Exit Strategies in Peace Support Operations

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Sammanfattning

Syftet med denna rapport är att analysera "exit strategies", dvs strategier för att avsluta fredsfrämjande insatser, samt att beskriva möjligheter och utmaningar som följer med olika tillvägagångssätt. I rapporten beskrivs bland annat hur EU, FN och NATO har hanterat dessa frågor. Två centrala koncept för avslutande av insatser analyseras i rapporten: end state och end date. Koncepten konkretiseras genom två fallstudier av EU-insatserna EUFOR Tchad/RCA och EUFOR Althea. Medan EU i de flesta fall har valt end dates som utlösande faktor för exit har FN och NATO oftare använt sig av end states. Rapporten visar på för- och nackdelar med båda koncepten. Insatser som styrs av end dates riskerar att ta fokus från de underliggande orsakerna till konflikten, samtidigt som de kan tvinga både insatsen och landet ifråga att skyndsamt genomföra förändringar. Att använda end states som utlösande faktor har fördelen att resultaten hamnar i fokus, samtidigt finns risken att mottagarlandet blir alltför beroende av insatsen då man riskerar att hamna i utdragna operationer som kan vara svåra att ta sig ur.

Nyckelord: Exit strategy, End state, End date, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR Althea, Transition, Peace Support Operation

Summary

The aim of the study is to analyse strategies for ending and exiting PSOs and to describe what challenges and possibilities comes with different approaches. The study highlights key concepts and strategies for exit and describes their different strengths and weaknesses. Two main "triggers" for exit are analysed in this report: end states and end dates. They are exemplified through case studies of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR Althea. Also, the report describes how the EU, NATO and the UN have dealt with exit in PSOs. Within the EU the end date strategy has been preferred whereas NATO and the UN more often have chosen strategies with end state triggers. While an end date's time limit might hamper the operations possibility to deal with the root causes of conflicts, it might also put healthy pressure on an operation to achieve its objectives as soon as possible. An end state on the other hand might make the host nation too dependent on international support but could also ensure that the operation focuses on the objective of the mission rather than an artificial deadline.

Keywords: Exit Strategy, End state, End date, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR Althea, Transition, Peace Support Operation

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Executive Summary[1]

The last twenty years have seen a greater focus on exit strategies as increasingly complex conflicts tie up our peacekeeping instruments. Even if there is a perfectly valid strategy in the planning stages for how an operation should be terminated, internal and external factors like national or organisational reputation or political and economical instability in the region might make that strategy obsolete. What is clear is that it is very difficult to describe your exit before the operation is implemented and then succeed in exiting the way you planned. Today's conflicts, often described as increasingly complex, almost guarantee that planning will have to be revisited and tweaked in order to mirror rapid changes in the environment of an operation. Thus, factors outside the immediate control of a mission are likely to shape the conditions for exit. Still, to engage in a conflict with armed forces without any notion of how those forces should reach their goals and ultimately be able to leave seems unwise.

There are several ways a PSO could end. The preferred way for international military to exit is to hand over responsibility to other, civilian, actors that continue to work towards sustainable peace and development without the need for military support. A PSO could also exit through a transfer of responsibility to another peace support actor. Furthermore, PSOs could end with failure or defeat (in operations with higher level of violence), leading to a forced withdrawal without the objectives being met.

The aim of the study is to analyse strategies for ending and exiting PSOs and to describe what challenges and possibilities comes with different approaches. The study highlights key concepts and strategies for exit and describes their different strengths and weaknesses.

Looking at EU's military ESDP operations, Operation Artemis, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, one can see one clear trend within the EU when it comes to exit strategies; with the exception of EUFOR Althea the EU has used end dates as the trigger for exit. Regarding Althea the exit strategy was inherited from NATO. A long-term commitment was also connected to the overall objective of integrating Bosnia and Herzegovina into EU and NATO. As for the end date missions the explanation for the chosen strategy could be the context into which these operations were deployed. All three missions were deployed to support the UN in one way or another with the assumption that the UN would regain or take over the responsibility once the EU had left.

What influences the decision of choosing an exit strategy is however more complicated than the operational context. The study shows that it is important for contributing countries not to have open-ended commitments and therefore an end date might be preferred. This is closely connected to available resource, as there are limits to how much a country is willing to contribute. The exit strategy is also influenced by national agendas and the national public opinion. In the end, when and how to terminate a mission is a political decision.

The concept of exit strategy has maybe been most elaborated within the UN. Even though important parts of the planning process take place within the Secretariat, it is ultimately the decision of the Security Council what exit strategy is chosen. However, the mandates generally describe tasks rather than desired outcomes or end states/end dates. This is normally combined with a time limit with the possibility for prolongation after review. Hence, when it comes to the peacekeeping missions, an explicit end state is rarely identified. With the introduction of benchmarks, triggers for exit might become clearer. Using benchmarks will naturally influence when a mission is to leave since there are clearly defined objectives to reach.

In NATO, the end state is formulated in the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). In reality, even if there is a formulated end state, NATO rarely plans for an exit strategy in the initial phase of an operation since that is too far into the future. NATO is dependent on other partners to reach political end states of an operation since it has very limited civilian resources.

Common for these organisations is that there seems to be a discrepancy between how the planning for an exit strategy is supposed to look and how it is played out in reality. Interesting to see is that exit for the EU and NATO are in many instances dependent on other organisations and on those organisations' ability to assume responsibility or working side by side with the military operation.

To exemplify different approaches to exit, two cases are presented in the study. The EU-led operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA used an end date as the trigger for exit. This was decided early on in the process based on the assumption that a long-term UN mission would follow. The EU operation was supposed to create a window of opportunity for the UN military presence. However, this decision was also influenced by what resources the member states were willing to commit. Political considerations, coupled with operational realities in other engagements such as in Afghanistan and the Balkans explain why the EU chose an end date, even though lessons learned from previous operations pointed in another direction.

EUFOR Althea is the only EU military operation thus far that has an end state-type exit strategy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina a long-term commitment has helped to make the EU engagement more credible. At the same time the local institutions might have become dependent on the international presence. The

choice of an end state rather than an end date as trigger for exit was partly driven by the geographical location of BiH. Being part of Europe made anything else than working towards EU integration difficult and this is a long-term commitment.

1 Introduction

It is commonly known that while it is relatively easy to get drawn into a conflict, it is far more difficult to get out of one. Even so, the international community seems more ready than ever to engage in conflicts in all parts of the world. The number and scope of United Nations (UN) deployments has reached unprecedented numbers since the turn of the millennia. In January of 2009, UN troops and police personnel amounted to nearly 90 000 divided into 16 operations.[2] With the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan claiming a staggering number of troops and resources, it seems that traditional Peace Support Operation (PSO) actors are stretched thin.

PSOs of today are generally tasked to address a wide set of complex issues under broad mandates from the UN Security Council. The aims of PSOs are generally far reaching, including objectives such as efficient government institutions, rule of law or Security Sector Reform (SSR). PSOs are not only conducted in areas where there is a peace to keep but also in areas where the operations are enforcing rather than keeping the peace. With such elusive objectives, operations tend to last for a long time, as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and Afghanistan, involving numerous international and local actors. These types of complex missions require enormous resources, and the demand for additional contributions seems never-ending.

Organisations and nations now look for possible ways to share these burdens amongst each other. Traditional PSO actors have started to look at regional alternatives like the African Union (AU) for cooperation. The UN, The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are examining different mechanisms, e.g. co-deployments, hybrid missions and transitions in order to cope with the strains that PSOs have put on the organisations and troop contributing countries. This is not only because of resource-dependency but might also increase legitimacy or evolve from the sharing of central values.[3] Mechanisms for coordination are however not fully developed and have yet to provide much needed relief to the organisations involved in PSOs.[4]

In sum, there is a great push towards finding ways of implementing PSOs without getting bogged down in complex environments, without a self-sustaining peace, or partners to take over at least some of the responsibility, in sight. To plan for the termination of a PSO, the exit strategy, is however utterly difficult.

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[2] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to the United Nations Operations'. Accessed 2009-04-02 at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/Yearly06.pdf.

[3] Derblom, Markus, Hagström Frisell, Eva, Schmidt, Jennifer, 2008. ‚UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa', FOI-R--2602--SE.

[4] Derblom et al, 2008. 'UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa'.

When aims and objectives are expressed in effects or outcomes such as stability or reform of the security sector, other factors than the intervening force will play such a great role in helping or hindering success of the mission that it will be nearly impossible to know when and how objectives will be met. That said, in the planning phase of a PSO, the issues of termination has to be addressed.

1.1 Aim of the Report

The aim of the report is to analyse strategies for ending and exiting PSOs and to describe what challenges and possibilities comes with different approaches. The study highlights key concepts and strategies for exit and describes their different strengths and weaknesses. Presently there is too little research on what consequences the choice of exit strategy can have on the outcome of an operation. Hence, exit and termination of operations are areas that need to be studied more systematically and this study aims to fill some of this gap. In the study, strategies from several important actors are described; however the focus of the report is on the EU and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mechanisms and operations.

1.2 Method and Delimitations

The method of this report has been to study official documents relevant to exit strategies from the EU, NATO and the UN, to describe how the planning for exit is supposed to look like within the three organisations. To investigate how this plays out in reality, these readings have been complemented with semi-structured interviews with representatives from the same organisations as well as from the academic world. These include representatives from the EU Council Secretariat, the UN Secretariat and the Operations Division at NATO.

To provide more concrete examples on how an exit and exit strategies can look like, two operations have been chosen as case studies. These are the European Force in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and the European Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea). The reasons for choosing these two EU-operations are several. Firstly, they present two very different approaches to exit, where Althea has an open-ended exit strategy and EUFOR had an end date. Secondly, they involve the EU, UN (EUFOR Tchad/RCA and Althea) and NATO (Althea) which means that they can say something about exit that also has some relevance to the other major PSO organisations. Thirdly and closely connected, they present us with interesting mechanisms for transitions and therefore help us analyze the benefits of different strategies from this aspect.

The EU, NATO and the UN are the main "providers" of PSOs today and therefore the focus in this report. However, more attention is given to EU-

operations, partly due to the Swedish presidency in the EU during fall 2009. Another delimitation is that this report primarily studies PSOs with a major military component. The case studies as well as other examples in the report are all operations with a relatively large military contingent.

