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ECCAS Capabilities in Peace and Security

A scoping study on progress and challenges

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Sammanfattning

Inom ramen för FOI:s Studier i Afrikansk säkerhet skrivs ett flertal rapporter som syftar till att öka kunskapen om den afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen (APSA). En fullständig förståelse för Afrikansk säkerhetspolitik, och särskilt APSA, kan inte nås utan en god inblick i de regionala mekanismerna som utgör dess byggstenar. Som en del av FOI:s studieserie redogörs i den här rapporten för Centralafrika och den regionala organisationen *Economic Community of Central African States* (ECCAS) med fokus på dess strukturer för fred och säkerhet.

Rapporten ger en översyn av det fortskridande arbetet med att operationalisera dessa strukturer och lyfter fram kvarstående utmaningar. Två viktiga beståndsdelar av ECCAS freds- och säkerhetsstruktur står särskilt i fokus: den Multinationella Styrkan för Centralafrika (FOMAC) och det Centralafrikanska konfliktförvarningssystemet (MARAC). Utöver dessa ger rapporten också en överblick av den politiska dynamik som existerar i regionen och som ligger till grund för ECCAS:s förutsättningar inom det säkerhetspolitiska området.

Slutligen för rapporten även ett resonemang om stöd från partners och externa givare för uppbyggnaden av ECCAS:s freds- och säkerhetsstrukturer och belyser viktiga frågor att hålla i åtanke inför bildandet av sådana partnerskap.

Nyckelord: ECCAS, FOMAC, MARAC, CEEAS, Centralafrika, Afrikanska freds-och säkerhetsarkitekturen, APSA

Summary

As the emerging structures for peace and security in Africa continue to evolve FOI, though its Studies in African Security Programme, has published several reports on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). A comprehensive grasp of APSA cannot be obtained without understanding the regional mechanisms which form part of it. As part of the APSA study-series this report has been conducted to obtain and promote knowledge about the peace and security structures in Central Africa, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

The report examines the recent level of progress in putting the regional peace and security architecture into operation and highlights remaining challenges ahead for this work. Two particular elements of the ECCAS peace and security architecture are in focus of the study: *the current status of the Multinational Force of Central Africa* (FOMAC), and *the Central African early warning system* (MARAC). An addition, the report maps member state dynamics to provide a better understand of the context in which ECCAS operates. Lastly, the report provides a brief discussion on the support from external donors to ECCAS peace and security structures and highlights some aspects needed to be taken into consideration ahead of potential future partnerships with ECCAS.

Keywords: ECCAS, FOMAC, MARAC, CEEAC, Central Africa, African Peace and Security Architecture

Table of Content

Acknowledgements

Map of ECCAS member states[1]

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[1] African Union, *ECCAS Overview*

Executive Summary

The emerging structures for peace and security in Africa continue to evolve. International partners seeking to cooperate with these structures benefit from a thorough understanding of the context, challenges and opportunities that lie ahead of this evolution. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the continental level effort to provide conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction support. A comprehensive grasp of the African politico-security context in general, and of APSA in particular, cannot be obtained without understanding the regional mechanisms which form part of it. This report has been conducted to obtain and promote knowledge about the peace and security structures in Central Africa, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

More specifically, *the aim of the report is to examine the recent level of progress in putting the regional peace and security architecture into operation, as well as to identify remaining challenges ahead for this work*. The report considers primarily two particular elements of the ECCAS peace and security architecture: the *current status of the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC)*, and *the Central African early warning system (MARAC)*. An additional ambition of this report is to map member state dynamics, as these relations are vital to grasp in order to understand the context in which ECCAS operates. Lastly, the report also provides a brief discussion on the support from external donors to ECCAS peace and security structures, as well as some aspects to consider ahead of potential future partnerships with ECCAS.

Regarding **member state dynamics**, there seems to be *a lack of regional identity* which negatively influences the progress of regional integration. There are wide disparities within the REC and member states have different loyalties, especially as they are members of different, overlapping, regional organizations. As a result, ECCAS is characterised as an organisation with high ambitions, but one that lacks the political will to realise these ambitions.

In the absence of a consensus on priorities and the pace at which to pursue integration, the strictly intergovernmental character of ECCAS and the weakness of control mechanisms become particularly challenging, as the body does not have the supranational institutions to act as a mediator or driving force to resolve political impasses and revive the process.[2]

The fact that there is no hegemonic power that is driving regional integration in ECCAS has further hampered integration. However, this fact also holds a

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[2] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival*, p. 27

potential for ECCAS to gain more pace as Angola, and to a certain extent the DRC, begin to affirm themselves in ECCAS.

In terms of its **track record**, ECCAS has consistently failed to address the region's most pressing peace and security needs. Instead, member states have often looked to external actors, such as the UN and other African states or regional bodies, for support and assistance in responding to conflict.

On the **non-military** side, ECCAS is showing a growing effectiveness in election monitoring and assistance. Nevertheless, criticism among the ECCAS countries remains a sensitive issue, and statements following electoral observation risk staying at a superficial level, especially since the organization lacks official principles of governance. Mediation remains a challenging task, partly because there is lack of political commitment to act as a joint community under an ECCAS label, but perhaps also because of an absence of a Central African leader with the necessary political legitimacy or credibility that would be required to engage in mediation. When compared to other regional bodies, such as ECOWAS and SADC, ECCAS also stands out as not having a regional mediation equivalent to the continental Panel of the Wise.

Despite the reluctance to take leadership in response to conflicts in the region, countries in the region have managed to mobilize a collective **military** response to the conflict in CAR. The other major regional organization in Central Africa – CEMAC – deployed the military mission FOMUC, and since 2008, this has been replaced by the ECCAS-led multinational peace consolidation mission, MICOPAX. A positive sign of collective commitment is that all ECCAS member states (except the host nation) contribute at least a small number of staff to the mission. Still, the mission has not been able to adequately respond to major threats in order to enhance security in a sustainable manner. This could partly be ascribed a narrow focus on state security at the expense of social, political and economic needs and other aspects of human security. Common for both of these missions is the heavy reliance on external partners funding, with the EU and France covering almost 50 per cent and 30 per cent of the costs respectively.

Whereas the AU embraces a newer, multi-dimensional notion of security that includes issues of human security, ECCAS has so far shown *a narrow interpretation of security* with an emphasis on hard security issues and developing capacities for such issues. For example, the Protocol on the establishment of COPAX, regulating the Central African peace and security architecture, clearly emphasizes its military dimension.[3] Similarly, FOMAC has prioritised military and gendarme/military police capacities over the development of the civilian component. The already noted absence of a mediation organ is equally a sign of a lack of attention given to civilian mechanisms to deal with

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[3] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival*, p. 19

peace and security issues. This discrepancy begs the question whether ECCAS is developing adequate capacities for addressing non-traditional security challenges that confronts its member states.[4] As a consequence, it might be improving its capacities to address manifestations of crises, but not necessarily their fundamental causes.[5]

A related challenge is that ECCAS has not taken an active role in opening up its institutions towards civil society. In order to overcome this, ECCAS needs to find ways of promoting engagement of civil society in the area of peace and security.[6]

A perhaps more fundamental challenge to human security is that in cases of intrastate conflicts, ECCAS does not allow for intervention in its member states without a host-nation invitation.[7] This means that the organization does not have the same 'non-indifference' principle as the continental body AU, which allows for interventions in its member states if widespread violations of human rights are committed.

When examining the recent level of progress in putting the regional peace and security architecture into operation, it has been noted that advancements towards the establishment of the standby force of Central Africa, **FOMAC**, has been much slower than for corresponding forces in West Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa.[8] Chronic underfunding from the start, and conflicts in the region in the following years, has prevented the efforts. There is a lack of resources at the General Secretariat and an over-reliance on external support.

Still, steps towards FOMAC's formation have been taken since 2006. Preliminary troop pledges were made in 2008 for the horizon of 2010, but these are yet to be realized. Currently, the organization aims at full operational capability by 2015 and initial, rapid deployment, operational capability no later than 2013. Following the 2010 multinational training exercise, 'Kwanza', the pace in establishing FOMAC has picked up and leadership for its formation was taken by Angola. Serious weaknesses still exist, especially in terms of organisation and planning. For the police, clear concepts and doctrines are

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[4] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa,* p. 154

[5] Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management* 20101027

[6] Cosme, N. and Fiacre, Y., 2001, *The Economic Community of Central Africa States and human Security* as presented in Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa,* p. 160; Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management* 20101027

[7] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa,* p. 159

[8] Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. 2005. *Progress with the African Standby Force*

lacking and they are poorly equipped. As for the civilian component, Kwanza was the first time that civilian elements were present during an ECCAS peacekeeping exercise and difficulties were noted in terms of understanding its role and taking the specificities of this component into account. Another common challenge for the different elements is the different levels of operational preparation and pre-training among contributors from different countries.

Regarding the Central African Early Warning system, **MARAC**, it is responsible for observing and monitoring developments pertaining to risk for conflict in the sub-region. While the idea is that early warning should lead to early response, the process is not yet developed to the extent that COPAX is adequately briefed or makes decisions on suitable action. The ambition was to have MARAC fully operational by the end of 2010. However, several challenges remain, including grave financial and human resource limitations. An urgent need is the recruitment of personnel to MARAC. As things stand, MARAC does not have the resources to send observers to embark on investigations. While there are plans to establish a sub-office in each member state, currently only half of the member states have such offices. Another challenge in terms of communicating early warning is that there is no standardized method for sending information to the continental system, CEWS, in Addis Ababa.

Regarding **external donors' support to ECCAS** peace and security structures, the EU and France are the largest international partners. In the absence of a strong regional leader among the ECCAS countries, this role has often been taken indirectly by **France**. In fact, by financing 25-30 per cent of the MICOPAX operation, and providing approximately 150 military personnel to ensure its operational support, France could be seen as providing a stronger response than the ECCAS states themselves.[9]

As the biggest donor to ECCAS, the **EU** provides support through three different channels: the 10th European Development Fund regional program; the African Peace Facility (APF); and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Together these three channels provide funding for capacity building, support to training and peacekeeping operations (including financing of 50 per cent of the MICOPAX budget); conflict prevention and peace consolidation as well as support for critical marine routes, actions to prevent, combat and control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) as well as support for prevention of and fight against terrorism.

Another big actor in the region, the **US**, does not have a formal relationship with ECCAS, but it engages foremost bilaterally with the individual member states. Existing cooperation between the US and ECCAS member states is mainly focussed on maritime security. This includes joint patrolling, with actions against

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[9] Central Africa researcher 1; ECCAS International partner 5

criminal activities and maritime piracy, and training exercises. Beyond this, the US engages in technical and material support.

One partnership that would seem to need strengthening is between ECCAS and the AU. Despite the adoption of an MoU between the AU and the RECs, there is a need for clarifying the precise role of each organization.

Overall, given the institutional weakness of the organization, the capacity of ECCAS to absorb funds is insufficient. As a consequence, only a part of the funds made available to ECCAS was actually paid out from the EU. Despite this challenge, **potential future partnerships with ECCAS** should consider the fact that the end of fighting in several ECCAS countries provides a window of opportunity to build peace and ensure post-conflict reconstruction and development in a sub-region that has been largely ignored by traditional donors. This will require promoting strong and operational communitarian bodies. In this light, it would seem desirable to enhance ECCAS' institutional capacity, especially by addressing its chronic shortfall in human, technical and institutional capacity. Beyond these institutional challenges, structural areas for improvement includes moving regional integration beyond the present state of intergovernmental cooperation as well as to enhance the interface with civil society in conflict management.

In conclusion it can be noted that ECCAS suffers from a number of challenges, which are hampering its development. Among these challenges are its *weak institutional capacity, narrow definition of security, the countries' lack of regional identity,* and *the impact of external partners*.

Broadly speaking the *institutional weakness* of ECCAS can be attributed both to operational issues, including the inputs such as financial and human resources as well as political will and to more structural issues, concerning whether ECCAS has an appropriate structure for its tasks.[10] Together this institutional weakness hampers its ability to contribute as a building block for continental security within APSA.

At a most basic level, ECCAS is unable to effectively mobilize sufficient resources to fund its work, partly because its internal capacity is weak, and partly because of a lack of political will among member states.[11] As a result, ECCAS relies heavily on external funding to meet core organizational and community mandates. This leaves ECCAS open to donor-driven priorities which could further erode political commitment to the organization.[12] Despite donor-funded capacity-building initiatives, ECCAS also lacks the minimum of organizational

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[10] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa*

[11] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

[12] Ibid

capacity to implement regional integration projects, as the regional body lacks a critical mass of competent staff members to drive the regional integration plan.[13]

In short, though, it remains hard to assess how far ECCAS has really come; what capability is really reached, and what the troop pledges are as no exact figures can be obtained. However, a general sentiment is that the work has picked up pace since the multinational exercise, Kwanza, took place in 2010. Since then, a certain development is taking place but any assessment needs a portion of caution, as what is true today could be false tomorrow.

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[13] African Capacity Building Foundation 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 256

1 Introduction

1.1 Context

The emerging structures for peace and security in Africa continue to evolve. International partners seeking to cooperate with these structures benefit from a thorough understanding of the context, challenges and opportunities that lie ahead of this evolution.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the continental level effort to provide conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction support. Among other things, APSA includes the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Continental Early Warning System.[14] Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms[15] constitute the building blocks of APSA, and five of these are responsible for the implementation of the ASF on a regional level (ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, EASFCOM and NARC). In other words, the work of these regional actors in the field of peace and security clearly link them to the broader APSA under the auspices of the AU.

A comprehensive grasp of the African politico-security context in general, and of APSA in particular, cannot be obtained without understanding the regional mechanisms which form part of it. This report has been conducted to obtain and promote knowledge about the peace and security structures in Central Africa, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

1.2 Aim and Method

The report seeks to increase the level of knowledge about ECCAS as an organisation and actor within the field of peace and security in Africa. More

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[14] Other important elements include: the AU Peace and Security Council; The Panel of the Wise; The Military Staff Committee; the Commissioner for Peace and Security (under the AU Commission), with its Peace and Security Directorate as well as the Continental Early Warning System. For FOI's earlier research on the topic see e.g. Bogland et al (2008; Derblom and Hull, 2009.

[15] The designated RECs are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Arab Magreb Union (UMA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Regional Mechanisms are the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) (now East African Standby Force , EASF) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).

specifically, *the aim of the report is to examine the recent level of progress in putting the regional peace and security architecture into operation, as well as to identify remaining challenges ahead for this work.* The report considers primarily two particular elements of the ECCAS peace and security architecture: the *current status of the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC)*, and *the Central African early warning system (MARAC).* The report further seeks to extract lessons from the achievements made by ECCAS as well as the stumbling-blocks the organisation has encountered, which could be useful for stakeholders involved in advancing the peace and security architecture also in other African regions. An additional ambition of this report is to map member state dynamics, as these relations are vital to grasp in order to understand the context in which ECCAS operates. Lastly, the report also provides a brief discussion on the support from external donors to ECCAS peace and security structures, as well as some aspects to consider ahead of potential future partnerships with ECCAS.[16]

The study is partly descriptive as it contains a general overview of the background and organisation of ECCAS, leading up to its contemporary structures. The study also focuses on ECCAS' frameworks for and activities in the area of peace and security, including a more detailed study of the organisations' means and mandates for conflict prevention and management, as well as of its track-record in this field. In addition to this type of mapping, the report provides an analysis of the political context of ECCAS' peace and security efforts, as well as the venture in realising the military and non-military elements of the peace and security architecture.

