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Managing Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations



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Synopsis (abstract in Swedish)

Denna studie är del av projektet Internationella Insatser, på uppdrag av Försvarsdepartementet. Projektet stödjer departementet med forskning kring frågor relaterade till fredsfrämjande insatser. Detta innefattar bland annat studier kring säkerhetssektorreform, civil-militär samverkan och utvärderingar av avslutade och pågående insatser.

Syftet med studien är att undersöka negativa oavsiktliga konsekvenser av fredsfrämjande insatser och presentera förslag på hur Sverige kan arbeta med att hantera dessa. Studien baseras på en genomgång av tidigare undersökningar och på ett antal mera uppmärksammade handlingsprogram och rekommendationer (främst FN:s rekommendationer), där vanligt förekommande oavsiktliga negativa konsekvenser av internationella fredsfrämjande insatser granskats. Mera specifikt sammanfattas erfarenheter kring påverkan inom områdena lokal ekonomi, korruption och organiserad brottslighet, sexuella övergrepp och trakasserier, HIV/AIDS-spridning samt miljöpåverkan. Därefter granskas hur dessa typer av negativa sidoeffekter har hanterats och utvärderats av FN, samt hur Sverige jobbat med att hanterat vanligt förekommande negativa oavsiktliga konsekvenser. Detta leder slutligen till rekommendationer, främst avsedda för Sverige, på hur oavsiktliga konsekvenser kan minimeras för att på så sätt förbättra framtida fredsfrämjande insatser.

Nyckelord: Fredsfrämjande insatser, fredsbevarande, oavsiktliga konsekvenser, negativa sidoeffekter, sexuella övergrepp, HIV/AIDS, miljökonsekvenser, ekonomiska konsekvenser

Abstract

This study is part of the Peace Support Operations project, commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. The project supports the Ministry with research regarding a wide range of areas with relevance for peace support operations. This includes e.g. civil-military relations, Security Sector Reform and evaluations of past and current operations.

The aim of this study is to examine negative unintended consequences of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and present recommendations on how to manage these. The study is based on a review of previous reports as well as policy documents (primarily from the UN) on mitigating negative unintended consequences of PSOs on host countries. Particular attention is given to four areas: impact on host economies, sexual exploitation and abuse, the contribution to the spread of HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation. The report explores how these types of negative unintended consequences have been dealt with by the UN. Attention is also given to current Swedish practices. The report finally presents some concluding remarks and recommendations for how to improve future PSOs by addressing the prevalence of unintended consequences. While the recommendations have been developed primarily with a Swedish context in mind, the report presents issues of relevance to other troop contributing countries as well.

Keywords: Peace support operations, peacekeeping, unintended consequences, negative side-effects, sexual exploitation and abuse, HIV/AIDS, environmental consequences, economic consequences

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Executive Summary

The aim of this study is to examine negative unintended consequences of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and present recommendations on how to manage these. It is based on a review of previous policy-studies as well as UN policy recommendations on negative unintended consequences for host countries. Particular attention is given to four areas: impact on host economies, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), the spread of HIV/AIDS and environmental consequences in the host country of the PSO. The study further explores how such types of negative unintended consequences have commonly been dealt with by the UN. Attention is also given to Swedish practices in dealing with unintended consequences of PSOs.

The study is guided by the following research questions: 1) what do contemporary policy-studies on PSOs identify as being problematic (“negative”) unintended consequences on host countries; 2) what measures has the UN taken to counter such negative effects, and; 3) how does Sweden act to minimise negative impacts on host countries where it deploys troops? The overall aim is thus to provide guidance when planning future PSOs in order to avoid unnecessary negative consequences on host countries.

The scope of the study is on *negative* unintended consequences of PSOs on host countries, thus excluding positive effects as well as those consequences affecting other actors, including the policy initiating countries themselves. Furthermore, while recognising that modern PSOs are multidimensional and robust, involving civilian as well as military components, this report focuses mainly on the military aspects of dealing with unintended consequences.

The four chapters dealing with economic, sexual exploitation and abuse, HIV/AIDS and environmental consequences respectively are concluded with recommendations for how Sweden could strengthening monitoring, planning, institutional capacity and accountability mechanisms to address these.

Unintended Consequences on Host Economies

By entering conflict zones, PSOs bring about a substantial influx of capital and resources to the host states, which in various ways could affect host economies. Since PSOs tend to take place in countries with less developed economies, widespread poverty and high rates of unemployment, as well as significantly limited government capacity to effectively address organised crime and corruption, PSOs can have significant, and sometimes negative, effects on host economies. To alleviate negative unintended economic consequences this study recommends Sweden to:

Monitoring

- Develop a formal and internal central function for systematic analysis of PSOs' impacts on host economies, e.g. through institutionalising economic officers to maximise the developmental impact
- Pay attention to salary payment and the distortion it can cause in the host country
- Carefully consider the distributional effects on the host economy in order to avoid fuelling existing divisions
- Make sure that Sweden's contribution to PSOs does not contribute to a local "brain drain"
- Collect information on unintended consequences and disseminate such to other relevant actors in order to better support their work to design more host-country sensitive PSOs

Planning

- Have well planned procurement practices in post conflict societies to avoid unintended consequences
- Pay attention to salary levels, gender, and rotation when hiring local and international staff
- Rely as far as possible on the formal economy of the host country
- Coordinate with civilian agencies, such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), to establish whether and how PSOs could contribute to the economic development of the country, within the limits of its short-term security focus.

Institutionalise

- Institutionalise an independent mission auditor to examine the mission's budget spending and report to civil control agencies
- Increase the civil-military dialogue to be more informed about dynamics of host economy

Accountability

- Develop ethical guidelines and have these accepted by economic sub-contractors of PSOs.
- Make sure that each PSO mission have at least one officer to consider long-term development aspects (alternatively have such monitoring at the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) Headquarters

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

PSOs take place in societies and amongst populations that are often socially and economically vulnerable. In this environment, it is not uncommon that peacekeepers and staff can be tempted to abuse their mandate over less advantaged locals for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Such abuse can constitute gross human rights violations, cause further spread of HIV and harmful changes to gender patterns in host society. Beyond detrimental effects on the exposed and the host society, it can also severely damage the legitimacy of the PSO itself. Indeed, it is an effective way of losing the 'hearts and minds' of local populations and of generating distrust towards the mission and the peacekeepers amongst the most important stakeholders. This report therefore recommends the following measures to address SEA:

Monitoring

- Promote and monitor recommendations by the 'Zeid Report' on SEA presented to the UN General Assembly. Ensure that clauses explicitly acknowledging the obligation to take legal action against perpetrators SEA are included in the memorandum of understanding with the agency under which Sweden contributes troops

Planning

- Increase the proportion of female soldiers participating in PSOs

Institutionalise

- Establish information campaigns in host countries to increase awareness, transparency and willingness to report bad behaviour
- Better institutionalise investigations, training and policy subscriptions in the mission organization to increase awareness of SEA
- Increase awareness and knowledge on SEA aspects by partnering training with civilian agencies such as Sida (drawing on their expertise in areas of gender, power dynamics and people's vulnerabilities)
- Establish an "ombudsman" function at each PSO in order to be more sensitive to protection issues and coordinate efforts with civilian actors to receive complaints through their channels

Accountability

- Provide mechanisms for reporting and holding perpetrators of SEA accountable

- Establish and keep up-to date code of conducts relating prevention of SEA among its soldiers rely on UN standards
- Increase training and institutional resources for the Swedish police and national prosecutors to better being eligible to conduct rapid investigations abroad (i.e. collect evidence and testimonies) following allegations of SEA
- Make available legal and economic support to victims of SEA¹
- Work for partner countries in PSOs to adhere to the ‘Zeid Report’ recommendations by committing to take legal action against members of their troops found to perpetrate SEA. This should be made a necessary condition for contributing troops to a PSO.

Unintended Consequences on the Spread of HIV/AIDS

Much of what has been written on the unintended consequences of PSOs seems to contend that there is some sort of correlation between PSOs and the spread of HIV/AIDS. There are three common contentions: peacekeepers get infected during their mission rotation; already infected peacekeepers spread the disease to host populations; or the disease is spread between PSO employees while on mission. Due to a fear of peacekeepers spreading HIV to the host nations, there have been requests by host states that troop contributing countries (TCCs) with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates should be excluded from contributing personal. There is a range of measures which can be applied to help prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within PSOs and between the PSO and the host community. Taking into consideration those steps already taken by Sweden to deal with HIV/AIDS within PSOs, a number of lessons and recommendations are put forward in this report:

Monitoring

- That Sweden provides voluntary counselling and HIV-testing during the mission and that troops are regularly informed about HIV/AIDS, including ways of transmission and preventative methods
- That Sweden establishes monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as conducts surveys on the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of its troops in relation to HIV/AIDS as well as SEA.

¹ In the Swedish context, victims of PSO personnel’s abuse could e.g. be allocated money from “Brottsofferfonden”.

Documentation of this information is crucial not only for future mission planning of the SwAF, but information collection is also vital for Swedish government agencies, like Sida, and multilateral organizations like the UN. Dissemination of information should therefore be made to other relevant actors

Institutionalise

- That each PSO include HIV focal points in mission to integrate preventive programmes in broader mission mandates
- That national staff are granted regular leave to enable them to maintain relations with their families

Planning

- Sweden could seek to ensure access Voluntary Counselling and Testing for its national staff, in order to contribute the prevention of HIV/AIDS in the host country
- That Sweden draws on the UNAIDS information materials for pre-deployment HIV/AIDS training
- That the mission provides continuous in-field ‘refresher’ trainings for mission staff. Such training should also be designed to include local staff
- That the SwAF draw on civilian organizations’ expertise in the area of how to prevent HIV/AIDS, as several organizations of the civil society are familiar with giving such training
- Sweden could work out joint-mission strategies with other TCCs and civilian organisations in the area of deployment to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Unintended Environmental Consequences

Impacts on the environment as a result of peace support operation can be positive and/or negative. The unintended consequences of PSO activities depend on many factors such as the duration and phase of the operation. Environmental impacts may include deterioration of air, soil and groundwater quality as well as impacts on natural, cultural and historical resources. In the case where competition for natural resources has been a contributing factor to the conflict, further resource competition or environmental degradation can seriously hamper any post-conflict peace-building effort. Therefore, organisational structures are required with the appropriate principles, policies, tasks, responsibilities, procedures and

structures to meet the specific requirement of environmental considerations for the particular peace support operation. Even though the primary role of PSOs is to keep and support peace, they also have a responsibility to ensure that their presence has a minimal ecological footprint. This is particularly the case where environment is a dimension of the conflict and further environmental degradation could exacerbate already existing grievances. In order to limit negative unintended environmental consequences, this study recommends that Sweden considers:

Monitoring

- Sufficient allocation of financial and human resources in the missions in order to comply with environmental regulations and guidelines and minimise the negative impact in the host country
- Ensure proper contracting oversight and supervision for services potentially resulting in negative environmental impact (e.g. waste management)

Planning

- Investigating the possibility to support the strategic end state through the environment, e.g. by handing over of facilities or equipment to the host nation when redeploying
- Develop a concept of environmentally friendly and sustainable procurement policies and promote these in multilateral agencies towards which Sweden contributes troops
- Taking into account, when planning and assessing environmental impact, the existence of UN's Environmental Policy for Field Missions and the Environmental Guidelines for UN field mission
- Carefully plan for the competition with the local population and negative effect on the environment that the demand for natural resources, such as wood, water and gravel from PSOs may have
- Carefully plan for how to mitigate the unintended consequences that the placement of the UN base camp may have for land, water sources and biodiversity

Institutionalise

- In order to create understanding and acceptance of the importance of environmental stewardship establish mission specific training programmes on environmental considerations in PSOs

Accountability

- Acknowledge that active and dedicated leadership is critical, and that the commanders are ultimately responsible for the integration of environmental considerations during the planning and execution of a peace support operation
- Exercise due diligence, i.e. having in place an adequate system to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to prevent negative environmental impacts resulting from the operation
- Ensure that foreign troops conducting experimentation and exercises in Sweden comply with the SwAF's environmental standards

Concluding remarks and future studies

Following a general literature overview on recent thinking of unintended consequences of PSOs, this study suggests that further and more in-depth case-studies ought to be conducted. By concentrating on a specific case where Sweden has been a TCC, a more refined analysis of unintended consequences for the host country can be made. This would bring further input to Swedish defence planners and hopefully enable more informed decisions when planning future PSOs.

Besides engaging in particular case studies, this report also suggests to look into a set of issues that were left out of this report. In particular, it is recommended that any future study more explicitly investigates: protection aspects of civilians of the host-country and how they are being effected by PSOs; unintended political consequences for the host country; recent developments and practices in other forums that have impact on Swedish PSO planning and operation.

1 Introduction

Recent years have seen an increase in the demand of Peace Support Operations (PSOs).² Hand in hand with such demands there has also been changing expectations on PSOs, not least with regard to performance and what they should achieve.³ While traditional peace support missions were characterised by goals such as to maintain ceasefire agreements, create buffer zones, and restricting the use of force to self-defence, modern PSOs have transformed to become more “multitask” and “robust”. Furthermore, while previously the United Nations (UN) Security Council gave relatively narrow mandates to its peacekeeping forces, i.e. to concentrate on ending violence and to separate warring parties, these mandates are nowadays providing more, as well as broader, tasks including the responsibility to protect civilians of the host country (e.g. political, military, humanitarian and development interventions). These new tasks are oftentimes based on joint planning and integration of civil and military interventions under a political leadership. In addition, there is a greater recognition that political solutions are needed, and that the military and police interventions are primarily deployed to support political processes.⁴ All of this suggests the need for more complex and refined approaches to settle violence and promote sustainable post-conflict recovery (e.g. by taking multiple layers of peace promotion and security reform actions).⁵ In view of this increasing complexity, peace support operations now need to be carefully planned multitask missions with capacities to provide a host of civil-military programmes. While previously, peace was meant to be achieved, today, it also needs to be durable. Following this, traditionally clear ‘military’ and clear ‘civilian’ components in PSOs have increasingly been blended to match context specific requirements of host countries. Consequently, the transformation to new modes of peace support operations creates new demands on mission deployment.⁶

While much of what has driven the shift in peace support operations was the increasing attention to intra-state conflicts after the end of the cold war, the

² Since 1948, there have been 63 UN peacekeeping missions in operation around the world. Of these, 15 are under current deployment. In addition there are a number of peacekeeping mission sent under non-UN flag while a number of missions are operating independently. It is also worth noting that although peacekeeping today has become synonymous with UN actions, peacekeeping per se is not found in the UN Charter.

³ De Coning and Romita: 2009: 2.

⁴ Gordon (2008).

⁵ For a more elaborate discussion, see Daase and Friesendorf (forthcoming (2010)).

⁶ See *A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (2009).

transformation has also been driven by the failure to respond forcefully to disastrous events such as the genocide in places such as Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia as well the protracted conflict in Somalia.⁷ As such the shift towards more robust peacekeeping can be seen as a response to an intensified call for a global consciousness of ‘doing good’.

However, parallel to the transformation of PSOs, a rather painful realisation that despite PSOs’ good intentions, missions do not always do good have been made. In the so-called *Capstone Doctrine*, which sets out principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations, side-effects causing negative social, economic and environmental impacts are noted.⁸ Indeed, a range of negative consequences of peacekeeping operations have been documented, resulting from failures to deliver as well as the deployment of the mission in itself.

Even if it is true that PSOs for the most part do more ‘good’ than ‘harm’, it is important to recognise that a number of such negative effects could be mitigated if taking them into account in the first place. By means of careful planning strategies, some usually negative consequences could even be turned into ‘intended’ positive impacts. To reduce the negative consequences of PSOs, mission leaders and troop contributing countries therefore need to generate awareness and understanding of a range of factors that can hamper the effectiveness of PSOs, or lead to unnecessary grievance for local populations in the mission area.⁹

Only modest scholarly attention had been given to unintended consequences of PSOs (particularly consequences on the host country). In fact, most research on PSOs has sought to explore ways to increase the efficiency and effectiveness in accomplishing intended objective or evaluating performance in relation to stated outcomes. Only recently has there has been a growing interest in understanding the nature of unintended consequences of PSOs.¹⁰ A common feature of this growing interest for unintended consequences of PSOs has been to sensitize states and organisations involved in peace support to the negative effects of such operations, so as to allow for more effective PSOs. This focus on improving PSOs is equally the focus of the current study. Examining unintended consequences is, in general, however,

⁷ This frustration led to a review which culminated in the so-called *Brahimi Report* (UNGA, 2000).

⁸ The “Capstone Doctrine”, formally referred to as United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2008: pp. 81-82.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See e.g. Aoi, de Coning and Thakur (2007), and Daase and Friesendorf (forthcoming, 2010)

as complex as it is difficult. In setting the stage for examining unintended consequences of PSOs, Aoi et al note,

*”No intervention in a complex system such as a human society can have only one effect. Whenever there is an attempt to bring about change in a complex system, the system reacts in a variety of ways. Some of these reactions are intended, in the sense that thy intervention was designed to bring about these changes. Others are unintended, in that those planning the intervention did not mean for these reactions to come about at all”.*¹¹

In further efforts to define the issue at stake, Aoi et al purport that “all those reactions that fall outside the scope of the response we wanted to elicit are the unintended consequences of our intervention” and that the term therefore refers to “acts that were not intended when [...] mandates were adopted or when they were executed”.¹² In an effort to further limit the scope of study, Aoi et al maintain that “unintended consequences need to be distinguished from a failure to achieve the intended consequences”.¹³ Hence, Aoi et al further narrow down the definition, to exclude those gaps between intentions and outcomes that are a result of *failures* of intended actions from the definition of unintended consequences. In this line, Daase and Friesendorf also hold that unintended consequences are about a gap between intentions and outcomes.¹⁴

Daase and Friesendorf further distinguish what the effect refers to and the value attached to the effect. In this vein, PSOs could have unintended consequences on the *policy initiator* or *the host country* and these consequences could either be *positive* or *negative*.¹⁵ Drawing on this distinction, the scope of the current study is limited to those unintended consequences which *negatively* impact the *host nation or population*.