1.3 Outline of the Report

In chapter two the current debate on exit strategies, partly focusing on the tension between two central concepts: *end states* and *end dates*, is presented. Chapter three focuses on a description of current practices. This is done by looking at how the EU, NATO and UN approaches exit in planning and implementation of PSOs. To highlight the tension between different exit strategies and what effect they have, the study then presents the two case-studies in chapter four: EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR Althea. The last chapter brings together the findings and presents the study's conclusions.

2 Exit Strategies

Exit strategies could be defined in a number of ways. One of the more straight forward and perhaps most useful definitions come from Edelstein: "an exit strategy is an intervening power's plan for disengaging its military forces from the target state of a military intervention".[5] In more comprehensive operations, Zaum suggests that exit should be understood as: "…the transition of governmental authority exercised by international administrations to local institutions".[6] Here, the important aspect of transition of power and responsibility is highlighted, something that is explored more thoroughly in this study.

While exit sounds like an event, where peacekeepers one day pack up and leave, very few PSOs end with a sudden halt to all activities without a gradual draw down. They are regularly followed by other missions, be it without military components or executive mandates. Exit strategies should instead be seen as processes where one actor gradually phases out its engagement and another assumes some sort of "follow-on" responsibility.[7] Eventually responsibility will have to be assumed by the state or local government, even though this is a process and responsibility that can be phased from one actor to another. Usually PSOs with military components hand over responsibility to civilian international actors who continue to work together with local authorities. The degree of responsibility, e.g. executive or non-executive mandates, will, at least conceptually, affect how complex exit is. If an international actor has assumed "full" responsibility in a conflict, the exit strategy will have to be more elaborate than in a mission with a non-executive mandate.

One aim in this report is to describe and analyse two "triggers" or determinants for exit strategies: end date and end state. These could be said to be a core theme of exit strategies, focusing the exit on a point in time (end date) or the attainment of a certain effect or outcome (end state). An exit strategy often has aspects of both an end date and an end state but is generally focussed on one of the two. Thus, an exit strategy is a broader plan or description for how and when an operation should exit, what responsibilities should be passed on to others and how this should be done. End dates and end states could be described as what triggers the exit strategy. They should not be understood as objectives or aims, even if they could occur at the same time, but rather as something that when it has been reached marks the start of the exit. Here it is argued that the choice of trigger profoundly affects PSOs as they stipulate key assumptions in an

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[5] Edelstein, David M, 2009. 'Withdrawal Symptoms: Understanding Exit Strategies from Military Inventions', paper presented at the 2009 ISA Convention, p. 6.

[6] Zaum, Dominik, 2009. 'International Administrations, Exit, and Peace Consolidation', Draft paper presented at the 2009 ISA convention, p. 7.

[7] See e.g. Zaum, 2009.

operation. For example, in operations where the time or deadline for exit is seen as crucial (usually leading to an end date) the operation is likely more limited in scope and objective, perhaps as a bridging operation. On the contrary, the end state concept has been used more frequently in operations with complex objectives and long-term engagements. The end state- and end date-concepts are further elaborated in the sections below.

2.1 End state

All PSOs needs a common aim to be effective. This is derived from a political process and interpreted at the military-strategic level into more tangible outcomes or effects that are to be achieved. An end state is the description of the situation where an operation can exit. An end state is not tied to a time frame even if an exit strategy could also include one. To reach the end state, a range of objectives, broken down from the strategic objectives, needs to be fulfilled.

It is difficult to identify relevant, achievable and effective end states that correspond with available resources and political. By describing an end state, it might be tempting (and rational) to be very ambitious, trying to fundamentally change a conflict-ridden society. Most conflict analysis in today's complex conflicts will inevitably identify some root-causes of conflict that go well beyond traditional inter-state conflict dynamics. These are likely to include poor governance and state institutions lacking both legitimacy and efficiency. Based on such an analysis, it will be difficult (and perhaps unwise) to ignore these challenges in the stages leading up to a PSO. The question remains however, how they should be addressed in the formulation of an end state. Strategic objectives are generally very ambitious and are likely to continue to be so. "Good enough" is rarely a politically viable option and military planners will only very rarely be given limited, "easy", objectives. The challenge is to pair political will with ability and the analysis of the conflict.

If, for instance, the analysis points to a failing government with limited will or ability to provide security or essential services as a root cause of conflict, the appropriate end state doesn't necessarily have to be tied to the establishment of a democratic and effective state. Rose would argue that there is a choice to be made between either limiting an operation to the absolute minimum, like the provision of security for humanitarian organisations, or to take on "full" responsibility for the development of that region/country and actually address the root-causes with the full knowledge that this might take a very long time.[8] However, this then needs to be followed by appropriate funding, sustained political will and resource allocation, all in a context where the realisation of the objectives, and subsequently, the end state, is likely to be in a large degree in the

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[8] Rose, Gideon, 1998. 'The Exit Strategy Delusion', Foreign Affairs 77:1 1998, p. 5-6.

hands of external actors. Without an appropriate level of personnel and resources an operation with an exit strategy tied to an ambitious end state might not always be a feasible option.

If end states (as opposed to end dates) are used for the planning of PSOs, it could be argued that the operations are more likely to reach the root-causes of conflicts. This is because an end state approach usually focuses the operation on reaching sustainable change in the environment. However, it might also mean that operations in conflicts which evolve in a negative direction are forced to stay for a (too) long time. If a PSO takes over too much responsibility (because of a 'too' broad or rigid mandate), it might be hard to leave since institutions could become dependent on international support. Hence, a fine balance will have to be found between taking too much responsibility and not being able to affect the dynamics of a conflict.

Even if end state is a widespread and frequently used term and planning tool, it is still generally considered to be a military term. This might in turn be in the way of the drive for a more "holistic" or comprehensive approach to PSOs. Military end states are generally different than those of civilian actors. Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) results have shown that, in multifunctional settings, the term end state hampers coordination.[9] It does so by limiting the military scope for planning to a point in time or outcome when the military can pull out, leaving civilian actors to plan for long-term stabilisation and recovery. This approach has proven to be unhelpful in situations where civilian and military actors rely on each other to reach common goals.[10] Still, civilian organisations also work towards certain "states" or outcomes; the difficulties probably have more to do with terminology than with differences in planning structure. It might be that the military usage of the end state concept is too narrow, focusing only on the military instrument when e.g. SSR operations require both civilian and military competencies to be successful. Also, this problem could be even more accentuated if an end date was introduced.

2.2 End date

An end date is a time limit that triggers an exit of a PSO. It is rarely expressed explicitly as an "end date"; instead it is more an assumption that guides planners in their work leading up to an operation.

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[9] Lindoff, Jenny, 2008. 'Swedish experiences from Multinational Experiment 5.Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation, Major Integrating Event, 7-18 April 2008', FOI Memo 2442, p. 24.

[10] This doesn't mean that using end dates would be preferable; instead this would probably sit even more uncomfortable with civilian actors.

As mentioned above, the termination of an operation is often at least partly regulated by a fixed timetable for the mission through a mandate and/or plan. International organisations regularly set time-limits to their PSOs and nations often have time limits for their contributions of troops and resources. These might be tweaked or prolonged but serve as the dead-line in planning and implementation of PSOs. With the introduction of hybrid and 'entrance'-forces, the usage of the end date becomes even more frequent. The EU Battle Group concept for instance, relies heavily on other actors to assume responsibility once the Battle Groups pull out.

Even though most PSOs have some sort of time-line it is difficult to find advocates for the concept of end dates. Instinctively, it would seem that the issue of when to exit should be driven by ends-achievement, i.e. when the mission or operation has achieved the effects or outcomes that have been agreed. If a mission is planned towards an end date, i.e. it is stated in the plan that a mission will end no matter what on a specific date, the matter of termination is "easy" in the planning phases. It does however raise serious questions about underlying planning assumptions since it is so difficult to foresee conflict dynamics in contemporary conflicts. The environments in which PSOs operate are often highly complex and dynamic and have a tendency to deviate from the hopes of planners and policy makers in our capitals. Thus, there is a big risk that a PSO with an end date might find that the operation has only addressed symptoms of a conflict when it is time to pack up and leave.

Critics of the end date concept thus claim that it is an unrealistic simplification of conflict dynamics. They could argue that it is not possible for planners to know beforehand when complex issues such as reform of security sectors or reconciliation processes are implemented and, perhaps most important, sustainable. They could also argue that the usage of end dates is driven by political/economical motives. If the exit strategy is dependent on conditions like stability or peace there is always the risk of being stuck in a conflict with no exit in sight. By committing to a time-line rather than an end state, it is likely easier to withdraw from a complex conflict and declare the mission to be successful.

There do however seem to be some arguments in favour of using end dates that should not be overlooked. For instance, it might be easier to find nations willing to contribute to PSOs by clearly stating what is being asked for and for how long. Also, it could force both international and national actors to start addressing difficult issues of conflict more promptly. As will be shown in the next chapter, the EU has frequently used end dates, not least since the Member States have preferred operations with clear time-frames. Operations with little chance of quick wins are difficult to "sell" to the public. PSOs also demand vast economic resources and the end date is one way to ensure that operations do not burden tax payers year after year without clear chances of success.

Stambaugh, defending the end date concept, argues that introducing and sticking to an end date forces both an operation and the warring parties to speed up the peace process:

"What is magic about a deadline? It affects peoples' behaviour […] [O]ne of the most positive aspects of a deadline is that a peacekeeping operation with a deadline is likely to accomplish more than one without. The deadline crystallizes effort."[11]

Central in Stambaugh's argument is that with an end date comes results. He refers to organisational and social studies that have shown that groups that are put under increasing time-pressure are more likely to get the job done. While this might not be that surprising, there might be a valid point in that a dead-line forces actors to focus on outcome. He also points to negotiation studies that have shown the importance of time pressure for forcing warring parties to speed up negotiations and peace processes.

Stambaugh goes on to argue that operations without an end date create unrealistic expectations and undermines national governments' sovereignty. Without an end date, Stambaugh argues, international engagement tends to take over too much responsibility from local actors, creating dependencies and ultimately weakening local institutions. While a central objective in many war-torn societies should be to create strong, democratic institutions, Stambaugh argues that several PSOs have been so ambitious in scale, coupled with (and partly because of) a lack of time-limits, that they are in fact counter-productive. Accordingly, a clear end date forces an engagement by local actors which creates conditions for a smoother exit.[12]

Still, just as the use of an end date could save resources, it could also become a big waste of effort since a too quick withdrawal could to lead to a relapse into conflict, making efforts thus far worthless. Opposing forces might bide their time and resume their course of action once the deadline has been reached.

