the SADC early warning system would have, even if it was finalised.

5.1.2.2 Summary: Challenges

The main future challenges for making the SADC standby force operable by next year can be sectioned into three broader categories, namely readiness,

[249] Interview SADC Secteratriat, Gaborone, Botswama. February 26, 2009
[250] E-mail correspondence with Anders Edqvist, Swedish Defence Ministry.
[251] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009
[252] Interview SADC Secteratriat, Gaborone, Botswama. February 26, 2009
[253] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009

interoperability and logistics. In a PowerPoint presentation Brig Gen Yekelo identifies the specific challenges as follows:

- Ensuring forces on standby are actually available and not committed elsewhere.
- Finalisation of the standby concept and roster
- Ensuring funding for the brigade and its deployment
- Making the early warning system operable
- Deciding on a logistics concept and the establishment of a logistics depot
- Ensuring interoperability of the national forces
- Building civilian capacity.[254]

Despite only having made limited progress in the establishment of SADCBRIG its achievements seem greater when considering that SADC only started building the brigade in 2005 and has moved much faster and further on establishing the standby force than on many other issues the organisation has undertaken over the years.[255] The situation of SADCBRIG must also be seen in a context of the achievements of the other RECs. Despite its shortcomings, SADCBRIG is largely on par with the ECOBRIG and EASBRIG and can thus be considered relatively well achieving, even if neither of the brigades can be guaranteed to stand fully ready by 2010. The other two brigades – FOMAC, and in particular NASBRIG, are considerably underachieving and highly unlikely to be operable in accordance with the ASF timeline. [256]

[254] Yelko, Gordon M. PowerPoint presentation: 'The Status and the Way forward for the SADC Standby force'; Cilliers, Jakkie. 2008. *The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress*. Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 160, March 2008

[255] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009

[256] Abiodu-Alghali, Z and Mbaye, M. 2008. 'The African Standby Force and Regional Standby Brigades'., *Conflict Trends*, Issue 3, p 37

	Brigade HQ	PLANELM	Training Centres	Framework Documents	MoU	Troop Pledges	Standby roster	Civilian Components
SADCBRIG	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	Ongoing	Ongoing
FOMAC	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
ECOBRIG	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	Ongoing
EASBRIG	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	Ongoing
NASBRIG	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗

Table: Readiness of the Regional Mechanisms/Standby Brigades to Achieve the 2010 Goals.[257]

[257] Abiodu-Alghali, Z and Mbaye, M. 2008. 'The African Standby Force and Regional Standby Brigades'., *Conflict Trends*, Issue 3, p 37

6 Partnerships and Assistance

SADC has a range of external partnerships with different agencies and donors in its socio-economic areas but its politico-security activities have so far predominantly been excluded from such partnership arrangements. The political and defence related issue areas are sensitive and SADC member states have sought to avoid external assistance for the main reason of ensuring the SADC states' political self-determination and independence from outside interference. Whilst the Secretariat and Organ recognise both a need and desire to receive more funding and support for its political endeavours, many member states still emphasise organisational liberty and freedom from donors directing SADC policy in much the same way as the colonialists once dictated it. Donors such as the European Commission (EC) have focused their partnership with SADC on the issue of economic integration but have long desired to open up programmes in the political field as well. The EC has, for example, identified disaster management as a potential area of collaboration, but reports having only received tepid responses from SADC, despite recognition within the secretariat of the need for assistance to build such capacity.[258]

Staffers within the SADC secretariat report that the greatest need for assistance in the peace and security field is currently support to election monitoring, for example observer training and supply of equipment. There are indicators that SADC might be opening up to such partnerships, not the least because of an acute need for support. SADC is at present faced with seven upcoming elections in member states over the remainder of 2009 and it will not be able to fulfil the monitoring missions it is likely to be asked to undertake without donor support to cover these expenses. The German Federal ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (GTZ) is a partner that has supported SADC in the field of peace-building in the past, supplying uniforms and training to SADC election observers. [259] An extension of such support is likely needed for SADC to realise its obligations.[260] The SADC secretariat seems pragmatic in this respect but the member states themselves have been hesitant regarding such partnerships and declined offers given by many partner/donor organisations to date, seeking to refuse any aid that comes with conditions attached.[261] As SADC is finding it difficult to face the cost of the seven upcoming elections during 2009, it is likely to seek further partnership/donor support to cover these expenses. The secretariat seems pragmatic in this respect but the member states themselves have been hesitant regarding such partnerships and declined offers given by for