In addition, rather than making its own country-specific assessment of unintended consequences of PSOs, this study has sought to synthesise previous scholarship in this domain.¹⁶ More specifically, the study looks at four particular areas where unintended consequences can more easily (i.e. concretely) be detected: impact on host economies; sexual exploitation and

¹¹ Aoi, de Coning and Thakur 2007: 3.

¹² Ibid. 2007: 6.

¹³ Aoi, de Coning and Thakur 2007: 6.

¹⁴ Daase and Friesendorf (forthcoming, 2010)

¹⁵ Ibid. See also Eriksson, in Daase and Friesendorf (forthcoming 2010).

¹⁶ It is worth noting that this research domain remains largely unexplored.

abuse (SEA); contribution to spread of HIV/AIDS; environmental consequences; as well as adjacent protection issues. Despite the occurrence of unintended consequences when engaging in a complex environment, measures can be taken to minimise their negative effects.

1.1 Aims and Objectives

The aim of this study is to further inform Swedish policymakers dealing with short- and long term planning of peace support operations, about negative unintended consequences that such operations may have on host countries. A primary objective is also to inform about possible measures for addressing such effects.

The study is guided by the following research questions: 1) what do contemporary studies on peace support operations identify as being problematic (“negative”) unintended consequences on host countries; 2) what measures has the UN taken to counter such negative effects, and; 3) how does Sweden act to avoid, or at least minimise, negative impacts on host countries? The overall aim is thus to provide food for thought when planning future missions to avoid unnecessary negative consequences on host countries.

1.2 Scope and delimitations

As noted, this report focuses on negative unintended consequences of PSOs on host countries, thus excluding positive unintended effects as well as those consequences affecting other actors, including the policy initiating countries themselves. It deals specifically with experiences from UN PSOs as well as Swedish practices. As such, it does not explicitly draw on recent practices or developments with regard to other organisations or institutions like the EU, NATO or OSCE. However, focusing on the efforts by the UN to address unintended consequences seems warranted based on its global reach and experience in the field of PSOs as well as the attention academia, and the UN itself, has given to such consequences from UN operations. Furthermore, while recognising that modern PSOs are multidimensional and robust, involving civilian as well as military components, this report focuses mainly on the military aspects of such operations.¹⁷ Thereby the report also excludes looking at humanitarian aspects following PSOs.

¹⁷ Placing the main focus of the report on the military components of PSOs is neither to suggest that such components cause more severe unintended consequences than their civilian counterparts, nor that the consequences from these actors can be clearly distinguished from their civilian counterparts.

In doing so, the report builds to a large extent on previous studies. Thus, a number of examples and problems identified herein have been brought forward in other studies and are as such not primary findings per se. What is exclusive though is that this report summarises key studies on unintended consequences of peace support operations by matching these with Swedish practices.

While the report explores unintended consequences in the areas of economic effects; sexual exploitation and abuse; HIV/AIDS; as well as environmental impacts, a report on the subject could equally have included a chapter on unintended political consequences. Indeed in some respect this may be the most defining aspect of unintended consequences. This is particularly so because an unintended *political* consequence can have a knock-on effect on the success or failure of the mission itself. Nevertheless, this report has consciously limited its scope not to focus on these aspects. There are a couple of reasons for this: First, peace support operations are essentially political undertakings and negative political consequences tend to be failures to achieve *intended* goals or objectives. Second, unintended political consequences tend to require in-depth case studies, which are beyond the scope of this report.

These two arguments for not including a chapter on unintended political consequences take away neither the urgency of such a study nor the likelihood of such consequences taking place. One can imagine examples where the stabilisation of a country in a certain region, could unintentionally jeopardise the stability in the region, or where actors opposed to a peace settlement are inadvertently promoted at the expense of peace constituents. Hence, while the scope of the report is limited not to include unintended political consequences, it still includes a discussion on a possible approach for future studies of such consequences in the concluding remarks.

1.3 Method

The report explores the issue at hand through reviews of key studies and UN policy recommendations investigating unintended consequences of peace support operations as well as through interviews key members of SwAF, government ministries and civilian agencies. Previous studies being reviewed were chosen on the basis of recent developments within the four areas of interest (impact on host economies, exploitation and abuse, spread of HIV/AIDS and unintended environmental consequences). Following each review, a number of subject-areas were filtered out and synthesised into a set of issues to be further investigated in connection to Swedish peace support practices. The interviews were conducted when examining what practices Sweden applied and what policy-thinking the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) (and supporting government agencies) pursued with regard to the areas of interest. The selection of interviewees were made on a reasonably

indiscriminate basis from the SwAF in the sense that the authors contacted Swedish officials and experts that on a daily basis either worked with the issues covered in this report, or were considered an authority in his or her field. There was also an effort to locate interviewees that had personal experiences from peace support missions (interviewees were often contacted upon recommendations). This widened the range of interviewees to include representatives also from the Ministry of Justice, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Each interviewee was presented in advance with a number of questions for discussion. Moreover, all interviews were open-ended in character, although structured. Notes were taken from each interview which then formed basis for a synthesised text. Finally it is worth noting that although most interviewees were contacted in their official capacity, most respondents gave input to the questions on the basis of personal knowledge or personal experiences.

1.4 Outline of the Report

The report is divided into four separate discussions: unintended consequences on host economies, sexual exploitation and abuse, unintended consequences on the spread of HIV/AIDS and unintended environmental degradation. Each sub-section is structured according to existing UN experiences and best practices followed by Swedish experiences and recommendations for future strategies to manage unintended consequences of peace support operations. In the final part of the report, some concluding remarks are made, including a brief discussion with regard to political problems that could be caused by unintended consequences of peace support operations. This is followed by recommendations for further research.

2 Unintended Consequences on Host Economies

Peace Support Operations are large and expensive endeavours whose operational cost have only increased in the last decades as missions have become more complex, requiring larger budgets and a greater number of civilian personnel. The insertion of PSOs into post-conflict zones brings about a substantial influx of capital and resources into the host states, which in various ways could affect host economies. Since PSOs tend to take place in countries with less developed economies, widespread poverty and high rates of unemployment, as well as significantly limited government capacity to effectively address organised crime and corruption, the PSO can have significant, and sometimes negative, effects on host economy. To demonstrate the economic significance of a UN PSO, one could for example, consider the budget of the UN mission in East Timor that, at the time, exceeded East Timor's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹⁸ Such massive flow of international assistance is inevitable to have consequences on livelihood, lifestyles and economic patterns of the host country, affecting these in both positive and negative ways. Although such effects may be predictable, they are seldom accounted for or taken into consideration in the mission mandate and must therefore be considered unintended, albeit not necessarily unexpected, consequences.

While complex and multidimensional PSOs are often intended to have positive effects on a country's economic development they could easily also have a severe negative impact. For example, despite the aim of a PSO to support governance structures by facilitating a social and legal environment in which economic development could be made more realistic, it is possible they could feed into corruption or inadvertently engage in transactions with organised crime. The military component, in turn, primarily contributes to this aim by restoring or maintaining the security needed to engage in economic activities but could unintentionally generate pressures for parallel, so called 'black', markets and thereby be exploited by those who gain access to resultantly scarce goods.

¹⁸ According to Ammitzvoell, the GDP of East Timor in 2001 amounted to \$US 80 million whilst the cost of The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) totalled \$US547 million the same year. 'Unintended Consequences of peace operations on the host economy from a people's perspective', in Aoi, de Coning and Thakur: 2007: 70.

The presence of a PSO has a range of unintended affects on the economic activities and structures of the host country, particularly the local area where the PSO is in fact deployed. The economic impact varies from the micro-economic to the macroeconomic and includes changes to basic services and housing, as well as to national income and inflation.¹⁹ In general, the economic impact of PSOs can be divided into four broad categories: effects resulting from international staff spending; the procurement of goods and services; the use of local labour markets; as well as fuelling organised crime and corruption.²⁰ Each of these will be further elaborated below. The presence of a PSO usually generates a ‘bubble economy’, where the normal economy is distorted to accommodate the needs of the PSO and its personnel. Thus, the presence of a PSO can cause a “fake” economy which can have both positive and negative consequences for the host country. Examples of this include:

- the increased local spending by the mission itself, as well as by personnel employed by the mission;
- employment opportunities arising from needs associated with the mission, both in terms of job opportunities within the mission and those resulting from local procurement of goods and services by the mission and its personnel;
- changes to the economic landscape resulting from needs of goods and services not previously required by, or available to, the local market, which in its turn also affects logistical planning and international supply chains to the local market,
- economic consequences caused by the PSO including increased inflation, distortions to local labour patterns, increased rental prices, domination of retail markets, the establishment of new and temporary service industries, as well as increased prostitution and trafficking in illegal drugs and humans.²¹
- International Staff Spending

Countries hosting PSOs are by nature conflict ridden and display a situation of societal fragility and poverty. It is into such context that PSOs are

¹⁹ See also Tejpar (2009).

²⁰ Ibid. 2009: 18.

²¹ Ibid. 2009: pp. 17-18; and Rudén: 2007: 13.

deployed. Although staff may originate from equally poor societal circumstances, the very nature of their salary status and the daily allowances provided to them means that in general they are considerably better off than local populations in terms of economic wealth.²² This could place local population in an unhealthy dependence position. Also, this sudden existence of comparable riches often leads to a number of effects as new demands for entertainment, transportation, housing and food, by people who are willing to pay substantially more for it than local populations. The presence of a PSO usually stimulates immediate growth in local businesses and entrepreneurship as local populations seek to respond to this demand in exchange for access to the spending of international staff allowances and wages.

According to a UN report on the impact of peace keeping on host economies, the largest area of staff expenditure is usually housing.²³ Since military contingents tend to live in purpose-built military camps they do not directly contribute to stimulus in the rental market. Nonetheless, civilian personnel in PSOs and staff performing military complementary services do acquire housing through local rental markets. The international staff usually seeks out the best properties at the best locations, pushing the price higher for desired properties, and potentially distorting the local property markets as internationals are able to pay more than local people can afford.²⁴ Although there may be positive effects, e.g. local families being able to generate income from letting out their own properties, it may also lead to situations where local populations are involuntarily driven out of cities and further away from their livelihood.

Another example includes services and entertainment utilised by PSO staff. Restaurants and leisure services are also important areas of entrepreneurship in the presence of a PSO. According to the UN report, about one quarter of the spending of mission staff went to food and one fifth was spent on recreational activities.²⁵ In most theatres of operation, several restaurants, hotels, bars, discos and other types of business are established with the sole purpose of catering to the needs of mission staff. Such businesses can constitute good initial investments and contribute to the formal economy, generating much needed revenue for the state that can play an important part in state and peace-building efforts, even if only in the short-run.²⁶ Yet, while

²² Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: foreword.

²³ Ibid. p. 2.

²⁴ Tejpar: 2009: 18.

²⁵ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 2.

²⁶ Tejpar 2009: 19.

such business can generate considerable employment and profit, it risks generating short-sighted investments leading to so-called 'boom and bust' cycles as the entrepreneurs are expected to go out of business as soon as the PSO departs.²⁷

A more serious negative unintended consequence is the effect on society and social norms resulting from the economic disparities that arise between internationals and local populations. For example, with high wages comes great economic influence and authority, which should be contrasted with the common vulnerability and powerlessness that local populations in post-conflict are often experiencing. Thus, for instance the presence of the international community in a society might mean a dominance of the retail market where goods targeting the international staff are prioritised above the basic needs of the locals. This might further distort already shattered markets but can also lead to make previously unavailable goods and services accessible. Other than the ability to ensure one's own access to scarce basic resources, economic power also means that things that may not previously have been for sale can now be purchased.

Local procurement of goods and services

A PSO itself requires a range of goods and services, the majority of which are brought in from abroad. Nonetheless, a variety of goods and services are procured locally. These include services such as cleaning, security, engineering and construction, as well as essential goods ranging from office supplies and equipment to fuel and bottled water.²⁸ A UN report from 2006 suggests that on average, approximately 20 percent of goods and services are procured locally (this amount obviously varies across different missions). The reliance on use of local goods and services is dependent on a range of factors, including the size and characteristics of the host economy, the mission area's location, access to capital and business experience of the local population, and the size and duration of the mission itself; particularly whether or not the goods and services required by the mission are available locally or if there is capacity to start supply of these products.²⁹

Through its procurement, mission expenditure on locally produced goods contributes to the development of local industries; it generates jobs and incomes for local populations, bringing workers into the formal labour force,

²⁷ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 20.

²⁸ Tejpar: 2009: 19.

²⁹ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 24.

increasing their skill-base and making the local labour force more internationally competitive. The incomes of the workers and profits of the business can generate bases for future investments. In addition, contracting of local businesses requires these to be formally registered, bringing these enterprises into the formal economy, and, as such, generate revenue for the state. Such build-up of local industries can in a best-case scenario also help generate export competitive industries. In general, local procurement of goods and services is considered to assist in the economic development of the host country.

Local labour markets

The largest negative and unintended consequence a PSO has on the local economy is how the mission affects local wage setting and labour markets. The main affect being the divide between the significantly larger wage paid by the mission to local staff and that paid by local civil service and the national private sector.³⁰ This divergence in its turn results in a range of other, related, consequences on the local economy and labour market; including skilled labour choosing low-skilled but higher paid jobs, and inflation in public sector and private sector wages.³¹

In general, PSOs tend to employ local staff for administrative tasks such as clerical and support roles but also as interpreters, drivers and guides. Other than by bringing these workers into the formal economy,³² the employment of local personnel has the positive effect of generating an income amongst the local population – who is more likely than anyone else to spend that income on locally produced goods and services – thus creating a multiplier effect by providing further employment and business opportunities in the local economy.³³ In addition, by integrating locals into mission activities, a positive effect could be that the employed person gets training, education as well as social networks which could have long-term benefits for the general benefit not only for the individual but also for the society.

The hiring of local personnel is a lot less expensive for the mission than employing internationals. Nonetheless, the salaries paid by international missions usually far exceed those paid to local state employees as well as

³⁰ Ibid. p.31.

³¹ Ibid. p. 4.

³² It should be noted, however, that even as local staff employed in PSOs, and thereby form part of the formal economy, they are often exempt from paying taxes.

³³ Rudén: 2007: 15.

those employed in the local private sector. The UN, for example, could in some situations pay its local employees a salary 10-15 times higher than that which can be afforded by the host government.³⁴ The problem with receiving such high salary of a local staff is that it can put the local and his or her family in dire position because of jealousy from other non-hired locals nearby the mission. For example, the hired local could get as much money as it distorts the economic balance in the home-village which may not be accepted by other village people. In the worst scenario the hired local staff may be forced to leave his or here home village because of risk of personal safety. Besides personal repercussions, such uneven salary balances could also lead to broader host-country consequences; it drains workers from national public and civil service and private sector to the mission, thus creating a need for national employers to increase their offered wages; and also sets a wage precedent on which many donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) base their own wages, which in their turn puts further pressure on national salaries.³⁵ As a medium- and long term consequence of this, there could be increased pressure on national labour markets, unmotivated inflated national salary levels, sometimes forcing the national government to print more money, leading to general inflation. Another effect is the change in migration patterns as people from other regions and neighbouring states seek out employment, which can disrupt and disturb social and family structures.³⁶

The high wages paid by PSOs can also cause brain drain. A PSO obviously requires and desires the best and most skilled employees in assisting to fulfil the mandate of its mission, but the same types of labour skills are also required by the host nation to help in the important task of rebuilding the state. Because post-conflict environments already tend to suffer from brain-drain, the flight of skilled and educated labour to other countries, it is often very difficult to find adequate numbers of appropriate personnel to meet the needs of the mission or the host state in the first place. In addition, the high wages paid by the mission often result in those labour groups with academic education that would be particularly required by the host government, rather choose to work in non-skilled positions within the mission, as drivers for example. University students often terminate their education to seek employment within the mission, leading to positive short-term income generation

³⁴ Ibid. p 14.

³⁵ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 4.

³⁶ Tejpar 2009: 23.

but also posing a threat to the national peace and reconstruction work and the future development of the host state.³⁷

Despite a number of negative consequences there are huge benefits to employing local personnel, including mission budget savings, injection of money into local economy, training of workers to make them more attractive to subsequent employment outside of mission structures, and last but not least, a potential increased legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the local population.³⁸ The negative consequences notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine that the negative effects of having national staff employed in PSOs would be worse than any effects of not having any locals work in the PSO at all, particularly concerning issues such as legitimacy and local ownership.

Organised Crime and Corruption

With the increasing demand and insertion of capital flows, conditions can easily fuel corruption and organised crime.³⁹ For peace support and peace building efforts this is particularly worrying as both corruption and organised crime can undermine durable peace, either by sustaining the material basis for war-fighting and reducing the incentives for turning to peace, or more generally, weakening the effectiveness and legitimacy of public institutions as well as undermining the economic recovery which could be instrumental for the peace process. Recently, increasing scholarly attention has been given to these issues, and which inter alia have called for increased mandates of PSOs to join, or even take a leading role, in the fight against these social harms.⁴⁰ Here though, the study concentrates on the unintentional consequences of fuelling corruption or organised crime and possible strategies for avoiding this.

At an overall mission level, the stability and predictability provided by peace support operations can make illicit business profitable, e.g. through securing certain black market trading areas or import points, such as harbours or airports. Other factors that can contribute to organised crime include the impact of sanctions or embargoes associated with many PSOs, which can create

³⁷ Rudén 2007: 14.

³⁸ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: pp.30-31.

³⁹ Cockayne and Lupel: 2009: pp. 151-168.

⁴⁰ This attention has e.g. been manifested in the two special issues of the journal *International Peacekeeping*, dedicated to the topics of corruption (vol. 15, no. 3, June 2008) and organized crime (vol. 16, no. 1 February, 2009) respectively.

incentives for smuggling. The transportation mechanisms employed in PSOs could also be misused for illicit purposes, e.g. to carry smuggled goods.⁴¹

At a personnel-level, staff engaged in peace support operations may – deliberately or otherwise – increase the demand for, or supply of, black market goods and services, which often involve organised crime.⁴² Examples could range from black market dealings in foreign currency and purchasing of pirated DVDs to buying sexual “services” provided through the sexual exploitation of commercial sex workers and trafficked women.