The research for this report was conducted using a range of both primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources include scholarly books and articles, while the primary sources are official documents such as treaties and doctrines, amongst others. In addition, interviews with official representatives from ECCAS, its member states, civil society and the international community have been carried out. The interviews were conducted during a research trip to Libreville, Gabon, in February 2011, as well as with relevant stakeholders within government and academia in Paris.

This report is part of a series of studies on the existing and emerging capabilities and structures for peace and security in Africa, conducted within the FOI Studies in African Security Programme on commission from the Swedish Ministry of Defence.

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[16] For further reading on the role of the EU and France's involvement in the area of African peace and security, see Elowson (2009) and Sörenson (2008) respectively.

1.3   Outline of the report

Following the introduction, chapter 2 opens with a description of the politics and regional dynamics of the Central African region. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is given, along with its history and organisational structure as well as the member state dynamics. Chapter 4 focuses especially on ECCAS' peace and security framework, giving an overview of ECCAS' structure including the key institutions to handle peace and security issues, and the technical organs of the Council of Peace and Security (COPAX). Furthermore, it examines ECCAS' military and non-military track record, giving the background to the CEMAC force FOMUC and the ECCAS peace consolidation force, MICOPAX, both handling the Central African Republic-conflict. Following this, chapter 5 describes ECCAS role in the African peace and security architecture (APSA) and includes analysis of ECCAS' early warning system, standby forces and its procedures for peacekeeping operations. In chapter 6, external partners' support and funding to ECCAS is explored. The chapter includes analysis regarding French, European and American involvement in the REC. Finally, chapter 7 summarises the findings and provides a conclusion focusing on the peace and security aspects of ECCAS. The conclusion sheds light on the recent level of progress in putting the regional peace and security architecture into operation, as well as the remaining challenges. Recommendations and suggestions on how to deal with present and upcoming challenges are an integral part of these.

2 Introducing Central Africa

2.1 Politics and regional dynamics

The region of Central Africa[17] was, in 2003, estimated to host 107 million inhabitants, equal to 12% of the continent's total population. About 70% of the population lives in rural areas.[18]

Human integration is impeded by the geographical characteristics of Central Africa. The sub-region has about four fifths of Africa's forests.[19] Vast areas are covered by the impenetrable forest, which makes transport and free flow of people impossible. At the same time, many of the countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and the Central African Republic (CAR) – share the forest, which means it has the potential to act as a common interest and hence further integration[20]

Central Africa is characterised by a diversity of climates and has other vast natural riches.[21] This includes mineral deposits (particularly in the Great Lakes region), including oil, as well as agricultural wealth. The hydro-electric potential of Central Africa is estimated to be so considerable that the sub-region could supply electricity to the whole of Africa.[22] In short, the region has very good economic prospects. However, the sizes of the economies in the region vary greatly and there are major income differences from one country to another. Angola, the biggest economy in the region, had a GDP of approximately USD 75 billion in 2009, whereas Sao Tomé & Principe, the smallest economy in the region, only reached a GDP of USD 0,188 billion.[23] Meanwhile, Equatorial Guinea had a GDP per capita of almost USD 15,000 in 2008, whereas Burundi, the poorest country in the region, had a GDP per capita of less than USD 150 in the same year.[24] Added to these challenges is an absence of strong institutions in many countries.[25] Despite the considerable natural-resource potential, this sub-

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[17] Here considered to include Angola. Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé & Principe. While Rwanda is generally considered to be part of Central Africa, it has been left out as it is not a member of either of the key regional organizations.

[18] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 256

[19] Ibid

[20] Central Africa researcher 1

[21] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 256

[22] Government of Spain *2009-2012 Africa Plan*, p. 93

[23] IMF, *World Economic Outlook Database April 2011*

[24] Ibid

[25] Government of Spain *2009-2012 Africa Plan* p. 93

region is still one of the most underdeveloped in Africa. The abundance of oil[26] in this zone has not had a significant impact on revenue growth and financial viability.[27] Protracted violent conflicts, most notably in the Great Lakes region as well as in Angola, have long prevented Central Africa from fully exploiting its abundant natural resources and rich agricultural lands.[28] Numerous coup d'états and political-military instability in the Republic of Congo, the CAR, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Burundi are part of the picture. The conflicts are set against the backdrop of deep poverty, illiteracy, and weak systems of governance. Undermined by unfavourable terms of trade, indebtedness and administrative failures, most ECCAS states have not responded adequately to the critical needs of their citizens.[29] The sub-region's vast mineral wealth, a contradiction amidst profound poverty, has attracted strong external interest and engagement that has more often than not exacerbated conflict and deepened instability.[30]

Structural problems such as extreme social inequalities and poor governance also continue to underpin instability in Central Africa.[31] The UNDP Human Development Index for 2010 classifies countries such as the DRC, Chad, CAR and Burundi to have the lowest HDI in the world (amongst Zimbabwe and Niger).[32] The weak social and economic indicators of the countries in the ECCAS region are compounded by the high prevalence[33] of HIV/AIDS. The civil wars and social strife that enveloped the region have also created conditions for the rapid spread of the pandemic. Pervasive cases of rape accelerated the spread of the disease amongst the population.[34]

However, a few countries in Central Africa have had relative political stability, and have experienced a relatively prolonged period of economic growth and prosperity, such as Cameroon and Gabon.[35] The former stands out because of its wealth in natural resources, especially oil, minerals and agriculture. The new Gulf of Guinea geopolitics, with the return to Cameroon by Nigeria of the Bakassi peninsula and the increasing interest in oil and gas exploitation, mean

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[26] The share of oil production in the GDP is 10 percent for Cameroon, 42 percent for Gabon, 54 percent for Congo, and 90 percent for Equatorial Guinea. Chad had just initiated oil production initiatives. No figure has been obtained for Angola and other ECCAS countries.

[27] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 103

[28] Ibid, p 257

[29] Ibid, p. 258

[30] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – *Peace and Security Architecture"*

[31] Ibid

[32] UNDP, Worldwide Trends in the Human Development Index 1970-2010

[33] Gapminder, *Adults with HIV (%, age 15-49)*

[34] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 259

[35] Ibid p. 258

that Cameroon is acquiring new relevance in the zone. Cameroon is one of the ten most developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Douala, the largest city of Cameroon, is the port of entry to Central Africa, and the literacy rate stands at 79%. Even if enjoying a relative political stability, the Cameroon government, headed since 1982 by President Paul Biya, does face difficulties in meeting the basic needs of the most disadvantaged social groups.[36]

During recent decades, Gabon has been able to draw on the invaluable resource of oil which has represented a significant factor of social and political stability in the country. Gabon ranks number five among Sub-Saharan African oil-producing countries; however a current decline in production means the country must diversify its economy.[37] The country has significant reserves of iron mineral and firewood trees, it is the world's second producer of manganese, and it has uranium and other mineral deposits. The abundance of natural resources and foreign direct investment have helped to make Gabon one of the most prosperous countries in the region and amongst the continent's wealthiest in terms of per capita income. Gabon, however, also suffers from social shortcomings, specifically in educational and healthcare infrastructures.[38]

2.2   Regional cooperation initiatives

The Central African states are all members of a range of inter-state cooperation initiatives, exploring both economic and/or political integration. As set out in Figure 1 below, some of these overlap other regional initiatives, for example the *Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States* (COMESA), the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC), the *Community of Sahelian-Saharan States* (CEN-SAD), the *Eastern African Community* (EAC)[39] or the *Eastern Africa Standby Force* (EASF).

Within Central Africa, there are also two important so-called Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).[40] These two organizations have a somewhat overlapping membership and have at times approached a similar agenda. While CEMAC is primarily an economic and monetary union and ECCAS originally was intended as a common market, the two organisations have both ventured into the realm of peace and security. In the

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[36] Government of Spain. *2009-2012 Africa Plan*, p. 115

[37] Gabon seeks to develop a new industry based on ecotourism, 12% of its area being protected.

[38] Government of Spain. *2009-2012 Africa Plan*, p. 116

[39] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008. *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 257

[40] CEMAC is not considered as a full REC by the AU, but rather as a grouping within ECCAS.

case of CEMAC, this venture may be considered a temporary diversion.[41] ECCAS, on the other hand, has developed an extensive peace and security agenda which also constitutes the Central African pillar in the African Peace and Security Architecture.

CEMAC was created in 1994 to replace the former Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC).[42] The primary aim of CEMAC is to establish both an economic and a monetary union amongst its member states.[43] CEMAC has been operational since 1999. Since then, it has made rapid progress toward the setting up of a customs union and a common market. The organisation nonetheless suffers from some of the same weaknesses and capacity problems as ECCAS. [44] These weaknesses will be described throughout the report.

The overlapping membership of ECCAS and RECs engaged in peace and security integration in other regions nevertheless pose a significant challenge to the viability and durability of ECCAS. Rwanda, the only Central African state not a member of ECCAS, left the organisation in 2007 to join the East African Community (EAC).[45] Burundi is also a member of the EAC but has so far chosen a dual membership. Beyond this, it contributes forces to the East African Standby Force – one of Eastern Africa's APSA elements. Similarly, Angola and the DRC are members not only of ECCAS but also of SADC – the REC appointed by the African Union to manage the Southern African contribution to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[46] In addition, some of the Central African countries are involved within a multilateral involvement named APS, African Partnership Station, a security cooperation initiative driven by the US to achieve safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea.[47] These divided loyalties are a major challenge facing ECCAS, albeit far from the only challenge.

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[41] Central Africa researcher 2

[42] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 107

[43] CEMAC, *Présentation de la CEMAC,;*
Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival*

[44] Ibid; African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 109

[45] Alusala, N. *Is there hope for the Economic Community of Central African States?*

[46] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 102

[47] Elowson Camilla. 2009. *Maritime Security in Western and Central Africa* FOI MEMO 2981, p 13,

Figure 2. Regional Cooperation Initiatives

3   ECCAS at a glance

3.1.1   Emergence of ECCAS

In 1981, the leaders of the already existing Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) agreed to establish a wider economic community of Central African States with the goal of creating a common market.[48] Two years later, in 1983, ECCAS was launched. The members states included all members of the UDEAC (the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea), as well as the members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States – Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire (later Democratic Republic of Congo). São Tomé was also an initial member.[49] Angola joined ECCAS in 1999, while Rwanda left in 2007 (although Rwanda presently has an observer status).

ECCAS – in Central Africa better known by its French acronym *Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEEAC) – has its headquarters located in Libreville, Gabon. ECCAS formally became functioning in 1985 but it was not long until the organisation lost its momentum. Conflict in member states and a lack of financial and other commitments from member states made cooperation and integration within ECCAS come to a grinding halt.[50] In between

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[48] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 255.

[49] African Union. *Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)*;
Government of Spain. *2009-2012 Africa Plan* p. 92

[50] Ibid. p. 93; African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 260

1992 and 1998, the organisation became completely inactive. Its structures remained but slowly decayed, forming nothing more than an ECCAS shell.[51]

In the beginning of 1998, an Extra-Ordinary Summit of ECCAS was held in Libreville, during which the Heads of State and Government committed to bring the organisation out of hibernation. It was decided that ECCAS would be restructured and its agenda be refined to give new life to the organisation. In 1999, four new priority areas for the work of the organisation were identified. In light of how the region had been negatively affected by the many conflicts taking place during the 1990's, one of these priorities was to enhance the region's capabilities for peace, security and stability. This was considered a prerequisite for the economic and social development of Central Africa. The other priorities were to develop the physical, economic and monetary integration of the region; to develop a culture of human integration; and to establish an autonomous financing mechanism for ECCAS.[52] At this time, Angola, which had previously carried observer status within ECCAS, decided to become a full member.[53] ECCAS also signed the protocol on relations between the African Economic Community (AEC)[54] and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which confirmed ECCAS as the major REC in Central Africa.[55] In 2008, it was decided that CEMAC was to merge with ECCAS, however when this will happen is another matter. A merger will be easier in certain areas, such as peace and security where ECCAS has a clear and recognised lead.[56]

As the principal organisation for security cooperation in Central Africa, ECCAS soon came to constitute the regional contribution to the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Architecture. Structures within ECCAS for this purpose were set up in the early 2000's (see chapter 4 on Peace and Security). Other than the need to address the degradation of peace and security in the region, the decision of the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS to establish regional peace and security structures was informed by the APSA-developments at the continental

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[51] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 255; African Union. *Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)*

[52] African Union. *Profile: Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS);* TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – *Peace and Security Architecture"*

[53] African Union. *Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)*; TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

[54] AEC was established well before AU, and it is gathering all African Union states in a monetary community, built upon the different REC's; South African International Relations and Cooperation Department, *AEC*

[55] African Union. *Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)* Government of Spain. *2009-2012 Africa Plan* p. 93

[56] ECCAS International partner 5

level.[57] The establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) thus contributed to give new life to ECCAS.[58]

Among the five RECs and mechanisms that form part of the ASF, ECCAS is (the REC with the lowest financial capacity, with an annual budget of USD 18 million.[59] ECCAS is to be financed through an import tax of 0.4% between the member states, however it is questionable if it is actually being collected on a general basis.[60] There have been a lot of difficulties in collecting funding from member states, with only some countries being more regular contributors (such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea).[61] In addition, ECCAS suffers great shortages in terms of human resources, in particular as regards highly-qualified professional staff.[62] Even after the re-launch of ECCAS in 1998, a dynamic pace has yet to catch on in this Community. In the absence of a critical mass of a regular professional staff and financial resources, ECCAS has failed to develop short-, medium- and long-term strategic plans as well as the requisite financial programming and management. Moreover, ECCAS neither has employee job descriptions nor job classifications. Certain observers see ECCAS as an organisation that simply continues to grope in the dark. The organisation's capacities, on the one hand, and its visions and missions on the other, do not fully correspond to each other.[63]

3.1.2   ECCAS organisational structure

Regarding ECCAS' formal structure, the key organs are *the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers*, and *the General Secretariat*. There is also a *Court of Justice*, which is not yet operational[64]. In addition, the ECCAS structure encompasses a *Consultative Commission* and *Specialised*

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[57] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival* p. 11

[58] Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management* 20101027

[59] ECOWAS is the one with highest financial capacity with a regular budget of USD $121 million. SADC follows with USD $45 million, while IGAD has USD $3 million. No information about NARC's financial capacity has been found; Fanta E. 2009. *The Capacity of African regional organizations in peace and security* p. 15

[60] ECCAS International partner 5

[61] Ibid

[62] Fanta E. 2009, *The Capacity of African regional organizations in peace and security* p. 15; African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008. *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 267

[63] Ibid

[64] On the one hand, it is expensive to run a Court of Justice; personnel would also need to be trained before the Court can be functional. On the other hand, the slow start up of the Court could also be due to reluctance among ECCAS member states to have a Court operating, as this could eventually have negative implications for them; Central Africa researcher 1

Technical Committees. The ECCAS framework that deals specifically with peace and security, i.e. *COPAX* and associated, are addressed in the next section.[65] The chairmanship of ECCAS is meant to rotate every year (following alphabetic order), in conjunction with the envisaged yearly meeting of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, however, this has not been the case. The current chair is Chad, which took over from the DRC in October 2009.[66]

Figure 3. ECCAS key institutions

The Conference of Heads of State and Government

The Conference of Heads of State and Government (henceforth referred to as 'the Conference') defines ECCAS' general policy and orientation, and controls the functioning of the other ECCAS institutions. It is the organisation's supreme decision-making body, including for issues relating to peacekeeping, the consolidation, the promotion and the restoration of peace and security (protocol Art 8). Hence, 'the Conference' decides on actions to be taken by ECCAS

