Arming the Peace

The Sensitive Business of Capacity Building

CLAES NILSSON, KRISTINA ZETTERLUND

FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden's largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors.

FOI
Swedish Defence Research Agency
Defence Analysis
SE-164 90 Stockholm

Phone: +46 8 555 030 00
Fax: +46 8 555 031 00

www.foi.se

FOI-R--3269--SE
ISSN 1650-1942

User Report
September 2011

Defence Analysis

Claes Nilsson, Kristina Zetterlund

Arming the Peace

The Sensitive Business of Capacity Building

Cover: Scanpix

Titel	Arming the Peace- The Sensitive Business of Capacity Building
Title	Arming the Peace- The Sensitive Business of Capacity Building
Rapportnr/Report no	FOI-R--3269--SE
Rapporttyp /Report Type	Användarrrapport/User Report
Månad/Month	September
Utgivningsår/Year	2011
Antal sidor/Pages	59 p
ISSN	ISSN 1650-1942
Kund/Customer	Försvarsdepartementet/Ministry of Defence
Projektnr/Project no	A12014
Godkänd av/Approved by	Maria Lignell Jakobsson

FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut	FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys	Department of Defence Analysis
164 90 Stockholm	SE-164 90 Stockholm

Sammanfattning

Kapacitetsbyggnad har blivit en allt viktigare strategi i fredsfrämjande insatser i konflikt och post-konfliktländer. Utgångspunkten är att hållbar utveckling måste komma från landet ifråga och bygga på ett folkligt stöd. Svaga stater ska stärkas så att de på egen hand kan hantera sina problem. Kapacitetsbyggnad har också blivit ett centralt instrument för att skapa förhållanden som tillåter fredsfrämjande insatser att dra sig ur och lämna över ansvar till nationella strukturer. I Afghanistan och Irak har kapacitetsbyggnad blivit centralt i det internationella samfundets ”exit strategy”.

Denna studie belyser kapacitetsbyggnad inom säkerhetssektorn samt centrala utmaningar inom området. Syftet är att analysera begreppet och dess tillämpning, samt att tydliggöra områden och aspekter som måste hanteras i kapacitetsuppbyggnadsinsatser.

Bland annat visar studien hur kapacitetsbyggnadsinsatser ofta enbart fokuserar på staten och statsbyggnad medan många grupper i konfliktdrabbade länder är beroende av icke-statliga aktörer för sin säkerhet. Andra områden som lokalt ägarskap, vikten av legitimitet hos givaren, privata säkerhetsaktörer och vikten av en bred uppsättning instrument för kapacitetsbyggnad diskuteras också i studien.

Studien visar att kapacitetsbyggnad inom säkerhetssektorn har stor potential, bland annat genom att aspekter som lokalt ägarskap hamnar i fokus. Kapacitetsbyggnad kan också minska behoven av externa interventioner. Samtidigt betonas betydelsen av långsiktiga strategier och av att ta hänsyn till komplexiteten som kapacitetsbyggnad i säkerhetssektorn utgör.

Nyckelord: Kapacitetsbyggnad, Säkerhetssektorreform, Fredsfrämjande insatser, Statsbyggnad

Summary

Capacity building as a strategy in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations is gaining increasing momentum. The idea is that, in the long run, sustainable solutions have to come from within conflict-ridden countries and enjoy the support of their populations. Fragile countries are to be strengthened so that they can shoulder their own problems, thus reducing the need for international assistance. In the hunt for viable exit strategies, capacity building has become a key activity. In Iraq and Afghanistan, building local capacity has become a central theme in the international community's exit strategies.

This study sets out to clarify some of the key challenges and opportunities offered by security sector capacity building. The aim is to analyse the concept and its application, and, in the end, highlight areas which need to be considered when engaging in security sector capacity building.

The analysis shows how capacity building has become intimately linked to state building and how this state-centric approach might not be appropriate in many conflict, or post-conflict settings. Other issues such as local ownership, the importance of legitimacy, private security actors and the need for a broader set of instruments in security sector capacity building are also discussed.

The study concludes that capacity building as a strategy is appealing, both to providers and recipients. It sits well with the local ownership paradigm and it could potentially save both lives and money by reducing the pressure for external military forces and facilitating "light footprints" by international actors. However, for security sector capacity building to be effective and sustainable, one must recognise the complexity of each specific context and the need for a long-term strategy.

Keywords: Capacity building, Security Sector Reform, Peacekeeping, State building

Acknowledgements

This report is a product of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. The report has benefitted substantially from input by many scholars and practitioners. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the interviewees from the New York University - Center on International Cooperation, International Crisis Group, the Stimson Center, RAND Corporation, the US National Defense University - Center for Complex Operations, UN agencies, the United States Institute of Peace and the World Bank for their valuable insights. Dr Adam Grissom at RAND Corporation reviewed the report and his most appreciated advice has improved several aspects of the report. It should be emphasised that the views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

With the international community's continuing engagement in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations, there is an ongoing search for new and improved ways of tackling the multitude of challenges that face international forces. One response has been to simultaneously address a wider set of issues, such as stability, economic development and governance, in the attempt to find the root causes of conflict. Concepts such as the whole-of-government approach and other comprehensive approaches have gained prominence in these discussions.

Another way has been to help build national capacity in fragile states, with the aim to enable them to handle their own problems. In a world of multidimensional conflicts, capacity building is seen as a means to build peace. The idea is that, in the long run, sustainable solutions have to come from within the conflict-ridden countries themselves and enjoy the support of their populations. Fragile countries are to be strengthened so that they can shoulder their own problems, thereby reducing the need for international assistance. In the hunt for viable exit strategies, capacity building has therefore become a key activity. Furthermore, by strengthening local capacity, the assumption is that the international community can avoid getting "stuck" in complex and expensive interventions. In Iraq and Afghanistan, building local capacity has, in many ways, become the international community's main strategy when trying to find a way out of the conflicts.

Assisting countries through capacity building is, however, not a strategy without potential or real problems. One major impediment is that capacity building is poorly defined and has come to mean different things to different actors, often leading to weak coordination among donors and challenges when it comes to local ownership. Another issue is that of conflict sensitivity when engaging in security sector capacity building. For instance, the actors that receive support are often parties to the conflict and might even be a major source of unrest. Capacity building then involves the risk of aggravating conflict dynamics by strengthening illegitimate actors. While the drive for smaller, shorter and less expensive operations is understandable, this study argues that there are several pitfalls which must be avoided in order for security sector capacity building to be effective. There is a risk that capacity building is seen as a simple way to cut costs and reduce risks by shifting responsibility and focus towards local actors and their performance. However, building the "wrong" capacity or strengthening the "wrong" actors might make a conflict even worse.

This study sets out to clarify some of the key challenges to and opportunities offered by security sector capacity building. The aim is to analyse the concept and its application and, in the end, highlight areas which need to be considered when engaging in security sector capacity building.

1.1. Method and Delimitation

Two main sources of information have been used in the report. First, a thorough literature review has been conducted. Research on capacity building in the development sector is rather extensive, while literature on the security sector rarely addresses capacity building explicitly. Second, the researchers have met with practitioners and academics to identify the critical topics to address.[1] Discussions and interviews with experts and representatives from major research institutes and organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, have shaped the focus of the study.

The report is by no means exhaustive, but highlights some of the issues which were especially emphasised in interviews and literature on capacity building. The focus is security sector capacity building in conflict- or post-conflict countries. Accordingly, capacity building in peaceful settings is not analysed here.

1.2. Outline of the Report

The report begins with a thorough discussion on the concept of capacity building, how it is defined by different actors and how this has affected its implementation. Major areas of conflicting views on capacity building are also considered. In the following chapter, the major actors involved in capacity building are presented and analysed using a "provider/recipient" perspective. Issues such as bilateral versus multilateral approaches, legitimacy, local ownership and bottom-up/top-down approaches are discussed. Chapter 4 deliberates on operational aspects, such as the importance of having a strategic, long-term view on building capacity despite the pressure to show tangible results. The problematic issue of train-and-equip operations, as opposed to strengthening institutions, is highlighted. Capacity building as an exit strategy and the difficulties in measuring effects and results are also discussed. Each chapter begins with a few bullet points, highlighting the central themes of the section. In the final chapter (chapter 5), some concluding remarks are presented, focusing on potential risks and challenges in capacity building. The goal is to provide readers with a broad understanding of the concept and its possible strengths and weaknesses, as well as some initial findings on what might work and what might not.

[1] For a list of institutes and think tanks, see the reference list.

2. The Concept

- The term *capacity building* is subject to multiple interpretations. This potential source of confusion can impede all steps in related processes – from planning and strategy development to implementation and evaluation.
- An illegitimate government loses its claim for monopoly on the use of force and may not be an appropriate recipient of security sector capacity building.

2.1. Definition

2.1.1. Multiple Interpretations

A report on capacity building automatically and promptly begs for a definition of the term – what is actually meant here by *capacity building*? However, capacity building is an all-encompassing term which, to some extent, resists any clear-cut definition. It has developed into an umbrella concept which contains many sub-activities and is used generously to mean various things.

That it is used broadly in different contexts and sectors arguably complicates any attempt to agree on a definition. And, as stated by the American theologian Nathanael Emmons (1745–1840): "Just definitions, like just distinctions, either prevent or end disputes."[2] A failure to agree on a definition of the term capacity building ultimately means that involved actors will have different views on objectives, means and results. Such discord will, in turn, act to impair any efforts to strengthen capacities home or away.

In the development sector, the term gained widespread currency in the 1990s, but even within this sector, little agreement can be found on its exact meaning.[3] Indeed, a case in point is that many development practitioners consider all development to involve some kind of capacity building.[4] This is not necessarily incorrect. However, by leaving the term to mean everything, it will mean nothing and contribute little in terms of use or impact. In development policy, capacity building often goes under the term capacity development. Part of the reason for this preference is that the term capacity development is seen to better reflect

[2] Park, Edwards A. "Memoir of Nathanael Emmons; with sketches of his friends and pupils", 1861.
[3] See, for example, Cornwall, Andrea and Eade, Deborah (eds.), "Deconstructing Development Discourse – Buzzwords and Fuzzwords", 2010.
[4] Lusthaus, Charles, Adrien, Marie-Hélène, Perstinger, Mark, "Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation", 1999.

already existing capacity.[5] The OECD DAC defines "capacity" as "the ability of people, organisations and society to manage their affairs successfully and depends on more than the experience, knowledge and technical skills of individuals".[6] Capacity development, according to the OECD, must be pursued on three levels: (a) the individual, (b) the organisational and (c) the enabling environment. Importantly, capacity building, therefore, refers not only to technical means and abilities but also to enabling processes and systems.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines capacity development as "the process through which individuals, organisations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time".[7] The World Bank chooses to describe capacity development similarly, as "a locally driven process of transformational learning by leaders, coalitions and other agents that leads to actions that support changes in institutional capacity areas – ownership, policy, and organisational – to advance development goals."[8]

In this report, we look at security sector capacity building in conflict and post-conflict countries. Also in the security sphere, however, the concept of capacity building can encompass different meanings. Indeed, a majority of the analysts and experts interviewed for this report expressed a concern about the divergent usage of the term. In addition, actors may describe capacity building efforts by using alternative terminology; or, as the Swedish proverb says: "a beloved child is called many things".[9] Therefore, capacity building may, for example, house the terms of Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense, Train Advise Assist (TAA), security system transformation or nation/state building. However, the fact that, at times, these terms are used interchangeably is not to say that they mean exactly the same things. Instead, they often address a certain aspect of capacity building.

For example, the US Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) defines SFA as "that set of activities that contribute to the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions".[10] More specifically, these activities involve the effort to Organise, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise (OTERA) FSF and their supporting institutions. In addition to military forces, FSF are seen to encompass the police,

[5] Harris, Vandra, "Building on sand? Australian police involvement in international policy capacity building", March 2010, p. 79-98.
[6] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice", 2007, p. 87.
[7] United Nations Development Programme, "Capacity Development: A UNDP Primer", 2009.
[8] The World Bank Capacity Development Resource Center, www.worldbank.org/capacity, accessed on 30 May 2011.
[9] In Swedish – "Kärt barn har många namn".
[10] https://jcisfa.jcs.mil, accessed 8 February 2011.

border forces and other paramilitary organisations. In the US Army's field manual for stability operations, SFA is defined as the "unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority".[11]

While SFA therefore is very much a component of capacity building, it is somewhat unclear to what extent it fully includes all of its aspects. While the above definitions of SFA recognise the importance of supporting related institutions, e.g. governmental ministries, the emphasis arguably seems to be on developing the forces. Indeed, if nowhere else, this predisposition is evident in the term *Security Force Assistance*. However, strengthening institutions, know-how and processes are at least as important cornerstones of capacity building, especially in order to ensure sustainability. Moreover, the term does not seem to include measures to strengthen rule of law institutions and processes – a key component of security sector capacity building.