The distinction between mission and personnel-level fuelling of corruption and organised crime need not be clear cut as the corrupt behaviour of employees can result in misuse of the mission assets. This could be effected e.g. through channelling procurement to vendors offering kick-backs, by facilitating the smuggling of goods through mission transportation mechanisms for a similar fee or by siphoning off of fuel from mission vehicles or stocks which is resold on the black market.⁴³

In a report to the General Assembly on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) notes “a breakdown in one or several components of internal control or a total disregard for controls”⁴⁴. This was based on the results of many of its audits and investigations of UN peacekeeping operations. The shortcomings pertained to integrity violations (sexual exploitation and abuse, and corruption) as well as procurement procedures (including waste, mismanagement and fraud). In a subsequent report on peacekeeping operations, OIOS “underscored the need for the Organization [the United Nations⁴⁵] to develop a formal internal control framework to ensure that risks are managed consistently and systematically through focused control processes across the Organization”.⁴⁶

It is important to note, however, that depending on the local power balance and political networks, organised crime may inadvertently contribute to the peace process, by mobilizing local legitimacy or even shifting the balance of

⁴¹ Andreas (2008).

⁴² Cockayne and Pfister (2008).

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly (2007).

⁴⁵ Noting that the reports pertain exclusively to oversight of the PSOs of the Organization.

⁴⁶ United Nations General Assembly (2009).

power in favour of peaceful elements in society.⁴⁷ One can therefore conclude that while it is important to include an analysis of the nature of local organised crime, its connections to local populations and warring factions to avoid unintentional fuelling of this activity, for this analysis to be complete, it needs to include the risks and opportunities it poses as a potential peace spoiler or partner.⁴⁸ Ultimately however, organised crime could have long term impact on host country as it affects both norms and day-to-day economic culture.

There is disagreement over the severity of the negative effects of all these impacts on the host economy. The 2006 UN commissioned report, on the economic impact of its peacekeeping interventions, suggests that PSOs have both negative and positive consequences on host economies but that the positive economic consequences usually outweigh the negative ones. The report states, for example, that the restoration of basic security leads to an immediate upsurge in economic activity; that the spending of international staff allowances, on mission procurement and national staff wages provides a needed stimulus to the local economy; and while some price rises and wage increases do occur in the immediate locale of the PSO deployment, this has only limited and local effect on inflation.⁴⁹ While all these aspects are welcome, it seems still to be very important to pay attention to possible unintended consequences of PSOs in order to avoid the most common negative aspects that can follow.

2.1 UN Strategies for Managing Unintended Consequences on Host Economies

In the face of frequent criticism for the negative impacts on the local economies in which UN PSOs take place, the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) commissioned the Economic Impact of Peacekeeping Project, including a study on the economic impact of peacekeeping operations.⁵⁰ The above mentioned report, which was the result of the project, focuses on issues like the host government's revenue administration, inflated expectations, sub-optimal impact on the local economy, and

⁴⁷ Cockayne and Pfister (2008).

⁴⁸ Ibid. See also Andreas (2009).

⁴⁹ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: pp. 51-52.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Foreword.

potentially destabilising distributional impacts and contains recommendations including: mission mandates or major policy and funding issues; measures to address negative consequences in the labour market; outsourcing policy and practice; administrative recommendations; and proposals to use voluntary contributions from donors to enable local firms to become more competitive bidders for mission business.⁵¹

It was also noted that the inherently unregulated nature of the post-conflict economies in which DPKO missions operate, makes corruption and fraud an important area that needs consideration in mission planning, particularly in relation to mission procurement.⁵² In view of this, applications of the existing United Nations procurement procedures are one of the prioritised areas for the OIOS.⁵³ The UN, through the OIOS has sought to address challenges of corruption and fraudulent behaviour by implementing a system of placing resident auditors at peacekeeping missions with large budgets (one internal auditor per USD 100 million annual budgets). Such resident auditors are audit staff deployed to the peacekeeping missions but who report to the Internal Audit Division of OIOS. The purpose of this strategy is to provide assurance to management that the internal controls are functioning effectively; provide a deterrent against mismanagement, fraud etc in high-risk missions; enable OIOS to gain more in-depth knowledge of mission operations; and facilitate for OIOS to identify problems and provide advice for mitigating them. In the experience of the UN, this has resulted in recommended recovery of fraud-related overpayments and adoption of cost-saving measures of close to USD 20 million over the period 1994 - 1999, as well as to ensure the quality of administrative and logistical support operations – in essence contributing to the efficient use of mission resources.⁵⁴

In the case of corruption, fraud, mismanagement or waste, for example, the OIOS experience of posting resident auditors in missions has proven to be an effective measure, which could easily be replicated by national contingents to large missions. A prerequisite for this to remain effective is that the resident auditor is kept sufficiently independent from the day-to-day running of operations and that the reporting chain is kept directly to the auditing office of the mission's capital.

⁵¹ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 46.

⁵² Ibid p. 52.

⁵³ United Nations General Assembly (1999).

⁵⁴ United Nations General Assembly (2001).

Apart from strict accountability measures to reduce the risk of corruption, fraud, waste or mismanagement of resources, there are currently only a few publicly available documented examples of strategies for reducing the negative unintended consequences on host economies of PSOs. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that recommendations are absent in the literature on peacekeeping operations. Most notably, the final report of the Economic Impact of Peacekeeping Project includes an extensive list of recommendations. Without discarding any of the recommendations captured therein, a few deserve additional attention in this chapter:

It has been noted that it is important to take economic consequences of the overall mission into consideration when planning of a PSO. To this effect, it has been recommended to appoint Senior Economic Officers, with explicit responsibility for maximising the developmental impact of mission operations.⁵⁵ By including this perspective in the planning phase, and ensuring continuous monitoring and evaluation during the implementation, this could lead to minimising unintentional negative consequences, such as distortions in the host economy, and an increase of intentional impacts, such as job creation and carefully prepared capacity-building strategies based on thorough needs assessments and/or participatory planning.⁵⁶ Examples of intentional positive impacts could then include support for the local economy through increased expenditure on local goods and services, both through favouring them ahead of imported goods for mission-level procurement and by phasing out goods from the mission commissaries as and when comparable goods become available from the local markets. Essentially, for positive consequences to be maximised they need to be explicitly taken into account in all mission policy decisions.⁵⁷

The UN report also highlights the need to reduce distortions caused by the salary scale of the UN system.⁵⁸ To address this, and improve efficiency gains, it recommends that national staff is used instead of international staff whenever possible as well as that outsourcing of services to companies using local wage-scales is done whenever feasible. While the report concludes that this can increase the acceptance for the mission among the local population, it is important to recall the need for impartial individuals in key decision-making positions to avoid that mission-level decisions are influenced by partisan local interests. In certain contexts, ensuring that such positions are

⁵⁵ See e.g. Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 6.

⁵⁶ Rudén 2007: pp. 17-18.

⁵⁷ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 3.

⁵⁸ Carnahan, Durch, and Gilmore: 2006: 51; and Rudén: 2007: 18.

held by internationals may increase the confidence in the mission's impartiality. Other strategies could be the 'light footprint' approach that tries to avoid adverse economic effects on the host economy by taking a cautious approach towards heavy influx of international assistance and spending, leaving more room for national ownership and decision making.⁵⁹

Regardless of what measures are considered to avoid negative economic consequences, it is paramount that possible distributional effects and associated political ramifications are considered. Whatever strategy is practiced, a crucial condition for reducing the number of unintended negative consequences on host economies in favour of intended positive ones is sufficient understanding of how decision-making will affect the economy of the host state and awareness of the relationship between economic recovery and other mission objectives. In view of this, conscious efforts need to be made to ensure that access to the opportunities presented by PSOs, whether in terms of trading or employment opportunities, do not unnecessarily fuel existing divisions in society.

2.2 Swedish Experiences of Managing Economic Effects on Host Economies

Despite the complexity of addressing unintended negative consequences for the host economy, Sweden has applied a number of measures which aim to control these. For example, with regard to mission procurement - a fundamental aspect of PSO and host country economic engagement - the work to ensure as little negative consequences for the host country as possible, and increase the positive ones, begins already at the planning and reconnaissance stage. During this phase, logistical aspects of the mission are being worked out, not least with regard to contracting and engagement with the local economy. In order to ensure transparency during this phase, Swedish procurement practices are regulated by the Swedish law "Lagen om Offentlig Upphandling" (Law on Public Procurement).⁶⁰ This law describes most areas relating to Swedish practices when contracting legal and natural entities in the host country. This law also builds upon the European Union (EU), European Community (EC) Regulations and Directives. When involved in procurement practices, Sweden also relates and refers to a number of international legal documents such as international covenants

⁵⁹ Ammitzvoell: 2007: pp. 71-71.

⁶⁰ LOU, Lagen om Offentlig Upphandling (2007:1 091).

(e.g. the International Labour Organization covenant). The Swedish Procurement law hence forms a framework and platform when locating contractors for Swedish missions. As such, the scope and room for corruption is formally controlled and reduced by legal frameworks.

In addition, in order to maintain control, all larger Swedish procurements for PSOs are carried out by special defence procurement officers at the logistics and procurement division of the SwAF. Like many other branches of the Swedish Government's engagement in peace supportive tasks, officials at the logistic and procurement division of the SwAF would like to contract local operators with a development and assistance preference in mind. However, they struggle to do so. First, the above-mentioned law for public procurement does not allow for preferential treatment to support local development. Second, procurement is, first and foremost, based on providing mission support. Given that there are quite high quality thresholds and high quantitative demands for items to be supplied for Swedish missions (e.g. food, fuel, etc.), local actors many times do not meet the demands.⁶¹ Indeed, for larger quantities of material for the Swedish PSOs, there are usually well established international companies specialised in mission support. Hence, from that point of view, the room for misconduct is reduced. Nevertheless, procurement officials are often sent to a prospective mission area to conclude contracts with local economic operators and representatives of supply companies. Sometimes, they are supported by intelligence officers who collect information about local actors and economic operators in order to make sure that the mission can procure material, food and other supplies from reliable companies that are reasonably well integrated in the formal economy and not covered by international blacklists.⁶²

With regard to Sweden's procurement practices on site in the host country, the SwAF has economic advisors at its Headquarter but not out in the missions.⁶³ Instead, each Swedish mission has a "paymaster", i.e. a mission accountant who keeps records of the contingent's budget (e.g. food costs, local agreement etc.), to ensure internal scrutiny of the actual mission spending. The paymaster usually reports directly to the national contingent Commander as well as back to the headquarters (HQ) of the taskforce.⁶⁴ Economic support and reviews are made at the HQ in Stockholm. Most

⁶¹ Interview with representatives from Swedish Armed Forces Procurement and Logistics Unit (sv. FM Log): 2009-11-13.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Interview with representative from the Personnel Unit, SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

⁶⁴ Interview with representative from the Personnel Unit, SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

procurement activities require testified and registered invoices, which reduces the scope for engagement with the black-market. Thus, internally, Swedish PSOs have fairly accountable and transparent procurement procedures with rigid checks and balances systems against corruption and black market interaction. However, the quality of these depends much on the existing security situation in the host country. Sometimes, as in Afghanistan, procurement operations cannot make a detailed and in-depth analysis of the economic contractors. The reason is simply that the security situation seldom allows for investigations or competitive bidding processes among a large number of qualified local operators. Besides security characteristics, other aspects, such as constraints in time, staff and resources, reduce the scope for Swedish procurement officials to provide sufficient in-depth investigations and background check-ups of contractors to ensure that local corruption or connections to organised crime can be ruled out completely. These aspects also form the main obstacles for ensuring that binding conditions of already concluded agreement are being respected (if procurement officials encounter contract breaches this will be reported and subject to legal investigations).

While there are several points of references for the overall PSOs interaction with host societies, there is less control of the economic activities of individual soldiers being out on mission. As noted in the earlier section of this report, it is not uncommon that soldiers engage with local markets to buy items and services that are outside the formal economy (e.g. DVDs, textiles, electronic items, cultural objects, etc.). This is difficult to handle as the informal market is not only attractive (e.g. cheap items) but usually also very widespread. Sometimes, there is not even a formal market to identify in conflict situations. Yet, soldiers are bound by a code of conduct, which explicitly states that they should not engage in corruption or activities which could support organised crime. Each soldier is notified of this code of conduct and has to sign a document acknowledging that he or she has received such code. Copies are often brought to the camp, but the routines around these are not fixed.⁶⁵ Moreover, often there are also ethical principles established for each mission on how to engage with the host country.

Since Swedish troops are covered by Swedish law while on mission, there are also prohibitions and laws against Swedish personnel to buy and sell illegal items such as drugs, weapons, etc. Breaches of such formal and informal stipulations lead to disciplinary measures or criminal charges (depending on the severity of such activities).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

In some missions, most foreign currency exchange takes place at the “post office” in the camp to avoid engaging black market money dealers and possible links to organised crime. However, there is always a possibility that soldiers make use of local exchange opportunities when being outside the mission compound. In general, though, each staff member should be at the camp unless one is tasked to be outside the camp on mission.⁶⁶ In Afghanistan, for example, the freedom of movement is strictly regulated. Soldiers do not leave the camp unless they are out on mission and tend to buy items for personal consumption, such as bread, water, fruit etc while on observation missions to interact with the local population. Sales of merchandise and services (e.g. a hairdresser, tailor, carpet vendors, etc) do take place at the camp, though. Although screening takes place of each person at the camp, it cannot be excluded that any of these activities could feed into black markets or corruption.⁶⁷

2.3 Lessons for Sweden to Manage Unintended Effects on Host Economies

With regard to negative economic impacts on host countries, there are a number of efforts that Sweden can take in order to better deal with negative consequences of PSOs. Much of this requires systematic analysis and well developed information collection capacities on economic host country impacts.

To deal with unintended effects, Swedish PSO planners need to take institutional approaches, for instance by making sure that there are mission staffs that are tasked with investigating host economic impacts. Today, there is no such function. Focus of such mission staff investigations could be to make sure that missions have access to economic data prior to, during and following deployment.

One way of avoiding negative side effects for the host country, in economic terms, hence is to have well-planned and host-country sensitive procurement procedures. However, most procurement procedures are dependent on a number of crucial components such as: amount of pre-planning time,

⁶⁶ Interview with representative from the Personnel Unit, SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

information about host-country, and information about host country economic structures (and practices).⁶⁸

Although procurements often need to be made on a short notice, Swedish mission planner should involve procurement units as early as possible in the planning. This seems not always to be the case. This way, however, necessary background checks could be made to better avoid that Swedish contracts go directly into the informal sector and thereby feed domestic corruption, etc. Having more time to its disposal, would also mean that procurement officials could more easily plan for follow-up reviews once having signed a contract (e.g. to make sure that the contractor is not violating the contract conditions). This also means that to avoid unintended consequences of negative host-country impact, procurement units must plan for how best to make use of limited time and resources at hand, but still make sure that contractors live up to Swedish and international standards (social, environmental, legal standards, etc.).⁶⁹

One way to ensure that such standards are followed is to have every Swedish PSO subcontractor to sign ethical guidelines (relating to a sound management of its workforce, its material, and its services). Today, there exist no such ethical guidelines, although there are plans to develop them. Ethical guidelines for economic operators in the host country could prove quite practical, thus, it is recommended that such guidelines should be developed. These guidelines could benefit from a coordinated effort with civilian experts outside the SwAF. Although national law provides for legal frameworks (non-discrimination and open competition), Sweden should also make sure that contractors carry out their work according to Swedish ethical guidelines unregulated in law in the host country, such as environmental protection, transparency, respect for human rights, regular review and transparent revisions etc.

In order to minimise negative unintended consequences on host economies, it is important that PSO mission planners are fully aware of the kind of impact that these operations cause. Usually, though, focus is more on providing for immediate security, and less attention is paid to social and structural aspects of the mission area (i.e. those aspects that falls outside military planning). In Sweden, this important task is not really institutionalised in the PSO planning. One way however is to task an officer with

⁶⁸ Interview with representatives from SwAF Procurement and Logistics Unit (sv. FM Log): 2009-11-13.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

the role of investigating impact. This officer could also be the focal point with other Swedish authorities that have insight and interests in ensuring that the Swedish PSOs do not cause negative side effects of the host country. There exists today little civil-military dialogue at a national level which, if increased, could make Swedish PSOs better informed. Thus, it is recommendable, for instance, that when Sweden is setting up procurement operations for a PSO, civilian Swedish agencies, like Sida or the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are also invited, to contribute to how such operations could effect societal structures (e.g. ethnic, commercial, and cultural structures as well as indigenous resources) and how to maximise development aspects to the benefit to the host state.

Another way of avoiding to feed host-country economic imbalances, corruption, etc. is to provide procurement officials with background information on the security situation, ethnic structures, formal and informal commercial structures.⁷⁰ Usually, the Swedish development and assistance community have much experiences of this, yet there is little information sharing or cooperation between PSOs and actors like Sida. One reason is that one does not want to enter into each others territories; particularly in field as mixing hats can have security consequences. On the other hand, more dialogue could take place between these actors and other knowledgeable actors in Stockholm.

When deploying a mission, Sweden should seek to avoid losing sight of long-term assistance needs of host countries, because of the short-term security needs. It could prove to be a misuse of resources to pour them into a mission area without thinking of how host government/society could benefit from this flow. For instance, Sweden could allow infrastructure of mission camps be sites for host-country use when missions end. Instead of building container cities, Sweden could build secure mission compounds that, later on, could be used as schools, hospitals or community centres, etc.

Sweden needs to counter short-term as well as long-term corruption. As far as possible, a mission should therefore rely on the formal economy of the host country so that taxation flows back to host community. However, such practices do not come about easily. Preparations, time, transparency, rationality, and knowledge of economic operators are important factors that missions need to keep in mind. The best way to streamline anti-corruption is to have officers responsible for analysing missions' roles in feeding the

⁷⁰ Interview with representatives from the SwAF Procurement and Logistics Unit (sv. FM Log): 2009-11-13.

informal market of the host country. Sweden does not have such a function yet. The officer could document and analyse mission practices and give practical advice on how to maximise the involvement of the formal market. Besides ensuring that Swedish PSOs do not actively contribute to the informal economy, an economic advisor, or the like, should also work to ensure that missions and procurements of the formal market are environmental friendly as well as based on fair-trade principles.

