Weak states are often considered a major threat to human and international security and can serve as safe havens for armed groups, terrorists and criminals. International support to security sector reform (SSR), aims to both improve the security of the people living within the state and to counter threats to global peace and security. While reforms of the security sector are an important component of the international community's peace-building strategies, it has proven challenging to undertake SSR in weak post-war states.

Through an in-depth analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic this report highlights challenges to implementing SSR in weak post-war states. Based on previous research, a number of factors and their impact on SSR, are scrutinised to enhance the understanding of challenges to SSR in this context.

Willing and Able?

Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States – Insights from the Central African Republic

Gabriella Ingerstad

Gabriella Ingerstad

Willing and Able?

Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States

– Insights from the Central African Republic

Cover: Gabriella Ingerstad

Sammanfattning

Säkerhetssektorreform (SSR) utgör idag en integrerad del av det internationella samfundets arbete för att skapa fred och säkerhet i svaga post-konfliktstater. Reformer av säkerhetssektorn har emellertid visat sig svåra att genomföra i den typen av miljöer. En mängd olika faktorer försvårar möjligheten att skapa säkerhetsstyrkor som kan tillgodose befolkningens behov av säkerhet.

Baserat på tidigare forskning belyser denna rapport några centrala utmaningar för SSR i svaga post-konfliktstater. Genom en analys av reformer av säkerhetssektorn i Centralafrikanska republiken visar studien att informella maktstrukturer, en instabil säkerhetssituation och otillräcklig förståelse för hur andra politiska processer inverkar på SSR, negativt påverkar möjligheterna att genomföra effektiva SSR-insatser. Vidare visar analysen att svag kapacitet och avsaknad av politisk vilja hos mottagarlandets regering är en utmaning för lokalt ägarskap och hållbara reformer. Trots en sektorsövergripande ansats och fokus på både effektivisering och demokratisering av säkerhetssektorn, har ett bristande internationellt engagemang, otillräckliga resurser, avsaknad av strategisk inriktning och bristfällig samordning mellan givarna, resulterat i att möjligheterna att genomföra reformer av säkerhetssektorn begränsats.

Nyckelord: Centralafrika, Centralafrikanska republiken, säkerhetssektorreform, SSR, Afrika, afrikansk säkerhet, svaga stater, fredsbyggande, kapacitetsbyggnad, lokalt ägarskap, sektorsövergripande angreppssätt

Summary

Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral part of the international community's efforts to build peace and enhance security in weak post-war states. It has, however, proven difficult to undertake SSR in such contexts. A number of factors constitute a challenge to create security forces that are able to provide security to the population.

Based on previous research, this report highlights some of the challenges to SSR in weak post-war states. Through an analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic, this study shows that informal power structures, a volatile security situation and failure to understand how SSR is influenced by other political processes, negatively impact on the prospect for successful implementation of reforms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that weak capacity and lack of political will on behalf of the national government, is a challenge to local ownership and sustainable reforms. Despite a holistic approach to reforms aiming to improve both the capacity of the security forces and to increase democratic control of the security institutions, insufficient international engagement, scarce resources, lack of strategic direction and inadequate donor coordination have limited the prospect for implementation of reforms.

Keywords: Central Africa, Central African Republic, CAR, security sector reform, SSR, DDR, Africa, African security, weak states, peacebuilding, capacity building, local ownership, holistic approach

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

APRD	Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie
AU	African Union
BINUCA	Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine
BONUCA	Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale
CPJP	Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix
CS RSS	Comité sectoriel de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRP	Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
FACA	Forces armées centrafricaines
FDPC	Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency
FOMUC	Force multinationale en Centrafrique
FPR	Front populaire pour le redressement
IGO	International Governmental Organisation
IPD	Inclusive Political Dialogue
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

MICOPAX	Mission de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine
MINURCA	Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine
MINURCAT	Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad
MISAB	Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui
MLCJ	Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development the Development Assistance Committee
OIF	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
PBC	UN Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
RSS	Réforme du secteur de sécurité
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIU	Security Institutions Unit
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STP	Secrétariat technique permanent
UFR	Union des forces républicaines
UFDR	Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN SGSR	United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative

Map of the Central African Republic

Source: UN, (2011), *Central African Republic,* Map No. 4048, Rev.4, United Nations, November 2011, Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section.

A Chronology of Historical Key Events

1884   France names the territory Oubangui-Chari.

1889   France establishes a post on the Oubangui River.

1903   Colonised by France.

1910   The territory enters into the Federation of French Equatorial Africa.

1946   The territory is granted a National Assembly and representation in the French National Assembly.

1958   The territory is granted autonomy within the federation and changes name to the Central African Republic (CAR). Barthélemy Boganda becomes prime minister but dies in a plane crash the year after.

1960   The CAR is granted independence on August 13. David Dacko becomes president and wins the presidential election as the only candidate in 1964.

1966   Chief of Army Staff, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, seizes power in a military coup.

1977   Bokassa declares himself emperor of the Central African Empire.

1979   The French army intervenes and reinstate Dacko as president.

1981   In March, Dacko wins the first multiparty presidential elections held in the country. Chief of Army Staff, André Kolingba, takes power in a bloodless coup in September.

1982   Failed coup attempt by Ange-Félix Patassé and François Bozizé.

1986   Constitutional referendum, Kolingba automatically becomes president for a period of six years.

1993   Multiparty legislative and presidential elections are held for the first time since 1981. Kolingba loses the presidential election to Patassé.

1996-1997   A series of army mutinies take place due to salary arrears, bad working conditions and ethnic manipulations.

1997   France launches a military operation against the mutineers. The Bangui Accords are signed and the *Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui* (MISAB) peacekeeping force arrives.

1998   France closes its army bases in the CAR. The *Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine* (MINURCA) replaces MISAB. Legislative multiparty elections are held.

1999   Patassé is re-elected as president in September.

2001   Failed coup attempt by Kolingba and army mutineers.

2001-2002   Bozizé, former Army Chief of Staff, revolts. *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique* (FOMUC) peacekeeping force arrives.

2003   Patassé is ousted by Bozizé. France re-establishes military bases with the deployment of the Boali detachment.

2004   A new constitution is approved in a referendum.

2005   Bozizé wins the presidential election. A series of rebellions take place in the northern parts of the country.

2008   *Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad* (MINURCAT) peacekeeping force and European Union Force (EUFOR) Tchad/RCA are deployed in the north-east. FOMUC is replaced by the *Mission de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine* (MICOPAX) peacekeeping force. The government and the majority of the rebel groups sign the Libreville Peace Agreement.

2011   Bozizé wins the presidential election and his party, Kwa Na Kwa, secures a majority in the National Assembly.

2012   Disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants resume and the only remaining politico-military group to join the peace process, *Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix* (CPJP), signs the Libreville Peace Agreement.

1 Introduction

Weak states are often considered a major threat to human and international security as these ungoverned territories can serve as safe havens for armed groups, terrorists and criminals. International support to security sector reform (SSR) in weak post-war states[1] often aims to both improve the security of those living within the territory of the affected state and to counter threats to global peace and security.[2]

The objective of SSR is to improve the governance of the security sector through effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control.[3] The aim is to ensure that the security sector is able to meet the security needs of both the state and its population.[4] In post-war societies, SSR includes a third objective, namely to contribute to the overarching goal of peacebuilding.[5]

Over the last decade, reforms of the security sector have been undertaken in a number of weak war-torn states in Africa and elsewhere. SSR is often a part of internationally supported post-conflict reconstruction and has been used as a strategy to prevent conflicts and consolidate peace since the 1990s.[6]

While the opportunities for SSR have proven to be beneficial in post-authoritarian and developmental contexts,[7] prospects for implementation of SSR in weak post-war states have often been poor.[8] The two-fold objective of SSR: to improve the capacity of the security sector *and* to enhance democratic governance of the security institutions, is particularly challenging in weak post-war states since the state institutions often lack both legitimacy and capacity.[9]

On the African continent, the international community has supported SSR in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sierra

---

[1] In this report weak state is used instead of the more common concepts fragile, failing or failed states. The term *weak post-war state* is used together with *weak war-torn state* and *weak state emerging from war,* to describe states with both a capacity gap and a security gap, where all conflicts are not yet resolved and organised violence still occurs, although major warfare has stopped. These definitions are based on Call (2011) and Jarstad (2008) p. 30, footnote 3.

[2] Andersen (2006).

[3] DCAF (2009a).

[4] Andersen (2006).

[5] Hänggi (2005) pp. 30-33.

[6] Bagayoko (2008); Brzoska (2006) p. 1.

[7] Post-authoritarian refers primarily to post-communist contexts where the key reform objective is democratisation. Developmental refers to relatively stable developing countries where the key reform objective is development. Post-war contexts refer to countries engaged in rebuilding the state after violent conflict and the key reform objective is peacebuilding.

[8] Hänggi (2005) pp. 29-30.

[9] Bryden & Olonisakin (2010); Hänggi (2005).

Leone, only to mention a few.[10] The results have been mixed, which has led to discussions about particular challenges to SSR in African countries.[11]

To illustrate such challenges, the Central African Republic (CAR) provides an interesting case study for three main reasons. First of all, the SSR process in the CAR can serve as a microcosm of the holistic SSR concept, since reforms not only involve the police and military but also include aspects of democratic control, rule of law and good governance.[12]

Secondly, the CAR is a typical example of a weak post-war state. Since a multiparty system was established in 1993, the CAR has been ravaged by internal conflicts, mutinies and military coups. Between 1993 and 2002, democracy survived, barely, and the period was characterised by high levels of instability.[13] Following a *coup d'état* in 2003, rebellions broke out in large parts of the country. Despite the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the majority of the rebel groups in 2008/2009, the state security forces are unable to exert control over the territory, where armed groups operate freely.[14] The country is ranked as one of the least developed and most unstable countries in the world and the government fails to provide even the most basic services to the population.[15] The CAR has been described as a phantom state, which lacks any substantial institutional capacity.[16]

Finally, SSR in the CAR was launched in 2008 but after less than two years of implementation the process stalled and was blocked during 2010 and 2011, only to be re-launched in the beginning of 2012.[17] Hence, the SSR process in the CAR provides a good case study to understand what challenges the implementation of SSR can encounter in weak post-war states.

Consequently, the findings from this study can be used to identify possible pitfalls and challenges to SSR and security sector capacity building in other weak states emerging from war, in particular in the African context. As such, the results can hopefully inform future decisions on how to provide support to SSR in countries like the DRC, Niger, Somalia and South Sudan.

---

[10] For an overview of external support to SSR projects in Africa see Bendix & Stanley (2008) pp. 40-51.

[11] Bryden & Olonisakin (2010).

[12] See chapter 2 for an elaborated description of the holistic approach.

[13] Mehler (2005).

[14] Amnesty International (2011).

[15] Ibid; Fund for Peace (2012); UNDP Human Development Index, (2011).

[16] International Crisis Group (2007).

[17] CS RSS (2012); STP/SIU BINUCA (2012a).

1.1 Aim, Method and Delimitations

This study has been produced within the Swedish Defence Research Agency's (FOI) Studies in African Security Programme and is part of a broader effort at FOI to study SSR and capacity building within the security sector. A number of studies and reviews of previous research on SSR and security sector capacity building have been undertaken at FOI. Based on literature reviews and interviews with practitioners and scholars, several challenges to SSR and capacity building have been identified.[18] This report provides a second case study in which these findings are used as a framework for analysis.[19] Findings from previous research at FOI serve as a basis for the analysis. To develop this analytical framework, some additional factors from previous research on challenges to SSR in weak post-war states are also examined.

The aim of this study is to examine which factors that can explain why the implementation of SSR stalled in the CAR. Findings from previous research are used to analyse challenges to implementation of SSR in the country. Using the CAR as an illustrative example, the purpose is to further enhance the understanding of challenges to SSR and security sector capacity building in weak states emerging from war.

In this study, the broader efforts to reconstruct the security sector in the CAR are considered. However, the main focus of the analysis is on the security forces and their supporting institutions. Hence, reforms of the judiciary and other institutions, which are a part of the SSR process in the CAR, are mentioned briefly but not analysed. The state security forces in the CAR comprise the military (including the presidential guard), the gendarmerie, the national police, the municipal police, border and custom guards, and the environment protection agency. However, the main focus of the study is on the military, the gendarmerie and the national police. Institutions such as the parliament and government ministries are also examined. The analysis is mainly focused on the period 2008-2012. The reason for this is that the current SSR process was initiated in April 2008, which serves as a natural starting point for the analysis.

1.2 Material and Sources

The study is based on primary and secondary sources. A large part of the material was collected in Bangui, the capital of the CAR, between August and November 2011. These primary sources consist of some 30 interviews with national and international stakeholders, official and unpublished documents, and

---

[18] See Nilsson & Svensson (2010) and Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011).

[19] A case study of capacity building of the security sector in Kosovo was published in 2011, see Skeppström & Weibull (2011).

observations from meetings and seminars. The material gathered in the field was complemented by email correspondence upon completion. Secondary sources such as academic articles, IOG/NGO-reports and news reports have also been used. All interviewees are anonymous when referred to in the text. However, a complete list of conducted interviews is provided in the references.

1.3 Outline

Next chapter, **chapter 2**, starts with an introduction to the concepts of SSR and capacity building including an introduction to some of the critique of the concepts. The chapter also includes a presentation of findings from previous research on SSR and capacity building in weak post-war states. These findings are presented as a number of factors which are thought to impact on the implementation of SSR. The factors serve as an analytical framework for the analysis in chapter 4.

Chapter 3 provides a background to the current SSR process through an introduction to the recent political history of the CAR and the armed conflicts in the country. The chapter also includes a brief presentation of the current SSR process and a summary of its outputs and outcomes since 2008.

In **chapter 4**, the SSR process is analysed based on the analytical framework presented in chapter 2. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of challenges to implementation of holistic SSR in the CAR.

The conclusions from the study are presented in **chapter 5**. In this chapter, the results from the study are also discussed in relation to previous research and challenges to SSR in weak post-war states more broadly.

2 Security Sector Reform and Capacity Building

This chapter provides an introduction to the concepts of SSR and capacity building. Definition of the concepts are followed by a summary of some of the critique put forward by scholars and practitioners. Following this, previously identified challenges to implementation of SSR in weak post-war states are presented. These factors comprise the analytical framework used in chapter 4.

2.1 The Concepts and their Critique

SSR[20] is derived from the concept of human security. As such, the referent object is individuals, not states.[21] The concept of SSR was originally introduced by policy-makers from the development community who attempted to bridge the gap between development and security.[22] It was later developed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) in the *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, which has served as a basis for most donor strategies on SSR. According to the OECD, SSR should be people-centred and guided by assessments of the security and justice needs of the people and the state.[23]

Some of the activities associated with SSR are not new. The aim of the concept is, however, to bring together all concerned actors and provide a holistic approach to reforms of the security institutions.[24] A holistic approach means that the security sector is understood in a broad sense comprising not only core security actors, such as the military and police, but also border guards, the judiciary, government ministries, parliament, civil society, media and non-state security forces, such as militias, vigilantes and rebel groups.[25] SSR is frequently used as a means to promote democratic governance of the state security institutions while also improving the capacities of those institutions to provide security to the population.[26]

---

[20] It is beyond the scope of this study to go deeper into discussions about the concept. It is worth to note, however, that a number of overlapping concepts have emerged in the SSR discourse over the years. SSR can refer to security *sector* reform or security *system* reform. Other variations are security sector *development*, *management*, *reconstruction* and *transformation*.

