



Paradigm Lost?

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership

Camilla Elowson and Per Nordlund

Camilla Elowson and Per Nordlund

Paradigm Lost?

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy:
A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership

Titel	Paradigmskifte eller inte? Den gemensamma Afrika-EU strategin: en studie av partnerskapet för fred och säkerhet
Title	Paradigm Lost? The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership
Rapportnr/Report no	FOI-R--3752--SE
Månad/Month	December
Utgivningsår/Year	2013
Antal sidor/Pages	66
ISSN	1650-1942
Forskningsområde	8. Säkerhetspolitik
Projektnr/Project no	A11306
Godkänd av/Approved by	Maria Lignell Jakobsson
Ansvarig avdelning	Försvarsanalys/Defence Analysis

Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk. All form av kopiering, översättning eller bearbetning utan medgivande är förbjuden.

This work is protected under the Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (SFS 1960:729). Any form of reproduction, translation or modification without permission is prohibited.

Cover: Scanpix/Oliver Hoslet

Sammanfattning

Den här rapporten är skriven inom ramen för Afrikaprojektet vid FOI på uppdrag av Försvarsdepartementet. Rapporten analyserar den gemensamma Afrika-EU-strategin (Joint Africa-EU Strategy, JAES) med fokus på partnerskapet för fred och säkerhet. Inledningsvis ges en bakgrund till strategin och partnerskapet, och utvecklingen sedan strategin antogs 2007 sammanfattas. Händelseutvecklingen på både den afrikanska sidan och inom EU diskuteras, varefter slutsatser och rekommendationer för framtiden presenteras.

Utgångspunkten utgörs av partnerskapets handlingsplan för fred och säkerhet och dess tre prioriterade åtgärder:

1. Politisk dialog.
2. Operationalisering av den afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen (African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA).
3. Förutsägbar finansiering av fredsfrämjande operationer, utförda eller auktoriserade av AU.

JAES representerar en långsiktig ambition att i grunden förändra relationerna mellan Afrika och EU. Behovet av ett paradigmskifte har uppmärksamats av de kontinentala aktörerna: från koloniala och biståndsgivarmönster, mot en gemensamt formulerad agenda för att åstadkomma ett partnerskap mellan jämlikar. Resultaten har hittills varit nedslående, och de berörda parterna har visat allt mindre engagemang för JAES under de senaste åren. Partnerskapet för fred och säkerhet fungerar förhållandevis väl jämfört med de sju andra partnerskapen inom JAES, men det finns fortfarande stort utrymme för förbättringar. Bland slutsatserna från den här rapporten kan nämnas: det akuta behovet av att förbättra den politiska dialog- och partnerskapskulturen, behovet av fortsatt stöd till centralisering genom ett stärkt AU och den långsiktiga visionen om ett enat Afrika, vikten av att bygga vidare utifrån de konkreta framsteg som gjorts inom handlingsplanen, betydelsen av att stärka både EU:s och AU:s medlemsstaters engagemang i processen, samt nödvändigheten av att stimulera afrikanska aktörers egen finansiering av JAES.

Slutligen blir frågan: vilka åtgärder kan vidtas för att paradigmskiftet mellan Afrika och EU inte ska gå helt förlorat? I denna rapport dras slutsatsen att en omfattande förändring av relationerna mellan Afrika och EU ännu är avlägsen. En betydande ökning av afrikansk finansiering av JAES och av APSA, samt genuin politisk dialog–i större omfattning och på högre nivå–mellan EU:s politiska ledning och dess afrikanska samarbetspartners är av avgörande betydelse för strategins genomförande. Om inte detta kan åstadkommas inom en snar framtid riskerar JAES att förbli en ambitiös men ofullbordad vision.

Nyckelord: Afrikanska unionen, AU, Europeiska unionen, EU, Afrika, JAES, afrikansk säkerhet, APSA, fred och säkerhet, gemensam Afrika-EU strategi, fredsfrämjande insatser, Amani Africa, partnerskapskultur, politisk dialog, säkerhetspolitik.

Summary

This report, commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, examines the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The report provides a background to the partnership and the strategy, and an overview of progress since the adoption of the JAES in December 2007. Developments on the African and the EU side are discussed, and conclusions and recommendations for the journey ahead are presented.

The point of departure is the Peace and Security Action Plan and its three Priority Actions:

1. Political dialogue.
2. Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
3. Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) undertaken by the AU or under its authority.

The JAES represents a long-term ambition to fundamentally change relations between Africa and the EU. The continental actors recognise the need for a paradigm shift: away from colonial and aid patterns of interaction and towards a mutually defined agenda for change between equals. The results so far, however, have to be regarded as a disappointment, and stakeholders have manifested less commitment to the JAES in the last few years. While the Peace and Security Partnership overall is performing better than the other seven partnerships within the JAES, there is still much room for improvement. Findings of the report include: the urgent need to improve the political dialogue and partnership culture, the need for continued support to centralisation through the strengthening of the AU and the long-term vision of Africa as one, the importance of building on concrete progress in the Action Plan, the necessity of strengthening buy-in to the process from EU and AU member states, and the urgency of stimulating increased funding of the JAES from African partners.

Ultimately the question is: What is the scope for ensuring that the envisaged paradigm shift in Africa-EU relations is not lost entirely? The report finds that a significant shift in Africa-EU relations is still a distant future. A substantial increase of African funding for the JAES and APSA, and a strong commitment of the EU's political leaders to engage in a serious political dialogue with their African partners are of crucial importance for the realisation of the strategy. If this does not happen in the near future, the JAES is likely to remain an ambitious but unfulfilled vision.

Keywords: African Union, AU, European Union, EU, Africa, Joint Africa-EU Strategy, JAES, African Security, African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA, Peace and Security, Peace and Security Partnership, Peace Support Operations, Amani Africa, Partnership Culture, Political Dialogue, Security Policy.

List of contents

1	Introduction	7
1.1	Background	7
1.2	The aim of the report	9
1.3	Method, material and outline of the study	9
2	Implementation of the Peace and Security Partnership – the current state of play	11
2.1	Current status	11
2.2	Achievements and challenges	12
2.2.1	Action plan initiatives	12
2.2.2	The strategy as such	19
2.2.3	Partnership culture	21
3	Developments on the EU side	26
3.1	Origins of the partnership	26
3.2	New dynamics in Europe	27
3.3	EU reform agenda for the JAES	29
3.4	Objections to the EU reform proposals	30
3.5	EU coordination	31
3.6	The JAES as a case of EU policy	34
3.7	Summing up the EU's engagement with the JAES	35
4	Developments on the AU side	36
4.1	New dynamics in Africa	36
4.2	The new AU Commission	37
4.3	Strategic planning	39
4.4	Building new partnerships	39
4.5	Commitment to seeking alternative sources of funding for the AU	41
4.6	The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises	43
4.7	Remaining challenges	44

4.7.1	Relations amongst African stakeholders	45
5	The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: How can it be revitalised?	48
5.1	Planning ahead of the 2014 summit	48
5.2	Conclusion: What way forward?	50
5.2.1	Future trends.....	54
	References	56
	Interviews	61
	Acronyms	62
	Appendix 1: AU PSD Organisation	64
	Appendix 2: EEAS Organisation	65
	Appendix 3: EC Organisation, JAES	66

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in Lisbon 2007 was the culmination of mutual ambitions to accomplish a paradigm shift in continent-to-continent relations. To accomplish this, a new kind of partnership was needed that would eschew post-colonial and donor-recipient driven patterns of interaction, and instead recognise the continents as equal and interdependent partners. The focus of this report is on the peace and security nexus of Africa-EU relations, a topic which has been at the top of the agenda since the first Africa-EU Heads of State Summit in Cairo 2000. The study can therefore also serve as a relevant case for tracing the evolution of Africa-EU relations in the post-cold war era.¹

The signing of the JAES by Heads of State in December 2007 established a bold and ambitious agenda for the future, aiming to reformulate and raise Africa-EU relations to a new strategic and political level. Today, with new EU member states and the new African country of South Sudan, the partnership encompasses 82 nation states on the two continents. This represents more than 40% of the United Nations (UN) member countries, further underscoring the importance, but also the complexity, of the JAES.

Developments since the adoption of the JAES in 2007 add to this complexity. These developments include institutional consolidation of African Union (AU) institutions and institutional changes such as the Lisbon Treaty for the EU, but also challenges such as the Eurozone economic crisis, the political crisis and transitions in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as enabling factors such as the continued economic progress in many African countries and the new vision for Africa's development.²

At present, the JAES consists of eight partnerships³. The starting points for all eight partnerships are the guiding principles and objectives for achieving the envisaged paradigm shift⁴:

¹ For a more comprehensive account of the background for the JAES, see the previous FOI report on the subject: Elowson 2009, and Europe Africa Policy Research Network (EAPRN) 2010: Beyond Development Aid: p 7ff.

² On EU and AU responses to the Arab Spring, see Eriksson & Zetterlund 2013, on the new vision for Africa's development for example AU's *Agenda 2063* background note.

³ The other seven partnerships are: governance and human rights, trade regional integration and infrastructure, millennium development goals, energy, climate change, migration mobility and employment, and science, information society and space.

⁴ *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. p 1-3.

