FOI

Peace-Building after
Post-Modern Conflicts

The UN Integrated Mission (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone

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Cover picture: UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein, Lungi Sierra Leone

Sammanfattning

Slutet på det kalla kriget tycks ha lett till nya former av väpnade konflikter som är mindre stat kontra stat krig utan mer av interna krig och konflikter, eller vad några författare refererar till som "nya" eller "postmoderna" krig. Förändringen i typen av konflikter har gjort det nödvändigt att hitta nya sätt att ta itu med frågeställningar och utmaningar som denna typ av krig och konflikter medför. FN:s generalsekreterare Boutros-Ghalis rapport från 1992, Agenda för fred, införde begreppet fredsbyggande som ett sätt för Förenta Nationerna (FN) för att förbättra sin förmåga att lösa konflikter. Brahimirapporten 2000, följde med begreppet integrerade operationer och rekommenderade att FN:s fredsbevarande insatser inriktas på samordning och samstämmighet mellan de militära och civila/humanitära organisationerna för att få en större inverkan på fredsprocessen och effektivare användning av resurserna. Dagens fredsoperationer har tenderat att bestå av både - fredsskapande och integrerade insatser - och FN:s uppdrag i Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) var ett sådant uppdrag. Detta dokument ger en översikt och en analys över några av framgångarna och utmaningarna i den integrerade civil-militära operationen - UNAMSIL – och hur dessa insatser bidrog till fredsbyggandeprocessen i Sierra Leone under åren 1999 - 2002. Rapporten fokuserar på hur den integrerade operationen brottats med att skapa säkerhet genom fredsbevarande insatser och samtidigt påbörja långsiktiga fredsbyggandeprocesser. I slutet av rapporten ges rekommendationer som syftar till att stödja konceptutveckling inom detta område.

Rapporten har skrivits inom ramen för FOI projektet "Ledning i multifunktionella insatser", som finansieras genom Försvarsmaktens FoU-program.

Nyckelord: Civil-militär samverkan, fredsbevarande insatser, FN, UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone

Summary

The end of the Cold War appears to have ushered in forms of armed conflict that are less state versus state wars and more internal wars and conflicts, or what some writers refer to as "new," "post-modern" or "residue" warfare. The change in contemporary warfare has made it necessary to find new ways to deal with the new issues and challenges that these types of warfare produce. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghalis' 1992 report, *Agenda for Peace*, introduced the concept of peace-building as a way for the United Nations (UN) to improve on its capacity in conflict prevention. The Brahimi Report of 2000, followed with the concept of integrated missions and recommended that UN peace missions focus on coordination and coherence between the military and civilian/humanitarian organisations in order to have a greater impact on the peace process as well as having clarity and the effective use of resources. Today's peace operations have tended to comprise of both – peace-building and integrated mission – and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was one such mission. This study provides an overview and analysis of the peace-building activities carried out through the Integrated Mission, UNAMSIL, and how these activities contributed to the peace-building process within Sierra Leone, between 1999 and 2002. It looks at how the Integrated Mission grappled with providing security and peacekeeping, while simultaneously embarking on long-term peace-building activities.

This publication was written to support the FOI research project "Command and Control in Multifunctional Environments", which is funded by the R&D programme of the Swedish Armed Forces.

Keywords: Civil-military cooperation, Peace Support Operations, UN, UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone

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Abbreviations

APC	All People's Congress
ARFC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CPI	Chronic Political Instability
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
IM	Integrated Mission
NCDDR	National Committee Disarmament Demobilisation & Reintegration
NPFL	Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SSD	State Security Division
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission is Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peace Building Office
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone

Executive Summary

Responding to the challenges presented by the new forms of warfare (sometimes termed "post-modern" and "residue" warfare) that are less state versus state and more internal wars and conflicts, for example, Kosovo; Bosnia; Rwanda; Liberia; and Sierra Leone, the UN Integrated Mission and peace-building concepts were introduced.

This study explores both the concepts and implementation of Integrated Missions and peace-building. It looks at the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) between 1999 and 2002, and provides an overview and analysis of the IM and peace-building concepts, and the practical implementation of those concepts through UNAMSIL. The main research question is: how did UNAMSIL contribute to the peace-building process in Sierra Leone?

The concepts of peace-building focus not only on ending hostilities but also on the conditions that give rise to these conflicts and those that result from them. The approach is to then tackle these issues through more holistic means. This approach addresses both the military and security issues, and the political and socio-economic issues, in a more long term manner to avoid a recurrence of conflict.[1]

The context within which the integrated mission was deployed is critical to understanding the efforts of the IM and to gauging its effectiveness. The history of the conflict in Sierra Leone can be said to be one of "Chronic Political Instability" (CPI), which refers to the political and socio-economic historical layers of this complex conflict. This includes the various dimensions to the conflict that involved various characters, struggles over resources and power, the various centres of authority, external influences, et cetera.[2] Thus UNAMSIL had to try and build peace under these conditions.

UNAMSIL was deployed under a UN Chapter VII, which mandates 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.'[3] This was a step up from the Chapter VI mandate of its predecessor UNOMSIL. This allowed UNAMSIL to actively pursue peace-building activities through both its military and civilian arms. These activities included supporting the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes that were fraught with challenges of carrying out such a process with multiple centres of

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[1] See Malan, M. Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 17.

[2] See International Alert. Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance & Peace-Building. Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Volume 1, Issue 1. October 2002.

[3] The United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, San Francisco.

authority: the Sierra Leone Army, the Revolutionary Forces, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (ARFC), the various civilian militias that made up the Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) and the West Side Boys. These groups did not always have the same objectives and any perceived threats to them led them to destabilise the fragile peace. While, the DD component was successful in its immediate objectives of disarming and demobilising combatants, it also played a crucial role in demonstrating that the peace process was a reality this time round.

The National outreach programme was another activity that made visible the fact that peace was being built. Socio-economic programmes to create jobs as well as economic activity, infrastructure rehabilitation such as roads and social outreach programmes carried out by both the civilian and military arms of UNAMSIL was crucial in carrying the message to the rural population in particular that the conflict was over.

The information and media campaign enabled UNAMSIL to gain public support which is critical to any military-civilian. One of the central plinths of public information is to gain and maintain broad support and understanding for the peace operations. Public information was used by the leadership of the mission to build trust and convince the parties to the conflict and the population to engage in peaceful courses of action.[4] It was also used to disseminate information as well as counter the spread of incorrect and often inflammatory information that spreads so quickly in the absence of reliable, authoritative and consistent information messages.

The diplomatic approach by the mission and particularly the efforts of the SRSG led to a speedier DDR process and allowed for adjustments and concessions to be made in order to ensure the various parties remained inside the peace process.

UNAMSIL faced many challenges from the context within which it was deployed. Chief among them was the fact that it was dealing with several conflicting parties who were not always clear about their motives and quite willing to pull out of the peace process at various points. It also faced the problem of internal cohesion.

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[4] See Coker, P. The Role of the Media and Public Information. Chapter 4 in Sierra Leone: Building the Road Recovery. Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 1

1 Introduction

The concept of Integrated Missions is a phenomenon that has evolved since the Brahimi report[5] and has been greatly influenced by the need to deal with the new post-modern forms of warfare and armed conflict. The end of the Cold War appears to have ushered in forms of armed conflict that are less state versus state wars and more internal wars and conflicts, for example, Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Liberia and the subject of this document – Sierra Leone. This new era of what Michael Pugh refers to as "new," "post-modern" or "residue" warfare[6] often includes internal fighting that entails communities suffering at the hands of their own community members. Post-modern wars include battles between different warring factions, Warlords, mercenaries and Sobels (soldiers by day, rebels by night). Combatants do not wear uniforms; children and women are combatants as well as decoys and service workers for armed factions.

The motives in post-modern wars are not necessarily about controlling the state or about ideology and competing views of the public good. They are often about private control and exploitation of resources, whether these are guns, diamonds, drugs or labourers.[7] In many contemporary conflicts there is a territorial disjuncture between the dominant statist thinking of sovereignty and the state's actual control over its borders and the territory within those borders.

This change in warfare has changed the way these conflicts are fought; the actors involved; and even the means of creating peace after the armed conflict. In interstate warfare, building the peace was primarily concerned with the two or more states involved in the war. At the end of the war, the individual states retreated to their internal borders and the soldiers involved were easily welcomed home and absorbed into their societies having returned from fighting a foreign enemy. Various civil wars of the past may provide exceptions.

In post-modern conflicts, the end of armed combat and the silencing of the guns do not necessarily mean that the conflict is over. Tensions remain high, and as the warring factions cannot hide behind their state borders but must face and live with each other everyday, peace building becomes an absolute must. Post-conflict states are fragile states and thus first sustaining and then building the peace, requires a concerted internal and external effort to carryout these processes through various means from providing security, justice, humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction which goes beyond military peacekeeping. No

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[5] United Nations General Assembly. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305–S/2000/809. New York: General Assembly & Security Council."

[6] See Pugh. M. Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations. Plymouth International Studies Centre, University of Plymouth. 2003. p. 112-113.

[7] Ibid.

one agency or organisation can provide all these specialised services and thus, multi-dimensional approaches were required.

In order to deal with these new realities of post-modern conflicts, the Integrated Missions (IM) concept was introduced and the UN has attempted to use it as a means of addressing these more complex peace building efforts that combine multifaceted elements which all need to be carefully balanced and synchronised. This has meant that coordination has become much more complex and delicate especially since the mission now has civilian and military operations being brought together and working under one UN head: the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).