[21] The concept 'Human Security' was introduced by the UNDP in 1994. See UNDP (1994).

[22] Albrecht & Buur (2009).

[23] OECD-DAC (2007) pp. 21-22.

[24] Egnell & Haldén (2009) p. 30.

[25] DCAF (2009a).

[26] Schnabel (2009) p. 9.

Strengthening the capacity of the security forces is not in itself the objective of SSR as it does not guarantee that democratic norms, sound principles of governance, transparency and rule of law will be respected.[27] However, capacity building is a central part of SSR and crucial in weak states as the capacity of the state institutions *per se* is low. The concept capacity building is subject to multiple interpretations and can encompass different meanings, also within the narrower field of security sector capacity building.[28] In this study, capacity building is defined as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. It comprises building capacity of the security forces and its supporting institutions, including strengthening civilian capabilities.[29]

In previous research, the holistic SSR approach has been criticised for being too ambitious and scholars argue that the goal of creating states that are at the same time stable, democratic and accountable is extremely difficult, at least in weak states emerging from war.[30] In weak post-war states, the state is seldom the main provider of security, it has low capacity and its structure is very different to that of the modern Western[31] state.[32] Although these are exactly the kinds of problems that SSR is meant to address, reforms may be problematic in weak states emerging from war as the state institutions – including the state security forces – often lack legitimacy.[33] Scholars argue that the state-centric approach of SSR rests upon two fallacies in weak post-war states: that the state is *capable* of delivering security and justice, and that it is the *main actor* in security and justice.[34] Although the OECD emphasises the importance of engaging both state and non-state actors – such as informal security providers – donors tend to fall back on state-centric approaches in practice and in most cases the local counterpart is the national government.[35] In the African context, this is particularly problematic since the main providers of security and justice in sub-Saharan Africa are informal actors.[36] SSR programmes, on the contrary, are often based on the assumptions that the state institutions *should* provide security, that those institutions are *legitimate* and that the ruling elite is *willing* to protect the population. These assumptions are, according to Alan Bryden and 'Funmi Olonisakin, flawed in many cases in Africa.[37]

---

[27] Skeppström & Weibull (2011) p. 8.
[28] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 9-10.
[29] This definition is based on Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 9-12.
[30] Egnell & Haldén (2009).
[31] Modern Western state refers here to the Weberian understanding of the state. See Egnell & Haldén (2009) pp. 34-36.
[32] Andersen, Moller & Stepputat (eds.), (2007); Baker & Scheye (2007); Egnell & Haldén (2009).
[33] Baker (2009); Nathan (2008) p. 2.
[34] Baker & Scheye (2007).
[35] Albrecht & Buur (2009); Nilsson & Svensson (2010) p. 33; OECD-DAC (2007) p. 22.
[36] Baker & Scheye (2007).
[37] Bryden & Olonisakin (2010) pp. 11-16.

2.2 A Framework for Analysis

In addition to this critique of the SSR concept and its applicability in weak post-war states, previous research has identified a number of challenges to implementation of holistic SSR in weak states emerging from war.

- **Training and Equipping vs. Institution Building**

The first challenge is the question of training and equipping versus institution building. For an activity to be labelled SSR it must, in addition to capacity building, include aspects of good governance and democratic control.[38] Nevertheless, a more narrow focus on the military sector at the expense of democratic governance has often been the norm in practice, resulting in a marginalisation of other sectors and institutions such as the judiciary and the parliament.[39] The main problem with neglecting sectors responsible for the rule of law and democratic control, is that the long term impact on security may be undermined and that the sustainability of reforms is jeopardised.[40] The idea that long-term security and justice reforms are only possible when a certain level of stability is attained, often results in an emphasis on equipping and training the security forces at the expense of holistic SSR.[41] Whereas it is crucial to strengthen the capacity of the security forces in weak war torn states, such a narrow focus may undermine security in the long run.[42] To support capacity building of the security institutions in cases when the government lacks legitimacy may even exacerbate internal tensions and add to grievances that can trigger conflicts.[43]

Institution building, i.e. to build efficient and transparent governance structures, is a complex task since every nation has its own governance tradition and history which have to be taken into account.[44] Reforming the security institutions is a sensitive business as it touches upon the very core of a state's sovereignty.[45] In many African societies, governance is exercised through complex webs of informal networks outside the formal state structures. Often these informal networks are used by formal and informal actors to consolidate power. As a result, the formal state structures may become a mere shadow image of the informal realities.[46]

---

[38] Nilsson & Svensson (2010) p. 20.

[39] Ibid. p. 21.

[40] Skeppström & Weibull (2011) pp. 10, 12.

[41] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) p. 38.

[42] Ibid. pp. 35-38.

[43] Ibid. pp. 15-16.

[44] Ibid. p. 39.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Jörgel & Utas (2007).

- **Local Ownership**

The second challenge, which is at the core of SSR, is that of local ownership, i.e. that national actors control the process. It has been suggested that local ownership is crucial to the successful implementation of SSR, as it is thought to enhance the legitimacy and the sustainability of reforms.[47] It has been argued that reforms must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors.[48] This has however proven challenging. Although it is desirable that local partners are involved from the outset to identify priorities, low capacity, uncertain power configurations and unstable security situations may hinder full local ownership at an early stage.[49] SSR is a political process which does not take place in a political vacuum; both local and external interests influence the SSR process.[50] It is therefore essential to identify key actors in the country.[51] In weak post-war states, however, it may be difficult to find individuals or organisations that have both capacity and will to drive the process forward.[52] It has been suggested that at least some minimal institutional and human capacity must exist for SSR to be implemented.[53]

The term 'local' can refer to a broad spectrum of actors ranging from national authorities to civil society.[54] When the local counterpart is the national government, it may even have a negative impact on implementation of SSR.[55] The norms of SSR and democratic governance often challenge the leadership and power structures that the affected government rests upon.[56] Nevertheless, national political will has proven critical for implementation of SSR; at least some members of the government must want to reform the security sector for implementation to happen.[57] This creates a paradox where those that are meant to implement reforms might have no interest in doing so.[58]

Local ownership is further complicated in weak states emerging from war as the national government is dependent on foreign support to plan and carry out reforms. While donors are reluctant to fund projects they have not approved, the recipient country often rejects externally imposed programmes.[59] This dilemma is a challenge to local ownership in practice.

---

[47] Donais (2008) p. 3.
[48] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) p. 24.
[49] Ibid. p. 25.
[50] Sedra (2010a) p. 20.
[51] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 25-26.
[52] Nilsson & Svensson (2010) p. 33.
[53] Sedra (2010b) p. 106.
[54] Donais (2008).
[55] Nilsson & Svensson (2010) pp. 33-35.
[56] Ibid.; Sedra (2010b).
[57] Nathan (2008) p. 23.
[58] Egnell & Haldén (2009) p. 32.
[59] Skeppström & Weibull (2011) p. 9.

- **A Volatile Security Environment**

The volatile security situation in weak post-war states provides an additional explanation as to why the government may be reluctant to undertake reforms that enhance democratic governance of the security forces. It has been argued that reforms that aim to enhance democratic control of the armed forces can only be pursued in the absence of violent conflict and that a country's security situation is connected to, and is as important as, the will of relevant actors to undertake such reforms.[60] On-going violent conflicts and an unstable external security environment can disrupt SSR.[61] SSR is a long-term process that addresses the structural causes of insecurity.[62] In weak post-war states, however, the priority of the government is often survival, not long-term projects to build institutional capabilities.[63] The threat from armed groups is often an obstacle to implementation of SSR, especially if the ruling government took control by force, in which case it will be reluctant to relinquish control of the armed forces.[64] This is connected to the presence of the so called security dilemma.

A security dilemma is a situation in which each party's efforts to increase its own security reduces the security of the others.[65] The security dilemma arises in environments of deep mistrust where the parties are unwilling to demobilise and disarm due to lack of security guarantees as they do not find it credible that their adversary will keep the promises made.[66] As long as the government is threatened by armed groups it will most likely be reluctant to undertake holistic SSR but rather focus on strengthening the military.[67] The security dilemma may be alleviated through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.[68] Hence, failed or flawed DDR will probably be an obstacle to SSR implementation. Another way to mitigate the security dilemma is by involving a third party as a peacekeeper or observer.[69] Some even argue that security provision by external actors is a necessary pre-condition for the successful implementation of SSR in weak post-war states.[70]

---

[60] Wulf (2004) pp. 6-7.

[61] Ginifer (2006) p.807; Woodward (2003).

[62] Sedra (2010b) p. 106.

[63] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) p. 25.

[64] Clément (2009) pp. 91-93.

[65] Kirwin (2006) p. 43.

[66] Fortna (2008) p. 84; Humphreys & Weinstein (2007) p. 535; Walter (2002) pp. 26-33.

[67] Clément (2009) pp. 91-93.

[68] Fortna (2008) p. 84; Humphreys & Weinstein (2007) p. 535.

[69] The security dilemma can also be mitigated through political, territorial or military power-sharing or by allowing former rebels to self-police. See Fortna (2008); Glassmyer, & Nicholas (2008); Hartzell & Hoddie (2003); Walter (2002).

[70] DCAF (2009b).

- **Sequencing and Timing**

The large number of challenges in weak post-war states means that priorities have to be made. Therefore sequencing of efforts may be necessary i.e. to prioritise certain measures in the short-term while planning for other issues to be dealt with at a later stage.[71] In situations of armed conflict it has been suggested that priority should be given to creating a stable environment.[72] The question is when to engage in SSR and capacity building and what to prioritise.[73] The unstable security situation in weak post-war states also raises the question of sequencing and timing of SSR in relation to other peacebuilding activities.[74] SSR is a long-term process which addresses the structural causes of insecurity.[75] While SSR can contribute to a number of issues and alleviate problems in the security sector, it may not be the best tool for bringing peace among warring parties, defeating insurgencies and addressing immediate insecurity.[76] In addition to understanding the limits of SSR, it is also important to keep in mind that SSR is a political process which does not take place in a political vacuum.[77]

- **Linking DDR and SSR**

DDR aims to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants into society. Often ex-combatants are integrated into the new security forces as a part of the peacebuilding process. While most researchers and practitioners agree that SSR and DDR are inextricably linked, the potential for synergies depends on the context and there is no consensus on how to link these two processes.[78] Nevertheless, restructuring of the security forces is a central element in both SSR and DDR. It has been argued that the involved actors must agree on the content of reforms of the security sector *prior* to the launch of DDR programmes as it incorporates DDR into the long-term strategy of the security sector.[79] Researchers argue that linking SSR and DDR ultimately is about connecting short-term measures in states emerging from war, to long-term efforts to build an effective, well-managed security sector.[80] In practice, however, DDR and SSR are often pursued autonomously, independent from one another.[81]

---

[71] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 44-46.

[72] Ibid. p. 45.

[73] Ibid. pp. 44-46.

[74] This thought is based on Autesserre (2010).

[75] Sedra (2010b) p. 106.

[76] Ibid. pp. 106-110.

[77] Sedra (2010a) p. 20.

[78] McFate (2010); de Vries & van Veen (2010).

[79] Nilsson & Svensson (2010) p. 17.

[80] Bryden & Scherrer (2012a) p. 181.

[81] Bryden & Scherrer (2012b) p. 3.

- **Long-Term Donor Engagement and Resources**

Another challenge is to link immediate effectiveness to long-term impact.[82] This is crucial to ensure that support to the security sector has an effect in the long run since it may take decades for the security institutions to become self-sustainable.[83] Although long-term donor engagement is necessary, short-term programmes are often prioritised due to the need for fast, measurable results.[84] The lack of long-term engagement is closely connected to access to adequate resources. Due to restrained and limited human and financial resources, the holistic approach is often abandoned.[85]

- **Strategic Direction**

The absence of clear strategic direction often results in inadequate coordination and ad hoc solutions, which is an obstacle to successful implementation of the holistic approach.[86] The strategic vision should come from the recipient country, in accordance with the principle of local ownership. In weak post-war states it has, however, proven difficult for local actors to develop a clear strategy as interests may diverge and mechanisms for non-violent negotiations often are non-existing.[87]

- **Donor Coordination**

The lack of donor coordination has been identified as a major obstacle to implementation of reforms.[88] Organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have made efforts to develop concepts, policy frameworks and strategies for coordinating SSR activities. Despite efforts to enhance and facilitate coordination and cooperation, this has proven a real challenge in the field and donor activities often overlap.[89] Although donor coordination is desirable, external actors will continue to pursue different, and sometimes contradictory, objectives. Consequently, a locally owned process and clear strategic direction, which guide the reforms, are crucial to facilitate donor coordination.[90]

---

[82] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 38-39.
[83] Skeppström & Weibull (2011) p. 11.
[84] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 35-37.
[85] Nilsson & Svensson (2010) p. 25.
[86] Ibid. pp. 29-30.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid. pp. 27-28.
[89] Nilsson & Zetterlund (2011) pp. 33-35; Skeppström & Weibull (2011) p. 11.
[90] Nilsson & Svensson (2010) p. 28.

3 The Central African Republic

This chapter gives a background to the current SSR process through an introduction to the recent political history of the CAR and the armed conflicts in the country. A description of security deficits, the role of the state and *de facto* security providers is followed by an introduction to the current SSR process and a summary of its outputs and outcomes since 2008.

In the CAR, insecurity is rampant as foreign and Central African rebels, unidentified armed groups, criminals and so called 'road-cutters' or *zaraguinas* freely operate throughout the country and contribute to the insecurity of the population and the state, which only controls small parts of the territory outside the capital Bangui.[91] The CAR is situated in a region ravaged by armed conflicts bordering Chad, Darfur in Sudan, the DRC and South Sudan. Spill-overs from other conflicts in the region have contributed to the instability of the country, as foreign troops and armed groups have used the ungoverned hinterlands[92] as safe havens.[93] Historically the administration has been highly militarised and elite power struggles have resulted in a number of *coups d'état,* mutinies and rebellions since the fall of the dictator Jean-Bédel Bokassa in 1979.[94] The leaders of the rebellions more often than not come from the small political and security elite in the capital.[95] At the same time, the needs of the population have been neglected by the civilian and military elites in power.[96]

3.1 Militarisation, Mutinies and Rebellions

The security sector in the CAR has been in urgent need of reforms for decades and a number of attempts to address this have been undertaken since the end of the 1990s. While the president traditionally has kept the armed forces under control to stay in power, failed reforms have done little to guarantee the security of the head of state and even less so that of the population, as the dysfunctional politicised security sector has been one of the root causes of rebellions, mutinies and *coups d'état* in the CAR.

---

[91] Amnesty International (2011); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011; RJDH-RCA (2012).

[92] Lombard uses the concept hinterlands to describe the ungoverned spaces in the CAR which are not subject to direct control, exclusive domination or close supervision. See Lombard (2012) p. 190, footnote 2.

[93] International Crisis Group (2007); Marchal (2009).

[94] International Crisis Group (2007); Mehler (2010).

[95] International Crisis Group (2007) pp. 21-29; Lombard (2012).

[96] N'Diaye (2009) p. 117.