1. To treat Africa as a single entity, thus enabling a sustainable continent-to-continent partnership with the EU and AU as the central actors.
2. To acknowledge the interdependence between the EU and Africa and therefore address issues of common concern for the continents.
3. To acknowledge joint ownership and responsibility for the process and give priority to peace and security, human rights, rule of law, gender equality, democratic governance and the right to development.
4. For the JAES to provide a comprehensive and long-term framework for Africa-EU relations, including a people-centred partnership encompassing civil society, the private sector and economic and social partners such as trade unions.

The Peace and Security Partnership (PS Partnership), which is the focus of this report, has been structured around three Priority Actions:

1. Political dialogue⁵.
2. Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
3. Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) undertaken by the AU or under its authority.

What, then, have been the achievements of the PS Partnership so far? This question is of great relevance in view of the upcoming Africa-EU summit on 2-3 April 2014, where the way forward for JAES and its implementation is to be discussed.

In this report, we use these principles and commitments of the JAES and the Priority Actions of the PS Partnership to assess progress to date. In general, the same factors that led to the development of the strategy in 2007 are valid and, as we discuss in this report, perhaps even more relevant and challenging today. Neither the Europeans nor the Africans have been good at managing this strategic partnership. If mutual and forceful efforts are not undertaken in the very near future, the 2014 summit is likely to be a lost opportunity for building a real partnership in the spirit of the JAES between the two continents.⁶

⁵ In the first Action Plan, this Priority Action was referred to as Enhance Dialogue on Challenges on Peace and Security.

⁶ There is an emerging and mutual awareness of this urgent challenge (Interviews Brussels, June 2013 and Addis Ababa, September 2013).

1.2 The aim of the report

The subject of this report is timely, particularly in view of the April 2014 summit. The main aim was to assess how the Africa-EU partnership has developed in the field of peace and security. *What are the main achievements and challenges in implementing the Peace and Security Partnership (PS Partnership)?* The report will also examine *key developments at the African and the EU side*, as well as identify *critical factors for enhancing the cooperation on peace and security between Africa and the EU*.

The reader needs to bear in mind that the focus in this report is the PS Partnership, and that the other seven partnerships under the strategy are not specifically examined. Overall, the literature and the interviews conducted for this study reaffirm the conclusion that the PS Partnership, despite its challenges, is still the partnership in which most progress has been achieved. The study's conclusions on the JAES PS Partnership are therefore not representative of other areas of cooperation within the JAES – where the lack of progress and dialogue is likely to be even more pronounced.

1.3 Method, material and outline of the study

With the aim of capturing progress and challenges for the implementation of the JAES PS Partnership up to the present time, this study was qualitative in character. The material used consisted of official protocols, AU, EU and member state documents but, most substantially, of semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders in Stockholm, Brussels and Addis Ababa. A smaller number of interviews were also conducted via the telephone. Interviewees were granted anonymity to ensure a higher degree of freedom when responding to questions and sharing opinions with the researchers. The selection of interviewees was made from a key informant perspective, as the small number of interviews to be conducted did not allow for a more representative sample.

This approach guarantees high validity of the study; we provide answers to the central questions posed with regard to the JAES implementation process. At the same time, the study was vulnerable to problems of reliability, in that we had to collect and interpret the data, which can be especially challenging when working with material that to a large extent consists of interviews. For this reason, as far as possible we sought to triangulate the interview data with other primary and secondary material and, where applicable, also with research in peer-reviewed journals and academic literature. However, and due to the contemporary character of the study, peer-reviewed material proved more difficult to find.

This report builds on a previous study carried out by Elowson in 2009 and issued by the Swedish Defence Research Agency: *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy. A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*⁷, and the present study makes reference to that previous report for a more thorough background account of the origins and constituent parts of the JAES.

After this introductory *Chapter 1*, we proceed in *Chapter 2* by providing an overview of the JAES and then focus on the implementation progress and challenges of the PS Partnership. *Chapter 3* takes a closer look at EU developments and driving forces of the JAES since its introduction in 2007. In *Chapter 4* we apply a similar focus to Africa and the AU, and look more closely at how new dynamics on the continent shape the approach towards the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. *Chapter 5* provides a brief overview of the remaining process leading up to the summit in April 2014, and outlines our main findings and conclusions about the future fate of the JAES.

⁷ Available for free download at: http://intranet.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_2736.pdf

2 Implementation of the Peace and Security Partnership – the current state of play

2.1 Current status

The enthusiasm for the JAES and the PS Partnership remained high for a few years following its adoption in December 2007. The third Africa-EU summit took place in Tripoli, Libya, in November 2010 and a second Action Plan was developed on this occasion. The stakeholders renewed their commitment to the JAES and decided to continue the work within the PS Partnership's three Priority Actions, i.e. generally along the same lines as previously.

By 2011, however, it was broadly agreed that momentum seemed to have been lost for the JAES as a whole. There was a growing insight on the part of both the EU and Africa that implementation was not proceeding according to expectations, and EU reflections on how to address the strategy's weaknesses began around this time.⁸ In 2013, the European Commission (EC), France and Sweden produced proposals on how to move on with the PS Partnership, but there were few reactions to these.

A "brainstorming meeting" between Africa and the EU with the aim of re-energising the JAES and preparing for the 2014 summit planned for June 2013 was cancelled by the African member states. The African side was not satisfied with the outline of the agenda for the meeting, which was perceived as being unilaterally decided by the EU. The EU's proposal (formulated by the EEAS and with buy-in from EU member states) on how to reform JAES was to merge the eight partnerships into three clusters or reform areas, with Peace and Democracy/Governance as one. This proposal was seen by the African partners as unsatisfactory, procedurally as well as substantively. Procedurally, it was felt that the proposal had not been sufficiently discussed with African partners before being tabled, and substantively it was seen as risky to merge the well-funded and comparatively well-functioning PS Partnership with democracy and governance issues.⁹

On 18 September 2013, African and EU partners finally met for a brainstorming and planning exercise in preparation for the 2014 summit. While there was broad participation on both sides, the ministerial, political level was not represented at the meeting. In short, while there was some progress on the practical way

⁸ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, civil society, EU member states.

⁹ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013.

forward up to April 2014, the meeting was a disappointment as it clearly demonstrated tensions and problems of a more partnership-related and political character.¹⁰

2.2 Achievements and challenges

The level of achievement of the PS Partnership to date can be debated. On the positive side, it is often cited as the most successful of the eight partnerships. Many observers in Brussels tend to look at achievements as an issue of choosing to see “the glass as half-full or half empty”. The EU officials interviewed for this study claimed that the PS Partnership has been working, and that “the glass is half full”.¹¹ Officials who have been working on the implementation since 2007 claim that Africa has indeed made progress in terms of peace and security efforts since the joint strategy took off.¹²

A more pessimistic view, prevalent among European stakeholders, suggests that there have been no major deliverables apart from the backing of African PSOs.¹³ It is also felt that the PS Partnership is “like an empty shell” that exists only because the African Peace Facility (APF¹⁴) exists.¹⁵ Perhaps a more fair judgment of Africa-EU collaboration on peace and security is that some things have been done through the PS Partnership, whereas some things have been achieved in a parallel way.

What then are the concrete achievements of the PS Partnership when progress is assessed according to the Action Plan? Some measures realised within the Action Plan’s three Priority Actions are commented on below, including an analysis of difficulties that these initiatives have confronted throughout implementation. Challenges are also discussed in terms of the set-up of the strategy, as well as for the general collaborative spirit and partnership culture.

2.2.1 Action plan initiatives

Priority Action 1: Political dialogue

In the second Action Plan, the objectives of the first Priority Action, *Political Dialogue*, are set as “joint contribution to global security governance, making the

¹⁰ Interview Stockholm, October 2013.

¹¹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

¹² Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

¹³ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

¹⁴ The APF is a key EU funding instrument for peace and security efforts in Africa. See further 2.2.1.

¹⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

dialogue more effective, addressing crises and challenges to peace, security and stability, and capitalizing on commonalities of positions”.¹⁶

Below the ministerial level, there has been a reasonable development of the political dialogue, i.e. on a middle level and lower technical levels. Achievements of the JAES include the establishment of regular EU Political and Security Committee (EU PSC) – AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) meetings and video conferences between EU PSC and AU PSC chairs, the reinforcement of the EU Delegation to AU in Addis Ababa, and the undertaking of joint AU-EU missions in the field at a technical level. Outside the formal PSC-PSC meetings, dialogue has also taken place when needed, on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, the former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, has been a regular guest in Brussels. At a working level, discussions between Africans and Europeans on peace and security issues have been held in various seminars, organised by think tanks¹⁷ on both continents.¹⁸

However, even if the political dialogue is judged acceptable at these levels, the high-level dialogue has not been satisfactory since the set-up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). According to EU officials, the African side rightly criticises the EU for lack of commitment to ensuring political dialogue on a ministerial level and above.¹⁹ Opportunities for real strategic political dialogue have been few since 2009, and high-level EU representatives have on numerous occasions cancelled visits to their African counterparts. This clearly signals the low priority EU leaders give to the JAES and African leaders. It also demonstrates the inability on the European side to realise that dialogue is an integral part of the JAES and that concrete progress and results on the Action Plan cannot be achieved if the political dialogue component is absent.