[258] Interview EU Commission delegation to Botswana and SADC. February 27, 2009
[259] Interview at the SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana. February 26 2009
[260] Ibid
[261] IRIN News. 2005. 'Peacekeeper Training Centre Re-opens'. 8 August

example the European Commission to date. The European Commission offered to co-finance the observers sent to monitor the elections in Zimbabwe in 2008, but SADC declined the offer from the former colonial states, preferring to draw the financial support needed from the UN instead.[262]

The GTZ is a traditional donor that is involved in carrying out projects and programmes to assist SADC even in the field of peace, security and governance. It, for example, works close to the Secretariat in implementing SADCs firearms protocol to combat the illegal flows and the proliferation of small arms in the region.[263] An International Cooperation Partner group on SADC Peace and Security may be emerging, including for example several EU member states as well as other outside countries. [264] There is a clear a willingness amongst donors to form such arrangements if SADC is receptive. SADC on its behalf has indicated a preference of continuing to work through traditional partners such as the GTZ.[265] It has, however, requested support and funding from the EU for the running of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre.[266] This is an area where SADC is likely to open up to external support for defence contributions. Such support from the EU is nonetheless controversial since an engagement to support SADC through this centre would require a revisiting of the EU targeted restrictions, given the centre's location in Zimbabwe and a previous decision of the EU member states Denmark and the UK to withdraw support from the centre due to Mugabe's failure to allow free and fair elections in the country.[267] Yet, the EU has made a commitment to SADC to maintain and strengthen its support for the organisation in the field of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and capacity building for peace and security. [268] Reportedly there has been more dialogue between the EU and ECOWAS than with SADC. There are several bilateral and multilateral partnerships set up by individual EU

[262] Interview EU Commission delegation to Botswana and SADC. February 27, 2009
[263] GTZ. Website- *Priority Cooperation Areas*. German Federal ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (GTZ), http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/afrika/4650.htm
[264] Interview Embassy of Austria Official, Pretoria, South Africa, February 18, 2009; Interview Embassy of Sweden Official, Pretoria, South Africa, February 17, 2009;
[265] Interview EU Commission delegation to Botswana and SADC. February 27, 2009
[266] SADC, EU. 2005. 'Meeting of the SADC-EU Joint Steering Committee', 20 June 2005, Johannesburg, South Africa, http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/06/23sec1311/23sec1311.pdf
[267] Institute for Security Studies, website. *Profile: South African development Community (SADC)*, http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3069&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3
[268] Council of the European Union. 2008. Communique of the EU-SADC Double Troika Ministerial Meeting 11 November 2008, Brussels.15597/08 (Presse 326)

states, such as France and the UK, to help build capacity for the ASF but a more coherent approach by the EU has been requested by observers.[269]

[269] Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2008. *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, Policy advisory group seminar report, 8-10 June 2008, Johannesburg, South Africa, p 15

7 Conclusions

The title of this report – 'Abandoning Frontline Trenches?' – alludes to a remaining concern that the transformation of SADC from a liberation movement bound together by a common struggle to a modern, regional security organisation with shared politico-security values is incomplete and staggering. The legacy from the FLS is still affecting decisions as well as internal member state relations, and sometimes renders the regional institutions inefficient. Emerging from this study is the insight that SADC may still be stuck in the trenches, and that it is of core importance to understand the enduring impact of the liberation legacy in order to assess the regional capabilities for peace and security in SADC.

Despite having foundations reaching almost three decades back in time, the SADC institutions for peace and security are nevertheless still underdeveloped and fragile. On the formal, explicit level SADC has worked swiftly in producing policies, agreements and a range of framework documents but – as has been pointed out numerous times in this report – implementation and observance of these frameworks are indeed staggering, both on the regional and the national level. Any investigations of SADCs peace and security achievements must be seen against this background, but also acknowledge the fact that the actual security structures are relatively young. If using the time of the formal creation of the SADC Organ as the baseline for assessing progress, the collective security arrangements and the organisation's achievements in fact seem more advanced.

The aim of this report as been to increase the level of knowledge about SADC as an organisation and actor within the field of peace and security in Africa. To this end, it has traced the history of the organisation, its track record, its contemporary structures and ambitions, and the challenges to the future evolution. In addition, it has sought to inform discussions about potential support from external partners to SADCs peace and security efforts, in itself and within the wider African Peace and Security Architecture.