With regard to hiring of local and international staff to the PSOs, Swedish mission planners need to conduct a continuous review of host country impact. With regard to mission employees, Sweden generally hires locals to perform services like cleaning, kitchen help, interpreters etc. In addition, consultancy contracts are issued for more demanding labour-intense work.⁷¹ In order to avoid boosting local salary levels at the time of the mission and to avoid distorting social and economic balances, Sweden needs to engage other missions in the area in coordination and dialogue. For instance, Sweden could seek to coordinate salary-levels for national staff with other TCCs to avoid unnecessary salary inflation. Another recommendation is that mission planners should try to rotate local staff regularly in order to reduce the risk of concentrating benefits only in the hands of a single or a few ethnic groups or families. While the SwAF has practiced this on an ad hoc basis, procedures around are not fixed. Moreover, mission planner need also to take a gender sensitive approach when hiring locals. For instance, by only hiring males, females may be kept socially dependent on their husbands. If consciously also hiring women in to high-paid positions, women could become more independent. Swedish mission planners need also be aware when hiring locals that it may lead to a brain-drain. Missions therefore need to make sure that it does not drain host society of all its best and most skilled workers as they, many times, may have important societal roles and positions to fill. For instance, translators may fill important positions as teachers, of which there could be a lack. In the end, the function of the mission is to support the host society.

Recommendations

Drawing from previous studies and experiences from the UN and the SwAF, the following recommendations can be made:

⁷¹ Interview with representative from the Personnel Unit, SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

Monitoring

- Develop a formal and internal central function for systematic analysis of PSOs' impacts on host economies, e.g. through institutionalising economic officers to maximise the developmental impact
- Pay attention to salary payment and the distortion it can cause in the host country
- Carefully consider the distributional effects on the host economy in order to avoid fuelling existing divisions
- Make sure that Sweden's contribution to PSOs does not contribute to a local "brain drain"
- Collect information on unintended consequences and disseminate such to other relevant actors in order to better support their work to design more host-country sensitive PSOs

Planning

- Have well planned procurement practices in post conflict societies to avoid unintended consequences
- Pay attention to salary levels, gender, and rotation when hiring local and international staff
- Rely as far as possible on the formal economy of the host country
- Coordinate with civilian agencies, such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), to establish whether and how PSOs could contribute to the economic development of the country, within the limits of its short-term security focus.

Institutionalise

- Institutionalise an independent mission auditor to examine the mission's budget spending and report to civil control agencies
- Increase the civil-military dialogue to be more informed about dynamics of host economy

Accountability

- Develop ethical guidelines and have these accepted by economic sub-contractors of PSOs.
- Make sure that each PSO mission have at least one officer to consider long-term development aspects (alternatively have such monitoring at the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) Headquarters

3 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Given that PSOs take place in societies and amongst populations that are often socially and economically vulnerable, it is not uncommon that peacekeepers and staff are tempted to abuse their relative position of power over less advantaged locals for the purpose of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Such abuse can constitute gross human rights violations, cause further spread of HIV and generate harmful changes to gender patterns in the local society.⁷² Beyond the detrimental effects on the individual exposed and the host society, it can also severely damage the legitimacy of the PSO itself. Indeed, it is an effective way of losing the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations and of generating distrust of the mission and the peacekeepers amongst the most important stakeholders.

The UN defines sexual exploitation as:

*“...any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another”. Its definition of sexual abuse, reads as “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions”.*⁷³

Over the years there have been numerous reported examples of SEA violations by PSO affiliates. For instance, soldiers from the NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) have been found to be involved in trafficking of women from Moldova and Romania into BiH. Members of SFOR have also reportedly visited local brothels where women and underage girls were kept as so-called sex slaves. Moreover, members of the International Police Task Force were also reportedly involved in trafficking, producing fake documents and participating in the recruitment and sale of women.⁷⁴ These examples suggest that PSO staff can be directly involved knowingly or unknowingly e.g. in trafficking, e.g. when buying sex from women who have been forced into prostitution. In a policy paper on Human Trafficking and UN Peacekeeping, DPKO is alarmed over the fact that peacekeepers are seen as part of the problem rather than being part of

⁷² Nordic Africa Institute (2009).

⁷³ United Nations Secretariat (2003). See also Nordic Africa Institute (2009).

⁷⁴ Rudén 2007: 25.

the solution.⁷⁵ Another example of SEA is provided by the 2004 UN investigation that documented 68 cases of rape, prostitution and paedophilia in the Bunia province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The reported cases involved personnel from Pakistani, Nepalese, South African and Uruguayan contingents, amongst others, showing that this is a universal problem.⁷⁶ It is not uncommon to come across the idea that modern states believe their contingents are protected from such dissipated acts. However, the prosecution of three Danish UN-soldiers in 2001 for having had sex with a 13 year-old Eritrean girl and the 2002 prosecution of an Irish UN-soldier for producing pornographic movies with Eritrean women show that European countries should not be under an illusion that their operations are immune to violations by their respective armed forces. In view of this, they, along with other nations, need to take proactive measures to prevent and manage such activities.⁷⁷

Sexual exploitation and abuse is complex because it has a range of unintended consequences beyond just the mere physical and psychological trauma of the victim directly related to the abuse. In the case involving the Irish UN soldier, he was sentenced to 16 days detention by the UN court and later dismissed from the mission. Perhaps more disturbing, in this case, is that the women involved in the sex-tape were punished not so leniently, with one of them being sent to prison for two years for prostitution.⁷⁸ In many cultures women and girls who are victims of rape and sexual abuse are so dishonoured in their communities that their entire lives will be essentially ruined, this is particularly the case if she bears a child as a consequence. Shortly after the incident with the Irish soldier in Eritrea, an Italian soldier was accused of similar behaviour. The combination of the incidents outraged the local population and severely harmed the UN operation as it was accused of bringing a “sick mentality” to the country.⁷⁹ Clearly such behaviour violates the moral code of conduct envisioned and supported by the United Nations.⁸⁰

In 2005, the UN Secretary-General reported 121 cases of sexual exploitation and abuse within UN missions, twice as many compared to the figures from

⁷⁵ DPKO: 2004a: 4.

⁷⁶ Murthy 2007: 165.

⁷⁷ Nordic Africa Institute (2009).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ See UN Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets.

2003. In 45% of these cases the accusations concerned sexual relations with minors and 15% rape or sexual assault.⁸¹

Referring back to the definition of sexual exploitation and abuse, in some ways SEA also includes the exploitation of vulnerable populations for sexual purposes *even* when the sexual act is consensual. Often women and children, due to a lack of other economic opportunities, are forced to sell their bodies in exchange for food, small sums of money or simple protection. Even though sexual relations with minors are always illegal, such so-called 'survival sex' by adult women areas are difficult to categorise as peacekeepers and civilian staff associated with PSOs are known to take temporary girlfriends and 'wives'. These relationships often include the peacekeepers providing the women and their families with food and money. In such situations, however, it is very difficult to determine whether the relationship constitutes real 'love' or is actually a case of direct exploitation.⁸²

It is generally recognised that the establishment of PSOs often lead to an increased level of prostitution in the host states. For example, with the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the number of prostitutes rose from approximately 6,000 to at least 20,000, even though the real numbers might have been three times greater.⁸³

By buying sex from prostitutes, PSO personal are likely to support organised crime. This is of particular concern in cases of trafficked women as network engaged in this type of criminal activity are often also involved in other illegal and informal markets such as drugs and weapons trafficking. In effect, therefore, PSO troops buying such sexual services can unknowingly be counteracting or compromising the very rule of law that the PSO is meant to strengthen and support.⁸⁴

The occurrence of prostitution makes the grey area between what might be considered 'sexual misconduct' – all sexual relations with the local population is considered inappropriate within UN missions – and sexual exploitation and abuse further complicated. There are, for example, reported incidents from the DRC where young girls claim to have been raped by peacekeepers and then given food or money afterwards.⁸⁵ Another consequence of sexual exploitation and abuse, whether consensual or not, are

⁸¹ Kent: 2007: 48.

⁸² Nordic Africa Institute (2009); Rudén: 2007: pp. 20-23.

⁸³ Rudén: 2007: pp. 23.

⁸⁴ Mendelson: 2005: 17; and UNDPKO (2004a)

⁸⁵ Zeid. 2005.

so-called 'peacekeeper babies', children fathered and abandoned by PSO personnel.⁸⁶ Indeed, there are several claims that the establishment of a PSO correlates not only to increased levels of prostitution, but also to the levels of rape, trafficking, sexual slavery, and sexual exploitation of children.⁸⁷

Holding perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse accountable for their deeds, however, is difficult for many reasons. As long as there is money to be earned there is also likely to be a demand and supply market for these kinds of services. Given that prostitution is an option (sometimes one of few) to earn a living, it may also be difficult to have women testify against perpetrators as this could not only expose them to danger, but also destroy their sole source of income. Due to the state of rule of law institutions in most post-conflict zones, prosecution in the host country is almost never viable. Furthermore, peacekeepers and other personnel, in for example UN missions, hold various levels of immunity and can only be prosecuted in their home countries, far from witnesses and evidence. In addition, some states consider sexual exploitation and abuse accusations as attempts to defame their own contingents and national contribution to PSOs and therefore rarely desire to acknowledge such violations amongst its own contingents, and even less so, hold its own soldiers accountable for such abuse.⁸⁸ Another reason for why such abuses is rarely given due attention at the national level, is fear that it could reduce the popular support domestically for sending troops abroad.

Other than legal impunity, impunity amongst ranks seems to still be widespread and obstructing implementation of actions against SEA. The overlooking of soldiers buying sexual services seems to be common. Despite the fact that purchasing sex from commercial sex workers is prohibited, senior officers often fail to actively work to stop inappropriate behaviours or set bad examples themselves.⁸⁹ There is still a tendency to downplay acts of sexual exploitation and abuse, or even cover them up.⁹⁰ Such lack of leadership on these issues portrays an indirect, if not direct, acceptance of this type of sexual misconduct. It has been suggested that there is also a tendency of fellow peers to look the other way due to the comradeship inherent in military contingents. Such bonds might counteract reporting because whistleblowers fear being stigmatised or because military colleagues, for

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Nordic Africa Institute (2009).

⁸⁸ Murthy: 2007: 165.

⁸⁹ Nordic Africa Institute (2009).

⁹⁰ Spencer: 2005: 178.

example, may try to protect national honour from being associated with sexual misconduct.⁹¹

Although sexual exploitation and abuse is conducted not only by soldiers but also by other humanitarian and aid personnel working in zones of conflict and disaster, staff directly associated with PSOs, military personnel in particular, are disproportionately on the receiving end of SEA accusations. For instance, a 2008 report by Save the Children UK on sexual exploitation and abuse of children by aid workers and peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Southern Sudan found that troops associated with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) were identified as a particular source of abuse and the most likely perpetrators of SEA crimes against children in these areas.⁹²

Save the Children UK points out the particular dependency of local populations on peacekeepers arising from the mere fact that peacekeepers are armed and provide much needed physical security to extremely vulnerable populations. In addition, the organisation notes the discriminatory attitudes towards women that exist within a significant number of military personnel.⁹³ Some arguments have been made portraying acts of sexual exploitation and abuse as associated with a militarised masculinity, or, more controversially, due to inherent male aggression.⁹⁴ What these arguments have in common is the notions that such negative patterns can be mitigated through having more female soldiers participate in peacekeeping operations.⁹⁵ Interestingly though, there are different statistics that both seem to support and discredit the notion that more female peacekeepers reduce the occurrence of SEA violations. For example, a 1995 UN study found that incidents of rape and prostitution fell significantly in the presence of females from the men's own culture.⁹⁶ Other studies suggest that instead of intervening against the abuse of male colleagues, female peacekeepers have had a tendency to turn a blind eye to such violations without taking action against it. Nevertheless, in the particular case of SEA violations, the access to female personnel who can receive reports of such abuse is absolutely essential since many women prefer to report such incidents to other females.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Martin (2005).

⁹² Csáky: 2008: 8.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Goldstein: (2001).

⁹⁵ Nordic Africa Institute (2009).

⁹⁶ Kent: 2007: 56.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

3.1 UN strategies for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs

Discussions within the UN regarding misconduct of peacekeepers on mission arose during the early 1990s but did not generate much attention until the turn of the century. In 2002, Save the Children UK and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released a report on sexual exploitation and abuse of refugees by peacekeepers and aid workers in West Africa. The report raised an alarm about how vulnerable young girls were coerced to barter sex for food, money or shelter, and accused over forty humanitarian aid organisations to have been involved in these incidents.⁹⁸ The UN decided to look into these allegations and, in the same year, the UN OIOS investigated the incidents but could not substantiate the particular stories expressed in the report. The investigations nonetheless found that other acts of SEA had been committed.⁹⁹ To years later, the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) released a memorandum recording a total of 150 SEA accusations against its soldiers; a second OIOS investigation was prompted. The ensuing report confirmed that sexual contacts between peacekeepers and local populations occurred regularly and often in exchange for small sums of money or food.¹⁰⁰

The accusations of sexual exploitation and abuse led to a series of ad hoc responses within MONUC during 2004, and in 2005, a MONUC Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (OASEA) was established to ensure that all matters related to this issue was centralised within one office. The sole mandate of OASEA was to address allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and OASEA understood its job as consisting of three parts: conduct investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse accusations; development of policy and advice for handling sexual exploitation and abuse matters; and training, awareness raising and advocacy of sexual exploitation and abuse issues.¹⁰¹ No template for establishing such an office, or rules and procedures for conducting SEA investigations existed within the DPKO at the time. The OASEA was thus established in a policy vacuum regarding issues such as the UN's responsibility towards victims, or how to address paternity claims.¹⁰² The Office only existed for eight months and in that time

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 47.

⁹⁹ General Assembly (2002).

¹⁰⁰ Dahrendorf (2006); Kent: 2007: 47.

¹⁰¹ Dahrendorf (2006).

¹⁰² Ibid.

it concluded 111 investigations, which led to a large number of disciplinary measures and criminal charges. In its short time of operating, the OASEA also structured and harmonised investigation and reporting procedures and developed investigation guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on SEA issues with the military, security section and MONUC police.¹⁰³ In the end of 2005, OASEA handed over its investigative capacity to the OIOS and transitioned to a Conduct and Discipline Team for MONUC, a formula which was also adopted for seven other UN PSOs.¹⁰⁴

During the last decade, understanding came to grow within the UN that cases of SEA were not isolated events and needed to be addressed at the institutional level. In 2003 the Secretary-General released a bulletin on 'Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse', which set out zero-tolerance standards for the code of conduct applicable to UN military and civilian personnel. Included in the definition of sexual exploitation and abuse was sexual activities with any person under the age of 18 and the exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sexual favours (for example sex with prostitutes). Sexual relations with beneficiaries of assistance, for example local populations, were strongly discouraged.¹⁰⁵ The bulletin also obliged any UN staff member developing concerns or suspicions of sexual exploitation or abuse by a fellow peace worker to report such concerns. In addition, it held managers at all levels accountable for creating and maintaining an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse.¹⁰⁶ Other documents such as 'Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets', 'Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers', and 'Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military members of National Contingents', as well as specific mission guidelines and training material on gender and sexual exploitation, have been produced by the UN to provide a framework within which sexual exploitation and abuse can be addressed.¹⁰⁷ In addition to the UN taking the initiative to develop these directives, the Secretary-General of the UN appointed Prince Zeid of Jordan to produce a report outlining a strategy to eliminate SEA.¹⁰⁸ The report, commonly referred to as the *Zeid Report*, investigated the previous attempts of the UN to address sexual exploitation and abuse violations, including its investigatory measures and attempts to

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ United Nations Secretariat (2003)

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Dahrendorf (2006).

¹⁰⁸ Kent: 2007: 45.

deter such violations in the future.¹⁰⁹ In 2007 some of the reports recommendations were implemented. Amongst other things a Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) tasked with the strengthening of accountability and the upholding of UN code of conduct standards was formed. The CDU is nowadays established at the UN Department of Field Support with 15 CDU teams around the world, including the DRC, Sudan and Liberia.¹¹⁰

UN procedures for reporting of sexual exploitation and abuse have been argued to be complicated, particularly for those living in the mission area and few of the community members reportedly know how to report sexual misconduct. One problem pointed out, for example, is that security guards at gates of the mission are strict and suspicious towards local persons attempting to enter the mission area to seek or share information.¹¹¹ Another is that SEA is not reported because of fear of negative repercussions.¹¹²

Today, clear UN policies, procedures and international legal obligations on sexual exploitation and abuse exist; yet the problem persists due to lack of implementation. DPKO has taken a stance against sexual misconduct by implementing a range of preventative measures such as standards for pre-deployment training; enhancing in-mission training; and deploying in-mission code of conduct officers and focal points.¹¹³ Nonetheless, these measures have been insufficient: greatly due to the fact that acts of sexual exploitation and abuse are still shrouded in a cloud of impunity.¹¹⁴ There are still a great number of sexual exploitation and abuse cases among peacekeeping staff which are never reported or investigated. Even in those cases when accusations are actually made, and can be substantiated, the most severe measures taken usually only amounts to repatriation of the concerned peacekeeper to his or her country of origin. The UN has no legal authority to prosecute staff even when there is evidence of misconduct, such action can only be taken by the Troop-Contributing Country (TCC), which itself decides if it will prosecute the person upon his or her return home. The UN has no legal right to request that TCCs hold peacekeepers who have committed acts of sexual exploitation and abuse accountable. UN regulations do not take precedence over the criminal and statutory law of a

¹⁰⁹ Zeid (2005).

¹¹⁰ Nordic Africa institute (2009).

¹¹¹ Spencer: 2005: 177

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Kent: 2007: 45.