Priority Action 1 also envisages collaboration on more thematic security-related issues, as well as in other parts of the conflict cycle, for example eliminating root causes of conflict, conflict prevention, long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. However, the dialogue has mainly focused on conflict situations and crises.²⁰ Several initiatives under Priority Action 1 have been funded, for instance concerning mediation efforts. A key challenge is the difficulty in keeping track of the initiatives that are ongoing as concerns Priority Action 1.²¹

¹⁶ European Parliament. Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013

¹⁷ E.g. the think tank network l’Observatoire Afrique, co-funded by the French Ministry for Defense (DAS). See also Chapter 3 for more details.

¹⁸ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, Civil society.

¹⁹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

²⁰ European Parliament. Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013

²¹ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

Priority Action 2: Operationalisation of APSA

The objective for Priority Action 2 is the “effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture to address peace and security in Africa”.²²

The operationalisation of APSA represents an important part of the PS Partnership, with a great deal of the funding coming from the APF. This funding instrument, created in 2003 by the EU, is intended as a resource for the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in their work for peace and security, with the focus on AU peacekeeping capacities. Around 90% of the APF²³ has been dedicated to African-led PSOs²⁴, while 7-8% of the funds have been provided to capacity building programmes for the APSA elements, including the RECs.²⁵ Some main activities here include the EU APSA support programme, the Early Response Mechanism²⁶, support for the employment of African Union Commission (AUC) personnel in peace and security programmes, support for the AU liaison offices in conflict and post-conflict countries, the Amani Africa II programme and support for the African training centres in peace and security.²⁷

As an overall assessment, the operationalisation of APSA has not yet been achieved. Clear evidence of this is the inability of the AU to handle the crisis in Mali in 2012-2013.²⁸ There, it was demonstrated that the African Standby Forces (ASF) were not ready, in particular by not being in possession of key enabling structures, such as strategic transportation capacity and command and control systems. Certain observers claim that the EU capacity building programmes have not led to much progress in APSA in the last few years.²⁹ Other voices want to see the EU being more coordinated as concerns the capacity building support, and argue that there is a need for a more realistic approach as to what can be

²² Key components of APSA include the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (POW), the African Standby Forces (ASF), the RECs/RMs, the Peace Fund and the Military Staff Committee (MSC).

²³ The APF cannot be used to cover military or arms expenditure, but only so-called “soft aspects”, i.e. costs related to the deployment of the peacekeeping force (Elowson, 2009).

²⁴ PSOs launched and implemented by the AU and/or by the RECs, such as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the FOMUC mission in the CAR, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR (MICOPAX), the AU Mission the Comoros (AMISEC).

²⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

²⁶ The purpose of the Early Response Mechanism is to endow the AU and the RECs with a source of immediate funding for the first stages of actions aimed at the prevention, management or resolution of crises. This includes the first stages of mediation actions, identification and fact finding missions to initiate the planning process for a PSO, and temporary ad hoc reinforcement of the planning cell for a potential PSO. DG DEVCO Website: Early Response Mechanism.

²⁷ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU Delegation.

²⁸ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

²⁹ Interview Brussels, June 2013.

achieved. Others again criticise the fact that the capacity building has focused mostly on the military, and less on the civilian dimension.³⁰

EU officials note that building the APSA is a long-term process and that existing weaknesses of the architecture are even more exposed when there is an immediate crisis. A recent APF evaluation concluded that capacity-building requires time and patience.³¹ Officials argue that the AU has indeed become a key player in African peace and security, because of the EU support. The AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) now has reasonable staffing of about 240 people (even if the EU stills pays the salaries of the majority of these); the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is seen as another achievement. The African partner has also shown that operations can be managed through the AU system, with success in improving conditions in Somalia and Burundi, through the African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Mission In Burundi (AMIB).³² Through the APF, links between the AU and the RECs have been promoted, with liaison offices and smaller practical necessities being funded.³³

Even if no clear-cut picture can be obtained of the achievements, it is evident that many areas within the APSA still need to be developed. Absorption capacity is a problem in this respect. A specific difficulty is the financial management institutions in the AU and in the RECs, where improvement is needed in order for them to be able to receive the funds intended to build capacity.³⁴ However, within the PSD, financial accountability is an area where there has been notable progress in the last few years. A specific financial management unit has been set up and new procedures have been established within the PSD. This measure was prompted by EU demands on the AU to clarify the funding received for PSOs and to deal with the financial reporting backlog.³⁵

As concerns the achievements, another aspect is the pragmatic way in which the operationalisation of the APSA proceeds. In fact, the PSOs do not formally fall under the PS Partnership and its Action Plans, but are set up outside the framework of the joint strategy. For instance, AMISOM – funded partly by the APF – is not explicitly part of the JAES. The EU and the member states seek to advance different types of creative initiatives, outside the JAES framework, to advance the peace and security collaboration.³⁶

³⁰ Interview Brussels, June 2013.

³¹ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

³² South African Institute of International Affairs website: <http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/the-african-union-and-security?print=1&tmp>. Hengari 2013.

³³ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

³⁴ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials. Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state.

³⁵ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU Delegation, AU officials.

³⁶ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

Amani Africa

Since the start-up of the JAES, *Amani Africa*, which aims at building up the ASF, has been the initiative receiving the most attention within the PS Partnership. Below, a brief account is given of the current status and challenges of *Amani Africa*.

A key element in the operationalisation of APSA is to ensure the full capacity and operational certification of the ASF, including its civilian and police dimension. The ASF, with up to 25 000 personnel within five regional brigades, is designed to be a continental military intervention rapid reaction force.³⁷

In order to achieve the ASF certification, the *Amani Africa* training cycle is the main tool for implementation. *Amani Africa* is a programme of political-strategic level training activities for African partners, with the focus on developing a capacity for decision making and planning in crisis management at the African continental level.³⁸ There is specific emphasis on developing the chain of command from the AU to the regional level, through implementing procedures for the level of political decision making all the way through to force deployment.³⁹

Amani Africa I ended with a Command Post Exercise (CPX) in 2010. The exercise demonstrated a number of challenges and concluded that the ASF is not yet mature. *Amani Africa II* is currently ongoing, with the plan being full operationalisation of the ASF in 2015. The Final Training Exercise (FTX) will be held in South Africa.⁴⁰

The lead for the training cycle is held jointly by an integrated AU-EU planning team. However, the Africans are set to be in the lead, with the EU playing a supporting role. *Amani Africa* is a concrete EU-Africa collaboration project, and as such a positive example of JAES implementation. Meanwhile, observers note that African ownership could be improved, and that there is a mismatch between the EU and AU ambitions. The EU has a much broader ambition for *Amani Africa*, emphasising the comprehensive approach at the strategic level (with civilian, political, judicial aspects included). The African partner has also shown interest in the strategic perspective, but is more focused on the operational level, wanting a more military focused exercise (pre-deployment field and live exercise). The EU approach risks being overambitious, especially in the light of the European side's own difficulties in employing a comprehensive approach.⁴¹

³⁷ Elowson, 2009.

³⁸ The regional levels are not supported militarily by the EU, but by the member states bilaterally.

³⁹ Elowson, 2009.

⁴⁰ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

⁴¹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, member state.

Another issue for Amani Africa is that the time schedule for implementation is constantly moving forward, with the pace of advance in training being slow. In this respect, the EU needs to remind itself that Amani Africa is an African-led process, and that African ownership means that Africans decide on the priorities. The officers responsible in the PSOD also have to take care of the current operations. This hampers the development of Amani Africa. However, if the AU is given time to address the lessons learned from its own operations, these new insights could feed into Amani Africa in a constructive way.⁴²

The APF has funded the Amani Africa exercise and at the same time provided expertise and staffing from the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The APF can only support certain aspects of Amani, so-called “soft aspects”. For example, the scenario development for Amani Africa, media training and workshops have been funded. A problem related to ownership is that the AU dependence on external funding means that the priorities in granting funding are largely decided by the European side.⁴³

Priority Action 3: Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority

The third Priority Action of the second Action Plan has as its objective to “make available adequate resources (financial, material, human resources, etc.) to plan, equip, deploy and support African-led peace support operations”.⁴⁴

Over the past nine years, the APF has paid €1.1 billion, of which around 90% has been spent on African-led PSOs. This funding instrument is perceived as a success by the African and the European side, and it has ensured the EU political leverage. Yet, the APF is seen as a victim of its own success, e.g. the EU provides the bulk of funding for AMISOM, which has been ongoing for years without an exit strategy in sight for the EU.⁴⁵ It can be argued that the most concrete and efficient EU (financial) support has been that provided to the African-led PSOs. However, certain EU member states argue that the effectiveness of these PSOs is hampered by the fact that the APF can only be used for non-military needs of PSOs.⁴⁶ A different criticism of the APF comes from civil society, as it is difficult for this type of stakeholder to access APF funding.⁴⁷

⁴² Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

⁴³ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

⁴⁴ European Parliament. Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013

⁴⁵ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU Delegation. Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU officials.

⁴⁶ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Member state.

⁴⁷ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

Concerning the predictability of funding, it can be argued that the European partner is not living up to expectations. The EU deadlines given for the funding arrangements are unclear, and its communication on this topic is vague. Funds that have been exhausted by the African partners too early have been replenished by the EU. Essentially, the EU is not in full control of what it funds and has a hard time setting limits.⁴⁸ While this sometimes pragmatic and ad hoc approach may contribute to the flow of funds, it is not sustainable in the long run and also raises questions of predictability. It also implies that African partners can quite easily negotiate new money, and that the AU takes for granted that the EU will continue to provide funds. At the same time, the economic crisis in Europe and ambiguity about whether the EU will continue to support AMISOM have had a negative effect on the drive and engagement of the African partner.