Yet another aspect to consider when determining the meaning of capacity building is that it is a key concept within different fields and schools of thought, meaning, in turn, that it is often approached from different angles. For example, capacity building is often viewed as an important ingredient of Security Sector Reform (SSR). At the same time, the value of capacity building is frequently highlighted in discussions on counterinsurgency (COIN). It may be argued that the fact that the term capacity building is discussed from different perspectives is of no necessary consequence, as the actual activities will remain the same. However, it is more likely that as the objectives of the capacity building differ, so will the related activities. Therefore, it is of considerable importance to understand and take into account the intended aim of the capacity building efforts when trying to understand which activities may be involved.

Lacking an agreement on a definition of capacity building acts as a serious obstacle to efficient and effective efforts, as actors' objectives and expectations will differ. In turn, different interpretations means that all steps of the implementation process – from planning and strategy development to implementation and evaluation – will risk falling victim to misunderstandings and misinterpretations. It is consequently crucial in each specific mission or context that that there is agreement among all involved actors on the meaning of capacity building. The relationship between providers and recipients could also suffer considerably if there is no shared understanding on expected results. Donors often have a strong view on what capacity should be built, regularly targeting structures that the recipient might not be willing to reform. Views on the scope of capacity building in the security sector might vary considerably, leading to differing expectations on what should actually be achieved and how.

[11] U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters, "Stability Operations", October 2008.

In this report, we will use capacity building in a non-prescriptive way to mean the process by which a state is enabled to carry out set activities and meet set objectives. Therefore, it is a means to an end, for example efforts to enable a state to carry out SSR. We will then use this definition as a basis from which to discuss how the concept at times is expanded, e.g. to include non-state actors. The study will consider security sector capacity building in conflict or post-conflict settings. We have deliberately chosen to limit the scope of analysis to security forces and their supporting institutions, much as described under the definition of SFA given above. We are not looking at the rule of law or the judicial systems. This omission does not in any way involve any value judgement; instead, it is a demarcation made in order to limit the study in terms of scope and focus.

2.2. State-centricity

2.2.1. The State

The objective of enhancing a state's security sector ultimately builds on the belief that the state claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, as famously stated by Max Weber.[12] This, in turn, is closely interlinked with the concept of the sovereign state, which underlines the supreme authority of all states. Sovereignty refers to the independence of each state, its undivided jurisdiction over its territory, the legal equality between states and the fact that no other state has the right to intervene in another's internal affairs.

The concept of sovereignty has been questioned by some who mean that the power of the state has been undermined by growing interdependence due to globalisation as well as the increasing role of organisations such as the UN and the European Union (EU). One counterargument, however, is that state power has never been complete as states have never been truly independent. Furthermore, membership in international organisations should, rather, be seen as a way of exercising sovereign powers.[13]

The concept of state building is closely related to a state-centric approach to capacity building, as it involves the effectiveness of government institutions, strengthening, for example, their design and processes so that they can effectively exercise their authority over a specific territory. This entails supporting the state's ability to uphold the rule of law, provide public services and claim the monopoly of legitimate violence. The OECD defines state building

[12] Weber, Max, "Politics as a Vocation", 1918.

[13] See, for example, the EU's description of how its member states remain sovereign but have chosen to *pool* their sovereignty to gain power and influence: http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm - accessed on 11 May 2011.

as "purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups."[14]

Security sector capacity building rests on the assumption that solid, legitimate and accountable state institutions facilitate stability and peace. Economic and social development and the rule of law are key components in advancing the well-being of individuals and states. But security also takes a front-seat role. Indeed, the interconnection and interdependence between institutions, development and security are increasingly recognised. The World Bank, in its *World Development Report 2011*, highlights how devastating repeated cycles of conflict and violence can be to a society and its economic development.[15] Stronger state institutions are, however, seen to be a possible remedy to such violence if bolstered by solid legitimacy and accountability. Security services are a crucial part of those state institutions, as noted by former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno: "Re-establishing trust between the people and the state must therefore start with the core function of a state, the capacity to assert its monopoly on the legitimate use of force."[16] Indeed, in times of conflict, security must first be established before humanitarian aid can be provided and economic and social development programmes launched.

Efforts to strengthen state institutions are also a way of ensuring sustainability in the long run. Solid, effective institutions act to decrease any dependence on particular individuals. That is, if systems, processes and resources are in place, things are not as likely to break down in times of upheaval.

It is of interest to note that a state is not the same thing as a nation, and, while often used interchangeably, state building is not the same thing as nation building. While the two concepts are often used to mean the same thing, they do refer to somewhat different goals and activities, even if they may at times overlap.

Nation building involves unifying the population through a shared national identity which is linked to the authority of the state.[17] A nation is famously thorny to define with any precision. Ernest Gellner offers two definitions in an attempt to untangle the concept of a nation:

---

[14] OECD, "Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations – From Fragility to Resilience", http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf, 2008.

[15] The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development", http://wdr2011.worldbank.org, April 2011.

[16] Ibid, p. 149.

[17] Smith, Michael G., and Shrimpton, Rebecca, "Nation-building Interventions and National Security – An Australian Perspective", 2011.

1. "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they *recognise* each other as belonging to the same nation."[18]

However, he then adds in the same breath, that while both the above single out important aspects in understanding nations and nationalism, neither is adequate. Instead, Gellner concludes, it is probably best not to try "too much in the way of formal definition".[19]

There are not many true nation states, but most states are instead multinational, though perhaps dominated by one large nation. Nation building is the effort to overcome any conflicting identities and instead forge a sense of unity based on shared cultural, historical or political interests. Nation building is, in a sense, a prerequisite for state building, as it helps to form a sense of community which can then act as a basis for state structures. While nation building, consequently, is different than state building, the efforts may be carried out in parallel. Indeed, Michael G. Smith and Rebecca Shrimpton state that both efforts are essential.[20] According to them, given that nation building involves an ongoing dialogue and interaction between the state and the population, it enables long-term success in building appropriate governments and stability based on an accurate understanding of what holds the population together.

Security sector capacity building often overlaps with efforts of state building, involving the strengthening of government institutions to enable the state to fulfil a set of core functions, including the provision of security. Importantly, this state-centric view of security is increasingly being questioned.[21] Not only do analysts and practitioners point to the growing number of non-state actors performing security-related functions, but there is also an increasing debate on whether it may, at times, be more suitable to strengthen non-state actors to handle that responsibility. The appropriateness of the state as the key guarantor of security is especially coming under fire with regard to those parts of the world where the state has been a historically weak actor. The role of non-state actors is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

[18] Gellner, Ernest, "Nations and Nationalism", 1983, p. 7.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Smith, Michael G., and Shrimpton, Rebecca, "Nation-building Interventions and National Security – An Australian Perspective", 2011.
[21] See, for example, Caparini, Marina, "Applying a Security Governance Perspective to the Privatisation of Security", 2006.

2.2.2. Legitimacy

While relations between states concern the external sovereignty of states, the internal sovereignty of a state refers to the authority of the governing body over its subjects. Closely connected to the issue of internal sovereignty is that of legitimacy. While a government may claim *de jure* (legal) sovereignty, this does not necessarily mean that it exercises de facto (actual) sovereignty. That is, it may not exercise control over its subjects. The reason for this may be because it does not have the means to exercise such control (e.g. a weak security sector) and/or it may be so because it does not enjoy the trust of at least a majority of its population. If the latter, the legitimacy of the state is in question. Therefore, it is of critical importance to determine whether, and if so why, internal sovereignty is lacking. An illegitimate government which, for example, oppresses its population arguably loses its claim for monopoly on the use of force, and, therefore, may not be an appropriate recipient of outside support for security sector capacity building.

Admittedly, however, determining the legitimacy of a government is highly subjective. Lauren Hutton lists three components of legitimacy: the recognition by the government and the population of (1) the right of the government to govern, (2) that the system of government is appropriate and (3) that the institutions of the state are appropriate.[22] Legitimacy ultimately derives from the consent of the people. Within the security sector, legitimacy would, according to Hutton, build on (1) security forces which are representative of the society and its security needs, (2) a system of checks and balances and (3) security institutions which suit the needs of the population and derive their authority from the rule of law.[23]

Indeed, the importance of legitimacy becomes perhaps even more important when considering that most conflicts today are within national borders. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, only three of the 30 major armed conflicts which occurred in 2000–2009 were interstate,[24] and most of those conflicts were fought over government (as opposed to, for example, territory). In 2009, of the 17 major conflicts being fought, 11 were over government while the remaining six were over territory. If security sector support is provided to illegitimate governments, fuel may be added to injustices and internal tensions and, ultimately, these trends of conflict may be reinforced. However, donors rarely encounter the ideal environment for capacity building. On the contrary, security sector capacity building is most often undertaken in countries where issues of legitimacy and sovereignty are contentious. It is

[22] Hutton, Lauren, "A bridge too far? Considering security sector reform in Africa", 2009.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "SIPRI Yearbook 2010", Appendix 2A, Patterns of major armed conflicts, 2000–2009, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/02/02A, 2010.

inherently difficult for outside actors to make judgments about the legitimacy of a state. Efforts to improve the governance, accountability and effectiveness of a state may also help to strengthen its legitimacy.

However, there may be a temptation to support an illegitimate government to ensure stability in the short term. Such short-sightedness will most likely only act to undermine long-term stability. As summarised by Charles Call: "Because they represent certain social interests, states are generally as much a problem for peace and development as they are a solution."[25] Or, as noted by Lauren Hutton, the security forces may become more efficient, but at repressing the population.[26]

[25] Call, Charles T., "Building States to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis", 2008.
[26] Hutton, Lauren, "A bridge too far? Considering security sector reform in Africa", 2009.

3. Actors

- Multilateral capacity building is a positive trend which can allow for more comprehensive assistance by increasing available resources. Capacity building, however, is not merely driven by resources but is, ultimately, a political endeavour.
- The legitimacy of the provider is key to the success of a capacity building mission.
- While private security actors are here to stay, they are not suitable for all security tasks. Can they enhance their ability to fill national resource gaps?
- Taking into account local perspectives is crucial for viable solutions, but supporting non-state actors runs the risk of creating future monsters.
- Successful capacity building requires local ownership, which requires an understanding of the local context.

3.1. Providers

Capacity building involves two sides – the providers and the recipients of related support. Meddling in a country's security sector, a cornerstone of sovereignty, is a sensitive matter and calls for special considerations and resources on the part of providers as well as recipients. For those providing the assistance, it involves judgements on questions such as legitimacy of the recipient government as well as the right size and structure of the security sector which is to be developed.

3.1.1. Bilateral and Multilateral Support

There are a number of ways to channel capacity building support. One is capacity building provided through bilateral assistance. Another option, also state-centric, is that offered through multilateral support.

Capacity building provided by regional or international organisations has its benefits. As coordination is a major challenge in capacity building, coordinating activities through multilateral organisations generally benefit both providers and receivers of capacity building initiatives. Through coordination the risk of duplication is reduced, gaps in the support are more easily addressed and the strain on the receiver's ability to absorb the support decreases. Another obvious advantage is that more involved donors most likely translate into more available resources. That, in turn, may increase the prospect of a more comprehensive approach to capacity building assistance. A broader and larger range of available

instruments can improve both the quality and quantity of the support provided. An interesting aspect is whether it may also shift efforts away from being supply driven, that is designed on the basis of what resources and experiences donors might have or might be willing to offer.

As noted by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Chair of a Senior UN Advisory Group which considered civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: "the international response to conflict is often supply-driven, with international actors focusing on what they can provide, rather than listening to the real needs of those they serve."[27] As discussed earlier in this report, too few or too one-sided resources on the supply side have considerable consequences. Attempts to expand the toolbox for capacity building efforts should therefore be encouraged.

However, it is not necessarily the case that multilateralism automatically leads to more comprehensive support. Involved donors may have similar resources and know-how, which would mean that while their collaboration will lead to more resources, it will not add any new instruments to the toolbox. In addition, as discussed in more detail in chapter 4, coordination is not immune to difficulties. Furthermore, and most importantly, foreign assistance is, in the end, a political endeavour. That is, the assistance is not merely designed on the basis of what resources are available to the provider. When a donor chooses to offer capacity building support to a certain actor, a political decision is already made.

It is important to point out that supply-driven support may also be the result of a lack of involvement on the part of the recipient. Such a disconnection between the provider/s and recipient may be explained by a number of factors, some which are discussed below in section 3.2.2. One example, however, is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the government reportedly distanced itself from broad SSR efforts as it was more concerned with building effective military forces and therefore felt that donors were trying to impose their agenda on the country.[28] The result was a supply-driven reform process with little involvement from national authorities.