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[65] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"; Government of Spain *2009-2012 Africa Plan* p. 93; African Union. *Profile: Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)*

[66] ECCAS International partner 3

organs.[67] 'The Conference' is to meet once a year in an ordinary session, but can also convene extraordinary sessions.[68] Despite these ambitions, 'the Conference' has so far never managed to meet on a yearly basis. However, since 2005, it has convened more regularly, with meetings in 2005, 2007 and 2009. No meeting has yet been carried out in 2011.[69]

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is in charge of the functioning and the development of ECCAS. Among other things, it formulates recommendations for 'the Conference', directs the activities of the other ECCAS institutions, and submit the budget to 'the Conference'. The Council consists of ministers from each member state. There is a contact ministry for ECCAS in each member state, although different states have appointed different ministries to be in charge of this task, depending on what focus they put on ECCAS. Certain states have representatives from their Trade Ministry, others from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and again others the Ministry for Development Cooperation etc. The Council of Ministers is foreseen to meet twice a year, and if there is a need, in extraordinary sessions.[70]

The General Secretariat

The ECCAS General Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General, who is elected for four years (the mandate period can be renewed one time only). It is foreseen that s/he is assisted by three deputy Secretaries-General, each of whom is to be in charge of the General Secretariat's three (four to be) departments. However, currently, only one department within the General-Secretariat is headed by a deputy Secretary-General (the Department for Physical, Economic and Monetary Integration).[71] The deputy Secretary-Generals for the Department for Human Integration, Peace and Security and for the Department for Human Resources, Projects and Budgets left ECCAS in 2010 and 2009 respectively, and have not yet been replaced.[72] The General Secretariat is tasked to ensure the execution of the projects and programmes of ECCAS. This includes preparing and carrying out the decisions and the directives of 'the Council' and the orders of the Council of Ministers, to elaborate and execute the budget, to establish the annual work programme of ECCAS, to report on the activities that have been accomplished, and to undertake studies on how to achieve the ECCAS objectives.[73]

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[67] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale*
[68] ECCAS Treaty, Art 10
[69] ECCAS International partner 3
[70] CEEAC, *Institutions de la Communaute* Art.12-14; ECCAS International partner 3
[71] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 264
[72] ECCAS International partner 3
[73] CEEAC, *Institutions de la Communaute* Art. 20-21

Figure 1 ECCAS General Secretariat, organizational structure [74]

The Consultative Commission

The Consultative Commission consists of experts designated by the member states. It can be charged with researching and examining specific issues or projects in detail for the Council of Ministers. The Specialised Technical Commissions are set up in application of annex protocols of the ECCAS treaty; they can also be created by 'the Conference'.[75]

The Executive-Secretariat

An ECCAS General-Secretariat organigramme was adopted in June 2009 (see Annex 2).[76] However, this should rather be seen as a temporary organizational chart that needs to be reviewed to adapt into its expanded vision, mission objectives and development challenges, as well as to provide an enabling internal environment for the implementation of its mandate. Furthermore, out of the different units, many are poorly resourced or only exist on paper.[77]

Upcoming institutions

In addition to the organs above, ECCAS established a Human Rights and Democracy Centre, which was inaugurated in 2001, as well as adopted a protocol

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[74] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 264; ECCAS organigram June 2009
[75] Treaty Art 23-26
[76] ECCAS International partner 3
[77] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p. 264; ECCAS International partner 3

on a network of Central African parliamentarians (Réseau des Parlementaires de la CEEAC, REPAC) in 2002.[78]

The Human Rights and Democracy Centre could come to play an important role in preventing conflict due to its primary aim of promoting human rights, democratic practices and good governance. The centre held its first meeting in Libreville, Gabon, at the beginning of September 2001 and it also seeks to ensure civil society involvement in ECCAS's peace-building efforts.[79]

The purpose of REPAC is to give advice on matters related to the ECCAS treaty on issues regarding, amongst others, Human Rights, citizenship, minority rights, gender issues, the environment, science and technology, education, public health and energy. REPAC will also be authorised to make statements on revisions of the ECCAS treaty as well as free mobility within the region.[80]

REPAC is intended to be located in Equatorial Guinea and its 50 seats will be filled by five representatives from each of the ten Member States' national parliaments, elected on a five-year basis.[81]

REPAC has taken long to set up and is still not very active. A major challenge in its establishment has been to secure financial support for the project as ECCAS itself has not been able to include the venture in its budget. In addition, the process of ratifying the REPAC protocol has also been slow and as a result the inauguration of the Network has repeatedly been rescheduled and postponed.[82] Despite these challenges, the structure for the REPAC Secretariat were set up in 2010 and since then a series of meetings and workshops have been organised to gather and educate parliamentarians from ECCAS member states regarding regionalisation and ECCAS community policies while the final inauguration of the Network is awaited.[83]

The eventual inauguration is hoped to facilitate improved integration in the ECCAS region and soften the current intergovernmental nature of the organisation. Whether this will actually happen is dependent on the willingness

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[78] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"; Government of Spain *2009-2012 Africa Plan* p. 93; African Union. *Profile: Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC/ECCAS)*

[79] Cosme, N. C. & Fiacre, Y. "The Economic Community of Central African States and Human Security", Proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa, held in Pretoria, 23 - 24 July 2001; TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

[80] Internationl Democracy Watch. *The Central African Parliamentary Network*, http://idw.csfederalismo.it/index.php/the-central-african-parliamentary-network#future

[81] Ibid

[82] Ibid

[83] Meyer, A. 2011. "Economuic Community of Central African State"s, in Finizio et al. *The Democratization of International Organisations: the First International Democracy Report 2011*. Centre of Studies for Federalism.

of the member states to relinquish its powers as the main decision making entities in the region.[84]

3.1.3   Member states dynamics

Generally, ECCAS is characterised as an organisation with high ambitions, but one that lacks the political will to realise these ambitions. One problem is that the member states do not feel part of ECCAS (neither of APSA). The involvement of member states in ECCAS is very limited. At the local level, few people know what ECCAS is. There is a vicious circle in place, as ECCAS is not really delivering, which means there is no interest to send money or professionals to ECCAS – as a result, ECCAS cannot deliver.[85]

Furthermore, a lot of mistrust between the region's Heads of State prevails, and the member states are only united in the "Francophonie"[86].[87] Certain states share a common currency, but there is no common tariff for imports etc.[88] Integration in Central African integration has developed around three poles; fraternity among the former French colonies in CEMAC (much liaised by the use of CFA); fraternity among the areas under previous Belgian influence (the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi); and Angola's recent leadership ambition which has resulted in advancements such as the Kwanza exercise. These units all come together at different paces of integration, which has hampered the development of ECCAS.[89]

It has been suggested that there is no hegemonic power that could take on a leading role in ECCAS.[90] In 2009, the region lost its natural leader and driving force with the death of Gabonese President Omar Bongo. His successor, Ali Bongo, has not shown the same interest in driving ECCAS; furthermore, Ali Bongo and Sassou-N'Guesso, president of the Republic of Congo, have shown several differences of opinion regarding various issues.[91] At the same time, while some would suggest that Bongo created cooperation among the member states and was a uniting factor of ECCAS[92], others suggest that the potential for ECCAS to prosper and gain more independence could potentially increase with

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[84] Internationl Democracy Watch. *The Central African Parliamentary Network*, http://idw.csfederalismo.it/index.php/the-central-african-parliamentary-network#future

[85] ECCAS International partner 5; Central Africa researcher 1

[86] Francophonie can be described as the common ties among former French colonies and France. This community has generated a set of cultural, political, economic, social and administrative similarities among the countries.

[87] ECCAS International partner 5

[88] CEMAC member states are gathered in a monetary union; CEMAC, *Presentation de CEMAC*; ECCAS International partner 5

[89] Central Africa researcher 1

[90] ECCAS International partner 4; ECCAS International partner 6

[91] Sassou N'Guesso is married to on of Omar Bongo's daughters; ECCAS International partner 4

[92] ECCAS International partner 5

his exit. The death of Bongo also left scope for Angola, and to a certain extent also the DRC, to begin affirming themselves in ECCAS.[93]

The increased leadership by the DRC and Angola has started to revitalise ECCAS.[94] In 2002 and 2003, relative peace emerged in these countries, which made it possible to increase their focus on foreign policy issues. This was a precondition for ECCAS to move forward. In 2006, Kabila was re-elected as Congolese president; this reassurance also opened up for further action by the DRC. The DRC took over the chairmanship of ECCAS in November 2007 (the DRC chaired ECCAS until October 2009). The chairmanship was an opportunity for the DRC to move away from its image as solely being a war-torn country, and to profile itself differently by driving regional initiatives.[95] In 2009, under its chairmanship, rhetoric grew stronger about further collaboration in terms of peace and security. These ambitions started to be manifested with a military exercise called Kwanza[96], which took place in April 2010.

Angola provided a firm leadership for the realisation of Kwanza.[97] At a first look, the membership of Angola in ECCAS does not appear given, as the country is more naturally a part of Southern Africa. Angola joined ECCAS in 1999, as it was hesitant to join SADC – being part of SADC would among other things mean collaborating with a rival great power South Africa. In 2002, Angola however became a member also of SADC. One observer claims that Angola plays a double game – its interest in SADC stemming from its strategy to obtain economic benefits by profiting from the economy in the Southern African zone and from South Africa wanting access to the Angolan market. Politically, it is more difficult to take a role within SADC, which motivates Angola to turn to ECCAS – where there is a vacuum in terms of political leadership.[98] Angola has shown that it is a regional power, for instance by being able to assert its power over the DRC and the Republic of Congo. According to another observer, the next step for Angola would be to take a greater role on the continent. In order for this to be realised, it is necessary for Angola to establish itself as a leader for a REC. In ECCAS, Angola could constitute itself as an economic power, together with the DRC. This would be a way to match South Africa. Gaining more influence in ECCAS would likely give Angola a stronger position also in SADC. If Angola's strategy – to use ECCAS to assure itself an important continental actor – would succeed, this could serve as a kick-start for ECCAS.[99]

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[93] Central Africa researcher 1

[94] Ibid

[95] Another observer claim however that the DRC does not yet have a regional strategy, but is waiting its post-conflict reconstruction to progress further; Central Africa researcher 2

[96] The military exercise Kwanza is discussed further in chapter 5.2.2

[97] Central Africa researcher 1

[98] Central Africa researcher 2

[99] Central Africa researcher 1

Few countries in the region would want to challenge Angola's ambition to take on the leadership. The reasons for this are several. First of all, Angola's military power and capacity is a major deterring factor for any country wishing to challenge Angola. Secondly, few other leaders are viable candidates. Potential leading countries apart from DRC, such as Cameroon and Chad, have not come forward. Cameronian President Paul Biya is portrayed as an absent leader, while Chadian President Idriss Déby does not prioritise the Central African region as he is more interested in the relation with his neighbours to the north and the east.[100] Among the smaller countries committed to peacekeeping, Burundi has expressed interest in leaving ECCAS for the East African Community, which is indicative, at least in part, of disillusionment with ECCAS' ongoing weaknesses as a regional and security body.[101]

However, even if Angola makes efforts to take on a leading role in ECCAS, the fact that the organisation is based in Libreville limits Angola's possibilities to rule, compared to those of Gabon. In the best case, this context could offer ECCAS more independence. Ambitions for Angola to assert itself in the region could be impeded by the fact that it is a Lusophone state, in contrast to the French speaking countries. On the other hand, there are many Angolans with experience from the DRC, meaning a considerate number of French speaking Angolans exist.[102] In contrast, other observers see Angola as simply being more interested in SADC and suspicious of the heavy French presence in many central African countries.[103] According to some, Angola is only in ECCAS because of the DRC's membership; and it is argued that Angola would leave ECCAS if it could convince the DRC to only be in SADC.[104] The DRC is seen as still being too poor and politically weak to be able to play a leading role.[105] The influence of the French is also mentioned in this respect, as neither Angola nor the DRC are zones of French influence (i.e. not former French colonies). France would be likely to be hesitant about these countries taking the lead for ECCAS.[106]

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[100] Central Africa researcher 1; ECCAS International partner 5
[101] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa* p. 156
[102] Central Africa researcher 1
[103] ECCAS International partner 5; ECCAS International partner 6
[104] ECCAS International partner 2
[105] ECCAS International partner 5; ECCAS International partner 6
[106] ECCAS International partner 2

4 ECCAS Peace and Security

4.1 Key documents and frameworks

Important ECCAS treaties and protocols include: *the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States*[107]; *the Protocol Establishing the Network of Parliamentarians of ECCAS (REPAC)*; *the Non-Aggression Pact; the Mutual Assistance Pact Between Member States of ECCAS*; and *the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa (COPAX)*. The three latter are of particular importance for ECCAS' activities in the field of peace and security. In addition, *the Standing Orders of FOMAC, the Defence and Security Commission and MARAC* are key documents in this respect.

The Non-Aggression Pact was signed by Central African states[108] already in 1996. In this agreement, the signatories vowed to reject the use of force as a means of regulating their differences.[109] Four years later, in 2000, these commitments were elaborated in ECCAS' Mutual Assistance Pact. The states ratifying the Mutual Assistance Pact automatically became parties also to the Non-Aggression Pact. The Mutual Assistance Pact requires member states to come to each other's assistance in the case of aggression and to prepare for this through joint military manoeuvres. The member states commit to deploying a joint peacekeeping force, the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) (for more on FOMAC, see chapter 5.2.2) in case of the need for an armed intervention. Details are also given on the conditions for intervention and the procedures to follow.[110] The Protocol relating to COPAX was signed on the same date as the Mutual Assistance Pact (24 February 2000), and entered into force in 2004.[111] The Protocol, which puts ECCAS primary mechanism for peace and security in place, clarifies the objectives of COPAX, defines the related peace and security structures, and elaborates on their means of implementation (for more on COPAX see below). In 2002, the Standing Orders for FOMAC/DSC/MARAC, which further details the functioning of these peace and security bodies, were adopted.