2.3 Different approaches to exit

Even if there is a perfectly valid exit strategy at the outset of an operation, internal and external factors like national or organisational reputation or political and economical instability in the region might make that strategy obsolete. What is clear is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to describe your exit before the operation is implemented and then succeed in exiting the way you planned. Today's conflicts, often described as increasingly complex, almost guarantee that planning will have to be revisited and adjusted in order to respond to rapid

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[11] Stambaugh, Jeffrey E., 2001. 'Peacekeeping Exit Strategy: A Renaissance for the Deadline?' Harvard University, pp. 12-13.
[12] Stambaugh, pp. 15-16.

changes in the environment of an operation. Thus, factors outside the immediate control of a mission are likely to shape the conditions for exit.

Still, to engage in a conflict with armed forces without any notion of how those forces should ultimately be able to leave seems unwise. Accordingly, every planning process has some form of exit strategy in that they state aims and objectives, the attainment of which signals the possibility for exit.

There are several ways a PSO could end. The preferred way for international military to exit is to hand over responsibility to other, civilian, actors that continue to work towards sustainable peace and development without the need for military support. This would generally mean that local actors, often supported by civilian international organisations, take over responsibility after conflict. This is likely the more appealing alternatives for international and local actors alike, yet, it is an often lengthy process of (re-)creating functioning and effective state institutions. In operations such as United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan the engagements are so far-reaching, stipulating fundamental changes in the government and society that some sort of international support is likely to be needed for a very long time.

A PSO could also exit through a transfer of responsibility to another peace support actor. The operations in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are examples of UN/EU cooperation in complex conflicts. Transitions, co-deployments and hybrid missions have become more frequently used tools for exit and burden sharing the last decade. Thirdly, PSOs could end with failure or defeat (in operations with higher level of violence), leading to a forced withdrawal without the objectives being met. This was for example the case in the American intervention in Somalia in the 1990s, where the costs for staying were deemed to high.[13] It could also be the case that PSOs end, or are perhaps gradually phased out, because interest and funding is directed to other conflicts or crises. Fourthly a PSO could end because a number of troop contributors decide to withdraw its resources from an operation. In that way a national exit strategy determines the end or the transition of a PSO as a whole. This was for example the case when Operation Althea was transformed, as will be shown in chapter four. A PSO could also end because it loses its UN mandate due to disagreements within the Security Council. This happened after disagreements in the Security Council when the UN was about to prolong the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

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[13] Edelstein, 2009, p 11, 16. There was still an international presence in Somalia through the UN after the American withdrawal.

Exit strategies are often linked to certain types of events or outcomes. Zaum highlights timetables, elections and governance benchmarks[14] while Durch draws a more multidimensional picture of exit strategies[15]. Durch outlines or grades PSOs in relation to their "comprehensiveness", ranging from full responsibility or intervention ("Forcible Regime Change") to traditional monitoring/peacekeeping ("Providing fair witness"). He discusses each of these (7) types of interventions in relation to internal and external factors that influence the exit strategy. Internal factors could be the ability of the operation to establish effective and responsive governance institutions or the ability to create able security forces. External factors are e.g. local and regional support for the operation or the local support for a new government.[16] It seems that while the internal factors are difficult and at times even beyond what PSOs can manage, the external factors are the really difficult areas and processes where operations need to be able to influence local and regional stakeholders and events.

An interesting argument is made by Rose who states that the common view on exit strategies as plans for bringing troops home is fundamentally flawed. This view, Rose argues, is centred on the wish to avoid becoming stuck in complex emergencies with no or little potential of finding "quick fixes". Moreover, to stress the need for an exit strategy prior to an engagement would, according to Rose, lead politicians to send troops only to places where a smooth exit would be possible, i.e. to avoid places who might need international support the most. In this sense Rose also connects exit strategies to the usage of end dates; an exit strategy that expresses when and how a PSO should terminate is contradictory to the environments where most contemporary PSOs are conducted. Rose reasons that one needs to focus more on the reasons why to get involved and what should come after (e.g. a follow-on force or a domestically driven process) than on how and when one's own forces could exit. Moreover, Rose argues that interventions should either restrict their objectives (which could admit shorter and "tidier" interventions, e.g. traditional peacekeeping), or to intervene in situations where the international community actually takes full responsibility for supporting a country to not only cease with hostilities but to actually address root causes of conflict.[17]

Looking at contemporary PSOs, Rose arguments seem to be worth taking notice of. The case of EU will be studied more in detail later on in the report but here it could suffice to say that the EU seem to continue to engage in shorter and less comprehensive PSOs, operation Althea being the obvious exception. It could be

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[14] Zaum, 2009, p. 11.
[15] Durch, William J., 2009. 'Exit and Peace Operations: When and How to Leave Kinshasa, Kabul, Dili, and Darfur', "Project on Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation", draft paper presented at the 2009 ISA Convention.
[16] Ibid, p. 5.
[17] Rose, 1998. 'The Exit Strategy Delusion'.

argued that this is all very well since the EU has as its comparative advantage "rapid" bridging operations. It could however also be argued that it is much "easier" to engage in operations with limited mandate and time-frames that will not be moved, thus guaranteeing swift return of European soldiers. Other organisations, such as the AU, may not have the breadth in capacity or the endurance to effectively engage in complex PSOs. They might be able to deploy to areas with lower levels of violence or in operations where the objectives are less comprehensive.[18] Gaps in capacity are also a reality for the UN; the availability of more sophisticated troops and resources like strategic transportation does not match the demand. Still, the more complex conflicts need to be addressed; who that someone will be is more uncertain.

2.4 Evaluation of progress – when is it time to exit?

The issue of measuring progress is fundamental in the termination of PSOs. If the PSO has an end date, this is easier even if there might be both internal and external pressure to remain engaged. However, when operations use end states as triggers the issue of exit becomes much more complex. With today's focus on democratisation and state-building it has become even harder to achieve the goals of ambitious operations like the ones in Bosnia or Afghanistan. Generally, contemporary large-scale PSOs deal with security and immediate humanitarian support, governance, security sector reform (e.g. forming efficient police and armed forces under popular control), economical support, reconciliation and democratisation. This is not a full list of activities, nor are they necessarily done in this order, but it marks some of the important challenges of today's PSOs. It involves several actors from military components, humanitarian organisations, state agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

A central issue is therefore how the complex environment described above affects the possibilities of exiting at the right moment. How, for instance, do we know when local forces can provide sufficient security and remain accountable without support from external forces? And how do we know that this is sustainable? To leave too early, only to see what you have built up fall to pieces is a big risk and one that is absolutely crucial to exit planning. Here, the *Who* is probably just as important as the *How*? Different actors, both international and local, have different interests in PSOs and it is likely that evaluations will look very different depending on who initiates the evaluation. One could only look to Kosovo to see a multitude of different analysis of the situation in the country.

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[18] On the capacity of AU, see for instance Bogland- Karin, Egnell- Robert, Lagerström- Maria, 2008. 'The African Union – A Study Focusing on Conflict Management, FOI-R--2475--SE.

The wider scope of PSOs discussed above makes measuring much more difficult. Military components need not only to create security; they are regularly tasked to engage in areas that go well beyond traditional military activities. Consequently, they need to evaluate what effect activities in traditional non-military areas have. Also, multifunctional or comprehensive operations means that it is not sufficient to measure progress in one policy area (e.g. military or police). Multifunctional operations will have objectives that cover a whole range of policy areas where one usually is dependent on the others. Thus, a system-wide approach to monitoring and evaluation might be necessary to be able to identify outcomes and benchmarks towards exit.[19]

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[19] See for instance Nilsson C., Hull C., Derblom M. & Egnell R (2008). *Contextualising the Comprehensive Approach – the Elements of a Comprehensive Intervention*. FOI-R—2650—SE

3 Exit Strategy Processes and Implementation

To study exit strategies and the concepts of end dates and end states it is necessary to look at existing policy processes. Equally important is the question of implementation, how has strategies for exit played out in reality? Below, the planning and the implementation within the EU, UN and NATO will be presented.

3.1 EU

The European Union has since 2003 conducted 20 civilian and military ESDP missions and operations.[20] They have been different in scope and mandate, but they have also differed when it comes to what strategy the EU has had for exiting a mission. Both end states and end dates have been used as triggers. The focus in this report will be on the military ESDP operations.

3.1.1 The Planning Process

According to the EU "identification of the end state or end date is an important part of military planning. This should lead on to the consideration of the transition (to the end of the operation) and potential follow-on forces".[21] Hence, the idea of an end state or an end date should be present when planning for an ESDP mission.

An ESDP initiative can originate from different actors. Firstly, a member state can propose an ESDP operation. This might result in a so called Option Paper which is not seen as a formal EU document, but is nevertheless introduced to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The question of end state or end date might appear already at this stage.[22] The initiative to start planning for a PSO can also come from the High Representative and the Council Secretariat. A third alternative is that an outside actor, like the UN, approaches the EU.[23] This was for example the case in Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo.

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[20] Council of the European Union, 2009a. 'Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2009'. Accessed 2009-05-08 at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/map-ENApril09.pdf
[21] Council of the European Union, 2009b. 'EU Military Rapid Response Concept', 23 January 2009.
[22] Interview at the Council Secretariat 2009-04-01.
[23] Björkdahl- - Annika, Strömvik - Maria, 2008. 'EU Crisis Management Operations ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures', DIID Report 2008:8, pp. 25.

When there is an agreement in the PSC to go ahead with such an initiative a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is developed. The CMC describes "the general political assessment of the situation, the overall objectives of the operation, and one or more proposed courses of action".[24] This might include the political context and the security situation, relevant actors in the area, political considerations and EU engagements, as well as an overall EU objective and a separate ESDP objective. Thus a distinction is made between the overall objective and the objective for the ESDP mission, which should be seen as a part of, or a way to reach the overall objective.

When the CMC has been approved by the Council, the EUMS should be tasked, through a Military Strategic Option Directive (MSOD), to develop Military Strategic Options (MSO). The MSO outlines possible military actions in order to attain EU's objectives. The MSO should also "contain the objective, the desired End State, the Exit Strategy, [and] the general objective of any military engagement".[25] When planning for the military exit at this stage, the links to the commission is seen as important since it is imperative not to create a vacuum in the EU engagement after a military withdrawal.[26]

Once a strategic option is chosen to proceed with, the Joint Action, which is the document that formally establishes the operation, should be adopted by the Council. In the Joint Action, the objectives of the operation, the mandate and the financial arrangements are normally outlined. The next step should be the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) which constitutes the guiding principles for the Operation Commander's planning. The IMD should describe the EU's political and military objectives as well as the foreseen military tasks needed to achieve those goals. The Operation Commander should also be informed about any political limitations which need to be considered when developing how to conclude the operation.[27]

The Operation Commander should thereafter develop the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The CONOPS outlines, among other things, the military objectives of the operation, whereas the OPLAN delineates the proposed conduct of the operation.