Below, some of the main conclusions from the study are repeated and highlighted below, under the headings of *SADC – general*, *priority areas for capability development*, and *potential partner support*.

7.1 SADC – general

The slow progress in the field of peace and security in SADC is linked to the prerequisites for regional integration. SADC has quite descriptively been designated as a "regional community in the making"[270] – hence not always matching external partner perceptions of the organisation's efficiency, or partner ambitions in terms of supporting its development. [271] The predominant reason for the slow progress is the fragile foundations for integration in the southern Africa region. The lack of enshrined common politico-security values among member states, fears of external meddling in internal affairs, and the limited will to cede power and surrender the scarce elements of national sovereignty hampers the integration process. This affects the trust among the member states of SADC. In addition, the economic and administrative weakness of its member states negatively impacts on the actual ability to implement grand policies and to staff up SADC institutions accordingly.

There is an overlap in agreements and institutional arrangements. Several SADC member states are also members of competing organisations and some members also have obligations towards other Regional Economic Communities. The amount of bilateral agreements made by member states, particularly South Africa, with partners, undermines the role of SADC as a platform for regional development as member states seem to emphasise such agreements.

The regionalisation process is moving forward in the right direction – but slowly. The skepticism with which most SADC member states seem to view a 'too quick' and 'too ambitious' regional integration naturally has consequences for the present formation and future of the organisation. It is clear, for example, that the SADC secretariat is smaller and less potent than what would be required to take on the full task expected of SADC both from within and outside the region and it is weaker than its equivalent in e.g. ECOWAS.[272] This situation renders it powerless in relation to strong member states in the region, and the conclusion that this may actually be a conscious strategy from some of these member states does not seem far-fetched, however contradictory to the formal expectations placed on the organisation this may seem. The need to supply more

[270] Tjønneland, Elling. 2005. 'Making SADC Work?: Revisiting Institutional Reform'. in D.Hansohm et al (ed) *Monitoring Regional Integration in southern Africa yearbook*. Volume 5, p 181

[271] Interview at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa. February 19, 2009

[272] Interview at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord), Durban, South Africa. 24 February 2009

power and authority to secretariat is formally acknowledged – but so is the fact that SADC will only have as much power as its member states will allow, and the pooling of sovereignty is still a sensitive issue in southern Africa.[273] This dualism affects the organisation's effectivness today, and will likely continue to do so.

SADC has ambitious and well-crafted policies and programs, but implementation staggers and observance and adherence to signed frameworks is neither monitored nor pushed. Political will and capabilities within the member states to implement in addition to ratification are questionable**.** To do SADC and the other regional structures in Africa some justice, it could be argued that lack of common values and limited will to cede power exist in most regional organisation, and that slow progress is also a natural feature of conscious regional integration. A fundamental difference, though, if one compares to, e.g., the European Union, is that the EU in principle works with gradual expansion, theoretically accepting as members only those who have reached certain standards in terms of good governance and economic principles. In turn, the accepted members can reap the benefits of for example regional integration, free trade and collective solidarity. SADC membership, while formally (according to the treaty) requires quite high standards, the criteria for membership seems to be based on the signing of the treaty, rather than adherence to its principles. Observance is not monitored, and deviation is rarely criticised.

SADC comparative advantages include frontline states credibility, gradual and consistent approaches, mediation experience, and well-crafted policy frameworks. While the liberation movement legacy is a potential risk for the political development within the member states, it also constitutes an asset for influence and mediation in the region. The frontline states credibility and respect for liberation elders still carries a lot of weight. The fact that SADCs peace and security structures are built on the legacy of the Frontline States, though, also influences the organisation negatively as it places potential constraints on the political manoeuvring in the region (such as for the SADC approach to the Zimbabwe situation). Much energy has been spent dealing with the situation in Zimbabwe over the past few years and slow progress in other security related areas can be somewhat linked to the exhaustion, overstretch and member state tensions caused by Zimbabwe testing SADC to its limits.

SADC has also shown a consistent, gradual, and orchestrated approach to peace and security matters, rather than rushing ahead, however slow and cumbersome this may have been perceived from the outside. Another advantage is that it is relatively economically developed with some strong economies within the

[273] Interview at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa. February 19, 2009

organisation. In the long-term, this may prove an advantage when it comes to the development of institutional capabilities for peace and security in the region.