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[107] For further information on agreements concluded as appendices to the ECCAS Treaty, see African Union, *Profile: Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC/ECCAS)*

[108] Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé & Principe, Tchad, Zaire, Burundi; CEEAC. *Pacte de non-agression entre les Etats membres du comité consultatif permanent des Nations Unies sur les questions de sécurité en Afrique Centrale*

[109] CEEAC, P*rotocole Relative au Conseil de Paix et de la Securite de l'Afrique Centrale*

[110] These are further elaborated in section "5.2.2.1 Mandate and Procedures" below. Source: CEEAC, *Pacte D'Assistance Mutuelle,*Art 1

[111] Alusala, N. 2007, *Is there hope for the Economic Community of Central African States?*

4.2 Peace and security structures

Different structures exist to handle peace and security issues within ECCAS. With ECCAS venturing into the realm of security cooperation it was decided in 1999[112] that the organisation would set up a *Council for Peace and Security* (*COPAX*) with a set of technical organs.[113] COPAX resembles the structure of the Council of Ministers, but is instead composed by ministers at the member states' Foreign Ministries, Defence Ministries, Interior Ministers or the like. The council is chaired by the Foreign Minister of the member state that chairs the Conference.[114] COPAX has so far met four times; since 2008 on a yearly basis. No meeting has so far been convened in 2011.[115]

COPAX was created as the main structure for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa.[116] It is in charge of monitoring and execution of decisions taken by the Conference, and is to exercise any other mandate that the Conference can give. The Protocol relating to COPAX underlines sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs as guiding principles. Yet the ECCAS member states align against conflict in the region; foremost through early warning and conflict prevention. When needed, civil or military engagement are promoted to maintain and restore peace. Among the objectives of COPAX are to prevent, manage and regulate conflicts and to undertake activities of promotion and consolidation of peace and peacekeeping. Furthermore, COPAX are to develop confidence-building measures between the member states, to promote policies for peaceful regulations of disputes, to implement pertinent measures relating to non-aggression and to mutual assistance in defence, facilitate mediation efforts during crises, ensure common approaches to such problems as refugees and internally displaced people, as well as transnational crime and arms trafficking.[117] Moreover, the cooperation against terrorism, border crimes, and work against illegal drug-trade and trade of weapons are also part of the preventive work.[118]

The technical organs of the COPAX are *the Central African conflict early-warning system (MARAC)*, *the Defence and Security Commission (CDS)* and *the*

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[112] The decision was made by Central African Heads of state and Government on 25 February 1999, at a summit in Yaoundé. On 26 June 1999, the decision was made to integrate COPAX within the ECCAS structure; Protocol relating to COPAX

[113] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale*

[114] Cycle RECAMP V

[115] ECCAS International partner 3

[116] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale*

[117] Ibid, Art 4

[118] Ibid, Art 5-6

Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC). The standing orders for these organs were adopted in 2002.[119]

Figure 3 COPAX and its technical organs

MARAC (Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide de l'Afrique Centrale) collects and analyses data for the early detection and prevention of crises. The mechanism feeds into the Continental Early Warning System with headquarters at the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.[120]

FOMAC is a non-permanent standby force (rapid reaction) to consist of military, police and civilian contingents from each ECCAS member state. The purpose of FOMAC is to accomplish missions of peace, security and humanitarian relief.[121] In line with the African Union plan for an Africa Standby Force by 2010, FOMAC will constitute the Central African brigade, or CENTBRIG.[122]

The **CDS** is a technical planning and advisory body made up of chiefs of staff of national armies and commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces from the different Member States, as well as experts from Foreign/Defence/Interior Ministries. Its role is to plan, organize and provide advice to COPAX and other decision-making bodies of the community in order to initiate military operations if needed.[123]

The daily management of the peace and security issues and programming takes place at the General Secretariat by the *Department of Human Integration, Peace,*

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[119] African Union. *Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)*

[120] Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management* 20101027

[121] African Union. *RECs Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS-CEEAC)*

[122] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

[123] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* Art. 13

Security and Stability (DIHPSS). Among other things, the department includes an electoral unit and a unit dealing with early warning.[124]

Figure 4. Structure of the Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability

4.3 Track record in the area of peace and security

ECCAS has often failed to address the region's most pressing peace and security needs. An analysis of security concerns in Central Africa over the last decade shows that member states have more often looked to actors outside the region, such as the UN and other African states and regional bodies, than to themselves for support and assistance in responding to conflict. This can be seen in three of Central Africa's most turbulent states, the CAR, the DRC and Burundi, where Central African states have relied heavily on external actors.[125]

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[124] ECCAS official 1 and 3

[125] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa*, pp. 154-157.

Nevertheless, ECCAS has undertaken certain efforts, non-military and military. Largely, the peace-making activities have been carried out more by chance than by design, on a periodic and ad-hoc basis – in response to international pressure or local dynamics which compelled the organization to intervene.[126] The ECCAS track-record is reviewed in the following two sections. Regarding APSA related developments, such as MARAC and FOMAC, these are separately examined in chapter 5.1.2 and 5.2.2.

4.3.1   Non-military track record

The peace-building capacity of ECCAS has been confined to election observation.[127] Electoral processes is claimed to be one of the priorities of ECCAS, and since 2005, one of the units (Elections and Good Governance) within the DIHPSS is assigned to this topic. Since mid-2000, ECCAS has deployed over ten electoral observation missions in its member states.[128]

It has been suggested that ECCAS shows a growing effectiveness in election monitoring and assistance. An example cited is the DRC, where ECCAS set up a dedicated office, headed by a special representative, to monitor the elections and the process of political transition. ECCAS also has ambitions to provide technical assistance to the national electoral commissions in countries where elections are to take place.[129]

Furthermore, a network is currently emerging among the Independent Electoral Commissions and pertinent NGOs in the member states. These stakeholders are working together on developing appropriate capacities, for instance through trainings and setting up curricula which consider the whole electoral cycle, in contrast to previous undertakings which have tended to focus only on observation on the elections day.[130]

Other analysts take a more pessimistic view on ECCAS track-record regarding electoral observation. One observer points to the fact that criticizing each other among the ECCAS countries is a sensitive issue, and that statements following electoral observation therefore risk to stay at a superficial level.[131] It is also noted that ECCAS does not have any document on which it can base its governance assessment, and that there is no methodology to assess elections.

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[126] Fanta E. 2009, *The Capacity of African regional organizations in peace and security.* p. 9
[127] Ibid p. 13
[128] These include: Gabon (2006; 2009; 2010), DRC (2006), São Tomé & Principe (2006), the Republic of Congo (2007; 2009); Angola (2008); Equatorial Guinea (2009); Burundi (2010); CAR (2011); Chad (2011); Central Africa Researcher 2, ECCAS International partner 3
[129] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"
[130] ECCAS International partner 3
[131] Central Africa researcher 2

ECCAS' involvement in São Tomé & Principe in 2006 is cited as an example of peace-making activities carried out with minimum organisational and legal support, "*driven by reputation and impulse, and lacking a clear strategy*".[132] Another difficulty is the problematic human resource situation. The Electoral Unit is only staffed by one person, and recruitment processes have proven complicated. To some extent, the slowness in hiring personnel within ECCAS is due to political rivalries, where different countries have different preferences of who should be accorded a certain position; however most of all the inability to employ sufficient staff is caused by administrative difficulties.[133]

In sum, ECCAS has not yet established a strong non-military track record. While it cannot be excluded that one of the member states occasionally could be motivated to undertake individual diplomatic activities, there is no general readiness to act as a joint community under an ECCAS label. Mediation or other diplomatic and conflict management initiatives have not been undertaken by ECCAS, despite the fact that a unit for mediation has established within the DIHPSS. The mediation unit is small, with very limited means at its disposal, and lacks transparency. Observers note that the unit was under heavy influence by Gabonese diplomats during Omar Bongo's rule; some even speak of an impression that the unit belonged to Gabon under an ECCAS cover. In reality, there was confusion about the difference between Gabon and ECCAS. Considering Bongo's high-level profile and strong reputation as a mediator, no other regional stakeholder would challenge Bongo in this domain. Following his death, it is questionable whether any other Central African leader has the political legitimacy or the credibility that would be required to engage in mediation. Clearly, the political cohesiveness to engage in these sorts of peace-making initiatives within ECCAS is currently lacking. The mediation unit within ECCAS General Secretariat presently exists only on paper; nevertheless, plans to sustain this unit appear to be maintained, and future attempts to build this kind of capacity could potentially gain pace.[134]

ECCAS' framework documents encourage multi-sector collaboration with all stakeholders in peace and security issues in Central Africa. A unit within the DIHPSS has been formed to liaise with civil society, and efforts from within DIHPSS have been made to push for an ECCAS-CSO partnership, bolstered by EU funding (see below). Still, little progress has been made on this front. In contrast, ECCAS seems to collaborate better with the UN system, particularly on small arms and light weapons.[135]

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[132] Fanta E. 2009, *The Capacity of African regional organizations in peace and security* p. 16

[133] ECCAS International partner 3

[134] ECCAS International partner 3; Central Africa researcher 1; Central Africa researcher 2

[135] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

4.3.2 Military track record

Central Africa has in the last decades witnessed a number of conflicts, notably in the DRC, Burundi and the CAR. On the whole, little response has been provided by ECCAS in terms of peacekeeping. In Burundi, South Africa played a leading role in an ambitious mission to restore peace; also Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal pledged troops.[136] However, no country from Central Africa contributed.

Regional peacekeeping exercises have been undertaken, with the objective of increasing the capacity of, and exchanging experiences among, ECCAS states in this respect[137].[138] For instance, in an exercise in 2007, a light brigade of 1,600 troops with companies from the ECCAS member states was assembled in Chad.

Even if the readiness of ECCAS states overall appears limited, Central Africa has indeed been able to respond to the situation in the CAR. Since 2008, a multinational peace consolidation mission (MICOPAX) of approximately 700 personnel is present, and foreseen to stay until 2013 in order to ensure security and stability in the country. MICOPAX was previously called FOMUC and was a CEMAC deployment (2002 – 2007/2008). In the following sections, the ECCAS military track record is examined in greater detail, including the transformation of FOMUC into MICOPAX and the handing over of responsibility to ECCAS.[139]

4.3.2.1 FOMUC

CEMAC has been more strongly adhering to its economic objectives than ECCAS. Nevertheless, in 2002, the conflict in the CAR forced the organisation to go beyond its treaty and broaden its agenda towards peace and security.[140] In fact, since the reform process of ECCAS had not been finalised in 2002, CEMAC was forced to, as the first Central African organisation, deploy a joint multinational force to CAR to intervene in support of peace and security.[141]

Already in 1997, the states of Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea set up a joint peace mission under Gabonese command in the CAR. Operating under a UN chapter VII mandate, the mission supervised the

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[136] Berman, E., Sams, K 2000, *Keeping the peace in Africa. Disarmament Forum*

[137] For instance, in Gabon, in 2000 the exercise held was a direct application of the French RECAMP programme (training programme aiming at reinforcement of African peacekeeping capacities).

[138] African Union. *Profile: Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC/ECCAS)*

[139] Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS*, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management 20101027

[140] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival* p. 7

[141] Ibid

implementation of a peace agreement between the government, army mutineers and political opposition. This mission also monitored the disarmament process.[142] The mission was funded by France and when France, in line with the "neither interference nor indifference" policy of the new socialist government, cut the funding in 1998, the mission was phased out. The UN mission MINURCA subsequently replaced the Central African force.

In 2000, the situation in the CAR was considered stable enough for MINURCA to withdraw. Nevertheless, over the next two years CAR's own security forces faced difficulties in stabilising the state. The instability in CAR was considered by the CEMAC states as a threat to the stability in the entire region. At the CEMAC summit in October 2002, it was therefore decided that the CEMAC member states would send a multinational peace force to CAR to assist the security forces and prevent an overthrow of the CAR government.[143] ECCAS should have been the regional organisation to establish such a force, however, since ECCAS newly created security facilities – COPAX and the CDS – were not yet operational it was decided that the *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique* (FOMUC) would operate as a CEMAC mission, until the ECCAS structures were functional.[144]

FOMUC, which consisted of 380 troops from Gabon, the Republic of Congo and Chad deployed to Bangui, the capital of CAR, in December 2002. The mission's initial mandate was to secure and protect the city and the airport and safeguard president Patassé from any coups. Nevertheless, this mandate was redefined several times and FOMUC became largely involved in monitoring the transition and reconciliation process as well as preparing for the elections that were to be held in May 2005. FOMUC was also engaged in providing support to the disarmament of rebel forces and in arresting the leaders of such groupings; this mandate led to expand FOMUC's presence beyond Bangui.[145]

FOMUC was only ever marginally funded by the CEMAC states. Instead, as with the preceding mission, France sustained FOMUC financially and logistically during the first two years of its existence. In 2004, the EU African Peace Facility program (APF) came into existence. The APF aims to, among other things, provide predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations.[146] Through this scheme, the EU provided funding to FOMUC throughout the rest of its existence. Military and logistical support continued to be provided by France along with Germany and China which provided additional

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[142] Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 160
[143] Ibid p. 158, 160
[144] Ibid p. 161
[145] Ibid
[146] APF, annual report. 2009, p 4

support to the mission.[147] When FOMUC was replaced by MICOPAX in July 2008, similar funding mechanisms remained.

4.3.2.2 MICOPAX

In October 2007 it was decided at a Heads of State and Government summit of ECCAS that its peace and security structures were mature enough to bear the primary responsibility for peace and security related matters in the region. Nine months later, FOMUC was replaced by an ECCAS peace consolidation force – *Mission de consolidation de la paix en République Centrafrique*, MICOPAX.[148] MICOPAX, which is deployed in the centre, north-west and north-east of the CAR, takes place under the authority of ECCAS and is the first military operation undertaken under the auspice of COPAX.[149] The mission is monitored and evaluated by the CDS.[150]

The revising and broadening of the mandate that had started under FOMUC, has continued under MICOPAX. The overall mission objective is now to contribute to durable peace and security in the CAR by creating preconditions for sustainable development in the country. To do so, MICOPAX has a mandate from ECCAS to:

- Protect civilians

- Secure the territory

- Contribute to the national reconciliation process

- To facilitate the political dialogue initiated by President Bozize [151]

Troop contributing states have expanded to include not only Gabon, the Republic of Congo and Chad, but also Cameroon and the DRC. In addition, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo provide a police contingent. Several member states contribute observers to the mission. Civilian personnel, including a policy unit, also accompany the forces. The civilian component consists of the Special Representative, the Chief of Staff, a Political Advisor and an SSR advisor.[152]

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[147] Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 162

[148] Ibid pp. 162, 168-169

[149] While the mandate of MICOPAX makes no explicit reference to the regional standby force, FOMAC, it could still be argued to form part of this non-permanent regional force, as it is deployed under the command of COPAX. For more on this see section 5.2.2.

[150] Central Africa researcher 2

[151] European Commission. 2010, *Annual report, African peace facility 2009*

[152] ROP, Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique / Peace Consolidation Force of the Economic Community of Central Africa; ECCAS International partner 3

Table 1. Member states contributions to MICOPAX, April 2010 [153]

Contributor	Mil.	Obs.	Police	Other	Total
Angola	-	-	-	2	2
Burundi	3	5	-	2	10
Cameroon	141	5	21	3	170
Rep. Congo	16	6	125	3	150
DRC	107	-	-	2	109
Gabon	137	5	-	5	147
Equatorial Guinea	2	5	-	1	8
Saõ Tomé et Principe	-	-	-	2	2
Chad	121	5	-	1	127
Total	527	31	146	21	725

Since September 2007, the Central African forces have deployed alongside the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). MINURCAT, a unique UN mission aimed solely at the protection of civilians, completed its mandate in December 2010, upon request from the Chadian government.[154] France was the main driving force behind the deployment of MINURCAT.[155] Despite a similar mandate, coordination between MICOPAX and MINURCAT never amounted to more than limited information exchange.[156] Similarly, in spite of the regional links between the conflicts in CAR and the DRC, MICOPAX has not had any significant information exchange with the neighbouring UN Mission in the DRC MONUSCO.[157]

As stated previously, the MICOPAX budget has to a large extent been covered by donors. The EU Commission, through the African Peace Facility, provides the main bulk of funding. In 2009, the EU reportedly provided €14.6 million for payment of troop allowances and general maintenance. France, also a major donor, allocated approximately € 9,5 million while the contributions by ECCAS

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[153] ROP, Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique / Peace Consolidation Force of the Economic Community of Central Africa
[154] UN, *United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad*
[155] Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 169
[156] Ibid p. 160-164; ECCAS official 2
[157] ECCAS official 2

member states amounted to about € 6 million.[158] This implies that around 50% of the funds are provided by the EU, around 30% by France and 25% by the ECCAS member states.[159]

In the framework of the Africa-EU partnership, a joint EU/AU/ECCAS evaluation mission was conducted in June 2009 to assess the impact of the force. On this basis, it has been agreed to continue the support by the African Peace Facility to MICOPAX.