The idea that the security forces in the CAR are in need of reforms dates back to the 1990s.[97] With the militarisation of politics and manipulation of tribalism for political ends, the state had more or less collapsed.[98] Three army mutinies broke out in the CAR in 1996, as soldiers were disgruntled by the bad working conditions and opposed the political leadership.[99] Ethnic loyalty also played a role in the mutinies as the former president, Andre Kolingba, had turned the army into a dominant Yakoma force, his own ethnic group.[100]

Until the end of the 1980s, the ethnic cleavage in the CAR had been more or less ethno-regional, with a clear north-south divide, and politics was dominated by southerners.[101] Kolingba, who seized power in a *coup d'état* in 1981, invoked ethnic cleavages by turning the army into an ethnically based force, something that seriously destabilised the armed forces.[102] This invention of ethnicity had repercussions for the loyalty of the forces.[103] Ange-Félix Patassé, a northerner who was elected president in 1993, replaced Yakoma soldiers with members from his own ethnic group, the Sara. This contributed to the mutinies in 1996 as the percentage of Yakoma in the army was heavily reduced.[104]

After two successive mutinies in the spring 1996, a National Convention of Defence was held in August and September the same year. The Convention resulted in a strategy for restructuring the security forces as the current status of the forces was deemed deeply unsatisfactory and needed to be addressed.[105] A third mutiny began in November.[106] Eventually, the mutineers signed a peace agreement, the Bangui Accords, with the government in January 1997.[107]

The signing of the Bangui Accords was followed by a number of attempts to restructure the armed forces with the support from the UN. These efforts had limited effects, due to the fact that they were strictly focusing on restructuring the military, *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA), while ignoring the democratic aspects of reforms. The restructuring of the FACA mainly addressed the demands of the mutineers and was focused on payment of salaries, provision of infrastructure, equipment and materiel.[108]

---

[97] N'Diaye (2009).
[98] International Crisis Group (2007).
[99] Mehler (2012) pp. 53-54.
[100] Mehler (2009) p.13; Mehler (2012) p. 53.
[101] Mehler (2009) p. 8.
[102] International Crisis Group (2007) p. 8.
[103] Ibid. pp. 10, 13.
[104] Ibid.
[105] N'Diaye (2009) p. 39
[106] Mehler (2012) pp. 53-54.
[107] UNSC (1997) S/1997/561.
[108] Mehler (2010) pp. 8-9.

The increased ethnic polarisation within the armed forces culminated in a failed coup attempt by Yakoma soldiers in 2001, allegedly led by the former president Kolingba.[109] The same year, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, called for the government to adopt a plan for restructuring the armed forces and the *Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine* (MINURCA) established a committee to address the restructuring of the FACA.[110] However, the failure to reform the military, mitigate ethnic tensions and put the armed forces under democratic control manifested itself in 2001 when the Army Chief of Staff, General Francois Bozizé was dismissed accused of planning a *coup d'état*.[111]

Bozizé left the capital and brought with him hundreds of troops from his own ethnic group, the Gbaya, to launch a rebellion against the democratically elected president Patassé.[112] In 2003, Bozizé took the capital and ousted Patassé with support from Chad. Following this, he embarked upon a democratisation project and was elected president in 2005.[113] After Bozizé had seized power, he claimed that one of the underlying reasons for the rebellion was the need for reforms of the army.[114] Efforts to reform the security sector were initiated by the government, and the UN mission, the *Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine* (BONUCA), supported the government in carrying out military reforms.[115] However, civil society and informal security forces, such as former rebels and self-defence groups, were excluded, resulting in limited effects.[116]

Reforms failed to contribute to the security of the population and during the following years several armed groups challenged the government launching rebellions in the northern parts of the country.[117] The rebellions have to a large extent been triggered by a combination of grievances among the marginalised population in the northern parts of the country and elite power struggles in the capital. Local self-defence forces often make up the rank and files of the rebel groups, whereas former ministers, or other high ranking government officials, proclaim themselves leaders of these groups, using the legitimate grievances of the population for their own personal interest.[118] The government's inability to provide security in the north-western and north-eastern parts of the country has been one of the main reasons for the emergence of rebel groups.[119]

---

[109] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2012).
[110] Martinelli & Klimis (2009) p. 19; Mehler (2010) pp. 8-9.
[111] International Crisis Group (2007) p. 14.
[112] Ibid. pp. 14-16; Mehler (2010) p. 7.
[113] International Crisis Group (2007) pp. 17-18.
[114] N'Diaye (2009) p. 39.
[115] UNSC (2007).
[116] N'Diaye (2009) pp. 56-57.
[117] For an overview of rebel groups in the CAR see Annex C.
[118] International Crisis Group (2007); Lombard (2012).
[119] Human Rights Watch (2007); Spittaels & Hilgert (2007); UNSC (2004) S/2004/1012.

3.2 The State and *de facto* Security Providers

The state in the CAR is neither capable of delivering security, nor the main provider of this public good. The state in the CAR has always been absent in rural areas. This absence of state institutions outside the capital is illustrated by the local expression *the state stops at PK12,* i.e. the state does not reach further than 12 kilometres from central Bangui.[120] Louisa Lombard demonstrates that while the elites in the capital fight over the control of the administrative structures of the state, the population in the rest of the country is left to fend for themselves in the threat of criminals and armed groups.[121]

The state security forces have proven incapable of protecting the population, are absent in large parts of the country and have often been responsible for human rights violations, abuses and crimes against civilians.[122] This absence can on the one hand be explained by the low capacity of the security forces, in terms of personnel, training and equipment.[123] On the other hand, the absence of state security forces in the provinces is also the result of a lack of willingness on behalf of the elite in the capital. Governments have repeatedly failed to show any significant interest in protecting the population from the persistent threats from armed groups and criminals.[124]

The absence of the state in the hinterlands of the CAR does not, however, imply that a vacuum exists in its place. Traditionally, informal actors have occupied the public spaces where the state has failed to extend its power.[125] For a long period of time, governance in many parts of the country has been exercised by rebel groups who, in addition to local defence groups, provide at least some minimum levels of security.[126] However, rebels have also violated human rights and abused their authority through acts of violence against civilians.[127] The security deficits described above, are exactly the problems SSR is meant to address through a holistic, people-centred approach.

3.3 The Current SSR Process

By the end of October 2007, the government submitted a paper to a donor roundtable in Brussels, Belgium in which the whole security and justice sector

---

[120] Bierschenk & de Sardan (1997).
[121] Lombard (2012).
[122] Amnesty International (2011); Human Rights Watch (2007); Lombard (2012) p. 200; Mehler (2012).
[123] See Annex B for an overview of the state security forces in the country.
[124] Lombard (2012).
[125] Bierschenk & de Sardan (1997).
[126] Persson (2008).
[127] Human Rights Watch (2007).

was identified as dysfunctional.[128] Following this, the current SSR process was launched during a four-day national seminar in Bangui, the capital of the CAR, in April 2008.[129] As already demonstrated previously in this chapter, this was not the first time efforts to reform the security sector were undertaken. However, the national seminar on SSR was the first of its kind in the country.[130]

The national seminar on SSR in 2008 brought together more than 150 participants from the government – including the President – the political opposition, the National Assembly, municipal and civil society representatives and representatives from the international community.[131] First of all, an analysis of internal and external threats was conducted and an overview of the status of the whole security sector was undertaken. Secondly, necessary actions to enhance the ability of the security sector to respond to these threats were identified. Finally, these actions were transformed into a detailed roadmap including short and medium-term projects comprising defence, police and paramilitary forces, judiciary and prisons, political, economic and financial governance, and intelligence services.[132] In addition, horizontal themes that would inform the work were highlighted: democratic control; governance; media, civil society and gender; the link between SSR and DDR; the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and foreign combatants on the territory.[133]

Three international partners have been particularly prominent in the SSR process in the CAR. France provides the bulk of military aid and is heavily involved in the training and equipping of the army, gendarmerie and police in addition to supporting the justice sector. [134] The EU has been one of the main supporters of the SSR process in the CAR, being the largest development partner in the country, and has provided funding and technical support through a number of development instruments and programmes.[135] Currently the EU is mainly involved in SSR through the support from the European Commission under the 10th European Development Fund.[136] The UN has taken a leading role in the SSR process in the CAR and supports reforms mainly through the *Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine*

---

[128] Mehler (2010) pp. 9-10.

[129] For an in-depth description of the national seminar see Martinelli & Klimis (2009).

[130] N'Diaye (2009) p. 45.

[131] Martinelli & Klimis (2009) p. 24 ; STP/SIU BINUCA (2011).

[132] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008); Martinelli & Klimis (2009) p. 24. For an open source in English where all envisaged activities are presented, see UNDP (2008).

[133] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008).

[134] Ambassade de France en RCA (2012a); Ambassade de France en RCA (2012b); Ambassade de France en RCA (2012c); Email correspondence May 2011; International Crisis Group (2007) p. 20.

[135] Bagayoko (2010); EU (2010); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[136] Europeaid (2008); Email correspondence, May 2012.

(BINUCA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).[137] The UN Peace Building Commission (PBC) and the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF) have also engaged in SSR in the country.[138] In addition, a number of other external actors have provided support to SSR or SSR related activities in the CAR.[139]

3.4 SSR in the CAR – Outputs and Outcomes

By the end of 2009, the majority of the short-term SSR projects from the seminar in 2008 had been implemented.[140] Following this, however, the SSR process stalled.[141] During 2010 and 2011, SSR was limited to the execution of a few technical projects and did not proceed on the political or strategic level.[142] After a two-year stalemate, the CAR government decided to re-launch SSR in early 2012.[143]

To evaluate the success of SSR initiatives both outputs and outcomes should be taken into account.[144] Outputs refer to: *SSR objectives that are institutional such as the development of a code of conduct for the armed forces, a marked increase in the number of female police officers or a certain percentage of members of the security services trained in human rights by a specific date.*[145]

Outcome indicators: *Aim to measure the effects or impacts of reform initiatives and include the real or perceived sense of security and the level of public confidence in the security and justice services; perceptions of whether the current system of democratic oversight is credible and legitimate; whether access to justice has meaningfully increased; and whether the national budget is produced in a transparent manner.*[146]

Outputs of SSR in the CAR include, among other things, activities to re-establish trust between the population and the security forces and improve respect for human rights. For example, army open house days have been institutionalised.[147]

---

[137] BINUCA replaced the *Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine* (BONUCA) in 2010.

[138] UN PBC (2008); UNSC (2008) S/2008/733 p. 6.

[139] These include Belgium, Germany, the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF) and the World Bank. In addition, South Africa, Sudan and the US have provided equipment and training to the army and presidential guard outside the SSR process, the two former through bilateral agreements. See UNSC (2008) S/2008/410 p. 4. The US supports the FACA and the AU regional initiative to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). See Ingerstad (2012).

[140] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009); CAR government (2011a) p. 41.

[141] UN DPKO (2012).

[142] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[143] CS RSS (2012).

[144] Downes & Muggah (2010) p. 142.

[145] Ibid. footnote 19.

[146] Ibid. footnote 20.

[147] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009).

Also, representatives from the national police have met with local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to discuss human rights and the disciplinary council of the police is now operational and have punished officers who have abused their authority.[148] As for the military, general rules for discipline have been developed and approved by President Bozizé and the disciplinary council has been rebuilt and reinforced.[149]

Another example is the efforts to strengthen the capacity of the security forces. 700 soldiers and police officers have been retired to allow for new recruits to enter the forces.[150] The EU provided financial support to retirement of ageing personnel and financed 33 months of salary arrears.[151] To guarantee that recruitment of soldiers is multi-ethnical, selection committees have been created.[152] Some 1800 new soldiers have been recruited and trained and approximately 300 police officers have been hired.[153]

It is a bit premature to evaluate the outcomes of SSR in the CAR, since the process only started in 2008 and then stalled for over two years. However, some points raised during the interviews are worth mentioning. Despite the outputs of SSR, the government has not managed to reach out to the population in rural areas and reforms have not had any significant impact on the security of the people. The effects on the ground, in particular outside the capital, have been limited so far.[154] Several interviewees attributed this to the fact that, in practice, the focus of the SSR process has been on the elite in Bangui.[155] To quote a representative for civil society in the CAR: *The analysis and the strategy from the national seminar are very good; it is the implementation that is problematic.*[156]

Despite efforts to increase the capacity of the security forces to ensure the security of the population, the soldiers and police officers often neglect, or are ignorant of, the recently developed codes of conduct and impunity is widespread.[157] The main obstacle to improving the security of the population, according to several interviewees, is that the security forces have not understood that their main task is to protect, not harass the population and that they join the forces for the wrong reasons.[158] Bad working conditions and salary arrears

---

[148] Ibid. pp.15-16.
[149] CAR Government (2011a) p. 15; Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009) p.56.
[150] CAR Government (2011b) p. 43.
[151] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[152] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009) p. 56.
[153] CAR Government (2011a) p. 15; CAR Government (2011b) p. 43.
[154] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Interview, Bangui, September 2011.
[157] CAR Government (2011a) p. 15.
[158] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

contribute to the disciplinary problems of the forces and partly explain why soldiers and police officers extort food and money from the population.[159]

Many interviewees also pointed to the failure of professionalising the recruitment process to the security forces, as nepotism and corruption is widespread.[160] The efforts to guarantee ethnically mixed recruitment to the army seem to have failed, which became evident as riots broke out in the capital in 2012. Aspiring recruits accused the government of ethnically biased recruitment and nepotism following the announcement of the list of accepted candidates.[161]

---

[159] Amnesty International (2011); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[160] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011; SSR-seminar for police officers, l'Ecole Nationale de la Police, Bangui 20-22 October 2011.
[161] Centrafrique-Presse (2012).

4 Challenges to Implementation

This chapter provides an analysis of challenges to implementation of the holistic SSR approach in the CAR based on the analytical framework and the factors presented in chapter 2. The aim is to improve the understanding of challenges to holistic SSR in weak post-war states and identify opportunities for international actors to support reforms in such contexts. Each section starts with a brief presentation of the factor, followed by an analysis of how this factor has affected implementation of holistic SSR in the CAR.

4.1 France

Before going into each specific challenge, the role of France in the security and defence sector in the CAR, and its impact on implementation of SSR, needs to be addressed.

France is the most influential actor providing support to the security and defence sector in the CAR and has a particular status as the former colonial power.[162] Since independence in 1960, France has provided military support to the CAR in different forms and exerts strong influence over the security and defence sector in the CAR.[163] In 2010, the governments of France and the CAR revised a defence agreement from 1960.[164] The revised accord sets the legal framework for continued French support to the CAR army for the following five years.[165] France has demonstrated a firm engagement in training and equipping the police, the gendarmerie and the army, and also supports the justice sector.[166]

The role of France in the security and defence sector in the CAR has had an impact on implementation of SSR in several ways. First of all, the French interference in security and defence matters, and the presence of technical advisers in the CAR administration, is a challenge to local ownership since France exerts such strong influence over the administration. Secondly, the French approach to SSR in the country, foremost considering it a security and not a development matter, is an obstacle to implementation of holistic reforms. Finally, the reluctance to cooperate with other international actors and France's view that French support to the security sector takes place outside the SSR process, have had a negative impact on donor coordination and, as a consequence, implementation of holistic SSR.

---

[162] Bagayoko (2010) p. 39.

[163] International Crisis Group (2007).

[164] The defence agreement from 1960 allowed France to deploy troops in the CAR.

[165] Assemblée nationale française (2011); Radio Ndeke Luka (2010).