1.1 Aim

IM's have been initiated in several post-conflict countries and Sierra Leone – a country that went through a decade long post-modern conflict - is one such country. This paper will look at the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) which functioned as an IM in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005, although this study will focus on the period from 199 to 2002. The aim is to provide an overview and analysis of the IM concepts; the practical implementation of those concepts through UNAMSIL; and how this contributed to the peace-building process in Sierra Leone. Critical to understanding the efforts of the IM and to gauging its effectiveness will be to understand the context within which UNAMSIL was deployed and the challenges this post-modern conflict environment posed. Lessons learnt will also be drawn from both the successes and failures of this IM.

Because there were multiple agencies, organisations and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) all working simultaneously to build the peace, it is near impossible to categorically state which institution was responsible for which specific outcome of the overall peace. This is more so because of the compounding effect that all the different actions at different stages have had on the peace-building process. Hence, there is no "one" specific action that was totally responsible for building the peace: it was a combination of multiple actions. Thus, this paper will simply highlight how UNAMSIL contributed to building the peace, but it will not give a definitive measure of the outcome of these actions. It is understood that UNAMSIL's efforts contributed to peace-building, but that it was not UNAMSIL's efforts alone that built any peace that may be found in Sierra Leone.

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2 Methodology

This study was carried out through a combination of interviews and desk research. The desk research consisted of studying a broad variety of secondary sources from academic material; lecture papers by scholars, politicians and civil society practitioners writing about pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict Sierra Leone, as well as a plethora of randomly selected media articles from across the globe covering the period 1999 to 2002. These media articles were random in the sense that a systematic analysis of the media was not conducted, but instead, this consisted of going through random media articles that were available. This was also in keeping with the limits in terms of the time, scope and space available for this study. The desk research included studying primary sources such as official UN Security Council Resolutions on Sierra Leone

A number of national and international persons who worked with UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone, the Military, warring factions, Civil Society, journalists as well as democratic and conflict practitioners from West Africa were interviewed. Criterion for the selection of the interviewees was based on their involvement, knowledge and experience of the period between 1999 and 2002 in Sierra Leone. The interviews were carried out in person and over the telephone, and the eventual choice of interviewees was partially influenced by their availability. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject at hand as well as the current (and in some cases even precarious) positions many of the interviewees hold, most of the interviews were carried out in confidence, and the interviewees preferred to remain anonymous. In total eighteen interviews were carried out.[8]

While UNAMSIL was in existence from October 1999 to December 2005, this study is preoccupied with the period between December 1999 and May 2002. The rationale for studying this period of time is because it allows us to focus on the complexities that are inherent in combining the functions of a peacekeeping mission and those of a peace-building nature, in a post-modern conflict context. This period gives us a chance to examine the impact of the interventions as the country moved from complete armed conflict in 1999 to peaceful "democratic" elections in 2002. This suggests that a significant shift from violent conflict relations to non-violent platonic relations was achieved in this period which is worth dissecting.[9]

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[8] The in person interviews have all been recorded and the tapes reside with the author.

[9] The significant shift must be taken in the context of an open conflict to peaceful elections. Peaceful elections do not necessarily equate to a conflict free society in Sierra Leone at the time of May 2002. Sierra Leone was still a fragile state at the time of the 2002 elections and in a high UN security phase. However, a shift from total conflict to orderly non-violent elections – while this may not be seismic – is significant.

However, this revision will not cover all and every dimension of the peacekeeping and peace-building phase. It will look at a sample of the peace-building activities carried out by UNAMSIL and how the civil-military aspects of coordination were managed at the field level. This study does not claim to be representative of the entire peace-building process in Sierra Leone.

2.1 Outline

Following on from this section, the concepts of peace-building and IM will be discussed in section 3, which is followed by a synopsis of the political background of Sierra Leone, the Conflict in the 1990's and the UN involvement in section 4. This simply provides some contextual background. The paper then takes a closer look at civil-military relations and peace-building in Sierra Leone under UNAMSIL in section 5. This section also explores the various challenges faced by the mission as well as its successes. It highlights the structures that were in place and how they worked, including the role of the media and information campaigns and the importance of diplomacy. Section 6 provides the conclusion and gives points to consider for future peace-building missions in post-modern conflicts.

3 The Concepts of Peace-Building and Integrated Missions

As mentioned in the introduction, post-modern wars and the attendant violence that accompanies them are less straight forward. In these conflicts, '[m]ultiple centres of authority create linkages to the global economy for markets, the acquisition of arms and the expatriation of profits, … Military activity is characterized by the absence of centralized authority, free-booting paramilitaries, the use of child soldiers, the flow and currency of small arms, and the privatization of security through profit making companies.'[10] Thus, the conditions that give rise to these conflicts and those that result from them need to be tackled in a more holistic approach. This approach needs to address the military and security issues, and the political and socio-economic issues in a more long term manner to avoid a recurrence of conflict.[11]

3.1 The Concepts of Peace-Building

As the question of how peace-building worked in UNAMSIL is our focus, it is important that the peace-building concept be clearly laid out. The concept of Peace Building was coined by the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his "*Agenda for Peace*" document in 1992.[12] It is a UN strategy for conflict resolution which consists of four components: preventative diplomacy; peacemaking; peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.[13] Apart from these features stated above, the UN concept of peace-building is made up of provisions to address long-term political, economic and social causes of conflict. These components make up what we can call the "circle of preventative peace-building."[14] The circle of preventative peace seeks to transform the economy and institutions of a society that are geared for creating and supporting war, to a society based upon peace, the promotion of peace and engagement in non-violent

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[10] See Powell, K. Sierra Leone: "A Peacebuilding Success Story?" The Ploughshares Monitor. Autumn 2002, volume 23, no. 3. p. 1; See also Pugh. M. Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations. Plymouth International Studies Centre, University of Plymouth. 2003 p. 112-113.

[11] See Malan, M. Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 17.

[12] Boutros-Ghali's analysis in this *Agenda for Peace* builds upon ideas and developments in the fields of peace research and conflict resolution and the literature of disaster relief and sustainable development.

[13] See de Zeeuw, J. Building Peace in War-Torn Societies: From Concept to Strategy. (Research Project on 'Rehabilitation, sustainable peace and Development'). Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael' Conflict Research Unit. August 2001. p. 13.

[14] Ibid.

political discourse. Peace-building moves away from "negative peace" that focuses exclusively on ending hostilities to a more positive peace which seeks to deal with the root causes of conflict. Thus, the four components are not to be seen as separate activities, but as mutually supportive.[15] De Zeeuw writes that:

> *'If aptly coordinated, peace-building can effectively contribute to peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. Finally, peace-building can complete the circle by insuring against the recurrence of conflict by building capacities for, among others, labour negotiation, civil society reconciliation, fair courts, and an electoral process that enable a society to resolve its conflicts before violence breaks out.'[16]*

This understanding of peace-building means that peace-building is instrumental in the immediate post-conflict phase and not only in the longer term activities. Thus, peace-building ought to be broadly defined by its activities and objectives and not by the actual sequencing of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building concepts in the peace process. These components are to be carried out simultaneously from the outset, including the mission planning stages.[17]

Thus, the task of peace-building must be context specific where the process identifies mechanisms, institutions, relationships and processes that encourage conflict resolution and facilitate the conditions that constitute an appropriate context for these structures to emerge.[18]

3.2 The Transformation to Integrated Missions

The Brahimi Report of 2000[19] examined past peacekeeping capabilities and made suggestions for improvement. Amongst other things the Report pointed out that the UN Secretariat lacked the structures for coherent mission planning needed for a successful and efficient approach to peace operations. It was from here that the conceptual approach to the Integrated Mission (IM) was initially seeded,

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[15] See de Zeeuw, J. Op. Cit., August 2001. p. 13.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. p. 14; See also In Galtung, J. War, Peace and Defence: Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 2 (Ejlers, C. Copenhagen). 1975. p. 17.

[18] See de Zeeuw, J. Op. Cit., August 2001. p. 18.

[19] This report is commonly known as the "Brahimi Report" because the report was delivered by a UN Panel asked to look into peacekeeping which was chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi. He also subsequently became the SRSG in Afghanistan and adopted the integrated approach and thus the association with IM and Brahimi became complete. The report is officially known as "United Nations General Assembly. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305–S/2000/809. New York: General Assembly & Security Council."

although the report itself never introduced it but simply recommended that a form of integrated planning be developed for future peacekeeping missions.[20]

The concept of IM focuses on coordination and coherence of the mission for clarity and the effective use of resources between the military and civilian/humanitarian organisations. However, it does not seek to mesh together the diverse mandates and functions of the different UN Agencies and actors. The UN Agencies maintain their independence but the IM establishes 'clear structures, processes and mechanisms of coordination to connect these individual entities and form one coherent approach based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of priorities and desired over-arching aims.'[21]

The fact that the IM works under one head means that the SRSG role takes on paramount importance. In an IM, the SRSG is also the head of the civilian UN Country Team made up of the various UN agencies, programmes and funds active in a given country. These UN institutions have their own mandates and reside outside of the mission proper. The IM concept seeks to attain coherence not only within the UN family, but also with the larger international system including such external actors to the UN as 'international donors, International Organisations (IOs), international and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local governments, regional organisations, neighbouring states and other external stakeholders also engaged in the peace support effort. The integrated concept seeks, to the greatest extent possible, [to] harmonize the activities of these external actors with that of the United Nations, as well as promoting coherence among the external actors themselves.'[22] In IM planning though, there is a bias towards concentrating on the high level formal command structures in organisations.[23]

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[20] See United Nations General Assembly. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305–S/2000/809. New York: General Assembly & Security Council, pp 35-37.

[21] Hull, C. Integrated Missions – A Liberia Case Study. (FOI). August 2008. p. 13; See also DeConing, C. 2007. 'Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace Operations'. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol 10:1, p 24.

[22] Hull, C. Op. Cit. August 2008. p. 14.

[23] See Ekengard, A. Op. Cit. August 2009, P. 12.