4.3.2.3 FOMUC/MICOPAX performance

Systematic research in this field of study is relatively limited. Information in the following section has therefore primarily been taken from Meyer (2009), who has done extensive research on FOMUC.[160]

Neither national or regional, nor international efforts to address peace and stability in the CAR have been successful. The regional initiative, FOMUC, has played a role in addressing the conflict, foremost by arresting combatants, monitoring the disarmament process, patrolling the border areas and supporting the initiation of peace dialogue between rebel leaders and the government. This has unfortunately not impeded high levels of violence and insecurity in the country, giving evidence of FOMUC's incapacity to adequately respond to the major threats, in order to enhance security in a sustainable manner.[161] Nevertheless, the limited impact of FOMUC is not surprising given the limits in size and scope of the mission.

The population's social, political and economic needs have been neglected by FOMUC, thus putting human security at high stake. The above mentioned inability to respond to the conflict could be explained by several different factors. The interplay of political self-interests, insufficient consideration of factors underlying the conflict in the country, as well as the pursuit of state security rather than human security have all been contributing to a compromise on security.[162]

Furthermore, the shortcomings of FOMUC could be explained by the security problems and political crises already existing in the region. During the response to the security problems in CAR, Central African states and their leaders have

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[158] Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 168-169

[159] ECCAS International partner 1; ECCAS International partner 3

[160] See in particular Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX.*

[161] Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 168-169

[162] Ibid p. 168

become aware of their own vulnerability, governing under limited legitimacy. According to Meyer, regional cooperation was therefore used as a way of realising specific political interests. On the one hand, Meyer suggests that regional governance gives national political leaders additional decision making power and authority. This is evident in both CEMAC and ECCAS as their executive organs are composed of the heads of state and there is limited scope for supranational decision-making. On the other hand, Meyer highlights that regional cooperation could increase state leaders' ability to withstand domestic opposition and other destabilising forces. The mandate of FOMUC was, for example, initially to protect president Patassé from coups (which it failed at), and therefore the president supported the mission.[163]

However, as Meyer points out these driving forces also make cooperation dependent on the leaders' underlying political interests. The role of Chad in FOMUC is illustrative of this dilemma. The increasing tensions between the CAR and Chad in 2002 makes the motivations for the latter's participation in FOMUC appear questionable. Some observers would assume that Chad's participation in FOMUC was linked to the Chadian president Déby's interest in seeing Patassé replaced by Bozizé as the president of CAR. The doubt is further reinforced by the non-interference of the FOMUC force, composed of one-third Chadian troops, during the overthrow of Patassé's government. The assertion that the member states' self-interest governed FOMAC's action is supported by the fact that the new CAR government, which came to power through a violent seizure of power by Bozizé, was unanimously recognised by the CEMAC Heads of States. These even urged the AU to recognise the new government, despite its principle to ban unconstitutional seizures of power.[164]

FOMUC's narrow and militaristic understanding and conceptualisation of security, at the expense of non-military, social, economic, and ecological aspects of security, limited the mission's success. The focus on 'hard security' is evidenced also in ECCAS, as the broadening of ECCAS' economic agenda to include security issues primarily resulted in the set-up of military facilities and the establishment of regional military organs: COPAX, CDS, FOMAC and MARAC.[165] Still, compared to FOMUC, the MICOPAX mandate is broader both in terms of its envisaged composition and tasks. Besides the military dimension it is planned to include a police and civilian component where the latter is set to include political affairs, human rights, child protection, gender, judicial affairs, prison affairs as well as HIV/AIDS. Similarly the tasks have been expanded to include human rights, coordination of humanitarian aid as well as participation in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Hence, with MICOPAX, ECCAS has, at least on

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[163] Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 165
[164] Ibid p. 166
[165] Ibid p. 167

paper, shown some commitment towards overcoming the strict focus on state security issues to include aspects of human security.[166]

Concerning MICOPAX performance, a number of specific criticisms can be noted. Firstly, MICOPAX is a peace consolidation mission, which, by definition, should mean wider focus than the purely military perspective, which is still dominant. Another issue is that MICOPAX has had limited training.[167] Certain observers also express concern over the inactivity of MICOPAX, noting that the mission has made surprisingly few patrols. It has been claimed that the mandate is inaccurate, not including SSR or DDR, and not providing for enough to be done. One observer felt that there seems to be a lack of enthusiasm among the troop contributing countries (TCC). ECCAS member states have questioned what the force will accomplish.[168] Furthermore, it is also argued that the TCCs regard MICOPAX as a training ground. This means the best troops are kept at home and, instead, forces that need to be trained are sent to the peacekeeping mission.[169] Of course, increasing the mandate of MICOPAX would also require adding resources to support its mission

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[166] Meyer, A. Email correspondence. May 20, 2011
[167] ECCAS International partner 2
[168] ECCAS official 2; ECCAS International partner 6
[169] ECCAS International partner 1; ECCAS International partner 6

5   ECCAS in APSA

As part of the effort of the African Union to promote peace and security in Africa, the decision was taken to implement an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), consisting of several elements for conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction support. Even though not specifically mentioned in the core AU policy frameworks, the AU Peace and Security Council Protocol speaks of "an overall architecture for peace and security".[170] The notion of an "architecture" supporting African peace and security has gained momentum over the last few years, at least within AU headquarters and among international partners.

Several endeavours in Central Africa support the evolution of APSA, including the building of a regional stand-by force and a regional early warning system. ECCAS is the primary Regional Economic Community designated to undertake these ventures. This chapter examines the progress made by ECCAS in terms of setting up FOMAC (the standby force) and of MARAC (the regional early warning system).

Unlike several other REC:s, such as SADC[171] and ECOWAS[172], and AU at the continental level, ECCAS does not have a Panel of the Wise/ Panel of Elders-type of programme or organ to carry out conflict prevention and resolution, mediation or reconciliation efforts in the region.

5.1   Early Warning

5.1.1   APSA and Regional Early Warning Systems

One of the central supporting-structures within APSA is the *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS), established to detect and support the prevention of conflicts. This centrally located continental-wide early warning system is currently being established at AU headquarters.[173] The CEWS will be linked to

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[170] African Union. 2002, *Peace and Security Council Protocol;*
  An established list of components of this structure, however, is not readily available. Some accounts point to the relation between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities as being the architecture. Others add the core institutions surrounding the AU Peace and Security Council, as stated in other articles of the PSC Protocol. Yet others include the policies and treaties constituting the platform for the security arrangements, such as the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and subsequent protocols and decisions.

[171] Southern Africa Development Community

[172] Economic Community of West African States

[173] Bogland et al. 2008, *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management*

regional early warning systems (REWS) in each of the five APSA regions.[174] There are ten officially recognised African organisations and mechanisms feeding into APSA and each of these can establish regional early warning systems feeding into the CEWS. In the following section, the ECCAS early warning system, MARAC, will be examined.

5.1.2 MARAC: Central African Rapid Alert Mechanism

MARAC, the Central African Early Warning system, is responsible for observing and monitoring developments pertaining to risk for (and causes of) imminent and long-term conflict in the sub-region. The objective is to facilitate decision-making by ECCAS regarding the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The activities of MARAC consist of collecting and analysing data on security concerns and submitting reports to the Secretary General, the CDS, and other concerned ECCAS officials. Daily press reviews, as well as weekly and monthly reports are currently provided. Ahead of ECCAS meetings, geopolitical and security analyses are also produced to serve the CDS and others concerned. Some of the briefs are made public, but as the information can be sensitive most of them are not. Distribution of the reports to member states' ambassadors and to external partners, does take place though.[175]

Around five staff are based at the MARAC early warning centre, in Libreville, Gabon.[176] MARAC foresees the establishment of one sub-office in each member state, to be in charge of observation to be fed into the data base of the early warning centre. However, currently, only five out of ten member states are active; the DRC, Burundi, the CAR, Cameroon and Chad. In these countries, 16 'decentralised correspondents' are placed, from where they are to report on incidents directly to the MARAC in Libreville. Two thirds of these correspondents are NGOs, while the rest are government officials.[177] The above countries have been prioritised since they suffer most from conflicts. The remaining five countries - Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé & Principe and Angola - are in the process of being connected to MARAC.[178] There have been difficulties relating to management issues when it comes to installing decentralised correspondents in the various countries.

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[174] I.e. North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa, Ibid

[175] CEEAC, *Feuille de Route 'Paix et Sécurité' de la CEEAC*; ECCAS official 1 and 3

[176] Out of these five, three are financed by the EU. A sixth staff member will soon be joining the Early Warning Centre. No plans are established for how much personnel is required to consider the centre as fully staffed; ECCAS International partner 3; ECCAs official 2

[177] ECCAS International partner 3

[178] ECCAS official 1 and 3; CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* Art 22

Currently, an assessment is being carried out of the correspondents' network, in order to see how these issues can be addressed.[179]

Trainings have also been conducted throughout 2009 and 2010, in order to advance country profile schemes, to put in place a detailed organigramme, and to identify needs concerning analysis methodology, communication with the decentralised correspondents and technical installations for the situation room. Hence, priorities for the coming years have been established and the work to realise them have been initiated.[180]

5.1.2.1 Challenges for MARAC

In principle, after the recipients of the reports have been alerted, the COPAX or 'the Conference' should be briefed and proceed by discussing suitable action to take, such as preventive diplomacy (for instance sending a fact-finding or mediating mission), or, eventually, preparing for a peacekeeping mission. This would be early warning leading to early response. In practice, the decision-making process is not yet developed to this extent within ECCAS.[181]

MARAC started to function on a basic level in 2007, when initial recruitment began. The ambition was to have MARAC fully operational by the end of 2010. However, several challenges remain, including grave financial and human limitations, which have largely paralysed the mechanism. Primarily, the analysis capacity of MARAC needs to be developed in order for the early warning mechanism to be able to play its intended role as support to decision-making.[182]

An urgent need is the recruitment of personnel to head MARAC[183] along with analysts and additional personnel. MARAC does not have the resources to send observers/data collectors to a hot spot. Installing the decentralised correspondents in all member states is another crucial element for MARAC to function properly. To make those correspondents in place operational, it is necessary to provide means and devices needed for them to carry out their work. This includes on-the-job training, which commenced in March 2010. Apart from these decentralised correspondents, some of which are NGOs, there is no systematic way of utilising

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[179] ECCAS International partner 3
[180] CEEAC, *Mecanisme d'Alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale (MARAC)*;
   CEEAC, *Feuille de Route 'Paix et Sécurité' de la CEEAC*
[181] ECCAS International partner 3
[182] Fanta E. 2009, *The Capacity of African regional organizations in peace and security*, p.7;
   CEEAC, *Feuille de Route 'Paix et Sécurité' de la CEEAC;*
[183] The position 'Director of Political Affairs and MARAC' (unit within DIPHSS) is held by
   someone who was recruited as Director of the MARAC service/early warning centre in March
   2007, and who was later "elevated" to the position of Director of Political Affairs and MARAC;
   ECCAS International partner 3

local resources for data collection.[184] Capacity to manage relations with the correspondents and to adequately handle the contents of their reporting also needs to be improved at the MARAC early warning centre in Libreville. Furthermore, collaboration with the General Secretariat and COPAX needs to be advanced. Another key priority is to develop an analysis methodology. For instance, MARAC can send a news/or warning flash when something urgent takes place, but there is no standardised way of reporting incidents. Neither is there a standardized method for sending information to the CEWS in Addis Ababa. In addition, there have been technological challenges regarding the communication. There is also a need to develop a system of organisation, classification and management of the information that MARAC handles.[185]

MARAC shares information with CEN-SAD and IGAD as these organisations' early warning centres overlap regarding Chad, the CAR and Sudan.[186] Representatives from each of these organisations meet on occasion. However, MARAC does not exchange any information with MONUSCO (nor did it exchange information with MINURCAT).[187]

5.2 Peacekeeping

5.2.1 African Standby Force

As part of the APSA the AU seeks to develop an African Standby Force (ASF) ready to deploy swiftly in Africa to help preserve peace and security in times of instability. The ASF concept was formalised in 2003 with the adoption of the *ASF Policy Framework.*[188]

The ASF is supposed to be constituted of five multinational brigades, each hosted by one of five African regions through their respective RECs (or in the case of East and North Africa, especially set up coordination mechanisms).[189] Unlike the broader APSA, the ASF effort thus only involves five regional organisations.

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[184] ECCAS official 1 and 3

[185] CEEAC, *Feuille de Route 'Paix et Sécurité' de la CEEAC;* ECCAS International partner 3; ECCAS official 1 and 3

[186] Special attention has been given to the movement of the Lord's Resistance Army; ECCAS official 1 and 3

[187] ECCAS official 1 and 3

[188] African Union. 2003, *ASF Policy Framework for the establishment of the African Standby Force*

[189] Bogland et all. 2008, *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management* p. 26

According to the roadmap for the ASF, each brigade is to be equipped and prepared for deployment in six types of scenarios, ranging from observation missions to peace-enforcement. These scenarios are listed in Table 2:

Table 2. Scenarios for the African Standby Force [190]

Scenario	Description	Deployment Required
1	Military advice to a political mission	in 30 days
2	Observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission	in 30 days
3	Stand-alone observer mission	in 30 days
4	Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building)	in 30 days
5	Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low level spoilers	90 days, with the military mission being able to deploy in 30 days
6	Intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly	14 days with robust military force

The force is intended to be deployed in member states at the request of the host state itself and mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council or the UN Security Council.[191]

According to the AU *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*, the standby force is meant to be "composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice".[192]

The establishment of the ASF was to have been undertaken in two stages. Phase one, which ran until 30 June 2005, was intended to have resulted in the AU having sufficient capacity to enable strategic level management for scenarios 1 and 2 missions. The five regional organisations (the RECs) were during the same

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[190] African Union 2003, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*

[191] Bogland et all. 2008. *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management* p. 26

[192] African Union 2003, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*

period also to establish standby forces, up to brigade size, with capacity to conduct missions as advanced as scenario 4.[193]

During phase two, 1 July 2005 until 30 June 2010, the AU was to have developed capacity to undertake missions in accordance with the first five scenarios, including complex 'Chapter VII' peacekeeping missions.[194] By 30 June 2010, the RECs were also expected to have developed capacity to establish a mission HQ for scenario 4 and continue to develop the brigades and support elements for these.[195] In most regions, these deadlines have not been met. Instead most regions have aimed for so called *Initial Operational Capability* for 2010 only expecting to reach *Full Operational Capability* in 2015.[196]

5.2.2   FOMAC: the ECCAS Standby Force

The standby force of Central Africa is hosted by ECCAS. It has been named the *Multinational Force of Central Africa*, but is primarily known by its French acronym FOMAC. Today, FOMAC is generally viewed as being ECCAS' ASF contribution. The issue of how to regard FOMAC, however, is not entirely clear and it could be argued that FOMAC should be understood from a two-folded perspective. Apart from being solely the Central African contribution to the ASF, FOMAC can be seen – according to ECCAS original documents – as a peacekeeping force purely within the scope of ECCAS and being originally an initiative of the ECCAS member states. With time, FOMAC has developed to be part of the APSA.[197]

The idea of an ECCAS standby force was first raised in the Mutual Assistance Pact and in the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council in Central Africa (COPAX), dating from 2000. The standing orders of FOMAC, detailing the objectives and functioning of the force, were then adopted in 2002.[198]

After the establishment of the AU and the development of AU plans to establish an African Standby Force, the member states' Defence Chiefs of Staff met in 2003 to discuss how ECCAS could create a brigade-size peacekeeping force to support this initiative and how the ideas of FOMAC would fit into this.[199] The meeting recommended that military planners from each of the ECCAS states

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[193] Bogland et all. 2008, *The African Union: A Study Focusing on Conflict Management* p. 26
[194] Ibid p. 27
[195] Ibid
[196] Hull, C., Skeppström, E., Sörenson, K. 2011, *Patchwork for peace* p.30
[197] Central Africa researcher 2
[198] Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*
[199] Angola and the DRC are members of both the central and southern standby forces, and the former country has designated different units on standby for Central and Southern Africa. Burundi has applied to join the EASF (Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*).

form a group to work out the details for the force. They also suggested the establishment of a joint peacekeeping training centre and military exercises every two years, the first of which was to take place in Chad.[200]

Between 2003 and 2004, a number of meetings were held at the level of experts, the Defence Chiefs of Staff and COPAX to adopt structures and action plans for FOMAC.[201] In 2004, the Protocol relating to COPAX entered into force.[202] However, all COPAX tools – FOMAC included – took time to define and prepare. By 2006, the establishment of FOMAC started to pick up pace, as regional staff were appointed.[203] A first ECCAS peacekeeping operation was undertaken in the form of MICOPAX in 2008.

