Recent Developments in Evaluation & Conflict Analysis

Tools for Understanding Complex Conflicts

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Sammanfattning

Dagens konflikter beskrivs ofta som komplexa. I denna rapport studerar vi aktuell utveckling inom uppföljning och utvärdering för att bedöma hur väl dessa metoder lämpar sig för komplexa konflikter. Konfliktanalys anses vara en central förutsättning för att genomföra utvärderingar av insatser i konfliktområden, därför har vi även inkluderat metoder för konfliktanalys i rapporten. Vi diskuterar också hur väl dessa metoder kan användas tillsammans. I nästa steg kommer metoderna att testas i praktiska fall.

Vi har analyserat fyra olika ramverk för konfliktanalys (från Sida, FHS, US DOS och US DOD) samt fem ramverk uppföljning och utvärdering (från US DOD, Nato, Världsbanken, OECD DAC samt Michael Patton).

Vår slutsats är att alla de behandlade metoderna för konfliktanalys kan användas i komplexa konflikter. Eftersom alla de behandlade konfliktanalysmetoderna omfattar olika teorier om konflikter, påverkar valet av konfliktanalysmetod hur en utvärdering kommer att utfalla.

De militära metoder för insatsvärdering som vi behandlat, och som är baserade på kvalitets- och resultatmätning, verkar ha en begränsad validitet och reliabilitet, samtidigt som det är troligt att denna typ av metoder medför negativa bieffekter.

Utvärdering av långsiktiga effekter enligt Världsbankens modell har en högre grad av reliabilitet och validitet, men vi bedömer att förutsättningarna för denna typ av utvärdering sällan föreligger i komplexa konflikter.

Därmed är OECD/DACs ramverk för utvärdering av fredsfrämjande insatser och Pattons ”utvecklande utvärdering” de angreppssätt som verkar medge förutsättningar för utvärdering i komplexa konflikter.

Nyckelord: konfliktanalys, utvärdering, insatsvärdering, komplexitet, uppföljning, fredsfrämjande insatser, konfliktförebyggande

Summary

Today's conflicts are frequently described as being complex. In this report, we aim to study recently developed tools used for monitoring and evaluation of interventions in complex conflicts, in order to make an initial assessment on how well these approaches address conflicts and conditions of complexity. Conflict analysis is considered an important pre-requisite for evaluation of interventions in conflicts, thus we look both at tools for evaluation and conflict analysis. The aim is both to assess the respective methods suitability for evaluation of interventions, and also to assess how they fit together. The next step will be to start testing the most promising methods on real cases.

We have analysed four conflict analysis frameworks (from Sida, Swedish National Defence College, US DOS and US DOD respectively), and five frameworks for monitoring and evaluation (from US DOD, NATO, the World Bank, OECD/DAC and Michael Patton).

We conclude that all the analysed methods for conflict analysis can be used for an evaluation of an intervention in a complex conflict. All the studied conflict analysis are based on different theoretical frameworks. Thus the evaluation results will depend on what conflict analysis method is chosen.

The military assessment methods studied here seems to show limited promise. Their validity and reliability are judged to be limited, and there are indications that this type of approaches incurs negative side-effects on the organisation using them.

Impact evaluation has a higher degree of validity and reliability than the military assessment methods, but the preconditions for conducting impact evaluation rarely occur in a complex conflict setting.

Thus, the OECD-DAC framework and Developmental Evaluation seems to promise a better approach for evaluation activities in complex conflicts.

Keywords: Conflict analysis, evaluation, assessment, complexity, monitoring, peace support operations, conflict prevention

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1 Introduction

Today's conflicts are frequently described as being complex. Conducting interventions and understanding the results of these interventions has proven to be a challenging task (OECD, 2008).

In this report, we aim to study recent developments in evaluation and conflict analysis with a specific focus on complex conflicts, in order to make an assessment on how well these approaches address conflicts and conditions of complexity. We also discuss how well these approaches may support each other.

To evaluate something means determining its merit, worth, value or significance (Patton, 2008). Evaluation of interventions in complex conflicts then means to evaluate the merits of the interventions the international community or nations and other actors make in order to address complex conflicts.

Conflict analysis has been identified as an important tool for conducting evaluations of interventions in conflicts (OECD, 2008).

The Phoenix network, of which FOI is a member, is an international network of evaluation experts and users who are researching ways to improve the current approach to evaluation of conflict prevention and peace-building measures (The Phoenix Concept, 2011). The report is intended to support the accumulation of knowledge both internally at FOI and within the Phoenix network. The report constitutes the first step by FOI's research programme, identifying methodical approaches that show promise for conducting evaluations in complex conflicts. The aim is then to continue with testing the most promising methods in practise, by using them in actual evaluations.

This study is based on a literature review of various method manuals, and some other relevant references. The selection of methods that are discussed have been chosen to get wide a variety of approaches to conflict analysis and evaluation while also looking at relevance for the peace support operations context, essentially a maximum variation sample (Patton, 2002). The study is a theoretical study of method descriptions and documented usage; we have not conducted any independent survey of user experiences.

2 Conflict analysis

2.1 Introduction to conflict analysis

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) activities, peace-building has become an overarching term for a broad range of actions designed to facilitate sustainable peace. For example; activities intended to promote socio-economic development, good governance, reform of justice and security institutions, and the promotion of a culture of justice, truth and reconciliation (OECD, 2008, p. 15). While evaluating CPPB activities, a conflict analysis is considered necessary in order to assess relevance and impact. A conflict analysis can be useful in order to assess the conflict sensitivity of activities other than conflict prevention or peace-building, which are conducted in conflicts or conflict-prone environments. A conflict analysis may also be required in order to assess risks for personnel conducting or contributing to the evaluation of activities in areas with high levels of violence (OECD, 2008, pp. 22-30).

According to OECD/DAC, the main features of a conflict analysis consists of a conflict profile, an analysis of conflict causes and potentials for peace, an analysis of actors, and an assessment of the conflicts dynamics and future trends. We have used these requirements to assess how well the studied methods are suited for evaluation purposes (see section 2.6).