¹¹⁴ Nordic Africa Institute (2009)

peacekeepers' state of origin.¹¹⁵ Due to the fact that peacekeepers enjoy privileges of immunity from the laws of the host nation – in addition to the fact that these states tend to have underdeveloped judicial systems with poor capacity anyway – peacekeepers who have committed acts of SEA cannot be prosecuted in the state where the crime has been committed either.¹¹⁶

Previous studies recommend several categories of strategies for addressing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) violations exist. One of these categories attempts to deal with the impunity that surrounds acts of sexual exploitation and abuse and increase transparency. Such strategies include establishing better reporting mechanisms, and punishment of perpetrators. These strategies exist to generate a deterrent among troops as well as a sentiment amongst victims that these things do not need to happen, facilitate awareness amongst local populations of reporting channels and empowering victims through holding perpetrators accountable. Another category is based on the notion that acts of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by troops are essentially command issues. Former UN Under-Secretary General for peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno stated that even though improving instruments for reporting about SEA violations was important, he regarded such acts among troops to be an issue of poor command and control that had resulted in misbehaviour of the soldiers. He thus regarded the solution to have to include educating both troops and commanders on the gravity of these issues and stressing a zero tolerance policy, the violation of which the commander in charge of the perpetrating troop would also be held accountable for.¹¹⁷

Moreover, female peacekeepers can be important because SEA victims or those reporting SEA violations may feel more comfortable to talk to a female. This strategy finds strong support in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, which among other things calls for increased representation and decision-making of women in peacekeeping measures.¹¹⁸ In some cultures women are even forbidden to interact with men they are not related to, wherefore having only male peacekeepers is a failure to reach out to half of the population.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Spencer: 2005: 172.

¹¹⁶ Martin: 2005: 533.

¹¹⁷ 'The future of peacekeeping operations', lecture by Jean-Marie Guéhenno at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs October 10th 2008

¹¹⁸ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1325*, S/RES/1325 (2000).

¹¹⁹ Martin: (2005).

Training in human rights and codes of conduct, including training aimed to generate awareness of the conditions and consequences of trafficking, prostitution and the vulnerability of local populations are essential parts of pre-deployment preparations, something which is the responsibility of troop and police contributing countries. This strategy was also reiterated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1820, which requests the Secretary-General to strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations and urges TCCs to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theatre awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of misconduct involving their personnel.¹²⁰ To conduct surveys and evaluations of attitudes amongst peacekeeping troops regarding prostitution and trafficking could also be an important tool in changing attitudes and increasing awareness.¹²¹

3.2 Swedish Experiences of Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

The Swedish Government has made it a priority to implement and promote the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the follow up UNSCR 1820. Sweden was one of the first countries to adopt a national action plan (2006-2008) for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This was followed by the current plan, covering the period 2009-2012, which explicitly includes reference also to UNSCR 1820, and expresses an aim for Sweden to be a model nation, leading the implementation of UNSCR 1325.¹²²

The Action Plan sets out priorities under three overarching aims:

1. A significant increase of women participation in international peace- and security support operations, and for such operations to be implemented with a gender perspective in order to increase the effectiveness of the operations.
2. Strengthening the protection of women and girls in conflict situations.

¹²⁰ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1820*, S/RES/1820 (2008).

¹²¹ Rudén: 2007: 28.

¹²² Swedish Government, *Regeringens handlingsplan för perioden 2009-2012 för att genomföra säkerhetsrådets resolution 1325 (2000) om kvinnor, fred och säkerhet*, 2009: 5.

3. Full and equal participation of women in conflict areas in all mechanisms and institutions for conflict prevention, crisis management, peace building, humanitarian interventions and other interventions during a post-conflict phase.¹²³

Furthermore, the Action Plan distinguishes between activities towards these overarching aims at three levels: national, regional (EU, OSCE, European Council, NATO, Nordic countries etc) as well as globally (primarily in the UN). In line with its ambition to be a leading nation in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, Sweden has established that it needs to ensure that it implements the resolution fully nationally, in order to effectively promote its implementation regionally and globally.¹²⁴

In 2008, the SwAF drafted a proposal for implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan, emphasising the importance of using gender as a force multiplier for increased operational effectiveness, e.g. through enhancing the ability to communicate with women as well as men in order to reach representatives of the whole population.¹²⁵ In addition, Sweden has adopted a system with a Gender Field Advisor, who supports the Commanding Officers in ensuring that operations are planned, implemented and evaluated with gender, UNSCR 1325 and 1820 mainstreamed.¹²⁶ Sweden also coordinated a joint study on best practices and lessons learned from the implementation of 1325 in NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan in an effort to support the Organization's concepts and a Policy Directive on UNSCR 1325.¹²⁷

Attention is given to the behaviour of Swedish troops from the recruitment phase throughout training and deployment to their return home. Experience has shown that military observers are at greater risk of conducting SEA violations or be exposed to temptations to do so. Special attention is therefore given to assessing the values and attitudes along with the competencies of these recruits through in-depth interviews during the selection process.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 8.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

¹²⁵ Isaksson and Saidi (2008).

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Olsson and Tejpar (eds.) (2009).

On deployment, Swedish troops have to sign a Code of Conduct, which largely conforms to the UN Code of Conduct.¹²⁸ While this code of conduct does not explicitly ban sexual relationships with the host population, it does not allow them either. Instead it emphasises that where these amount to a situation characterised by abuse of a powerful position, they can lead to disciplinary measures (e.g. reduced salary or repatriation). Nevertheless, it happens that mission personnel get emotionally and physically involved with local populations, or even to develop sexual relationships with locals. This happens both within and outside the camps.¹²⁹

Good examples have been noted of Swedish contingency Commanders collecting these signed codes of conduct, to emphasise the importance given to them, but the routines around these are not fixed.¹³⁰ A breach of the code of conduct can result in disciplinary measures in accordance with Swedish laws.¹³¹ With regard to mechanism to file reports following sexual harassments within the camp, these follow the ordinary chain of command, whereby the employer formally has to act if it becomes known to him or her. In addition, there are informal channels: security officers, priests, doctors etc. (all often acting under confidentiality).¹³²

In order to supervise disciplinary issues, all Swedish contingents with over 200 troop members are to include a Legal Advisor, whose tasks include carrying out disciplinary inquiries and assist the Commander of the Swedish contingent in deciding whether a certain conduct should be a matter for disciplinary measures. However, since recruited troops are protected by a three-month notice period, it is costly to repatriate soldiers, as their vacancies will need to be filled while they continue to draw salaries even after being repatriated.

In the event that a suspicion arises that a criminal offence (defined in accordance with Swedish law, which e.g. criminalises the purchase of sexual services) has been committed, such cases should be brought to the Swedish

¹²⁸ UNDPKO, Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/ten_in.pdf; UNDPKO, *We Are United Nations Peacekeepers* (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/un_in.pdf)

¹²⁹ Interview with representative from the SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

¹³⁰ Interview with representative from the Personnel Unit, SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

¹³¹ *Lag (1999:568) om utlandsstyrkan inom Försvarsmakten* and *Lag (1994:1811) om disciplinansvar inom totalförsvaret, m.m.* Info also based on interview with representative from SwAF Headquarter 2009-11-25.

¹³² Interview with representative from the SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

contingency Commander.¹³³ In principle, Swedish criminal law covers all those personal that have been sent out by Sweden to participate in international mission.¹³⁴ While the regular chain of command applies in terms of reporting misconduct, such cases can also be brought by the Legal Advisor or the Military Police. In situations where it is reasonable to suspect that a crime has indeed been committed, the Swedish contingency Commander has an obligation to take legal proceedings directly to the Swedish Prosecution Authority. Based on the information presented with the case, a Public Prosecutor, in turn, decides whether to request a preliminary investigation for an indictment.

Should the crime be of a minor nature (e.g. petty theft, drinking violations, or car accidents, etc.), the Public Prosecutor would normally rely on the Military Police on site. However, in the event of a more serious crime, the Public Prosecutor is likely to request the Swedish Police to investigate the case.¹³⁵ For more severe crimes, suspected perpetrators will be repatriated to Sweden pending the outcome of the criminal procedures.¹³⁶ However, even where Swedish prosecutors may suspect a crime, they may face difficulties in collecting witnesses and evidence in the country where crimes have taken place, reducing the likelihood of making it possible to make it a legal case.¹³⁷

In cases of legal proceedings, the SwAF offers legal or financial support neither to the alleged offender, nor to the victim.¹³⁸ However, while the legal system in Sweden ensures that support is given to the prosecuted, victims abroad seldom receive legal support by Sweden. The main reason for this lack of support is probably that Swedish courts and prosecutors have little knowledge about practice and about routines to handle cases abroad. Moreover, while Sweden nationally has a fund for crime victims, this fund is seldom used by victims abroad.¹³⁹

¹³³ It should be noted, that regardless of immunity in the host country, Swedish troops can be prosecuted in Swedish courts for acts that constitute crimes according to Swedish Law.

Source: Interview with representative from SwAF Headquarter 2009-11-25.

¹³⁴ See for instance Förordningen (1999:569) om utlandsstyrkan samt Förordning 2003: 172.

¹³⁵ Interview with representative from SwAF Headquarter 2009-11-25.

¹³⁶ Interview with representative from the SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

¹³⁷ Interview with representative from the Swedish Ministry of Justice: 2009-10-29.

¹³⁸ Interview with representative from SwAF Headquarter 2009-11-25.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

3.3 Lessons for Sweden to Manage Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

As suggested by previous literature and recent policy developments, there are a number of steps that can be taken to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. In this section, lessons from these measures are applied to the SwAF, taking into consideration those steps already taken by Sweden to deal with SEA within PSOs. As previously highlighted, valuable steps to be taken in this regard include to institutionalise investigations, training and policy subscriptions in the mission organization to increase awareness of these issues, provide conditions for reporting and holding perpetrators of SEA accountable; establishing code of conducts (according to UN standards), establish information campaigns to increase awareness, transparency and willingness to report misconducts); and to have female soldiers participate in peace support operations to deal with the impunity that often surrounds SEA acts.

In order to hold Swedish troops accountable for possible crimes abroad, Sweden has established that they are covered by Swedish law, regardless of immunity in the host country. Yet, for this accountability to be effective the prosecutors' office and the Swedish police needs the institutional capacity to rapidly deploy and carry out adequate investigations. In addition, legal support needs to be provided to the victims in order to enable them to testify in a manner that satisfies Swedish courts. Currently, there seems to be unclear procedures for ensuring such support to victims abroad.

Furthermore, in accordance with Sweden's ambitions to be at the forefront of implementing UNSCR 1325 and 1820 addressing SEA in PSOs, Sweden could take its position on accountability further, by promoting the recommendations by the Zeid Report on SEA. For example, to set an example, Sweden could ensure that clauses are included in the memorandum of understanding with the organisation under which it contributes troops (e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)/EU/UN), explicitly acknowledging the obligation to take legal action against perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by its military members of peace support missions. In addition, in the memorandum of understanding Sweden could commit to report on any action taken by it on cases referred to it as a result of United Nations/EU/NATO investigations in which it participated. Sweden could also lobby for the General Assembly to decide that acceptance of such procedures constitutes a necessary condition for acceptance of an offer by a troop-contributing country to supply troops to the United Nations.

Noting that Sweden already has a code of conduct, current efforts should focus on obtaining even stronger commitments for this code, e.g. by ensuring that the pre-deployment training on the code includes greater emphasis on

both the reasoning behind the code and the disciplinary measures that could follow in case the code is breached. Such training could benefit from partnering with civilian agencies such as Sida (drawing on their expertise in areas of gender, power dynamics and people's vulnerabilities).¹⁴⁰

Finally, while Sweden has come a long way in implementing UNSCR 1325 and made Gender Field Advisors part of its international contingents, there is limited evidence to suggest that all citizens of the host country in areas where Swedish PSO contingents operate have access to a general ombudsman-functions (or protection officer). Such functions could be an essential part of ensuring easily accessible reporting structures for the local population to report SEA or file complaints related to other protection concerns and for facilitating access to formal legal structures.

Recommendations

Having reviewed lessons from previous studies as well as recent measures by the UN and the SwAF, to address SEA, the following recommendations can be made:

Monitoring

- Promote and monitor recommendations by the 'Zeid Report' on SEA presented to the UN General Assembly. Ensure that clauses explicitly acknowledging the obligation to take legal action against perpetrators SEA are included in the memorandum of understanding with the agency under which Sweden contributes troops

Planning

- Increase the proportion of female soldiers participating in PSOs

Institutionalise

- Establish information campaigns in host countries to increase awareness, transparency and willingness to report bad behaviour
- Better institutionalise investigations, training and policy subscriptions in the mission organization to increase awareness of SEA
- Increase awareness and knowledge on SEA aspects by partnering training with civilian agencies such as Sida (drawing on their

¹⁴⁰ Interview with desk officer at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 2009-11-17; and representative from SwAF Headquarter 2009-11-25.

expertise in areas of gender, power dynamics and people's vulnerabilities)

- Establish an “ombudsman” function at each PSO in order to be more sensitive to protection issues and coordinate efforts with civilian actors to receive complaints through their channels

Accountability

- Provide mechanisms for reporting and holding perpetrators of SEA accountable
- Establish and keep up-to date code of conducts relating prevention of SEA among its soldiers rely on UN standards
- Increase training and institutional resources for the Swedish police and national prosecutors to better being eligible to conduct rapid investigations abroad (i.e. collect evidence and testimonies) following allegations of SEA
- Make available legal and economic support to victims of SEA¹⁴¹
- Work for partner countries in PSOs to adhere to the ‘Zeid Report’ recommendations by committing to take legal action against members of their troops found to perpetrate SEA. This should be made a necessary condition for contributing troops to a PSO.

¹⁴¹ In the Swedish context, victims of PSO personnel's abuse could e.g. be allocated money from “Brottsofferfonden”.

4 Unintended Consequences on the Spread of HIV/AIDS

Much of what has been written on the unintended consequences of PSOs seems to contend that there is some sort of correlation between PSOs and the spread of HIV/AIDS. There are three common contentions: peacekeepers get infected during their mission rotation; already infected peacekeepers spread the disease to host populations; or the disease is spread between PSO employees while on mission.¹⁴² Due to a fear of peacekeepers spreading HIV to the host nations, there have been requests by the host state that troop contributing countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates should be excluded from contributing personal.¹⁴³ An example of this is the letter to the Security Council from Eritrea, requesting that troops be tested for HIV before deploying to the UN-led peacekeeping operation in Ethiopia-Eritrea. The request was subsequently denied by the UN.¹⁴⁴

The prevalence rate of HIV among peacekeeping troops is difficult to determine, as few statistical facts are available. Some studies suggest that armed forces tend to have a HIV prevalence rate equal to or higher than country rates and others studies suggest there are reasons to suspect that prevalence rates among some peacekeeping forces are in fact lower than the national level, particularly due to screening procedures and mechanisms.¹⁴⁵

Although not required by the UN, several TCC test their peacekeepers for HIV before they are deployed overseas. This is at least the case for most of the main TCCs, contributing the vast majority of peacekeepers to UN operations. The HIV testing is usually part of the assessment of fitness for duty, and infected troops are usually excluded from partaking in the deployment.¹⁴⁶ The HIV testing practice is, however, not applied by all countries.

Even though a majority of peacekeepers cannot be considered likely of carrying the HIV virus upon deployment, some may do so. Whether or not PSOs deploy peacekeepers that are already infected with the disease, certain

¹⁴² Rudén: 2007:29.

¹⁴³ Lowicki-Zucca, Karmin, and Dehne: 2009: 352.

¹⁴⁴ UNAIDS: (2003).

¹⁴⁵ UNAIDS: Peacekeeping Operations and Uniformed Services; See also Lowicki-Zucca, Karmin, and Dehne: 2009: 352; and UNAIDS (2004).

¹⁴⁶ Lowicki-Zucca, Karmin, and Dehne: 2009: 357.

factors suggest that peacekeeping troops are at particular risk of transmitting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. These factors include:¹⁴⁷

- Age: Peacekeepers tend to be predominantly men and women in their 20s- 30s, an age group that are a) sexually active, and b) less risk averse than other age groups.
- Separation from families and home for longer periods: Long deployment periods where peacekeepers are isolated from families and sexual partners can for various reasons lead to sexual behaviours and patterns putting peacekeepers at risk of sexually transmitted diseases, including the likelihood of having multiple partners.
- Perception of invulnerability: The age of the peacekeepers, along with belonging to a professional group that has a particular ethos of risk taking can lead to a perception of invulnerability among troops that make them more likely to practice unprotected sex.
- Poor sexual education: Knowledge of HIV/AIDS and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases vary between and within PSOs. Each TCC is responsible for developing and implementing HIV training for its own troops and mistaken beliefs and ignorance about HIV/AIDS are widespread amongst some contingents. Similarly, condom use is in many cases incorrect, inconsistent or entirely lacking. The use of condoms could for some individuals even be considered a taboo.
- Stress and drug abuse: Peacekeeping is a challenging job and troops need to manage the stress that working in a conflict or post-conflict environment entails, in addition to being away from friends and families, which can lead to a great deal of stress tension and anxiety, or even trauma. Such stress is sometimes handled or canalised through sexual activity. Similarly, abuse of alcohol and other substances contribute to unsafe sexual practice.
- Personnel may have to handle HIV-infected injured people or dead bodies.

¹⁴⁷ UNAIDS: 2005: 9-10; UNAIDS (2004); Lowicki-Zucca, Karmin, and Dehne: 2009: 360; UNAIDS: Peacekeeping Operations and Uniformed Services.

- The existence of financial means to purchase sex. Peacekeepers have a steady income that is usually much higher than that of the surrounding communities. Thus, the fact that they also tend to operate in environments where local populations often live in poverty may contribute to a greater potential to purchase sexual favours. In fact, it is not uncommon that sex industries tend to grow around PSOs, creating an environment in which all are at high risk of HIV.
- Unbalanced sexual relationships: Many sexual relationships between peacekeepers and host population, whether they constitute prostitution or not, are often, as noted above, rooted in some sort of dependency. For example, host populations could be dependent on peacekeepers for food and security, resulting in unbalanced sexual relationships. Local women engaged in sexual encounters with peacekeepers may for example end up in a situation where they, even if they would like to use protection, are not in position to ask for use of condoms.
- ‘Emergency’ sex: Finally, statistics show that during conflict “both consensual and non-consensual sexual encounters tend to increase and adherence to prevention measures declines”.¹⁴⁸ Studies show that during times of stress/crises, there is a tendency to give less consideration to the use of sexual protection (i.e. condoms etc).

A study among UN peacekeepers in Haiti found that about 6.5% of the troops interviewed had engaged in sexual activities whilst on the mission. In addition, over 29 percent stated that they had done so while not on duty.¹⁴⁹ The nature of this pattern of sexual behaviour is likely to increase the risk of contracting and transmitting of HIV.