The relation between FOMAC and MICOPAX is not entirely clear, as the mandate of MICOPAX makes no explicit reference to FOMAC, and its deployment did not follow the organisation's policies for FOMAC deployment. Still it could be argued that MICOPAX should be seen as a FOMAC operation, as it is deployed as a non-permanent force under the command of COPAX.[204] Nevertheless, the units participating in FOMAC and in MICOPAX are largely the same, and after MICOPAX set off, FOMAC has continued to develop along the criteria of the ASF, with attempts to insert FOMAC into the African Peace an Security Architecture and transform the initial FOMAC into a completed African Standby Force brigade.[205] In 2008, preliminary troop pledges for the horizon of 2010 were listed during a COPAX meeting.[206] This was another important step taken to better link FOMAC with the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Standby Force.[207]

5.2.2.1   Mandate and Procedures

As described in the previous section, the ASF policy framework is a key point of departure for FOMAC's mandate and procedures, describing its continental commitments towards the APSA evolution. Further mandate and procedures for deployment are stated in the ECCAS Mutual Assistance Pact, the Protocol relating to COPAX and in the Standing Orders for FOMAC.

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[200] African Union. *Profile: Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC/ECCAS)*
[201] Cilliers, J, and Malan,M. 2005, *Progress with the African Standby Force. Institute for Security Studies*
[202] Ibid
[203] ECCAS International partner 4
[204] Meyer, A. Email correspondence May 20, 2011
[205] Central Africa Researcher 2
[206] The Catalogue of units 2010 for the first regional standby force of FOMAC
[207] ECCAS International partner 3; ECCAS International partner 4

According to the ECCAS Framework documents, FOMAC is to "carry out peace, security and humanitarian assistance missions".[208]

The missions for FOMAC are specified as follows:

- Observation and monitoring

- Peace-keeping and restoration of peace

- Humanitarian intervention following a humanitarian disaster

- Enforcement of sanctions as provided for by existing regulations

- Preventive deployment

- Peace-building, disarmament and demobilization;

- Policing activities, including control of fraud and organized crime

- Any other operations as may be mandated by the Conference [209]

Procedures

The decision to deploy a FOMAC mission would have to come from 'the Conference'.[210] When there is a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region, 'the Conference' convenes an urgent meeting and activates the appropriate COPAX mechanism.[211] The request to 'the Conference' could come through an inviting member state, at the initiative of the General Secretary, or at the request of the AU or the UN.[212] Thus, FOMAC can be deployed under three separate arrangements: as a standalone ECCAS intervention in an ECCAS member state, as an AU mission – as ASF – with an AU mandate, or by putting contingents of FOMAC at the disposal of the UN. Nothing would prevent that a standalone ECCAS mission is also supported through an AU Peace and Security Council Resolution and UNSC resolution; as such support would be sought.

'The Conference' is the ECCAS body deciding on appropriate measures for prevention, management and regulation of conflicts, particularly for any military action and the establishment of FOMAC. Efforts are made to take decisions to intervene by consensus, but if no unanimous agreement can be found, the decision can be taken with a two thirds majority of votes.[213] 'The Conference' determines the mandate for military operations and nominates the Special

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[208] ECCAS, *Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)* Art 23
[209] Ibid, Art 24
[210] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale*, Art 1e
[211] CEEAC *Pacte D'Assistance Mutuelle* Art 6
[212] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* , Art 26
[213] CEEAC *Pacte D'Assistance Mutuelle* Art 7

Representative, the Force Commander, and the Head of Military Staff (Chef d'etat major).[214] According to the ECCAS framework documents, FOMAC can be deployed in the case of :

A) threat of aggression or conflict in all member states

B) conflict between two or more member states

C) internal conflict, which either threatens to provoke a humanitarian catastrophe, or constitutes a serious threat for peace and security in the sub-region

D) attempt of reversal of constitutional institutions of a member state (coup d'etat)

E) any other situation assessed as preoccupying by 'the Conference'. [215]

As concerns ECCAS engagement in an AU intervention, the mandating decision would come from the AU Peace and Security Council. Once an ASF peace support operation has been mandated, the mission would be placed under the command and control of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC). Apart from appointing the SRCC, the Chairperson would also appoint a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police and a Head of the Civilian Component. Thus, once deployed, the regional standby force (e.g. FOMAC) contribution would come under AU command and control as an ASF. In this arrangement, ECCAS responsibility would be on the one hand, force generation and preparation, and on the other hand, provision of planning, logistic and other support during ASF deployment.[216]

The Standing Orders specify that FOMAC logistics support shall be provided by COPAX during the engagement period. However, the FOMAC may receive logistic support from any other institution of a donor state, subject to the consent of the chairman of the Conference.[217] In the event of a FOMAC engagement on behalf of the UN or the AU, the logistics shall be provided by these organisations.[218]

Regarding financing of missions, it is foreseen that all COPAX member states shall contribute to the financing of all operations. However, also external partners may contribute financially. All member states contributing troops shall pre-finance the cost of military operations for the first three months of deployment. Beyond that period, COPAX shall take over. The pre-financing is to

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[214] CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* , Art 8
[215] Ibid, Art 25
[216] Elowson C., MacDermott, J. 2010, *ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and Security* p.48
[217] ECCAS*, Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC*)
[218] Ibid

be refunded by the COPAX budget.[219] In the event of FOMAC engagement on behalf of the UN or the AU, the funding shall be provided by these organizations.[220]

5.2.2.2 Structure and Current Status

<u>Structure</u>

As seen above, the concept of the ASF is based on a multidimensional standby force, including civilian and police components along with military components. ECCAS framework documents set up FOMAC along the same logic: according to the Standing Orders, the force is to be composed of "national interservice, police, gendarmerie contingents and of civilian modules from member states in ECCAS [...]"[221]

FOMAC is foreseen to consist of approximately 4800 - 5000 personnel, military, police and civilians included. This full operational capability is supposed to be reached in 2015, while an initial operational capability of 1200 personnel is expected no later than 2013. The initial operational capability is to be designed in the framework of a rapid deployment capacity. In terms of force levels, plans, for the time being, are that FOMAC is to be comprised of one standby brigade.[222] The possibility to add two other brigades (or potentially restructure the one brigade into smaller brigades) could be considered in the future.[223]

As mentioned above, a preliminary list of troop pledges was put together in February 2008 in 'the Catalogue of units 2010 for the first regional standby force of FOMAC'. In this document, the ambition to set up a standby brigade of approximately 5000 personnel is expressed. In terms of force levels, the Catalogue divides the standby force in four tactical groupings, which each are to consist of 1200 personnel and each to include police, civilian and military components (where the latter would consist of, among other things, one infantry battalion, one command/service support company, one squadron of light tanks, one artillery support battery, one engineer section, one helicopter squadron and one logistics company).[224] The troop pledges were initially to be realised by 2010. Even if the member states committed to providing the personnel already in 2008, the pledges have not yet been entirely realised[225], and the Catalogue of

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[219] ECCAS, *Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)*

[220] ECCAS, *Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC);* ECCAS International partner 4

[221] ECCAS, *Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)*

[222] Central Africa Researcher 1; ECCAS International partner 4

[223] ECCAS International partner 4

[224] Ibid

[225] With the exception of during the exercise Kwanza, where the member states provided a considerable number of units. Fore more on Kwanza, see chapter 5.2.2

Units should rather be seen as an evolving document, which is to be revised every second year by COPAX. While no review took place in 2010 there could be a revision in 2011.[226] The preliminary list of troop pledges, from 2008, is to be found in Annex 1.

The FOMAC planning element (PLANELM), currently with 20 employed staff,[227] has been established in Libreville. Two of these staff are police officers (they are soon to be joined by a third) and two civilians (one of whom is a legal advisor).[228] A regional logistics base for peacekeeping operations is to be located in Doula, Cameroon, or/and in Angola, while a medical facility – a training institute for military doctors – is being developed in Libreville.[229]

FOMAC should include general staff from its different member states, which are to be appointed by consensus. Concerning the military component, FOMAC is – in addition to ground troops – to include sufficient air and naval assets.[230] The standby force is not a formed military troop assembled in one place, but made up of contingents of national armies which are to be called upon by COPAX in response to an emergency.

Since most of the ECCAS troop contributing countries are former French colonies, the intention is that police would be constituted by gendarmerie for robust missions and may include civilian police where the mission allows this.[231] According to the Catalogue of units, the standby force would need six formed police units, as well as a police company able to perform desert operations (mounted police capacity).[232]

Concerning the civilian component, the Standing Orders state that "FOMAC may receive reinforcements from civilian units composed of NGOs and associations authorized by the ECCAS General Secretariat".[233] The Catalogue of units mentions in general terms that 'civilian elements to be provided at demand', and that civilian observers are to be identified and formed.[234] Nevertheless, the structure of the civilian component is not well defined at the moment.[235]

In terms of training, ECCAS disposes of a number of centres of excellence. However, these are national centres, whose curricula are currently not in line with international training standards. The issue at stake is whether these centres

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[226] ECCAS International partner 4
[227] ECCAS Official 2
[228] ECCAS International partner 3
[229] Kinzel, W., 2008, *The African standby force of the African union: ambitious plans, wide regional disparities – an intermediate appraisal* p 21; ECCAS International partner 4
[230] Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*
[231] Ibid
[232] ECCAS International partner 3
[233] ECCAS, *Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)*
[234] ECCAS International partner 3
[235] ECCAS International partner 4

can adapt their curriculum to be suitable as APSA training institutes. Seven centres in the ECCAS region are presently on the AU's list, and hence considered to be engaged as APSA training institutes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. A definite assessment of which of these centres will be used awaits the finalisation of a needs analysis on the ECCAS training needs.[236] The Cours Superior Interarmées de Défense (CSID) in Yaoundé/Cameroon seems to have been accepted to be used at the strategic level, while Ecole d'Etat-Major de Libreville (EEML) in Libreville/Gabon is appropriate for the operational level. Concerning tactical level training, there is a school (EFOFAA) in Luanda/Angola, however its profile is considered as too tactical and rather meant for the start of military carriers.[237] Another option is in Bata/Equatorial Guinea, but this is a basic navy academy, not in line with FOMAC needs. There are also plans to further develop a police force training centre (EIFORCES) in Awae/Cameroon.[238] In addition, smaller national centres such as the one for medical training (Libreville, Gabon) and the one for engineers (Brazzaville, Congo), could play a regional role in due course.[239] COPAX is responsible for coordinating training programmes for the conditioning of FOMAC contingents.[240]

Status and challenges

Advancement towards the establishment of FOMAC has been much slower than the setting up of corresponding forces in West Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa.[241] While FOMAC was conceived already in 2000, progress only started to take off around 2006. However, chronic underfunding from the start, and the substantial conflicts in the region in the following years, continued to prevent the efforts to establish the regional brigade.[242] Although a national division of labour has been made between individual countries of the region, the effective realisation of the regional standby brigade (as well as the ideas

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[236] ECCAS International partner 2

[237] ECCAS International partner 2

[238] Kinzel, W., 2008, *The African standby force of the African Union: ambitious plans, wide regional disparities – an intermediate appraisal*. German institute for international and security affairs, SWP research paper, p 21

[239] Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*. Institute for Strategic Studies, ISS paper 160

[240] ECCAS, *Standing orders of the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)* 17 juni 2002; ECCAS International partner 4; ECCAS International partner 3

[241] Cilliers, J, and Malan, M. 2005. *Progress with the African Standby Force*

[242] Kinzel, W., 2008, *The African standby force of the African union: ambitious plans, wide regional disparities – an intermediate appraisal*, p. 21

concerning the development of a Rapid Deployment Force) still faces many technical challenges.[243]

However, with the latest multinational training exercise, 'Kwanza', which took place in Angola in May/June 2010, progress has been noted and the pace in establishing FOMAC has picked up. With Kwanza, leadership for FOMAC was taken: Angola took a great part of the responsibility and especially the real life support, such as logistics, communication and network assets, deployment and supply. Most of the funding was also secured by Angola. Observers note that if Angola did not take this role, the Kwanza exercise would probably never have been realised.[244]

Kwanza was a key exercise because it intended to serve to certify FOMAC as an APSA brigade. The exercise (following the AU scenario 4) addressed all levels of implementation of an integrated mission – political, strategic, operational and tactical, and, being a multidimensional and multifunctional exercise it took into account different activities: political/diplomatic action (civilian component), stabilisation through observation and military action (military component: observers and land, sea and air troops), consolidation through police/gendarme action (police component) and humanitarian action (civilian component).[245] It was the first time that an inter-service exercise at brigade level took place, where the whole cycle of a peace support operation was taken into account. Some observers, however, question whether this was really training for a peace support operation or rather a standard military exercise, and hence, whether certification was actually feasible. For instance, no civil society took part.[246] On the other hand, the exercise was well organised, and certain observers judge it on the whole as a success for ECCAS. Kwanza was a major effort, and the organisation proved that they are able to deploy and train a force of 3700 troops by its own.[247] The certification report issued by ECCAS in October 2010 concluded that "*FOMAC, an ASF component, has been certified and can be used in peace keeping missions, in the framework of a multinational and multidimensional force*".[248] This certification, however, is only an internal ECCAS assessment, and is not accepted at the AU level. It has been suggested that most of the objectives of the Kwanza exercise were attained.[249] At the same time, it is underlined that the ECCAS operation in the CAR, a couple of years earlier, could not be run

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[243] Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*

[244] Central Africa researcher 1; ECCAS International partner 4

[245] CEEAC, *Rapport Bilan et Retour d'Experience de la Composante police/gendamerie de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010*

[246] Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management* 20101027

[247] ECCAS International partner 4; ECCAS International partner 3

[248] CEEAC, *Synthese des Travaux de la Conference Bilan et Retour d'Experience de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010*

[249] ECCAS International partner 4

without the support from external partners; and that the ECCAS member states themselves would not be capable of maintaining the mission more than a few days.[250]

Meanwhile, one observer noted that the standard of the exercise was very low. In particular, this observer highlighted that FOMAC staff still have to improve capabilities, especially weaknesses regarding the organisation and planning, the Communication & Information Systems battalion (CIS), command and control structure, logistics, real life support and the dissemination of information. In short, FOMAC is far from the UN basic standard. Regarding FOMAC operability, the military infantry battalions are assessed as more or less acceptable, while others are still in need of progressing.[251]