Priority areas for capability development

A SADC challenge over the next years is the issue of unconstitutional changes or maintenance of government in the region. Democratisation and succession issues in the member states seem to be coupled with risks of violent power struggles and resulting turmoil. The transformation from liberation movement rule to multi-party democratic systems in the member states must be closely followed by SADC, as set-backs can be expected. There are recent frameworks available to aid in approaches to this area, such as the Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. This charter, with links to the PSC protocol, the SADC Protocol, and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, is an emerging, modern framework, signed and ratified by several member states. However, ratification and implementation are two very different things, and the potential effect and member state observance of the new charter is still unclear.

Other identified regional challenges include food insecurity, energy crises (impedes development, and energy supply needs infrastructure), **and trans-border issues** (including light weapons flows, migration, trans-border crime, and drug trade). Contingency plans and capabilities for management of natural disasters and phenomena have yet to be developed. HIV/AIDS, as well as other diseases, e.g. cholera, and a continued difficult situation in the DRC, Madagascar and Zimbabwe, on which SADC fails to make a coherent and appropriate response, are issues of concern.

From a SADC perspective, **the priority areas for capability development** in the field of peace and security is to **strengthen the secretariat**, operationalise **the African Standby Force and the Regional Early Warning System** (including attached elements), as well as strengthening institutional capacity for **election monitoring, mediation, and regional disaster management**.

SADC capabilities within the overall APSA framework is progressing, and the organisation currently seems among the more advanced in relation to the other RECs. Its achievements seem even greater when considering that SADC only started building the brigade in 2005 and has moved much faster and further on establishing the standby force than on many other issues the organisation has undertaken over the years.[274] However, there are remaining concerns that SADCBRIG will not be operational by 2010 as intended, mainly due to issues of availability of pledged forces, interoperability, lack of a logistics concept and depot, and the development of the civilian capabilities.

[274] Interview at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. 17 February 2009

Potential partner support

SADC will not be eligible for partnerships in the field of peace and security to *any greater extent*. Within SADC, Politics, Defence and Security have traditionally been areas exempted from external partnerships. These issues are sensitive and SADC member states have sought to avoid external assistance for the main reason of ensuring the SADC states' political self-determination and independence from outside interference. Whilst the Secretariat and Organ recognise both a need and desire to receive more funding and support for its political endeavours, many member states still emphasise organisational liberty and freedom from donors directing SADC policy.

There may, however, be entry points for external partnership in certain sub-areas of SADC peace and security emerging. There are indicators that SADC might be opening up to partnerships in some areas, not the least because of an acute need for support. SADC is at present faced with seven upcoming elections in member states over the remainder of 2009 and it will not be able to fulfil the monitoring missions it is likely to be asked to undertake without donor support to cover these expenses. Staffers within the SADC secretariat report that the greatest need for assistance in the broader peace and security field is currently support to election monitoring, for example observer training and supply of equipment. Matching suggestions for partnerships and support to needs portrayed by SADC, priority areas for potential partners should be

- Support for election monitoring (resources, logistics, training)
- Support for the development of the Mediation Unit
- Support for regional contingency planning for disasters and migration flows

Support for military capability development and early warning systems are likely to be declined.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAF	Allied Assistance Force
ASF	African Standby Force
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOBRIG	ECOWAS Standby Brigade
EU	European Union
FLS	Frontline States
FOMAC	Multinational Force of Central Africa - Force multinationale de l'Afrique centrale
GPA	General Peace Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
GTZ	German Federal ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HoS	Heads of State and Government
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISPDC	Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDP	Mutual Defence Pact

MSC	Military Staff Committee
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SAIIA	South African Institute for International Affairs
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADCBRIG	SADC Standby Brigade
SADCPOL	SADC Police Component of the Standby Brigade
SIDA	Swedish International development Cooperation Agency
SNDF	South African National Defence Force
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPDS	SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
NASBRIG	Northern Africa Standby Brigade
NICOC	South Africa National Intelligence Coordination Cell
PLANELM	Planning Element
PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community
REWS	Regional Early Warning System
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO) for the Organ on Politics, Security and Defence Co-Operation
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
ZANU- PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

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Annex 1 – SADCBRIG Composition