Multilateralism can then *potentially* produce more, and/or more suitable, available resources for international missions – in terms of financial and material means as well as experience and know-how. Consequently, there is an increasing tendency, for example in the area of peacekeeping, to move towards regional collaboration. The African Union (AU) is perhaps the most obvious case in point. However, given the organisation's relative infancy, as well as lacking capabilities due to considerable resource gaps, it has also evolved into a major recipient of capacity building support. And the AU will most likely require external capacity

[27] United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, "Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict – Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group", 2011.

[28] Boshoff, Henri, Hendrickson, Dylan, More, Sylvie and Vicoulon, Thierry, "Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place", 2010.

support for some time before it is able to meet all of its objectives. Indeed, as stated by an interviewed UN official, even when the AU has the capacities, chances are that it will be overwhelmed by the international community's high expectations.

Moreover, the drive towards regional solutions is also based on a wish to tap regional expertise and know-how and consequently increase the odds for generating a solution or response tailored to the needs of the specific setting and circumstances. Similarly, problems or threats are rarely confined within a state's border but have a regional and, at times, international dimension. A collaborative effort, involving regional and possibly international players, may therefore increase the chances of designing a suitable response. For example, if the security situation has been undermined by porous national borders, successful capacity building may involve building stronger border monitoring together with neighbouring countries.

The trend of multilateral approaches to the provision of security capacity building is also inspired by a desire to establish independence from outside interference, especially in countries which may have experienced colonialism. However, on the other hand, efforts to strengthen, for example, Africa's security architecture have also, at times, been accused of simply reflecting a reluctance of Western countries to intervene in African conflicts.[29]

There is a general recognition that regional or international collaborations and support confer a sense of legitimacy and are less vulnerable to charges of colonialism and pure power politics. While multilateralism counteracts risks of national interests becoming the driving force behind the provision of capacity building support, it should be added that international collaborations are most often dominated by one or some few powerful states.

3.1.2. Legitimacy of the Provider

When interfering in a state's security sector, the legitimacy of the provider becomes crucial. Legitimacy can exist on a number of levels.[30] Analyst Ian Hurd defines legitimacy as "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution

[29] Cottey, Andrew and Forster, Anthony, "Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance", 2004.

[30] Sharon Wiharta categorises the legitimacy of a peace operation into three interlinked components: (a) political consensus – referring to agreement or acquiescence by the international community and host state that the operation is desirable, (b) legality – mainly referring to the legality of the mandate under international law; and (c) moral authority – determined largely by the behaviour of the personnel. Mats Berdal chooses to group legitimacy in post-conflict settings into two aspects: that of the perceived legitimacy of the outside force itself and that of the structures put in place by the intervening actors. From Wiharta, Sharon, "The legitimacy of peace operations", in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Yearbook 2009", 2009, and Berdal, Mats, "Building Peace After War", 2009.

ought to be obeyed … a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor's perception of the institution."[31]

Multilateralism confers a sense of legitimacy by decreasing the risk for unilateral power politics. The uniquely broad representation in the UN means that its involvement or blessing represents extra fuel to such moral approval. The 2008 UN publication on principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations, or the so-called Capstone Doctrine, states that international legitimacy is one of the most important assets of UN peacekeeping.[32] Indeed, legality under international law, for example by way of a UN Security Council Resolution, is possibly the most basic, and most objective, determinant of a mandate.[33]

The choice of intervening countries, also when partaking in an international mission, is of great significance to whether the intervening party/parties will be respected in the host country. Therefore, aspects such as the historical relationship between the host country and the country providing support are important, as is how the intervening country is viewed by the population. For example, it may not be appropriate for a former colonial power to intervene with military personnel.

The conduct of the personnel in the field is essential for how a mission is perceived, both internationally and by the local population, and, therefore, the legitimacy of the operations. Respecting local customs is, for example, key, as is the intervening forces' adherence to rules of engagement and use of force arrangements. Charges of misconduct, such as corruption or crime, can be very harmful with regard to how a mission is regarded by the local population. One sad example of how the behaviour of personnel can seriously undermine the reputation of the mission as a whole is reports of UN peacekeepers sexually abusing girls in the DRC.[34] Another way in which the legitimacy of operations can be undermined is if the host country and the provider/s have divergent views as to what the support should entail, e.g. what training and equipment should be provided or whether less or more focus should be on strengthening institutions etc. In addition, there are a number of unintended consequences which can potentially arise as a result of a foreign presence, e.g. on the economy and/or environment of the host country.[35] For example, vast income gaps between

[31] Hurd, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics", 1999, cited in Berdal, Mats, "Building Peace After War", 2009.
[32] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines", 2008.
[33] Wiharta, Sharon, "The legitimacy of peace operations", 2009.
[34] See, for example, UN News Centre, "Peacekeepers' sexual abuse of local girls continuing in DR of Congo, UN finds", 7 January 2005.
[35] See, for example, Hull, Cecilia, Eriksson, Mikael, MacDermott, Justin, Rudén, Fanny and Waleij, Annica, "Managing Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations", 2009.

international staff and the local population can cause resentment in the country and, in the end, harm the legitimacy of the mission.

The effectiveness of a mission can positively influence its perceived legitimacy. Conversely, the effectiveness of a mission can be improved by a strong perceived moral authority of those efforts. This is the case as legitimacy facilitates the power to influence parties, the power to engage partners – in summary, it is a key to the success of an operation. However, it is essential to bear in mind that the legitimacy of a mission is very much a dynamic factor which can quickly erode if not cared for.

3.1.3. Private Security Actors

Cuts in defence budgets and severely reduced military forces since the Cold War, coupled with ever-increasing demands for external interventions in conflict-ridden states, have created both the demand for and supply of private security actors.

A case in point is the war in Iraq, which represented something of a watershed with regard to the use of private contractors. Not only have many private contractors been used, but they have also performed tasks which have historically been performed by regular military forces, including armed security services. According to the Congressional Budget Office, Congress's fiscal watchdog, in 2008 there were at least 190,000 contractor staff, including subcontractors, working for US-financed contracts in Iraq.[36]

The use of private military actors is an issue also in connection with capacity building. That is, also in the area of providing support to strengthen a country's security sector, private security contractors play a considerable role, offering, for example, police and military training. One of many cases in point is British company AEGIS, which states on its website that it trains the special forces of an anonymous Middle Eastern country in areas such as leadership, sniping and technical surveillance countermeasures.[37] US company DynCorp International is another example, offering police training in post-conflict countries and peacekeeping support.[38] In 2007, DynCorp won a contract from the US Department of State to train and equip soldiers for the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

While these issues will not be discussed in depth here, is should be noted that the use of private security actors is not unproblematic. As noted above, the legitimacy of the provider of capacity building is key to the success of such

[36] Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, "Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq", 2008.
[37] AEGIS, www.aegisworld.com.
[38] DynCorp International, www.dyn-intl.com.

efforts. However, the conduct of private security actors has, at times, seriously undermined the popular opinion of various interventions. One case in point was an incident in September 2007, when security guards working for the US security firm Blackwater were accused of having killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad.[39] Private contractor personnel were also implicated in the torture and abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison.[40] While this type of incident is not restricted to private actors, the lack of appropriate oversight mechanisms is problematic.

There are additional question marks which arise with the use of private security actors. Peter Singer lists several challenges to the use of private military contractors, which he argues the US government has become dependent on.[41] One is that the entry of additional security actors has enabled policymakers to avoid political accountability, leading to operational decisions which may not echo public opinion. Singer stresses that the war in Iraq would not have been possible without private contractors.[42] Another fundamental issue which is sometimes raised is that the driving force behind these companies is profit, which puts in doubt their interest in ensuring peace and stability.

Today, there are those that argue that it is getting increasingly tough for private security actors.[43] For example, not only has US President Barack Obama introduced more restrictive rules and regulations with regard to the use of private security actors, but demand for their services is also expected to decrease with the scaling down of the operation in Iraq and (soon) in Afghanistan. Private security actors are, however, here to stay. They have an important role to play in stepping in where there is a need to complement lacking national resources. It is therefore crucial that the control, oversight and accountability of these companies are continually assessed and enhanced. And private security companies should be encouraged to offer those specific services which are in demand. At the same time, there are some tasks which are simply not suitable to hand over to private actors but which must remain within the state's control. Consequently, it may be advisable to consider whether, and if so how, private security actors can better contribute to civilian and police skills and resources.

[39] See, for example, New York Times, Business, Companies, stories under Blackwater Worldwide, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/blackwater_usa/index.html, 2011.
[40] Isenberg, David, "A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq", 2004.
[41] Singer, P. W., "Can't Win With 'Em, Can't Go To War Without 'Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency", 2007.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Spear, Joanna, "Private military companies eye new markets in difficult times", 2011.

3.2. Recipients

While capacity building support can be a sensitive matter for the provider, e.g. due to costs and questions such as the legitimacy of the receiving government, it also involves considerable sensitivities for the recipient. Outside support for a state's security structures involves an intrusion into the very heart of that state's sovereignty.

3.2.1. Prioritising

Capacity is arguably a subjective term. Indeed, in the same way as we humans strive for progress, there can be said to always be room for capacity building. How then, are recipients of capacity building efforts to be selected?

Nathan Freier has drawn attention to the debatable assumptions underlying the idea of building partner capacity (BPC): (a) that one, with certainty, can determine who one's partners should be and the boundaries between related defence and non-defence activities, (b) that the main obstacle to partners acting effectively is a lack of capacity and (c) that partners will pursue policies in line with the interests and values of those providing the support.[44]

Indeed, it is important to remember that, in the end, capacity building assistance rests on one or many political decisions. For example, RAND, in an analysis of stability operations partners, concludes that while many fragile states could potentially benefit from capacity building support, only a small number of the countries are of strategic importance to the US. Furthermore, RAND notes that those states that are in the greatest need of such support are often among the least receptive to stability operations-related assistance.[45]

However, one way of prioritising such support can be to make a needs-based assessment. David Chuter argues that determining what the threats to stability are and how these should be met suggests SSR programmes should only be initiated when at least one of the following criteria is met:

- "There are weaknesses or defects in the current security arrangements which materially provoked the crisis or are materially obstructing a return to stability, or

[44] Freier, Nathan, "The New Theology: Building Partner Capacity", 2010.
[45] Marquis, Jefferson P., Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Beck, Justin, Eaton, Derek, Hiromoto, Scott, Howell, David R., Lewis, Janes, Lynch, Charlotte, Neumann, Michael J., Thurston, Cathryn Quantic, "Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations", 2010.

- Even if the above is not the case, initiatives can be undertaken to improve the security arrangements of the country which will themselves substantially assist in the restoration of stability."[46]

Such needs assessment can also help to prioritise between various capacity building activities in a given country. Lauren Hutton notes that different settings call for different SSR goals and, accordingly, lists five types of recipient countries: (1) consolidating democracies, (2) lapsing or stalled democracies, (3) transitional democracies, (4) conflict-torn societies and (5) states under reconstruction.[47]

These studies all focus on states as potential receivers of capacity building support. This top-down approach, whereby state structures are strengthened to facilitate stability and peace in a country, is arguably the classical version of capacity building. Increasingly, however, interest in a bottom-up approach is gaining ground, both in operations and in debates among experts and commentators.

3.2.2. Local Ownership

While much capacity building assistance is supply-driven, there is a general recognition that in order to ensure that sustainability and efforts are tailored to suit each specific context, local ownership is a must.

Yet another much-debated concept, it is, however, clear that "local ownership" implies influence on the part of the recipient. While not specifically addressing capacity building, Laurie Nathan argues that local ownership of SSR entails that "the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors."[48]

This definition, in turn, leads to a series of follow-up questions and considerations. First, as noted by Timothy Donais, it is not realistic to expect donor countries to write blank cheques to recipients in the name of local ownership, as much as the recipients are unlikely to uncritically welcome any externally imposed programmes.[49] Therefore, he suggests that ownership should perhaps rather be viewed as a specific configuration or political authority resulting from a process or negotiations in which both international and local actors have a say.

[46] Chuter, David, "Security Sector Reform: Ambitions and Reality", 2008.
[47] Hutton, Lauren, "A bridge too far? Considering security sector reform in Africa", 2009.
[48] Nathan, Laurie, "No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform", 2007.
[49] Donais, Timothy, "Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform", 2008.

While local involvement is essential for ensuring that the systems and institutions put in place are sustainable and suitable, a complicating factor is that the local owners are often part of the reason why there is a need for capacity building efforts.[50] In fragile conflict or post-conflict situations, the state's priorities may be survival rather than to build long-term capabilities. At times, and especially so in conflict settings, there is no legitimate government in place, able to cooperate effectively with external donors. In such situations, limited local ownership may be the only option. Similarly, at times it is recommended that the international community strongly encourages aspects which would otherwise not have been taken into account, e.g. gender-sensitive processes and institutions.