Lastly, in contrast to the (relative) delivery of the military component, it was more difficult for the police/gendarme and civilian components to perform during Kwanza. Out of the 3700 participants in the exercise, the police personnel amounted to 400 people. The police units are generally in an acceptable state, but this assessment is based on how they reach their national standard and the national specificities, not in terms of being part of an international peacekeeping force.[252] In particular, for the police/gendarmes, the transfer of responsibility during the stabilisation phase to the consolidation phase was a challenge, especially the balance between keeping their specific role and integrating in the multidimensional force. While planning, for the police component, was on the whole assessed as satisfactory during Kwanza, the development of doctrines and operational procedures proved to be aspects where progress need to be made. Clear concepts and doctrines are key for the police to know what they are intended to do. Moreover, police units are not well equipped.[253]

As for the civilian component, Kwanza was the first time that civilian elements were present during an ECCAS peacekeeping exercise.[254] These were largely made up of political and humanitarian actors. Difficulties were noted in terms of the basic conception of civilian component; determining its exact role and taking the specificities of this component into account.[255] It is also difficult for the civilian component to mobilise adequate resources.[256] Generally, civil society, which was largely absent from the exercise, is weak in the Central Africa region,

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[250] Ibid

[251] ECCAS International partner 4

[252] Ibid

[253] CEEAC, *Rapport Bilan et Retour d'Experience de la Composante police/gendamerie de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010;* ECCAS International partner 4

[254] CEEAC, *Synthese des Travaux de la Conference Bilan et Retour d'Experience de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010*

[255] CEEAC, *Synthese des Travaux de la Conference Bilan et Retour d'Experience de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010;* CEEAC, *Rapport Bilan et Retour d'Experience de la Composante police/gendamerie de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010*

[256] ECCAS International partner 4

and this sector is particularly unorganised in the field of security. This implies difficulties in terms of formulating action plans and to be able to play a real role.[257] The civilian component is underway trying to find a contractor able to provide a good roster.[258]

A common challenge for all components is the insufficient level of training of the personnel and that they generally keep low standards. During Kwanza, it was apparent that different countries had had different levels of operational preparation and pre-training, which hampered the effectiveness.[259] Doctrines, organisation and equipment were also main areas of difficulty. On a whole, it is therefore difficult for ECCAS to be able to carry out multidimensional peacekeeping exercises. The General Secretariat suffers a severe lack of resources and from over-reliance on external support for almost all activities of FOMAC. Important pillars of FOMAC, such as training centres of excellence, the logistic base and training programmes have for long been at a standstill partly because of non-existing internal resources and competing donor initiatives. Structural challenges such as the weak managerial capacity of DIHPSS, the slow decision-making procedures of COPAX and the inadequate skills of many officers attached to the regional PLANELM (especially the strategic planning) further hinder the development of FOMAC.[260]

Regarding the way ahead, and linked to the AU time schedule, FOMAC is supposed to train to integrate the lessons learned from Kwanza, and especially, in order to achieve the rapid-deployment capability requirements no later than late 2012 or early 2013. The military, police and civilian components have to upgrade their standards and learn to work together in the general framework of the AU guidelines. All RECs met in Harare in December 2010 to plan the forthcoming training. At the time of writing, ECCAS focused on planning for the 2011 - 2013 cycle. Much of the focus will be on the police and civilian components. Proposals for the creation of an integrated training centre (multinational, with civilian, police and military elements), to be created at the ECCAS headquarters in Libreville, have been made. A decision on this issue is foreseen in 2011.[261]

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[257] Central Africa Researcher 1

[258] ECCAS International partner 4

[259] CEEAC, *Synthese des Travaux de la Conference Bilan et Retour d'Experience de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010;* CEEAC, *Rapport Bilan et Retour d'Experience de la Composante police/gendamerie de l'Exercise KWANZA 2010*

[260] Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*

[261] ECCAS International partner 3

6   External partners

Two external partners dominate the scene when it comes to support to ECCAS: the EU and France. Canada, the US, Japan, Belgium, Spain, the African Development Bank and the African Capacity Building Foundation are examples of other donors. Brazil, China and India are also powerful and active stakeholders in Central Africa. Besides the French colonel who is attached to ECCAS, Germany, Italy and the UK have possible plans to accredit their Defence Attachés in Kinshasa to ECCAS. The US is also considering having a permanent US staff within FOMAC (envisioned to be a naval officer funded by AFRICOM[262]).[263] A partner-support group "the friends of ECCAS" has had a first orientating meeting to avoid overlapping initiatives in the future.[264]

Around 2007-2008, external partners provided a lot of funds to ECCAS, having great expectations on the APSA project. However, little has been obtained, and it is not evident that ECCAS is progressing, which has made donors somewhat disappointed. Partly, this could be seen as a consequence of the ECCAS management being the same as during the pre-APSA years. The major APSA ambition is also felt by stakeholders on the ground as rather being only an EU ambition. Nevertheless, the cooperation continues.[265] Criticism has been raised towards ECCAS' partners, claiming that they are not sufficiently interested in whether their funds come to proper use, whether results are obtained, and hence, whether their presence is justified. The argument is that, irrespectively, the partners want to stay - out of self-interest.[266]

<u>France</u>

Several of the ECCAS countries are former French colonies and/or francophonie countries, and traditionally, France is one of the most important donor countries in this region. France, which has a track record of supporting military/peacekeeping operations in Central Africa, plays an important role in the building of military capacities of Central African states. A French military adviser, who is helping develop FOMAC's vision and capacity, is provided. Support also comes in terms of logistics, and finance and, more importantly,

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[262] The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is responsible for the US military relation with the 53 African countries. It search to prevent conflicts, support a secure African environment and build African nations own security capacity. This is done through regional security cooperation, and by military-to-military programs that support professional development and capacity building of military forces in Africa; U.S. Africa Command, *About United States Africa Command*

[263] ECCAS International partner 6

[264] ECCAS International partner 6; ECCAS International partner 3

[265] ECCAS International partner 5; ECCAS International partner 3

[266] ECCAS International partner 3

training.[267] The strategic and operational training centres for FOMAC are both supported and funded by France. The French support to training centres has been largely focused on 'by militaries for militaries'. Hence, this kind of support is only partly suitable. It could perhaps be assumed that France desires the EU to take responsibility for other components, including the rest of the financial burden. It should also be noted that it remains difficult for the EU to stay immune to French influence.[268]

Some observers see France as the real leader in the region, and claim that many ECCAS member states seem to identify more with France than with Africa. Clearly, in the absence of a strong regional leader among the ECCAS countries, this role has often indirectly been taken on by France. In fact, France has provided more response than the ECCAS states themselves when conflict has developed.[269] Regarding MICOPAX France contributes with 25-30% of the financing.[270] France also contributes to MICOPAXxwith a detachment from its military base in Libreville (Forces Francaises au Gabon). These amount to 150 personnel and go under the name 'Boali'. Boali ensures operational support to MICOPAX, is in charge of transport between Libreville and Bangui, guards the airport, trains MICOPAX soldiers and procures uniforms. Being such a small mission, the costs associated with financing MICOPAX are not considerable for France. If MICOPAX would withdraw from Bangui, the CAR is likely to come close to a collapse; hence, French presence is a way to keep stability in the country. It is certain that as long as MICOPAX remains in the CAR, France will support the mission.[271]

For France, the CEMAC would in some respect be a more convenient organisation to interact with. As for ECCAS, Angola and the DRC are important member states, over which France has much more limited influence.[272] France however intends to continue its engagement for the whole of ECCAS in the long-term.[273] French business interest, such as access to uranium, oil and timber, is prevalent in Central Africa. However, this interest is not the key motivation for France's presence in the area - maintaining the spirit of community and solidarity between Central African countries and France is more important, as the survival of the 'Francophonie' will guarantee that this part of Africa continues to be a zone of influence. Still, the locomotive for the Franco-African relations has waned, with the coming to power of French President Sarkozy and Gabonese President Omar Bongo passing away. France, however, continues to support this

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[267] Cilliers, J. 2008, *The African Standby Force: An update on progress*
[268] ECCAS International partner 3
[269] Central Africa researcher 1; ECCAS International partner 5
[270] Around 50% of the funds come from the EU/African Peace Facility and around 25% is contributed by ECCAS itself ; ECCAS International partner 1; ECCAS International partner 3
[271] ECCAS International partner 1
[272] Central Africa Researcher 2
[273] ECCAS International partner 1

Francophonie zone, even if perhaps not as outspokenly and overt as it used to. The currency in these countries, the CFA, is connected to 'Banque de France'. This means that these Central African countries rely on France's economy, and it makes it possible for France to control the economic/financial situation in the Central African countries. With these ties in place, France can also count on their political support.[274] Certain observers argue that the CEMAC presence in the CAR – FOMUC - to a large extent was "*an attempt by France not only to disengage its military forces from the country and the conflict there, but also to remain relevant in CAR domestic politics under the cover of a multinational force composed of countries with whom France has close relationships*"[275].[276] The extent to which this is the whole truth can be disputed. The fact remains that, in relation to its former colonies, France finds itself in a difficult situation – the French will be exposed to criticism if it takes an active stance towards these countries, as well as if remains inactive. Certain is, however, that French support alone will not suffice to achieve any significant progress, in relation to FOMAC development and as well as to other ECCAS peace and security efforts[277].

The EU

The EU is the biggest donor to ECCAS. The peace and security support to ECCAS is managed at different levels. Within the 10th European Development Fund regional program, the regional indicative program (RIP) for Central Africa benefits both ECCAS and CEMAC.[278] Among other things, the RIP contains an envelope of € 15 million supporting the political integration of Central Africa; ECCAS is the leading regional organisation for this domain.[279] Within the political integration domain, the support program to ECCAS in terms of peace and security (Programme d'Appui à la CEEAC en matière de Paix et Sécurité 2, PAPS 2) contains almost € 12 million. It was signed in December 2010 and has three expected results:

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[274] Central Africa researcher 1

[275] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa*

[276] International Crisis Group 2005, *Central African Republic: anatomy of a phantom state*

[277] Critics argue that even though France has been present in its current form for 50 years, providing support, little has improved. It is also pointed out that the relationship between France and the Francophonie countries would eventually have to change, as it is a dysfunctional one; ECCAS International partner 5; Kinzel, W., 2008, *The African standby force of the African union: ambitious plans, wide regional disparities – an intermediate appraisal* p. 21

1) Support to DIHPSS: capacity building, support to political and diplomatic action[280] as well as to research projects. This strand includes the operationalisation of MARAC (€ 1.6 million).

2) Support to training and peacekeeping capacities: FOMAC, training development and support to training activities (€ 2.5 million)

3) Conflict prevention and peace consolidation: fight against trafficking of small arms, capacity building in the field of elections, border program, strengthening of civil society and development of CSO-ECCAS cooperation (€ 3.4 million)[281]

The PAPS 2 also includes the payment of 8-10 staff, allocated to the three expected results. Furthermore, a technical assistance is planned to support ECCAS in implementing the program (€ 3 million)

A second funding stream for peace and security is the African Peace Facility (APF), which is centrally managed from Brussels, through the AU. The APF is redistributed through the AU at the REC level (among which ECCAS can be found). The APF includes a capacity building component and support to peace keeping operations. Concerning the capacity building component[282] of the APF, ECCAS could benefit from an AU liaison office in Addis Abeba, support to MARAC activities, mediation, the PLANELM, training centres and institutional support. As regards the support to peace keeping operations, the APF finances around 50% of MICOPAX (around € 20 million).

Finally, funds related to peace and security are also channeled through the Instrument for Stability (IfS) (also managed by Brussels). The IfS supports various projects, such as critical maritime routes, actions to prevent, combat and control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), support for prevention of and fight against terrorism, etc.

Even if the EU is heavily financing many of the ECCAS activities, the capacity to absorb these funds is insufficient. As a consequence, only a part of the funds made available to ECCAS was actually paid out from the EU.[283]

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[280] For instance, to increase the ability of ECCAS to mediate member state conflicts, including those pertaining to resource exploitation, cross-border crime and arms trafficking; Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa*

[281] The amounts indicated above may evolve over the course of the project; ECCAS International partner 5

[282] For the 9th European Development Fund (capacity building component), € 670 000 was allocated to MARAC and € 2.5 million to FOMAC, the PLANELM and for further support of MARAC; Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa*

[283] ECCAS International partner 5

The US

The US does not yet have a formal relationship with ECCAS, but engages foremost bilaterally with the individual member states. This includes inviting their military to US military exercises as observers, and supporting with logistics.[284] Existing cooperation between the US and ECCAS member states is mainly focussed on maritime security, a partnership that will be elaborated below.

The Central Africa maritime area has been divided into different zones, where zone D is the zone most connected to the ECCAS countries, covering Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé & Principe. COPAX has accepted that the defence ministers of these countries cooperate in order to achieve maritime security in the area.[285] Since March 2010, the US is involved in zone D via a maritime security initiative called the "African Partnership Station" (APS).[286] The APS is part of the AFRICOM's Security Cooperation Program and involves American, European and African actors.[287] The US is also engaged in a multinational maritime security and safety initiative (including training) where several Central African states are involved[288] together with Benin, Nigeria and Togo.[289] Furthermore, Equatorial Guinea has joint patrolling and training exercises with the US.[290]

The United States have supported cooperation between Central African countries regarding maritime questions, foremost through the evolvement of agreements between countries such as Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea on maritime security.[291] Furthermore, maritime trainings of coast guard patrols named "African Endeavour" and "Ubangame/Obaygaem", supported by the US, were performed by the ECCAS countries Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon in 2009. São Tomé & Principe acted as observer of the trainings.[292] Moreover, apart from US hosting meetings and helping to develop strategies around the subject of maritime safety in the area, US technical and material support is of great importance for the security in the Gulf of Guinea.

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[284] ECCAS International partner 6

[285] Africa Union, *The Multinational Center of coordination Zone D*

[286] ECCAS International partner 6

[287] Elowson Camilla. 2009. *Maritime Security in Western and Central Africa* FOI MEMO 2981

[288] Such as Angola, Cameroon, The Republic of Congo, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé & Principe.

[289] Blackanthem Military News, *Navy to Lead Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Initiative*

[290] FOI, *Maritime Security in Western and Central Africa*

[291] African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, *A survey of the capacity needs of Africa's Regional Economic Communities* p 102; ECCAS International partner 6

[292] ECCAS International partner 6

More broadly, US maritime cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea consists of joint patrols with actions against criminal activities and maritime piracy.[293] In accordance with the US International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security it assists countries in the region to improve regional cooperation, policing protocols and monitoring efforts.[294] Noteworthy is that the US engagement for security in the Gulf of Guinea goes beyond Central African states to include other countries concerned by security issues in the region, most importantly Nigeria.[295]

6.1 Opportunities

The end of fighting in several ECCAS countries provides a window of opportunity to build peace and ensure post-conflict reconstruction and development in a sub-region that has been largely ignored by traditional donors.[296] Predominant EU and French intervention is not enough partner support to enhance the performance of ECCAS peace and security efforts. Continued efforts in different areas need to be undertaken: critical areas include promoting the development of strong and operational communitarian bodies, building ECCAS' institutional capacity. Current efforts to address the chronic shortfall in human, technical and institutional capacity are in their infancy and have by and large been slow to come about. In developing strategies of assistance, close attention should be paid to ECCAS' financial and absorptive capacity. Accountability is already weak within ECCAS, and clearly, it would be a challenge for ECCAS to account for larger amount of money, as this would mean needing more administration and human resources.[297]

The progression of regional integration beyond the present state of intergovernmental cooperation is another key area. Regional efforts could be improved if the potential of civil society in conflict management was further recognised and fostered. The importance of involving civil society actors especially lies in the potential to counterbalance the intergovernmental and state-driven nature of regional security initiatives.[298] Steps to strengthen the

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[293] ECCAS International partner 6

[294] Naval Postgraduate School, *Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea*

[295] Naval Postgraduate School, *Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea*; Afrique Avenir, *Nigeria talks tough over security in Gulf of Guinea;* ECCAS International partner 6

[296] TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

[297] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival* p. 31; TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"; ECCAS International partner 5

[298] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival* p. 31

relationship between ECCAS and civil society have been taken in the last few years within EU ECCAS Support Programme for Peace and Security in Central Africa (PAPS). The programme, financed by the EU's European Development Fund, builds capacity around the interface between ECCAS and civil society, and establishes and coordinates a civil society network to advise and support ECCAS.[299] The experiences gained from this project needs to be further built upon. In order to deepen civil society's engagement with ECCAS around peace and security, partner support could, for instance, seek to draw on the experiences of the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) in West Africa.