[166] Ambassade de France en RCA (2012a); Ambassade de France en RCA (2012b); Ambassade de France en RCA (2012c); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

France has been omnipresent in the CAR administration since independence with technical advisers placed in ministry cabinets, the presidency and elsewhere.[167] These technical advisers work on a daily basis to support the government and national authorities on issues regarding security, justice and defence.[168] While their presence reinforces the capacity of the national government, France's strong influence and paternalistic approach towards the CAR authorities does, according to the interviewees, little to encourage local ownership.[169]

The French approach to SSR in the CAR is informed by the former colonial power's long-term security and defence cooperation with the country and is more concerned with short-term stability of the government than eager to adhere to the holistic approach promoted by the OECD.[170] In the CAR, France's conception of SSR as a security matter disconnected from development issues has been an obstacle to comprehensive SSR as the former colonial power exerts such profound influence over the security sector and the administration.[171]

France has often acted without consulting other international actors involved in SSR in the CAR.[172] Although France supports SSR related activities, France is not perceived by national and international stakeholders to be interested in letting anyone else exert any significant influence over defence and security policy in the CAR.[173] Furthermore, France does not consider its support to be a part of the SSR process as such. French representatives interviewed for this study stated that SSR related projects, which are supported by France, are an integral part of the French bilateral defence and security cooperation with the former colony, not of the SSR process.[174] Although this support contributes to SSR, the French involvement in the security and defence sector in the CAR goes beyond SSR as it has its roots in France's strategic interests in the region and is based on the historical ties between the two countries.[175]

4.2 Training and Equipping vs. Institution Building

To transform the security sector so that it is consistent with democratic norms and good governance is one of the main objectives of SSR. Achieving this objective requires institution building and an approach that takes into account the

---

[167] International Crisis Group (2007) p. 20.
[168] Bagayoko (2010) p. 36; Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[169] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[170] Bagayoko (2010) p. 24; N'Diaye (2009) p. 55.
[171] Bagayoko (2010) p. 24; Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011; N'Diaye (2009) p. 55.
[172] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.

whole security sector including the military, the police, the judiciary and democratic oversight. In practice, however, equipping and training of the security forces have often been prioritised at the expense of holistic SSR.

The CAR is an exception to this as seven sub-sectors are involved in SSR: defence, police, territorial management, public finance, democratic control, justice, and intelligence services.[176] Also, the role of civil society and media in democratic governance has been acknowledged.[177] The government and donors demonstrate an intention to go beyond the more narrow focus on the military sector that is so common and the SSR process in the CAR has been described as a case where the holistic approach, as promoted by donors and OECD, has been applied literally.[178]

One example, which illustrates the intention to go beyond equipping and training of the security forces, are the efforts to enhance participation of the National Assembly, civil society and the media as a part of the strategy to improve democratic control of the security institutions.[179] Furthermore, SSR has led to a number of institutional improvements and changes. Among other things, a special Statute for the national police and an organisational structure for the force have been adopted by the National Assembly; the Ministry of Defence has created a human resources section within the ministry; national commissions have developed codes of conduct for the police, the army and gendarmerie; the Military Planning Law for 2009-2013, which provides strategic direction of the army and gendarmerie and sets the budget of the forces, has been passed by the legislators.[180] The adoption of the military planning law is an important step forward and for the first time since independence the CAR has a detailed plan for the armed forces.[181]

However, institution building is a complex task and in the CAR *de facto* democratic governance is obstructed by informal networks of power.[182] To a large extent, informal governance structures and weak institutional capacity have hampered any significant improvement with regards to democratic control.[183] In addition, the president is an army general and supreme commander of the armed forces. In that capacity, he is responsible for appointing all civilian and military staff. He also chairs the Council for National Defence.[184] In practice, the National Assembly remains subordinate to the Executive and the legislators

---

[176] CAR Government (2011a).
[177] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008).
[178] Renner (2010).
[179] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009).
[180] Ibid.
[181] International Crisis Group (2008) p. 12.
[182] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[183] CAR Government (2011a).
[184] Ibid. p. 19.

exercise no control over the defence budget. Therefore, the security and defence policy remains under the strict control of the Presidency.[185]

It is important to keep in mind that in the CAR, public and private affairs are intertwined, i.e. the state is privatised and used for the personal interests of those in power.[186] Informal networks of power continue to operate within the formal institutions of the state. These informal links are based on factors such as ethnic group, family or informal political connections and the institutional structures are merely formal expressions of *de facto* power relations.[187] Consequently, strengthening the institutional capacity of the formal state institutions does little to change the informal structures where power actually is exercised. Despite these difficulties, the inclusion of a broad range of sectors concerned with security and security sector governance demonstrates how SSR in the CAR aims to transform the holistic SSR concept into real reforms.

4.3 Local Ownership

Local ownership, i.e. that the national actors are in charge of reforms of the security sector, is at the core of the holistic SSR approach. However, local ownership has proven challenging in practice. It may be problematic for local actors to control the process at an early stage due to low capacity and lack of resources. In weak post-war states it may be difficult to identify local actors who are at once capable, willing and legitimate to drive the process forward. Often the donor counterpart is the national government, which may be problematic since it creates a paradox where those that are meant to implement SSR may have no interest in doing so. An additional obstacle to local ownership is the dependency on external support which often results in international actors defining the priorities and driving the process forward.

In the CAR, local ownership has been assured through a national institutional framework for implementation of SSR. However, low administrative and human capacity is a challenge to local ownership, as it negatively impacts on local actors' ability to implement and manage reforms. Although the government is in charge of reforms, the low capacity constitutes a major obstacle to local ownership in practice. Only when external technical assistance was provided could the national authorities implement reforms. While some efforts have been made to include non-state actors and local leaders in the SSR process in the CAR, the term *local* refers to the government. Failure to include actors outside the government seriously challenges the legitimacy of reforms and the prospects for improving the security of the population. Furthermore, the process has been

---

[185] Ibid. pp. 17-24.
[186] International Crisis Group (2007); Lombard (2012).
[187] Bagayoko (2010) p. 38.

blocked on the political level and the leadership has demonstrated little political will to push reforms forward. The dependency on foreign aid also complicates practical local ownership in the CAR as local actors are restricted by donors' approval of projects. Although the national government is in charge of SSR on the political and strategic level, the lack of financial and human resources limits the room for manoeuvre.

An institutional structure has been set up to guarantee local ownership of SSR in the CAR.[188] The *Comité sectoriel de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité* (CS RSS) is the highest national decision-making body on SSR in the CAR. It is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence and is composed of ministers involved in the SSR process.[189] The *Secrétariat technique permanent* (STP) is tasked to coordinate the national actors, guarantee national ownership and function as a link between the technical and political level of SSR.[190] Nine thematic groups,[191] comprising representatives from the Central African government, affected authorities and, in some cases, non-state actors are responsible for monitoring the implementation of reforms and to push the process forward on a technical level, within the concerned ministries.[192]

Despite these efforts, the general institutional weakness of the administration has affected the national authorities' capacity to implement reforms of the security sector. A number of projects in the SSR strategy aim to address the general low capacity of the state institutions.[193] However, such efforts have so far been insufficient and the extremely low level of education in the country is a severe obstacle to increasing the capacity of the state institutions.[194] The civil servants are often insufficiently educated and trained. In addition, there are no clear strategies or plans to identify the mission and objective of the government ministries, which affects recruitment and execution of policies negatively as it is unclear what results are to be obtained.[195]

Only in the presence of a multidisciplinary team of seven international experts, jointly deployed by the EU and the UNPD, was the government able to implement SSR.[196] The international experts were embedded in the thematic groups and in the STP and were mandated to provide technical assistance and

---

[188] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[189] Bagayoko (2010) p. 42.

[190] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009).

[191] At the outset, in 2008, there were seven thematic groups. At a later stage, a thematic group responsible for DDR and one in charge of communication were created. These two groups were not, however, yet operational as of August 2012. See annex A for all the thematic groups and an overview of the institutional structure for implementation and coordination.

[192] CAR Government (2011a) p. 39; Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[193] CAR Government (2011a); UNDP (2008).

[194] CAR Government (2011a).

[195] Ibid. pp. 17-18.

[196] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

support to the national authorities.[197] The presence of the multidisciplinary team reportedly had a positive impact on local ownership as it strengthened the national actors' capacity to undertake reforms.[198] Once the team left, the SSR process stalled.[199]

While the ambition has been to include the broader population and representatives of civil society, local leaders and informal security providers have to a large extent been excluded from the process following the national seminar on SSR in 2008.[200] Formally, it was agreed that civil society and media were to participate in the implementation of activities related to democratic control.[201] However, according to some of those interviewed for this study these sectors had no opportunity to influence the reforms. Instead, their role was rather symbolic and interviewees described their participation as a way for the government to legitimise the process.[202]

Implementation of SSR in the CAR has a state-centric approach and the main focus of reforms has been on the state institutions, hence non-state security actors have not been involved in planned activities.[203] This leaves the main providers of security in the CAR out of the SSR process. Furthermore, rebel leaders did not participate in the national seminar on SSR as the peace agreement only was signed after the seminar. As a result, the leaders for the politico-military movements were not involved in designing reforms.[204] Implementation and management of SSR has been dominated by the government, which controls the financial and institutional resources needed to execute reforms. This is also related to the fact that the government and the Presidency to a large extent control the National Assembly and decentralised actors.[205]

During interviews with international stakeholders, the lack of political will on behalf of the national government was put forward as one of the main explanations as to why the SSR process in the CAR stalled.[206] While the political leadership had agreed to undertake reforms, the government was unwilling to fully implement and push SSR forward on a political and strategic level.[207] Traditionally, the powerful elites have been reluctant to undertake reforms of the

---

[197] DCAF/ISSAT (2009b).

[198] CAR Government (2011a) p. 40; Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[199] STP/SIU BINUCA (2012a).

[200] Bagayoko (2010); Interviews, Bangui, September, 2011.

[201] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[202] Ibid.

[203] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011; Mehler (2010) p. 58.

[204] International Crisis Group (2008) p. 1; International Crisis Group (2010) p. 5; Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[205] Bagayoko (2010) p. 37.

[206] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[207] Ibid; N'Diaye (2009).

security sector in the CAR.[208] The current SSR process has partly been blocked by political disagreements and fear from the political and security leadership that reforms may threaten their power base.[209]

The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world and the capacity of the national authorities to undertake reforms without external financial and technical assistance is very limited. Although the government has introduced a specific budget line for SSR in the national budget, the amounts are not sufficient to cover the anticipated costs of SSR in the country.[210] This dependence on foreign aid has resulted in national actors being deprived of control of the process. Donors have not been satisfied with the progress of reforms and are therefore reluctant to provide financial support to SSR.[211] In addition, several Central African interviewees describe how donors have no confidence in the Central African counterparts and often have a paternalistic approach towards local actors, including civil society.[212] Indeed, a patronising attitude towards the local actors was also revealed in interviews with some international stakeholders.[213] Such attitudes and distrust has done little to facilitate local ownership and implementation of SSR in the CAR.

4.4 A Volatile Security Environment

SSR is a long-term process that addresses the structural causes of insecurity rather than short-term security deficits. In the midst of on-going violent conflict, the national government is likely to be reluctant to undertake reforms to improve democratic governance of the security forces. When armed groups are challenging the government, the political leadership will not be eager to undertake long-term governance reforms but instead prefers strengthening the military. Threats from rebel groups, neighbouring countries or foreign armed groups hamper implementation of democratic reforms of the security sector as the government is busy countering these threats. The immediate security dilemma that the government faces after, or during, violent conflict, can be mitigated through other mechanisms, such as DDR or external security provisions.

The CAR government faces a number of external and internal security threats and has prioritised strengthening the military at the expense of implementing holistic SSR. To keep personal control of the military is crucial for the incumbent president to not lose power in a *coup d'état,* this probably explains why is

---

[208] N'Diaye (2009).

[209] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011; N'Diaye (2009).

[210] DCAF/ISSAT (2009b).

[211] Ibid.

[212] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[213] Ibid.

reluctant to cede power of the armed forces to the parliament. Elite power struggles and continuous rebellions have created an environment of deep mistrust and suspicion among the political elite. Short-term survival is more important to the leadership than long-term institution building as a number of armed groups challenge the power of the government.

The security situation in the broader region is very unstable and neighbouring countries cooperate with the CAR government in defence and security matters and a number of external peace support operations have been deployed in the CAR between 2008 and 2012. However, these third-party involvements have proven insufficient to stabilise the security situation.

In the CAR, national political actors conceive of SSR as a means to reinforce the military apparatus rather than a long term process.[214] Although democratic governance and reinforcement of human rights are two of the objectives of SSR in the CAR, the government still gives primacy to equipping and training the security forces.[215] While this is understandable, given the volatile security situation, the government's stance has become an obstacle to the implementation of a holistic SSR strategy.

The ruling elites in the CAR have good reasons to worry about their security as military coups, mutinies and rebellions often have been instigated by other members of the small political elite as a result of power struggles.[216] The president, General Bozizé, seized power by force in 2003, which may explain why he is reluctant to change the patron/client relations through which he exerts power over the armed forces and put those under democratic control. As one interviewee expressed it, the incumbent president launched a rebellion with the help of troops from the armed forces and is therefore not interested in reforms that may diminish his personal control of the army; he is aware of the importance of controlling the army through patronage to stay in power.[217]

Although the CAR has never been the scene of a large-scale civil war,[218] a myriad of politico-military groups, with the aim of overthrowing the government, have operated on the territory.[219] The majority of the rebel groups joined the peace process in 2008/2009 and signed the Libreville Peace Agreement.[220] However, splinter groups and new politico-military movements emerged throughout 2009-2012 and the signatory rebel groups did not disarm and

---

[214] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011

[215] Bagayoko (2010) pp. 19-3; Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[216] Mehler (2008).

[217] Interview, Bangui, September 2011.

[218] The highest battle related fatalities occurred in 2001, during a coup attempt, when between 200 and 300 people died. For an overview of the armed conflicts in the CAR see Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2012).

[219] For an overview of the major rebel groups active in the CAR see Annex C.

[220] Libreville Peace Agreement (2008).

demobilise.[221] To demonstrate his force, the President prioritises strengthening the military, rather than promoting governance reforms.[222]

The fact that the presidential guard and the intelligence services have been left out of the SSR process illustrates how the volatile internal security environment and lack of trust among the elites have been obstacles to implementation of SSR in the CAR. History suggests that the president had better keep personal control of the armed forces, in particular the presidential guard, if he does not want to lose power to rebels or in a military coup.[223] The presidential guard, which has a terrible human rights record,[224] has been completely left out of the SSR process.[225] Instead, South Africa and Sudan have trained and equipped the presidential guard through bilateral agreements.[226] The envisaged reforms of the intelligence services have been completely blocked on the political level.[227] The services do not officially exist in the CAR, as no legal framework regulates their mandate and mission.[228] The deep mistrust and fear among the elite results in the intelligence services being under control of several different national authorities which do not cooperate and share information.[229]

In addition to internal security threats, foreign armed groups infringe on the CAR's territorial integrity. These armed groups mainly constitute a threat to the population, not the government, as they operate far away from the capital where the state institutions and government representatives are absent.[230] The CAR government cooperates with some of the neighbouring countries to counter these external threats. The FACA conducts joint border patrols and undertakes joint military operations with the Chadian armed forces and with the Sudanese army.[231] The CAR security forces also collaborate with troops from the DRC, South Sudan and Uganda in the eastern parts of the CAR.[232] The presence of foreign armed groups is used as a pretext for the government to give primacy to strengthening the military, something which only may have a positive impact on the security of the population if accompanied with governance and institutional reforms.[233]

---

[221] Amnesty International (2011) pp. 33-36; CAR Government (2012); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[222] Interviews Bangui, September and October 2011.