The matter of securing long-term funding for African PSOs is seen by many observers as the real issue at stake for the PS Partnership. With the low level of African funding for the APSA, there is no independence for African stakeholders and, hence, no equal partnership between the EU and Africa.⁴⁹ This puts into question the overall sustainability of the APSA structure. Another consequence of insufficient funding is the limited capacity to improve on key issues, such as the relationship between the AU and the RECs, although there has been some progress here with the establishment of the REC liaison offices to the AU in Addis Ababa.

A dialogue on the topic was initiated in the years following the elaboration of the JAES, within the framework of the UN Security Council, through the Prodi panel report on support to African-led peacekeeping operations and through subsequent elaboration of the UN Secretary General's (UNSG) reports on its implementation.⁵⁰ The idea of the Prodi panel report was to have a fund which included contributions from emerging African countries and from the EU. However, little has happened since the report was issued. There has been disagreement between the EU and the UN on how the fund should be designed. Furthermore, there has been limited buy-in from the African side. Other initiatives to establish funding for the AU, such as the AU High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding⁵¹, have, similarly, produced little result so far.

When summing up progress so far on the three Priority Actions for the PS Partnership, it becomes clear that the glass being half-full or half-empty analogy is misleading. It is misleading because we believe that the actual achievements compared against the Action Plan are not up to the level where we could come to the half-empty conclusion. The half-full, optimistic view could possibly apply to

⁴⁸ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013; EU Delegation.

⁴⁹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

⁵⁰ UN General Assembly, A/63/666-S/2008/813

⁵¹ See further Chapter 4.

the overall trend, which can be said to be moving in the right direction for the PS Partnership – but with one critical caveat. It would be wrong to call the political dialogue at ministerial level anything other than an outright failure. Even more alarming, the trend is negative, with the two continents drifting further apart during a time when there is a dire need to redefine the relationship. Bridging this gap in the time remaining before the April 2014 summit seems unrealistic. What is working better is dialogue on the levels below the strategic political level, for example College-to-College interaction and the dialogue between the two security councils of the AU and EU. A more bottom-up approach based on concrete activities is therefore likely to better inform the agenda for the 2014 summit than a top-down approach.

2.2.2 The strategy as such

European and African institutions and member states agree that the implementation of the joint strategy has not proceeded as envisaged in the Action Plans. To what extent can these shortcomings be explained in terms of the strategy itself and supporting structures and initiatives?

A key challenge for the JAES is that it has been difficult to sustain the high ambition that it represents. Even if the necessary tools to coordinate the implementation had been in place, the scope of activities under the Priority Actions within the PS Partnership has been too extensive. Eight partnerships are also perceived to be too many.⁵²

A factor complicating the effectiveness of the JAES is the existence of a parallel framework for Africa-EU relations, the Cotonou Agreement. Signed in 2000, this Agreement regulates development cooperation, economic and political relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. The agreement and the joint strategy are in disconnection, with the Cotonou Agreement being a legally binding contract between the two continents and the more recent JAES being merely a political document.⁵³

Regarding supporting structures, some joint Africa-EU implementation channels for the JAES include the annual College-to-College meetings (between the EC and the AUC), the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, sectoral Africa-EU Ministerial meetings, AU PSC-EU PSC meetings, EC-AUC Joint Task Force meetings (with representatives from the services of the two commissions), and the Non-State Actor Interim Steering Group. The key body of the JAES, the Informal Joint Expert Groups (IJEGs), were set up in 2008 as an Africa-EU inter-institutional structure with the task of ensuring implementation by engaging in the concrete activities of the Priority Actions.

⁵² Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, EU member state.

⁵³ DG DEVCO Website: Cotonou Agreement.

However, the IJEGs have worked as a forum to vent ideas, but have not contributed much towards achieving results.⁵⁴ The IJEGs are informal in their character, with neither decision-making powers nor financial clout invested in these structures. It has not been clear how to make policy from the IJEG discussions, with the link between informal working group and political decision-making missing. With the realisation that there are limitations in terms of impact and possibility to influence the decision-making, the participation by AU and EU member states in the IJEGs has declined.⁵⁵

EU partners feel that representation in the IJEGs has been limited, especially on the African side with participation only by the local embassies without the necessary expertise, and that the involvement of the RECs has also been insufficient.⁵⁶ At the same time, it was clearly stated by African partners during the Africa-EU brainstorming meeting in Brussels on 18 September 2013 that the IJEGs should not be abandoned, but instead formalised as part of the JAES structure. This could be interpreted as showing that where the EU sees limited engagement and talk rather than action, African partners tend to value the dialogue and its contribution towards the realisation of the JAES principles and objectives.

The IJEGs were to be composed of representatives of implementation structures in place in the two continents; African Expert Groups and EU Implementation Teams. These structures have also worked unsatisfactorily. Member states were intended to constitute a key pillar of these structures, but commitment among the individual countries to engage through the EU/AU channel has been difficult to stimulate. Another factor is the lack of resources of member states to drive the partnerships. On the EU side, only a few member states have participated in the Implementation Team meetings. As momentum for the strategy has been increasingly lost, the meetings have been reduced to an information-sharing forum where the EU institutions present their ongoing work. Member states have shown a decreasing interest in providing input. With the absence of proper discussion, it is questionable what added value these meetings have had.⁵⁷

In short, the JAES working arrangements as concerns the IJEGs have been perceived as time-consuming and ineffective. It has also been difficult to monitor what goes on in this type of complex structure.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Interviews with stakeholders in Brussels confirm that the IJEGs have served to defuse heated emotions after certain events, such as the Arab Spring. However, the positions stated in this forum were the participants' personal viewpoints, not necessarily those of the country or the continent that the participant represented.

⁵⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, EU member states, civil society.

⁵⁶ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, EU member states, civil society.

⁵⁷ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, EU member states, civil society.

⁵⁸ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

2.2.3 Partnership culture

Africans as well as Europeans remain engaged in the PS Partnership. Real on-the-ground conflict tends to drive the need for advancing African preparedness to deal with peace and security on the continent. However, neither the European nor the African side has been good at managing the strategic partnership. Today, the JAES, the PS Partnership included, is suffering from a damaged partnership spirit, where trust between the Africans and Europeans has largely been lost.⁵⁹ Mismatched priorities, insufficient African ownership, deficient communication and different expectations have all contributed to a negative partnership mindset.

Many EU officials and other European stakeholders, when interviewed, have been prone to self-criticism concerning the deteriorating partnership culture. These European perspectives on EU weaknesses are reflected in the analysis below. African viewpoints on its own responsibility for the partnership spirit, and on that of the EU, have been more difficult to obtain.⁶⁰ When interviewed for this study, Africans were relatively unwilling to criticise the EU, but eager to point out that the operational collaboration is proceeding satisfactorily. At other levels and in other contexts, however, the African partner has voiced harsh criticism of Europe.

Mismatched priorities and insufficient African ownership

From the outset of the partnership, there was a tendency for the EU to push the African side into adopting European ideas. Consequently, the JAES architecture has largely been perceived as a European construction. The EU has been overambitious in its approach, identifying too many objectives and activities for the partnerships. This is manifest in the first and second Action Plan of the PS Partnership, both of which constitute long and detailed lists of issues to be addressed. Priorities are not clearly spelled out, with the consequence that the African partner is overwhelmed with challenges. Human resources and capacity are lacking on the African side to respond to all the demands that they are faced with, creating frustration. The numerous EU proposals of policy areas to address reinforce the capacity gap: the African side is not able to deal with the suggested areas. Hence, additional assistance from Europe to tackle the issues at hand is needed, which creates a vicious circle of “offer and demand”. It should also be noted that the EU has expected Africa to deliver on issues which the EU itself has had problems in delivering, such as promoting shared values and speaking with one voice.

⁵⁹ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

⁶⁰ This is partly explained by the limitations of the methodology for the study; researchers being European.

A telling example of this imbalance comes from an account of an Action Plan follow-up meeting within the JAES Migration Partnership. While the AU official in charge attended the meeting prepared to cover all 12 projects within the partnership, the EU was represented by 12 staff, each being responsible for one of the 12 projects.⁶¹ Even though the staffing and capacity situation is somewhat better within the AU's Peace and Security Department, which has responsibility for the PS Partnership, the example above shows that the AU does not have the same possibility as the EU to devote resources corresponding to the ambitions of the Action Plans – sometimes this is a matter of lack of means, other times a matter of mismatched priority.