These are the formal documents dealing with the objectives and the exit strategy of the operation. It is however important to highlight that in reality not all these planning steps are necessarily taken. Instead some steps might be skipped, or do not contain all prescribed components. This is mostly due to time constraints and happens when an expeditious planning of a mission is deemed to be important.

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Council of the European Union, 2008. 'EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level', 16 June 2008.
[26] Interview at the Council Secretariat 2009-04-01.
[27] Council of the European Union, 2008.

Below we look at how exit strategies have been played out in reality in ESDP operations.

3.1.2 Exit in EU Operations

As mentioned before the EU has so far conducted more than 20 ESDP operations and missions. When focusing on military operations[28] the following are either ongoing or finished: Operation Artemis – taking place in the DRC in 2003, Operation Concordia – taking place in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003, EUFOR Althea – in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004, EUFOR RD Congo – taking place during 2006, EUFOR Tchad/RCA – taking place during 2008/2009, and the ongoing EU Navfor Atlanta. EUFOR Althea and EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be further explored in the next chapter. Therefore, only a brief overview will be presented here.

As mentioned before, both operations in the DRC were set up upon a request from the UN. When it comes to the operation in Chad EU assumed responsibility when a UN military component was not accepted. In the case of Althea on the other hand, the EU assumed responsibility from a long-term NATO commitment. This was also the case with Concordia. Looking at these missions, one can see one clear trend within the EU when it comes to exit strategies: with the exception of EUFOR Althea and to some extent Operation Concordia[29], the EU has often tied end dates to its operations.

Regarding Althea, the end state was inherited from NATO. A long-term commitment was also connected to the overall objective of integrating BiH into EU and NATO. As for the end date missions, the explanation for the chosen strategy could be the context into which these operations were deployed. Operation Artemis was identified as a stabilisation force complementing the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) when the security situation grew worse in the eastern DRC and the idea was for the UN to thereafter resume responsibility. Hence, both the UN Security Council resolution 1484 and the EU Joint Action, mandating the operation, had a time limit attached to them.[30] EUFOR RD Congo was a reinforcement force during the DRC presidential elections in 2006 and it was

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[28] Civil-military engagements like the one in Guinea-Bissau are thus not accounted for.

[29] In the case of Concordia the mandate was prolonged once. In total the operation did last for less than a year. At the same time Concordia was followed by a police mission, thus prolonging the over overall EU engagement. See: Council of the European Union 2003a. 'Council Decision relating to the launch of the EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 18 March 2003 and Council of the European Union, 2003b. 'Council Decision 2003/563/CFSP of 29 July 2003 on the extension of the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'.

[30] Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003).

thus decided that the mission was to end four months after the elections. In Chad the original idea was that the UN would have the full responsibility. When this was not possible the EU assumed responsibility over the military tasks and in that way, time was bought in the negotiations with the Chadians to get them to accept a UN force.

What influences the decision of using an end date or an end state is however more complicated than the operational context. According to one interviewee, it is important for member states not to have open ended commitments and therefore an end date is preferred. The reason for this is that it is not politically attractive, it is expensive and the troops are often already committed elsewhere.[31] Thus the decision of using an end date is very resource driven; there is only so much a country is willing to contribute. The exit is also influenced by national agendas and the public opinion within the member states.

This can be exemplified in several ways. A lot of the EU member states are engaged in Afghanistan, which is a long-term commitment that is costly and bind resources to a specific place. When planning for a new mission, the interest for additional long-term commitment might therefore be limited. In operation Althea, as will be explored further below, the draw down or transformation of the mission in 2007 was not so much dependent on the security situation but rather on the lack of troop contributions.[32]

Looking at national interest and political constraints on the national arena, EUFOR RD Congo provides an interesting example. The decision to use an exit strategy with strict adherence to an end date was influenced by Germany who was to contribute with a third of the force. The German government did not want to present an operation to the Bundestag if the operation was not limited in time. The importance of having the Germans taking the lead of the operation was seen as more important for some member states than having more ambitious objectives.[33] As for EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the operation was a French initiative and to get the necessary support from other member states an end date probably had to be chosen, according to interviews.[34]

3.2 UN

The UN has come quite far in its conceptual development of exit strategies. Naturally, with experience, the way to exit has changed over time and it is therefore worth looking at how these strategies have evolved to understand where the contemporary ideas of terminating a mission come from.

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[31] Interview at the Council Secretariat 2009-04-01.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.

3.2.1 The Evolvement of Exit Strategies

Looking back at the missions mandated before 1989, when peacekeepers were used as a buffer between the former warring parties (normally states), [35] five of the 15 missions are still ongoing. [36] This is partly due to how the mandates were formulated. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the first UN mission, is an example of how the mandates could look like. UNTSO should be in place "until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached". [37] This is a very long-term objective and for obvious reasons such broad formulations has not become standard for UN missions.

In 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, identified the need for post-conflict peacebuilding. [38] In the field, however, successes were declared too hastily with the holding of elections. On several occasions, once elections had been held, the PSO was ended. However, the holding of elections and democracy were not the same thing and other strategies were needed.

This thought was developed in the so called Brahimi Report in 2000, which stated that "elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions". [39] Furthermore, peacebuilding, creating a secure environment through political, social and economic changes, would be the only way to offer "a ready exit to peacekeeping forces". [40] Thus the evolvement of peacebuilding strategies would affect the possible exit of peacekeeping missions.

In April 2001 then Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the report"No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations". In the report three previously identified key objectives for successful and comprehensive peacebuilding was underlined: a) Consolidating internal and external security, b) Strengthening political institutions and good governance and c) Promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation. [41] It also stated that "a good exit strategy results from a good entrance strategy". [42] This report served as the intellectual basis

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[35] Ahmed, Salman, Keating, Paul, Solinas, Ugo, 2007.'The United Nations and peacebuilding: prospects and perils in international regime (trans)formation, Shaping the future of UN peace operations: is there a doctrine in the house?', in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:1, p.13

[36] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, List of Operations. Accessed 2009-04-01 at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf.

[37] United Nations Security Council Resolution 54 (1948).

[38] See United Nations, 1992. 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping', S/24111. Accessed 2009-03-15 at: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.

[39] United Nations, 2000a. 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', S/2000/809, p.7.

[40] United Nations, 2000a. 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', p.5.

[41] United Nations, 2001.'No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations', S/2001/394.

[42] Ibid, p.8.

when developing what came to be the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which is the planning process that is supposed to be used today.[43]

3.2.2   The Planning Process

To be able to deal with long-term peacebuilding efforts with both civilian and military instruments the UN has developed a concept for Integrated Missions. "An integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives of the UN presence at the country-level".[44] Overall objectives for the UN are to be reached through an integrated Chain of Command as well as the IMPP, which should engage all relevant parts of the UN system to a specific country setting. The IMPP was adopted 23 January 2004 and the aim of the IMPP is to "assist UN actors to achieve a common strategic and operational plan that is responsive to the objectives of the UN system and the Security Council mandate".[45]

The IMPP is to be launched by a decision of the Secretary General and can be divided into three phases: Advance planning, Operational Planning and Review and Transition planning.[46] In the advanced planning the stage for a possible UN engagement should be set through a Strategic Assessment which among other things includes strategic objectives for a possible PSO as well as different scenarios and strategies for a UN engagement.[47] Based on the Strategic Assessment the Secretary-General should issue a Strategic Planning Directive. This document includes the strategic objectives of the operation and gives the responsibility of leading the IMPP to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The next step is to develop the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping's Planning Directive which should present the foundation for operational planning. This includes more detailed strategic objectives as well as benchmarks. A draft Mission Plan which includes an overview of an integrated CONOPS is then developed. The CONOPS should outline the end state of the mission.[48] It also provides benchmarks to be used when planning for a transition and exit.[49] Finally in this phase a Secretary-Generals report should be drafted, in reality a CONOPS, which is then presented to the Security Council.

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[43] Gowan, Richard, 2008. 'The Strategic Concept: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-2008', in International Peacekeeping, 15:4, August 2008, p.463.

[44] United Nations, 2006. 'Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary General on 13 June 2006', p.3.

[45] Ibid, p.4.

[46] Ibid, p.2.

[47] Ibid, p.6.

[48] Derblom-Markus, Egnell-Robert, Nilsson- Claes, 2007. 'The Impact of Strategic Concepts and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations', FOI-R--2394--SE, p.25.

[49] United Nations, 2006. 'Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)', p.9.

The Operational phase is initiated when the Security Council authorises the peacekeeping mission through a resolution. The formulation of the mandate is a closed door exercise that the Secretariat can not influence more than through the documents it has presented to the Council.[50] The advanced draft of the Mission Plan provides, among other things, benchmarks that form the foundation for the transition and exit plan which is part of the third phase of the IMPP. However, determining the completion of the mandate for a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation is difficult and the benchmarks have to be context specific.[51] When reaching the benchmarks, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) recommends that the transition and exit phase should commence. The ultimate decision to exit is always taken by the Security Council.

The IMPP has not been fully implemented in any mission.[52] Hence, as in EU processes, the formal planning process is not always fully followed. Therefore little can be said about how the IMPP process affects the exit strategy.

What has been adopted however is the use of benchmarks and work is ongoing to create a method for the development of benchmarks to be incorporated in the Security Council resolutions.[53] The fulfilment of benchmarks could probably be the future trigger for exit within the UN system.

3.2.3   Exit in UN Missions

There are only four missions headed by DPKO that have been initiated since the IMPP was launched. These are United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) – which is a Political Mission, African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Out of these, benchmarks are explicitly mentioned in the resolutions establishing BINUB and MINURCAT.[54] MINURCAT, the most recent peacekeeping mission to be launched, is the one with the most developed benchmarks that the Security Council has endorsed.[55]

There are two missions that have been terminated since the IMPP was launched: the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).[56] ONUB was terminated upon the request from

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[50] Interview with Desk Officer at the UN Secretariat.
[51] United Nations, 2008a. 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines', p.88.
[52] Hull, Cecilia, 2008. 'Integrated Missions - Liberia a Case Study'. FOI-R--2555--SE.
[53] Interview with Desk Officer at the UN Secretariat.
[54] See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1719 (2006) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1861 (2009).
[55] For a more detailed encounter of MINURCAT's benchmarks see next chapter.
[56] United Nations, List of operations.

the Burundian government that had come to the conclusion that the operation was no longer needed.[57] However, the UN did not leave Burundi, instead BINUB was established. UNMEE was ended because the Eritreans were putting too many restrictions on the mission, making it impossible to fulfil its mandate.[58] Hence, exit sometimes takes place due to circumstances in the host nation, making it difficult, or impossible, for the UN mission to perform its mandate.