[223] International Crisis Group (2007); Mehler (2008).

[224] Human Rights Watch (2007).

[225] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008).

[226] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011; UNSC (2008) S/2008/410 p.4.

[227] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[228] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[229] Ibid.

[230] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[231] UNSC (2011) S/2011/739 p.3; UNSC (2012) S/2012/374 p.3; Radio Ndeke Luka (2012c); Radio France International (2012).

[232] Ingerstad (2012).

[233] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

A number of regional and international peace support operations, both military and civilian, have been deployed in the CAR between 2008 and 2012.[234] However, as for the military operations the number of troops has been insufficient and the forces have only been deployed to a limited area of the country.[235] For example, the presence of the UN mission, *Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad* (MINURCAT) and the EU operation, EUFOR Tchad/RCA between 2008 and 2010, only improved the security situation in the north-eastern parts of the country.[236] As for the currently deployed *Mission de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine* (MICOPAX),[237] the number of troops is insufficient to provide security in the vast country and its impact has been limited.[238]

4.5 Sequencing and Timing

The holistic SSR approach goes beyond equipping and training the security forces and comprises a range of sectors. However, to undertake reforms of all concerned sectors simultaneously is complicated in weak post-war states. Sequencing may be necessary. Ultimately, it is a question of priorities. It has been suggested that priority should be given to SSR activities that aim to create a stable environment in situations of armed conflict. However, it is important to understand the limits of SSR, which is a long-term process. In weak post-war states, timing and sequencing of SSR and capacity-building also relates to other peacebuilding initiatives. Simultaneous political processes may also impact on, or be affected by, SSR.

In the CAR the aim is to undertake reforms of all sectors involved in security governance and security provision simultaneously. Hence, sequencing has not been applied in the CAR. While the government wants to strengthen the operational capacity of the armed forces, many donors are reluctant to support such efforts. Despite the fact that SSR is a part of the broader peace building process, the connection between SSR and other peace building measures have to a large extent been overlooked. Since SSR is a highly political process this is unfortunate and has had an impact on implementation of reforms. The timing of the national seminar was not ideal as reforms were initiated before the peace process had started. In addition, other political processes, such as elections, were considered more important to the national political leadership and slowed down the implementation of SSR. National actors have conceived of SSR as a process

---

[234] For an overview of all peace support operations undertaken in the CAR since 2008, see Annex D.
[235] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[236] UNSC (2008) S/2008/410; UNSC (2008) S/2008/760.
[237] In 2008, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) took over the operation from the *Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale* (CEMAC).
[238] International Crisis Group (2011) pp. 12-13.

which, in addition to long-term effects, also can contribute to the security in the short-term. A better understanding of the interaction between SSR and other political processes, as well as the limits of SSR, is necessary for SSR to be successfully implemented in the CAR.

Onana Renner argues that the holistic approach undertaken in the CAR ignores the need for stabilisation and that insisting on transparency and democratic governance is problematic in a society that is still in violent conflict.[239] Some of the interviewees also voiced concerns that the SSR process was initiated to early, i.e. that the CAR was not yet ready for such comprehensive reforms.[240] The SSR strategy is guided by a multi-sectoral approach and reforms of all sub-sectors are to be undertaken simultaneously.[241] However, priorities diverge among different stakeholders. While the government has prioritised strengthening the armed forces some of the major donors supporting holistic SSR have been more concerned about democratic control, rule of law and strengthened human rights within the SSR framework.[242]

In the CAR, as in other weak post-war states, SSR is part of a broader peacebuilding process.[243] It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the link between SSR and all peacebuilding activities undertaken in the country. There are, however, three political processes, which are a part of the broader peacebuilding efforts (in addition to DDR), that are of particular importance to understanding why SSR has been so difficult to implement in the CAR: the signing of the Libreville Peace Agreement, the Inclusive Political Dialogue and the electoral process.[244]

In the CAR, SSR was disconnected from the broader peace process at the outset. The signing of the Libreville Peace Agreement in June 2008 marked the start of the peace process in the CAR.[245] As the peace agreement had not yet been signed at the time of the national seminar on SSR that was held in June 2008, some of the main actors, the rebel groups, were initially left out of the SSR process. Consequently, the armed opposition could not fully participate in the national

---

[239] Renner (2010).

[240] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[241] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008).

[242] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[243] CAR Government (2011b) p. 51; CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008).

[244] Due to the fact that SSR in the CAR has been state-centric and focused on the elite, peacebuilding activities that address local sources of conflict, such as conflict over land or communitarian violence are not included. This decision does not involve any value judgement but follows from the fact that SSR in the CAR has a top-down approach. Therefore the links to other top-down peace-building activities are in focus. It would, however, be fruitful to explore the links between SSR and other peacebuilding activities.

[245] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2012).

seminar on SSR, which prevented them from engaging in an issue central to their political demands.[246]

Following the signing of the peace agreement, the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD) was initiated by the government. The dialogue culminated in December 2008, gathering some 200 participants from political opposition parties, the government, the signatory rebel groups and civil society.[247] A committee was established to monitor implementation of all recommendations in the peace agreement. Their recommendations endorsed SSR but all practical details had already been agreed upon at the national seminar.[248] Hence, the rebel leaders had no influence on SSR. This deprived the dialogue of an important element as one of the main demands of the rebel groups concerned the state's insufficient protection of the population.[249] To exclude some of the key security actors from the SSR process seriously challenges the prospects for SSR to contribute to the security of the population.

Another factor, which seems to have had a negative impact on implementation of reforms, was the electoral process. Several interviewees raised the point that the delayed electoral process had been an obstacle to implementation of SSR.[250] The presidential and legislative elections were scheduled for April 2010 but due to logistic problems and fear for irregularities among opposition and donors, the elections were postponed several times. Eventually they were held in January and March 2011, almost a year later than anticipated.[251] During this period, the interest for SSR on the political level diminished and the responsible ministers prioritised the electoral process.[252]

During the interviews it became evident that the expectations on SSR in the CAR were high, in particular among national stakeholders. Several interviewees expressed how they hoped that SSR would contribute to peace, democracy and security in the short-term.[253] This demonstrates a flawed understanding of what SSR can achieve.

4.6 Linking DDR and SSR

SSR and DDR are inextricably linked and restructuring of the security forces is a central element in both SSR and DDR. Often ex-combatants are integrated into the new security forces as a part of the peacebuilding process. It has been argued

---

[246] International Crisis Group (2010) p. 3.
[247] Ibid. p. 3.
[248] Ibid. p. 5.
[249] Ibid. p. 5.
[250] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[251] UNSC (2010) S/2010/295.
[252] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[253] Ibid.

that the involved actors must agree on the content of the reforms of the security sector *prior* to the launch of DDR programmes and that linking DDR and SSR is necessary for connecting short-term and long-term measures in weak post-war states. In practice, however, DDR and SSR are often pursued separately.

Despite intentions to link DDR to SSR in the CAR at the national seminar on SSR in 2008, the two processes have been separated in practice until recently. The case of the CAR provides an example of how the causes of the armed conflict must be taken into account when deciding how (and if) DDR programmes should be linked to SSR. Separating DDR and SSR in the CAR has not facilitated implementation of reforms of the security sector, neither has it increased the prospects for SSR to contribute to the security of the population.

At the national seminar on SSR in 2008, DDR was identified as an important horizontal theme which was meant to inform all the concerned sub-sectors involved in the SSR-process.[254] However, due to the timing of the seminar, i.e. that it was held prior to the signing of the peace agreement, SSR and DDR emerged from two different processes and have been separated until recently.[255] In addition, the UNDP, which initially was in charge of DDR together with the government, intentionally kept DDR separated from SSR.[256]

The importance of linking DDR and SSR in the CAR is related to the nature of the armed conflicts in the country; the dysfunctional security sector is one of the root causes of the conflicts as the politicised and ethnically biased security forces have triggered military coups and rebellions for years.[257] The lack of security in large parts of the country has led to the creation of local self-defence groups, which have transformed into rebel groups.[258]

One of the main objectives of SSR is to improve the security of the population. However, when disarming the rebel groups in the CAR, people risk losing their only protection against criminals and foreign armed groups.[259] Naturally, rebels are reluctant to lay down arms as long as the state security forces are incapable of providing security. In the CAR, the government has provided some of the rebel groups with fuel and food and has agreed to these groups controlling parts of the territory in the absence of state security forces.[260] However, this far only a limited number of former rebel soldiers have been formally integrated into the army.[261]

---

[254] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008).
[255] DCAF/ISSAT (2009a); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[256] International Crisis Group (2010) p. 12.
[257] International Crisis Group (2007); N'Diaye (2012).
[258] Lombard (2012); Spittaels Steven & Hilgert Filip (2007).
[259] Lombard (2012).
[260] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[261] CAR Government (2012).

The above demonstrates how the link between SSR and DDR in the CAR needs to be strengthened for reforms to have any real effect on the security of the population. Hence, it is positive that efforts to strengthen the link between the two processes have been undertaken with the creation of a thematic group working on DDR within the institutional structure for SSR implementation.[262] In addition, the Security Institutions Unit (SIU), within the UN integrated mission BINUCA, is tasked to strengthen the link between SSR and DDR.[263] These are positive steps which increase the prospects for SSR to actually contribute to the security of the population in the CAR.

4.7 Long-Term Donor Engagement and Resources

To ensure that support to the security sector has an effect in the long run, long-term donor engagement is necessary. It is important to link immediate effectiveness to long-term impact. Unfortunately, donors often prioritise short-term programmes in the search for fast measurable results and the holistic approach is often abandoned due to limited financial and human resources.

In the CAR, very few external partners have shown interest in committing to SSR in the longer-term, resources have been limited and national actors have had a hard time linking short-term gains to long-term strategic steps forward. A general donor fatigue, which springs from the view that progress of reforms has been to slow, has had a negative impact on implementation of holistic SSR in the CAR. This reading of the situation has led to international partners being reluctant to providing additional financial resources.

According to many national actors, this lack of long-term donor engagement and limited resources explain why the SSR process stalled in the CAR.[264] For example, the joint EU/UNDP-funded multidisciplinary team of international experts was only deployed for one year. When the team ended its work by 2009/2010, there was no plan to follow up on the progress and continue to provide technical support.[265] This short-term engagement had a serious impact on the possibilities for the national authorities' capacity to translate progress on the technical level into strategic steps forward.[266]

Another example is the reluctance of the donors to provide additional financial resources. During the national seminar, it had been agreed that international partners would provide financial support to implementation of medium-term

---

[262] Email correspondence, August 2012; Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009).
[263] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[264] Ibid.
[265] CAR Government, (2011a) p. 8.
[266] DCAF/ISSAT (2009b).

projects once the short-term projects were finalised.[267] By the end of 2009, the national authorities considered the short-term objectives achieved.[268] The CAR government tried to mobilise financial support for a number of projects during donor round tables in 2009 and 2011, but international partners were unwilling to provide such support.[269] During interviews it became evident that the lack of long-term engagement in terms of financial and human resources constitutes a severe obstacle to implementation of holistic SSR in the CAR.[270]

Most donors have been reluctant to commit to any long-term SSR projects.[271] During interviews in the CAR, international stakeholders pointed out that since the SSR process was stalled on the political level, they might as well shift their focus to other activities.[272] The EU and the UNDP, who were the main supporters of the holistic SSR approach at the outset, changed their priorities in 2010 to focus on other development issues.[273] It should, however, be noted that the EU is committed to supporting national authorities in implementing the governments ten year strategy for justice reform, through its justice reform programme.[274]

Instead the UN, through the support from the PBC, the PBF and in particular the BINUCA, has taken a leading role in SSR in the CAR.[275] Through the creation of the SIU which is charged with SSR within the BINUCA, the UN has demonstrated a firm engagement to SSR in the CAR.[276] The UNDP also provides support to reforms of the judiciary through its rule of law programme.[277]

A general donor fatigue with regards to SSR in the CAR has been a major obstacle to long-term engagement and implementation of holistic SSR. Many of the interviewees described the short-term gains as unsatisfactory, expressed disappointment over the slow progress of reforms in the country and were therefore unwilling to provide financial resources to new projects.[278] Due to the lack of quick measurable results, which donors interpreted as a lack of political

---

[267] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[268] Some 70% of the projects had been implemented by the national authorities by the end of 2009, see CAR government (2011) p. 41.
[269] CAR government (2011a); International Crisis Group (2010) p. 17; STP/SIU BINUCA (2012a) p. 4; UNSC (2010) S/2010/295.
[270] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[271] Ibid.
[272] Ibid.
[273] CAR Government (2011a).
[274] CAR Government (2009); Email correspondence, May 2012.
[275] UN DPKO (2012); UN PBC (2008); UNSC (2008) S/2008/733 p. 6.
[276] UNSC (2011) S/2011/311.
[277] UNDP CAR (2008); UNDP CAR (2011).
[278] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

will on behalf of the national government, many international partners have been reluctant to commit to long-term reforms.[279]

4.8 Strategic Direction

It is important that the strategic vision for SSR comes from the country in focus. In weak post-war states, however, it has proven difficult for local or national actors to develop a clear strategy as interests diverge and national authorities often lack human resources and capacity. The absence of clear strategic direction often results in inadequate coordination and ad hoc solutions.

In the CAR, a strategic vision for SSR was developed by national actors with the support from donors. A detailed action plan from the national seminar on SSR in 2008 provided strategic direction for the coming two years. Following this, however, no common framework was elaborated to provide detailed strategic direction as it proved difficult for national authorities to develop strategies without external technical support. In addition, divergent interests and low capacity were obstacles to developing a broad strategy for SSR. The lack of strategic direction led to inadequate coordination but also resulted in donors being reluctant to provide more financial resources to SSR. Renewed efforts to develop a medium-term strategy in 2012, with the support from BINUCA, provide a new opportunity for SSR in the CAR.

The lack of clear strategic direction has been described as a major impediment to implementation of SSR in the CAR and is put forward as an explanation as to why the process stalled.[280] In the CAR, SSR falls within the broader strategy to reduce poverty in the country. The objectives of SSR are spelled out in the *Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté 2008-2010* (DSRP I) and in the *Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté 2011-2015* (DSRP II). These documents place SSR in a broader context but do not provide any detailed plan for implementation.[281]

For the first two years, 2008-2010, an action plan provided strategic direction for the short and medium-term. The action plan was developed by national actors together with international partners at the national seminar on SSR.[282] The short-term projects were envisaged to be fulfilled within eight months and comprised existing and new SSR projects. Following the completion of the short-term projects, the medium-term phase was to start in 2009 with support from

---

[279] DCAF/ISSAT (2009a).
[280] STP/SIU BINUCA (2012a).
[281] CAR Government (2007); CAR Government (2011b).
[282] CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008); CAR Government (2011a); STP/SIU BINUCA (2011); UNDP (2008).

donors.[283] However, as implementation of the short-term objectives was delayed, there was a need for a revised strategy guiding the medium-term reforms to re-engage international partners in SSR.[284]

The national authorities presented a revised medium-term strategy including a number of concrete projects at a donor round table in 2009.[285] However, donors were reluctant to provide funding for these projects as the revised strategy did not provide a common framework for all national and international stakeholders.[286] For the same reasons the government once again failed to convince donors to provide support. The lack of a common strategic framework resulted in ad hoc solutions as international stakeholders continued to provide support to SSR activities without any coordination or common goal.[287]

One interviewee pointed out that it was difficult for national actors to develop strategies that would correspond to the donors' demands and expectations. Several interviewees also described that it was difficult to agree on a strategic vision for SSR due to the divergent interests and lack of cooperation among national stakeholders.[288] For example, the strategic document from the round table in 2009 was elaborated by the national coordinator for SSR and the STP without consulting all concerned actors within the government, resulting in the content being contested.[289] The capacity of the STP was limited due to the absence of a clear mandate, lack of resources and expertise. The STP reportedly worked isolated from other national stakeholders.[290]

In the beginning of 2011, a detailed medium-term strategy for the sub-sector democratic control was developed by the government with the support from an international expert recruited by BINUCA.[291] This external technical support was highly appreciated by the national authorities.[292] The same year, the CAR government asked BINUCA for support to revise the national SSR strategy and define medium-term objectives.[293]

In early 2012, the CS RSS re-launched the SSR process and currently the CAR government is elaborating a revised three-year national strategy for SSR with the support from BINUCA.[294] This medium-term strategy is to comprise six sub-

---

[283] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009); STP/SIU BINUCA (2012b).