4 Background

4.1 A Political History of Sierra Leone: from Independence to UNAMSIL

The history of the conflict in Sierra Leone can be said to be one of "Chronic Political Instability" (CPI), which refers to the political and socio-economic historical layers of this complex conflict. This includes the various dimensions to the conflict that involved various characters, struggles over resources and power, the various centres of authority, external influences, et cetera.[24]

Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain in 1960 and has ever since been led by the two major political party's: the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress (APC). Its history is filled in between by numerous military juntas who regularly ceased power through military *coup d'etat*. In fact so regular were the *coups, counter-coups* and attempted *coups* that two separate Presidents – Siaka Stevens (APC) in the 1970's and Tejan Kabbah (SLPP) in the 1990's – disbanded the Sierra Leone Army.

On March 23, 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sanko invaded eastern Sierra Leone and released a communiqué announcing that a rebellion had begun. The RUF proffered a vaguely populist agenda as reasons why they were fighting against government officials and their business associates in Freetown who had plundered the country's resources.[25] As the conflict evolved, control of the resources in the diamond mining areas became critical to the RUF.

The conflict lasted a decade which saw the RUF taking international and Sierra Leonean hostages; many children as young as eight years old[26] forcefully recruited or abducted. Boys carried weaponry and food stuffs, were in most cases exposed to drug abuse and turned into child soldiers. Girls were saddled with domestic chores and abused as sex slaves, although many young women also

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[24] See also International Alert. Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance & Peace-Building. Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Volume 1, Issue 1. October 2002.

[25] See also *Africa Confidential* "Chronology of Sierra Leone 1991 to 1998: How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict." http://www.africa-confidential.com/sandline.html, December 6 1998: Revolutionary Front, "Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: the Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) Perspective and Vision."

[26] See Human Rights Watch 2000, "Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers." May 31. [Online] Available from http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/new-may.htm

operated as fighters. The brutality of the conflict led to thousands of people being amputated, a great number of females being raped and resources plundered. These acts – it would appear - were carried out by all parties to the fighting, who also engaged international mercenary outfits to assist in the fighting.[27]

After the Abidjan peace agreement that was signed in November 1996, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was deployed in Sierra Leone and was involved in much of the fighting after the agreement had fallen apart. In July 1999, the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed between the government and the RUF. However, hostilities continued and the capture of Sankoh in the year 2000[28] led to the RUF disintegrating.

While there is an emphasis on RUF as the main warring faction there were in fact several factions including the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (ARFC), the West Side Boys and the civilian defence forces (CDF) which was an umbrella group for the different civilian militia groups that fought against the RUF. The biggest group was found in the south and was popularly known as the Kamajohs.

4.2 The UN's Involvement

Against this backdrop and with a sense and evidence that the conflict was wearing down – but by no means over – the UN entered Sierra Leone. First as the observer mission UNOMSIL in 1998 under UN Chapter VI, which has a focus on the 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes?'[29] In 1999 the UN then deployed UNAMSIL under UN Chapter VII, which mandates 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.'[30] UNAMSIL's mandate and role will be explored in more detail in the next section under "Civil-Military Cooperation in Sierra Leone."

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[27] See Ayissi, A and Poulton, R.E. (eds). Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2000; Human Rights Watch 2000, "Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers," May 31. [Online] Available from http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/new-may.htm; Orr, R. Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2002; Powell, K. Sierra Leone: "A Peacebuilding Success Story?" The Ploughshares Monitor. Autumn 2002, volume 23, no. 3; Africa Confidential "Chronology of Sierra Leone 1991 to 1998: How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict." http://www.africa-confidential.com/sandline.html, December 6 1998: Revolutionary Front, "Lasting Peace in Sierra Leone: the Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) Perspective and Vision."

[28] Pham, P. "Lazarus Rising: Civil Society and Sierra Leone's Return from the Grave ....." International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 1 / November 2004. p. 3.

[29] The United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, San Francisco.

[30] Ibid.

4.3 UNOMSIL

As mentioned above, UNOMSIL was an Observer Mission set up under the UN Chapter VI: "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." This observer mission's Mandate - under Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998) - was essentially a two pronged Observer Mission with a military element and a civilian element. The military element was to monitor the military and security situation as well as the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process. The civilian elements were focused on advising on police reform, reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights and to assist the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs.[31] The nature of a UN Chapter VI means that UNOMSIL had no powers to intervene militarily in the conflict.

A brief mention of an incident that occurred under UNOMSIL is important because it set an image of the UN that was of an instant disadvantage to UNAMSIL when it was deployed. The deployment of UNOMSIL created enormous expectations on the ground. The majority of the population was completely unaware of the legal standings of an armed UN mission that arrived while the conflict persisted. The population immediately assumed that the mission's presence was there to protect them. The Abidjan Accord was signed but there were still many violations of the ceasefire agreement and fighting continued. This was to be an important point as civilians in Freetown came under attack from the RUF/ARFC on January 6, 1999. When the RUF/AFRC contingent entered Freetown and committed atrocities against the civilian population it became clear that the UNOMSIL observers were not going to intervene. The population felt that the UNOMSIL Mission offered them a false sense of security.

The people on the ground were not aware of the restrictions in place on UNOMSIL through its legal mandate. In an interview with a former CDF fighter, he said:

> *'The UNOMSIL mission was misunderstood because we were not aware of the legal implications of the mandates that governed them. All we saw was that the UN came in with Armoured Personnel Carriers and lots of weapons. But no one told us that they could not use this equipment. So when the peacekeepers were unable to protect civilians the local populations began to question why they were here and why they had brought all this equipment if they could not use it. If they were only meant*

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[31] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1181, S/RES/1181, 13 July 1998.

to observe then why not deploy them unarmed and this would not create expectations. So people got fed up with them. [32]

An information campaign that could reach the general population informing them on what the mission is about and what the mission can actually do was a lesson learnt from UNOMSIL and implemented under UNAMSIL. It is discussed below under "The Information and Media Campaign" section 5.1.3.

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[32] Interviewee 12. Former CDF fighter, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 1 December 2009.

5 Civil-Military Cooperation in Sierra Leone

At the time of UNAMSIL's deployment in December 1999, there had already been a civil-military presence in place since 1996/7 through ECOMOG and then UNOMSIL.

The Lomé Peace Accord signed in July 1999 led to a significantly strengthened UN presence in Sierra Leone through the October 22 UN Resolution 1270 which established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as a peace keeping force.[33] UNAMSIL existed from October 1999 and ended in December 2005. This mission was mandated under UN Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." The peacekeepers were authorised 'to take the necessary measures … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.'[34] (However, it is worth pointing out that this change was not completely understood by the UN leadership in the country and led to difficulties with regards to its implementation.)[35]

The UNAMSIL mandate under Chapter VII was later expanded under Security Council resolution 1289 (2000), to include provision of security at key locations in and near Freetown and at all disarmament sites, to provide the free movement of people and goods and to provide security for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process.[36]

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[33] See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270, October 22, 1999.

[34] Ibid.

[35] A report from a workshop of Experts on Civil-military relations reported that: 'When UN mandates have directed peacekeepers "to protect civilians," leaders have not always understood what it meant. Even when protection language was added to an existing operation's mandate such as UNAMSIL and MONUC, leaders did not recognize a shift. ... In Sierra Leone, the UNAMSIL mandate was not seen as a radical change on the ground or as "taking into account" the problems that civilians faced. One UNAMSIL force commander, however, sought to translate the UN mandate to protect civilians into "action," he recounted, and asked UN headquarters about what protection meant: was it to protect every town? "'No, no, no,'" he reported being told, the broad concept of operations would ensure protection.' See Holt, V. K. & Smith, J. G. Halting Widespread or Systematic Attacks on Civilians: Military Strategies & Operational Concepts. The Henry L. Stimson Center. (Report from an International Experts Workshop, 14–16 February 2007, Accra, Ghana). Spring 2008.

[36] Yabi, G. "Sierra Leone" in Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities. 2009. p. 162; See also Hirsch, J.L. Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. 2001. p. 86; Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL – Mandate. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. © United Nations 2005.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamsil/mandate.html

In essence, UNAMSIL's mandate was to assist the GoSL and the other parties to implement the Lomé peace agreement. This entailed assisting with the restructuring of the police force, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), establishing a national presence, monitoring the ceasefire agreement, encouraging and supporting national confidence building and providing support for the holding of national elections.[37] Since the elections were held in May 2002, which was two and a half years later, this entailed to a large degree that UNAMSIL engaged in peace-building and not only peacekeeping.

UNAMSIL was a truly multifunctional, civilian-led mission. Under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria and he exercised control through his two deputies: DSRSG (Operations and Management, or O&M), Mr. Behrooz Sadry of Iran, and DSRSG (Governance and Stabilisation) Mr Alan Doss of the UK.

DSRSG O&M, Mr. Sadry, assisted the SRSG in the overall political leadership, operations and management of UNAMSIL. He also assumed the responsibilities of Acting SRSG in the absence of the SRSG. DSRSG Sadry had control over all logistical functions of the mission, including integrated services, which is responsible for, among other things, telecommunications, transportation, engineering, supply services, air operations and movement control. These functions were all critical to the coordination and execution of both civilian and military activities. Since they were controlled under DSRSG O&M, the actions of the different civilian and military agencies had much more coherence and thus, a greater impact on the peace process.

The DSRSG Governance and Stabilisation, Mr Alan Doss co-ordinated UNAMSIL's civilian components, focusing on governance, recovery and reintegration matters in support of a cohesive approach to peace-building. He also served as the Resident Co-ordinator and Humanitarian Co-ordinator, as well as the Resident Representative of UNDP.[38] This arrangement enabled the various elements of the UN system to come together in support of common humanitarian and development goals while ensuring a more effective sharing of resources and information.[39] The DSRSG/RC/HC function was thus instrumental in tying

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[37] See Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL – Mandate. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. © United Nations 2005.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamsil/mandate.html

[38] The Resident Coordinator (RC) and Resident Representative (RR) are sometimes percieved as the same function, which is in correct. The RC's function is coordinate the UN Country team and the RC can be from any UN agency, even though this person is usually from UNDP. The RR on the other hand, has the specific function of representng UNDP.