Frustration on the European side includes African vagueness when approached on the topic of implementing initiatives under the PS Partnership. EU officials have been bothered by the African side not rejecting EU proposals outright, but rather just failing to implement them.⁶² One explanation for this is that Africans prefer not to openly decline proposals, seeing the risk of missing out on funding. The problem partly stems also from the EU not realising to what extent the collaboration has become an unreasonable burden for the African partner. In view of the upcoming revision of the JAES, it appears vital to improve the partnership culture by installing more open two-way communication. However, the indications are that the EU leaders are not very receptive of emerging changes in Africa and therefore remain within the donor-recipient aid framework – despite their stated ambition to move away from this type of relationship.⁶³

Lack of leadership and deficient communication

The lack of leadership, on both sides, has severely damaged the communication and partnership spirit. On the one hand, this is due to the EU failing in terms of maintaining a high-level political dialogue. On the other hand, the new AUC chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, has been largely inaccessible and maintains a rather harsh tone towards Western partners, at least in the public arena and in statements. While this approach is in line with the push for *Africa Rising* and increased self-assertiveness, it also complicates political relations with the EU. In addition, the African side remains unable to speak with one voice, with AU-REC relations being one good example⁶⁴. The EU, as discussed, suffers from the same problem of fragmentation in its approach to Africa and the AU, with EU member countries pursuing bilateral strategies towards Africa parallel to the EU Commission and the EEAS.

⁶¹ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society.

⁶² Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, civil society.

⁶³ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013.

⁶⁴ For more on AU-REC relations, see Chapter 4.

Despite these weak dynamics, the EU has taken responsibility for the work to proceed or, seen from a different angle, has continued on the path of unilaterally designing the way forward. By June 2013, the EU side presented ideas on how to redo the JAES, but at this stage discussions with the African partner on the topic had not really taken off. EU officials appear confident that EU proposals on how to breathe new life into the JAES, such as the Pan-African Programme (PAP) financial mechanism⁶⁵, is the way forward and are convinced that Africans are in favour.⁶⁶ This is contrary to the opinion of many African stakeholders outside the AU, who have expressed harsh criticism of the JAES (and the PAP more specifically)⁶⁷.

The EU tendency to decide on how to proceed, and only check – at a later stage – with the African side how to go about implementing the EU ideas, therefore appears to be still in place. At same time, the EU has shown some willingness to engage in exploratory dialogue with the African partners, one example being the initiative for the brainstorming session in June 2013. As discussed above, this meeting was cancelled at the last minute by the African partner, who was not internally coordinated, but also due to an African perception that the agenda was unilaterally decided on by the Europeans.⁶⁸

Different views on dialogue content

Among stakeholders in Brussels, the perception seems to be that the EU is the more active partner ahead of the 2014 summit.⁶⁹ The question is whether the Europeans are turning a blind eye to a more fundamental discontent among the African side with the conditions and context of the collaboration. For instance, Africans have expressed irritation that not all burning issues are included in the Africa-EU dialogue. Notably, the partnership culture has been negatively affected by the unresolved issue of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), diverging views on the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as by migration issues, where one African argument is that the EU's real agenda is to limit the number of refugees to Europe.⁷⁰

According to AU officials, the need to discuss divergent views, damaged EU-AU relations and problems that arose out of the Libyan experience has also been neglected. AU officials have also expressed the view that the EU only shows a symbolic, window-dressing willingness for dialogue, but is largely lacking the

⁶⁵ For more on the PAP, see Chapter 3.3.

⁶⁶ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

⁶⁷ See for example ISS publications and website for documentation. AGI Policy Brief No 3. 2013.

⁶⁸ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

⁶⁹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: Civil society, EU officials.

⁷⁰ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: Civil society. Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU official, EU member state.

political will to discuss issues of real importance for the African partner⁷¹. The EU, for its part, is perturbed by delays by the African partners in preparing specific agendas and timely meetings.⁷²

AU officials also draw attention to a strong and vocal internal debate within the AU for more equality between the organisation and its external partners, not least the EU. The demand is for a more balanced dialogue agenda, including not only African challenges but also problems in Europe and issues of mutual concern. Some AU member states want to push this perspective more strongly, while others judge it to be unfeasible in view of the dominant financial position of the EU.⁷³

Considering that the AU is just over a decade into existence, the institution has made strong progress over the last few years. The AU is today more of an equal partner, although clearly still weaker than the EU in financial and organisational terms. As a consequence, negotiations are now tougher and more difficult between the two organisations. The question is to what extent the EU and its member states are prepared – and have readiness for – a stronger, more resourceful and more assertive AU.

Issues relating to funding

A recurring frustration among EU stakeholders is a feeling that Europeans are considered by Africans very narrowly as funding partners rather than partners in a broader sense. The EU claims to have the ambition to “face issues together”, but feels that Africans see the matter of African ownership as the right to identify a range of issues that they desire the EU to provide and pay for. EU officials feel that the EU is paying without influencing, or even perceive it as “the EU *must* pay, but the EU *must not* influence”. There is also a perception on the European side that other partners to the AU pay less, but influence more. Some observers believe that the African focus on obtaining European funding might in the best case be an issue of time. For example, in the case of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), the African partner announced, for the first time, that it would contribute funds.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, the bureaucratic aspect of funding issues has severely damaged the partnership spirit, with Africans frustrated about the different EU funding

⁷¹ The criticism is not only directed towards the EU. An AU-Arab League meeting was cancelled earlier in 2013 for the same reason; a one-sided agenda. The Arab League cancelled the meeting when it heard about the demands from the AU regarding the agenda for the talks. Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013.

⁷² Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU official. Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

⁷³ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU official.

⁷⁴ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU officials, EU Delegation. Interviews Brussels: EU officials.

instruments and the EU routines to obtain funds, which are cumbersome, time-consuming and difficult to understand. This sometimes involves delays in e.g. per diem payments for the African partner. The fact that the European side approaches the AU with different hats – sometimes as a bilateral donor, sometimes as the EU donor – can also be confusing for the African partner. The EU, for its part, is concerned about the AU's unsatisfactory accountability as regards the funding received, which – even though improving – remains an issue.⁷⁵

Drawing on the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (New Deal), the outcome of the 2011 Busan High Level Aid Effectiveness meeting for building peaceful states, it is clear that the African partners also have international backing for their position. With the EU and key African countries for the PS partnership having endorsed the New Deal (for example the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan), and the AU actively taking part in the dialogue on the New Deal, future relations between Africa and the EU need to incorporate New Deal principles into the cooperation. This includes risk sharing, strengthening and increased use of country systems, and providing timely and predictable aid. *“We will develop and use simplified, accountable fast-track financial management and procurement procedures to improve the speed and flexibility of aid delivery in fragile situations.”*⁷⁶ It is therefore doubtful whether increased use of accountability tools such as Results Based Management (RBM), as suggested by some European actors, is the right way to proceed when working in fragile states.

⁷⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials. Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU officials.

⁷⁶ New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

3 Developments on the EU side

3.1 Origins of the partnership

When the JAES was adopted at the Lisbon EU-Africa summit in 2007, this was only the second ever summit between the EU and Africa. Among EU member states, Portugal had been an important driving force for renewed relations with Africa. Being the EU Chair also in 2000, Portugal coordinated the Africa-EU Cairo summit that year together with the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) (the African Union being established in 2002).

After the Cairo Summit in 2000, the EU became more preoccupied with the recent accession of ten new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, and less interested in its continental relations with Africa. The void left by EU's disengagement with Africa also started to fill up with emerging actors such as China and India. However, this did not mean that political dialogue between Africa and the EU was absent. Following the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the establishment of the AU in 2002, senior officials and ministers of the two continents started to prepare the second summit planned for 2003. This summit was subsequently cancelled, partly due to controversy over the participation of certain countries, Zimbabwe being one such issue of contention. This postponement of the summit meant that, again, dialogue was less frequent. However, following a meeting with the AUC in 2005, the EC adopted a Communication on an EU Strategy for Africa in October 2005, which took place in parallel with the EPA negotiations.⁷⁷

Following an EU-Africa meeting in Bamako later in 2005, agreement was reached to develop a joint EU-Africa strategy. In 2007, Portugal was instrumental in bringing about the second summit between the continents. Portugal and France felt a need for shifting the focus from Eastern and Central Europe towards the Mediterranean region and Africa. As a result of difficult and intensive negotiations on each side, but also importantly through the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, the 2007 Lisbon Summit successfully established the JAES as a very ambitious framework. Initially, there was strong ownership and enthusiasm among the continental actors but also among member states. The JAES represented potential for a paradigm shift by laying out the framework for establishing a partnership between equal and interdependent continental actors.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Farrell 2009.

⁷⁸ See for example Ferreira-Pereira 2008:65ff.

3.2 New dynamics in Europe

Since the signing of the JAES, the EU has undergone important institutional changes. Some of the most influential changes affect the implementation of the JAES and the PS Partnership, and are discussed below.

The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, has profoundly changed the EU, with the set-up of new structures, functions and procedures for the organisation. The election of a long-term President of the European Council has been one of the major innovations, alongside the establishment of an EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy⁷⁹, which was intended to give the EU more weight in world affairs. Catherine Ashton, the current High Representative (HR), is in charge of the EU's own diplomatic service, the EEAS, established in July 2010.

The EEAS has drawn in specialists from the EC and from member states' administrations. HR Ashton is also the chair of The Foreign Affairs Council meetings where she, as High Representative, is assisted by the EEAS and by the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC). EU member states take turns to chair all of the ten Council configurations – except the Foreign Affairs Council, where the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is always the permanent chair. This is an important factor with bearing on African partner and EU member state engagement, or lack thereof, in the dialogue process, as the Lisbon Treaty effectively changed the previous order whereby EU-AU Troika meetings were an essential part of the JAES implementation structure.⁸⁰

Needless to say, such a fundamental reorganisation takes time to complete. The division of roles and responsibilities between the EU Council, the EC and the EEAS and their front figures has been a long process, while the latter institution is also still taking shape. Consequently, the attention of EU leaders and officials has largely been inward-focused in recent years.