That said, it is important that local partners are involved from the outset, including financial participation. In reality, funding for SSR-related activities often fall outside of the national budget. William Byrd provides the example of Sierra Leone, where more than half of the total security sector expenditure in 2005 occurred outside the national budget, including nearly all non-operating expenditures.[51]

Realistically, however, low capacity, uncertain power configurations and fragile security situations may mean that it is not possible to ensure absolute local ownership from the start. In addition, as pointed out by Eirin Mobekk, there is also a temptation not to involve local demands, as it means that the process takes much longer to implement.[52] It is therefore important to ensure that local ownership, when viable, is not postponed only to become an exit point at which donors transfer responsibility to the local actors.

This leads us to the fundamental issue of whom we mean by local actors – who should own the process locally? There are numerous views as to what the appropriate level of inclusion and representation should be: whether the local owner should be the national authorities only or whether, for example, civil society and the private sector should be included. Whichever approach one chooses, it is important to bear in mind that outside support will inevitably influence power configurations in the recipient country. Similarly, and even more so in a post-conflict situation, balances of power are not likely to be static. Indeed, the political power is then likely to be contested and outside support, even symbolic, may carry crucial weight in any contest for power.

At the other end of the spectrum, it is questionable to what extent all context-specific aspects can be included in processes. Judy Smith-Höhn notes that there

[50] Mobekk, Eirin, "After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership", 2005.
[51] Byrd, William A., "The Financial Dimension of Security Sector Reform", 2010.
[52] Mobekk, Eirin, "After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership", 2005.

are some local elements which are difficult to incorporate.[53] She provides the example of the secret societies in Liberia, which she argues cannot be incorporated into a security sector as they are a parallel society with its own rules and objectives. This is not to say they should not be taken into account – it is important that local norms and customs are recognised when shaping programmes.

Eric Scheye argues that there is little policy guidance on how to select local owners because Western donors' focus on the state may not be valid in many post-conflict situations. He goes on to argue that donors often fail to recognise that in many cases it is not the governments which are the main providers of justice and security in their countries.[54] Right or wrong, this highlights the issue of mirror imaging, the risk of the providers assuming that the receivers are like themselves, and forcing any information to fit into that known frame of reference. Accordingly, policies which would work at home are also applied elsewhere. There is a tendency of donors to interact with counterparts who have a similar language, values and cultural background – they may, for example, have been educated in a university in the donor country. There is, at times, also a lack of understanding on the part of donors of who the key actors in the host country actually are. As stated by Eirin Mobekk, it is important to bear in mind that a complete power vacuum rarely, if ever, exists in a state. Rather, donors fail to recognise some of the local actors which have authority, as they might not have international legitimacy.[55]

In the end, a deeper understanding of local contexts is key. The need to involve historians and anthropologists, to gain an insight into the functioning of societies and cultures, was often called for by experts during the writing of this report. There are a number of issues which have hampered such transfer of knowledge, e.g. a disinclination at times by academia and social scientists to translate their insights into policy.[56] There has also been a reluctance on the part of social scientists to work with military issues while, on the other hand, the military has periodically been more focused on the technical aspects of conventional warfare and less on contextual social understanding.[57]

[53] Smith-Höhn, Judy, "Rebuilding the Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies – Perceptions from Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone", 2010.
[54] Scheye, Eric, "Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development", 2010.
[55] Mobekk, Eirin, "After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership", 2005.
[56] De Waal, Alex, "Fixing the Political Marketplace: How can we make peace without functioning state institutions?", 2009.
[57] Miller, Derek B., "Applying Cultural Knowledge to Design Problems: Notes for the U.S. Military about Challenges and Opportunities", 2009.

3.2.3. The Bottom-Up Approach

One concept which has gained widespread attention of late is that of bottom-up approaches to security sector capacity building. Bottom-up approaches involve capacity building support to non- or sub-state actors. These actors can be more or less connected to state structures, and normally they supply security services within a specific territory.

The idea of supporting security structures on a local basis has taken root, especially in debates and operations connected to countries where the state is historically weak and security functions are instead performed by local actors. Many of those that argue for a bottom-up approach believe that there must be security structures complementary to that of the state. Bruce Baker, for example, states that the conviction that post-conflict states must be strengthened to be able to provide security to their citizens often leads to disappointment, as it fails to recognise the true nature of many post-conflict states where many non-state actors share the responsibility of providing policing.[58] Instead, he says, the state-centric view of the state monopoly on force should be supplanted by a multi-layered approach where both non-state and state actors are recognised. On the other side of the debate, however, are those that strongly believe that support to non-state actors may satisfy security needs in the short term, but only at the expense of the government's authority and long-term peace and stability. Somewhere in-between is the argument that local support should target those local structures that are directly linked to the state, e.g. municipalities, and, as such, represent an extended arm of the government.

The growing interest for bottom-up approaches also stems from practical experiences. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the idea of providing capacity building to non-state security actors has been, and is being, tried.

Iraq

An important practical example of a bottom-up approach, and one which is widely regarded as having set a precedent, is the so-called "Anbar Awakening" or "Sons of Iraq" programme in Iraq. This local security initiative was deemed a big success and seen by many as a turning point, helping to reverse the country's brutal cycle of violence. The programme was initiated in 2006 when a group of predominantly, but not exclusively, Sunni tribal leaders, in the western Anbar province, decided to stop fighting the allied forces and turn their back on Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. The uprising reportedly reached a total size of

[58] Baker, Bruce, "The Future is Non-State", 2010.

about 95,000–100,000.[59] The fighters were provided with monthly salaries by the US military and entered into information-sharing arrangements with US forces.[60]

While the programme and its rapid spread throughout the country were considered a success, warnings were, however, also quickly heard. The programme was criticised by some commentators for providing training and support to parties to the conflict, possibly building a "monster" which later would be likely to switch sides again.[61] There have also been reports of problems. One issue has been how to integrate the fighters into the regular Iraqi security forces or find them other jobs. As of July 2010, only 41,000 out of the 94,000 fighters had been offered jobs by the Iraqi government, according to Pentagon data.[62] In addition, Awakening fighters are said to not have received their salaries in time, especially since the Iraqi government, in late 2008, took over the responsibility for paying them. Yet another, and more fundamental, challenge in integrating these fighters has been that of bridging the sectarian divide. This involves building trust and overcoming a mutual suspicion between the Shia-led government and these predominantly Sunni armed groups.[63] It is still too early to tell how the Sunni fighters will be treated, and there have been reports of Awakening fighters defecting, or planning to potentially defect, to rejoin the insurgency.[64] The reasons have allegedly been frustration with the government as well as targeted threats and attacks by Al-Qaeda.

Some of the main problems and concerns are therefore connected to the question of whether the government's authority has been undermined by the strengthening of sub-actors and what long-term implications this might have for the stability of the country. However, as a whole, the programme in Iraq is perceived a success by many and has led to calls for implementation of what is seen to be a winning concept elsewhere.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is another obvious example of where one has been increasingly looking to the bottom-up approach, modelled to some degree on Iraq.

[59] Katzman, Kenneth, "Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security", 2009.
[60] See, for example, Green, Mathew, "FT Interview Transcript: Gen David Petraeus", 2011, and Bruno, Greg, "Backgrounder: Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'", http://www.cfr.org/iraq/finding-place-sons-iraq/p16088#p5, 2009.
[61] See, for example Simon, Steven, "The Price of the Surge", 2008.
[62] New York Times, Editorial, "Iraq's Stalemate", 2010.
[63] See, for example, Flintoff, Corey, "U.S.-Allied Sunni Groups Struggle Under Iraqi Control", 2009.
[64] See, for example, Londoño, Ernesto and Mizher, Qais, "US opens fire on Sunni militia in Iraq", 2009, and Williams, Timothy and Adnan, Duraid "Sunnis in Iraq Allied With U.S. Rejoin Rebels", 2010.

In August 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai authorised the formation of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) force after negotiations with US General David Petraeus. Yet another in a long line of local defence initiatives in Afghanistan, the ALP is organised under the Afghan Interior Ministry. While Afghan government oversight, arguably, can act to prevent these groups from turning into independent militia groups, there are those who question whether the Interior Ministry, laden with corruption, has the capacity to control these forces.[65]

Members of the ALP are nominated by a Shura Council, vetted by the Afghan intelligence service, and then trained for three weeks by Afghan Police and US Special Forces. In addition to a background check, biometric data is collected from each member. The salary is around 60% of what a member of the regular Afghan National Police (ANP) receives, and they are equipped with AK-47 rifles, uniforms, radios, vehicles and motorbikes.[66] The idea is for the ALP to serve as a bridge before the members, in two or three years' time, can join the ANP.[67] As of mid-March 2011, 70 Afghan districts had been identified for an ALP presence, with each district authorised to have an average of 300 members. Some 27 of the district ALP elements had, at that time, been validated for full operations.[68]

General Petraeus, describing the ALP as "a community watch with AK-47s", has attached great weight to this community-based initiative.[69] The fact that Lieutenant General John Allen, Deputy Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), has replaced General David Petraeus as Commander ISAF and US forces in Afghanistan, may signal a continued interest for such a strategy. Allen was one of the key commanders who implemented the Sons of Iraq programme.[70]

So far, results of this bottom-up initiative seem to be mixed.[71] There have been reports of a lack of restraint in the use force by the ALP and inconsistencies in their recruiting, vetting and oversight.[72]

It can be argued that the local security initiatives are a consequence of a frustration with the national Afghan government and that they are a way of circumventing the state. Perhaps more importantly, the reasoning behind the setting up of these local security arrangements in Afghanistan is that Afghanistan has never had a strong centralised state, but rather local actors handling security, and that, consequently, the top-down approach to security is inappropriate. Seth

[65] Rubin, Alissa J., "Afghans to Form Local Forces to Fight Taliban", 2010.
[66] Taylor, Rob, "Afghan local police stoke fears of new-generation militia", 2011.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Petraeus, David H., "Statement before the US Senate Armed Services Committee", 2011.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Barnes, Julian E., "New Afghan War Leader Helped Nurture Sunni Awakening in Iraq", 2011.
[71] See, for example, Hewad, Gran, "When the police goes local; more on the Baghlan ALP", 2011.
[72] See, for example, Ruttig, Thomas, "Talking about Civilian Casualties in Kabul", 2011.

Jones is one of many commentators who say that the international community must recognise the local nature of politics in Afghanistan and translate it into bottom-up programmes alongside top-down state-building efforts, much as the Taliban and other insurgent groups are using local networks in their strategies.[73]

Creating Monsters?

Another bottom-up strategy, the community-based approach to security, is becoming increasingly established in debates on capacity building. It is especially prevalent when discussing assistance for historically weak states and where the national government has not been the traditional provider of security. Accordingly, various initiatives have been based on grass-roots security approaches. One example is a project of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to develop a systemic and rapid way of understanding local security problems and needs as they are viewed by members of the community themselves. This so-called Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) sets out to then integrate the knowledge gained through cultural research into project design and plans of field-level activities.[74]

But while locally based capacity building efforts are drawing increasing attention both in academic debates and operationally, it is an approach which, for various reasons, is vulnerable to both critique and questioning. For one, there is an inherent problem in bottom-up approaches in that they involve selecting which actors should receive support. While capacity building arguably always entails choosing sides, a bottom-up approach may necessitate a more complex decision, especially when involving non-state actors. In a conflict or post-conflict setting, this is an especially tricky ground to tread, as power structures are likely to be more loose and contested as well as sensitive to external influences. Strengthening specific local power configurations can, therefore, fuel the conflict in the short and/or long term by altering balances of power.

In the same line of thinking, it is uncertain where the loyalty of these local security configurations lay and whether they, for example, would be prepared to fight for the national government. A case in point is the various local security programmes which have been created in Afghanistan. In an analysis examining three previous local defence initiatives – the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), the Afghan Public Protection Programme (AP3) and the Local Defence Initiatives (LDI), Mathieu Lefèvre concludes that these groups turned into rivals rather than partners of Afghan national security forces.[75] In addition, he notes that it is hard not to pick sides when supporting informal armed groups

[73] Jones, Seth G., "It Takes the Villages", 2010.
[74] UNIDIR, research project, "Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) Project: Phase II", http://www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=337, accessed on 21 June 2011.
[75] Lefèvre, Mathieu, "Local Defence in Afghanistan", 2010.

and that it is impossible to know what effects this might have on the future political and security landscape.