Infantry

–1 x BDE tactical HQ (South Africa)
–1 x Para Bn (South Africa)
–1 x Motorised InfBn (South Africa)
–1 x Motorised Infantry Bn (Angola)
–Brigade Commander (Botswana)
–1 x Motorised Infantry Bn (Botswana)
–1 x Brigade Staff Officer (DRC)
–1 x Light Infantry Company (Lesotho)
–1 x Infantry Company (Malawi)
–1 x Mot Infantry Company (Namibia)
–1 x Mot Infantry Bn (Swaziland)
–1 x Brigade Tactical HQ (Tanzania)
–1 x Mot Infantry Bn (Tanzania)
–1 x Light Infantry Bn (Zambia)
–1 x Deputy Brigade Commander/Chief of Staff (zambia)
–1 x Motorised Infantry Bn (Zimbabwe)
–1 x Brigade Commander (Zimbabwe)
–5 x Brigade HQ Staff Officers (Zimbabawe)

Artillery

–1 x 120mm Mort Bty (South Africa)
–1 x Artillery Battery (Angola)
–1 x Mortar Platoon (82mm/120mm) (Namibia)

Engineers

–1 x Composite Engineer Squadron (South Africa)
–1 x De-mining Platoon (Angola)
–1 x Explosives Ordinance Disposal Section (Botswana)
–1 x De-mining Platoon (Mozambique)
–1 x De-mining Section (Namibia)
–1 x De-mining Section (Swaziland)
–1 x De-mining Troop (Zimbabwe)

Intelligence

–1 x Tact Int Tp (South Africa)
–1 x Intelligence Team (DRC)
–1 x Intelligence Platoon (Zimbabwe)

Signals

–1 x Integrated Signal sqn (South Africa)

–1 x Signals Platoon (Angola)
–Signals Liaison Officer (Botswana)
–Signals Company (Botswana)
–1 x Communications Squadron (Zimbabwe)

Air

–2 x Medium Lift Helicopters (South Africa)
–2 x Light Utility Helicopters (South Africa)
–1 x Medium Lift TPT (South Africa)
–1 x Mobile Air Operations Team (40 x Pers) (South Africa)
–2 x Transport Aircraft (Angola)
–1 x Tactical Air Mob (Botswana)
–1 x Medium Lift Transport (C130) (Botswana)
–2 x Helicopters (Bell 412s) (Botswana)
–1 x Casa 212 (Lesotho)
–1 x Air Traffic Controller (Lesotho)
–1 x Transport aircraft (Tanzania)
–1 x Fixed wing transport (Zambia)
–1 x Helicopter (Zambia)
–2 x Air Traffic Controllers (Zambia)
–1 x Regimental Flight (Security) (Zambia)
–Air Element (Zimbabwe)

Navy

–1 x Op Diving Team (South Africa)
–5 x Harbour Patrol Boats (South Africa)
–1 x Large ship (South Africa)
–1 x Platoon of Maritime Reaction Squadron (South Africa)
–1 X Marine Platoon (Angola)

Medical

–1 x Field Hospitals (South Africa)
–Level 4 Hospital (South Africa)
–Chemical, Biological & Hazard Material Advice (South Africa)
–1 x Medical Officer & 3 Nurses (Botswana)
–10 MILOBS (South Africa)
–1x Composite Maintenance Comp (South Africa)
–MPA (South Africa)
–4 x Brigade Staff Officers (Majors in the fields of Operations, Logistics, Human Resources and Intelligence) (Angola)
–15 x Military Observers (Angola)
–10 x Military Observers (Botswana)
–10 x Staff Officers (Botswana)
–5 x Interpreters (DRC)

–1 x Civilian police platoon (DRC)
–10 x Military & Civilian Observers (DRC)
–1 x Staff Officer (Lesotho)
–10 x Military Observers (Lesotho)
–Staff Officers (Mozambique)
–Military Observers (Mozambique)
–10 x Military Observers (Namibia)
–10 x Staff Officers (Namibia)
–1 x Staff Officer grade 1 or 2 (Namibia)
–3 x Staff Officers (Swaziland)
–2 x Military Observers (Swaziland)
–40 x Military Observers (Tanzania)
–Liaison Officers (Zambia)
–20 x Military Observers (Zambia)
–20 x Staff Officers (Zambia)
–200 x Civilian Police (Zambia)
–Support staff with vehicles and equipment (Zambia)
–10 x Military Observers (Zimbabwe)