With the appointment of Ashton and the establishment of the EEAS, key individuals in the Council Secretariat, previously strongly associated with the JAES, were removed. Previous key functions, such as the Special Advisor for African Peacekeeping Capabilities (held by Pierre-Michel Joana) were not included in the new organisation. This meant that previous focal points for the strategy on the EU side disappeared, to the disappointment of the African partners. The shift in staff and positions could also reflect sentiments on the

⁷⁹ Combining the previous portfolios of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the External Affairs Commissioner.

⁸⁰ *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. JAES, 2007 on “Africa-EU Troikas” paragraphs 100-102: “The biannual Africa-EU ministerial troika meeting will play a central role in the review and monitoring of the implementation of the Joint strategy and its successive Action Plans.”

European side that perceive EU's Africa functions to be dominated by French representatives.

With an EU President and a stronger 'EU Foreign Minister' in place, another consequence is that the EU member states do not have the same official role in the foreign policy field as previously, when they used to chair the General Affairs and Foreign Affairs Council during their Presidency periods. Therefore, when holding the EU Presidency under the new Lisbon Treaty structure, the member states now expect the EEAS to act, rather than taking own initiatives.⁸¹ With the birth of the new EU administration, the bi-annual Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meetings⁸² – which had been a regular and valued political level dialogue forum – have been interrupted. This means that the member states are even more cut off from EU political dialogue with Africa. Meanwhile, many member states accept that the EEAS and the EC have taken over part of their role, and that the EU institutions are in the driving seat as concerns the JAES.⁸³ As for the African side, much importance was accorded to the Ministerial Troika meetings and the African partner regrets that these dialogue opportunities have ceased.

Subsequent ministerial meetings between HR Ashton's office and AU political representatives have not been as successful in upholding the political, strategic dialogue climate. Repeated postponements of EU high-level political visits to Africa and the AU have further complicated the dialogue. After 2009, there has been a shift at the EEAS away from a JAES focus. As a result, and while there is useful, regular and concrete dialogue between for example the EU PSC and the AU PSC, the strategic political dialogue is more irregular and less intense than before Ashton's appointment.⁸⁴ The analysis is therefore that declining strategic, high-level political dialogue on the EU side partly originates from institutional changes, and that this trend is further exacerbated by the low priority given to African dialogue opportunities by the highest EU representatives.

The EU has also faced external challenges which have affected the implementation of the PS Partnership. The Eurozone economic crisis that started to unfold in 2009 and erupted fully in 2010 shifted EU priorities to internal processes, and this was clearly felt also within the EEAS. If Ashton's administration ever had a clear vision for the JAES, this was lost in the internal EU turmoil at the time. Among the member states there was no common view on Africa and everybody was, and to a considerable degree still is, absorbed by the economic crisis. In addition, developments that evolved in North Africa in 2011

⁸¹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

⁸² Elowson 2009:31.

⁸³ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU member state.

⁸⁴ Interviews Brussels, June 2013 and Addis Ababa, September 2013. See also Pereira 2013.

have also affected the EU, and call for considerable revision of EU – and AU – policy and partnership in that region.⁸⁵

3.3 EU reform agenda for the JAES

Within the EU, the reflection on how to confront the difficulties with the JAES started in 2011. The EEAS initiated a reform process, and in 2012 it sought the interest of European stakeholders in an attempt to breathe new life into the JAES and the PS Partnership. In 2013, the EU member states, the EEAS and the EC agreed on a proposal for a radical remake of the JAES architecture, to be presented before the summit in April 2014. This new EU thinking originates departs from a perceived need to focus on the actions of the JAES, to lower the ambitions within the eight existing partnerships and to set more limited and realistic objectives.⁸⁶

The EU proposal is to dissolve the eight partnerships as well as the IJEGs (which were supposed to be the centre of activity). The new structure suggested by the EU consists of three clusters covering the previous eight partnerships: 1) Peace and Democracy 2) Sustainable Growth and 3) Global Issues. With the first cluster⁸⁷, Peace and Democracy, the EU wants to emphasise the link between these two terms, strengthening the work on rights, good governance and democracy as an enabler of peace.⁸⁸ This idea of clustering the existing eight partnerships into three theme areas is somewhat in line with the ideas of the new AUC chair, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, who has proven to have a more integrated and results-orientated approach to peace and security and wider development issues. The aspect of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding, bridging (possibly merging) the APSA with the African Governance Architecture (AGA), could therefore be one area of common ground between EU and AU. At the same time, there is resistance within at least the AU PSD to merging the PS Partnership with other areas, since the EU funding for the PS Partnership is seen as absolutely crucial for the whole of APSA and AU PSOs.

Regardless of the future outline of the JAES, the issue of how to establish predictable and reliable financial mechanisms for the JAES will continue to be a challenge. While the APF is to remain intact, the PAP is a complementary EU initiative intended to infuse new energy into the JAES. The PAP is a replication

⁸⁵ For a detailed account of the North Africa developments, see Eriksson and Zetterlund 2013.

⁸⁶ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

⁸⁷ The second block, Sustainable Growth, encompasses a range of topics, through job growth. The reasoning is that if jobs are secured, other challenges such as migration, piracy, urbanisation etc, are indirectly targeted. The third block, Global Issues, focuses on harmonising different African and European actors' contributions in different forums, for instance concerning voting patterns.

The aim is to encourage a systematic dialogue and exchange of information between these actors.

⁸⁸ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

of the APF to other areas of the JAES, and could also support any additional fields within peace and security, e.g. counter terrorism, organised crime, smuggling, the African border programme and maritime security. How the PAP should be administered is still subject to negotiations with the European Parliament, and it is unclear how it will be implemented (through what implementation partners etc.).⁸⁹ In the new long-term budget, the EC has proposed a Pan-African Programme 2014-2020. It is likely that the PAP will amount to approximately €100 million per year.⁹⁰ Some EU stakeholders point out that this is a small amount of money for the intended purpose and believe it is unclear to what extent, if any, it will cover peace and security.⁹¹

3.4 Objections to the EU reform proposals

The EU reform ideas have encountered some resistance among European stakeholders. The proposal to dissolve the IJEGs is welcomed as a move to simplify the implementation. However, it is also pointed out that even if the IJEGs have been difficult to fill with life, they have a relatively unique format, as an inclusive forum where the views of different types of stakeholders can be exchanged. The last few years have proven that the partnership needs regular dialogue and interaction at all levels in order to function, and that it cannot rely on sporadic visits or e-mail correspondence.⁹²

Civil society observers claim that the EU reform proposals are in fact a move towards the abolition of the JAES, and that the 2014 summit will confirm this tendency. The view is that the PS Partnership is being emptied with the EU proposals of going back to previous meeting and dialogue channels and the reduction of the eight partnerships to only three key areas.⁹³ This is an interesting observation, and potentially indicative of a lack of EU dedication to increased Africa-EU collaboration. However, rather than the complete abolition of the JAES, a more likely scenario along these lines would be to revert back to a less formalised partnership where a broad framework for future cooperation remains on the table, but where more time and negotiations are needed before agreement can be reached on a revised implementation focus and strategy.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ A concern within civil society is how there will be room for innovation for this sector to carry out initiatives within the PS Partnership while having little access to funding within the APF or PAP (Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society).

⁹⁰ The reason behind the new programme is that the intra-ACP funding will go down, the DCI will decrease, which means a new instrument to support the JAES is needed (Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials).

⁹¹ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

⁹² Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU member state.

⁹³ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

⁹⁴ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

The initiative for the JAES revision originates from the EU and is arguably problematic on two counts. First, it has been developed unilaterally by the EU, with little or no involvement from EU member states. In addition, without prior consultation with the African side, the EU is perceived as setting the agenda for the summit in a unilateral manner.⁹⁵

Second, the reform initiative is challenging from a substantive point of view, as the proposal suggests the integration of peace and security with democracy and governance issues. As stressed above, this may reflect trends on both the AU and EU sides for a more integrated, comprehensive approach where security is linked more clearly to political transitions and development issues. However, it also evokes fear among the African partners regarding the continued flow of funding for peace and security operations. With the EU providing more than 75% of existing funding to the APSA structure, the AU will not look favourably on any changes to the present PS Partnership and funding mechanisms.⁹⁶

3.5 EU coordination

Despite stated principles and objectives in the JAES, the EU remains fragmented in its approach to Africa, both internally, with member states pursuing strong bilateral agendas and channels of communication with Africa instead of relying on the EU to be the key actor, but also externally, by not making the JAES the central instrument envisaged in 2007.

As concerns the EU fragmentation, there is scope for improved coordination. The ambition on the EU side in the inception phase was to pool resources and know-how from the EU institutions and the member states. The APF functions as a coordination mechanism where funding approval for projects is required from the member states. On the other hand, there is a limited flow of information from the EU member states as to what they engage in individually. The lack of coordination can be attributed to political sensitivity, culture and institutional jealousy from member states, who desire to have their own visibility. Joint programming is the ultimate test of the will to coordinate – and interviewees indicate that this has been a struggle.⁹⁷

The EU member states tend to look at relations with Africa from a development perspective. Whether and when a member state drives a perspective depends on whether and when that issue happens to be a specific bilateral priority for that member state. Peace and security initiatives are more accidental and fashion-driven than strategy-related. In this environment, the tendency is rather for member states to resort back into their individual channels, instead of supporting

⁹⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

⁹⁶ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013.