When it comes to deciding on an exit strategy the influence of the Security Council is very important. According to the IMPP the UN strategy should be responsive to the mandate given by the Security Council.[59] According to one interviewee, the Secretariat tries to advice the Security Council but in the end the members, mainly the permanent five, have the final word. [60] However, the mandates generally describe tasks rather than desired outcomes or end states/end dates. This is normally combined with a time limit that can be prolonged. This was for the example the case in MONUC that was formed in November 1999.[61] The objective of MONUC according to the Secretary-General's report was to assist in the process of disengagement and withdrawal of the warring parties, contribute to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process and provide security for its own personnel.[62].This mandate was initially only given until 31 August 2000. MONUC has since then had its mandate extended 19 times, sometimes only with a month at a time, and the Concept of Operation has changed twice.[63] The mandate has also been expanded through various resolutions now including several tasks in the areas of protection, DDR, SSR and territorial security.[64]

The reasons for combining tasks with a time limit could be several. For example it creates flexibility. With a time limit the Security Council always has the option to end a mission when the mandate expires. It also gives possibilities to modify the Concept of Operation and the mandate, due to changes on the ground. A time limited mandate might also be the only way to get the necessary support from the members of the Security Council. The members thereby have a possibility to

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[57] United Nations, 2005. 'Letter dated 23 November 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council', S/2005/736.

[58] United Nations, UNMEE. Accessed 2009-03-26 at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/.

[59] United Nations, 2006. 'Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)', p. 4.

[60] Interviews at the Council Secretariat 2009-04-01.

[61] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999). However, it was not until resolution 1291 in 2000 that MONUC became a large-scale peacekeeping operation.

[62] United Nations, 2000b. 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo', S/2000/30, 17 January 2000, para 52.

[63] United Nations, Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUC - UN Documents. Accessed 2009-03-26 at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/monucDrs.htm.

[64] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008).

review their support for a certain mission and are thus not politically bound for an unspecified time.

Hence, when it comes to the peacekeeping missions explicit end state are not always identified. This does not mean however that the UN as a whole does not have a long-term end state for its engagement, which the focus on peacebuilding shows. Scaling down the peacekeeping presence and replacing it with new, less military focused operations, is a sign thereof.

3.3 NATO

NATO has deployed PSOs since the mid 1990s, when it first engaged in BiH. NATO is currently involved in two major PSOs, Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. Previously it has also been engaged in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.[65]

3.3.1 The Planning Process

The general framework document when it comes to planning a crisis response within NATO is the Crisis Response System (NCRS) Manual. This document divides the planning of the mission into five different phases: indications and warning, assessment of the developing crisis situation, response options, planning and execution and return to stability.[66] During the assessment phase, the relevant crisis management committees should recommend objectives and desired end state. This assessment then leads to phase three which includes the development of an initiative directive, including the alliance political end state. During phase four, planning and execution, the CONOPS and OPLAN are developed. In the last phase assessments are made to see whether the end state has been reached or not.

However, the NCRS is rarely used in practice when planning for a military operation.[67] Instead the planning draws upon the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP), which relates to the activities taking place in phases 3-5 of the NCRS. The operational planning process is divided into five phases: initiation, orientation, concept development, plan development and plan review. In these different phases the political and military objectives and end states will be formulated as well as the criteria needed for measuring if the end sate has been achieved. In reality however, even if there is an end state formulated, NATO

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[65] NATO has/is also involved in other operations such as assistance to Iraq and the AU, Counter piracy operations, and earthquake relief operation. These are not part of the analysis.
[66] Interview NATO Headquarters 2009-03-30.
[67] Interview NATO Headquarters 2009-03-30, Desk Officer at the Swedish Ministry of Defence.

rarely plans for an exit strategy in the initial phase since that lies so far away in the future, according to one interviewee.[68]

Similarly to the EU and the UN, the GOP might not be fully followed when planning for a mission. This was for example the case with ISAF where not all the planning steps were taken.[69] Hence, within NATO as within the other organisation, following the planning process presents the ideal situation, not always reality.

3.3.2   Exit in NATO Operations

When engaged in a PSO NATO has normally committed long term, as is the case in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and was also the case in BiH. However, its first engagement in BiH, Implementation Force (IFOR), had a clear and relatively short end date as trigger for exit. With the holding of elections in 1996, IFOR's mandate ended. However, NATO decided to transform IFOR to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), thus prolonging its engagement until 2004 making the overall commitment long-term.[70] Hence, the use of an end state has been more common in NATO.

Take the example of ISAF where the defined political end state was: "A self-sustaining, moderate, and democratic government able to exercise its sovereign authority, independently, throughout Afghanistan", with the desired strategic military end state being "Afghan national security forces provide security and sustain stability in Afghanistan without NATO support".[71] Here, a division has been made between the political and military end state, where the military end state is a step towards reaching the political end state. The end state is to be reached through five different phases: assessment and preparation, geographic expansion, stabilisation, transition and redeployment.[72]

There are differences among the NATO member states as to which exit strategy to choose within its operations. For example, in Afghanistan some member states would like a clearly defined exit strategy set in time (i.e. an end date) whereas others rather speak in terms of remaining committed.[73] The decision on for how long an operation should go on is also influenced by the fact that a lot of NATO

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[68] Interview NATO Headquarters 2009-03-30.

[69] Beckman, Steve, 2005. 'From Assumption to Expansion Planning and Executing NATO's First Year in Afghanistan at the Strategic Level', USAWC Strategy Research Project, pp. 5.

[70] For a longer discussion on NATO's engagement in BiH and its exit strategies, see chapter 4.

[71] NATO, 2005. 'OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1): SACEUR Operation Plan for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan', Unclassified Version, p.1, 5. Accessed 2009-04-29 at: http://www.folketinget.dk/samling/20051/UM-del//Bilag/44/242709.PDF

[72] Ibid, p.2.

[73] Interview NATO Headquarters 2009-03-30.

members are also members of the EU. If EU decides to engage in an area, this will also affect the NATO engagement, as was the case when terminating SFOR.

Linked to the question of exit strategy is also the fact that NATO is first and foremost a military organisation. In this way, it differs from the EU and the UN that have much more civilian instruments. NATO can have an overall political end state but will not be able to reach that by itself since it does not have the necessary civilian capacities. Hence, to reach an overall end state, responsibility in NATO operations have to be complemented with or transitioned to another organisation.

3.4 Transitions

A transition of a mission can take place between or within organisations as a step towards reaching strategic objectives. In general, a transition of a mission within the same organisation is closely connected to a long-term exit strategy where different types of engagement are needed over time. This is often the case within the UN, where an operation evolves over time and might shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. However, long-term commitments might also result in the transition of responsibility or cooperation during a limited time between organisations. The UN has for example taken over the responsibility from the EU in Chad/CAR, whereas the EU took over the responsibility in BiH from NATO. Some frameworks for handling such transitions already exist.

3.4.1 EU/UN

The EU/UN cooperation is based on the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management. [74] The document establishes a joint consultative mechanism to look at issues such as planning, training, communication and best practices. There is also the EU-UN cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration. In this document, two options are set out when it comes to cooperation between the organisations in the field of military PSOs: a) provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation and b) an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN.[75]

Regarding option two, the importance of rapid response operations is underlined and one identified model for this is a bridging force until a UN mission can take over the responsibility. The EU military operations in DRC could be defined in

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[74] Council of the European Union, 2003c. 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management', 19 September 2003.

[75] Council of the European Union, 2004a. 'EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration', 17-18 June 2004, p.2

this way. Furthermore, it is stated that "[t]he exit strategy from such an operation is the arrival, in time, of a UN force able to take over from the EU force deployed and tailored to the mission".[76] Hence, the exit strategy for a bridging force is not that a specific end state is reached but rather the transfer to another mission. The EU-UN coordination has also been further enhanced through the Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management, stating, among other things, that regular contact and meetings should take place between the two organisations.[77]

EUFOR Tchad/RCA could in some way be identified as a bridging force.[78] However, the operation in Chad differs regarding the way that the UN took over from EU instead of the EU operation being an extra compliment to already existing UN military efforts. In such cases "an effort should be made to develop a mutually agreed joint transition plan outlining the modalities, steps and timeframe for achieving transition and the assumption of United Nations responsibility".[79] Still, UN cooperation with other organisations in the field of peace and security has often taken place in an ad hoc manner.[80]

Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning have been developed. These guidelines include a comparative road map staking out the respective planning processes of the organisations, terms of references of a possible UN-EU planning coordination group, a checklist of the elements to consider when drafting a Security Council resolution authorizing a EU operation and a checklist of elements to be included in the arrangements setting out the terms of an EU operation.[81]

3.4.2   EU/NATO

EU-NATO cooperation in PSOs is set out in the so called Berlin Plus arrangements. Berlin Plus is constituted of three parts: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and EU use of NATO assets and capabilities.[82] In practice this means that the EU could use the Supreme

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[76] Ibid, p.4

[77] Council of the European Union, 2007. 'Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management', 7 June 2007.

[78] See next chapter.

[79] United Nations, 2008a. 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines', p.86.

[80] Ibid.

[81] United Nations, 2008b. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Filed Support, 'Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN filed missions', 13 June 2008, p.3.

[82] Council of the European Union, Background EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus. Accessed 2009-04-24 at: http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf.

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which is the headquarters of the NATO military organisation when planning for a mission. As for command options this could mean that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) becomes the EU Operation Commander. The command elements in the field could also be provided by NATO. NATO has also developed a catalogue of assets and capabilities that could become available to the EU upon EU's request.[83]

In the first military ESDP operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Concordia, these arrangements were used. EU used NATO assets and capabilities and DSACEUR acted as Operation Commander. Also, the Berlin Plus arrangements are currently being used in Operation Althea. When planning for Althea in 2004 it was decided to once again use DSACEUR as Operation Commander and place the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) at SHAPE. There was also an agreement to use NATO assets and capabilities.[84] Since Althea, no new engagements under the Berlin Plus have been initiated.

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[83] Ibid.
[84] Reichard, Martin, 2006. 'The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective', Burlington: Ashgate, pp.259.