[39] See Malan, M. UNAMSIL After the Elections. In "Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery." Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 37.

together the relief and development programmes which also represent peacekeeping and peace-building agendas respectively.

It is important to point out that the United Kingdom, was largely responsible through its International Military Army Training Team (IMATT) forces, for restructuring the military while UNAMSIL concentrated on restructuring the police force.

The organisational structure of UNAMSIL is found below.

Figure 1: Diagram showing the organisational structure within UNAMSIL

IM's are integrated to various degrees and the rigidness of the command structure differs from mission to mission. UNAMSIL is an example of what has been termed "minimalist integration". The responsibility for overseeing the humanitarian programme in Sierra Leone was situated within the mission, with

the DSRSG the designated U.N. RC and HC. However, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the U.N. entity mandated with the coordination of a humanitarian activities including those performed by non-UN actors, was located on the other side of town from the UNAMSIL office. This is consistent with a minimalist integration approach which seeks to ensure that integration does not interfere with concepts such as "humanitarian space," and it also allows many humanitarian organisations such as NGOs, to distance themselves from any military association the mission might have. An example of "maximalist integration" would be UNAMA in Afghanistan where all the responsibility and structures for humanitarian coordination are located firmly within UNAMA's management structure, and staffed and financed like any other part of the mission. There was no separate OCHA identity, office or staff.[40] UNMIL in Liberia is another example where OCHA was completely closed down in 2004.

While UNAMSIL started off on a stronger footing than UNOMSIL with a Chapter VII mandate, it did suffer a near collapse within its first six months due to the hostage incident that took place in Makeni, in the year 2000. On April 1 2000:

> '... tensions re-emerged between UNAMSIL and RUF combatants around DDR reception centres, especially in the Makeni/Magburaka area. Events took a turn for the worse on 1 May, when RUF fighters approached the DDR reception centre in Makeni demanding that UNAMSIL turn over disarmed ex-combatants and their weapons in order to punish them for having joined the DDR programme. The rebels detained three UNAMSIL military observers, destroyed part of the camp and looted the town. In Magburaka, RUF fighters tried to disarm UNAMSIL troops, provoking an exchange of fire throughout the day. ... RUF destroyed DDR facilities in both locations, where attacks on the Kenyan peacekeepers continued. Incidents multiplied in all places where RUF fighters were in contact with UNAMSIL. As immediate measures were taken by the force commander, a ... battalion moving from Lungi to Makeni was ambushed by the RUF in one of the most humiliating episodes for UNAMSIL: "[s]ome 400 UN troops [the eventual number believed to be 500] were believed to have fallen into the hands of RUF, which reportedly had moved 200 of them to its stronghold in the Kono district."[41]*

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[40] Porter, T. NGOs Need to be in on Peacekeeping Discussions. (AlertNet). Global Policy Forum. May 21, 2004. p. 2.

[41] See Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 19 May 2000; See also Yabi, G. Op. Cit. 2009. p. 172.

This led to a long drawn out affair where the peacekeepers were eventually released – some as far off as in Monrovia, Liberia. However, this incident saw the UN and international community not only condemn the actions of RUF but to also bring in measures to take a firmer stance against it, for example, sanctioning some of its sponsors.[42] This was an important step that helped UNAMSIL to stabilise the peace as there was much more enforcement on its part and it also meant that the fighting factions were inclined to follow the peace agreements.

This incident also serves to illustrate some of the challenges presented in post-modern conflict settings and that relate directly to a peace-building concept of dealing with the root causes of the conflict. Leading up to this particular incident there seemed to be relatively good relations between UNAMSIL, the various fighting groups, and in particular RUF. According to the Secretary-Generals report, 'There were many positive actions ongoing.'[43] At a meeting held within the National Commission on DDR, which included both RUF and ARFC leaders, unhindered access to all parts of the country was given to UNAMSIL. At the time, the RUF stronghold Kailahun, had UNAMSIL peacekeepers deployed there, but they did not have access to the diamond mining area of Kono which was controlled by RUF fighters. [44]

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the threat of losing control of the diamond mining areas and the resources they brought was one of the motives behind the hostage taking. As President Kabbah stated at the Special Court in Sierra Leone, 'Sankoh became uneasy after he took over the chairmanship of Strategic Mineral Resources Commission in my government because he thought he was supposed to be in full control of the minerals and not answerable to the then Minister of Mineral Resources. This was a situation that he (Sankoh) found absurd which later prompted him to create an uneasy calm, thus disturbing the peace process.'[45]

The question of whether the RUF and ARFC leaders were genuinely interested in peace or whether they were simply using the process to recuperate at times when they were weakest, before coming back resurgent to keep control of the diamonds, is a valid one. The motives of the fighting are also brought into stark view – were they for the reasons stated in their ideological manifesto or were they now purely fighting for resources? 'Documents taken from Sanko's residence revealed his flagrant disregard of the Lomé Peace Agreement's ban on

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[42] Yabi, G. Op. Cit. 2009. p. 163.
[43] See Fourth Report of the Secretary-General Op. Cit,. 19 May 2000
[44] Ibid.
[45] Jah, U. S. (of the Democrat). Printed at BBC World Service Trust. Communicating Justice, Reporting transitional justice in Africa. May, 2008
http://www.communicatingjustice.org/en/stories/30052008_sierra_leone_s_former_president_testifies_special_court

illegal diamond mining.'[46] This is important in terms of understanding the causes and drivers of the conflict in order to make decisions upon what actions to take and how effective they will be.

In August of 2000, UN Resolution 1313 admitted serious weaknesses found within UNAMSIL which it considered to be a threat to UNAMSIL and the security state. It conceded that in order to counter this threat UNAMSIL needed appropriate strengthening. It lists a number of specific points to be strengthened but those important for this paper are: '(b) to deter and decisively counter the threat of RUF attacks by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force; (c) … within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of imminent physical violence; …'[47] The Security Council also decided that 'the illicit trade in diamonds was fuelling the conflict, and voted Resolution 1306 on 5 July 2000 to tackle "conflict diamonds" and strengthen the ban on arms exports.[48]

These resolutions from the Security Council both strengthened UNAMSIL and – if not weakened, then at least stymied – RUFs manoeuvring. This paved the way for a more robust peacekeeping force from UNAMSIL, which was necessary in order to maintain the peace and provide some form of stability and confidence within the population in order to lay the platform for peace-building.

5.1 UNAMSIL and Peace Building

As discussed in the Concepts of Peace building section above (3.1), at the conceptual level peace-building is about transforming a society that is geared for war making, into one that is based upon promoting peace. It also combines the activities of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building in a non-sequenced manner.

According to Hamre and Gordon, successful peace-building involves four separate and distinct, yet interrelated categories of tasks, or "pillars of reconstruction"[49] The first of these pillars is security, upon which all the others are built. Security relates to all aspects of public safety. The second pillar is Justice and Reconciliation, which addresses the past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from the conflict and to create an impartial and accountable legal system for the future. Thirdly, we have Social and Economic well-being, which focuses on the socio-economic needs of

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[46] Hirsch, J.L. Op. Cit. p. 89.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Yabi, G. Op. Cit. 2009. p. 164-165.
[49] Hamre, J.J. and Sullivan, G.R. Towards Postconflict Reconstruction, in The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2002, p 143

the population including the provision of emergency relief and the restoration of essential services as a means of laying the foundation for a viable economy. The fourth and last pillar is Governance and Participation. This deals with the creation of legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes as well as the setting of rules and procedures for political decision-making and giving a voice to the populace in government.[50]

Following along the understanding of this concept and lessons learnt, the UN country team[51] prepared a UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peace-building. The UN strategy paper was developed to guide the UN (including the humanitarian and development agencies as well as UNAMSIL) on how to contribute in a cohesive manner to the process of transition from relief to recovery: combining peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building.[52]

The main objectives of UNAMSIL were to assist the Government to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilise the situation progressively throughout the entire country. UNAMSIL assisted in the promotion of a political process which led to a renewed DDR programme and the holding of free and fair elections.[53] This contributed to the three pillars of security, governance and justice. UNAMSIL increased its security presence closer to the elections, and '[d]uring the election period, [civilian-police] deployed regional co-ordinators to all the regional headquarters, and strengthened its team sites in the various sectors.'[54] These actions were primarily to help stabilise the state and simultaneously build confidence within the population which was crucial for building the peace.

At the end of the conflict and still after the successful staging of national elections in May 2002, the UNAMSIL peacekeeping forces were instrumental in supporting the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). Commentators have said that, 'This was the first truly non-violent vote in the country's history, in large part because of the successful disarmament and the continued substantial presence of UNAMSIL peacekeepers.'[55] At the end of the elections, it was decided that the

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[50] For a detailed description of the four pillars and their functions from which this synopsis was taken, see Malan, M. Introduction to "Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery." Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 4.

[51] In Sierra Leone, the UN country team (UNCT) is comprised of: The UN Resident Co-Ordinator (Mr. Alan Doss, who is also the Humanitarian Co-ordinator and the DSRSG for Governance and Stabilisation); FAO; IOM; OCHA; UNAMSIL Political Affairs; UNDP; UNFPA; UNFSO; UNHCR; UNICEF; WFP; WHO and the World Bank.

[52] See also Malan, M. Introduction to "Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery." Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003.

[53] See Malan, M. UNAMSIL After the Elections. "Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery." Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p.33.

[54] Ibid. p.15.

[55] Malan, M. Introduction to "Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery." Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 3.