⁹⁷ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

and engaging with the PS Partnership through the EU. Given this development, EU member states expect the EEAS and the EC to lead on JAES.

Overall, it is felt that coordination is becoming more difficult, not easier. While EU institutions can gain from coordination with the member states, the usefulness of this is felt much less among the member states. At the same time, successful implementation of the JAES depends on EU member state involvement, as they provide up to 80% of the overall EU support to development cooperation in Africa. Challenges here involve different budget cycles for the EEAS and EC/Directorate General Development and Cooperation and EuropeAID (DG DEVCO), as well as most (DG DEVCO) budget items being earmarked from the outset, and therefore less accessible for coordination with EEAS activities for the JAES.⁹⁸

While coordination between the EEAS and the EC (DG DEVCO) on the PS Partnership is working relatively well, few EU member states attend the EU Implementation Team meetings and their buy-in is low. Most EU member state representatives are junior officials who only take part in the meetings, but with limited capacity to provide expertise. The EEAS and DG DEVCO are partly frustrated by the low engagement by EU member states and partly at ease with this, as it allows freedom for the EEAS especially to act on its own.

Meanwhile, EU member states are discouraged that the implementation of the JAES has never really taken off. On the other hand, some EU member states clearly feel marginalised and excluded from EEAS actions, while others take a more positive view of the EEAS and the EC being in the driving seat. This format does not really work and should be a priority for internal reform.⁹⁹

One step in the right direction may be the recent reshuffle of DG DEVCO's departments for development cooperation with Africa, so that they correspond to those of the EEAS at Director level.¹⁰⁰ The EEAS on its side is a young institution that has recently been reviewed, providing an opportunity for EU member states and the EC to influence the future orientation and organisation of the EEAS.¹⁰¹ While this may solve some of the coordination issues between the EEAS and DG DEVCO, it still does not address all remaining issues of how EU member states and primarily the EEAS should work together in the implementation of the JAES. Let us take France as one of several examples of this tension between coordination and fragmentation as France's approach has changed in this direction over the last years:

⁹⁸ Interview Stockholm, October 2013.

⁹⁹ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Kraetke 2012:2.

¹⁰¹ European External Action Service. Review July 2013.

The France-Africa summit in December 2013 is important for the revitalisation of the Africa-EU peace and security collaboration, and an example of the concerns above. The summit is likely to reveal whether the French choose to focus on supporting the military aspects of APSA, and to what extent they take the wider perspective of PS Partnership into account.¹⁰² The French thinking has not yet been clearly articulated, but it appears that France's position is that the JAES has not worked well under the current EU leadership. The added value of the JAES has been questioned by France and, according to the French perspective, there is a need to move away from the focus on the AU, especially considering the lack of trust between African member states and the AU. The current French approach appears to be to develop the AU member states' own military capabilities, in order to create some credible players which can then build up the RECs. The view that REC leaders are needed is stressed; hence, the focus should be more on strong African states. These are not necessarily the larger states, but could be those states that are major contributors to the PSOs and those willing to work with the EU.¹⁰³

On the one hand this position by the French can be seen as a way of complementing the JAES efforts, by contributing to capacity building on a sub-regional level. On the other hand, it can be used as an excuse for continuing bilateral strategies as usual, with the risk of contributing to fragmentation and specific country agendas.

The EU tendency to treat Africa not as one, but several, regional partners is further undermined by the separation of the JAES from the dialogue on the extension of the Cotonou Agreement, and even more so, the EPAs.¹⁰⁴ In addition, all North African countries are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and benefit from its financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Political dialogue with North African partners largely takes place in the framework of the ENP according to its own modalities. The regional approach with North Africa is also defined in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Most important for the African side, however, is the continued separation of the EPAs from the JAES agenda. The EU is therefore failing to live up to the stated objective in the JAES of treating Africa as one entity.¹⁰⁵ This fragmentation undermines the credibility of EU ambitions to realise the paradigm shift envisaged in the JAES: "...both sides will treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa-EU political dialogue to enable a strong and

¹⁰² Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

¹⁰³ France points out that the EU member states have to complement the EU's work with building the capacity of the African states, as the EU is prevented from addressing certain aspects of capacity building (Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials, EU member states).

¹⁰⁴ African Governance Institute Policy No 6, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Council of the EU 2007:3.

sustainable continent-to-continent partnership, with the AU and the EU at the center”¹⁰⁶.

3.6 The JAES as a case of EU policy

How can we attempt to explain the EU’s regional integration approach in terms of JAES from a comparative perspective? Is this a unique case for the EU or can it be seen as part of a trend or tendency for how the EU relates to external partners? One way of understanding the EU’s participation in the formulation and implementation of the JAES is by applying a policy learning perspective to the EU as an actor. Policy learning here means a long-lasting change in perceptions of policy-related challenges, attitudes and beliefs. Can such a learning perspective be useful for explaining the shift, or absence thereof, in the EU’s partnership attitude when promoting regional integration in terms of the JAES?¹⁰⁷

Post-colonial continent-to-continent cooperation was initially institutionalised under the Lomé Agreements. Already at this point, the European side declared that the agreement was one between equals. The Lomé Agreements were replaced by the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries in 2000, the same year as the first EU-Africa summit was held in Cairo. Another seven years elapsed before the EU and Africa, now the AU, was able to come together again for the second EU-Africa Summit, this time in Lisbon. The interim period saw the EU being occupied with the accession of new member states and EPA negotiations, and showing at least partial apathy regarding its relationship with Africa. As a consequence, the EU absence was to some extent filled with emerging new actors such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey. The ambitious JAES should be understood as trying to re-capture lost ground and establish a strong long-term strategic alliance between equals.

In a broader assessment of EU learning and policy formulation, an initial take on the JAES notes that while the EU has adopted these new policy instruments, it has also retained its fundamental core beliefs and identity as a strong normative actor where the promotion of values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights are at the centre.¹⁰⁸ This does not mean that the EU is seeking to export the EU model as such, but it reinforces the EU’s self-image as a leader of regional integration processes.

Farrell concluded that the EU’s promotion of normative values and regional integration relies more on authority through uneven distribution of power than on the creation of consensual knowledge shared by all political actors involved. For

¹⁰⁶ Council of the EU 2007:3 One of four objectives defined in the JAES.

¹⁰⁷ See Farrell 2009 for the broader theoretical argument.

¹⁰⁸ Farrell 2009.

example, this could explain why the EU has no corresponding JAES policy instrument in place for the Asian region. With Asia being much stronger than the African region in economic and geo-political terms, the EU would be unable to disregard dialogue functions or have a similar influence over the formulation and implementation of action plans.¹⁰⁹ For African partners, stronger economic independence and self-funding of JAES activities will therefore most likely be necessary in order to force the EU to adhere more closely to the stated vision of ownership and equality between the continents.

This argument holds true even after six years of opportunities for learning from the JAES process and moving beyond the previous aid paradigm. The point here is that the difficulty the EU displays in terms of shifting the paradigm away from donor-recipient towards a more equal partnership with Africa is not unique to EU-Africa relations. The pattern is consistent with EU normative and regional integration processes in a wider sense, and therefore reinforces the point that learning and change management within the EU is limited by various political and institutional capacities of the EU. A more detailed study of recent EU learning from the JAES processes so far would probably be instructive for how to live up to stated JAES principles and objectives.

3.7 Summing up the EU's engagement with the JAES

The EU has expected Africa to deliver on issues where the EU itself has had problems in delivering, e.g. in promoting shared values, speaking with one voice and following the JAES rather than pursuing bilateral strategies and objectives. Most importantly, the EU has failed to be a credible dialogue partner to the Africa and the AU at a time when Africa is re-defining itself and its place in the global society. This should have been an opportunity for the EU to deepen its relationship with Africa. Instead, the first six years have largely been an opportunity lost in this sense and the distance between the continents at a political strategic level has widened. The EU can ill afford to have the coming phase of the JAES, or its successor, continue along this path.

¹⁰⁹ Farrell 2009.

4 Developments on the AU side

4.1 New dynamics in Africa

Africa is undergoing fundamental changes, with new dynamics being played out on the continent in recent years. This means that the context for Africa-EU collaboration has altered since the JAES was signed in 2007, which has implications for the implementation of the PS Partnership.

African continental cooperation is gaining momentum and receiving increased attention globally. The AU's predecessor, the OAU, celebrates its 50th anniversary this year, while the AU and the APSA have now been in place for slightly more than a decade. The 50th anniversary celebrations in May 2013 coincided with the AU's 21st Summit, where new dimensions of Africa's approach for the future were revealed.