[284] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[285] CS RSS/STP (2010); DCAF/ISSAT (2009a).

[286] UN DPKO (2012).

[287] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[288] Ibid.

[289] Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009) p. 71.

[290] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[291] CAR Government (2011a).

[292] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

[293] UNSC (2011) S/2011/739, p. 6.

[294] CS RSS (2012); UNSC (2012) S/2012/374, p. 6.

sectoral strategies[295] based on the assessment from the national seminar in 2008.[296] The sub-sectoral strategies will incorporate existing relevant documents[297] developed by the national government to provide a common strategic framework for reforms.[298]

4.9 Donor Coordination

The lack of donor coordination has been identified as a major obstacle to implementation of reforms of the security sector. International actors all have their individual understanding of SSR and security, despite efforts to develop common policy frameworks. However, a locally-owned process and a clear strategic direction may enhance coordination of donors' different activities.

In the CAR, the different approaches to SSR have had an impact on donor coordination and implementation of reforms. In particular, the French understanding of SSR has affected the prospects for implementing comprehensive reforms, as described in the beginning of this chapter. However, the deployment of the multidisciplinary team of international experts in 2008/2009 improved donor coordination and had a positive impact on implementation of SSR, as it enhanced coordination between the main donors. Once the team left, donors started to pursue their own objectives without coordinating efforts. At this point, weak local ownership and the absence of a clear strategy had a negative impact on donor coordination and implementation of holistic reforms of the security sector, despite efforts from BINUCA to coordinate national and international stakeholders.

Whereas France is mainly concerned with stability and security in the traditional sense in the CAR, the EU puts its efforts into rule of law, human rights and democratic governance and has been an eager promoter of the OECD approach to SSR, advocating a holistic approach in the CAR from the outset.[299] The UN also supports a holistic approach to SSR in the CAR through UNDP and the UN integrated mission, BINUCA. The different approaches to SSR have had an

---

[295] The sectors concerned are the armed forces and gendarmerie, the police, the justice sector, territorial management, public finance and democratic control. A medium-term strategy for democratic control has already been developed but is to be revised.

[296] UNSC (2012) S/2012/374 p. 6.

[297] These documents include: la Déclaration de politique générale gouvernementale (May 2011), le Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté de deuxième génération (April 2011), la Stratégie de communication pour la RSS (April 2010), la Stratégie spécifique du groupe thématique contrôle démocratique (January 2011), la Stratégie nationale de réintégration des ex-combattants (July 2011), la Stratégie décennale de la Justice (October 2009), la Loi de programmation militaire (2009-2013), la Stratégie sectorielle de la RSS en RCA (October 2009). Source: STP/SIU BINUCA (2012a).

[298] UNSC (2012) S/2012/374, p. 6.

[299] Bagayoko (2010); Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.

impact on donor coordination and implementation of SSR, in particular in the absence of a strategic framework guiding reforms during 2010 and 2011.[300]

Nevertheless, the CAR provides a good example of how donor coordination can be facilitated in the field. In 2008, the EU and the UNDP jointly deployed a multidisciplinary team of international experts, to support the national authorities in implementing the strategy from the national seminar. This joint approach enhanced coordination between the main donors assisting in the field at the time as it brought together the EU, France and the UNDP.[301] The presence of the team was crucial for maintaining a holistic approach to SSR as it enhanced coordination between national actors *and* between donors.[302] The international experts on defence and police were French and already posted in the CAR, now changing roles from bilateral advisers to members of the multidisciplinary team.[303] Hence, the presence of the team also integrated France's work into the holistic SSR approach.

BINUCA, and in particular the SIU, has assumed a role as the international SSR coordinator in the CAR following its transformation into a UN integrated mission in 2010. However, the lack of clear strategic direction was an obstacle to BINUCA's efforts to coordinating international actors in 2010 and 2011. In the absence of a clear strategy, donors have ceased to coordinate their activities and security actors have pursued their activities disconnected from development actors who, on the other hand, have shown a limited interest in engaging in more traditional security issues. During the interviews, several international stakeholders asked the author for updates on the activities of other donors.[304] This demonstrates the lack of donor coordination and cooperation with regards to SSR in the CAR.

---

[300] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[301] DCAF/ISSAT (2009b).
[302] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.
[303] Bagayoko (2010) p. 36.
[304] Interviews, Bangui, September and October 2011.f

5 Conclusions

This study has provided an analysis of the SSR process in the CAR with the aim to increase the understanding of challenges to SSR and security sector capacity building in weak states emerging from war. Throughout the analysis, the aim has been to scrutinise how factors that are thought to impact on implementation of holistic SSR in weak post-war states, have affected implementation of SSR in the CAR. The findings from this study validate some of the propositions from previous research and the results highlight the complexity of undertaking or supporting SSR in weak post-war states. However, some of the findings seem to be particular to the CAR case.

The dysfunctional security sector in the CAR has been in need of reforms for decades. The state security forces in the CAR are not capable of protecting the population and have often been perpetrators of violence. The state has been neither able nor willing to provide security. The aim of the SSR process in the CAR is to address these shortfalls but SSR has proven to be a challenging endeavour and in the analysis a number of explanations emerge. In general, the ambitions of SSR in the CAR are high while the conditions for SSR are poor.

There are some factors that are particular to the CAR, which partly explain why implementation of SSR has been so difficult to undertake. First of all, the influence of France in the security and defence sector explains some of the difficulties. France has been reluctant to let other donors exert any significant influence over security and defence matters in the CAR, often pursuing French objectives at the expense of the holistic approach. France mainly approaches reforms of the security sector as a security, not development, matter. In addition, the strong influence and presence of the former colonial power has been an obstacle to local ownership, something that is at heart of SSR.

Another aspect which is particular to the CAR case is that the root causes of the armed conflicts partly can be found in the dysfunctional security sector. This concerns several of the general factors that constitute a challenge to implementation of SSR in weak post-war states. This is particularly so with regards to the link between DDR and SSR, and the interaction between SSR and other peacebuilding activities. The weak link between DDR and SSR in the CAR has diminished the prospects for SSR to contribute to the security of the population. An understanding of the root causes of the conflict is necessary to determine in which way SSR and DDR should be linked in weak post-war states. Timing and sequencing of other peacebuilding activities, and a lack of understanding of the dynamics between SSR and simultaneous political processes among involved stakeholders, have hampered implementation of reforms of the security sector in the CAR. SSR is a political process and must be understood as such.

In the CAR, the holistic SSR approach, as promoted by OECD and a number of other donors, has been applied literally. The analysis shows that despite efforts to engage in both institution building and equipping and training of the security forces, informal power structures are an obstacle to *de facto* democratic control of the security forces. Hence, it is important to acknowledge these informal structures for reforms to have an actual impact. The CAR provides an example of how a holistic approach to SSR can be applied in a weak post-war state and the analysis highlights some of the aspects which need to be considered when international partners decide to support comprehensive reforms of the security sector in such contexts.

Local ownership in weak post-war states is challenging due to weak capacity of the national authorities. It may also be difficult for international partners to identify which national actors are willing to undertake SSR. Since SSR touches upon the very core of the sovereign state, at least some members of the government of the recipient state must be willing to reform the security sector. However, as this study shows, those in power may be reluctant to undertake governance reforms to increase transparency of defence and security matters. This creates a dilemma in cases where the executive controls the parliament and personal agendas guide the actions of the political leadership.

The CAR case demonstrates that despite the inherent challenges to local ownership in weak post-war states, it is feasible with the support from international partners in terms of providing technical advice and human resources. While the national government should be in charge of the process and take decisions on the political and strategic level, local ownership needs to be sustained through external technical support to enhance the capacity of the national authorities to undertake reforms. However, the approach of these technical advisors determines whether their presence will contribute to implementation of holistic SSR or not. The partner that provides such support may have other interest than supporting holistic SSR.

To exclude civil society, local leaders and informal security providers from the process and work exclusively with the government challenges the legitimacy and sustainability of reforms in weak post-war states. This is particularly so in cases such as the CAR, where state institutions are concentrated to the capital and the government shows little interest in the security of the population in the rest of the country. While the government, at least when it is democratically elected as in the CAR, should be the main partner of donors it is crucial to recognise the internal power dynamics in the recipient country to avoid for reforms to be counterproductive and contribute to increased militarisation and marginalisation of certain groups.

One of the major challenges to holistic SSR in the CAR, as in other weak post-war states, is the volatile security environment. The reluctance of the government to implement reforms which aim to enhance democratic governance and the

tendency to prioritise strengthening the military can partly be explained by the persistent insecurity in post-war contexts. To alleviate the immediate security dilemma, international partners can, instead of equipping and training the security forces, support peacebuilding activities which are complementary to SSR. For example, international or regional organisations can provide third party security guarantees or support DRR. It is important that external actors understand the root causes of the armed conflicts to be able to identify which other peacebuilding activities may increase security in the short-term. SSR is a long-term process and demands long-term engagement from international partners in combination with other peacebuilding measures to have an actual effect on the security of the population. If donors are not willing to provide this and deal with the challenges and constraints, they should reconsider whether it is worth to even initiate, encourage and engage in SSR. SSR is not a silver bullet which can contribute to building peace, prevent future armed conflict, improve human rights, ensure democratic governance of the security forces and improve the capacity of these forces to provide the population with security all at once. Failure, on behalf of donors and the recipient country, to acknowledge the limits of SSR, may lead to disappointment and a stalled SSR process, as in the CAR case. In weak states emerging from war, it may be necessary to sequence efforts to reform the security sector, also in relation to other peacebuilding efforts.

SSR is a long-term process and in weak post-war states the necessary means to undertake reforms are often lacking. Hence, firm donor engagement is necessary for reforms to proceed and unrealistic expectations on the national authorities do little to facilitate SSR. While it is understandable that international partners ask for results, they need to improve their understanding of how weak capacity, in terms of human and management resources, restrains the national authorities. In addition, a lack of political will on behalf of the national government, as in the case of the CAR, should not come as a surprise to international partners given the unstable security situation, the legacy of armed conflict and the historically militarised administration. To find ways to encourage the national authorities to pursue SSR is better than suggesting external control of the process, at least if the aim is to promote local ownership. Without the necessary resources and firm engagement on behalf of the international community, the recipient country cannot possibly commit to long-term reforms.

This study also confirms the need for clear strategic direction for reforms to be implemented. A detailed strategy is necessary for two main reasons. First of all, a clear strategy is necessary for donors to be willing to contribute financially to SSR. However, as is demonstrated in the analysis, it is difficult for national authorities to develop strategies without the technical support of international partners. While strategies should be developed by national actors to ensure that the strategic view is anchored within the national government, divergent interests and low capacity means that external technical support is necessary. Secondly, a detailed strategy provides a common framework for all involved actors which

improves coordination as it provides a common understanding of the objective of reforms.

Donor coordination is not only dependant on a clear strategy. In addition, mechanisms to bring together involved international stakeholders may also be necessary. In the CAR, the deployment of a multidisciplinary team of international experts did not only increase the capacity of the national authorities to implement reforms but it also enhanced donor coordination. This external support proved crucial and contributed to implementation of holistic SSR. The CAR case demonstrated how innovative measures, such as the deployment of the multidisciplinary team can bring together international stakeholders which not necessarily share a common understanding of SSR.

To summarise, the analysis of the SSR process in the CAR shows that for implementation of holistic SSR to happen, the national government must be both willing and able to undertake reforms. Whereas international partners can enhance the capacity of the national government to undertake reforms and develop strategies, the question of willingness is a bit more complex. Reforms need to come from within and must be anchored in the national government. In cases such as the CAR, where political will is demonstrated at the outset and then diminishes, international partners need to analyse the underlying reasons for this. It should be possible to encourage national authorities to undertake reforms if the will was there at the outset. This may be complicated but necessary if local ownership is to be sustained. In weak post-war states reforms take time. In an environment of deep mistrust, where insecurity and political instability persist, SSR is a sensitive political process. Therefore patience and a firm engagement should be a part of the approach of international partners if reforms are to have any effect.

Recent developments in the CAR provide a new window of opportunity for SSR in the country. The presidential and legislative elections in 2011, the renewed DDR efforts and the announcement of the main rebel groups to enter the peace process, to transform into political parties or to dissolve, gives the government and the donors an opportunity to pursue the path set out at the national seminar on SSR in 2008. International partners should continue to encourage the CAR government following the decision to re-launch the SSR process. International support to the current development of a three-year strategy for SSR in the CAR is a positive step forward.

As this study demonstrates, firm international engagement is necessary for SSR in the CAR to be implemented. In addition, other peacebuilding initiatives should be considered in relation to SSR to avoid that the reform process stalls. The security situation is highly unstable and political developments will affect the prospect for SSR in the near future. A reinforced third-party intervention could mitigate the security dilemma and help to stabilise the security situation. In light of this it is unfortunate that MICOPAX plans to withdraw in 2013.

Annex A – Structure for Implementing and Coordinating SSR

Comité sectoriel de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité (CS RSS)

The highest decision-making body for SSR in the CAR

Responsible for the strategic and political direction of SSR

Chaired by the Minister of Defence and comprises eight other ministers

Secrétariat technique permanent (STP)

The national coordination mechanism for SSR

Headed by a national coordinator assisted by a deputy

Functions as a link between the political/strategic level (the CS RSS) and the technical level (the thematic groups)

Works closely together with the SIU

Thematic groups

Nine thematic groups work on the following sectors: defence, police, territorial management, public finance, judiciary, intelligence, democratic control, DDR and communication (DDR and communication are yet to be operational)

Each thematic group is headed by a *Chargé de mission*

The thematic groups are responsible for implementation of SSR within its respective sector

Security Institutions Unit (SIU) within BINUCA

Works closely together with the STP

Supports coherence and implementation of national SSR and DDR strategies

Supports national actors on strategic, operation and tactical level

Manages the political and technical level of DDR and SSR

Facilitates the coordination between UN actors and between other international actors

Supports fundraising for SSR and DDR

Encourages the link between SSR and DDR

Annex B – State Security Forces

Army

The Central African Armed Forces, FACA, are concentrated to the capital. FACA comprise some 5000 troops and is tasked to ensure territorial integrity, national defence and citizen protection. In 2008, FACA mainly comprised 'loyalists' from the pre-mutiny army, former mutineers from the mutinies in 1996/1997 and Chadian mercenaries, so called *liberateurs,* who helped Bozizé take power in 2003. The latter forms the core of the presidential guard. Multi-ethnical recruitment and retirement of ageing officers may change the dynamics of the force following implementation of SSR.