4 Case studies

The case studies of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR Althea aim to exemplify challenges and possibilities that come with different choices for exit strategies. The cases do not aim to give full accounts of the conflicts or to describe all international engagements in the two countries during and after conflict. Furthermore, the case studies are not evaluations of the PSOs; impact, effectiveness etc is not studied. Instead, the focus is on how the two missions have handled exit and transitions and what lessons can be drawn from these processes.

4.1 EUFOR Tchad/RCA

4.1.1 Background

The EU operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) was closely connected to the conflicts in Sudan. While planning to take over the responsibility in Darfur from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the UN also saw a need for stabilizing the bordering areas since the conflict at that time had gained regional dimensions. The safety of the civilian population as well as the conduct of humanitarian operations, were in danger.[85] Therefore the UN Secretariat, in addition to planning for UNAMID, also started to look into the possibility for the deployment of an operation in eastern Chad and the CAR, including military, police and civilian components. However, it soon became clear that a military component of a UN operation would probably not be allowed to enter by the Chadian president Déby.[86] In the light of this, France, who had been very active in pushing for an operation in Chad, looked to the EU to perform this task. EU would provide the military component while the UN remained responsible for the civilian components. This was accepted by president Déby and the EU started planning for an ESDP mission in Chad and CAR.

4.1.2 EUFOR Tchad/RCA

The planning of EUFOR Tchad/RCA officially started with the drafting of an Options Paper, jointly put together by the Council Secretariat and the EU Commission. Already at this stage the idea of an end date was introduced.[87] The

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[85] United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2007/2.
[86] United Nations, 2007. 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', S/2007/97, para 33.
[87] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, 2009-04-01

Options Paper led to an EU CMC of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation, which outlined a multidimensional presence where a military component would provide the overall security. From the MSO that was thereafter outlined, the option of two lines of operation including i) supporting the UN deployment and ii) protecting the civilian population in a wider area was adopted.[88]

Alongside producing these official documents, there was a discussion among the member states on why the EU should deploy the operation. According to Mattelaer there were three factors motivating the operations: the French push for an operation, the EU discussions on the crisis in Darfur that so far had not led anywhere and, the need for a new military ESDP operation.[89]

The planning of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was coordinated with the UN already from the outset. The operation and the civilian UN mission MINURCAT were mandated through the same Security Council resolution for a period of 12 months. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was tasked to:

- Contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
- Contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel.[90]

In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution the EU, through its Joint Action, decided to launch a "military bridging operation […] end[ing] no later than 12 months after having reached Initial Operating Capability".[91] In the Initiating Military Directive the strategic objective of the mission was defined as contributing to a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE).[92] Once again the wording *contributing* was used, implying that the EU would not have the sole responsibility. Moreover, the level of SASE to be reached before leaving was not defined. In that way, EUFOR had to maintain a condition rather than achieving a clearly defined outcome.[93] Furthermore, the objective was rather formulated as a task than a strategic objective, making it easier to withdraw since a task is less complicated to fulfil.

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[88] Mattelaer, Alexander, 2008. 'The strategic Planning of EU Military Operations- The Case of EUFOR TCHAD/ RCA'. IES Working Paper 5/2008 pp.15
[89] Ibid, p.15.
[90] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007).
[91] Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic.
[92] Mattelaer, 2008, p.18
[93] Mattelaer, 2008, p.20

The decision to set an end date was based on the assumption that a long-term UN mission would follow. The EU operation was supposed to create a window of opportunity for the UN to convince Chad about a UN military presence. In that context a set time frame was seen as a highly feasible option.[94] However, there were also other reasons for choosing an end date, one being, as mentioned before, that other PSOs that European forces participate in are engagements that are not easily terminated. The willingness to commit troops for yet another long-term mission was low since there were limited number of troops available and the ongoing engagements were costly. This was shown when there was time to commit troops to the operation. It took five formal troop contributing conferences before reaching a sufficient level of troops.[95]

Even though the operation had been given an end date, the Secretariat wanted to frame the EU operation as part of a bigger engagement, contributing to the overall end state for the international community in Chad and CAR.[96] Hence, a military end state for the International community was defined as being the establishment of a safe and secure environment that Chad and CAR themselves would be able to provide. With the assumption that a long-term UN commitment would follow this idea was not too far fetched. Also it might have made it easier to see the value of a short term operation. However, one could question this approach since the overall end state was formulated by the EU, more or less without dialogue with the international community as a whole.

The local actors had some difficulties accepting that the EU would use an end date. They did not see the point of sending a mission for just one year to such a complex conflict with no possibility to address the root causes of the conflict. The EU argued that their effort should be seen in a larger context, where the EU operation was part of a bigger international effort.[97] The operation was launched for one year between 15 March 2008 and 15 March 2009.

4.1.3   Transition to the UN

In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution 1778, the UN and the EU were, after six month, supposed to look at follow-on alternatives for the EU operation. One of the alternatives was a possible UN operation. In reality, a UN follow-on mission was the only solution and, as mentioned before, something the EU had counted on when planning its operation. Hence, a joint fact finding team visited Chad and CAR in June 2008. The joint visit had a positive effect on the

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[94] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, 2009-04-01
[95] Mattelaer, 2008, p.24.
[96] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, 2009-04-01.
[97] Ibid.

subsequent EU/UN relations and led to weekly Video Tele Conferences between the two organisations regarding the transfer of operations.[98]

The result from the joint fact finding mission showed that there still was a need for a military presence due to security threats in the area. Therefore, the UN Secretariat recommended that MINURCAT's mandate would be enhanced to also include a military component once EUFOR Tchad/RCA left.[99] For the sake of the transition a few things were underlined. During the period of transition and before the UN would become fully operational, an "over the horizon" capability in the size of a battalion would be needed to reinforce the UN forces if the security decreased in the area. It was also important that EUFOR sites and facilities were handed over to the UN by the Governments of Chad and CAR and that these could be expanded. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat recommended that a resolution would not be adopted until sufficient troops had been offered from the member states. Before transfer of authority, there was a need for enabling capabilities in the form of aviation, medical, engineering and logistics to be in place. Lastly, for a smooth transition, the EUFOR logistical contracts had to be continued until the UN could have their own contracts in place.[100]

The Security Council adopted resolution 1834 dated 24 September 2008, which, besides extending the mandate of MINURCAT, also requested the Secretary-General to continue the planning for a transfer of authority.[101] This trigged more extensive EU-UN cooperation and the EU sent a technical team to the UN headquarters in New York in order to start working together more intensively.[102]

According to the interviews, the EU did feel that the UN at this point was not prepared to initiate this planning phase. It was felt that the UN was late in appointing a Force Commander, setting up headquarters and generating troops.[103] At the same time the overall assessment was that the EU/UN cooperation worked better than ever before, taking the cooperation several steps forward compared to previous operations.

On 14 January 2009, the Security Council authorised MINURCAT to take over from EUFOR and endorsed benchmarks towards an exit strategy for the operation.[104] These were:

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[98] Derblom et al, 2008. 'UN-EU-AU Coordination's in Peace Operations in Africa', p.33.
[99] United Nations, 2008c. 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad', S/2008/601. para 63.
[100] Ibid, para 70-81.
[101] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1834 (2008).
[102] United Nations, 2008d.'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad', S/2008/760.
[103] Interviews at the Council Secretariat 2009-04-01.
[104] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1861 (2009).

- Voluntary return and resettlement in secure conditions of a critical mass of internally displaced persons;
- Demilitarization of refugee and internally displaced person camps as evidenced by a decrease in arms, violence and human rights abuses;
- Capacity of local authorities to provide the necessary security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers;
- Ability of the national law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order with respect for international human rights standards;
- Progress of an independent and effective judiciary in eastern Chad contributing to end impunity, as evidenced by a significant increase in the capacity and independence of, and respect for, the justice sector;
- A strengthened prison system in eastern Chad that is based on a human rights approach to prison management.[105]

Thus, the UN opted for a much longer commitment than the EU, using an end state strategy rather than an end date, even though initially prolonging the mandate for just one year.

On the 15 March 2009, the UN formally assumed responsibility for the operation and the transition was complete.

4.1.4 Lessons Learned

The EU chose, as it has in several other cases, an end date as a trigger for exit in Chad and CAR. The reason for this was mainly the assumption of a UN follow-on mission. However, the end date was also chosen to gain sufficient support among the EU member states. Hence, the strategy was partly based on political considerations. It is hardly a surprise that PSOs are highly political but it is interesting to see how some strategies are more viable than others in certain contexts. The reason for deciding on an end date may vary from case to case, depending on political considerations. Here these considerations, coupled with operational realities in other operations helps explaining why the EU once again chose an end date as exit point, even though lessons learned from previous operations pointed in another direction.

Another aspect of using an end date is that it requires that someone else is willing and able to take over the responsibility when the force leaves, since it is unlikely that a conflict will be solved after a short military presence. Nevertheless, the choice of using an end date seems reasonable in the context that it was used. The force was seen as a bridging force until the UN could deploy and that makes some sort of a time limit quite natural. The use of an end date might even make it easier to justify the deployment for the general public as it would be less

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[105] United Nations 2008d. S/2008/760.

expensive and not open ended. It might also create some freedom of action since there is nothing that says that a mission with an end date could not be prolonged. Hence, for this type of PSO the use of an end date can be expected in the future.

However, it is questionable how keen (and ready) the UN actually was to deploy when it had to and if such a decision was the result of the EU leaving rather than being the optimal solution for the UN. The recent experience of deploying in Darfur with UNAMID had shown to be very difficult when it came to e.g. force generation. Being stretched to its limits one could guess that the UN had its doubts about taking on yet another mission. With the EU stating that it would only be there for twelve months, the UN had no choice but to assume the responsibility. At the same time the UN was not able to deploy a military force from day one. Hence, the EU could be seen as an intermediary, a facilitator, until the political constraints and the resource issues were solved.

Looking at the transition to the UN, this seems to have worked better than ever before. At the same time the UN itself states that the cooperation with other organisations often has taken place in an ad hoc manner.[106] Partly, this seems to have been the case also this time as problems were worked out during the way as they arose. However, cooperation began at an early stage and both organisations have praised the relatively smooth transition in Chad. Transitions from the EU and the UN are likely to continue in the future and therefore standing mechanisms or procedures between the two organisations on how this should be done could be further developed.