An academic approach to conflict analysis can be found in a wide range of disciplines, such as history, sociology, economy, psychology and political science. Peace studies often focus on mediation, conflict resolution and reconciliation, whereas war studies focuses on how to win wars. The scope of this study however, is the practitioner's rather than the scholar's. By comparing a set of conflict analysis methods designed for planning and execution of international interventions, the aim is to identify and clarify differences, and assess their utility for evaluation of CPPB activities. The common denominator of the compared tools is that they are applicable for strategic level conflict analysis, although two of them have applications for lower levels (sector/program, operational/tactical) as well.

The United States Government (USG) Interagency Conflict Analysis Framework (ICAF) and the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) Conflict Analysis Handbook is intended for inter-agency planning. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) Manual for Conflict Analysis is designed for development cooperation and the United States Department for Defence (DoD) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(JIPOE) for military interventions. The analysis is limited to a theoretical comparison, based on handbook descriptions rather than practical experience.

2.2 Sida - Manual for Conflict Analysis

2.2.1 Scope

The analytical process described in the Sida Manual for Conflict Analysis, is intended to guide Sida staff and partners in analysing violent conflicts. The aim is to improve the effectiveness of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in places affected by violence and insecurity, as well as to provide a better basis for assessing the conflict sensitivity of programs. The goal of the process is not merely the creation of a report. Rather, the output should be improved learning through dialogue among the team conducting the analysis. The process is to be used in the preparation for or follow up of a strategic level conflict analysis, but can also be useful in order to assess conflict analyses attached to program documents. A conflict analysis at strategic level should involve Sida officers of relevant thematic and regional departments, as well as field based staff and advisors from other authorities and organisations. At project level, the conflict analysis should be carried out by the implementing organisation, involving local partners and governments in order to build local ownership and accountability of the process. (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, pp. 5-6)

2.2.2 Process

Strategic level

The analysis at strategic level is divided into three elements, namely the conflict analysis, the scenario analysis, and strategies and options. The conflict analysis consists of an analysis of structures, actors, and conflict dynamics. Structures are comprised of tensions and root causes of the conflict, as well as factors contributing to peace. Factors such as economic development, equity of distribution, the political system and demographic structures should be taken into account. In analysing actors, the analyst should identify critical local, national and international factors that influence or are influenced by the main actors of the conflict. Focus should be on incompatible interests in terms of greed and grievances, and possible gaps between different expectations and how these expectations are to be met. Fear is considered a strong incentive for actors in insecure situations. The conflict dynamics should be outlined in terms of events, actions and decisions that could serve as accelerating or triggering factors of the conflict. Rapid economic decline, changes in the degree of state cohesion, shifts in international control over parts of the central authority, and shifts in the

distribution of power, is considered factors that may lead to negative attitudes or violent behaviour. Having analysed these aspects, one should supposedly be able to identify the mechanisms driving the conflict (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, p. 12).

A scenario analysis is to be conducted in order to facilitate contingency planning and a more flexible approach to the intervention. The aim is to assess possible future scenarios that may contribute to the change of conflict dynamics. Acknowledging the difficulties in trying to predict the future, the manual suggests a mind-set focusing on what may be done during a range of different circumstances. While trying to identify a realistic future, the analyst should look at potential change in the level and type of violence (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, p. 13).

The last part of the strategic conflict analysis is to develop strategies and options. This is conducted through an assessment of possible impacts of future Sida engagement, through the identification of opportunities and risks connected to the engagements in a given country or region. The output should consist of clear recommendations regarding how to work at operational level, and how to act in concert with other donor activities, diplomatic efforts or trade sanctions. Promotion of dialogue, security and structural stability are actions considered vital for the facilitation of sustainable peace and security (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, pp. 13-14).

Sector level

Health, education and agriculture are considered sectors that provide ample opportunities to tackle structural causes of conflict, and may thus contribute to the prevention of conflicts. Another obvious sector is the security sector, where the manual considers it important to distinguish between internal and external security, and the different roles of civilian and military elements. Limited guidance as how to conduct the sector level analysis is provided, apart from recommendations to consider factors such as key actors that needs supporting, level of local government transparency, risk of funds getting diverted for other purposes (for example military), position of other donors, and human rights standards (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, pp. 19-21).

Project level

The conflict analysis at project level could be conducted as a conflict sensitivity assessment or a comprehensive conflict analysis. The conflict sensitivity assessment is conducted by identifying dividers (sources of tensions among people), and factors that connect people to conduct an assessment of the impact of the project on dividers and connectors. That analysis may lead to a possible

redesign of the project. An analysis of dividers and sources of tensions is conducted through the establishment of a list of tensions and dividing factors that could lead to increased violence during specific circumstances. Factors that are considered to connect people are for example common languages, religion, culture, markets, workplace and infrastructure. While assessing the impact of the project on dividers and connectors, the analyst should consider how and why dividers and connectors are affected. One should also reflect on whether the project might reduce or worsen tensions, and if it will support or undermine connectors. If there is a risk that the project will have negative impacts, the task is to redesign the project in order to avoid negative, and to maximise positive impacts (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, pp. 25-26).

If the project aims directly at influencing conflict dynamics, or if there is a potential that it will have negative impact on the conflict setting, a more comprehensive conflict analysis is to be conducted. Based on the strategic level analysis, structural causes and actors are to be divided into factors that increase and factors that reduce the risks of violence in society. Through an analysis of the conflict setting, opportunities for sustainable peace are to be identified. If several potential conflict sources and opportunities for peaceful change exist, they are to be prioritized in terms of highest risk for violence and best chances for peaceful development. The analytical process should be concluded by assessing relevance of the project, and whether or not it promotes peace and security by having impact on factors driving the conflict, and if windows of opportunity are exploited (Ekstedt & Holmberg, 2006, pp. 27-29).

2.2.3 Considerations

The manual advocates different processes depending on the level of analysis (strategic, sector or program). The strategic level emphasizes macro level structural causes of instability, whereas the program level analysis focuses on actors and their ability to function as dividers or connectors in society. The third element of the strategic level conflict analysis, as well as the project level analysis can be considered to be part of a planning process, rather than an independent conflict analysis. The methodology provides limited guidance on what results are achieved. Rather, it describes a wide range of issues or questions to address while conducting the analysis.