Presidential Guard

The Presidential (or Republican) Guard is formally a part of the FACA but is under the direct control of the Head of State. The Presidential Guard comprise some 1000 officers (estimations between 800-1200 depending on the source) and is mainly responsible for the security of the president. These forces, which mainly consist of Chadian mercenaries, constitute the most important security pillar of the current government and are better trained and paid than the rest of the army.

Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie comprises 1800 officers who are tasked with enforcing judicial and administrative rules, maintaining public order and military police duties throughout the country. The Gendarmerie is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence.

National Police

The National Police, under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for domestic law enforcement for the whole country and comprises some 1500 officers. High ranking officers outnumber those tasked with everyday police work resulting in a 'reversed pyramid' structure of the force.

Municipal Police

The role of the Municipal Police is unclear due to the absence of a clear legal mandate. The municipal police forces are under the control of the mayors (who are appointed directly by the government) and are present in the capital and a few other towns. No reliable information on the current number of officers is available.

Intelligence Services

The intelligence services are divided across a number of government organisations including the Office of the President, the FACA and the Ministry of Interior. The services are tasked to ensure political stability and monitors CAR and foreign nationals who may pose a threat to the government. There is no mechanism coordinating the different services and no legal mandate regulates the activities of the intelligence services.

Customs

Some 450 customs agents are tasked to monitor the borders of the country to counter illicit trafficking of goods, arms, drugs and human beings. The customs services are under the authority of the Ministry of Finance.

Waters and Forest Rangers

Some 400 rangers are responsible for protection of wildlife and the environment under the authority of the Ministry of Waters, Forest, Hunting and Fishing.

Annex C – Main Rebel Groups[305]

APRD - Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie

The APRD is led by Jean-Jaques Demafouth, former defence minister under President Ange-Felix Patassé. Demafouth ran for president in 2005 and 2011. APRD signed the Libreville Peace Agreement with the government in 2008. By 2011 all hostilities had ceased and the rebels started to disarm and demobilise, but still controlled large parts of the north-western CAR. APRD has also been in armed conflict with the Chadian rebel group *Front populaire pour le redressement* (FPR), which operates in the CAR. In May 2012, the APRD reportedly was dissolved.

CPJP - Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix

This rebel group emerged in the north-eastern part of the CAR in 2008. After the leader Charles Massi, former minister of the government 2005-2008 and presidential candidate in 2005 disappeared in 2010, Abdoulaye Hissène led the rebels. A cease fire was signed with the government in June 2011. However, the CPJP is still active in the north-eastern and central-eastern parts of the country and clashed with the *Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR) in a battle over control of diamond mines in September 2011. The two groups signed a cease fire in October the same year. On August 25, CPJP signed the Libreville Peace Agreement with the government and decided to transform into a political party. However, splinter groups continue the armed struggle against the government.

FDPC - Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain

FDPC was one of the first rebel groups to take up arms against Bozizé. FDPC is led by the former Head of President Patassé's Presidential Guard Martin Koumtamadji, also known as Abdoulaye Miskine. In July 2007 the rebel group signed a peace agreement with the government and signed the Libreville Peace Agreement in 2008. As of April 2012 the FDPC had withdrawn from the DDR process and threatened to take up arms against the government.

---

[305] The list includes the main rebel groups active in the CAR between 2005 and 2012 but is not exhaustive. It is important to note that rebel groups in the CAR often transform, split and merge.

FPR - Front populaire pour le redressement

This Chadian rebel group has been active in the CAR since 2008 and is led by Baba Laddé who was arrested in 2009 in the CAR, transferred to Chad but escaped and joined his forces in 2011. The group has mainly been active in the centre-north of the country. The leader occasionally threatens to oust both the CAR and Chadian presidents. In January 2012, FACA and Chadian armed forces launched a joint military operation against the FPR. In September 2012, the leader of the group turned himself in to the CAR authorities and was repatriated to Chad. However, elements of the FPR continue to harass the population.

LRA – Lord's Resistance Army

These Ugandan rebels moved into the CAR in 2008 after failed peace talks with the Ugandan government. The leader Joseph Kony and his rebels are also active in South Sudan and the DRC. Currently, a joint AU mission comprising 5000 troops from Uganda, the CAR, South Sudan and the DRC, is to launch a military operation with the logistic support from US special troops. Due to lack of resources the mission had not yet been deployed as of July 2012. Currently the Ugandan army undertake operations together with the FACA in eastern CAR to defeat the rebels.

MLCJ - Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice

Abakar Sabone is the leader of this group which is based in the far north-east of the country. MLCJ signed the Libreville Peace Agreement in 2008 but continued to clash with government forces sporadically and had not yet started to disarm and demobilise as of May 2012.

UFDR - Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement

UFDR was created in 2005 after its founders had fallen out with Bozizé after helping him taking power. Its leader Zakaria Damane signed the Libreville Peace Agreement with the government in June 2008 and has been in temporary alliances with the FACA. The rebels clashed with CPJP over control of diamond mines in September 2011. The UFDR participates in the DDR process but had not yet started to demobilise and disarm as of May 2012. The rebels control a large area in the north-western part of the country.

UFR - Union des forces républicaines

This group is led by Florian Njadder and took up arms in 2005 against Bozizé. UFR is based in the north-west, has signed the Libreville Peace Agreement and entered the DDR process but had not yet started to disarm as of May 2012. The number of combatants is low, not exceeding a hundred and its presence is limited to a small area in the north.

Annex D – Peace Support Operations 2008-2012

NAME OF MISSION	DURATION	LEGAL MANDATE	TYPE OF MISSION
FOMUC *Force multinationale en Centrafrique*	2 October **2002** – 12 July **2008**	Decision taken at the summit of heads of states of *Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale* (CEMAC) on 2 October 2002	**Military** composed of 350 soldiers from the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad. Support from 200 French troops
BONUCA *Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine*	16 February **2000** – 31 December **2009**	**UN Security Council** Presidential Statement S/PRST/2000/5 of 10 February 2000	**Civilian** with a limited number of military and police advisors (5 military advisors and 6 police officers in 2009 of a total of 95 employees)
MINURCAT *Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad*	25 September **2007** – 31 December **2010**	**UN Security Council** resolution 1778 and resolution 1861	**Military/police** including 300 police officers, 50 military liaison officers and the 2500 – 3000 troops from the military operation **EUFOR – TCHAD/RCA** as of 2009

EUFOR – TCHAD/RCA *European Union Force Tchad/République centrafricaine*	15 October **2007** – 15 March **2009**	**EU Council Joint Action** 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October, **UN Security Council** resolutions 1778, 1834 and 1861	**Military** composed of between 2500 – 3000 soldiers
MICOPAX *Mission de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine*	12 July **2008** Ongoing with current mandate to expire in **2013**	**ECCAS** took over FOMUC from CEMAC through decision N°02/ECCAS/CCEG/XIII/08 and transformed it into MICOPAX	**Military/police** with 494 soldiers, 31 military observers and 167 police officers
BINUCA *Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine*	1 January **2010** Ongoing with current mandate to expire in **2013**	BINUCA replaced BONUCA with **UN Security Council** Presidential Statement S/PRST/2009/5 of 7 April 2009	**Civilian** UN integrated mission headed by a UN SGSR comprising 77 civil administrators, two military advisors and two police advisors
AU RCI-LRA *African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative against Lord's Resistance Army*	2 November **2011** Officially ongoing with no clear end-date but not yet deployed due to lack of resources	**AU Peace and Security Council** decision adopted at 299th meeting, 22 November 2011	**Military** and planned to comprise some 5000 soldiers from Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and the CAR. Supported by US military advisors

Source: Réseau Francophone de Recherché sur les Opérations de Paix (2012).

References

Publications, reports and articles

Albrecht Peter & Buur Lars (2009) 'An uneasy marriage: non-state actors and police reform', *Policing and Society*, 19:4.

Amnesty International (2011) *Central African Republic: Action Needed to End Decades of Abuse,* 20 October, London, UK.

Andersen, Louise (2006) 'When security is found beyond the state', *Forum for Development Studies*, 33:2.

Andersen, Louise, Moller Bjorn & Stepputat, Finn (eds.) (2007) *Fragile states and insecure people? Violence, security and statehood in the twenty-first century*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Autesserre, Séverine (2010) *The trouble With the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*, New York; Cambridge University Press.

Bagayoko, Niagalé (2008) *L'Union Européenne et la Réforme des Systèmes de Sécurité*, Note d'Analyse du GRIP, 17 décembre 2008, Bruxelles, http://www.grip.org/fr/siteweb/images/NOTES_ANALYSE/2008/NA_2008-12-17_FR_N-BAGAYOKO.pdf, (September 4, 2012).

Bagayoko, Niagalé (2010) 'Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic', *IDS Working Paper*, Vol.2010, no.351, Institute of Development Studies.

Baker, Bruce (2009) 'Introduction: Policing post-conflict societies: helping out the state', *Policing and Society*, 19:4.

Baker, Bruce & Scheye, Eric (2007) 'Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile states', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 7:4.

Bendix, Daniel & Stanley, Ruth (2008) *Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Promise and the Practice of a New Donor Approach* Occasional Paper Series: Volume 3, Number 2, 2008.

Berman, Eric G. & Lombard, Louisa L. (2008) *The Central African Republic and Small Arms - A Regional Tinderbox,* Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Bierschenk, Thomas & de Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier (1997) 'Local Powers and a Distant State in Rural Central African Republic', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 35, n° 3, 1997.

Brégeon, Jean-Joel (1998) *Un rêve d'Afrique. Administrateurs en Oubangui-Chari, la Cendrillon de l'empire*, Paris: Denoël.

Bryden, Alan & Olonisakin, Funmi (2010) 'Conceptualising Security Sector Transformation in Africa', in Bryden, Alan & Olonisakin, Funmi (eds.) *Security Sector transformation in Africa*, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Bryden, Alan & Scherrer, Vincenza (2012a) 'The DDR-SSR Nexus: Turning Practical Experience into Good Practice' in Bryden, Alan & Scherrer, Vincenza, (eds.) (2012) *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform*, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Bryden, Alan & Scherrer, Vincenza (2012b) 'The DDR-SSR Nexus: Concepts and Policies' in Bryden, Alan & Scherrer, Vincenza (eds.) (2012) *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform*, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Brzoska, Michael (2006) 'Introduction: Criteria for evaluating post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform in peace support operations', *International Peacekeeping*, 13:1.

Call, Charles T. (2011) 'Beyond the 'failed state': Toward conceptual alternatives', *European Journal of International Relations,* 17:2.

Cawthra, Gavin & Luckham, Robin (eds.) (2003) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books Ltd.

Clément, Caty (2009) 'Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past', in Born, Hans & Schnabel, Albert (eds.) (2009) *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, DCAF, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

DCAF (2009a) 'Security Sector Governance and Reform', *DCAF Backgrounder*, 05/2009, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Governance-and-Reform, (August 14, 2012).

DCAF (2009b) 'Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding', *DCAF Backgrounder,* 05/2009, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Reform-in-Post-Conflict-Peacebuilding, (September 4, 2012)

De Vries, Hugo & van Veen, Erwin (2010) *Living apart together: On the Difficult Linkage between DDR and SSR in Post-Conflict Environments,* CRU Policy Brief 15, October 2010, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/CRU-policy-brief-Living-apart-Together.pdf , (July 5, 2012).

Donais, Timothy (2008) 'Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform', in Donais, Timothy (ed.) (2008) *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, Zurich: LIT Verlag.

Downes, Mark & Muggah, Robert (2010) 'Breathing Room: Interim Stabilization and Security Sector Reform in the Post-War Period' in Sedra, Mark (ed.) (2010) *The future of security sector reform*, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada.

Egnell, Robert & Haldén, Peter (2009) 'Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory', Conflict, Security & Development, 9:1.

Ewane, Etah F. (2011) *The Role of the European Union in ECCAS Security Architecture,* paper presented at panel 42: 'Behind Africa's Engagement for Peace and Security: Actors, Mechanisms and Outcomes', at the 4th European Conference on African Studies (ECAS 4), http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/41-60/panel-42/Etah-Ewane-Full-Paper.pdf, (August 31, 2012).

Fortna, Virginia Page (2008) *Does Peacekeeping Work: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ginifer, Jeremy (2006) 'The Challenge of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions: The Case of Sierra Leone', *Democratization*, 13:5.

Glassmyer, Katherine & Sambanis, Nicholas (2008) 'Rebel Military Integration and Civil War Termination', *Journal of Peace Research* 45:3.

Hartzell, Caroline A. & Hoddie, Matthew (2003) 'Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management', *American Journal of Political Science* 47:2.

Human Rights Watch (2007) 'State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians', *Human Rights Watch Report*, Vol.19, No.14, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6469~v~Central_African_Republic__Action_Needed_to_End_Decades_of_Abuse.pdf, (July 11, 2012).

Humphreys, Macartan & Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2007) 'Demobilization and Reintegration', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51:4.

Ingerstad, Gabriella (2012) *Lord's Resistance Army i Centralafrika: Gränsöverskridande lösningar på ett regionalt hot*, FOI-R--3399—SE.

International Crisis Group (2007) 'Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State', *ICG Africa Report no 144*, 13 December 2007.

International Crisis Group (2008) 'Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue', *ICG Policy Briefing no 55*, Nairobi/Brussels, 9 December 2008.

International Crisis Group (2010) 'Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive', *ICG Policy Briefing no 69*, Nairobi/Brussels, 12 January 2010.

International Crisis Group (2011) 'Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa', *Africa Report N°181*, 7 November 2011.

Jarstad, Anna K (2008) 'Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions', in Jarstad , Anna K. & Sisk, Timothy D. (eds.) (2008) *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jörgel, Magnus & Utas, Mats (2007) *The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone*, FOI-R--2418—SE.

Kirwin, Matthew (2006) 'The Security Dilemma and Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire', *Nordic Journal of African Studies,* 15(1).

Lombard, Louisa (2012) 'Rébellion et limites de la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine', *Politique africaine* n° 125 - mars 2012.

Marchal, Roland (2009) *Aux marges du monde, en Afrique centrale…*, Les Etudes du CERI, No 153, mars 2009.

Martinelli, Marta & Klimis, Emmanuel (2009) 'La Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité en République Centrafricaine', *2009/5, GRIP*, Brussels.

McFate, Sean (2010) 'The link between DDR and SSR in conflict affected countries'*, USIP Special report 238*, May 2010, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR238McFate_DDR_SSR_Conflict.pdf, (July 5, 2012) .

Mehler, Andreas (2005) 'The Shaky Foundations, Adverse Circumstances, and Limited Achievements of Democratic Transition in the Central African Republic', in Villalón, Leonardo A. & VonDoepp, Peter (2005) *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments – Elite and Institutions.*

Mehler, Andreas (2008) 'Breaking the "Insecurity Trap"?: How Violence and Counter-violence are Perpetuated in Elite Power Struggles', *GIGA Working Paper No.87/2008*, Hamburg : German Institute of Global and Area Studies http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp87_mehler.pdf (July 29, 2012).