Beefing up local security structures with arms and equipment may not only increase the risk of conflict but also the levels of violence. A larger availability of small arms and light weapons can intensify the lethality and duration of conflicts.[76] Indeed, arming former parties to a conflict runs counter to the whole idea of ridding post-conflict societies of weapons and initiating the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Robert Perito draws attention to the fact that the ANAP was widely criticised for reversing the effects of the 2005 Disband Illegally Armed Groups programme by again establishing and legitimising tribal militias and groups loyal to powerful warlords.[77]

Even when seen as a necessary evil, supporting non-state actors arguably involves the risk of choosing the "wrong" side. Sunil Dasgupta, however, stands out in his view that fuelling the conflict is the whole objective of supporting local allies in a COIN fight.[78] He argues that providing support to local groups is a way of identifying potential allies to stand up against the rebels. A civil war between paramilitaries and rebels, from which the government withdraws, will ensue, and if the paramilitaries fail to defeat the rebels, the government will step in to provide additional support. However, Dasgupta recognises that there are risks to this policy, e.g. that the armed allies will turn against the government independently or, perhaps, even together with the rebels.

There is also the fundamental issue of assisting non-state actors to provide security, thereby circumventing the state and its monopoly on violence. Such local capacity building support will automatically challenge the state's authority. Accordingly, it is not a policy which is recognised or implemented by the UN, which is an organisation formed by states. It would be impossible to get the approval by all member states to strengthen actors that could pose potential threats. Therefore, such capacity building strategy would also be difficult to include in an operational mandate. Supporting local security actors can, however, mean different things. At one side of the spectrum is support provided to independent armed groups, e.g. militias, who have or are party to the conflict. At the other side is assistance to local actors directly linked to government structures. This bottom-up approach involving capacity building to sub-state actors is also implemented by the UN. The UNDP has, for example, developed the so-called Community Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC) approach – a

[76] See, for example, International Committee of the Red Cross, "Unregulated arms availability, small arms & light weapons, and the UN process", 2006.
[77] Perito, Robert M., "Afghanistan's Police – The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform", 2009.
[78] Dasgupta, Sunil, "Paramilitary Groups: Local Alliances in Counterinsurgency Operations", 2009.

multi-sectoral programming approach which addresses security issues locally.[79] It brings together a broad spectrum of state and civil society actors to develop local solutions, but together with the national government to assure an enabling environment.

A related issue, rarely discussed in writings, is how to link the national and local levels – how to ensure that top-down and bottom-up approaches meet smoothly. Without such a connection, there is the risk of creating parallel structures and, again, undermining state authority. One obvious answer is to integrate locally based structures into national, state structures. However, a key consideration is how quickly such integration can be realised. The longer it takes, the greater the risk is that local groups will not successfully be integrated. Moreover, as discussed in the section on Iraq, integrating local configurations into state structures are not necessarily trouble free.

Involving the local perspective is crucial for viable peace and stability. However, when assistance bolsters independent, potentially unreliable armed groups, the question must be posed whether one is not just creating a future monster – a better-trained, better-equipped party to an ongoing or future conflict.

[79] United Nations Development Programme, "Community Security and Social Cohesion – Towards a UNDP Approach", 2009.

4. Operational Aspects

- Lacking coordination poses considerable challenges to capacity building in the security sector. The many interpretations of the concept hinder efficient arrangements for coordination.
- Capacity building is more than military assistance. There is a need to strengthen donors' civilian and police capabilities for interventions. There is also a need to delineate the different roles and functions of police and military forces.
- Existing trends of restricting capacity building efforts to training and equipping security forces are potentially dangerous. The link between these activities and efforts to support security institutions must be strengthened.
- Capacity building provides the opportunity for external actors to withdraw by enabling local actors to handle the conflicts. The difficulties in measuring results are challenging, not least when using capacity building as an exit strategy.
- Preventive capacity building is cost-effective but also difficult to realise. However, multilateral recognition of its benefits may encourage national political will by creating supporting norms and values.

There are numerous challenges and pitfalls involved when looking at activities to strengthen the effectiveness of a country's armed forces. This section discusses challenges when implementing security sector capacity building, highlighting issues such as the coordination of efforts, short-term versus long-term efforts, exit strategies and the timing of interventions. These areas can be seen as a series of dilemmas that policymakers will have to address when engaging in capacity building. Any engagement will require trade-offs between ideal and actual situations, and the key challenges discussed below will ultimately shape capacity building interventions.

4.1. Building Capacity Together?

Building capacity in the security sector often entails, at least in theory, engaging with a broad set of programmes, structures and actors. Depending on how the security sector is defined (with or without the justice sector for instance), a wide range of actors and structures – such as the military, police, customs, ministries, agencies and private businesses – form the security sector.[80] For one,

[80] Nilsson, Claes, Svensson, Emma, "Security Sector Reform in Transition – Towards a new SSR-agenda", 2010.

coordination between these actors is necessary in order to facilitate a link between short-term capacity building and long-term institution building. Security sector capacity building often involves recipient states with low capacity to absorb what donors have to offer. By coordinating capacity building efforts, donors will make it easier for recipient states to effectively and actively engage in capacity building.

Generally, literature on SSR calls for better coordination among donors to be able to address the challenges the actors involved face. As always, however, cooperation and coordination is a challenge.[81] International and national actors working in the security sector rarely have authority over each other. Nor do they necessarily agree on what the main challenges are or how they should be addressed. Add to that a highly dynamic environment, civil and military actors with little experience of working together, a common lack of strategic direction and recipients who often fail to sustain, or even resist, change, and the chances for effective coordination are slim, at best.

To address these issues, both horizontal and vertical coordination need to be improved. A fundamental difficulty with security sector capacity building is the lack of strategic integration/coordination. While working with SSR by definition implies broad engagements, there is no consensus for how this should be achieved. Coordination is sought on a number of levels. At a national level, one often talks about a "whole-of-government approach". The need for improved national coordination and the link between civilian and military action in the area of security sector capacity building are often stressed. There are several different ways by which coordination can be enhanced, such as the creation of cross-departmental structures[82] or "pooling"[83] of funds for stabilisation operations and SSR.

Organisations such as the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) use the concept of "comprehensive approach", while the UN have an "integrated mission" concept. Broadly speaking, both aim at coordinating the organisations' responses to conflict. While the UN "integrated mission" concept focuses on internal coordination, NATO's "comprehensive approach" focuses more on coordination with external partners and views NATO as a part of a larger framework.

Another example is the G8++ Africa Clearing House initiative, established in 2009 to strengthen coordination and information exchange in order to more effectively and efficiently support African organisations and individual countries

[81] England, Madeline, Boucher, Alix, "Security Sector Reform: Thematic Literature Review on Best Practices and Lessons Learned", 2009.
[82] The UK, for instance, has a Stabilisation Unit, jointly funded and run by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign affairs and the Department for International Development.
[83] Ball, Nicole, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/52/35096612.pdf, 2004.

through capacity building.[84] The idea was to establish a website where donors would provide information about their programmes and projects. The website would then inform donors of new projects about what was already being done, thereby facilitating complementing rather than competing projects. As of now, the contributing countries seem to provide only sporadic information.[85] This initiative illustrates the difficulties in maintaining an up-to-date picture of capacity building initiatives and the challenges in promoting coordination, information exchange and, ultimately, synergies between international actors.

So far, concepts for enhanced coordination have yet to deliver broad strategies for SSR and capacity building. The lack of coordination between development and security actors continues to pose serious challenges in the field.[86] Rivalry and competition often poison relationships. Many civilian actors are still wary of interacting with the military in conflicts. There is no consensus on how capacity building in the security sector should be coordinated at an international level. At a programme level, cooperation has also been a challenge. Looking again at security sector capacity building in Afghanistan, the programmes there have been widely criticised for their lack of coordination. The security sector was initially divided between intervening states and organisations without any clearly formulated framework strategy.[87] For instance, the building of police capacity in Afghanistan involved several bilateral and multilateral actors acting without any proper coordination mechanism or joint strategy, resulting in widely divergent initiatives. There were also bilateral initiatives linked to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were not coordinated with the overarching programmes.[88] Since then, the building of capacity in the Afghan security forces has been placed high on the international community's agenda and coordination is beginning to improve.

4.2. Part of the Concept – Train and Equip

Capacity building and military assistance are nothing new. Notably, the Cold War offers prime examples of such programmes. In the so-called Nixon Doctrine, US President Richard Nixon asserted that the US would furnish military and economic assistance to allies, but that the country threatened should assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.[89]

[84] http://www.g8africaclearinghouse.org/search.html.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Nilsson Claes., Hull Cecilia, Derblom Markus & Egnell Robert. "Contextualising the Comprehensive Approach – the Elements of a Comprehensive Intervention", 2008.
[87] Gross, Eva, 'Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's contribution', 2009, p. 22–23.
[88] Perito, Robert M., "Afghanistan's Police – The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform", 2009.
[89] Nixon, Richard, "Address on Vietnamizing the War", 1969, http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/pdocs/nixon_vietnamization.pdf.

This also offered the US administration an exit strategy from the troublesome war in Vietnam.

Military assistance during the Cold War, however, focused on technical support and the development of military operational capabilities rather than the normative and organisational aspects of the security sector.[90] The objective of the support was to form well-equipped and well-trained security forces that could participate in the ideological and political struggle both domestically or internationally.

While it is now widely recognised that capacity building comprises a broad set of instruments, including support to ministries and systems, there has been a tendency, especially when programmes appear to be failing, to limit efforts to training and equipping.

As stated by Mark Sedra, this knee-jerk reaction is perhaps not surprising given that training security forces in tactics and strategy is precisely what Western donor states do best, as opposed to their more varied past performances in promoting good governance and establishing democratic norms.[91] There are a number of additional possible reasons for this tendency to limit support to training and equipping partner forces and neglecting issues such as institution strengthening. One is that the support given is a reflection of providers' own capacities. In many donor countries it is a challenge to rally civilian personnel with the right competences for capacity building missions. Not only are these limited numbers of people often needed at home, but it is also, at times, difficult to convince them to work abroad and in possibly risky environments.

The low number of civilian personnel with relevant competencies is evident not least in the US. The Pentagon has come to dominate US policy and its implementation abroad, especially during the presidency of George W. Bush. This so-called militarisation of US foreign policy has become even more pronounced after the launch of the War on Terror in the aftermath of 9/11 2001.[92] Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of a "creeping militarisation" of the country's foreign policy and advocated for more support for diplomacy and development.[93] The preponderance of the Department of Defense is revealed in numbers. Citing figures released in 2006, David Kilcullen states that the US Department of Defense is about 210 times larger in terms of personnel than the US State Department and USAID combined.[94] In terms of

[90] Williams, Rocklyn, "Africa and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform", 2000.
[91] Sedra, Mark, "Introduction: The Future of Security Sector Reform", 2010.
[92] Sherman, Jake, "The 'Global War on Terrorism' and its Implications for US Security Sector Reform Support", 2010.
[93] Gates, Robert M., Secretary of Defense, remarks delivered at The Nixon Center, Washington, DC, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425.
[94] Kilcullen, David, "The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One", 2009, p. 26.

budgets, the gap is even bigger, at some 350:1. That is compared to other Western democracies where the ratio between military personnel and that of foreign offices and aid agencies normally stands at between 8 and 10:1, according to Kilcullen. Gates applauded US efforts to build the operational capacity of partners, but also underlined the need for the US to improve its efforts to build institutional capacity and human capital, pointing to, for example, poor interagency structures.[95]

Yet another reason for why donor governments may limit their support to train-and-equip programmes is the wish to show results. This leads donors to look for measurable activities, and it is arguably easier to count the number of soldiers trained and equipment delivered than trying to measure the extent to which institutions have been strengthened. The message that achievements have been made may be directed at different audiences – e.g. the government and/or population of the partner country, the international community or the population at home. Similarly, the pressure to improve security in the short term may mean that the more long-term efforts of strengthening institutions and processes have to suffer at the expense of producing freshly trained military forces.

The core objective of enabling countries to handle their own security is also an issue of resources. Having to deploy troops and equipment in conflicts elsewhere in the world is costly, both in terms of budgets and casualties, and such costs can translate into political pressure at home. Even if the nature of conflicts point to the need for patience and lengthy interventions, there may be impatience among voters at home, especially regarding time. This can, for example, be witnessed now, with the waning support among US voters for the war in Afghanistan. A poll conducted by the *Washington Post-ABC News* in March 2010, showed that US support for the war had dipped to a new low, with nearly three-quarters of respondents thinking that a substantial number of US troops should be withdrawn from the country by the upcoming summer.[96]

Calls for clear exit strategies are now regularly heard.[97] The fear of so-called "mission creep" – the unintended extension and/or expansion of an operation – and associated costs, both in terms of resources and political support, mean that interventions today often require pronounced strategies for future disengagement. This, in turn, has led to a growing interest for capacity building. However, when capacity building is viewed as merely increasing the number of trained indigenous troops to enable one's own forces to withdraw, the complexity of the security sector is not taken into consideration. Indeed, as stated by Lieutenant General (LTG) James M. Dubik, this vision of SFA is simplistic and misleading,

[95] Gates, Robert M., "Helping Others Defend Themselves", 2010.
[96] Wilson, Scott and Cohen, Jon, "Poll: Nearly two-thirds of Americans say Afghan war isn't worth fighting", 2010.
[97] On exit strategies, see Nilsson, Claes and Svensson, Emma, "Exit Strategies in Peace Support Operations", 2009.

as it fails to recognise that security forces always depend on a security sector.[98] While most capacity building efforts include some elements that go beyond train-and-equip activities, the emphasis is generally on strengthening the operational side of the security sector. Security sector capacity building which mainly relies on programmes of training and equipping forces can, ultimately, undermine security by, for example, failing to ensure accountability, and does little, if anything, to ensure sustainability.