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capacity of the SLP was not adequate as yet to maintain law and order on its own. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) was not mandated to provide support to the police, and thus, the UN peacekeeping forces filled this gap. In these cases, UNAMSIL combined the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building efforts simultaneously in order to enhance the building of the peace.

According to peace operations doctrine, military peace-building activities carried out in civilian areas should have a high visibility and impact, demonstrating an immediate benefit from the presence of the peacekeeping force.[56] UNAMSIL did engage in such activities.

> *'In places like Daro and Pedemba – both in the East where the RUF had its main base – the peacekeepers were very much liked as they helped build and reconstruct roads and build bridges, etc. This visibility in doing things for the communities made them appreciable to the local communities. In the cities and towns, people did not see the work UNAMSIL peacekeepers did because most of it was done in the rural areas.'[57]*

Although military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is often regarded as wasteful of the military's "relative advantage" and as something to be avoided, UNAMSIL peacekeepers displayed an extremely positive and constructive approach to their "non-military" role. The UNAMSIL military observers also adapted extremely well to playing a key role in peace-building, after their highly successful engagement with supervising and monitoring the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants.[58]

5.1.1   Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

As an important part of UNAMSIL's mandate was to assist with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), UNAMSIL, under the overall leadership of the SRSG but more directly under DSRSG, Governance and Stability (Mr. Alan Doss), supported the government led National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) programme. The goal of the NCDDR programme was to consolidate the existing short-term

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[56] See Peace Support Operations, Joint Warefare Publication (JWP) 3-50, London, Ministry of Defence, 1999.

[57] Interviewee 2. Journalist and Civil Society Activist, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 25 November 2009.

[58] See See Malan, M. Introduction to "Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery." Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003.

security, to form the basis for lasting peace. The overall programme successfully achieved its goals which were to:

- 'Collect, register, destroy and dispose of all conventional weapons/ammunitions retrieved from the combatants during the disarmament process;

- Demobilize approximately 45,000 combatants comprising the following factions: the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (SLA)-6,000, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)-7,000, Revolutionary United Front (RUF)-15,000, Civil Defense Forces (CDF)-15,000 and paramilitary forces as designated in the Lomé Agreement-2,000 combatants. Disabled and child combatants include approximately 12 per cent of the total number of combatants to be demobilized (and would require special reintegration support);

- Prepare for the sustainable social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants for long-term security.'[59]

NCDDR played an important and strategic role in bringing together all the stakeholders in the peace process, including the leaders of the different warring factions, the peacekeeping forces and representatives of donors. The head of state, President Kabbah, was the Chairman of the Committee with an executive secretariat that included the following members:

- Representative from the donor community;

- Minister of Information and Broadcasting;

- Minister of Finance;

- Deputy Minister of Defence (who was the Civil Defence Force coordinator);

- Special Representative of the UN;

- UN Military Force Commander (UNAMSIL); and

- Head of the RUF.'[60]

Having all the stakeholders sitting at the same table to implement the DDR programme meant that there was constant communication between them and in many cases – but by no means the majority of the cases – consensus was formed.

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[59] Kai-Kai, F. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-War Sierra Leone. in "Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone. (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research). Edited by Anatole Ayissi and Robin-Edward Poulton. 2000. p. 114.

[60] Thusi. T. and Meek. S. Disarmament and Demobilisation. In Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. 2002. p. 8.

This forced the parties to come together and work together. The process of working together in itself creates relationships and introduces an element of predictability - in the different parties actions - which creates an important space for planning. However, this did not always deliver the desired results as was demonstrated by the constant relapse into hostilities including the Makeni hostage scenario described above.

An Executive Secretariat was set-up for the implementation of the NCDDR policies within a national DDR programme that had regional offices in the Eastern, Northern, Southern Provinces and the Western peri-urban areas of Freetown. The headquarters was in Freetown. Part of the coordination mechanisms were two Technical Coordination Committees (TCC) - one for Disarmament and Demobilization (DD) and the other for Reintegration (R).

The DD TCC focused on the operational difficulties, procedures and the special approaches to child ex-combatants. This TCC had regular weekly meetings with its members that included those in charge of operations from UNAMSIL, UNICEF, the Sierra Leonean ministry responsible for children, and the child protection agencies. The different former-fighting factions were also represented in the committee.[61]

The R TCC focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants, including children associated with fighting forces. A larger number of governmental institutions were represented on this TCC as well as UN agencies and NGOs involved in the socio-economic integration of former combatants. The overall coordination for the resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons and refugees was also linked to this TCC.[62] There was a larger civilian presence in this TCC as it dealt with the less military activities.

Government provided the institutional framework for coordination and assigned specific roles to the different stakeholders involved in the DDR programme. UNAMSIL was responsible for disarmament, which was essentially a military activity. Security was provided by UNAMSIL for the entire peace process and UNAMSIL was there to secure the rights of the disarmed ex-combatants. UNICEF was given the mandate to coordinate all the other agencies active in the pursuance of child welfare. The Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs ran a child protection network. The agencies in this network implemented child-focused programmes and played a significant role in the demobilisation of children at interim care centres and also in their eventual reintegration into their families and communities. Other international agencies were contracted for

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[61] See Kai-Kai, F. Op. Cit. 2000. p. 116-117.
[62] See Kai-Kai, F. Op. Cit. 2000. p. 116-117.

specific tasks, such as setting up and assisting to administer demobilisation centres.[63]

Additionally, 'Tripartite meetings between the government, the RUF, and UNAMSIL, were conducted on a monthly basis in order to assess the level of disarmament and to deal with any problems that might be hindering the process.'[64] These meetings had a consultative and consensual tone, which contributed to the success of the DD process. At a tripartite meeting in July 2001, the parties resolved to complete the DD process by the end of November 2001, a target that was nearly met.[65] However, the mere fact that they almost made the target is a significant marker for the speed with which the programme was carried out, which also contributed to the perception that peace was an attainable quantity.

The stop-start nature of the DDR programme from the time of UNOMSIL as well as all the breaches of the ceasefire agreements meant that the population was never really convinced that there would be a peaceful process when UNAMSIL was deployed. 'They were constantly anticipating an outbreak of violence at any moment.'[66] The nation did not believe in the peace process and hence, they never really moved themselves beyond a certain symbolic threshold. Again, the perception of things is as good as the reality, and if people perceive the conflict not to be over then they are never really going to commit themselves to real peace initiatives and therefore, real peace is not established. The rapid and visible DDR and even destruction of weapons accelerated the perception that this time peace could be achieved.

The disarmament and demobilisation of the combatants was also a major component in disarming the leadership of the fighting factions as it limited their options outside of the peace process. This, of course, is the purpose of a DDR programme in a sense, but within the context of this conflict where the ceasefires were continuously violated, where combatants remained quasi mobilised and where it was not always clear what certain factions were fighting for – to hold on to resource rich areas or defending the state – this was an important process in limiting the options of defecting from the peace process.

However, the absence of a clear policy and operational framework for weapons handling and destruction from the initial planning stages was problematic. According to the then Head of NCDDR, Francis Kaikai: 'Experts who evaluated this component of the programme have criticised the peacekeeping force for poor

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[63] Ibid.
[64] Thusi. T. and Meek. S. Op. Cit. 2002. p. 79.
[65] Ibid. p. 76.
[66] Interviewee 6. AV Womens Civil Society Leader, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 28 November 2009.

handling and storage and the Government for the absence of a policy of immediate destruction.'[67]

While the DD programme was by most accounts very successful (See list of DD achievements below in this section), the R part remained a worry as most combatants were not reintegrated into society. Katarina Powell suggests that this was due in part 'to a lack of comprehensive funding for demobilisation and retraining programs.' [68] This was a worrying reality especially for the ex-combatants falling into the youth category of ages between 15 and 35 (Sierra Leonean standard for youth) who represented a large group. This category of people – if they remained without income generating prospects – were the most vulnerable to re-recruitment for criminal activities or the fighting in Liberia where Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie (a senior RUF Commander) was now fighting for Charles Taylor. Because of the history of the war and its trans-border character with Liberia, this was a clear danger.[69]

Subsequently, UNAMSIL deployed itself aggressively across the country and in working together with UN Agencies it 'launched quick-impact and income-generating projects to provide jobs to thousands of unemployed youths and ex-fighters and basic services to local communities. UNAMSIL troops reconstructed schools and clinics, launched and funded agricultural projects, and sponsored free medical clinics in far-flung areas.'[70] Although these jobs were short-term and labour intensive public works projects, they provided relief by creating income generating activities for people. It also meant the people – including the different categories of combatants – could find some value in peace and thus reduce their dependence on conflict jobs (as many combatants survived through the use of their gun and the general chaos created by the conflict). These quick impact projects certainly helped to lower the risk of having ex-combatants re-recruited and provided some time to build the peace. However, these projects appear to not have gone beyond the short term and the risk for future conflict remains.

The diplomatic interventions of UNAMSIL were also instrumental in sustaining the pace of DDR. There were cases where many of the different civil militia that formed the CDF used unconventional weaponry such as hunting guns, machete's, etc. These are not classified as "military weapons" under the traditional DD of wars past. Post-modern wars entail many of these unconventional means of combat that need to be accommodated. UNAMSIL made the adjustment and

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[67] Kai-Kai, F. Op. Cit. 2000. p. 122.

[68] Powell, K. Sierra Op. Cit. Autumn 2002, volume 23, no. 3. p. 4.

[69] See also Gotab, E. The Challenges Project. Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century, Stockholm. 2002.

[70] Overview: UNAMSIL: A Success Story in Peacekeeping.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamsil/Overview.pdf

accommodated them in order to disarm them and bring them into participation in the programme.

A clear example of this was at Gandorhun, where Civil Defence Forces (CDF)-instigated disturbances in August 2001 caused the reception centre to be closed, resulting in delays to the process. The dispute was apparently related to the surrender of hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, and mines, which were classified as ammunition under the NCDDR disarmament guidelines, and not as weapons. The CDF objected, wanting them to count as weapons. The dispute was resolved after UNAMSIL intervened and allowed them to disarm with these "weapons."[71] This definitely contributed to building the peace.