2.3 SNDC – Conflict Analysis Handbook

2.3.1 Scope

The SNDC Conflict Analysis Handbook is designed for the Swedish Ministry of Defence, in support of the analytical process of an intergovernmental strategic

planning. The aim is to obtain a more cohesive and coordinated intervention effort, by civilian as well as military components. The team of analysts should consist of subject matter experts, and may be conducted as a desktop study. By visualizing key factors of a conflict context, the process helps create an understanding of how sub-factors of a conflict interacts and influence conflict dynamics (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 7).

2.3.2 Process

The methodology is a seven-step process consisting of an analysis of the international context, recent developments, actors, Sweden's interests and engagement, the conflict area, and of what threatens and what is threatened through the conflict.

While analysing the international context, the team should define the geographical distribution (area, region or territory) of the conflict. Actors that are active in, are affected by, or have a stake in the conflict are to be identified (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 14).

The analysis of conflict development should contain a review of events that from a political perspective has had an overall influence on the course of the conflict. It should be supplemented by an analysis of the conflict's impact on the international community (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 15).

The analysis of actors should clarify the underlying dynamics or power constellations that make actors behave in certain ways. The aim is not to sort out all underlying motives or constellations, but rather to display factors that are central to actors that have the ability to influence dynamics and developments of the conflict. Actors' influence in terms of power base, intentions and goals should be identified. Preferably, actors are to be divided into either connectors with positive impact, or dividers with negative impact on the conflict. Thereafter, they are to be categorized as actors that are to be informed (connector with limited influence), monitored (divider with limited influence), included (connector with extensive influence) or influenced (divider with extensive influence) (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, pp. 16-19).

As basis for the continuation of the analysis, Sweden's interests and engagement in the conflict is to be analysed. Despite the national premise, Sweden's interests could be defined as for example international peace and stability, as prerequisite for democratic development, human rights, rule of law and prosperity (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 20).

The area of conflict is defined and analysed through political, security, economic, societal and environmental sectors. The political sector refers to governance systems, leaders, powerbases, legitimacy and the execution of power. The security sector is analysed in terms of how violence is exercised, and through

identification of factors that could increase or reduce the levels of violence in society. The economic sector addresses issues such as whether the state or private actors control the economic system and economic infrastructure. The well-being of the people is studied through the societal sector, by cultural, ethnic, religious and societal factors that influence the everyday existence of the population. The environmental sector refers to factors that may threaten the prerequisites for livelihood and living conditions, for example devastation of forests and lands, pollution of water supplies and probability of draught or natural disasters (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 24).

The following step of the process is to analyse what is threatened through the conflict. Focus should be on the causes, rather than on factors contributing to the resolution of the conflict. Threatened objects could be found within as well as outside of the conflict area, constituted by factors that are directly or indirectly affected by the conflict (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 27).

Finally, by analysing what threatens the security object defined in the previous step, actors are to be linked to the object together with a description of why and how it is threatened (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2011, p. 29).

2.3.3 Considerations

The model has a clearly stated normative premise, being the protection of Swedish interests, including norms and values that Sweden pursues (i.e. international peace and security, human rights and humanitarian law etc.). The seven step process considers both structural causes and actors, but gives little theoretical guidance or explanation to the possible mutually reinforcing nature of the factors.

2.4 USG – Interagency conflict assessment Framework

2.4.1 Scope

The United States Government (USG) Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is designed for a variety of situations, such as steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, contingency planning based on a hypothetical future, or as a part of a government crisis response planning. The analytical team should consist of representatives from relevant agencies, and the representatives should be able to reach back to respective agency in order to fill critical information gaps throughout the process. The method draws upon social science expertise, and provides a strategic snapshot of a conflict, designed to help create a common understanding among relevant USG department and agencies

for the dynamics driving or mitigating a conflict within a country (United States Department of State, 2008, pp. 2-6).

2.4.2 Process

The ICAF conflict analysis process is divided into the elements of Conflict diagnosis and Segue into planning. The conflict diagnosis is constituted by a review of the context of the conflict, understanding of core grievances and social and institutional resilience, analysis of drivers and mitigating factors, and to describe windows of opportunities for the increase or decrease of the conflict. While reviewing the context of the conflict, the task is to determine the preceding elements of conflict dynamics. Such elements could be for example poverty, youth bulge, regional tensions, and the history of the conflict. An understanding of core grievances is obtained through the identification of groups that considers their identity, security or livelihood threatened by others. Social patterns ability to reinforce perceived deprivation is to be described, as well as inter-group rivalries and disputes. Social and institutional resilience is analysed through an assessment of government performance, and how the legal system, schools, security forces and other institutions perform. Through an analysis of drivers and mitigating factors of the conflict, actors that are central to the perpetuating or changing of social patterns or institutional performance are to be identified. They are to be categorized in terms of who has impact on societal patterns and grievances, where and in what institutions and organizations they are positioned, what motivates them, and how they exert influence. By describing opportunities for the increase or decrease of the conflict, windows of vulnerability and opportunity are to be identified. Windows of vulnerability are defined as moments when events threaten to fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power, whereas windows of opportunity is defined as moments when over-arching identities become more important than sub-group identities (United States Department of State, 2008, pp. 7-13).

The second element of the ICAF process is to segue into planning. For steady-state and conflict prevention planning, this is done firstly through the identification of current USG activities, and how these could impact drivers or mitigating factors of the conflict. Secondly, by identifying current efforts of non-USG actors such as bi- and multilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations, private sector and local entities. Thirdly, the planning team should identify gaps, i.e. drivers and mitigating factors that are not addressed by existing efforts, as well as challenges to the addressing of those gaps (United States Department of State, 2008, p. 14).

2.4.3 Considerations

The methodology draws upon social identity as the main driver of intra-group conflicts, and the security object to be protected is peace and stability. The task to "segue into planning" could be considered a part of a planning process rather than conflict analysis. Despite the inter-agency approach, the methodology seems to consider interventions with development or diplomatic rather than military efforts.