Regional integration is hampered by the poor relationship between the ECCAS countries, and the limited knowledge about ECCAS among the member states.[300] While ECCAS has drawn the attention of EU and other donors, the organisation's member states do not always benefit from the same amount of support. In view of challenges in terms of limited capacities and varying political motivation among the member states, it could also be argued that it is imperative to keep a bilateral perspective in the effort to support ECCAS. This implies that provision of technical support to the member state is needed. The fact remains that attempts to advance the regional organisation, particularly as concerns the involvement of member states, tend to be rather ineffective. These efforts should be furthered along support at the level of ECCAS itself.

Strategies, which will make the ECCAS institutions function, still need to be found. A challenge is to find an approach which means working together in a real partnership. Applying a pure western model, or a western view and criteria of how the different components of ECCAS peace and security architecture should develop, is likely to lead to deception among donors. Obviously, support and guidance should continue to be given, and experiences shared, but with the comprehension for the complexity of the context in which these developments occur, and with an insight that room for flexibility must be allowed for local ways and means in advancing matters – even if these do not follow the action plans as described on paper.

One observer remarks, however, that a certain mistrust towards external partners lately seem to be prevalent within ECCAS. In addition, not all partner countries were allowed in as observers during Kwanza (non-acceptance mainly by

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[299] See FOI's ECOWAS report: Elowson, C., MacDermott, J. 2010 *ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and Security A scoping study of progress and challenges*;
Meyer, A. 2009, *Regional Conflict management in Central Africa: from FOMUC to MICOPAX* p. 172*; Alusala, N. 2007, *Is there hope for the Economic Community of Central African States;*
TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"
[300] ECCAS International partner 5

Angola).[301] This has been interpreted as the organisation in some senses embarking on an introvert agenda where priority is given to proceeding with ECCAS' own efforts to advance.[302] Reasons for this approach – if correctly interpreted - can be several. According to one observer, the attitude of 'we deal with our things ourselves' is merely a discourse, which can be useful for ECCAS as the effect can be increased rivalry between different donors - which in turn gives ECCAS an upper hand towards its external partners. In practice, however, ECCAS needs the financial and technical support, and would never refuse.[303] Meanwhile, in this context, it should be noted that the promotion of a "western" perspective of how to proceed in implementing ECCAS peace and security architecture, means that there is a limited will to understand the African partners' political norms and working mode. This will make the partnership difficult, with a likely consequence that the western proposals will not be followed all the way through. African ownership means accepting that European standards are not the measuring stick. If donors want to measure the progress, there is a need to increase the understanding for African solutions, show openness and adapt to African manners of obtaining results. Efforts should be made to encourage and optimise local systems, and to approach gaps between plans and outcomes in a constructive and creative manner.

Meanwhile, African ownership should not be confused with non-accountability concerning donor funded projects. Critics point to a limited readiness among the external partners to confront ECCAS on problematic issues. Non-accountability and lacking dedication by ECCAS is rarely countered by partners with the straightforward message that the continued payment of funds is dependent on a real commitment to the cooperation. A specific example is the regional training centres: these centres are impatient to be declared as APSA training institutes, partly in order to benefit from funds. One observer note that the donors appear hesitant to turn these centres down on grounds that they are not suitable, even if this is often the truth.[304]

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[301] ECCAS International partner 6
[302] ECCAS International partner 1
[303] Central Africa researcher 2
[304] ECCAS International partner 3

7 Conclusion

A general challenge for the development of APSA that has been noted is the different paces at which the different regional components are able to progress. This report has focused on the progress made, the track record and challenges ahead for the Central African component, i.e. ECCAS engagement in the area of peace and security. Without having undertaken a regional comparison, it is safe to assume that ECCAS is one of the RECs to have progressed the least in the area of peace and security.

In terms of its track record, ECCAS has often failed to address the region's most pressing peace and security needs. Instead, member states have often looked to external actors, such as the UN and other African states or regional bodies, for support and assistance in responding to conflict

What can be concluded from this report is that ECCAS had a late start, due to being paralyzed by ongoing conflict in the 1990's. This partly explains its relative weakness compared to other RECs. Nevertheless, ECCAS has also suffered from other challenges hampering its development. Four challenges are particularly concerning: *its weak institutional capacity; its narrow definition of security; the member states' lack of regional identity;* and *the impact of external partners.*

Institutional weakness
Broadly speaking the *institutional weakness* of ECCAS can be attributed both to operational issues, including inputs such as financial and human resources as well as political will, and to more structural issues, concerning whether ECCAS has an appropriate structure for its tasks. Brought together, these institutional weaknesses negatively affect ECCAS ability to contribute as a building block for continental security within APSA. ECCAS has, for example, adopted structures similar to those of the more advanced RECs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, but has been unable to operationalise them due to a lack of qualified personnel and resources. Hence, formal structures often lack substance.

However, the fact that ECCAS is often characterized as the weakest of the RECs should not only result in resignation, as it also means opportunities. More developed RECs, such as ECOWAS, have been established and reasonably functioning for a long time, which means there are many preconceived views of how things should work. Many patterns are therefore difficult to remake. ECCAS, on the other hand, is more of a blank page, with newer institutions and less developed policy instruments. This implies that there could be more room for new ideas of how to move on and possibly that it could be easier to let civilians into the peace and security architecture at an early stage of its set-up.

Narrow definition of security

Whereas the AU embraces a newer, multi-dimensional notion of security that includes issues of human security, ECCAS has so far shown *a narrow interpretation of security* with an emphasis hard security issues and developing capacities for such issues. For example, the Protocol on the establishment of COPAX, regulating the Central African peace and security architecture, favours a narrow approach of security and clearly emphasizes its military dimension. Similarly, FOMAC has prioritised military and gendarme/military police capacities over the development of the civilian component. The already noted absence of a mediation organ, is equally a sign of a lack of attention given to civilian mechanisms to deal with peace and security issues. This discrepancy begs the question whether ECCAS is developing adequate capacities for addressing non-traditional security challenges that confronts its member states.[305] As a consequence, it might be improving its capacities to address manifestations of crises, but not necessarily their fundamental causes.

Central Africa has an advantage in that it does not currently suffer from an acute crisis. On the other hand, the region has plenty of areas with general instability. These circumstances could put to test, or should bring to the front, the need of conflict prevention – especially considering the fresh experiences of the consequences of waiting for unstable situations to escalate into war. As there is currently no full-blown conflict ongoing is the region, perhaps it is now time to look at and develop conflict prevention policies.

A related challenge is that ECCAS has not taken an active role in opening up its institutions towards civil society. While this could partly be attributed to the general weakness of civil society in the region, relations between civil society and governments have traditionally been hostile in the region. In order to overcome this, ECCAS needs to find ways of promoting engagement of civil society in the area of peace and security. [306]

Member states' lack of regional identity
The progress on regional integration is certainly negatively affected by a *lack of regional identity*. There are wide disparities within ECCAS and member states have different loyalties, especially as they are members of different, overlapping, regional organizations.

In the absence of a consensus on priorities and the pace at which to pursue integration, the strictly intergovernmental character of ECCAS and the weakness

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[305] Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa,* p. 154

[306] Cosme, N. and Fiacre, Y., 2001, *The Economic Community of Central Africa States and human Security* as presented in Macaulay, C and Karbo, T. *Up to the task? Assessing the ability of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to protect human security in Central Africa,* p. 160;

Meyer, A. Lecture: *Peacebuilding and Security in Africa: the case of ECCAS, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict management* 20101027

of control mechanisms become particularly challenging, as the body does not have the supranational institutions to act as a mediator or driving force to resolve political impasses and revive the process.[307]

The fact that there is no hegemonic power that is driving regional integration in ECCAS has further hampered integration. However, this fact also holds a potential for ECCAS to gain more pace as Angola, and to a certain extent the DRC, begin to affirm themselves within ECCAS.

Many Central African states are struggling with obtaining internal legitimacy among their population, due to lack of capacity and motivation to carry out needed activities on the domestic scene. An alternative way to obtain this legitimacy can then be through gaining international credibility. For instance, being able to put a standby force in place, and driving regional integration, would be one way to gain visibility and to achieve positive international attention. ECCAS could thereby be used by member states as a platform to politically affirm itself on the international scene, to gain respect as an international player, and thereby to access funds.

Impact of external partners
Member states systematically fail to make payments of dues to the organization and the customs collection scheme has taken off slowly and is not yet operational in a number of countries.[308] As a result, ECCAS relies heavily on external funding to meet core organizational and community mandates.

The EU and France are the largest international partners. In the absence of a strong regional leader among the ECCAS countries, this role has often been taken indirectly by France. In fact, donors have had a great impact on the set up of the central African peace and security architecture. France has, for example, financed 25-30 per cent of the MICOPAX operation, and provided approximately 150 military personnel to ensure its operational support. As a result, France has in many cases been seen as providing a stronger response than the ECCAS states themselves.[309] The reliance on donor funding and support alongside a lack of political interest among member states have led ECCAS open to donor-driven priorities. It could be argued that this has only further eroded the political commitment of the member states to the organization.

In conclusion, writing a comprehensive progress report for ECCAS's capabilities in terms of peace and security remains difficult. Certainly, it can be claimed that

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[307] Meyer, A. 2008, *Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa – Assessment and Perspectives 10 years after the revival*, p. 27

[308] According to the Contribution Communautaire d'Integration (CCI), a 0.7 percentage tax on all imports emanating from third party countries is meant to be contributed to ECCAS; TrustAfrica, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – Peace and Security Architecture"

[309] Central Africa researcher 1; ECCAS International partner 5

the peace and security architecture is being put in place at a slow place. To date, the body assigned for making decisions on peace and security, COPAX, and its organs have yet to be fully established. The region's contribution to the African Standby Force, FOMAC, is still in the early stages of development and failed to meet its 2010 deadlines for readiness to deploy. It remains hard to assess how far ECCAS has really come and what capability has in fact been reached. For these reasons, writing (and reading) a progress report requires prudence; for what may be considered true today may be falsified tomorrow.

Annex 1

Composition of Brigade FOMAC

States	Components	Type of unit
	Terrestre Ground troops	1 Infantry batallion
	Aérienne	Strategic airlift capacity: 2 IL76
	Air Force	Air force component: 3 utility helicopters
	Navale Naval units	Force contributor
Angola	Police	
	Ground troops	1 Infantry batallion
	Air Force	
	Naval units	
Burundi	Police	
	Ground troops	1 Light tanks bataillon
	Air Force	Strategic airlift capacity: 1 C130 Air force component
	Naval units	Leading state for naval component and force contributor
Cameroon	Police	1 Formed Police Unit (FPU)
	Ground troops	1 Support batallion 1 Signal company
	Air Force	Strategic airlift capacity: to be defined Air force component
	Naval units	Force contributor
Republic of Congo	Police	1 Formed Police Unit (FPU)
Gabon	Ground troops	Leading state of force component and force contributor 1 Maintenance squadron (Auto Motorised Vehicle) 1 Logistics company

		1 Field hospital N2
	Air Force	Strategic airlift capacity: 1 C130 Air force componant
	Naval units	Force contributor
	Police	1 Formed Police Unit (FPU)
	Ground troops	2 Infantry companies 1 Oil transport squadron
	Air Force	
	Naval units	Force contributor
Equatorial Guinea	Police	
	Ground troops	1 Infantry batallion
	Air Force	
	Naval units	
CAR	Police	1 Formed Police Unit (FPU)
	Ground troops	1 Infantry batallion
	Air Force	
	Naval units	
DRC	Police	1 Formed Police Unit (FPU)
	Ground troops	
	Air Force	
	Naval units	Force contributor
São Tomé & Principe	Police	
	Ground troops	1 Infantry batallion
	Air Force	Strategic airlift capacity: 1 C130
	Naval units	
Chad	Police	1 Desert operation company (Méhari)

Annex 2 – ECCAS General-Secretariat Organigram

ORGANIGRAMME CEEAC
Juin 2009

SECRETAIRE GENERAL

Représentant CEEAC auprès des Institutions internationales

Coordinateur Projet REPAC

Contrôleur Financier

Agence Comptable

Directeur de Cabinet

Conseillers du Secrétaire Général

Service Communication

Cellule NEPAD

Assistante du Secrétaire Général / Chef du secrétariat

Service Protocole, voyages et conférences

Cellule Juridique

Cellule technique Coopération et Coordination de l'aide

SGA Chargé du DPBARH

Secrétaire de direction

Service Informatique et base de données

Direction des Programmes et Budget

Service Budget

Service Programmes

Direction Administration et Ressources Humaines

Service Administration

Service Ressources Humaines

SGA Chargé du DISC

Cellule Genre

Cellule Emploi

Secrétaire de direction

Direction de la Santé et du Sport

Service Santé

Service en Charge du Sport

Direction de l'Éducation Sciences et Cultures

Service Éducation et Culture

Service Sciences et Technologies

SGA Chargé du DIHPSS

Assistant spécial/ Secrétariat COPAX

Secrétaire de direction

Cellule de liaison avec la Société Civile

Etat Major Régional (EMR)

Direction de la Sécurité Humaine

Service Élection et bonne Gouvernance

Service Justice et Droit de L'Homme

Service Lutte contre la Criminalité

Service Libre Circulation Des Personnes

Direction Des Affaires Politiques et du MARAC

Service Diplomatie Préventive et Médiation

Service du MARAC

SGA Chargé du DIPEM

Secrétaire de direction

Cellule des statistiques, analyse et prévisions économiques

Direction de l'Agriculture, du Développement rural et de l'Environnement

Service Environnement

Service Agriculture et Développement Rural

Direction des Politiques Macroéconomiques, du Commerce et de l'Industrie

Service Commerce, Douanes et Industrie

Service des politiques macroéconomiques

Direction Des Infrastructures

Service Transports

Service NTIC et Télécommunications

Service Énergie et Eau

Acronyms

APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF - African Standby Force

AU - African Union

CAR - Central African Republic

CDS - Commission de Défense et de Sécurité

CEEAC – Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale

CEMAC - Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale

CENTBRIG - Central African Brigade

CIS - Communication & Information Systems

COMESA - The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

COPAX - The Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa

CSID - The Cours Superior Interarmées de Défense

DIHPSS - Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

EASFCOM - Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism

EASF - The Eastern Africa Standby Force

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States

EEML - Ecole d'Etat-Major de Libreville

FOMAC - Force multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale

FOMUC - Force Multinationale en Centrafrique

IfS - Instrument for Stability

MARAC - The Central African early-warning system

MICOPAX - The Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic

MINURCAT - Mission to the Central African Republic and Chad

MONUSCO - United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

NARC - North African regional Capability

PLANELM – Planning Element

REC - Regional Economic Community

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons

UDEAC - Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale

WACSOF - West African Civil Society Forum

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