Mehler Andreas (2009) 'Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation', *GIGA Working Paper No. 116/2009* Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Mehler, Andreas (2010) 'Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic', *Armed Forces & Society,* published online 19 November 2010.

Mehler, Andreas (2012) 'Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic', *Armed Forces & Society*, 38:1.

Nathan, Laurie (2008) 'The Challenge of Local Ownership of SSR: from Donor Rhetoric to Practice', in Donais Timothy (ed.) (2008) *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, DCAF, Zurich: LIT Verlag.

N'Diaye, Boubacar (2007) 'Beyond Demobilization : Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic', *Working Paper No. 2,* MDRP, Washington, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Working_Paper2.pdf, (October 24, 2010).

N'Diaye, Boubacar (2009) 'Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic', in Born Hans & Schnabel Albert (eds.) (2009) *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments,* DCAF, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

N'Diaye, Boubacar (2012) 'The Central African Republic', in Bryden, Alan & Scherrer, Vincenza (2012) *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform*, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Nilsson, Claes & Svensson, Emma (2010) *Säkerhetssektorreform i förändring*, FOI-R--2816—SE.

Nilsson, Claes & Zetterlund, Kristina (2011) *Arming the Peace: the Sensitive Business of Capacity Building*, FOI-R--3269—SE.

OECD-DAC (2007) *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, Paris, France, OECD Publishing.

Persson, Mariam (2008) 'In the Absence of State Power - others will fill the vacuum', in Persson, Mariam; Jörgel Magnus & Matti Hanna (2008) *Beyond the Façade of Formal Statehood – Shadow Networks, "Big Men" and Franchised Rebellion – case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic,* The Swedish National Defence College.

Renner, Onana (2010) 'La réforme du secteur de sécurité en République centrafricaine:heurts et malheurs de la raison holistique', in Agokla, Kossi; Bagayoko, Niagalé & N'Diaye, Boubacar (eds.) (2010) *La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone*. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), March 2010.

Schnabel, Albert (2009) 'Ideal Requirements Versus Real Environments in Security Sector Reform' in Born, Hans & Schnabel, Albert (eds.) (2009), *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, DCAF, Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Sedra, Mark (2010a) 'Introduction: the future of security sector reform', in Sedra Mark (ed.) (2010) *The future of security sector reform*, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada.

Sedra Mark (2010b) 'Towards a second generation security sector reform', in Sedra Mark (ed.), (2010), *The future of security sector reform*, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada.

Skeppström, Emma & Weibull, Anna, (2011), *Security Force in the Making: Capacity Building in Kosovo,* FOI-R--3276—SE.

Spittaels, Steven & Hilgert, Filip (2007) 'Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic', *IPIS and Fatal Transactions report,* http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/IPIS_CAR_mappingconflictmo tives.pdf , (August 13, 2012).

UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*, New York: Oxford University Press

Walter, Barbara F. (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Woodward L. Susan (2003) 'In Whose Interest is Security Sector Reform? Lessons from the Balkans'*,* in Cawthra, Gavin & Luckham, Robin (eds.) (2003), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishements in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books Ltd.

Wulf, Herbert (2004) *Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries*, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Official and unpublished documents

Assemblée nationale française (2011) *Accord entre le gouvernement de la République française et le gouvernement de la République centrafricaine instituant un partenariat de défense,* Projet de loi n° 3197*,* http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/projets/pl3197.pdf, (July 1, 2012).

CAR Government (2007) *DSRP 2008-2010 Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté,* http://www.cf.undp.org/DSRP/CAR_PRSP_FRA.pdf, (March 12, 2012).

CAR Government (2009) *Programme décennal de réforme de la justice en RCA*, Ministère de la Justice, unpublished document.

CAR Government (2011a) *Stratégie du Moyen Terme (2011-2013) Sous Secteur "Contrôle Democratique", La Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité en République Centrafricaine*, January 2011.

CAR Government (2011b) *DSRP II 2011-2015 Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté*, http://www.cf.undp.org/DSRP%20II/DSRPII%20RCA%20Edit%C3%A9.pdf , (July 23, 2012).

CAR Government (2012) *Note conceptuelle en vie de la reunion du groupe des amis de la RCA,* unpublished, undated document.

CAR Ministère de la Defense (2008) *Rapport Final du comite preparatoire du séminaire national sur la réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Republique centrafriacine*, http://www.hdptcar.net/sites/www.hdptcar.net/files/rapport-final-definitive-du-15-07-08-corr-p12.pdf , (July 30, 2012).

CS RSS (2012) *Chronogramme pour la relance de la RSS Approuvée par le CS RSS,* 8 February 2012, unpublished document.

CS RSS/STP (2009) *Strategie Sectorielle de la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité en République Centrafricaine Document 1 : Partie narrative*, Table ronde sur la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité en République Centrafricaine, 29 October 2009.

CS RSS/STP (2010) *Situation de la RSS dépuis la tenue de la table ronde*, unpublished document.

DCAF/ISSAT (2009a) 'Part 1 – Possible follow-on activities for the EU to support the SSR-process in the Central African republic (CAR) during the first quarter of 2010'*, Mission Report from EU Evaluation in the Central African Republic, Bangui, 10-17 December 2009*, 22 December 2009, unpublished document.

DCAF/ISSAT (2009b)'Part 2 – Lessons for the future use of the EU/UNDP concept of a joint, multi-disciplinary team '*, Mission Report from EU Evaluation in the Central African Republic, Bangui, 10-17 December 2009*, 22 December 2009, unpublished document.

Equipe d'evaluateurs (2009) *Mission d'Evaluation Conjointe de la Reforme du Secteur de la Sécurité en RCA, entre le gouvernement et les partenaires techniques et financiers*, Bangui, February 2009.

Europeaid (2008) *Country Strategy Paper for the Central African Republic (2008-2013),* http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cf_csp10_fr.pdf , (May 17, 2012).

Libreville Peace Agreement (2008) *Accord de Paix Global entre Le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine et Les Mouvements politico-militaire centrafricans*, Libreveille, 21 Juin 2008, http://www.apo-opa.org/080623-1.pdf, (May 8, 2012).

STP/SIU BINUCA (2011) *Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité,* Presentation September 2011, unpublished power point presentation.

STP/SIU BINUCA (2012a) *Proposition de Méthode de Travail pour Relancer la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité/RSS*, Version consolidée 120204, unpublished document.

STP/SIU BINUCA (2012b) *Relance RSS Moyen Terme,* Presentation February 2012, unpublished power point presentation; CAR.

UNDP (2008) *Crucial Steps: Security Sector Reform in CAR*, report published with the support of the UNDP, http://www.hdptcar.net/sites/www.hdptcar.net/files/undp_ssr_report_may_2008.pdf, (July 23, 2012).

UNDP CAR (2011) *Fiche de projet: Projet de renforcement de l'Etat de droit à travers la justice et la sécurité (PRED),* http://www.cf.undp.org/FICHE%20PRED/Fiche_de_projet_PRED11%5B1%5D.pdf , (July 23, 2012).

UN PBC (2008) *Report of the mission to the CAR of the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission CAR configuration,* 10-11 July 2008.

UNSC (1997) S/1997/561, *Identical letters dated 18 July 1997 from the chargé d'affaires a.i. of the permanent mission of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to the secretary-general and to the president of the Security Council,* 22 July 1997.

UNSC (1999) S/1999/1236, *Letter dated 10 December 1999 prom the president of the Security council addressed to the Secretary-General,* 10 December 1999.

UNSC (2000) S/PRST/2000/5, *Presidential Statement*, 10 February 2000.

UNSC (2004) S/2004/1012, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic,* 23 December 2004.

UNSC (2007) *Repertoire 15th Supplement (2004 – 2007): Chapter V*, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2004-2007/04-07_05.pdf#page=80, (July 23, 2012).

UNSC (2008) S/2008/410, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country*, 23 June 2008.

UNSC (2008) S/2008/733, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country,* 26 November 2008.

UNSC (2008) S/2008/760, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad,* 4 December 2008.

UNSC (2009) S/2009/309, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country,* 12 June 2009.

UNSC (2009) S/PRST/2009/5, *Statement by the President of the Security Council,* 7 April 2009.

UNSC (2010) S/2010/295, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country*, 10 June 2010.

UNSC (2010) S/2010/409, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad,* 30 July 2010.

UNSC (2010) S/2010/584, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country,* 19 November 2010.

UNSC (2011) S/2011/311, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country,* 16 May 2011.

UNSC (2011) S/2011/739, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country,* 28 November 2011.

UNSC (2011) S/RES/2031, *Resolution 2031*, 21 December 2011.

UNSC (2012), S/2012/374 *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country,* 29 May 2012.

Websites

Ambassade de France en RCA (2012a) *La coopération militaire et de défense*, http://www.ambafrance-cf.org/La-cooperation-militaire-et-de,485, (August 1, 2012).

Ambassade de France en RCA (2012b) *La coopération Justice,*
http://www.ambafrance-cf.org/La-Justice, (August 1, 2012).

Ambassade de France en RCA (2012c) *La coopération Police,*
http://www.ambafrance-cf.org/La-Police, (August 1, 2012).

BINUCA (2012) *A propos de BINUCA,*
http://binuca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2876&language=en-US,
(May 17, 2012).

Centrafrique-Presse (2012) *Des jeunes mécontents de n'être pas retenus au
recrutement dans l'armée manifestent dans plusieurs points stratégiques de
Bangui,* Jeudi 2 août 2012, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-
des-jeunes-mecontents-de-n-etre-pas-retenus-au-recrutement-dans-l-armee-
prennent-plusieurs-points-st-108754133.html, (August 3, 2012).

Enough Project (2012) *In Report, U.N. Secretary-General Highlights Challenges
to the A.U.'s LRA Initiative,* 19 June 2012,
http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/report-un-secretary-general-highlights-
challenges-au-lra-initiative, (July 29, 2012).

EU (2010) *The European Union support to Central African Republic electoral
process*, Press release, MEMO/10/517, Brussels, 25 October 2010
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/517&for
mat=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (May 21, 2012).

European Commission (2012) *MICOPAX,*
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace-
support-operations/micopax_en.htm, (August 13, 2012).

Fund for Peace (2012) *Failed State Index 2012*,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi (February 20, 2012).

Radio France International (2012) *Le gouvernement centrafricain assume
l'offensive contre le rebelle tchadien Baba Laddé,* 25 janvier 2012,
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120125-le-gouvernement-centrafricain-assume-
offensive-contre-le-rebelle-tchadien-baba-ladd, (August 1, 2012).

Radio Ndeke Luka (2010) *RCA-France : l'accord de défense de 1960 révisé,* 19
Decembre 2010, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/politique/item/2686-rca-
france-l%E2%80%99accord-de-d%C3%A9fense-du-15-ao%C3%BBt-1960-
r%C3%A9vis%C3%A9, (May 17, 2012).

Radio Ndeke Luka (2012a) *La CPJP se dit favorable pour le retour de la paix.*Dimanche 8 Juillet 2012, http://radiondekeluka.org/securite/item/9897-la-cpjp-se-dit-d%5C'accord-pour-la-signature-de-l%5C'accord-de-paix, (August 1, 2012).

Radio Ndeke Luka (2012b) *Des barrières illégales démantelées à Berberati*, Dimanche 22 Juillet 2012, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/societe/item/10106-des-barri%C3%A8res-ill%C3%A9gales-d%C3%A9mantel%C3%A9es-, (July 23, 2012).

Reliefweb (2012) *DDR in CAR - hopes and hurdles,* 19 April 2012, http://reliefweb.int/node/491084, (May 13, 2012).

Réseau Francophone de recherché sur les opérations de paix (2012) *Centrafrique* http://www.operationspaix.net/, (August 1, 2012).

UNDP (2011) *Peacebuilding Fund in CAR*, Bangui, Central African Republic, 10 June 2011 http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF_Map_Total_EN_A3_11061011.pdf, (May 17, 2012).

UNDP CAR (2008) *Nos dernières nouvelles*, 3 November http://www.cf.undp.org/art_09_pred.htm, (May 17, 2012).

UNDP CAR (2012) *Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement Centrafrique*, http://www.cf.undp.org/, (August 1, 2012).

UNDP Human Development Index (2011) *Central African Republic Country Profile: Human Development Indicators*, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CAF.html, (May 21, 2012).

UN DPKO (2012) *SSR Newsletter*, No.13, January-March 2012, http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/7393/67705/file/SSR%20Newsletter%2013.pdf, (July 7, 2012).

UN PBF (2011) *The Central African Republic,* http://www.unpbf.org/countries/central-african-republic/, (May 17, 2012).

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2012) *Central African Republic/War and minor conflict,* UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Uppsala University, www.ucdp.uu.se/database, (July 31, 2012).

Interviews

BINUCA, Bangui, 3 September 2011.

BINUCA, Bangui, 6 September 2011.

BINUCA, Bangui, 10 September 2011.

BINUCA, Bangui, 15 September 2011.

CAR Civil Society Representative, Bangui, 23 September 2011.

CAR Civil Society Representative, Bangui, 20 October 2011 .

CAR Government, Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 6 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 8 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 13 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 21 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry for Relations with the Parliament, Bangui, 8 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry for Relations with the Parliament, Bangui, 15 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry for Waters, Forests, Hunting and Fishing, Bangui, 6 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry for Waters, Forests, Hunting and Fishing, Bangui, 20 September 2011.

CAR Government, Ministry for Water and Forest, Bangui, 3 October 2011.

CAR Government, Secrétariat technique permanent, Bangui, 6 September 2011.

CAR Government, Secrétariat technique permanent, Bangui, 15 September 2011.

CAR Government, Secrétariat technique permanent, Bangui, 24 October 2011.

CAR Journalist, Bangui, 23 September 2011.

European Commission, ECHO, Bangui, 17 October 2011.

EU Delegation, Bangui, 9 September 2011.

EU Delegation, Bangui, 17 September 2011.

EU Delegation, Bangui, 24 October 2011.

EU Delegation, Bangui, 27 October 2011.

EU Delegation, Bangui, 29 October 2011.

French Embassy, Bangui, 29 September 2011.

French Embassy, Bangui, 14 October 2011.

MICOPAX, Bangui, 13 October 2011.

UNDP, Bangui, 24 October 2011.

UNDP, Bangui, 25 October 2011.

US Embassy, Bangui, 18 October 2011.

Email correspondence

Central African Government official, 9 May 2012.

European diplomat, EU Delegation in Bangui, 9 May 2012.

French diplomat, French Embassy in Bangui, 9 May 2012.

French diplomat, French Embassy in Bangui, 18 May 2012.

UN diplomat, BINUCA, 4 August 2012.

Miscellaneous

Radio Ndeke Luka (2012c) *Interview with Colonel Augustin Tombou Commandant de Zone Adjoint des Forces Tripartites à Birao,* 14 August 2012, http://radiondekeluka.org/component/k2/item/10517-colonel-augustin-tombou, (August 14, 2012).

RJDH-RCA (2012) *Localisation des forces en présence en Centrafrique,* http://reseaudesjournalistesrca.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/localisation-des-forces-en-prc3a9sence.jpg, (August 28, 2012).

SSR seminar for police officers, l'Ecole Nationale de la Police, Bangui, 20-22 October 2011.

UN (2011) *Central African Republic,* Map No. 4048, Rev.4, United Nations, November 2011, Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/car.pdf, (June 7, 2012).