2.5 US DoD – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

2.5.1 Scope

The analytical process of the US DoD JIPOE is to be carried out by the military intelligence organisation, in support of operational planning or the continuous support to military operations. The process may be used for strategic, operational as well as tactical level intelligence preparation. At strategic level, the JIPOE should examine the instruments of national power, being they diplomatic, economic or military. At operational level, the process should be concerned with the facilitation, coordination and sustainability of friendly forces. The tactical level analysis requires greater level of detail over smaller segments of the operational environment (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, pp. xi-xvii).

2.5.2 Process

The JIPOE is a four step process conducted through the defining of the operational environment, description of the impact of the operational environment, evaluation the adversary and its capabilities, and by determining the adversary's courses of action.

While defining the operational environment, the limits of the operational area is to be established, as well as the mission and the force commander's intent. The limits of the area of interest are to be defined through an initial analysis of significant factors of the operational environment (physical as well as non-physical). The level of detailed required is determined, as well as the time available and possible intelligence gaps and shortfalls. Thereafter, additional material is to be collected, and requests for further information to be submitted (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, pp. xvii-xviii).

A description of the impact of the operational environment includes physical and non-physical factors that may affect adversary, friendly and neutral actors military capabilities and courses of action. This is obtained through the development of a geospatial and systems perspective, and through the

visualization of how factors of the environment interact as part of the whole (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, p. xix).

The adversary and its capabilities are to be analysed through the creation of models, drawing on the opponent's doctrinal ways, observed operational patterns, as well as current situation and order of battle. By identifying capabilities and vulnerabilities, and by comparing those with the constructed models, the adversary's centre of gravity is to be determined (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, p. xx).

The adversary's probable courses of action are to be assessed through the adaptation of a holistic view and an understanding of the adversary's probable intent and future strategy. Based on political, economic, military as well as sociocultural capabilities and characteristics, the task is to identify adversary likely objectives and desired end state. Each developed course of action is to be evaluated, prioritized and ranked according to likely order of adaption (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, pp. xxi-xxii).

Stability, peacekeeping and asymmetrical situations

The main difference between JIPOE efforts during conventional war and stability operations or irregular warfare, is the higher level of detail required and an emphasis on the demographic analysis of the civilian population when assessing stability operations or irregular warfare. Aspects such as society, social structures, culture (identity, beliefs values, attitudes and narratives etc.), power and authority (social capital, economic power etc.) as well as interests (physical security, economy or political participation) are to be taken into consideration. The process still aims at identifying adversary courses of action, but the adversary may to a higher degree be understood as parties, groups or individuals, that may interact with own forces and possibly hamper the accomplishment of the mission (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, pp. IV-1 - IV-13).

2.5.3 Considerations

The military intelligence process is often separate from the planning process it is designed to support, and the output is relatively detailed in terms of products and sub-products to be produced. Rather than striving for general peace or conflict prevention, the ultimate goal of the JIPOE is the success of the force commander's mission, often obtained through the victory over an adversary. The characteristics of the operational environment (conflict context) are factors that affect the military mission, rather than to be affected by it.

2.6 General considerations

According to OECD/DAC, the main features of a conflict analysis consists of a conflict profile, an analysis of conflict causes and potentials for peace, an analysis of actors, and an assessment of the conflicts dynamics and future trends. The conflict profile should contain a description of the political and economic history, as well as the socio-cultural backbround of the conflict. The analysis of causes of the conflict and potentials for peace should involve structural causes, triggers of violence, and factors prolonging or mitigating the conflict. Actors are to be analysed in terms of interests, goals, relations and positions. If possible to distinguish, their aptitude to function as spoilers or promotors of peace should be identified. The assessment of dynamics and future trends should involve scenarios and the identification of possible windows of opportunity (OECD, 2008, p. 29).

Table 1: Comparison of Conflict Analysis approaches

	Sida	**SNDC**	**ICAF**	**JIPOE**
Conflict profile	Yes, but no conflict history or geography	Yes	Yes, but no conflict history or geography	Yes
Conflic causes and potentials for peace	Yes	Limited to analysis of threats	Yes	Limited
Actors	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dynamics and future trends	By scenario analysis	Limited	Limited	Of actors likely courses of action, rather than the conflict

All of the studied models can be considered to more or less meet the criteria for a conflict analysis as outlined by OECD/DAC (See Table 1). While all methods have some limitations in relation to the OECD/DAC conflict analysis criteria, no strong preference has emerged from our analysis.

However, none of the methods are designed as isolated processes, and are rather to be seen as parts of a planning process. The conflict analysis methods can be

considered to mirror the interventional tools available to the planner. They can also be considered to build on the underlying premise, that the interventional tools available to the planner are appropriate in order to handle the problem that initiated the process. Both the ICAF and the Sida Manual for conflict analysis emphasize sociological factors such as social identity factors and intra-group tensions. Aspects of peace-building and conflict preventions can be affected through development aid. Military interventions on the other hand, have the propensity to affect actors through threat from or the use of force. The outcome of the JIPOE is a thorough analysis and assessment of actors (adversaries) possible courses of action. According to OECD/DAC, evaluators need not necessarily perform the conflict analysis themselves. Instead, analysis provided by the evaluated intervention (i.e. donor agency) or third party may be used (OECD, 2008, p. 28). As all studied conflict analysis methods has underlying premises, the evaluator may possibly reach the same conclusions as the planner of the intervention, thereby potentially misjudging relevance, or omission to assess unintended consequences of a program or intervention.

As the next step in our research effort, we will investigate one of these methods on a specific case study.

3 Evaluation

3.1 Introduction to evaluation approaches

Evaluating interventions in current conflicts has proved to be challenging. Challenges include the complex and rapidly changing environment, the difficulty of understanding impacts and assigning attribution, the lack of clearly stated theories of change and the difficulties of collecting accurate data in the field with an on-going conflict (OECD, 2008).

A *theory of change* answers the question "how do we believe this intervention achieves its objectives?", and is frequently encoded as a results chain, a description on how the *inputs* and *activities* of an intervention will lead to intended *outputs*, then *outcomes* and finally *impacts*. This construct is often used in the description of various evaluation methods (OECD, 2008).

A distinction is made between *summative* and *formative* evaluations, where a formative evaluation is conducted during a project in order to help improve and enhance the project, while a summative evaluation is normally conducted after a project, in order to learn from the project and consider if repeating similar interventions might be of additional merit (Patton, 2008).