After the stop-start process that encompassed multiple phases, the DDR programme disarmed and demobilised 72,490 combatants, and collected and destroyed 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition over a demanding four year period.[72] By all standards the DD component of the larger DDR process can be said to have been successful. (See list of achievements below). This has been a phenomenal achievement for the NCDDR, in partnership with UNAMSIL. This created conditions conducive to peace and stability in Sierra Leone. 'It is largely due to the success of DD that Sierra Leone was able to hold 'free and fair' elections in May 2002, marked by an unprecedented level of calm across the country.'[73]

To a surprisingly high degree, the DD process in Sierra Leone after May 2001 largely kept to plan and schedule. The key achievements listed below also illustrate the actions taken in order to achieve these successes:

- 'Institutionally, the NCDDR together with UNAMSIL were able to design a flexible policy framework that was able to accommodate the complexities of the Sierra Leone political process without compromising the objectives of DDR.

- The NCDDR and UNAMSIL were able to initiate 'targeted disarmament', and delegated responsibility to relevant agencies such as UNICEF who dealt with child soldiers.

- UNAMSIL provided expertise and committed resources in the establishment of cantonment centres in the country.

- UNAMSIL was instrumental in mediating collaborative strategies that included subcontracting arms destruction to the German [agency] GTZ,

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[71] See Thusi. T. and Meek. S. Op. Cit. 2002. p 83-85.
[72] Ibid. p. 91.
[73] Ibid.

and ensuring that this was witnessed at community level, which increased people's confidence in the merits of disarmament.

- The NCDDR managed to set up a realistic programme by acknowledging the need to broaden the DD programme, and thereby sustaining their own work through a long-term communal process.

- The reduction of the encampment period from 21 days to 7 days speeded up the process of demobilisation.

- Disarming over 70,000 ex-combatants contributed significantly to improving the security situation in the country and created an environment conducive to peaceful elections.'[74]

Evaluating the success or failure of a disarmament process is a complex exercise, especially when concerns about re-recruitment and re-armament of former combatants remain. However, Alusala and Thusi give us a few indicators to support this assessment. These indicators include the following:

- The NCDDR was able to design a programme that was suitable to the dynamics of the peace process in Sierra Leone. This included designing a 'targeted' disarmament programme to take into account the needs of different groups and categories.

- UNAMSIL provided expertise and committed resources to establish cantonment areas in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the RUF and government as well as local authorities (i.e. to determine who owns the land and handing over that infrastructure to benefit the community concerned).

- Disarming an estimated total of over 70,000 ex-combatants exceeded the estimated number of 45,000 and made a significant difference in pacifying the country.[75]

With less arms and less mobile combatants, not only did it improve the security situation, but it also built confidence in the peace process and encouraged civilians to start participating in development and peace-building activities in a much more meaningful manner. There was more commitment and belief that the process would deliver a peaceful solution. The speed of disarmament and the size of the combatants disarmed also created a compounding effect. This is in contrast to the previous attempts at building the peace where armed and mobile

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[74] Thusi. T. and Meek. S. Op. Cit. 2002. p 93.
[75] Alusala, N and Thusi, T. "A Step Towards Peace Disarmament in Africa." Learning from Sierra Leone. Published in Monograph No 98, February 2004.

combatants constantly violated the ceasefire agreements which meant that civilians never trusted the peace process and were thus less committed to it.

As Kaikai has pointed out and Thusi and Meek agree: 'The primary lesson learned from disarmament and demobilisation in Sierra Leone was that putting a DDR programme on the peace agenda must take into account the financial, logistical and technical issues associated with the objectives and scale of the programme, and be mindful that such objectives depend largely on the political process.'[76] As was seen with the two DDR processes after the Abidjan and Lomé agreements, both dragged on and were constantly disrupted by the political process, which in turn slowed down the processes of building peace.

5.1.2   National Outreach Programme

The deployment of UNAMSIL to almost every part of Sierra Leone was an achievement due to the extremely difficult environmental conditions for travelling and deployment in the various rural areas. Access to the rural areas was limited to roads that were destroyed during the fighting and a pure lack of physical infrastructure. While UNAMSIL did make use of a helicopter for access to certain rural areas the majority of the travel was done by motor vehicles. An interviewee who was working with the European Union (EU) between 2000 and 2002 stated:

> *'UNAMSIL carried out good outreach programmes where they travelled to the most remote and almost impenetrable places in Sierra Leone. Places even I as a Sierra Leonean thought twice about going to. I personally met the UNAMSIL forerunners [vehicles] going into villages that had not seen a car since the war began and these were civilian workers. They made a huge effort to reach out and speak to the rural population and let them know the war was over and spoke to them about the possibility of their sons coming home and about the communities receiving them. This was very much appreciated by these rural populations.'[77]*

As demonstrated in the deployment map below, UNAMSIL's deployment was extensive and it created a presence in the nation that helped provide a space for building the peace. There are a few sections of this deployment that are worth highlighting. The Sector 4 – Magburaka – had a focus on DDR up until January

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[76] Thusi. T. and Meek. S. Op. Cit. 2002. p. 66. See also Kai-Kai, F. Op. Cit. 2000. p. 122.
[77] Interviewee 15. Former European Union outreach professional. Freetown, Sierra Leone. 3 December 2009.

2002, with specific responsibility for the formal disarmament camps at Makeni, Magburaka and Kabala. Between December 2001 and March 2002, it also lent support to the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) to conduct its Community Arms Collection and Disposal (CACD) programme.[78]

From March 2002, Sector 4 also provided support to the National Electoral Commission (NEC). This involved the secure transportation of election materials to all polling stations in the sector, the establishment of a patrol base to ensure security for the elections, and the retrieval of electoral materials once the ballots had been cast. The sector also provided transport for the 670 SLP members that were deployed for the elections throughout the sector's area of responsibility.

The continuing poor state of governance and community services was of concern to Sector 4. Some of the issues raised included the paramount chiefs' lack of respect for the authority of the District Officers (Dos); the judiciary not being represented, that revenue collection remains non-existent, and that schools had not yet reopened. Sector 4 utilised its own resources to launch a number of projects for the locals which were appreciated. These were in the areas of educational and developmental assistance, sports and cultural development, and the provision of agricultural equipment and advice.

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[78] See Malan, M. UNAMSIL After the Elections. Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. 2002. p. 43.

Figure 2: The UNAMSIL Deployment Chart shows all the areas in which the peacekeepers were deployed by 2002. It shows the deployment was national and extensive.

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An engineering project for the reconstruction of the Mile 91–Robol road was also carried out. The significance of this project lies in the fact that the old road was virtually impassable, and many locals chose to travel from Mile 91 to Robol and Magburaka via Makeni, adding much time and cost to the journey. On the upgraded road the distance can be covered in an hour. This helped stimulate the movement of people and goods, and has thus made a significant contribution to the future development of the area.[79] These efforts by the UNAMSIL peacekeepers not only helped to build the peace but also improved the military-civilian relations between the mission and the population.

Improved government control of the diamond trade undoubtedly contributed to the signs of economic upturn during 2000. Sierra Leone exported a total of 132,394 carats between October 2000 and May 2001, earning US $17.34 million after a new certification system, aimed at curbing the illicit trade in 'conflict diamonds' mined in rebel-held areas, was introduced.[80]

Government control over diamond extraction and the diamond trade helped economic recovery, but also helped to curb the resources used to fuel the conflict. Hence, control of the industry was seen by many as an essential key to the Sierra Leone peace process, but one area that UNAMSIL found itself limited to act in due to the sheer complexity of the issues at stake.[81]

The major challenge for UNAMSIL in this area was that it had neither the mandate nor the manpower to control alluvial mining. As Ms. Pratt has commented, 'The ultimate test [of the peace process] will be the diamond areas of Kono and Tongo Field. Until both the RUF and the ... CDF cede full control of these areas to ... UNAMSIL and full control of diamond mining to the Government of Sierra Leone... , it would be premature to believe that peace has been achieved.'[82]

This clearly demonstrates the diverse nature of the issues in a post-conflict environment, and that while diamond mining had economic and security concerns: 'it also has a deep sociological dimension that should not be ignored during the longer-term phase of peace-building in Sierra Leone. The short-term concerns of the "security first" lobby are indeed valid, but need to be viewed in a holistic context.' [83]

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[79] See Gotab, E. Op. Cit. 2002.
[80] See Peace with Diamonds? Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight. Malan, M., Rakate, P. & McIntyre, A. Published in Monograph 68. 2002. p. 53.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Pratt, D. Sierra Leone News, 9 August 2001.Cited in Peace with Diamonds? Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight. Malan, M., Rakate, P. & McIntyre, A. Published in Monograph 68. 2002. p. 53.
[83] Peace with Diamonds? Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight. Malan, M., Rakate, P. & McIntyre, A. Published in Monograph 68. 2002. p. 53.

5.1.3   The Information and Media Campaign

> *'If the legitimacy of a peace operation depends in large measure on internal support, then the ultimate success of an operation depends heavily on relations between the intervening forces and the local population – and particularly on local perceptions of force credibility.* [84]

IM's are essentially a joint military and civilian endeavour and thus require public support in order to realise their mission goals. The central plinth of public information is to gain and maintain broad support and understanding for the peace operations. Public information can be used by the leadership of the mission to build trust and convince the parties to the conflict and the population to engage in peaceful courses of action.[85] It is also a way of disseminating information as well as countering the spread of incorrect and often inflammatory information that spreads so quickly in the absence of reliable, authoritative and consistent information messages.