4.3. Linking Immediate Effectiveness to Long-Term Impact

In line with the argument above, train-and-equip operations are often given primacy, partly because long-term security and justice reform are said to be possible only after a certain level of stability has been achieved. In order to face mounting challenges in, for example, Afghanistan and Iraq, a rapid expansion and improvement of the indigenous security forces has become the centrepiece of intervening countries' strategy.[99] The COIN strategy and its focus on "clear, hold, build", demands a high level of presence and, therefore, also high numbers of trained soldiers and police.[100] While the international presence in Afghanistan has grown substantially since 2001, the Afghan security forces have exploded in numbers in line with ISAF's key strategy of developing the army and the police. In COIN strategy, it is not only the number and quality of the security forces that matter, but the legitimacy they bring to the table. In the long run, COIN strives to strengthen the host government, and supporting and training national forces are part of the effort towards that end.

Indeed, in many fragile states, security forces lack both adequate numbers and training. Building national forces that are able to keep the peace and defend the state and its citizens is critical in conflict-ridden states. As discussed in chapter 2, such forces need administration, oversight and sustainable financing. However, the link between the immediate building of effective security forces and efforts to create long-term institutions is often missing. There are several reasons why. First, the belief that without security there can be no development puts the focus on "hard" security in the initial stages of interventions. Therefore, with the limited resources that the international community has at its disposal, national security forces become very important. While traditional peacekeeping missions have often worked with *disarming* and *demobilising* often predatory national

[98] Dubik, Lieutenant General James M., "Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer", 2009.
[99] In the case of Iraq, Dobbins argues that "train and equip" does not do justice to more recent US engagement for building the capacity of the security forces, Dubik, M.," Building security forces and ministerial capacity – Iraq as a primer", 2009, p. 6.
[100] Dubik, M., "Building security forces and ministerial capacity – Iraq as a primer", 2009, p. 10.

armies and other armed groups, capacity *building* of security forces is now as common. DDR processes and capacity building in the security sector are by no means contradictory. But there has been an interesting shift of focus in the international community's response to many conflicts, whereby "pacifying" strategies are matched by "building" strategies.

Second, peacekeeping or stabilisation operations, be it UN, NATO or bilaterally led, are military heavy and therefore driven by military logics. It is perhaps natural to start with the things you know best – how to strengthen security. Most often, an integral part of this is to build up the security forces. To go beyond immediate security concerns necessitates a different set of instruments and skills which are often scarce in operations. The military/security logic that drives operations is often different to the logic behind long-term governance or democracy development. As Stepputat writes: "due to the urgency of this enterprise, the approach to SSR tends to be driven more by tactical and technical needs than by politically embedded governance issues."[101] The actors are rarely the same and the time perspectives, just as the instruments, differ considerably. Therefore, short-term and long-term activities are not only separate, they are sequenced, as civilian actors tend to engage in the post-conflict phase. As Scheye points out, sequencing support, e.g. to focus firstly on training and equipping and then working with the organisation and administration of the security sector, may lead to critical challenges in areas such as financial sustainability and local capacity to manage these new structures.[102]

Third, while training and equipping military forces is relatively straightforward, albeit challenging in many conflict-affected countries, building institutional capacity is, for most parts, uncharted territory. Today, there are no blueprints for building effective, efficient, transparent governance structures in conflict or post-conflict countries. State or institution building is highly complex and time-consuming. Every nation has its own particular history and governance tradition which has to be taken into account and supported in capacity building efforts. While many donors might have a lot of experience of building state capacity in developing countries, strategies for conflict countries have yet to be developed. Indeed, compared to training soldiers, building or reforming security institutions touches upon the very core of a state's sovereignty and is very delicate business. Accordingly, there are few examples to learn from.

[101] Albrecht, Peter, Stepputat, Finn, Andersen, Louise, "Security Sector Reform the European way", 2010, p. 83.
[102] Scheye, Eric, "Realism and pragmatism in Security Sector Development", 2010.

4.4. Widening the Support – the Issue of Police Capacity

Police and other personnel supporting the rule of law have become increasingly prominent in peacekeeping operations, reflecting a recognition of the importance of rule of law to peace and stability. While some 2,000 UN Police (UNPOL) were deployed through the 1990s, those figures rose notably in 1999 with the peacekeeping missions and Kosovo and Timor-Leste.[103] As of 30 April 2011, the total number of police participating in UN peacekeeping operations stood at 14,669.[104] Simultaneously, the tasks of the police in peace operations have also expanded, from mainly monitoring host state police forces to reforming and rebuilding the same.[105]

However, while demand for international police personnel has increased, the supply side has had problems keeping up. Many donor states are themselves struggling with maintaining a sizeable police personnel and are therefore reluctant to deploy those they have on international missions, especially the more competent and experienced ones.[106] Australia stands out, having, in 2004, created the Australian Federal Police (AFP) International Deployment Group (IDG).[107] The IDG was formed especially for the rapid deployment of police personnel for international peacekeeping operations and now has a personnel force of 1,200. Thaddeus Lin notes that while in many ways successful, the IDG still faces some operational challenges, such as those related to legitimacy and perceptions of neo-colonialism due to its predominantly unilateral approach.[108] However, all in all, the force is seen to offer a model for UNPOL on how to improve its effectiveness.

The UN has been criticised for lacking capabilities and processes for recruiting, preparing and deploying police to missions and then managing those officers when in the field.[109] William Durch and Madeline England note that it takes an

[103] Durch, William J. and England, Madeline L. (eds.), "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law", 2010.
[104] United Nations, "Monthly Summary of Contributions", www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml, accessed on 8 June 2011.
[105] Durch, William J. and England, Madeline L. (eds.), "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law", 2010.
[106] Lin, Thaddeus, "Institutional Capacity and Cooperation for Policing Operations: The Australian Experience", 2007.
[107] Australian Federal Police, International Deployment Group, http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx, accessed on 28 June 2011.
[108] Lin, Thaddeus, "Institutional Capacity and Cooperation for Policing Operations: The Australian Experience", 2007.
[109] Durch, William J. and England, Madeline L. (eds.), "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law", 2010.

average of nine months before the police officers authorised by the Security Council are actually deployed.[110]

The fact that the world's largest military power, the US, does not have any national police force adds to the shortfall in supply of police personnel. Instead, responsibility for policing in the US falls on state and local authorities. This, in turn, inhibits Washington from, on a national basis, contributing police officers to international missions.[111] The preponderance of the US Department of Defense over USAID and the US State Department further intensifies the imbalance in favour of military resources.

It has also been suggested that efforts to support police and rule of law functions are often not taken as seriously as those related to defence. In the DRC, for example, key officials are said to have deemed defence matters much more important than police reforms in connection with SSR efforts.[112] Military clashes in the eastern part of the country reportedly influenced the prioritisation. This, in turn, highlights the challenge of looking beyond immediate security concerns when building capacity.

It could be argued that police forces should be prioritised only when security is established. Consequently, focusing efforts on military forces may be suitable if the security situation remains unstable. Instead, today we are seeing local police forces often performing military tasks in countries where capacity building efforts are underway. One case in point of this paramilitarisation of police forces is Afghanistan, where the police force often finds itself in combat situations. While Afghanistan, admittedly, does not have any history of democratic policing, Cornelius Friesendorf states that the paramilitarisation of Afghan police forces has also been propelled by international donors who have supplied the police with military weaponry and training in mainly military tactics.[113] At the same time, Afghan police have been deployed for high-risk missions and helped to increase the number of security forces on the ground. Robert Perito notes that the US often labels Afghan police and the military under the joint term Afghan National Security Forces, which, in turn, further blurs the distinction between the police and the military.[114] It should be noted, however, that in many countries the line between the police and the military is not absolute. Sometimes soldiers are tasked with policing chores and sometimes the police are assigned tasks which normally would fall under the military.

[110] Ibid.
[111] Perito, Robert M., "U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations", 2007.
[112] Boshoff, Henri, Hendrickson, Dylan, More, Sylvie and Vicoulon, Thierry, "Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place", 2010.
[113] Friesendorf, Cornelius, "Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police", 2011.
[114] Perito, Robert M., "Afghanistan's Police – The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform", 2009.

It is often the urgency of short-term security concerns which may lead to a paramilitarisation of police forces in the attempt to fill the security gap, to stabilise the situation with more boots on the ground. However, if possible, this temptation should be resisted. The demarcation drawn between the police and the military, while not always perfectly clear, is based on the idea that in a democracy, in general, the police should be responsible for a state's internal security while the military handles the external security. This division of labour entails different tasks and expectations. For example, the police are tasked with combating crime, collecting evidence and nurturing a closer relationship with the population. Robert Perito states that the police in COIN efforts should "establish relations with the public, protect citizens against violence, and work as a component of the criminal justice system along with effective courts and prisons."[115] A failure to deliver on those expectations can potentially have wide-ranging consequences. Friesendorf argues that the absence of effective policing in Afghanistan ultimately weakened Afghans' faith in the state and thereby worked in the Taliban's favour.[116]

The shortage of police personnel and resources, as well as the unfixed security context, mean that, at times, military forces have to shoulder civilian and policing tasks. One clear example is that military personnel or ex-military personnel (e.g. employed by private security contractors) often train police officers. But as much as police officers do not have the set of skills and equipment to perform military functions, the same holds true for military troops conducting policing. In a review of the US involvement in peace and stability operations, Perito concludes that the US military has repeatedly failed to deal with initial large-scale public disorder.[117] US military forces were simply not trained nor equipped to perform police functions.

Another way of describing the different roles of the police and the military is offered by LTG Dubik, who states that while the military or paramilitary police forces can impose security, local police enforce it locally after it has been established.[118] He emphasises that local police are neither trained nor equipped to handle insurgent attacks. It is notable that both Iraqi and Afghan police forces, less trained and equipped than their military counterparts, have become prime targets for enemy forces.

[115] Ibid.
[116] Friesendorf, Cornelius, "Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police", 2011.
[117] Perito, Robert M., "U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations", 2007.
[118] Dubik, James M., "Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems", 2010.

4.5. Capacity Building as an Exit Strategy and the Problem of Measuring Results

Building capacity in the security sector is increasingly viewed as a way for external actors to exit a peacekeeping or stabilisation operation. Building the recipient's capacity to deal with its own problems seems logical enough. If we assume that, in the long run, the only ones capable of turning conflict into stability and development is the local population and its appointed government representatives, then building or supporting that capacity makes sense. According to the same logic, once that capacity has been built, there is not much external actors can, or should, do. Therefore, in the area of peacekeeping and stabilisation operations, building an effective, efficient and legitimate security sector would provide external actors with "a way out". Accordingly, in most operations today, much emphasis is put on the capacity of the state to provide security and basic services to its citizens.

So how do we know when enough capacity has been built? Much as in other policy areas, there is an ever-increasing pressure to show results from capacity building activities.[119] When it comes to stabilisation or peacekeeping operations, this is difficult. External interventions aimed at creating stability and building long-term capacity are dependent on a number of variables they cannot control, such as national political will, sustained funding, conflict dynamics etc. Planners have to formulate strategies and goals that are realistic *and* possible to measure. Goals like "stability" are inherently difficult to measure. Couple that with a broad range of ongoing, parallel and likely uncoordinated efforts to create this stability, plus a conflict dynamic with its own logic and national actors that might have very different goals, then any measurement of success will be difficult. The result is that assessments of capacity building are not always expressed in very clear-cut wordings but, rather, described in terms of "able" or "sufficient".