Some studies seem to show that the risk of infection is related to the number of years spent on peace support mission. For instance, two studies of HIV prevalence amongst peacekeepers from Nigeria suggest a correlation between duty in a conflict region and HIV transmission. One of the studies found that the percentage of HIV infected troops rose from 7 percent in the first year of a mission, to 10 percent in the second year and 15 percent in the third year. The study also confirmed the results from a previous study that found that infection rates among peacekeepers were more than double the

¹⁴⁸ UNAIDS: (2004).

¹⁴⁹ Lowicki-Zucca, Karmin, and Dehne: 2009: 361.

average of infection in Nigeria and that the risk of infection doubled every year spent on deployment abroad.¹⁵⁰ The evidence indicating that participation in PSOs may increase the risk of HIV amongst a nation's troops is otherwise limited. Yet, it is a serious concern for TCCs, particularly when the death tolls amongst peacekeepers infected by HIV during the mission far exceeds the combat related deaths such as was the case during the Indonesian peacekeeping experience in Cambodia which resulted in 11 fatalities in AIDS compared to only two non-disease related deaths.¹⁵¹

The transmission and contraction of HIV by peacekeepers may be sensitive issues for some TCCs, many of which take offence at the idea that the presence of its contingents is linked to an increased spread of the disease. India, for example, have vigorously refuted the claim that its peacekeepers have ever transmitted or been infected with HIV whilst on mission, even though UN assessments claim otherwise.¹⁵²

The contraction of HIV of peacekeepers whilst on mission is troublesome to TCCs because increased prevalence of the disease reduces their ability to participate in other PSOs, particularly when the country in question has a policy of not deploying HIV infected troops.¹⁵³ Furthermore, should peacekeepers from TCCs with relatively low prevalence rates contract HIV whilst on mission; they could become an epidemiological bridge between populations, contributing to a more rapid spread of the virus in their country of origin. The task of preventing HIV/AIDS amongst peacekeepers is therefore of interests to TCCs with high HIV prevalence among its armed forces; TCCs with low domestic HIV prevalence rates; co-deploying states; PSO generating organisations such as the UN, NATO and EU; as well as host nations.

4.1 UN Strategies for Addressing HIV/AIDS in PSOs

In 2000, the UN Security Council through UNSCR 1308 obliged the UN DPKO to provide HIV awareness and prevention programmes to all peace-keeping personnel in order to reduce the risk of peacekeepers contracting or

¹⁵⁰ Bazergan: 2004: pp. 5-6; Aning: 2007: pp.142-143.

¹⁵¹ UNAIDS: 2005: 13.

¹⁵² Murthy: 2007: 164.

¹⁵³ Bazergan: 2004: 3.

spreading HIV.¹⁵⁴ In response to the resolution the UN Office on Aids, Security and Humanitarian Response was established under the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) the same year, to coordinate efforts to address HIV/AIDS amongst national uniformed services and peacekeeping personnel.¹⁵⁵ In 2001 and 2006 the General Assembly released declarations on HIV/AIDS, setting out targets and strategies to reduce the spread of HIV and asking that troop contributing countries also adopt national strategies to address the spread of HIV amongst their uniformed services.¹⁵⁶ In 2001, UNAIDS and DPKO also signed a collaborative framework aiming to jointly work towards training peacekeeping personnel on HIV awareness issues.¹⁵⁷ The need to prevent and mitigate the consequences of HIV was also reiterated in Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, since HIV/AIDS have strong gender dimensions due to the particular vulnerability of women and girls to infection.¹⁵⁸

The UN's strategy to combat HIV/AIDS in PSOs has five central elements:

- Creating specific in-mission capacity for HIV/AIDS programmes;
- Ensuring availability of condoms, post-exposure prophylaxis kits and screened blood supplies;
- Availability of voluntary counselling and testing capacities in missions;
- Establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and practice survey of among peacekeepers on HIV knowledge, attitude and practice;
- Developing outreach projects specifically targeting local communities and integrating HIV/AIDS concerns in broader mandate activities.¹⁵⁹

The current policy on HIV/AIDS practiced by the DPKO is based on non-discrimination and respect for human rights. This includes not requiring that peacekeepers be tested for HIV in relation to their deployment, a policy the UN at times has been criticised for. The UN supports the right of individuals to know his/her HIV-status without fear of personal or professional discrimination and therefore requires that HIV-testing and counselling is

¹⁵⁴ DPKO/DFS Policy Directive (2007).

¹⁵⁵ UNAIDS: 2005: 14.

¹⁵⁶ General Assembly (2001); and General Assembly (2006).

¹⁵⁷ UNAIDS: 2005: 14.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations (2007).

¹⁵⁹ Information found at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q14.htm>

available to peacekeepers prior to and during deployment on a voluntary basis. The UN does not require any mandatory testing or that the results of any tests form basis of inclusion or exclusion of deployment.¹⁶⁰ Individual fitness and aptitude must be determined by a pre-deployment medical examination conducted by the TCC and the UN respects the national requirement of some TCCs that HIV-testing is mandatory and that for some states a positive result leads to exclusion from deployment.¹⁶¹ According to the UN's own medical and human rights guidelines, the HIV status should not in itself be considered an indication of fitness for deployment; however, individuals showing active signs of immunodeficiency, such as AIDS, must be precluded from partaking in UN operations.¹⁶² Any discovery of non-compliance with the pre-deployment medical standards during the mission will result in repatriation of the individual. If the change in medical status has clearly occurred while in the mission, repatriation will be at cost of the UN. Where deployment of the individual has been at breach of the guidelines, the repatriation cost will be charged to the TCC.¹⁶³

Whilst mandatory pre-deployment HIV-testing is a controversial and polarising issue, so is the UN's policy. Without mandatory testing, it is difficult to determine the number of infected personnel before and after the mission. Whilst the voluntary position taken by the UN is welcomed by many on grounds of human rights and non-discrimination, it is considered by others to be counter-productive in combating the HIV epidemic.¹⁶⁴ Several TCCs practice mandatory HIV-testing before deploying troops to PSOs; in addition, in many of these states, positive test-result means exclusion from deployment. Out of the five permanent of the UNSC, three – China, Russia and the US – have mandatory HIV screenings of their military personnel, while the UK and France have policies of voluntary testing.¹⁶⁵

AIDS-related deaths among recently deployed PSO personnel suggest that guidelines for medical screenings are not being routinely followed. Reportedly, a majority of these cases come from countries which claim to

¹⁶⁰ UNAIDS. *Peacekeeping Operations and Uniformed Services*; and DPKO Office for Mission Support (2004).

¹⁶¹ DPKO Office for Mission Support (2004).

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Bazergan: 2004: 4.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

have national policies of mandatory HIV screenings, indicating a failure of some TCCs to live up to their own national medical examination policies.¹⁶⁶

In addition to voluntary testing, training and awareness programmes on HIV transmission and prevention are key strategies of the UN to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. Pre-deployment training is the responsibility of TCCs. To ensure that minimum standards are met, the DPKO has developed a standardised training module, including training on HIV/AIDS, to be used by TCCs.¹⁶⁷ A national HIV/AIDS programme for peacekeepers conducted by TCCs can receive technical and financial support from UNAIDS to ensure quality of such training. Other than pre-deployment training conducted by TCCs, the UN has special mission capacity for HIV/AIDS programmes. All major PSOs nowadays have so-called HIV/AIDS Units with HIV advisors and smaller missions have HIV focal points.¹⁶⁸

The HIV/AIDS units have two main objectives: 1) they are responsible for implementing awareness and prevention programmes – targeting both uniformed and civilian, national and international, personnel – to reduce the risk of personnel contracting/transmitting HIV; 2) they advise the head of mission on HIV/AIDS related issues and support the integration of HIV/AIDS concerns into broader mandated activities, such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; reform and training of national police and armed forces; human rights protection; and Mine Action, for example.¹⁶⁹ The HIV/AIDS units also strive to go beyond merely raising awareness about the issue to changing risky behaviour patterns. The units visit deployed contingents within six weeks of their entry into the mission area to implement such training and provide refresher sessions for contingents staying longer than six months.¹⁷⁰ In addition, they are responsible for ensuring capacity to provide access to voluntary and confidential counselling and HIV testing within the mission and do so by, amongst other things, training and monitoring peer advisors and counsellors.¹⁷¹ The UN recommends that contingents encompassing more than 200 peacekeepers should include at least one such peer HIV/AIDS advisor who has been certified to provide pre- and post-test counselling.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

¹⁶⁷ Lothe and Gurung: 2007: 4.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ DPKO/DFS Policy Directive (2007).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² DPKO Office for Mission Support (2004).

A range of tools have lately been developed to generate awareness amongst peacekeepers about HIV. One of these tools is the AIDS awareness cards: wallet-sized cards with a small pocket to fit a condom to be worn with the uniform. The AIDS awareness card strategy includes three distinct cards targeting peacekeepers, other uniformed personnel and UN civilian employees respectively. The peacekeeping cards are available in 12 languages and contain basic messages about HIV transmission and what to do in an accident, as well as the peacekeepers' codes of conduct.¹⁷³

The UN has commissioned two reports investigating the sexual behaviours and patterns, including use of condoms and sexual relations with sex workers, amongst peacekeepers in two of its missions – United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL/Liberia) in 2005 and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, HAITI) in 2007.¹⁷⁴ The purpose of the studies was to map out potential risks in these sexual behaviours and guide strategies for combating the spread of HIV/AIDS. The studies also explored the awareness amongst the peacekeepers of ways of transmitting HIV and other Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) as well as knowledge of ways to prevent and avoid the spread of these.¹⁷⁵

The study of MINUSTAH found that only 6.5 per cent of peacekeepers reported having sex while in mission, although 29.2 per cent had had sex during compensatory time off.¹⁷⁶ The reported prevalence of condom use was high and the study indicated that UNMIL had done a good job of ensuring access to condoms for sexually active troops.¹⁷⁷ Even though the knowledge of condom protection was also considered high, few peacekeepers could give examples of symptoms of STIs and amongst certain groups of peacekeepers misconceptions about HIV/AIDS – such as that HIV could be transmitted through mosquito bites or sharing a meal with an infected person – were common.¹⁷⁸ There were large variation in HIV awareness depending on the background and culture of the peacekeepers, nonetheless, the level of knowledge about HIV/AIDS did not correspond to pre- or in-mission training on HIV/AIDS related issues.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷³ UNAIDS (2005).

¹⁷⁴ Bazergan (2006); and Lothe and Gurung: (2007).

¹⁷⁵ Lothe and Gurung: (2007).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. pp. 4-5.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 12.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 13.

Providing staff with easily accessible and free condoms is an important UN-strategy in the attempt to combat HIV/AIDS. On average, five condoms per officer are distributed each week.¹⁸⁰ The chief HIV/AIDS officer is responsible for identifying needs, costing and budgeting for condoms, as well as for the development of a mission supply strategy. Such strategies, which also require liaison with medical and supply sections, aim to monitor and track usage to ensure there are sufficient stocks in the mission area and that condom dispensers are available at medical facilities and communal sites, such as toilets.¹⁸¹ While the provision of condoms has been criticised for contradicting the UN's policy of discouraging sexual relations whilst on mission and its zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation, the UN defends this distribution arguing that it should not be seen as an encouragement to engage in sexual relations but a responsible measure to prevent the transmission of HIV.¹⁸² In addition to prevention provided by condom use, all UN missions are required to have Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kits available in all mission areas, including isolated locations in case of an emergency. UN guidelines state that these can only be used in cases of occupational exposure or sexual assault and they serve as an important HIV-transmission prevention tool in mission tasks such as mine action services, where access to PEPs might be crucial at times of accidents.¹⁸³

4.2 Swedish Experiences of Addressing HIV/AIDS

Much of Sweden's efforts at addressing HIV/AIDS in PSOs coincide with the country's efforts to address SEA. These efforts could be characterised as an ABC strategy, namely: Abstain, Be faithful, and use a Condom. For example, as noted in the previous chapter, sexual relationships with the local population, even when based on consent, is strongly discouraged and can be found to constitute abuse of a position of power and lead to disciplinary measures (Abstain). As such sexual interaction is restricted in the code of conduct. The troops are also granted regular leave¹⁸⁴, whereby they are

¹⁸⁰ Kent: 2007: 54.

¹⁸¹ DPKO/DFS Policy Directive (2007).

¹⁸² Kent: 2007: 54.

¹⁸³ DPKO/DFS Policy Directive (2007).

¹⁸⁴ In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the military personnel are entitled to two two-week leaves during a six-month deployment period. Source: Olsson and Tejpar, (eds.) (2009), p. 99.

offered trips home to Sweden, to enable them to visit their family members, which facilitates maintaining relationships while on mission (Be faithful). Finally, Swedish troops have ready access to condoms through the health facilities (use a Condom).

Beyond this, as with the prevention of SEA, the SwAF also rely on awareness raising to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. This training is provided through the Swedish 'Life Guards' (sv. 'Livgardet'), which conduct pre-deployment training, including health protection education.¹⁸⁵ This pre-deployment training is mission specific, meaning that for countries with higher levels of HIV/AIDS prevalence, the epidemic is given more attention in the training programme. For instance, in Afghanistan, where the military personnel do not interact with locals except for when on duty, there is hardly any room for sexual misconduct outside the camp. The situation is very different to Kosovo and the DRC where interaction with locals is much more common. Hence, the spread of HIV/AIDS and sexual abuse is much dependent on mission circumstances, wherefore it is taken into consideration in the training.¹⁸⁶ Healthcare personnel, on the other hand, are routinely trained in handling wounded or other patients as if they were HIV-positive as part of precautionary measures.¹⁸⁷

The SwAF practice HIV/AIDS screening, whereby all prospective troop-members are screened for HIV (this is also followed by a mandatory test on completion of the mission). Anyone found to be HIV-positive is barred from participating in international PSOs. Given the strict tests prior to deployment, the short period of deployment usually practiced within Swedish missions and the mandatory HIV-test on completion of the mission, a need has not been identified to provide voluntary counselling and testing systematically while on mission. However, voluntary testing is made available upon request to troops suspecting that they may have contracted the virus. PEP-kits are also available for prompt use upon potential exposure.¹⁸⁸

In terms of monitoring behaviour, the same structure applies as for SEA, meaning that any misconduct should be reported to the relevant supervisor. As noted, the mandatory follow-up HIV-test on return to Sweden also serves a monitoring function. There are no systematic knowledge, attitudes and

¹⁸⁵ Interview with representative from the SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-22.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with representative from the SwAF Headquarters: 2009-10-27.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with representative from the SwAF Headquarter: 2009-10-27

behaviour surveys in the mission.¹⁸⁹ Healthcare facilities within the camp are usually open to non-Swedish staff working in the camp. Beyond this, there are no systematic outreach programmes for the local population.¹⁹⁰

4.3 Lessons for Sweden to Managing HIV/AIDS

There is a range of measures which can be applied to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within PSOs and between the PSO and host community. Those steps already taken by Sweden to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within missions and to the host country already include valuable points. For example the screening of PSO-personnel as part of pre-deployment medical examinations; providing voluntary counselling and HIV-testing during missions; informing personnel about HIV/AIDS, including ways of transmission and preventative methods such as proper condom use; providing easy access to condoms. Additional measures that could be useful include establishing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including surveys of peacekeepers' HIV knowledge, attitude and behaviours; and finally, creating HIV focal points in mission to integrate preventive programmes in broader mission mandates. As an employer in a mission, Sweden could also seek to ensure access to voluntary counselling and testing facilities for its national staff, in order to contribute to the prevention of HIV/AIDS in the host country. Similarly, condoms made available on the camp should be equally accessible for international and national staff of both sexes.

While tailoring the pre-deployment training to the specific mission, it is important that a minimum level of HIV/AIDS awareness is ensured throughout the training. This could be facilitated by drawing on the UNAIDS materials for pre-deployment HIV/AIDS training. In order to maintain the behavioural impact of such training, it could be desirable to give 'refresher' trainings for deployed mission staff, including the code of conduct. Such on-mission training should also include national staff to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS, the code of conduct and reporting structures for misconduct. Rather than relying on back-stopping from HQ or developing HIV/AIDS focal points in the mission, one could envisage it to be more effective to draw on civilian organisations' expertise in the area, as many humanitarian organisations are familiar with giving such training. In addition, Sweden

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

could work out joint-mission strategies with other TCC as well as with civilian organisations.

Finally, Sweden could consider monitoring the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of its troops through surveys documenting these aspects in relation to HIV/AIDS as well as SEA.

Recommendations

Monitoring

- That Sweden provides voluntary counselling and HIV-testing during the mission and that troops are regularly informed about HIV/AIDS, including ways of transmission and preventative methods
- That Sweden establishes monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as conducts surveys on the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of its troops in relation to HIV/AIDS as well as SEA. Documentation of this information is crucial not only for future mission planning of the SwAF, but can also be useful for Swedish government agencies, like Sida, and multilateral organizations like the UN. Dissemination of information should therefore be made to other relevant actors

Institutionalise

- That each PSO include HIV focal points in mission to integrate preventive programmes in broader mission mandates
- That national staff are granted regular leave to enable them to maintain relations with their families

Planning

- Sweden could seek to ensure access Voluntary Counselling and Testing for its national staff, in order to contribute the prevention of HIV/AIDS in the host country
- That Sweden draws on the UNAIDS information materials for pre-deployment HIV/AIDS training
- That the mission provides continuous in-field 'refresher' trainings for mission staff. Such training should also be designed to include local staff
- That the SwAF draw on civilian organizations' expertise in the area of how to prevent HIV/AIDS, as several organizations of the civil society are familiar with giving such training

- Sweden could work out joint-mission strategies with other TCCs and civilian organisations in the area of deployment to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.

5 Unintended Environmental Consequences

The link between environmental degradation, the competition for resources, and conflict is widely acknowledged although not entirely un-debated.¹⁹¹ In fact, since the early 1970's there has been an ongoing discourse with regard to the interrelation between the environment (including the earth's natural resources base) and security issues (including conflict).¹⁹² The management of natural resources, distribution of arable land or access to water are elements that might contribute to conflict, particularly where these resources are either scarce or in great abundance.¹⁹³ Armed conflicts, in their turn, can have a devastating and deteriorating effect on the environment. As such, the environment and its natural resources can both be a contributing cause and a victim of conflict.