At any point within a conflict, fear plays a major role in determining peoples actions as they strive to survive. In such circumstances people tend to re-act very quickly to security information that suggests their lives are in danger regardless of whether this information is correct or not. This often leads to people acting in ways that prolong the conflict because no-one is willing to take a risk with their lives by waiting to see if the information is correct or not before taking steps to protect themselves. This is especially so if they do not have access to a reliable source of information.

In 1999 when UNAMSIL arrived in Sierra Leone, there was one government owned television station for an estimated population of 4.5 million and three FM radio stations all concentrated in Freetown. On the other hand, there were newspapers everywhere as they were cheap and easy to set up.[86] An important feature of these newspapers was that:

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[84] Malan, M. UNAMSIL After the Elections. In Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. 2002. p. 43.

[85] See Coker, P. The Role of the Media and Public Information. Chapter 4 in Sierra Leone: Building the Road Recovery. Published in Monograph No. 80, March 2003. p. 1

[86] See Coker, P. Op.Cit. 2003. p. 7.

> *'These newspapers served various partisan interests and their views about the way forward were as diversified as the interests they represented. Strikingly, these views were mostly largely uninformed and sometimes downright negative. Nonetheless, these newspapers had a pervasive influence on people and were major opinion-moulders.'[87]*

UNAMSIL, like UNOMSIL before it, was grossly misunderstood at the beginning. Whereas ECOMOG had fought the rebels, UNAMSIL was mandated to assist the government in implementing the Lomé Peace Accord of July 1999 and its mandate did not permit recourse to war should a warring faction become belligerent.

Plans to talk peace with the rebels faced internal opposition prior to the signing of the peace agreement as most of the civilian population did not trust the rebels and felt it was pointless talking peace with them.[88] Hence, when UNAMSIL was deployed 'Initial opposition to peace talks was transferred on to the UN peacekeepers, as it was thought that the UN, together with powerful countries, arm-twisted the president into signing the Lomé Accord. The RUF did not help matters. Almost immediately after Lomé, the RUF began to violate the agreement. In May 2000 they took 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage, capturing their arms and ammunition.'[89] When this incident occurred, both the international[90] and national press responded negatively to UNAMSIL.

> *'The local press added insult to injury, referring to the mission as a 'toothless bulldog'. It described as disgraceful the abductions of more than 500 peacekeepers, and even agitated for the mission to be closed. In fact, local newspapers coined the word 'U-NASTY' to mean UNAMSIL, and substituted 'beach-keepers' for peacekeepers in their reporting on the mission. Within UNAMSIL, morale quickly plummeted.'[91]*

In these times of fear and uncertainty – as in all other times – the perception of things is as good as the reality. Therefore, it is important to get the right message across when the mission is engaged in peace-building.

There was a need to address this misunderstanding of the role UNAMSIL would play and to reduce the gap of expectations that the population had to those that UNAMSIL was mandated to deliver. The people of Sierra Leone - not just the

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[87] Ibid. p. 17.
[88] Interviewee 1. OH Civil Society Activist, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 24 November 2009.
[89] See Coker, P. Op. Cit. 2002. p. 7.
[90] Traube, J. New York Review of Books, June 2000.
[91] Coker, P. Op. Cit. 2002. p. 2.

civilian population, but also those from the RUF and other fighting factions - needed to understand and accept that the tasks the peacekeepers were to carry out under UN Security Council Resolution 1270, did not include going to war with any of the parties.

UNAMSIL developed an aggressive communications and information strategy to counter the bad image it had obtained. A UNAMSIL public information section was restructured and organised into various units: radio, print, community liaison and spokesperson's office. Each unit had specific duties and responsibilities, although all the sections worked in together as a team.[92]

At the time though, the majority of the population, including the rank and file of the RUF, ARFC and West Side Boys, resided in the interior and were insulated from the information campaign that took place in Freetown on a daily basis. This meant that the country was polarised in what they thought and understood to be happening depending on their geographical location: Freetown residents often thought quite differently from people in the interior. This made it difficult to mobilise the population in general in support of any one particular initiative.[93]

With radio being one of the most effective means of conveying messages in Sierra Leone – it being a predominantly oral culture – a UN radio called "Radio UNAMSIL: The Voice of Peace," was set up with a much wider coverage than the other FM stations in Freetown. It broadcasted 24 hours a day, seven days a week, on FM and short-wave frequencies.

The radio, more than any other form of the communication and information campaign, was the most effective at reaching the majority of the population with a single message of peace. Distorted messages that may have been sent out by partisan media were quickly corrected using radio UNAMSIL. It did not take too long before this radio station became the main source of information for the majority of the people un Sierra Leone.[94]

UNAMSIL enlarged their media campaign with the appointment of a Mission Spokesperson, Ms. Margaret Novicki. Patrick Coker explains that Ms. Novicki monitored media and information developments both within the mission and in the national media with great sensitivity. Press conferences were initially called on a daily basis to update journalists on the latest developments. The press conferences made the mission more accessible and provided an understanding of what the mission was doing or trying to do. The national and international media could now deal directly with the mission and get answers to their questions directly, instead of using second party sources. These press conferences were very useful in creating a better image for the mission. As the situation with

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[92] Ibid. p. 3.
[93] See Coker, P. Op. Cit. 2002. p. 1-2.
[94] Ibid. p. 4.

regards to the dissemination of information and the image of the mission improved, the meetings were moved to being held on a weekly basis.[95]

Information gathered by the military-observers was collated in a civilian situation report. The actual report was distributed to all mission units, who then added their specialist interpretation and analysis. It was, however, emphasised that in order to make the information as useful as possible, there was a need for greater civil-military co-ordination and co-operation in this process. The "clients" for such assessments included not only UNAMSIL and the UN agencies, but also other key agencies such as the NCDDR and other government departments, as well as a wide variety of NGOs involved in community-level assistance programmes and projects. 'The military observers covered about 30 villages per day, or an average of about 900 per month, so they are indeed the "eyes and ears", not only of the force, but of the mission and all its various components.'[96]

5.1.4 The Value of Diplomacy

While all the structures and mechanisms were in place for UNAMSIL to carry out peace building activities in this integrated mission, diplomacy did play an important role in building the peace.

With all the uncertainty and tactical manoeuvring that the RUF – and particularly Foday Sankoh – engaged in, it was almost impossible to have any form of predictability as to what the RUF would do next in the peace process. Predictability is a central tenet to building relationships with counterparts within a peace-building mission. With the emergence of Issa Sesay, the process of demobilising RUF was smooth and fast. He actively sought to demobilise the RUF and worked very closely with UNAMSIL to achieve this. His actions matched his words which made the operations much more predictable and thereby facilitated for the timely execution of plans.

An interviewee explained that Issa Sesay was instrumental in convincing the other RUF commanders and especially Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie in Kailahun, to agree to the Lomé Peace Accord negotiations, prior to Issa Sesay taking command of RUF. The interviewee also claimed that the UNAMSIL negotiators in Kailahun identified Issa Sesay as someone they could work with and develop reliable plans, and thus focused their diplomatic efforts on him.[97]

In 2000, UNAMSIL became more innovative with their approach by using different forms of diplomacy. This started at the UN headquarters where, a panel

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[95] See Coker, P. Op. Cit. 2002. p. 5.
[96] Malan, M. UNAMSIL After the Elections. In Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. 2002. p. 10-11.
[97] Interviewee 13. SB. L. C., Freetown, Sierra Leone. 28 November 2009.

chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi on UN peacekeeping reform was instrumental in underlining the need for peace enforcement to deal with spoilers.[98] Thusi and Meek argue that 'There were other problems associated with a lack of trust between the RUF and the CDF, which also had an impact on the pace of disarmament. It was in part due to the diplomatic skills of UNAMSIL that the continuation of the DD process was on occasion ensured.'[99] This was spearheaded on the ground by UNAMSIL's SRSG Oluyemi Adenigi, where he pursued a 'skilful negotiation strategy, the so-called "Kambia Formula," which led to the successful implementation of the Abuja ceasefire agreements and the phased disarmament of the rebels.'[100]

As part of UNAMSIL's diplomatic efforts, the SRSG arranged a key meeting in Abuja, Ivory Coast, on the 2nd of May 2001. This meeting led to the pro-government CDF's decision to disarm simultaneously, starting in the Kambia district, where fighting between RUF and the Guinean army was continuous. 'Known as "the Kambia Formula", this decision was "the crucial step which accelerated the peace process in post-May 2000", in the words of the SRSG. Besides enabling fast implementation of the DDR issue, he said, it resolved regional difficulties linked to Guinea's attitude.'[101]

This was not the only diplomatic measure taken by the SRSG and this was acknowledged in the tenth report on UNAMSIL, 25 June 2001. The report noted that 'disarmament of RUF and CDF in Kambia and Port Loko concluded on schedule, and the Sierra Leonean army completed its deployment in the Kambia district on 31 May. RUF had released 591 child combatants on 25 May and 178 on 4 June. Clashes between CDF and RUF in the Kono district ceased after discussions between UNAMSIL and the local commanders of both groups.'[102]

UNAMSIL's diplomatic efforts were strengthened by the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as US Permanent Representative to the United Nations who played a key role in securing the release of US funds for UNAMSIL. This was important because money plays a big role in diplomacy. If the carrot and stick principle is used, then one must have money to follow through. Talking diplomacy that is unable to deliver the implementation of agreements is worthless, especially in conflict areas where there is still lots of uncertainty,

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[98] See Oliver, G.F. The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It? 2000.

[99] Thusi. T. and Meek. S. Op. Cit. 2002. p 83-85.

[100] See Sola-Martin, A. Reviews. The Journal of Modern African Studies. Cambridge University Press, Manchester University. 2009. p. 161.

[101] Oluyemi Adeniji, 'End of assignment report of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone', quoted in Yabi, G. "Sierra Leone" in Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities. 2009. p. 179.