James Dubik, building on his experience from building security forces in Iraq through the Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), argues for an approach that recognises "good enough".[120] When discussing what should be good enough, he states that: "The issue for an organisation like MNSTC-I … becomes defining sufficiency in as much detail as possible for the near term to suit the real conditions of the nascent force. Then it must use that definition as a guide to training and developing a nation's security force and improving its security ministries. Over time, the definition of sufficiency may change, but that is precisely the point."[121] Dubik dismisses the often-cited choice

[119] Becker, David C and Grossman-Vermaas, Robert, "Metrics for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative", 2011.
[120] Dubik, James, M, "Building security forces and ministerial capacity – Iraq as a primer", 2009, p. 12.
[121] Ibid, p. 23.

between quality and quantity and states that both are needed in operations such as that in Iraq. He argues that focusing solely on either one would be a big mistake. Dubik's strategy in Iraq was to drastically increase the number of Iraqi security forces by using an iterative approach, where capacity is not seen as an absolute, but rather as something that should be continuously strengthened. And herein lies another important point: building "hard" capacity does not provide a quick exit. Accordingly, Dubik argues that international actors should avoid engaging in capacity building if there is no long-term strategy in place.[122]

So, if we agree that capacity building should be measured in what it produces, which, broadly speaking, is security, the next issue is whose security we are talking about. Is it state security – the ability to protect the state towards internal or external enemies? Or are we discussing other aspects, such as human security,[123] in which case measuring results become even more complex? An obvious risk when using capacity and SSR as an exit strategy is that the trend of focusing on training and equipping security forces is reinforced. Since building governance capacity is a long-term engagement, it fits rather poorly with the will of those who look for a quick fix. Determining success based on the number of soldiers trained is practically easier than measuring the capacity of a governance system and is therefore also more likely to allow for a quicker exit, as one can point to measurable achievements.[124]

4.6. Timing

4.6.1. Sequencing

Given the broad spectrum of activities available in the toolbox of capacity building, it is important to consider *when* they should be used.

[122] Dubik, M, "Building security forces and ministerial capacity – Iraq as a primer", 2009, p. 2.

[123] See, for example, Kaldor, Mary, "Human Security in Complex Operations", 2011 or Schroeder, Ursula, Measuring Security Sector Governance – A Guide to Relevant Indicators, 2010.

[124] To date, it seems that there are few frameworks or methods for measuring capacity building in the security sector. Some tools, such as the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) or the OECD/DAC Guidelines for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, provide methods or frameworks for measuring and evaluating stabilisation and SSR engagements. See Becker, David C. and Grossman-Vermaas, Robert, "Metrics for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative", 2011 and OECD/DAC, "Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities", 2008. In 2010, a RAND report launched the Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART), "designed to assess the state of the defense sector in a given country". Schaefer, Agnes Gereben, Davis, Lynn E., Ratner, Ely, Dunigan, Molly, Goulka, Jeremiah, Peterson, Heather Riley, K. Jack, "Developing a Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool", 2010.

Complex transitional environments pose a variety of challenges to international donors by the pure breadth of issues which may need to be addressed. This, in turn, means that often difficult priorities have to be made.

In situations of conflict, the first priority should be to establish a relatively safe and stable environment. In practical terms, this might mean that a country's military forces should be strengthened before the police, as the latter are not suitable for combat.[125]

Sequencing of efforts is both necessary and advisable. Alex De Waal notes that trying to build institutions before stability has been achieved, for example, can turn into an exercise in rewarding actors already in power.[126] Instead, he adds, it is necessary to first try to understand the political preconditions which will enable state building.

It is impossible to do everything everywhere and at once. Indeed, the World Bank draws attention to the fact that while it may be tempting to tackle as much as possible from the start, doing too much and too soon may actually heighten the risk of reigniting the conflict.[127] The *World Development Report 2011* highlights that the "too much, too soon" syndrome can lead to various negative outcomes, for example:

- Overtaxing the existing political and social network capacity of national reformers (as in the Central African Republic and Haiti in the early 2000s).
- Transplanting outside "best practice" models without putting sufficient time or effort into adapting to context (for instance, in Iraq).
- Adopting an output orientation that defines success in the *de jure* space in the capital city (for example, by passing laws, writing sector plans and policies or creating new commissions or organisational structures) and not an outcome orientation in the de facto world where people live (by improved services, even if basic, in insecure and marginalised rural and urban areas), such as in Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2005.
- "Cocooning" efforts into parallel channels that facilitate a short-run accomplishment by bypassing national organisations and institutions,

[125] Dubik, Lieutenant General James M., "Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer", 2009.
[126] De Waal, Alex, "Fixing the Political Marketplace: How can we make peace without functioning state institutions?", 2009.
[127] The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development", April 2011, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/.

> and undermine national institutional building in the longer term, as, for example, in Afghanistan in 2001–2003 and to some extent afterward.[128]

In the end, each capacity building mission is context specific. It is therefore important for donors to be perceptive and their instruments to be flexible so that emerging opportunities in transition phases are taken advantage of. Part of such sensitivity to developments on the ground also involves correctly understanding and responding to public expectations.[129] Simultaneously, as noted above, there is a human predisposition to want to do things *now*, and, as noted, this is not always advisable. There can also be a "middle" decision – setting out longer-term objectives from the start while starting to implement those that are more urgent.

Thomas Carothers provides an illustrative example in his thoughts on democracy promotion.[130] Instead of sequencing, he chooses to recommend gradualism. The distinction between the two, according to Carothers, is time. Gradualism involves striving for the objective from the start, but first allowing for cumulative actions that will permit it to be realised. Elections may, for example, not be held immediately but be planned in a couple of years, allowing for a series of activities to prepare society for it. Such policy then still allows for the population to have the objective in sight, knowing that it will happen at a specific point in time. This is opposed to sequencing which, according to Carothers, entails putting off the elections for decades, e.g. with the argument that rule of law and a well-functioning state should exist before a society can democratise.

All contexts are different, and it is impossible to present a formula that fits all. In addition to patience, perhaps the most important thing is that there is an agreement between donors and with the host government on which areas to prioritize. Furthermore, while donors address immediate concerns, it is important that long-term plans, developed from the start, are continuously born in mind.[131]

4.6.2. Prevention

It is a truism that preventing conflicts is better than having to react to conflicts once already ignited. Prevention involves lower costs in terms of resources, but also lives. Unfortunately, however, prevention is a tricky business.

For one thing, prevention assumes, to some degree, an ability to predict future conflicts or to at least perceive risks of future conflicts. However, conflict

[128] Ibid.
[129] UK Department for International Development, "Building Peaceful States and Societies – A DFID Practice Paper", 2010.
[130] Carothers, Thomas, "How Democracies Emerge – The 'Sequencing' Fallacy", 2007.
[131] See, for example, the UK Department for International Development, "Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations – Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm 2010.

dynamics are context specific and depend on a large number of various factors. There are some discernable patterns though. For example, countries which have once been in conflict run a larger risk of falling into violence once again. Lawrence Woocher points out that while about 25% of states which, since 1945, have experienced civil war have relapsed into conflict within five years, only a minority of the world's conflicts can be considered relapses.[132]

David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel draw attention to the inherent problems with prediction in relation to time.[133] They observe that predictions are more difficult the longer one is from the actual occurrence, but they also note that the closer one is to the occurrence, the more likely it is that factors other than underlying structural causes decide whether a conflict will ignite or not. Therefore, human behavioural aspects, such as psychological ones and group dynamics, become critical in any attempt to predict the outcome.

Posing serious impediments to preventive work are also a number of political considerations. While it is widely recognised that preventive capacity building is much more cost-effective than having to take measures once a conflict has broken out, it remains a challenge to carry out such proactive work. This is naturally very much a result of having to prioritise the allocation of limited resources. First of all, basing policy on predictions naturally pose a serious challenge in trying to convince policymakers to take action. While the price tag on preventive work is relatively cheaper, it is also difficult to show tangible results. That is, it is arguably hard to prove that conflict has not happened due to actions taken years in advance. This runs counter to the desire of policymakers to show that taxpayers' money has been well spent. Similarly, they often find it somewhat difficult to justify spending substantial portions of that money in countries far away and not within national borders. The fact that politicians are most often elected only for a few years also means that there is an inherent predisposition for them to prioritise policies which will show results during their time in office, thereby also increasing their chance for re-election. Lawrence Woocher correctly adds that pre-violent conflict situations rarely attract much media coverage, which can impel a response.[134]

In addition, intervening in a state's internal business is, as repeated throughout this report, sensitive. Not only are many governments reluctant to interfere in what they consider to be other countries' domestic affairs, but it may be difficult to convince the host state of their need for external support and secure their consent. Indeed, often it is the government in place which is part of the reason

[132] Woocher, Lawrence, "Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, Meeting Challenges", 2009.
[133] Carment, David and Schnabel, Albrecht, "Building Conflict Prevention Capacity: Methods, Experiences, Needs", 2001.
[134] Woocher, Lawrence, "Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, Meeting Challenges", 2009.

for why there might be an identified need for capacity building assistance, and they are then probably not very eager to encourage actions which they fear might endanger their position of power.

There is also the aspect that attempts at preventive action may actually fail and even increase the risk of conflict. There is agreement that external actors can do harm as well as good, intentionally or unintentionally. This naturally also applies to the area of capacity building. One example is that capacity building efforts may benefit elite groups and act to broaden disparities in societies.[135]

Therefore, preventive capacity building requires a good dose of courage as well as wit. Furthermore, not only is it necessary to understand *when* but also *what* to do and *how* in relation to specific contexts. Moving forward, the question is how to promote political will for preventive action? Multilateral support can be one way of creating norms and values which will encourage such action. The increasing recognition of the benefits to prevention may signal that we are moving in the right direction. Indeed, as expressed by one UN official interviewed for this report: "The wind is blowing in the direction of preventive efforts."

[135] UK Department for International Development, "Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations – Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm", 2010.

5. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this study has been to provide a comprehensive understanding of capacity building in the security sector. Such capacity building has become increasingly important as a military strategy, and is gaining momentum in contemporary operations. Yet, the concept is subject to multiple interpretations, potentially opening up for much confusion.

Throughout this study, some recurring themes have emerged. One is the need for clarity on what capacity building entails and what one hopes to achieve by it. As discussed in chapter 2, different interpretations of capacity building can lead to conflicting expectations. Such misunderstandings concerning methods and goals could be devastating to capacity building projects, not least by undermining cooperation between the providers and national actors.

Another emerging discussion concerns capacity building as being too focused on the state and often being implemented with a top-down approach, which does not necessarily reflect how security is traditionally delivered in many conflict or post-conflict states. In many societies, other actors than the state are the prime providers of security. These might be in direct conflict with the state or function alongside formal institutions. For capacity building to be effective and relevant, these actors and structures must be taken into account. Donor countries and multilateral organisations, such as the UN, are not always used to, and/or comfortable with, working with other actors than the state in the security sector. Informal security actors may, for example, have their own interests and standards, not necessarily acceptable to donors. Arguably, the primary security actor should, when possible, be a legitimate state which respects human rights and provides security to all of its citizens. Capacity building in the security sector can help to strengthen weak institutions and security providers, increasing their legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. However, when political will does not exist, creating such structures through capacity building efforts is unlikely to succeed. Supporting local (not necessarily informal) security actors and facilitating cooperation between central state structures and local security providers, with the aim of adapting to the needs and realities of each specific context, could be further explored. In essence, without a thorough understanding of the local context, its actors and dynamics, capacity building is likely to fail or, even worse, fuel conflict.

In order to achieve more effect and efficiency in capacity building initiatives, multilateral and regional solutions can provide an interesting alternative. Improved coordination and a broader palette of instruments could facilitate more comprehensive support. What is becoming increasingly clear is the need for more civilian expertise and resources in security sector capacity building. The link between security forces and security institutions, such as oversight bodies, ministries and parliament, has been highlighted as critical, but it is often missing.

While donors are used to providing hands-on support to the armed forces, they have little experience of strengthening the capacity of security sector institutions. Consequently, donor resources for and knowledge about institution building is often scarce or underdeveloped. Initiatives to strengthen this capacity, both in donor and recipient countries, are badly needed.

The issue of legitimacy is also key when considering the provider of support. One interesting aspect linked to capacity building is the increasing usage of private security actors. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, private security firms have been essential in building the capacity of national security forces. However, issues such as oversight and control may become problematic in the long run as private companies increase their presence in conflict environments.

Preventive capacity building is inherently both more cost-efficient and effective than trying to put out fires once they have started, and most analysts agree on the need for early action. A major challenge to effective and preventive capacity building is that the states which need it the most are often also the ones most likely to resist any form of outside interference in their security sector. While funding and training of security forces are often sought, most countries are unlikely to admit any problems in the governance of their security apparatus. It seems that to reform the inner security core of a sovereign state, the recipient country needs to be in such a bad state that it is either in great risk of "failing" or trying to rebuild after a major crisis.

Security sector capacity building is about much more than training and equipping military forces. However, there are few strategies in place for how capacity building should be expanded to include new recipients and new areas. Support to the police has, for instance, often become too military focused, building forces that are better equipped to fight insurgents rather than fighting everyday crime. This militarisation might be appealing in the short term as a means of handling immediate security concerns. In the long run, however, the way to a stable, peaceful society might have become even more difficult.