Monitoring is usually used to describe a system for more-or-less continuous feed-back to managers and other stakeholders (Patton, 2008).

Different communities of practise use different terms for their evaluative activities. In the military field, the term used most frequently is *assessment*, which commonly denotes continuous feed-back from the field to the commanders (Nilsson P. , 2011), in order to understand the outcomes of the operation. In evaluation terminology, it's perhaps equivalent to a qualified monitoring process.

The various approaches used so far by the military for assessment have not been very effective (Frelin, 2009). Identified issues include the military culture, unstructured data collection, lack of training of personnel working with evaluation and oversimplification (Nilsson P. , 2011; Harriman & Lackenbauer, 2010).

This chapter summarizes a set of evaluation and assessment approaches that are judged to be of interest for practitioners that work in complex conflicts. We look at NATO's Operations Assessment, US DOD Assessment, World Bank Impact Evaluation, OECD/DAC Guidance on evaluation of conflict prevention and peace-building and Developmental Evaluation by Michael Patton. They are all reasonably recent developments, promoted by different communities of practise

such as the military, civilian peace operations, development aid and general evaluation practise.

The specific approaches have been included because they have been judged to be substantially different in approach or known to practitioners in the field. They have been chosen using a maximum variation sampling strategy (Patton, 2002). Each approach has been described based mainly on the documents in which it is published.

There is an on-going debate of the merits of quantitative or qualitative methods in evaluation. While the methods discussed in this chapter usually take a mixed methods approach, which espouses combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, most of the methods in this chapter has a definite focus on one or the other.

3.2 NATO Operations Assessment

3.2.1 Scope

NATO Operations Assessment is described in an interim handbook from January 2011 (NATO, 2011). Operations Assessment is designed to provide a feedback process for determining the effectiveness of NATO operations in dynamic environments. Operations Assessment both determines the progress of tasks and measures the achievement of results. The NATO handbook has identified a requirement for both historic and predictive assessment. Conflicts where NATO is conducting operations are described as being complex, multi-dimensional and asymmetric where changes are constantly happening.

Operations Assessment is conducted by military staffs at all levels of command in NATO. The different responsibilities at different levels of command are detailed in Table 2: Operational Assessment Focus and Responsibilities on Different Levels. The handbook compares Operations Assessment with monitoring and evaluation, but Operations Assessment does not fill the role of an independent evaluation function.

3.2.2 Process

Operations Assessment is conducted in four steps:

a. Designing the assessment and support to planning
b. Developing the data collection plan
c. Data collection and treatment
d. Analysis, interpretations and recommendations

Step a. is conducted when a plan is being made, and in close cooperation with planning staff. In this step, the objectives and effects of the plan are assigned with Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). Measures of Performance (MOP) may also be identified to measure the actions that the planners has identified to achieve the objectives and effects (depending on the level of command).

Step b. details what data needs to be collected, and by what means. The handbook discusses pros and cons of various collection methods, such as surveys, interviews, observation and using military reporting products.

Step c. details various information management issues for assessment data, and how to ensure data quality.

Step d. details how data is to be analysed, mostly be describing various statistical approaches.

Collection and analysis is conducted as the operation progresses, while design and development is reviewed periodically.

Table 2: Operational Assessment Focus and Responsibilities on Different Levels (NATO, 2011)

	Focus and Responsibilities of Operations Assessment			
Level	**Military Considerations**	**Non-Military Considerations**	**Audience / Users**	**Geography**
Strategic	• Achievement of end-state, objectives and effects in strategic military plan • Progress of overall mission and status strategic military assets • Capture of overall Assessments from Operational / Tactical levels • Engagement of internationally recognised subject-matter experts on region	• Achievement in political, economic, civil, social domains in theatre • Achievements of key non-military national government, international, and non-governmental organisations in theatre • Tracking of international organisation's monitoring and evaluation in region (e.g. United Nations reports, World Bank, IMF, OSCE) • Monitoring of key international conditions and situations that may impact upon strategic military mission (e.g. international trade embargos, world oil prices, international public opinion)	• SACEUR / SHAPE • NAC • NATO Nations' Defence Ministries • Operational Level Commander • Host Nation Government • IO/NGO HQs • International Media	• International • Regional • Joint Operation Area (JOA)

Operational	• Achievement of objectives, effects and Decisive Conditions in operational military plan • Capture of assessments from tactical level • Coordination of overall data collection effort • Hiring of external contractors required to support data collection / polling etc.	• Measurement of important aspects in non-military domains that impact on the operational military mission • Achievements of non-military organisations whose goals are specified in the military plan (either through collaborative planning or through estimation)	• Joint Force Commander / JFC • Tactical Commander • SOPG • Local IO / NGO partners • Local host nation government	• Regional • JOA
Tactical	• Achievement of assigned and implied effects or Decisive Conditions as appropriate • Achievement of tasks / actions / mission • Data collection for the tactical / operational level assessments	• Data collection activities as assigned by higher commands	• Tactical Commander • JOPG	• JOA

The main measuring tool of Operations Assessment is the MOE. In the handbook, a MOE is described as follows:

> "An MOE must:
>
> - Describe one system element or relationship of interest.
> - Be observable, such that it is measurable consistently over time
> - Describe how the element is expected to change
> - Be as specific as possible (ensure you are measuring only and exactly what you want).
> - Be sensitive to change in a period of time meaningful to the operation.
> - Be culturally and locally relevant
> - Have an associated Acceptable Condition
>
> Additionally, an MOE should:
>
> - Be reducible to a quantity (as a number, percentage, etc.).
> - Be objective.
> - Be defined in sufficient detail that assessments are produced consistently over time.
> - Cost-effective and not burdensome to the data collectors
> - Have appropriate threshold(s) of success or failure
> - Have an associated Rate of Change"
>
> (NATO, 2011, pp. 3-3)

MOE are normally assigned to objectives and effects, in order to measure how these objectives and effects are accomplished.

MOP are also used in order to measure inputs to the operation.

3.2.3 Considerations

The product of Operations Assessment is typically a briefing to the commander, featuring an assessment based on the MOE and MOP, explaining how the campaign is going, and suggestions for adaptations. Sometimes a written assessment is also produced.