4.2 EUFOR Althea

4.2.1 Background

The international community has been engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the early 1990's. The first PSO, the UN protection Force (UNPROFOR), deployed in 1992.[107] UNPROFOR may have played a de-conflicting part but was never able to prevent or put a halt to the hostilities. In 1995 the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), commonly known as the Dayton agreement was signed. Several events had led up to the signing of the agreement: the Serbian atrocities and the UN's incapacity to act on these, the NATO air bombings and ground offensives from the Croatian/Bosnians. The Dayton agreement set forth a plan for state building for BiH, with the international

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[106] United Nations, 2008a. 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines', p.86.

[107] In 1995 the UN deployed a police and law enforcement mission to BiH, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which was terminated in December 2002 and followed by the EUPM.

community taking an active role. The Dayton agreement put the NATO led multinational Implementations Force (IFOR) in charge of the military aspects of the peace settlement.[108] Through UN Security Council resolution 1031 IFOR was mandated for one year and IFOR deployed six days after the signing of the Dayton agreement.

The main tasks for IFOR were to contribute to an end of hostilities and separation of forces and with the holding of elections in 1996 the goals of IFOR were completed. However, since the situation remained unstable NATO agreed to deploy another operation, SFOR in 1996. While IFOR had reminded more of a traditional peacekeeping force, the tasks assigned to SFOR were more complex. The end state was set out to be "a secure environment adequate for the continued consolidation of the peace without further need for NATO-led military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina".[109] This was to be reached through, among other things, patrolling, supporting defence reform, arresting people suspected of war crime and assisting in the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).[110] At the same time SFOR was given a time limit of 18 months at the outset.

In the United States, one of the driving forces behind the military intervention in BiH, the discussion on the operations came to centre on the issue of exit strategy. According to Strambaugh, deciding on an end date played a crucial role in getting U.S. troops to BiH in the first place.[111] To get acceptance from the Congress and the U.S. citizens for a peacekeeping force in BiH, an initial deadline of a one year U.S. commitment to IFOR was set. However, one month before the mandate was suppose to end President Clinton announced that the engagement would have to be extended.[112] The plan was that the forces should be fully withdrawn by June 1998, thereby staying for an additional 18 months.[113] The reason for this was that the economic and political development was taking much longer time than anticipated. Again, the setting of a deadline played a crucial role in getting acceptance for the mission. However, reaching the end of 1997 the president once again announced that the deadline would not be met. The example clearly highlights one important flaw in end dates when they are combined with a set of goals: they are very hard to plan for. The environment is

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[108] Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 1A, Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlements. Accessed 2009-03-11 at: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=368.

[109] SFOR web page, Accessed 2009-07-07 at http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm.

[110] NATO, Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Accessed 2009-07-07 at: http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html#aim.Ibid.

[111] Stambaugh, 2001, p.37

[112] Ibid, p.36

[113] Mitchell, Allison, 1996. 'U.S. Ready to Keep a Force in Bosnia 18 Months Longer', The New York Times on the web, 16 November 1996. Accessed 2009-03-20 at: http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/1116yugo-bosnia-us.html.

likely to change and it is extremely hard to change in favour of any given strategy. In BiH, so many challenges remained that the exit had to be postponed again and again, showing how difficult it is to plan for, in time, the achievement of objectives in complex conflicts.

4.2.2   EUFOR Althea

With the original end date for SFOR set for June 1998, the U.S. Congress wanted to see Europe taking over the responsibility for BiH. Hence, the exit strategy for SFOR from a U.S. perspective became Europeans assuming the responsibility. After initial unwillingness from the European countries[114] the EU in late 2002 expressed its willingness, under the ESDP-frame, to take over the responsibility of the military operation from NATO.[115] However, it took some time until a more concrete proposal was presented. In February 2004 Javier Solana, EU High Representative, presented a report on the possible deployment of an EU mission to BiH. In the report it was stated that "In providing a force for BiH the EU's principal objective would be to contribute to Bosnia's aspiration to achieve full integration into the EU and NATO".[116] It was also stated that an EU force should assume the military responsibilities of the Dayton Agreement and contribute to stability and democracy by guaranteeing a secure environment. The force was supposed to be able to "address any threats to a secure and stable environment in BiH".[117] The EU accordingly took on a broad approach, though the mandate for Althea was more or less inherited from the NATO operation.[118]

On the 26th of April 2004 the EU endorsed the EU-mission Althea, consisting of around 7000 troops to, among other things; carry out the military tasks of the Dayton Agreement.[119] At the same time, at the NATO summit in 2004 it was decided, as a result of the improved security situation, to bring SFOR to an end. The UNSC subsequently welcomed the EU's initiative to take over from SFOR.

In the Council Joint Action from 12 July 2004 it was stipulated that Althea

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[114] Daalder, Ivor H., 1998. 'Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement', in Survival 39:04, Winter 1997-1998, p. 9. Hillen, John, 1997. 'After SFOR- Planning a European-Led Force', in Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, p. 75.

[115] Council of the European Union, 2002. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002.

[116] Council of the European Union, 2004b. 'Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on a Possible EU Deployment in BiH Presented to the EU Council of Foreign Ministers'. Accessed 2009-06-02 at: http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=31930.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, 2009-04-01.

[119] Kim, Julie, 2006. 'Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping', CRS Report for Congress. Accessed 2003-03-20 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21774.pdf.

"Should provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1.A and 2 of the GFAP in BiH and contribute to the safe and secure environment, in line with its mandate, required to achieve core tasks in the Office of the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)".[120]

Althea was also to support the BiH development towards EU integration and to sign a Stabilisation and Association agreement. As for exit, nothing was decided and looking at the objectives it seems obvious why. Goals such as EU integration are inherently complex and very difficult to put into a time table. Instead a sixth-month review to look at changes in size, mandate and tasks was stipulated.[121] As Lampe puts it "…the exit strategy for Bosnia has become a transition strategy- to a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union (EU), with a feasibility study already impending, and to Partnership for Peace membership for a single Bosnian army".[122]

In 2006, the security situation was judged secure enough for a first transition of Althea.[123] According to some interviewees, the reconfiguration was equally a result of the United Kingdom decision to withdraw its military support to Althea.[124] Hence, the EU did not have enough troop contributions to continue the operation in its current structure. The operation with three multinational task-forces was reconstructed into a multinational manoeuvre battalion, consisting of around 500 troops, on stand-by outside Sarajevo in case of a deteriorating security situation. EU-presence was now secured by Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT), military units whose main mission is to act as a link between the operation and the civilian population. They work in direct contact with the population and institutions as well as with the international community in order to help with an up-to-date picture of, above all, the security situation. There is also an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) covering the whole of the country. This 2006 draw-down marked the beginning of the gradual downsizing of Operation Althea and it could be seen as the first phase of the EU's long-term exit strategy for BiH.

During 2008, the operation has come close to reach its military end state, that is: military stability in accordance with Dayton, BiH having self-sustaining military capacities and no longer requirement for military support for achieving EU's political objectives through the EU Special Representative/ Office of the High

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[120] Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Lampe, John R., 2004. 'The lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo for Iraq', in Current History, 103:671, pp.113-118, March 2004.

[123] Council of the European Union, 2006. Press release 2770th Council meeting General affairs and external relations 11 December 2006.

[124] The Dutch had also signalled that they would withdraw.

Representative (EUSR/OHR). The question is now whether the third objective has been reached or not and there is no consensus in the Union.[125]

According to interviewees at the Council Secretariat, the operation could evolve to its next phase sooner rather than later, however, it was also recognised that this is ultimately a political question. Some countries think that Althea could be terminated in its present form. Other countries argue for a status quo, at least until three months after the closure of the OHR.[126]

Nevertheless, the Secretariat has started to draft the next phase of the operation, the so called Option 3. This is based on an assessment done in 2008 with regards to what form of security assistance is still needed. Two areas were identified as needing continued support: training and capacity building. The training would focus on training the trainers and rationalizing all the different activities taking place on a bilateral basis at the moment. Capacity building would be a smaller task focusing on BiH reaching international standard with regards to the tasks EUFOR has handed over to the local authorities. It is estimated that such an operation would go on for a couple of years with approximately 200 people deployed. According to one interviewee this approach would have political benefits since the EU would maintain an international presence, it fits in with the EU overall approach and it "keeps Berlin Plus going".[127] According to the same person the Option 3 would be a combination of an end state and an end date by stating a clear objective and at the same time anticipating how long time it would take to reach these goals. This would provide for a possible prolongation or shortening of the operation if necessary.

The EU has been engaged in a wide range of sectors and programmes in BiH, Althea being only one component. Prior to the launching of operation Althea the EU had deployed its first ever ESDP-mission: The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003. The aim of EUPM has been to help establish a "sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police service operating in accordance with European and international standards".[128] At times, the cooperation between Althea and EUPM has been far from perfect, largely stemming from the wide mandate for Althea with competences in the traditional policing sectors. Another central actor in BiH has been the OHR, later coupled with the EUSR. The OHR/EUSR has been responsible for overseeing the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement. Also, it has had a coordinating role regarding the EU engagement in BiH. The OHR/EUSR has, as discussed above, played an important role as regards possible exit strategies for Althea. According to interviews at the Council Secretariat, the OHR/EUSR function has argued for a continued military

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[125] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, 2009-04-01.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed 2009-05-04 at: http://www.eupm.org/OurMandate.aspx.

presence, thus making it very difficult for Althea to leave. The OHR has also had difficulties keeping to its time-frame, the function was initially planned to leave in 2007 but has been postponed indefinitely due to remaining ethnic tensions and weak governance institutions.[129]

4.2.3 Lessons Learned

The conflict and the subsequent international interventions in BiH provide several lessons concerning exit strategies and the challenges that come with different approaches. The UN operation UNPROFOR handed over the responsibility to NATO and IFOR after the Dayton agreement in 1995. The much more robust NATO operation was deemed necessary to keep the peace after the war. IFOR struggled with new difficulties regarding exit, notably the short time-frame. Soon it was clear that the one-year end date was not enough which lead to the creation of SFOR. The U.S. engagement in BiH has exemplified the national aspects of termination of PSOs. Initially presented as a relatively short operation, IFOR and SFOR proved how difficult it is to fit operational realities with political will. The initial time-line was moved on several occasions until it was clear that the engagement would have to go on for a long time or transferred to another organisation.

The transition from SFOR to Althea seems to have gone smoothly. Most contributing countries stayed put with the same troops and the command arrangements of Berlin Plus meant that much would stay the same. As SFOR, Althea did not work with an end date, and as such, it is a unique military ESDP operation.