As discussed in chapter 4, capacity building is often seen as a way out of a conflict for external actors. It should be emphasised, though, that capacity building is by no means a quick fix. While Western military forces are generally good at producing troops, their record in building institutional capacity of whole security sectors is arguably not as solid. Such comprehensive endeavour is potentially both time-consuming and costly. For capacity building to be effective, providers and receivers must agree on the long-term objectives. To increase the effect, support should also be provided in a coordinated manner, which is rarely the case. Furthermore, for capacity building to become a useful exit strategy, methods for measuring capacity building results and outcomes need to be refined.

In summary, capacity building is appealing, both to providers and recipients. It sits well with the local ownership paradigm as it focuses on the recipient's capacity and ability. It could potentially save both lives and money by reducing the pressure for external military forces and facilitating "light footprints" by international actors. Preventive capacity building has the potential to avert conflicts in the first place. For security sector capacity building to be effective and sustainable though, one must recognise the complexity of each specific context and the need for a long-term strategy.

6. References

AEGIS, www.aegisworld.com.

Africa Clearing House, http://www.g8africaclearinghouse.org/search.html.

Albrecht, Peter, Stepputat, Finn, Andersen, Louise, "Security Sector Reform the European way", in Sedra, Mark (ed), "The future of security sector reform", The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, Canada, 2010.

Australian Federal Police, International Deployment Group, http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx, 2011.

Ball, Nicole (principal author), "Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools - The Security Sector Reform Strategy", Evaluation Report 647, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/52/35096612.pdf, 2004.

Baker, Bruce, "The Future is Non-State", in Sedra, Mark (ed.) "The Future of Security Sector Reform", The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, Canada, 2010.

Barnes, Julian E., "New Afghan War Leader Helped Nurture Sunni Awakening in Iraq", The Wall Street Journal, 28 April 2011.

Becker, David C and Grossman-Vermaas, Robert, "Metrics for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative", Center for Complex Operations, PRISM, Vol. 2, No. 2, 03/2011.

Berdal, Mats, "Building Peace After War", Adelphi 407, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009.

Boshoff, Henri, Hendrickson, Dylan, More, Sylvie and Vicoulon, Thierry, "Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place", Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, April 2010.

Bruno, Greg, "Backgrounder: Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'", Council on Foreign Relations, 9 January 2009, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/finding-place-sons-iraq/p16088#p5.

Byrd, William A., "The Financial Dimension of Security Sector Reform", in Sedra, Mark (ed.), "The Future of Security Sector Reform", The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, Canada, 2010.

Call, Charles T., "Building States to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis", Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2008.

Caparini, Marina, "Applying a Security Governance Perspective to the Privatisation of Security", in Bryden, Alan, and Caparini, Marina (eds.), "Private Actors and Security Governance", LIT & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2006.

Carment, David and Schnabel, Albrecht, “Building Conflict Prevention Capacity: Methods, Experiences, Needs”, United Nations University Workshop Seminar Series Report, February 2001.

Carothers, Thomas, “How Democracies Emerge – The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 2007.

Chuter, David, “Security Sector Reform: Ambitions and Reality”, Background Paper, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2008, Draft Rev 1 October 2008.

Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq”, August 2008.

Cornwall, Andrea and Eade, Deborah (eds.), “Deconstructing Development Discourse – Buzzwords and Fuzzwords”, Practical Action Publishing and Oxfam GB, 2010.

Cottey, Andrew and Forster, Anthony, “Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance”, Adelphi 365, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004.

Dasgupta, Sunil, “Paramilitary Groups: Local Alliances in Counterinsurgency Operations”, Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, No. 6, Brookings, June 2009.

De Waal, Alex, “Fixing the Political Marketplace: How can we make peace without functioning state institutions?”, Fifteenth Christen Michelsen Lecture, Bergen, 15 October 2009.

Donais, Timothy, “Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform”, in Donais, Timothy (ed.), “Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform”, DCAF, LIT Verlag, 2008.

Durch, William J., England, Madeline L. (eds.), “Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law”, Stimson Center Report No. 63, Rev. 1, August 2010.

Dubik, James M., “Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer”, Institute for the Study of War, August 2009.

Dubik, James M., “Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems”, Institute for the Study of War, October 2010.

DynCorp International, www.dyn-intl.com.

England, Madeline, Boucher, Alix, “Security Sector Reform: Thematic Literature Review on Best Practices and Lessons Learned”, Stimson Center, December 2009.

European Union, “EU institutions and other bodies”, http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm.

Flintoff, Corey, “U.S.-Allied Sunni Groups Struggle Under Iraqi Control”, NPR, 22 December 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121516208.

Freier, Nathan, “The New Theology: Building Partner Capacity”, Small Wars Journal, May 2010.

Friesendorf, Cornelius, “Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 2011.

Gates, Robert M., “Helping Others Defend Themselves”, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010.

Gates, Robert M., remarks delivered at The Nixon Center, Washington, DC, on 24 February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425.

Gellner, Ernest, “Nations and Nationalism”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, USA 1983.

Green, Mathew, “FT Interview Transcript: Gen David Petraeus”, Financial Times, 7 February 2011.

Gross, Eva, ‘Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s contribution’, ISS Occasional Paper, No. 78, April 2009.

Hewad, Gran, “When the police goes local; more on the Baghlan ALP”, 4 March 2011, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1539, Afghanistan Analysts Network.

Hull, Cecilia, Eriksson, Mikael, MacDermott, Justin, Rudén, Fanny and Waleij, Annica, “Managing Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations”, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), FOI-R--2916--SE, 2009.

Hurd, Ian, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”, International Organization, Vol .53, no.2, 1999, cited in Berdal, Mats, “Building Peace After War”, Adelphi 407, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009.

Harris, Vandra, “Building on sand? Australian police involvement in international policy capacity building”, Policing and Society, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2010.

Hutton, Lauren, “A bridge too far? Considering security sector reform in Africa”, ISS Paper 186, May 2009.

International Committee of the Red Cross, “Unregulated arms availability, small arms & light weapons, and the UN process”, Background paper, 26 May 2006, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/small-arms-paper-250506.htm.

Isenberg, David, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq”, British American Security Information Council, Research Report, 4 Sept 2004.

Jones, Seth G., “It Takes the Villages”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages.

Kaldor, Mary, “Human Security in Complex Operations”, Center for Complex Operations, PRISM, Vol. 2, No. 2, 03/2011.

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security”, Congressional Research Service, 28 October 2009.

Kilcullen, David, “The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One”, Oxford University Press, UK, 2009.

Lefèvre, Mathieu, “Local Defence in Afghanistan”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2010, http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100525MLefevre-LDIpaper.pdf.

Lin, Thaddeus, “Institutional Capacity and Cooperation for Policing Operations: The Australian Experience”, International Peacekeeping, Vol 15, Number 5, November 2007.

Londoño, Ernesto and Mizher, Qais, “US opens fire on Sunni militia in Iraq”, Financial Times, 3 April 2009.

Lusthaus, Charles, Adrien, Marie-Hélène, Perstinger, Mark, “Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation”, Universalia Occasional Paper, No. 35, September 1999.

Marquis, Jefferson P., Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Beck, Justin, Eaton, Derek, Hiromoto, Scott, Howell, David R., Lewis, Janes, Lynch, Charlotte, Neumann, Michael J., Thurston, Cathryn Quantic, “Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations”, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2010.

Miller, Derek B., “Applying Cultural Knowledge to Design Problems: Notes for the U.S. Military about Challenges and Opportunities”, a lecture for U.S. Training and Doctrine Command’s “Culture Summit” 2009.

Mobekk, Eirin, “After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership”, Conference Report in Ebnöther, Anja H and Fluri, Philipp H., PfP Consortium Working Group “Security Sector Reform”, August 2005.

Nathan, Laurie, “No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform”, University of Birmingham, October 2007.

New York Times, Business, Companies, stories under Blackwater Worldwide, April, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/blackwater_usa/index.html, 25.

New York Times, “Iraq’s Stalemate”, Editorial, New York Times, 19 October 2010.

Nilsson, Claes, Hull, Cecilia, Derblom, Markus, Egnell, Robert, “Contextualising the Comprehensive Approach – the Elements of a Comprehensive Intervention”, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R--2650--SE, 2008.

Nilsson, Claes and Svensson, Emma, “Exit Strategies in Peace Support Operations”, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R--2816--SE, 2009.

Nilsson, Claes, Svensson, Emma,”Security Sector Reform in Transition – Towards a new SSR-agenda”, (In Swedish: Säkerhetssektorreform i förändring – Mot en ny SSR-agenda), Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R--3032--SE, 2010.

Nixon, Richard, “Address on Vietnamizing the War”, 3 November 1969, http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/pdocs/nixon_vietnamization.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ”OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice”, 2007.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations – From Fragility to Resilience”, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, 2008.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC), “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities”, 2008.

Park, Edwards A. “Memoir of Nathanael Emmons; with sketches of his friends and pupils”, Congregational Board of Publication, Boston, 1861.

Perito, Robert M., “U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 191, August 2007.

Perito, Robert M., “Afghanistan’s Police – The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 227, August 2009.

Petraeus, David H., “Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander International Security Assistance Forces NATO before the Senate Armed Services Committee”, 15 March 2011.

Rubin, Alissa J., “Afghans to Form Local Forces to Fight Taliban”, New York Times, 14 July 2010.

Ruttig, Thomas, “Talking about Civilian Casualties in Kabul”, Afghan Analysts Network, 3 July 2011, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1893.

Schaefer, Agnes Gereben, Davis, Lynn E., Ratner, Ely, Dunigan, Molly, Goulka, Jeremiah, Peterson, K., Heather, Riley, Jack, “Developing a Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool”, RAND Corporation, 2010.

Scheye, Eric, “Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 257, October 2010.

Schroeder, Ursula, “Measuring Security Sector Governance – A Guide to Relevant Indicators”, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper No 4, 2010.

Sedra, Mark, “Introduction: The Future of Security Sector Reform” in Sedra, Mark (ed.) “The Future of Security Sector Reform”, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, Canada (2010).

Sherman, Jake, “The ‘Global War on Terrorism’ and its Implications for US Security Sector Reform Support”, in Sedra, Mark (ed.) “The Future of Security Sector Reform”, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, Canada, 2010.

Simon, Steven, “The Price of the Surge”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008.

Singer, P. W., “Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency”, Brookings, Policy Paper Number 4, September 2007.

Smith-Höhn, Judy, “Rebuilding the Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies – Perceptions from Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone”, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2010.

Smith, Michael G., and Shrimpton, Rebecca, “Nation-building Interventions and National Security – An Australian Perspective”, Center for Complex Operations, PRISM, Vol. 2, No. 2, 03/2011.

Spear, Joanna, “Private military companies eye new markets in difficult times”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 June 2011.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Yearbook 2010”, Appendix 2A, Patterns of major armed conflicts, 2000-2009, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/02/02A.

Taylor, Rob, “Afghan local police stoke fears of new-generation militia”, Reuters, 25 April 2011.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development", April 2011, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/.

The World Bank Capacity Development Resource Center, www.worldbank.org/capacity.

UK Department for International Development, "Building Peaceful States and Societies – A DFID Practice Paper", 2010.

UK Department for International Development, "Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations – Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm", DFID practice paper, March 2010.

United Nations, "Monthly Summary of Contributions", 2011, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Capacity Development: A UNDP Primer", 2009.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Community Security and Social Cohesion – Towards a UNDP Approach", December 2009.

United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, "Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict – Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group", A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), research project, "Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) Project: Phase II", http://www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=337.

U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters, "Stability Operations", Field Manual No. 3-07, October 2008.

U.S. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), https://jcisfa.jcs.mil, 2011.

Weber, Max, "Politics as a Vocation", 'Politik als Beruf', originally a speech at Munich University, 1918.

Wiharta, Sharon, "The legitimacy of peace operations", in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Yearbook 2009", Oxford University Press, 2009.

Williams, Rocklyn, "Africa and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform", Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 46, February 2000.

Williams, Timothy and Adnan, Duraid "Sunnis in Iraq Allied With U.S. Rejoin Rebels", New York Times, 16 October 2010.

Wilson, Scott and Cohen, Jon, “Poll: Nearly two-thirds of Americans say Afghan war isn’t worth fighting”, The Washington Post, 15 March 2010.

Woocher, Lawrence, “Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress, Meeting Challenges”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 231, September 2009.

6.1. Interviews

Interviews were conducted in March 2011 in Washington D.C. and New York with researchers and representatives from:

The International Crisis Group

National Defense University, Center for Complex Operations

New York University, Center on International Cooperation

RAND Corporation

The Stimson Center

The World Bank

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

United States Institute of Peace (USIP)