Operations Assessment is placed explicitly in the school of results-based management and performance measurements. (NATO, 2011, pp. 7-26) This inclination is also expressed by how the MOE construct is used, and by

displaying a preference for quantitative measurements. (Qualitative data is also allowed, but are framed within the MOE construct).

3.3 US Military Approaches

3.3.1 Scope

Recent developments in the US Department of Defense view on assessment have been promulgated in new planning manuals for the joint force (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) and the US Army (Department of the Army, 2010). The approaches to assessment they have chosen are quite similar, although the US Army version includes some additional comments and nuances.

The new planning manuals specifically attempt to address planning for military operations in a complex environment, where a military force is expected to face complex challenges and uncertainty. The US Army points out that this complexity makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult, which contributes to the uncertainty of military operations (Department of the Army, 2010, pp. 1-2).

3.3.2 Process

According to the US view, assessment intends "to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, pp. D-1) (The same language is used by the joint force and the US Army). Assessment is conducted by the commander supported by the staff, normally the operations and planning departments supported by the intelligence department.

Assessment is divided into three main activities:

> "(1) Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
>
> "(2) Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
>
> "(3) Recommending or directing action for improvement."
>
> (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, pp. D-2)

The manuals emphasize that assessment is a continuous process that precedes and concludes any operation.

Monitoring is defined as continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring generally includes the sources of information available to a military command, such as the common operational picture and

reports from subordinates as well as using external sources as required by the operation.

Evaluation is defined as using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Criteria, in this context, are MOE and MOP that are used to gauge how the operation is progressing. MOE are intended to measure the attainment of an effect or an objective. There can be more than one MOE per objective or effect. MOE's are, in turn, divided into several indicators.

MOP's are used to measure the accomplishment of actions. In its simplest form, a MOP can be answered with yes or no.

Recommending or directing action is seen as a vital step, assessment is incomplete without acting upon it.

All levels of command are to conduct assessment. JP 5-0 states that "As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed." Combat Assessment, which used to be the main US method for assessment (Frelin, 2009), is now seen as a method for assessment on the tactical level.

The approach for assessing outcomes is using MOE's to measure end-states, objectives and effects, and MOP's to measure task accomplishment. Measures should be relevant, responsive and resourced, according to the manual. While qualitative measures are allowed, quantitative measures are preferred by joint doctrine as they are "less susceptible to subjective interpretation". (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, pp. D-9). Joint doctrine specifically endorses the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments Framework (MPICE) (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010).

The US Army has placed the emphasis a bit differently. They underline the commander's responsibility in conducting assessment, pointing out that the commander has the final responsibility for assessing the operation. They also describe the difficulties in establishing cause and effect in a complex environment, and give equal merit to both quantitative and qualitative indicators, adding that mixed approaches are usually appropriate. They also warn against burdening the organization with a big, formal assessment procedure and big data collection efforts.

3.3.3 Considerations

The product of Assessment is normally a briefing to the commander, featuring an assessment based on the MOE and MOP, explaining how the campaign is going, and suggestions for adaptations. Sometimes a written document is also produced.

Just like NATO Operations Assessment, the current US approach to assessment of military operations is based on the results-based management school of thought, where performance measurements are the key ingredient. While the US Army indicates some differences in emphasis, the basic approach is the same.

3.4 Impact Evaluation

3.4.1 Scope

Impact evaluation, in the sense discussed in this report, is evaluation designed to prove the impact of aid efforts. It's built mainly on the work conducted at the World Bank. The aim of impact evaluation is to show what kind of aid programmes actually has an impact on poverty (White, 2007).

3.4.2 Process

Impact evaluation employs experimental or quasi-experimental designs on actual aid projects. The ideal impact evaluation will establish a baseline before a project is initiated, randomly select project participants from those individuals or groups eligible to take part, establish a control group from another set of eligible individuals or groups in order to understand the counterfactual, measure the outcomes while the project is underway and then establish the impact by making a final comparison with the participants and the control group some time (years) after the project is finished. A full impact evaluation is thus always a summative evaluation. Data gathering is normally done with surveys. By its very nature, impact evaluation is normally conducted by independent evaluation experts. At the same time, for these ideal conditions to apply, impact evaluation has to be part of the project design from the outset.

Impact evaluation can still be conducted if not all of these conditions apply. Baselines can be established based on personal recall, and there are statistical methods to compensate for some of the problems that occur if the project participants or control groups cannot be selected randomly.

Another focus in World Bank approach on impact evaluation is the theory of change. All steps in causal chain from inputs to impacts are evaluated. (White, 2006)

While the focus of impact evaluation is quantitative randomly controlled trials, the World Bank recommends mixed method designs in order to get a full picture of an aid project.

The following requirements need to be fulfilled for conducting an impact evaluation: (White, 2006)

- Contamination of the control group must be avoided. “Contamination” means that participants in the control group “accidentally” reap the benefits from the aid programme being evaluated, or from other aid programmes. The activities of another aid agency can thus destroy the validity of the experiment.
- There has to be a reasonable number of participants so that statistical methods can be applied to both the project participants and the control group. Participants in aid projects are usually communities, small companies or individuals. If this condition is not met, the World Bank recommends “careful qualitative analysis” instead.
- The full attribution of causes and effects are only possible after a project has been concluded, thus impact evaluation is of limited use for assisting an on-going operation.
- Impact evaluation is relatively costly, so reasonably it can only be conducted on a select number of subjects that are thought to contribute to policy-relevant knowledge.

3.4.3 Considerations

The product of impact evaluation is normally a summative written report, describing the impact of the project as the evaluation team has discovered them.

The focus of impact evaluation is rigorous quantitative experimental designs, while the requirement to complement this approach with qualitative methods is acknowledged.

3.5 OECD/DAC Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Activities

3.5.1 Scope

In 2008, OECD published guidance on evaluation of conflict prevention and peace-building (CPPB) activities (OECD, 2008). The guidance is still a working draft for trial use. Its purpose is to assist in understanding the effects of the increased amount of aid resources that are spent on peace-building efforts, and to learn more on what does and does not work, and why.