In the case where competition for natural resources has been a contributing factor to the conflict, further resource competition or environmental degradation can seriously hamper any post-conflict peace-building effort. Furthermore, the environment as means to dialogue and conflict resolution is gaining terrain in the international debate.¹⁹⁴

PSOs may also exacerbate a negative environmental impact in itself. In the worst case scenario the PSO itself may be involved in the competition for natural resources.¹⁹⁵ Similarly, any peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction efforts may need to include elements aiming at restoring the environment and actively monitor and protect it.¹⁹⁶ There is a debate regarding whether PSO mandates should include environmental protection

¹⁹¹ UNEPa (2009); Austin and Bruch: (2000); Waleij, Liljedahl, Edlund, Lindblad, Sjöström, and Ahlberg (2005); Brauer (2009); Deudney: 1990: pp. 461-476.

¹⁹² Meadows et al.: (1972); and Waleij, Bosetti, Doran, Liljedahl (forthcoming).

¹⁹³ UNEP 2007 *Sudan Post Conflict Assessment*. UNEP, Geneva; and Global Witness (2009).

¹⁹⁴ PSOs can have intended or unintended impacts on the environment, this report, however, does not further explore the possibility of environmental management mandates as means of addressing the underlying causes of conflict but focuses on the direct impact of the PSO itself upon the local environment when performing its more traditional tasks: Conca and Dabelko (2002); Conca, Carius, and Dabelko: 2005: pp. 144-155; Ali (ed.): (2007)

¹⁹⁵ Gberie: pp 156-196.

¹⁹⁶ UNEP (2007).

tasks.¹⁹⁷ For instance, a recent report co-produced by UNEP and Environmental Law Institute urges the UN to consider this:

*“The mandate of peacekeeping operations for monitoring the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources fuelling conflict as well as for protecting sensitive areas covered by international environmental conventions should be reviewed and expanded as necessary”*¹⁹⁸

Impacts on the environment as a result of peace support operation can be positive and/or negative. It is not always easy to assess in the short term the full extent of the impact. Therefore, organisational structures is required with the appropriate principles, policies, tasks, responsibilities, procedures and structures to meet the specific requirement of environmental considerations for that particular PSO.¹⁹⁹ Even though the primary role of PSOs is to keep peace and support they also have a responsibility to ensure that their presence has a minimal ecological footprint.²⁰⁰ This is particularly the case where environment is a dimension of the conflict and further environmental degradation could exacerbate already existing grievances.

The unintended consequences of PSO activities depend on many factors such as the duration and phase of the operation and environmental impacts might include deterioration of air, soil and groundwater quality as well as impacts on natural, cultural and historical resources. Areas of concern in most PSOs include:

- Planning and setting up of logistic arrangements for the mission:

When planning, designing and constructing the mission, security, force health protection, type and number of occupants, location of mission, duration of requirement, known constraints, geographic considerations, availability of material, need for portable buildings, site preparation, logistics coordination and power generation are some aspects that needs to be accounted for.²⁰¹ Placement of a base camp on productive lands might force the local population to use land more liable to erosion and road construction

¹⁹⁷ While not addressing wider environmental issues, the mandate of MONUC includes to “use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources” through UN Security Council resolution S/RES/1896 (2009) 30 November 2008 and UN Security Council resolutions S/RES/1856 (2008) 22 December 2008.

¹⁹⁸ UNEP: 2009b: 54.

¹⁹⁹ Waleij, Bosetti, Doran, Liljedahl (forthcoming).

²⁰⁰ Capstone Doctrine: 2008: 81.

²⁰¹ Bosetti et. al. (2008).

for securing re-supply to the base camps can lead to modified drainage and flooding.²⁰² This means that the geological and topographical characteristics of the site, such as drainage and erosion; ability to store and handle wastes; sensitivity of potable water sources; ecologically sensitive flora and fauna; ability to locate noise-generating activities and dirty areas and ablution units away from living areas need to be carefully planned for.²⁰³ In addition, the planning of camp construction, including choice of building materials, design of build, energy efficiency of the build and choice of drainage, is essential for environmental protection.²⁰⁴

One challenge for environmental sustainable solutions lies within procurement. For instance, all United Nations Department of Field Support's (UNDFS) procurement goes through the Secretariat's Procurement Division. This is subject to lowest price bidding as the General Assembly has so far not considered approving the concept of environmentally friendly and sustainable procurement.²⁰⁵ Another challenge regards contingency own equipment. There have for example been incidents when TCCs has brought equipment with ozone depleting substances to theatre although it is forbidden as enforcement mechanisms previously have been lacking.

- Maintenance and operations of the mission:

In the maintenance phase of a mission many challenges faced have parallels with those challenges faced by small cities by the fact that there is a whole spectrum of environmental aspects that needs to be addressed, whereas others are unique and require innovative solutions to be developed internally.

- Natural resources management

Natural resources management is and always has been a challenge for PSOs. On the one hand, with respect to the PSO's own supply chains of delivering commodities such as water, fuel and construction material to the operation and reducing its own vulnerability and dependence on the host nation infrastructure. On the other, to avoid unintended consequences from the deployment itself by e.g. competing for limited natural resources that may fuel natural resources related tensions in the area of operation.²⁰⁶ The demand for natural resources such as fuel wood, timber and gravel for

²⁰² Kelly: (2007).

²⁰³ Bosetti et. al. (2008).

²⁰⁴ NATO: (2008).

²⁰⁵ Minutes of the Seminar "Sustainable Approaches in Conflict and Disaster Areas" 10 March 2009 Nairobi, Kenya. FOI. Umeå. 30 March 2009.

²⁰⁶ Waleij, Bosetti, Doran, Liljedahl (forthcoming).

construction may be significant both to start up and maintain a peace support mission. The use of such resources can have great effects on local populations. For instance, the demand for timber and bricks to construct camps and other accommodation for peacekeepers and the international relief community is a case in point. The demands by international security standards (e.g. UN Minimum Operational Security Standards, MOSS) require two-metre high compound walls making the international relief community a major customer for bricks. In Darfur especially, the relief community has become a significant factor in the deforestation process.²⁰⁷

In areas where water is scarce, the increased water consumption associated with the deployment of a PSO might be a serious concern as extraction of groundwater might lead to water shortages for residents in the camp area, so called “water mining”, which could cause suffering amongst local populations and resentment of the mission. Similarly, the establishment of a mission usually results in large movements of people towards the base camp (often due to increased security in the area). The strain on natural resources of these displaced populations is also an issue that needs to be taken into account.²⁰⁸

- Waste management

A PSO generates a vast amount of solid waste (e.g. office waste, construction waste, and scrap metal), waste water and sewage as well as hazardous waste (e.g. medical and infectious waste, waste oil, tyres and obsolete stocks of chemicals). However, in many occasions host country infrastructure is not prepared to deal with this surge in wastes produced. Not only does improper waste management impact the environment but also constitutes a health threat to the troops as well as the local population. Waste and waste water disposal is often outsourced to local contractors in the theatre whom on many occasions lack the knowledge and capability for delivering services in accordance to acceptable international environmental standards. This has been acknowledged as a major problem in UN, EU as well as NATO PSO's and demands for provisions on contracting oversight and supervision has started to get incorporated in environmental policy and guidance documents by the above mentioned organisations.

- Hazardous materials management

Oil spills have traditionally been one of the most visible environmental impacts from military operations as well as a major and costly problem. The

²⁰⁷ UNEP: 2007: 107.

²⁰⁸ Kelly: (2007).

prevention of spill of hazardous materials such as petroleum products should also be actively promoted and any spills sufficiently cleaned up. One thing to consider is that there may also be a secondary market for wastes, particularly solid ones such as construction materials (that could contain asbestos) or even waste oil. Hence, although some waste can be of use it can also constitute a hazard to the local population.²⁰⁹

- Pollution

A range of activities conducted by PSOs causes pollution which needs to be prevented or mitigated, such as air pollution (e.g. combustion products or ozone depletion substances.); water pollution (e.g. from oil spill or sewage); soil pollution (e.g. hazardous substance spills or poor waste management).²¹⁰ Noting the strain that pollution can have, on local environments, it is critical that as much attention as possible is given to minimise such effects.

- Energy consumption

Energy and fuel consumption by the mission results in emissions of pollutants into the air contributing to e.g. climate change. It can also lead to increased erosion caused by forests felled for firewood.

- Cultural and historical resources management

When establishing mission locations, historic structures or remnants of unknown archaeological sites may be uncovered with the risk of destroying the site. Cultural differences between mission personnel and the local population can also cause conflicts. The same could happen as a result of unsuitable behaviour of personnel with regard to monuments and religious, historic or archaeological sites.²¹¹

- Close down and withdrawal of the mission

Once the mission is nearing its end, one of the most environmentally critical periods commences. Deconstruction of the camp site, the movement of hazardous materials out of the site, and restoration and remediation of the camp area are activities that are not always appropriately conducted. The abandoning of equipment, inappropriate ad hoc waste disposal upon departure and the leaving behind of camp structures that are inhabitable and/or prevent the use of the land for other means of livelihood often contradict the stated aspirations of organisations like NATO to return the area occupied by its forces to a state no worse than prior to the entry of the

²⁰⁹ Ibid; Waleij, Bosetti, Doran, Liljedahl (forthcoming).

²¹⁰ Bosetti et. al. (2008).

²¹¹ UNDPKO/DFS, draft (2007).

mission.²¹² Reportedly, the UN was presented with a 70 million dollar bill by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) following the termination of UNPROFOR. The bill was for a range of items, including environmental damage caused by the mission during its deployment.²¹³

In essence, PSO activities can place a great deal of stress on already vulnerable environments. By being aware of the environmental affects caused by PSOs, missions can 'green' their operations and minimise the unintended consequences of their activities. However, lack of financial and human resources in the missions, lack of mandate as well lack of commitment by some senior managers constitute a challenge.

5.1 UN Strategies for Addressing Environmental Consequences in PSOs

It has been a long standing strategy that UN forces should be prohibited to use methods of warfare that would cause unnecessary damage to the natural environment.²¹⁴ In June 2009, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Services²¹⁵ (UNDPKO/DFS) promulgated its environmental protection policy for UN field missions.²¹⁶ In addition, UNDPKO/DFS has drafted environmental protection guidelines for UN field missions.²¹⁷ The guidelines have been brought by an increased awareness regarding the importance of the natural environment in a post conflict society as well as a UN field mission's impact on the same. One

²¹² NATO: (2008).

²¹³ The UN did not accept this claim and no payment were made. See Sills et. al.: (1999).

²¹⁴ Sills et. al.: (1999).

²¹⁵ UNDFS was created from the UNDPKO in 2007 and consists of departments for logistics, information and communication technologies, personnel, budget and finance.

²¹⁶ UNDPKO/DFS: June (2009).

²¹⁷ UNDPKO/DFS: (2007). It is expected that the UNDPKO/DFS Environmental Guidelines for UN Field Missions will be promulgated in the first semester of 2010. The current draft will be slightly reviewed; NATO has also developed Environmental Protection Policy: NATO MC 469 NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection (EP). Doctrine; NATO. 2008. Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO Led Military Activities. STANAG 7141 EP (Edition 5), 26 February 2008 and Procedures; NATO STANAG 2510, Ed 21, Joint NATO Waste Management Requirements during NATO-led Military Activities. 11 September 2009, NATO STANAG 7102, Ed 1, Environmental Protection Requirements for Petroleum Facilities and Equipment, NATO STANAG 2982, Ed 1, Essential Field Sanitary Requirements 2004.

example of this increased awareness is the UN Capstone Doctrine stating that:

*“The size of a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s human and material footprint is likely to have a direct bearing on its impact, or perceived impact, in the community”.*²¹⁸

This underlines the fact that those responsible for PSOs must be aware of the possible side-effects they may cause, including environmental impacts (e.g. waste management or water usage).²¹⁹ One example of this increased awareness is the UN Secretary General’s message on the International Day (06/11/2008) for preventing the exploitation of the environment in war and armed conflict:

*“The United Nations attaches great importance to ensuring that action on the environment is part of our approach to peace. Protecting the environment can help countries create employment opportunities, promote development and avoid a relapse into armed conflict. On this International Day, let us renew our commitment to preventing the exploitation of the environment in times of conflict, and to protecting the environment as a pillar of our work for peace”.*²²⁰

The UNDPKO/DFS Environmental Protection policy and guidelines are designed to assist the staff at United Nations peacekeeping field missions, including military, police and civilian components, in addressing environmental issues that are likely to arise from their operations. The draft guidelines consist of two parts. Part one sets out policy guidelines that provide the overall policy framework for addressing environmental issues in peacekeeping field missions. Part two contains technical references that provide a practical basis for establishing an environmental plan and the operating procedures for addressing major environmental issues in a peacekeeping field mission.

During the development of the guidelines it was noted that environmental issues generally were dealt with on an ad hoc basis by individual missions relying upon their own assessment of environmental problems and the voluntary actions of individual members of the respective missions. Although staff members working in field missions often were aware of the need to address such environmental issues, the lack of standing operating

²¹⁸ Capstone Doctrine (2008).

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ki-moon (2008).

procedures concerning environmental issues made it rather difficult for them to take coherent practical environmental measures. Although not formally decided upon yet, the guidelines are indeed much welcomed at the operational and field levels and various field missions have already started to implement them.²²¹ Some missions have even developed their own guidelines, for example the United Nations Mission in Sudan.²²²

Training and education is critical when it comes to fostering environmental awareness and stewardship. This is also the view of UNDPKO/DFS. Training for UN peacekeepers on the UN Environmental Protection policy and draft guidelines have taken place on four occasions.²²³ The first training took place in May 2006, when the UNDPKO organised a trial training session at the UN logistics base (UNLB), in order to educate deployed UN engineers on environmental responsibilities and familiarise them with the environmental guidelines. The five days of training addressed: water and environmental management policy, environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring, renewable energies and energy conservation.²²⁴

In July 2008 and October 2008, the second and third trial environmental awareness training sessions took place in Juba, Sudan for TCCs to UNMIS.²²⁵ Based on the outcome of these trial educations, UNMIS HQ Engineering section and Training sections have further developed environmental awareness and training material for UNMIS. In December

²²¹ Waleij and Liljedahl: (2009).

²²² United Nations Mission in Sudan (2009). In this context it is also worth noting that the Environmental and Natural Resources Unit of UNMIL (the United Nations Mission in Liberia) had, as the first UN field mission, assessed the environmental implications of UNMIL's activities and provided assistance to prevent unnecessary environmental damage being caused by the mission's presence. Amongst other things the unit conducts briefings to UNMIL personnel and contingents to raise awareness regarding preventing unintended environmental consequences and how to minimise the ecological footprint. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that the Unit makes reference to the UN Security Council Resolution governing UNMIL for its environmental work, although the focus of the UNSCR is more on the management of natural resources for the purpose of combating corruption (the specific section of the Resolution 3 (r) UNSCR 1509, states "to assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources". Source: Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) on the establishment of UNMIL).

²²³ Performed by UNDPKO, FOI and SwAF and Funded by Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

²²⁴ Borla, Waleij and Liljedahl (2008).

²²⁵ Waleij, Bosetti, Doran, Liljedahl (forthcoming).

2009, a fourth environmental awareness workshop was carried out for MONUC personnel in Kinshasa, DRC.²²⁶

During the World Environmental Day 2007, it was expressed that the United Nations should lead by example also within peacekeeping. To this effect, the UNDFS has appointed an Environmental Officer in HQ and Environmental Focal Points in all Field Missions. Furthermore, the UN launched a project called “peacekeeping goes green”. This includes the development of robust, practical tools to facilitate the everyday work in different phases of a mission.

A pilot mission, UNMIS, Sudan, has been chosen as a test ground for models and tools for reducing negative environmental impacts before their future implementation in other ongoing or upcoming missions.

Moreover, UNDPKO/DFS work in partnership with the UN’s Environmental Programme (UNEP) on various pilot studies on ‘greening’ efforts. In addition, collaboration between Sweden and UNDPKO/DFS is ongoing since 2006 on environment and health issues in UN field missions. The collaboration is based on the UNDPKO/DFS Environmental Policy and draft environmental guidelines, as well as the “UN peacekeeping mission goes green” project.²²⁷ Together these initiatives include methodologies for applied Environmental Impact Assessments, environmental training and awareness programmes, and sustainable solutions for base camp infrastructure (for example, energy and water conservation). As a tool for strategic decisions, environmental vulnerability assessments are suggested in order to highlight environmental concerns early in the planning and deployment phase. Special focus is set on biodiversity, natural resources management (e.g. water scarcity) and on potential links between the environment, conflict and the war economy.²²⁸ In partnership with UNEP, various efforts for “greening” base camps in the United Nations Support

²²⁶ By UNDPKO/DFS, FOI, MONUC and UNEP, <http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=932&ctl=Details&mid=1096&ItemID=6621>.

²²⁷ On assignment from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Department of Field Support, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) coordinates a collaboration project on environment and health issues in peacekeeping operations. The SwAF is the primary partner, but the project also includes other civilian and military actors, such as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and various universities and technology enterprises.

²²⁸ Waleij and Liljedahl: (2009).

Mission to Somalia (UNSOA) and United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) are also being investigated.²²⁹

5.2 Swedish Strategies of Addressing Environmental Consequences

Environmental and climate issues stand high on the global agenda, as does it within Swedish policy programmes.²³⁰ In the Swedish strategy for participation in international peace and security activities it is stated that Swedish engagement in PSOs is first and foremost aimed at facilitating a just and durable global development through maintaining international peace and security.²³¹ Therefore, environmental considerations are a natural part of a PSO and Sweden has decided that the applicable environmental law of the host nation should be respected, especially if it is more stringent than its own national legislation. In cases where host nation legislation is absent, if governmental mechanisms for implementing and enforcing such legislation are lacking, the SwAF has decided to apply the Swedish Environmental Act to the extent possible while recognising that the operational imperatives and requirements are paramount.²³² Furthermore, as stated in the SwAF 'Defence Sector Environmental Goals' policy document, negative impacts on the environment should be minimised to the greatest extent possible. This includes by actively working to alert others about the importance of environmental protection in PSOs and through demanding that foreign troops conducting experimentation and exercises in Sweden comply with the SwAF's environmental standards.²³³ In addition, environmental protection guidelines issued by the troop sending entity (such as UN²³⁴ and NATO²³⁵) also need to be considered.