So what can be learned about exit and the termination of PSOs from the Althea experience in BiH? So far it seems that the efforts from Althea and other international interventions have at least played a positive role in Bosnia. The long-term commitment from both NATO and the EU has probably made the efforts much more credible. EU has been able to take a broad approach towards reforming and rebuilding BiH that would have been hard to maintain within a shorter, pre-determined time-line. By using an end state the EU has shown that it is willing to take full responsibility for the post conflict situation. Thus by using an end state the EU might be able to gain legitimacy for its actions to a further extent than when using an end date.

However, some of the root-causes for conflict, such as ethnic tensions, remain in BiH and international presence is still needed to keep the peace. In line with the argument made by Stambaugh, neither the international actors, nor the local actors have had the pressure that a dead-line would introduce. In line with this argument, the lack of an end date after the initial stages of the NATO

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[129] Zaum, 2009. 'International Administrations, Exit, and Peace Consolidation', p.2.

engagement and the patience showed by the EU presence has made BiH institutions and key actors dependent on international support and it has been possible to avoid tough issues such as ethnic conflict. The international presence in BiH thereby risks becoming the main condition for peace, which would make exit very difficult.

It is also difficult to measure when the objectives have been met; as we have seen in BiH, exit is as much a political question as it has to do with operational reality. The political aspects of exit strategies are evident in the case of Althea. Many military actors seem to agree that there is little need for Althea's military presence in BiH. This view is however not shared by the OHR/EUSR and the interdependencies between the two missions in the mandate for Althea means that the end state therefore can not be said to have been reached. Many also point to the importance of keeping the only Berlin Plus operation going so that EU-NATO cooperation can continue at an operational level. Other issues, such as fear of mass-migration may also play a part in the continuing military presence in BiH.[130] At the same time, political considerations will always play an important role when it comes to choosing an exit strategy, no matter if it is an end date or an end state that is used.

Still, the gradual termination of Althea in its present form is inevitable and several steps have already been taken. Responsibility for the security in BiH is likely to be handed over to civilian institutions in BiH with support from international advisers. The EU will not end its engagement in the country but rather once again shift form into a civilian presence aiming at integration and development or a new type of military engagement with different objectives than the present operation.

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[130] Interviews at the Council Secretariat, 2009-04-01.

5 Conclusions

The aim of the study has been to analyse strategies for ending and exiting PSOs and to describe what challenges and possibilities comes with different approaches. The discussion on exit strategies and use of end states and end dates has provided a deeper understanding of theoretical underpinnings and experiences of approaching termination of PSOs in different ways. We do not advocate the future usage of only one of the different approaches to exit analysed in the report. Both end states and end dates have their merits and weaknesses as triggers for exit. Also, different types of operations benefit from different types of exit strategies. What the study does show is that planners and policy makers need to be aware of these pros and cons in order to make the most appropriate decisions regarding exit in relation to the specific conflict. Also, the study shows that the choice of exit strategies should follow from a conscious choice regarding the depth of the engagement from the international community. If addressing the symptoms of a conflict is "enough" for a PSO, then a fixed time-line may be most appropriate, coupled with realistic objectives for the operation. If the engagement is broader, aiming at fundamental change in a conflict society, time-limits will have to be used with care.

It should be noted that even though the usage of an end state generally marks a long-term engagement and end dates a wish for short and less complex engagements, it could be the other way around. An end date could be placed years or decades from now, marking a commitment to stay for the long run. An end state could be extremely narrow, seeing to it that the operation will be able to exit in a short period of time with a successful engagement.

5.1 The Three Organisations

The three organisations studied in this report have chosen different approaches to exit. The EU has mainly used end dates and has been strict about its time-limits, with the exception of Operation Althea and to some extent Operation Concordia. This is mainly due to political considerations, which are often resource driven and affected by national concerns of each individual member state. But it is also clear that the EU has been able to give valuable contributions to peace in its operations, paving the way for other actors like the UN. Thus one of the Unions' advantages is the possibility to deploy relatively fast coupled with the legitimacy it brings. The UN has started to use benchmarks as a way to plan and link goal fulfilment to exit in peacekeeping missions. However, a mandate is never given without a time limit which is then generally prolonged. Nevertheless, peacekeeping missions are seen as a part of a bigger peacebuilding effort making the overall exit strategy for the UN engagement close to that of an end state. NATO has mainly used end states as its exit strategy. NATO will however

always be dependent on other organisations to reach political objectives of an operation since it has very limited civilian resources. There are clear differences between the organisations as to what trigger for exit is chosen and how it is planned for.

Common for the three organisations is that there seems to be a discrepancy between how the planning process for an exit strategy is supposed to look like and how it is played out in reality. In the EU, steps in the planning process might be skipped due to time constraints and the exit strategy is political rather than operational driven. The UN so far does not seem to have used all parts of the IMPP and NATO rarely plans for exit at the outset of an operation. Looking at the formal policy process is therefore not enough to understand how exit strategies are chosen and later implemented.

It is interesting to see that the exit strategy for the EU and NATO in many cases have been dependent on other organisations and on those organisations' ability to assume responsibility or working side by side with the military operation. These dependencies are likely to continue.

Another aspect of this is that the three organisations have overlapping memberships, which of course intertwine the actions even more. An example of this is the French initiative for an operation in Chad. When it was not possible to deploy an operation within a UN context France shifted focus to the EU. This meant that the mission somewhat changed focus and subsequently the exit strategy was changed as well. Hence, political considerations play a prominent role when choosing what organisation should perform a certain PSO and what type of exit strategy should be used.

5.2 The Case Studies

The two case studies tell us a lot about different types of exit strategies. In Chad the choice of an end date was influenced by the fact that the EU was to act as a bridging force, thereby making an end date the most feasible option. What also becomes clear when looking at EUFOR Tchad/RCA was that the choice of exit strategy was heavily influenced by political considerations. The use of a time limit was necessary to get sufficient support for the operation. At the same time, political considerations have also played a prominent role when planning for Operation Althea where an end state strategy was chosen. Hence, no matter what trigger for exit is chosen, it will always be influenced by political considerations.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, long term commitment seems to have made the EU engagement more credible. At the same time the local institutions risk becoming too dependent on the international presence. The choice of an end state rather than an end date also seems to have been driven by geography. Being part of Europe made anything else than working towards EU integration an impossible

solution. Hence, *where* a mission is to deploy might influence what strategy the EU chooses to use.

Another interesting aspect that has influenced both operations is the question of resources. Eventually the decreasing resources influenced the exit strategy in BiH. If an operation is not getting enough resources, some sort of exit or transition becomes necessary. In Chad shortages in available resources contributed to the choice of an end date strategy.

What has become clear in the case of BiH is that the exit strategy is very much dependent on the national exit strategies of the troop contributing countries. Hence, one has to take into account national considerations not only during the planning phase of a mission but also during deployment.

5.3 The Future of Exit Strategies

The report has shown that different actors have different approaches to exit and termination of PSOs. The EU as an actor in (military) crisis management is likely, at least in the short term, to continue to use end dates as the main trigger for exit strategies. There seems to be several reasons for this. Firstly, there might not be enough resources to engage in operations with long-term end states, which could lead to fewer operations with more limited objectives in the future. Since the end of the Cold War the focus of the military has been on expeditionary operations. However, lately the idea of a strong territorial defence has ones again gained in prominence. Moreover, the resources countries are willing to commit to PSOs seem to be reaching its limits, not least after the financial crisis. Secondly, the end date concept might be the way forward if one wants ESDP to continue to be a dynamic instrument. The organisation has shown that it is able to support the UN with bridging operations, thus creating space for other organisations to launch more long-term operations. Thirdly, the attractiveness of an end date is that it can always be extended. You can adjust the objectives over time or realize that the time is not enough and prolong the end date.

This trend might change and is ultimately dependent on three issues: political will, the context in which future ESDP operations are conducted, and the future of EU as a global actor. If the EU and the member states agree to take on more comprehensive engagements the approach to exit would probably have to be revised. In the African context it is likely that the EU, in the short term, will engage in end date-type of missions but would something happen in the neighbourhood area, as it did on the Balkans in the 1990s, the response might be very different.

The development of exit strategies and the use of benchmarks within the UN will also be very interesting to follow. As mentioned above, benchmarks have been included in the resolutions mandating the most recent operations. Using

benchmarks will naturally influence when a mission exits since there are clearly defined objectives to reach. Making this a useful exit strategy will depend on how these benchmarks are formulated and how indicators of success are identified. If this is successfully done, it might influence methods for measuring if and when objectives are met, thereby affecting the concept of exit strategy in the future.

NATO is currently facing many difficulties linked to exit strategies, most evident in Afghanistan but also in Kosovo. It is likely that operational experiences will shape how NATO continues to work with exit strategies and that an engagement like ISAF forces NATO to revisit how it formulates and implements its exit strategies.

The report has predominately focused on exit strategies in military PSOs. As these operations become more integrated and multifunctional, it is relevant to look at how civilian actors approach the issue of exit. EU civilian ESDP missions for instance, rarely focus on end dates. Instead the objectives are often described in more long-term outcomes where a fixed time frame might seem anachronistic. This does not mean that they do not have time-limits, but rather that the main issue for termination of a civilian mission is more focused on the *state* than the *date*. The missions look more like the UN model where the Joint Action rather than the operation in itself is given a time limit which is prolonged if the objectives have not been met. Why then do military and civilian ESDP operations and missions approach exit in different ways? It might be because civilian operations are less politically controversial. Even if civilian missions can be politically sensitive, the use of force by one state or organisation in another state is always extremely sensitive. Also, it could be argued that civilian missions to a much lesser extent affect the contributing countries' ability to defend or handle crises nationally. Furthermore, participating in a civilian ESDP mission is relatively cheap and the costs for resources and people are far less than in military operations. Less complicated logistical and security arrangements also affect the costs of a civilian mission. Hence, a long-term civilian commitment is not as expensive as a military operation, opening up for a more negotiable time-frame.

Whatever the reasons, a more thorough look at differences in approaches between different actors involved in PSOs could tell us more about how we could and should handle termination of operations in the future.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
CAR	Central African Republic
CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force
EUFOR RD Congo	EUFOR République Démocratique du Congo
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	EUFOR in Tchad and République Centre Africaine (country names in French)
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUPM	EU Police Mission
EUSR	EU Special Representative
GFAP	Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace
GOP	Guidelines for Operational Planning
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LOT	Liaison and Observation Teams
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
MSO	Military Strategic Options
MSOD	Military Strategic Option Directive
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRS	NATO Crisis Response System
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OHR	Office of the High Representative
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPLAN	Operation Plan
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SASE	Safe and Secure Environment
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

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