The OECD points out that most contemporary conflicts takes place within states, and that they have mainly civilian victims, as well as serious negative impacts on development. They note that “Whole of government” approaches have been

launched as a donor strategy to address these kinds of challenges, though big challenges remain in working coherently across government agencies. Occasionally, ill-designed aid projects have increased tensions and restrained capacities for peace. The OECD also notes that there is comparatively little evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of conflict prevention and peace-building activities. Challenges to effective evaluation include conducting evaluations in a complex, rapidly changing environment with high risks to human life, lack of stated theories of change, differences in cultures and terminologies among actors in conflict areas as well as the difficulty of understanding impacts and assigning attribution.

3.5.2 Process

The OECD is flexible regarding the choice of methods for the evaluation. Quantitative and qualitative methods can be used as it suits the conflict and the programme being evaluated. The purpose of the evaluation must guide the choice of methods, if the evaluation is conducted by internal or external evaluators and whether it's a formative or summative evaluation. Another important issue is to determine the scope of the evaluation, from a system-wide effort to evaluate all programmes being launched in a specific conflict setting to an evaluation of a single project by a single agency.

The main tools for evaluations in conflict setting that the OECD suggests are:

- In order to understand the context of the conflict the programme is designed to affect, a conflict analysis is required. The conflict analysis is an important tool for understanding the relevance and impact of the programme.
- Another important tool for understanding a programme is to find the theory of change behind it. A theory of change answers the question: how do we think our programme will reach its stated objectives? Experience shows that theories of change are sometimes not stated explicitly, which means the evaluators have to identify and formulate them.
- Programmes are judged using several criteria. OECD has previously identified 5 criteria for aid evaluation (relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency), which have been re-interpreted for use in conflict prevention and peace-building field. In addition, the report suggests that new criteria are added in this field: coherence, linkages, coverage and consistency with values.

3.5.3 Considerations

In conclusion, the OECD Guidance is more of an evaluation framework than an evaluation method. It requires design of specific methods for specific evaluations.

The product of an evaluation conducted according to this guidance is normally an evaluation report, which can be either formative or summative.

During the trial period several evaluations have been launched to test the framework; FOI has contributed one of them. (Derblom, Frelin, Lindén, Nilsson, & Tejpar, 2009). The conclusions on the OECD framework from that evaluation have been documented by Nilsson & Derblom (2011). The overall conclusions from the trial period were discussed at a workshop in Oslo on 16-17 February 2011. (OECD, 2011)

At the time of writing, the trial period of this framework should be over and a final version of the Guidance published, but the authors are not aware of a final edition.

3.6 Developmental Evaluation

3.6.1 Scope

Developmental Evaluation has been devised by Michael Patton in order to address evaluations in conditions of complexity (Patton, 2011). “Developmental” in this context implies that a programme must ‘develop’, or change, in order to adapt to an unpredictable and ever-changing environment. Developments are not necessarily “improvements”, it implies all types of adaptions a programme must do in order to survive and prosper. Developmental evaluation is conducted to help a programme develop in this type of circumstances.

Patton distinguishes between simple, complicated and complex situations, where complex situations are characterised by uncertainty both in cause-effect linkages, and what outcomes are desirable in the first place. Stakeholders may simply not agree on how the situation “should be”. Complex situations are thus characterised by high uncertainty and high social conflict.

In this type of situation, formulating counterfactuals is meaningless, according to Patton, as there are too many variables that may affect outcomes. Cause and effects can occasionally be identified provisionally by abductive reasoning. Methodological flexibility and eclecticism are important traits in the developmental evaluator. A developmental evaluator will be in close collaboration with the intervention team, in order to shape the evaluation as the intervention progresses and to facilitate evaluative thinking and learning.

3.6.2 Process

Patton suggests no specific method for developmental evaluation, the methods has to be continuously adapted to evaluation purpose and changing situation. Mixed methods, using indices flexibly, network mapping, capturing perspectives from key actors and identifying uncertainties may be helpful approaches.

Instead of focusing on methods, the main focus should be on what questions should be answered, according to Patton. In order to help the evaluator identify relevant questions, Patton suggests 10 ‘inquiry frameworks’, each framework including a specific set of questions.

Patton is focused on non-governmental, non-profit users, both nationally and internationally, who frequently face this type of circumstances, and has a high requirement to adapt or perish.

3.6.3 Considerations

Developmental evaluation then is not so much a method as another framework for evaluation, an alternative to summative or formative evaluation, where the actual methods must be added and adapted. What developmental evaluation provides is a specific perspective on complexity that must permeate all evaluation activities.

The product of developmental evaluation is normally continuous advice to programme management, providing knowledge and suggestions for action. In a way, developmental evaluation can be seen as flexible, multifaceted approach to monitoring.

There’s a distinct similarity between Patton’s conceptualisation of complexity and the “puzzles, problems and messes” construct used by operational analysis (Pidd, 1996). Some ideas from operational analysis may thus be useful additions to developmental evaluation.

3.7 Discussion on evaluation methods

The evaluation methods presented here can be divided into three broad categories:

- Operational Assessment (NATO) and Assessment (US) are essentially results-based management methods using quantitative performance measures.
- Impact evaluation is a quantitative experimental method with the aspiration to actually prove cause-effect relationships.

- Developmental evaluation (Patton) and the guidance on evaluation of CPPB activities (OECD) are broad evaluation frameworks that have to be complemented with other methods to suit the actual application. The viewpoint of the two frameworks is substantially different, though there's no reason they couldn't be combined.

3.7.1 Issues with performance measurement

The military assessment methods (US and NATO) are both relatively recent, and should most likely be seen as attempts at fixing the well-known problems that has permeated prior military attempts at assessing the outcomes of military operations (Frelin, 2009) and focus, as noted above, on using performance measures. Results-based management and performance indicators are also part of the OECD guidance on CPPB evaluation (OECD, 2008, Annex 3). Performance measures are indicated as a central approach to CPPB monitoring. Unlike the military approaches, however, the OECD guidance does not focus on performance measures as the main approach to evaluation.