To what extent Swedish environmental legislation will be applied depends on the type of operation as well as the local conditions in the area of

²²⁹ UNEP Draft report "Resource efficiency, energy, water and waste reduction plan" AMISOM Camps; Forthcoming report from UNEP-FOI-UNDFS trip to DRC Nov/Dec 2009

²³⁰ For summary of Swedish general environment and security non-paper, see Regeringskansliet: Inriktningspromemoria Miljö och säkerhet (PM 2009-01-22).

²³¹ See Skr 2007/08:51, <http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/10/09/87/e611b8f5.pdf>

²³² See Miljöbalken (SFS 1998: 808)

²³³ Swedish Armed Forces: 2006: pp 10-11.

²³⁴ UNDPKO/DFS EP Policy and Guidelines.

²³⁵ MC 469, STANAG 7141, 7201, 2982, 2910

operations. General environmental considerations should be incorporated in the Standing Order for the Swedish International Forces (SOFUS) and specific considerations for each operation should be incorporated in the operations order (OPORDER). At the tactical level, the deployed unit is responsible for developing environmental targets and environmental management plans. Exercising due diligence, i.e. having in place an adequate system to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to prevent environmental impacts resulting from the operation, is considered good practice. In 2006, a requirement was put on the SwAF by the Ministry of Defence for developing and implementing a system for environmental considerations in PSOs.²³⁶ One step in this direction is the development of an Environmental Guidebook for Military Operations in collaboration between SwAF, FOI and defence organisations in Finland and the United States.²³⁷ The guidebook proposes general as well as specific considerations for environmental protection throughout the life cycle of an operation (planning, deployment, rotation, post deployment and lessons learned). Important to note is that it only proposes recommendations and does not necessarily reflect a specific nation's official policy or doctrine (and it is not legally binding).

Defence related environmental issues are also considered by the Swedish government as an important component of finding sustainable solutions for PSOs.²³⁸ For instance, environmental provisions need to be incorporated in scenarios, concepts and early mission planning for military as well as civilian components to PSOs. Therefore, the SwAF is collaborating with the FOI and the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, as well as with other nations and institutions in developing new methods and strategies to reduce the ecological footprint of Swedish PSOs. For instance, environmental vulnerability analysis has been undertaken for the operations in Afghanistan, Horn of Africa and Chad.²³⁹ Furthermore, Sweden has encouraged the EU to develop a concept for environmental protection in EU-led military operations, participated in activities towards strengthening NATO EP and in the previously mentioned 'UN peacekeeping goes green' project.

²³⁶ Försvarsdepartementet (2006).

²³⁷ Bosetti, et. al. (2008).

²³⁸ Regeringskansliet Inriktningspromemoria Miljö och säkerhet (2009-01-22)

²³⁹ Undertaken within the framework of the SwAF Medical intelligence.

5.3 Lessons for Sweden to Managing Environmental Consequences

Given that Sweden has been at the forefront in developing capacities for decreasing the environmental footprint of international PSOs, not least within the overarching UNDPKO/DFS programme “peacekeeping mission goes green”, Sweden should continue to push for this work at a UN level but also at home, for its own missions.

Recommendations

Following the review of previous studies as well as the measures adopted by the UN and the SwAF the following recommendations for Sweden to consider are made:

Monitoring

- Sufficient allocation of financial and human resources in the missions in order to comply with environmental regulations and guidelines and minimise the negative impact in the host country
- Ensure proper contracting oversight and supervision for services potentially resulting in negative environmental impact (e.g. waste management)

Planning

- Investigating the possibility to support the strategic end state through the environment, e.g. by handing over of facilities or equipment to the host nation when redeploying
- Develop a concept of environmentally friendly and sustainable procurement policies and promote these in multilateral agencies towards which Sweden contributes troops
- Taking into account, when planning and assessing environmental impact, the existence of UN’s Environmental Policy for Field Missions and the Environmental Guidelines for UN field mission
- Carefully plan for the competition with the local population and negative effect on the environment that the demand for natural resources, such as wood, water and gravel from PSOs may have
- Carefully plan for how to mitigate the unintended consequences that the placement of the UN base camp may have for land, water sources and biodiversity

Institutionalise

- In order to create understanding and acceptance of the importance of environmental stewardship establish mission specific training programmes on environmental considerations in PSOs

Accountability

- Acknowledge that active and dedicated leadership is critical, and that the commanders are ultimately responsible for the integration of environmental considerations during the planning and execution of a peace support operation
- Exercise due diligence, i.e. having in place an adequate system to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to prevent negative environmental impacts resulting from the operation
- Ensure that foreign troops conducting experimentation and exercises in Sweden comply with the SwAF's environmental standards

6 Concluding Remarks

In the preceding chapters, a review of negative unintended consequences of PSOs for host countries has been made. The study has looked into four areas: economic effects, sexual exploitation and abuse, the spread of HIV/AIDS as well environmental consequences. While the focus has been on the effects on the host country the analysis has also found that negative events may affect the legitimacy of the PSO itself.²⁴⁰

As negative unintended consequences are inherently harmful to the host economy, environment and its population, which the PSOs ultimately are there to serve, there is a need for TCCs to be receptive to such consequences. Rather than relying on ad hoc measures this requires systematic monitoring, reporting, feedback and re-planning and re-strategising.

While unintended consequences will inevitably continue to happen as interventions are undertaken in complex operations, the negative consequences need to be put into relation to the, hopefully, greater good that PSOs contribute to. Still, this does not mean that such unintended consequences should be ignored. On the contrary, accountability mechanisms need to be in place, which hold commanders responsible for unnecessary suffering on the local economy, nature and its people. The fact that security is the primary concern of commanders of PSOs should not be sufficient to brush aside any accusations of unwarranted economic distortions, SEA by the PSO troops, spreading HIV or environmental neglect. For these mechanisms to function effectively, they would have to demand from commanders to demonstrate that all appropriate efforts were exhausted to avoid these consequences, within the prevailing security condition.

Noting the multitask nature of current PSOs, combining civilian and military components, often with a number of TCCs present, some of the efforts to reduce negative unintended consequences for the host country are likely to benefit from coordination with other TCCs as well as with civilian agencies.

Finally, this report has made a number of recommendations for how Sweden could manage unintended consequences. This is not an exhaustive list. It rather serves as an indicative list of how to address such negative aspects of PSOs. In order to guide these efforts, the recommendations of the report are summarised under the areas investigated. In addition, these recommen-

²⁴⁰ As was the case with the SEA by PSO troops in Eritrea, which led to reduced legitimacy for the mission.

dations have been structured into measures for improving monitoring of, planning for, and the institutional capacity to handle, and accountability for, negative unintended consequences. These recommendations follow below:

Recommendations for Managing Economic Consequences

Monitoring

- Develop a formal and internal central function for systematic analysis of PSOs' impacts on host economies, e.g. through institutionalising economic officers to maximise the developmental impact
- Pay attention to salary payment and the distortion it can cause in the host country
- Carefully consider the distributional effects on the host economy in order to avoid fuelling existing divisions
- Make sure that Sweden's contribution to PSOs does not contribute to a local "brain drain"
- Collect information on unintended consequences and disseminate such to other relevant actors in order to better support their work to design more host-country sensitive PSOs

Planning

- Have well planned procurement practices in post conflict societies to avoid unintended consequences
- Pay attention to salary levels, gender, and rotation when hiring local and international staff
- Rely as far as possible on the formal economy of the host country
- Coordinate with civilian agencies, such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), to establish whether and how PSOs could contribute to the economic development of the country, within the limits of its short-term security focus.

Institutionalise

- Institutionalise an independent mission auditor to examine the mission's budget spending and report to civil control agencies
- Increase the civil-military dialogue to be more informed about dynamics of host economy

Accountability

- Develop ethical guidelines and have these accepted by economic sub-contractors of PSOs.
- Make sure that each PSO mission have at least one officer to consider long-term development aspects (alternatively have such monitoring at the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) Headquarters)

Recommendations for Managing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Monitoring

- Promote and monitor recommendations by the 'Zeid Repport' on SEA presented to the UN General Assembly. Ensure that clauses explicitly acknowledging the obligation to take legal action against perpetrators SEA are included in the memorandum of understanding with the agency under which Sweden contributes troops

Planning

- Increase the proportion of female soldiers participating in PSOs

Institutionalise

- Establish information campaigns in host countries to increase awareness, transparency and willingness to report bad behaviour
- Better institutionalise investigations, training and policy subscriptions in the mission organization to increase awareness of SEA
- Increase awareness and knowledge on SEA aspects by partnering training with civilian agencies such as Sida (drawing on their expertise in areas of gender, power dynamics and people's vulnerabilities)
- Establish an "ombudsman" function at each PSO in order to be more sensitive to protection issues and coordinate efforts with civilian actors to receive complaints through their channels

Accountability

- Provide mechanisms for reporting and holding perpetrators of SEA accountable
- Establish and keep up-to date code of conducts relating prevention of SEA among its soldiers rely on UN standards
- Increase training and institutional resources for the Swedish police and national prosecutors to better being eligible to conduct rapid

investigations abroad (i.e. collect evidence and testimonies)
following allegations of SEA

- Make available legal and economic support to victims of SEA²⁴¹
- Work for partner countries in PSOs to adhere to the ‘Zeid Report’ recommendations by committing to take legal action against members of their troops found to perpetrate SEA. This should be made a necessary condition for contributing troops to a PSO.

Recommendations for Managing HIV/AIDS

Monitoring

- That Sweden provides voluntary counselling and HIV-testing during the mission and that troops are regularly informed about HIV/AIDS, including ways of transmission and preventative methods
- That Sweden establishes monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as conducts surveys on the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of its troops in relation to HIV/AIDS as well as SEA. Documentation of this information is crucial not only for future mission planning of the SwAF, but information collection is also vital for Swedish government agencies, like Sida, and multilateral organizations like the UN. Dissemination of information should therefore be made to other relevant actors

Institutionalise

- That each PSO include HIV focal points in mission to integrate preventive programmes in broader mission mandates
- That national staff are granted regular leave to enable them to maintain relations with their families

Planning

- Sweden could seek to ensure access Voluntary Counselling and Testing for its national staff, in order to contribute the prevention of HIV/AIDS in the host country

²⁴¹ In the Swedish context, victims of PSO personnel’s abuse could e.g. be allocated money from “Brottsofferfonden”.

- That Sweden draws on the UNAIDS information materials for pre-deployment HIV/AIDS training
- That the mission provides continuous in-field ‘refresher’ trainings for mission staff. Such training should also be designed to include local staff
- That the SwAF draw on civilian organizations’ expertise in the area of how to prevent HIV/AIDS, as several organizations of the civil society are familiar with giving such training
- Sweden could work out joint-mission strategies with other TCCs and civilian organisations in the area of deployment to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Recommendations for Managing Environmental Consequences

Monitoring

- Sufficient allocation of financial and human resources in the missions in order to comply with environmental regulations and guidelines and minimise the negative impact in the host country
- Ensure proper contracting oversight and supervision for services potentially resulting in negative environmental impact (e.g. waste management)

Planning

- Investigating the possibility to support the strategic end state through the environment, e.g. by handing over of facilities or equipment to the host nation when redeploying
- Develop a concept of environmentally friendly and sustainable procurement policies and promote these in multilateral agencies towards which Sweden contributes troops
- Taking into account, when planning and assessing environmental impact, the existence of UN’s Environmental Policy for Field Missions and the Environmental Guidelines for UN field mission
- Carefully plan for the competition with the local population and negative effect on the environment that the demand for natural resources, such as wood, water and gravel from PSOs may have

- Carefully plan for how to mitigate the unintended consequences that the placement of the UN base camp may have for land, water sources and biodiversity

Institutionalise

- In order to create understanding and acceptance of the importance of environmental stewardship establish mission specific training programmes on environmental considerations in PSOs

Accountability

- Acknowledge that active and dedicated leadership is critical, and that the commanders are ultimately responsible for the integration of environmental considerations during the planning and execution of a peace support operation
- Exercise due diligence, i.e. having in place an adequate system to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to prevent negative environmental impacts resulting from the operation
- Ensure that foreign troops conducting experimentation and exercises in Sweden comply with the SwAF's environmental standards

While much action is recommended above, there are also a number of areas that need to be further examined. Below, three other areas are singled out, that were consciously left out from this study, but which require further attention. These areas could be explored through case studies by applying thematic investigation on 1) how PSOs impact on overall protection concerns of the host population and how PSOs can improve protection of civilians, 2) how PSOs cause unintended political consequences and how these have been dealt with in order to establish lessons learned or best practices in terms of adjusting to critical political consequences of PSOs; and 3) how negative unintended consequences have been addressed within other multilateral forums such as the EU, NATO and OSCE. Aspects of these three areas of further study follow below.

Outlining Aspects of a Study on Protection Concerns

Following the literature, it seems that systems for receiving complaints, apart from those specifically related to SEA, are rather ad hoc features in many PSOs. Nonetheless, actors like the UN and the EU have developed a degree of sensitivity and responsiveness to complaints made by host populations. For instance, for the UN Kosovo mission, the UN/EU is currently developing an accountability mechanism where the host country population could turn to if they have experienced a violation of their human rights by

UN/EU staff members in executive positions. This mechanism comes in addition to already existing, albeit weak, mechanisms in Kosovo, such as the Ombudsperson Institution and the Human Rights Advisory Panel. The new proposal suggests clearer mandate to be given to an independent panel of experts which will be tasked to judge whether there is substance to reports of violations of human rights (the panel will not investigate substance or responsibilities). If there is reason to believe that human rights violations have been committed, the case is referred to the sending country of the accused staff member for further investigation.²⁴²

In terms of ensuring access to complaint mechanisms, lessons may also be available from humanitarian organisations, which sometimes develop networks of protection focal points, who act, not only as advisors, but also hold ombudsman-functions. In addition, organisations like NATO and OSCE, may have additional experiences in ensuring accountability. Case studies exploring mechanisms for protection concerns could therefore include the immediate ombudsman-function. They could also explore how advice is obtained on how to avoid exposing the civilian population to protection concerns. Finally, such case studies could explore formal structures for holding perpetrators accountable, including systems for taking legal action, opening investigations and how legal support is ensured to possible victims.

Outlining Aspects of a Study on Political Consequences

Having elaborated on key findings in the areas of economic impacts, sexual exploitation and abuse, HIV/AIDS and environmental impact, as well as expanded the discussion to encompass protection more broadly, an issue intrinsically linked to the success or failure of the mandate remains – unintended political consequences.

It was noted in the introduction of this study that the inquiry into the nature of such consequences was beyond the scope of this study. It was explained that this was first because of a matter of definition, where political consequences tread the borderline between unintended consequences and failure to achieve intended outcomes. According to the definition, unintended consequences refer to side-effects which were not part of the planned aim of the mission. As such, it should be recalled that they do not include a “mere” failure to achieve the set objective. There are many instances in which one could claim that a PSO has failed to achieve its

²⁴² Interview with representative from the Swedish Ministry of Justice:2009-10-29.

mission, but this does not automatically imply that there have been unintended consequences. The risk of failure is always present when setting up conscious goals and objectives. Noting that PSOs are essentially political undertakings, i.e. in support of a political mandate, political consequences tend to have a direct impact on the goals or objectives of the mission. Similarly, failures in the mission will also have political consequences. This is not to say that the consequences are unintended. Instead they are failures to achieve the intended goals or objectives. Moreover, since unintended political consequences are intrinsically linked to the success or failure of the mission, they require in-depth case studies to investigate their links to particular operations as well as missions.

Such in-depth studies would have to consider a number of factors. For example, for an intervention to succeed in as complex a situation, an in-depth understanding of the nature and origin of the conflict, including its political, military, social, psychological and moral dynamics to name a few is required. In addition, the development of a conflict is determined by the actions of different actors, be they physical persons, or organisational structures. Therefore, these actors, including their motives, need to be understood as well.²⁴³ In the humanitarian context, the 'Do No Harm' concept has emphasised that an ill informed analysis of either the nature of the conflict, the actors, or their motives, could easily lead an intervention to unintentionally cause non-intended political consequences.²⁴⁴ Moreover, the 'Do No Harm' concept acknowledges that among the actors and structures in society plagued by violent conflict, some, termed connectors, tend to favour peaceful settlements whereas others, referred to as dividers, may be fuelling the conflict or opposed to a reconciliatory process. Unless a thorough understanding of such dynamics is available, or acted upon correctly by adopting an informed strategy, the mission is likely to unintentionally support dividers or inadvertently sideline or exclude forces in favour of a peaceful settlement (i.e. connectors). Such consequences could severely impair the likelihood of sustainable peace.

Outlining Aspects of a Study on Recent Developments in other Forums

Last but not least, any future study would require an examination of recent developments taken by other actors to address negative unintended

²⁴³ See eg. Försvarshögskolan, *Strategisk Planering*, 517/8, (2008-12-05).

²⁴⁴ See e.g. CDA: Collaborative Learning Projects (2004).

consequences of PSOs. While this report concentrated mainly on UN PSOs, NATO, the OSCE, as well as the EU are actively developing their own standards and practices. In order for Sweden to take lead in promoting a host-country friendly PSO approach, such studies are warranted.

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CDU	Conduct and Discipline Unit
DFS	Department of Field Services (of the UN)
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations (of the UN)
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	The European Community
EU	The European Union
FOI	(eng.) Swedish Defence Research Agency
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Green House Gas
HQ	Head Quarter (Swedish Armed Forces)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Mission DR Congo
MOSS	Minimum Operational Security Standards
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OASEA	Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
OPORDER	Operations Order
PEP	Post Exposure Prophylaxis
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SCCA	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SFOR	Stabilization Force
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreements
SOFUS	Standing Order for the Swedish International Forces

SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (of the UN)
STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infection
SwAF	Swedish Armed Forces
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission to Sudan
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UNSOA	United Nations Support Mission to Somalia
UNTAET	The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar

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