Annex 2 – SADCBRIG troop pledges by country

SOUTH AFRICA

Army
–1 x BDE tactical HQ (c/w infrastructure not availableand staff is available)
–1 x Para Bn (718 Pers/ SANDF Reserve, not available)
–1 x Motorised Inf Bn (850 Pers/not rotational/ Deployed and not immediately available)
–1 x 120mm Mort Bty (189 Pers/ SANDF Reserve, not Available)
–1 x Composite Engineer Squadron (203 Pers/Deployed and is not available SADCBRIG)
–1 x Tact Int Tp (34 Pers/Available with limited support elements of A and B Each)
SAAF
–2 x Medium Lift Helicopters (available)
–2 x Light Utility Helicopters (available)
–1 x Medium Lift TPT (C130 on request) (1 Available in RSA)
–1 x Mobile Air Operations Team
SAN
–1 x Op Diving team (Available)
–5 x Harbour Patrol Boats (Available)
–1 x Large ship
–1 x Platoon of Maritime Reaction Squadron
SAMHS
–1 x Field Hospitals (Deployed)
–Level 4 Hospital (1 Mil)
–Chemical, Biological & Hazard Material Advice (Available
Other
–10 MILOBS (Available)
–1 x Composite Maintenance Comp (120 Pers/ Deployed)
–MPA (54 Pers/ Deployed)

ANGOLA

Army
–1 x Motorised Infantry Battalion
–1 x Signals Platoon
–1 x Artillery Battery
–1 x Military Police Platoon
–1 x Tactical Intelligence Platoon
–1 x De-mining Platoon

Air
–2 x Transport Aircraft
NAVY
–1 x Marine Platoon
OTHER
–4 x Brigade Staff Officers (Majors in the fields of Operations, Logistics, Human Resources and Intelligence)
–15 x Military Observers

BOTSWANA

Army
–Brigade Commander
–Deputy Commander/Operations & Logistics Staff
–Signals Liaison Officer
–Signals Company
–1 x Motorised Infantry Battalion
–1 x Early Entry/Rapid Response team (on request)
–1 x Explosives Ordinance Disposal Section
–1 x Military Police Section
Air
–1 x Tactical Air Mob (on request)
–1 x Medium Lift Transport (C130)
–2 x Helicopters (Bell 412s)
Medical
–1 Medical Officer & 3 Nurses
OTHER
–10 x Military Observers
–10 x Staff Officers

DRC

Army
–1 x Brigade Staff Officer
–1 x Mechanized Infantry Company
–1 x Intelligence Team
OTHER
–5 x Interpreters
–1 x Civilian police platoon
–10 x Military & Civilian Observers

LESOTHO

Army
–1 x Light Infantry Company
Air
–1 x Casa 212
–1 x Air Traffic Controller

Other
–1 x Staff Officer
–10 x Military Observers

MALAWI

Army
–1 x Infantry Company
–6 x Brigade Staff Officers
–20 x Military Observers

MOZAMBIQUE

Army
–1 x De-mining Platoon
Other
–Staff Officers
–Military Observers

NAMIBIA

Army
–1 x Motorised Infantry Company
–1 x Base Maintenance Section
–1 x Military police Platoon
–1 x Mortar Platoon (82mm/120mm)
–1 x De-mining Section
Other
–10 x Military Observers
–10 x Staff Officers
–1 x Staff Officer grade 1 or 2

SWAZILAND

Army
–1 x Motorised Infantry Battalion (1 Company on stand-by to deploy)
–1 x De-mining Section
Other
–3 x Staff Officers
–2 x Military Observers

TANZANIA

Army
–1 x Motorised Infantry Battalion
–1 x Brigade Headquarters (plus equipment & staff officers)
Air
–1 x Transport aircraft (on request)
Other

–40 x Military Observers

ZAMBIA

Army
–1 x Light Infantry Battalion
–1 x Deputy Brigade Commander/Chief of Staff
–1 x Military Police Section
Air
–1 x Fixed wing transport (on request)
–1 x Helicopter (on request)
–2 x Air Traffic Controllers
–1 x Regimental Flight (Security)
Other
–Liaison Officers
–20 x Military Observers
–20 x Staff Officers
–200 x Civilian Police
–Support staff with vehicles and equipment.

ZIMBABWE

Army
–1 x Motorised Infantry Battalion
–1 x Brigade Commander
–5 x Brigade HQ Staff Officers
–1 x Military Police Platoon
–1 x Communications Squadron
–1 x Intelligence Platoon
–1 x De-mining Troop
Air
–Air Element (on request)
Other
–10 x Military Observers (Names Provided)

MAURITIUS

Pledges not yet confirmed