There are good reasons to be sceptical of the utility of monitoring with a performance measures approach. There are strong indications that the attempts to measure the performance of organisations in this quantitative fashion do not deliver the sought benefits, while incurring some perverse side-effects, for example (Lindgren, 2008; Woxblom, Holgersson, & Dolmén, 2008):

- Measuring what can be measured
- Creative bookkeeping
- Goal substitution, where the measures become objectives
- Innovation is stifled
- Decrease in professionalism of staff

As far as we can determine in this theoretical study, the likely outcome of employing these methods as they are described in the manuals is that not much discernible improvement of assessment takes place, while there is a risk that perverse side-effects will also affect the organisations using them.

Impact evaluation is also based on the results-based management approach, but focuses instead on experimental designs (White, 2006) (rather than day-to-day gathering of performance measures). While experimental designs may be victims of some of the same challenges that seem to occur with performance measure approaches, there are some alleviating factors. Firstly, by its experimental design, impact evaluation will be substantially higher in validity and reliability than the performance measure approaches. Secondly, impact evaluation can only be completed after a programme is finished, which means it can't be used to support

the day-to-day management of the programme in the same sense as performance measures. The designers of impact evaluation themselves makes the note the quantification without sufficient reliability and validity is pointless: “Better no numbers than silly numbers.” (White, 2006).

In order to conduct impact evaluation, a sufficient number of beneficiaries are required for statistical analysis. In conflict situations, many of the critical effects that are sought by the intervention are aimed at singular actors (both connectors and dividers), and thus not amenable for statistical analysis. In those cases, the World Bank analysts recommend “careful qualitative analysis” instead (White, 2006).

3.7.2 Implications of complexity for evaluation

Complexity is mentioned as an important condition of the environment in all of the discussed evaluation approaches except impact evaluation. The NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NATO, 2011) mentions “understanding of complex situations, including the interrelationship of different political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) domains” and complex problems. In addition, the Operations Assessment Handbook points out that:

> “complex, multi-dimensional and asymmetric military operations of today and of the future, ‘success’ is becoming increasingly hard to define”

The handbook also notes that “The strategic engagement space is a complex, interdependent system of systems” and that:

> “Current thinking in academia on statistical theory and assessment of complex programs is of the view that causality is extremely challenging to infer, in all but the simplest of cases”

JP5-0 mentions complex challenges and complex problems and points out that operations will face “ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment”. Complexity is addressed by involving the commander in the process, and by “defining the essence of a complex, ill-defined problem”. JP 5-0 also notices that causes of effect can be difficult to predict (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).

The OECD mentions a “complex, rapidly changing environment” and notes that the conflict field faces problems of complexity and attribution. The OECD also notes challenges concerning the “complex interface of development, diplomacy, defence, trade and finance”. In order to address this complexity, the OECD endorses mixed-method approaches (OECD, 2008).

The most in-depth discussion on complexity is the one in Developmental evaluation (Patton, 2011). As noted above, Patton distinguishes between simple, complicated and complex (and sometimes chaotic) situations, where complex situations are characterised by uncertainty both in what causes will have what effects, and what outcome is desirable in the first place. Complex situations are thus characterised by high uncertainty and high social conflict. According to Patton, the hierarchy of complexity can be described in this fashion:

- Simple situations are characterised by cause-and-effect relationships that are repeatable, perceivable and predictable. Best practises and standard operating procedures are possible.
- Complicated situations are characterised by cause-and-effects that are separated over time and space, systems analysis and systems thinking are appropriate.
- Complex situations are characterised by cause-and-effects that are coherent only in retrospect and do not repeat, complex adaptive systems and pattern management.
- Chaotic situations are characterised by no perceivable cause-and-effects, crises management approaches and seeking stability.

This hierarchy of complexity is similar to the one used as a hierarchy of problems by operational analysis (NATO, forthcoming), where the levels are known as puzzles, problems and messes. This hierarchy is used for planning rather evaluation, but many of the challenges are similar.

According to this understanding of complexity, the performance measure approach that predominates in the reviewed military assessment methods does not seem to address the challenges that complexity present, apart from the other issues with performance measure approaches noted above. Also, complexity makes it very hard to maintain the preconditions for successful impact evaluation (see section 3.4).

Thus, the evaluation approaches that seem to hold the most promise for the evaluation of interventions in complex conflicts are the OECD CPPB evaluation framework and Developmental Evaluation. The other approaches are assessed to be less suitable for complex conflicts.

4 Conclusions

All the described methods for conflict analysis can be used for an evaluation of an intervention in a complex conflict. Initially, our aim was to be able to identify a preference in this report, but through the theoretical approach taken here, we were not able to establish a significant difference between between them. The choice of conflict analysis method depends on the nature of the intervention being evaluated, as well as what aspect of the conflict mechanisms the evaluation will emphasize. As all the studied conflict analysis methods are based on different theoretical frameworks, the choice of conflict analysis method will frame how questions of relevance and sustainability will be answered, and thus the evaluation results will depend on what conflict analysis method is chosen.

Of the evaluation/assessment approaches, the military methods based the results-based management/performance measures approach unfortunately seems to show limited theoretical promise of improving the quality of military assessment. Their validity and reliability are assessed to be limited, and there are good reasons to suspect that performance measure approaches incur negative side-effects on the organisation using them.

Impact evaluation should have a higher degree of validity and reliability than the military assessment methods by its experimental design, but we assess that the preconditions for conducting impact evaluation are unlikely to occur in a complex conflict setting. The actors that the interventions intend to affect are often too few in number to permit statistical analysis, or it may not be possible to create a control group (a spoiler may intentionally affect the control group for instance).

This means that the quantitative evaluation approaches discussed in this report seem to fit less well for interventions in complex conflicts. This doesn't mean that all quantitative approaches will be unusable, but that any quantitative approach has to be carefully designed to fulfil the requirements of a complex conflict.

Thus, the OECD-DAC framework and Developmental evaluation seems to provide better approaches for evaluation activities in complex conflicts. Both these approaches are frameworks rather than specific methods; they need to be complemented with other methods.

5 Further work

- In order to further understand the implications of the various conflict analysis methods discussed in this report, we will test a number of them as support to upcoming evaluations.
- As we have already tested using the OECD/DAC Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building activities, the most interesting approach to test in a further study is Developmental Evaluation.

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