[102] Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/627, 25 June 2001.

mistrust and hidden agendas. If parties agree to something, it often involves a financial cost to carry that out, and if the diplomat – in this case the SRSG - does not have the finance or cannot mobilise the finance, then the agreement is non-existent. The UK military presence "over the horizon" as Yabi puts it, also proved to be an effective strategy to deter spoilers of the peace process.[103] (Bearing in mind the fate the West Side Boys suffered at the hands of the British military).

5.2 Challenges Faced by UNAMSIL

One of the main challenges UNAMSIL faced was one purely of coordination. At the time of UNAMSILs deployment, there were many organisations on the scene. In any Integrated Mission (IM), the sheer scale of fragmentation is a huge challenge. The diversity of the actors, their legal standings - for example, regional organisations, UN Agencies, NGO's - their organisational structures, programme cycles and cultures as well as goals, may differ across all the actors which makes it very difficult to coordinate. Importantly, the fact that they have their own resources, access to resources and control of their resources, means that they have virtual autonomy. This is juxtaposed against the military sector, which is also marked by a variety of traditions, cultures and objectives.[104] However, all these actors are interdependent as no one actor can reach the common goal on their own.

As mentioned before, UNAMSIL entered Sierra Leone at a time when there were incidents of continued ceasefire violations. The experience of the aggression of ECOMOG[105] and the lack of military protection from UNOMSIL meant that there was a great deal of uncertainty and mistrust amongst the population. This, in turn, added another challenge to the effectiveness of the peace-building initiatives under UNAMSIL.

5.2.1   Internal Mission Cohesion

Internal cohesion for an IM is very important, if the IM is to embark on a coherent and consistent peace-building approach. Incidentally, 'One of the most important mission training needs articulated by the human rights section was for

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[103] See Yabi, G. Op. Cit. 2009. p. 180.
[104] See Pugh. M. Op. Cit. 2003. p. 110-111.
[105] ECOMOG had been heavily engaged in militarily fighting the RUF forces for several years and due to the attacks upon them and the high number of ECOMOG deaths, the soldiers were very aggressive in their pursuit of RUF/ARFC combatants in Freetown and this spilt over to civilians foul to ECOMOG's defensive aggression since the RUF/ARFC fighters did not wear uniforms and were difficult to tell apart from ordinary civilians.

cross-sectional or inter-component training on the role and functions of each element of UNAMSIL. According to the human rights section there is a very low level of comprehension among mission personnel about the work that people do beyond their immediate section, and thus very limited understanding of how to interact with and contribute to the broader mission objectives.'[106] While there was a progressive external media campaign to improve communications, there was need to improve in-house communication, coherence and coordination.

This was pronounced more so in UNAMSIL with regards to the multinational troops serving the mission. Troops came from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Parkistan, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia.

Having cohesion and coherence amongst such a diverse group of military personnel presents a big challenge. The different soldiers have been trained in vastly different doctrines, are of very different levels of professionalism, possess different types of weaponry and logistical equipment and with many unprepared to cope with the tactics of the armed groups. There were constant calls from the UN Secretariat to troop contributing states to provide peacekeepers with standard UN equipment. This was again highlighted after the incidents in Makeni in 2000 where the report to the Secretary General actually noted that: 'UNAMSIL was reinforced by the arrival of 300 'well-trained and well equipped troops' from Jordan.'[107] The fact that the report explicitly makes mention of this does suggest that "good training and equipment" was not the norm for some of the peacekeepers that had already been deployed.[108]

While the issue of equipment and training plagues even well organised organisations such as NATO, this does not mean that improvements in this area cannot or should not be carried out.

Another challenge towards cohesion was that of national caveats. National caveats are when countries who contribute troops to the mission impose rules on how those troops ought to be used. It sometimes entails national forces taking orders directly from their capitals and thus by-passing the UN command. In multinational operations, such caveats are somewhat commonplace.[109] The Nigerian command and troops, for instance, was heavily suspected of listening

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[106] "Interview with Ms. Lizabeth Cullity, Human Rights Officer, Freetown, 22 August 2002. Quoted in Malan, M. UNAMSIL After the Elections. In Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. 2002. p. 23.

[107] Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 19 May 2000.

[108] See Yabi, G. Op. Cit. 2009. p. 172.

[109] See Ekengard, A. Op. Cit. August 2009, P. 27.

first and foremost to their government while with ECOMOG and then later when their troops came under UNAMSIL.[110] Again, this meant that the mission was pushing in different directions.

A good example where this was demonstrated was during the ceasefire period and after signing the Lomé Peace Agreement where all factions moved troops and weapons. 'These movements, especially those by the RUF were aimed at gaining territory at the expense of Government. In addition, the willingness of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops was not matched by UNAMSIL's determination to demonstrate robustness in peacekeeping. These differences in approach among the peacekeepers were also exploited by the RUF and AFRC to start violations of the ceasefire and the peace agreement on different occasions.'[111]

A combination of the above exacerbated the challenge of creating cohesion and coherence and as one writer has commented:

> *'Regrettably, much of the current UNAMSIL force is inadequate, and its soldiers are not willing to put their lives at risk in a conflict in which they have no direct interest. ... Peacekeepers in May 2000 put up little resistance to RUF attempts to disarm them in Makeni. Rather than disarming combatants, they contributed a significant array of weaponry and equipment to the arsenal of the RUF. An informal poll of the rules of engagement by various contingents revealed that they would return fire if under attack but that they considered themselves under no obligation to go to the rescue of another country's soldiers in UNAMSIL.'[112]*

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[110] See Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy. ICG Africa Report No. 28. 11 April 2001 Page 20.

[111] Kai-Kai, F. Op. Cit. 2000. p. 124.

[112] Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy ICG Africa Report No 28. 11 April 2001. p.2.

6 Conclusions

This study has provided an overview and an analysis of the peace-building activities carried out through the Integrated Mission, UNAMSIL, and how these activities contributed to the peace-building process within Sierra Leone, between 1999 and 2002. The context of deployment was of grave importance as we have seen that the circumstances UNAMSIL found on the ground, very much dictated the way in which UNAMSIL could manoeuvre.

UNAMSIL was deployed into a post-modern conflict situation that required an integrated approach in order to maintain the fragile peace and simultaneously build long lasting peace. The leadership provided by UNAMSIL gave it the ability to coordinate much more effectively both the military and civilian sides of the mission. UNAMSIL also engage in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building activities simultaneously and not necessarily sequentially.

From a peace-building perspective, it is clear that there were a number of key areas within which the mission succeeded. UNAMSIL was instrumental in the DDR programmes which helped create the belief that peace was a tangible entity. It carried out successful national outreach programmes that helped to not only build the peace but also improve civil-military relations and enhance UNAMSIL's image amongst the national population. The Information and media campaigns were successful in getting out a consistent message to all across the country which helped to bring together the diverse national factions. But this campaign was also critical in establishing a national presence in Sierra Leone along side the deployment of peacekeepers and civilian staff. As is acknowledged in peace-building theory, the acceptance of the mission by the local population will enhance its ability to achieve its goals.

While the mission faced a number of external challenges such as the start-stop DDR process, numerous violations of the ceasefire, lack of resources for the reintegration components of the DDR and the challenges the physical environment presented, the internal challenge that confronted it the most was that of cohesion.

While it is safe to say that Sierra Leone is now a peaceful country, it is also fair to say that it is still a fragile state and that the peace has not been entirely built a decade after UNAMSIL was deployed.

6.1.1 Considerations for future missions

It is important for any peace mission and its mandate to consider the factors fuelling the conflict and prescribe ways to legally constrain those factors. The example of the RUF continued diamond mining – a resource that the RUF used

to sponsor much of their fighting – was still a source of income for the RUF after the conflict and how UN Resolution 1306 (2000) was used to thwart this, is a good example.

A detailed and thorough mapping of the conflict including all the actors, their interests, sources of revenue and relationships would be important in order to anticipate some of the unorthodox issues that a post-modern conflict may throw up. This may enable the mission to devise ways of dealing with the fears and uncertainties of the warring factions that may lead them to defect from the peace agreements if they suspect that their interests are being threatened. This will certainly help inform and thus arm those carrying out the diplomatic efforts.

Military peace-building activities carried out in civilian areas should have a high visibility and impact, demonstrating an immediate benefit from the presence of the peacekeeping force.

Creating a national presence and demonstrating some momentum in the peace process is important as it enforces the impression that the peace process is genuine and making progress. The perception that peace is being established has a strong force among the population and can weaken the position of spoilers.

Combining peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building and carrying them out simultaneously is an important aspect of building the peace from the outset. However, certain aspects of the process may need to take on more emphasis or importance at certain stages in the process. Peacekeeping and the prevention of relapse into conflict will have to take priority in the beginning, because if there is no individual or community security and society cannot function properly then no reform of governance institutions or the economy will make progress.

The information and media campaign led by UNAMSIL demonstrated how important it is to get out consistent and correct messages of peace to the population at large. Building peace consists to a large extent of building trust, security and the perception that peace is now a reality. The role the mission is supposed to play under its specific UN chapter and mandate should also be clearly articulated from the outset in order to bridge the gap of expectations. When a UN mission arrives in any conflict situation the expectations of the local population are going to be very high and therefore it is important to bring some realism to what the UN will actually deliver. This will also help develop trust and goodwill between the mission and the local populations.

The concepts and practice of IM's are all about creating coordination and coherence in order to have a greater effect on peace-building. However, this must apply to the activities with the external actors to the mission as well as being a principle for the workings within the mission.

Real steps towards peace-building will require a concerted effort in the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants and the civilian population in general.

The risk of recruitment and re-recruitment for criminal and violent activity is high in post conflict settings and this can easily derail the peace process. Sierra Leone narrowly escaped this risk, although the risk of conflict breaking out remains a concern.

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