Africa is in the middle of the process of redefining itself, from several points of view. Many observers take a more optimistic view as concerns large-scale violence on the African continent, which they expect to decline steadily in the future.¹¹⁰ One central aspect is moving away from state level conflicts and increasingly focusing on human development, stressing the need to address socio-economic inequalities and unfair distribution of resources. These problems have long been known in Africa, and the population is becoming increasingly impatient to partake of the economic gains through development efforts and redistribution of resources.¹¹¹ With this situation comes an underlying potential for instability, alongside the changing nature of security threats¹¹². As a result, the security-development nexus has come to rank high on the African agenda.¹¹³

Positive dynamics in Africa have led to new realities on that continent. In terms of economic development, the traditional pessimism for Africa is no longer relevant. Africa fared better during the financial crises of recent years than countries elsewhere around the globe, and today many of the fastest growing economies¹¹⁴ in the world are to be found in Africa.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ In these observers' opinion, the risk of instability and violence is likely to persist, however, and even increase in some instances, in particular in view of the changing nature of security threats. See Cilliers and Schünemann 2013 and Maru 2012 among others.

¹¹¹ Hofmeyr 2013.

¹¹² Other security challenges, including the blurring of criminal and political violence, the threat of terrorism, militarily weak groups operating transnationally (often with connections to illicit flows) and rising electoral violence (see further Cilliers and Schünemann 2013).

¹¹³ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: REC official, civil society.

¹¹⁴ During the BRICS summit in March 2013, the South African government pointed out that "Africa is the fastest growing power after Asia, and offers the highest return on investments of

Another noteworthy feature is the tendency for increasingly democratic practices across the African continent, with more and more countries initiating or repeating multi-party elections that are gradually becoming more free, fair and peaceful¹¹⁶. Moreover, the recent changes caused by the ‘Arab Spring’ and the disappearance of certain African leaders have also had an (initial) strengthening effect on the empowerment and livelihoods of the populations.¹¹⁷

In all, this new context has resulted in increasing self-confidence and belief in Africa’s future and the AU and its member states, as was evident during the 21st Summit. Africa and the AU have become more assertive, emphasising their ownership and leadership in peace efforts.¹¹⁸ Even if problems remain within the AU, the organisation is increasingly becoming consolidated and established as an international actor. A new AUC and a new chairperson, the recent articulation of the Agenda 2063, the ambition to set up an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), the latest commitment to seek alternative sources of funding for the AU, and the building of new partnerships are all signs that the AU is determined to assume better control over its destiny.¹¹⁹

4.2 The new AU Commission

The new AUC and its Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who took office in October 2012, have pronounced ambitions to build a united, self-reliant and self-confident Africa.¹²⁰ Dr. Dlamini-Zuma depicts Africa as a future “model continent” and emphasises strongly that the AU should start from its own regulations, instead of just following those of donor systems. For example, irritation can be noted within the AU about having to ask permission from a “higher ranking donor” to make purchases.¹²¹ Most notably, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma has taken a less conducive stance towards donors and has been markedly less accessible to international partners.¹²²

anyregion. The African continent constitutes 60% of the world’s unused agricultural land. Africa is also very rich in energy resources and minerals”.

¹¹⁵ A central problem is that the rapid economic growth has so far has not benefited the populations in most of these countries. See Akwagyiram 2013-06-18 and Cilliers and Schünemann 2013

¹¹⁶ For elections, see Lindberg 2009. Despite these gains, challenges to democracy remain such as: weak political institutions and parties, underrepresentation of women in political life, contentious and violent elections and limited media freedom. See International IDEA and Human Security Report 2012.

¹¹⁷ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

¹¹⁸ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU officials.

¹¹⁹ ISS, June 2013.

¹²⁰ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state. Fabricius, October 2013.

¹²¹ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013.

¹²² Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013.

Since taking office, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma has strongly reacted against the AU's poor financial position and has pledged to speed up efforts to find alternative sources of funding.¹²³ During the AU's 21st Summit in May 2013, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma spoke about the unsustainable dependence of the AU on donor funding.¹²⁴

In terms of strategic priorities, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma has pronounced a reorientation, where direct attention to peace and security is to decrease. The new Chairperson's approach is to focus on socio-economic development. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma stresses the need for peace and development to be an integrated approach, explicitly making socio-economic progress part of the peace and security agenda.¹²⁵

A first assessment indicates a commission which is taking a more results-oriented approach. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma has initiated a review system for planning, monitoring and evaluation, in order to strengthen this approach; a roadmap for operationalisation of the results-based approach is currently being finalised.¹²⁶ The AUC has also expressed a desire to streamline and have practical outputs for the JAES. Meanwhile, the AU's follow-up committee for the JAES has produced few results as of yet.

Despite the initial tough rhetoric and clear commitment of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, many observers claim that no major or concrete changes have occurred under the new AUC, at least not anything visible in the short term. The (former) Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra has also been able to continue to act independently under the new chairperson.¹²⁷ Mr. Lamamra left his post in mid-September 2013, and was replaced by another Algerian national, Smail Chergui. On the other hand, some questions have been raised about changes underway within the AUC since the arrival of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, with "member states-appointed staff" being removed or disempowered¹²⁸. This has given rise to an atmosphere of positioning amongst the AU staff.¹²⁹ Even if Dr. Dlamini-Zuma is improving the efficiency of the AU bureaucracy, certain observers believe this is costing her the loyalty and support of much of the bureaucracy she took over, as well as of the AU member states.¹³⁰ Were this tendency to grow in importance, a risk would be that Dr. Dlamini-Zuma loses momentum for reform and, hence, has to devote more energy to being re-elected as the AUC chairperson in 2016.¹³¹

¹²³ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU Delegation and African Confidential, 7 June 2013.

¹²⁴ ISS, June 2013.

¹²⁵ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU officials, civil society, EU member state.

¹²⁶ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state.

¹²⁷ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU officials, EU Delegation, EU member state.

¹²⁸ Staff that used to be able to take decisions under former AUC chairperson Ping is now being constrained from doing so (Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013).

¹²⁹ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU Delegation, EU member state.

¹³⁰ Fabricius, October 2013.

¹³¹ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society.

4.3 Strategic planning

A development within the AU is the marked commitment to long-term strategic planning. The AU Summit in May 2013 adopted the Strategic Plan 2014-2017 of the AU Commission, but recently the organisation has also engaged in a further strategic outlook: Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is an attempt to ensure that Africa's future is driven by policies and programmes created mainly by African institutions. It sets out to establish a credible platform on which Africa can build its future development.¹³²

Agenda 2063 clearly reconfirms Africa's future vision for economic, judicial¹³³ and military independence. It focuses on the peace-development-security nexus, and aims to take full account of the policy difficulties and pitfalls of the past, including civil strife and poor governance, and propose strategies to overcome these. It will also seek to inspire African countries to continue emphasising the themes of solidarity and collaboration.¹³⁴

The development of Agenda 2063 will include consultations with different stakeholders, such as governments, the private sector, women, young people, various think tanks and civil society groups, throughout Africa. The ownership of Agenda 2063 is shared between the AUC, the member states and the RECs. Agenda 2063 is to be presented, discussed and adopted at the AU Summit in June 2014, and to be revised every five years.¹³⁵

4.4 Building new partnerships

Western states have long been engaged in varying types of partnerships with Africa, allowing in their most extreme form military action, such as the French intervention in Mali in 2013. The UN¹³⁶ and the EU have intensified their partnerships with Africa in recent years to build APSA, among other things.

Lately, opportunities for new forms of partnership have been expanding for Africa. Over the past decade, a strong increase in commercial and strategic engagements between the BRICS¹³⁷ countries and Africa has been seen.¹³⁸ China, as well as India and Brazil, have strongly engaged in a business-focused relationship with African countries. In recent years, countries such as Korea and

¹³² Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013. African Development Bank Group (AfDB), June 2013.

¹³³ With clear reference to the International Criminal Court and the present case against the Kenyan President and Deputy President (Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society).

¹³⁴ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013. AfDB, June 2013.

¹³⁵ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state. AfDB, June 2013.

¹³⁶ In particular, the UN-AU Ten-Year Capacity Building Program, the UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security.

¹³⁷ Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

¹³⁸ Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). February 2013.

Turkey have seen a rapid surge in their trade with Africa. The trade between these emerging countries and Africa is growing more rapidly than that of the continent's traditional Western partners.¹³⁹ Africa has also started to look for structured relations with Middle Eastern countries, but is awaiting the stabilisation of the political situation in North Africa before taking concrete steps.¹⁴⁰

In March 2013, the AU was invited to a BRICS summit for the first time. The theme of the meeting was "BRICS and Africa – Partnerships for Development, Integration and Industrialization", following the South African government's efforts to make BRICS promote the integration agenda in Africa instead of only focusing on access to resources. Observers claim that BRICS has given impetus to Africa's economic emergence and contributed significantly to the relevance and status of the continent.¹⁴¹ A proposition has also been made to convene BRICS-Africa retreats during the upcoming 6th BRICS summit in 2014.

For Africa, it is clearly beneficial to engage in various types of partnerships, the essential matter for Africans being that development is taking place and that concrete results are seen. Lately, however, Africans are becoming somewhat apprehensive about the real agendas of the new partners, questioning how sustainable their support can be. This means that even if Africa is becoming more self-assertive in its relations with the EU, the AU is not ready to alienate traditional partners. The approach will rather be to maintain a balance between traditional and new partners.¹⁴²

The AU is now increasingly reflecting on how to reformulate its various partnerships. Within the AU, the reasoning is that the organisation is involved in too many partnerships, adhering to too many different types of agreements. According to African observers, the AU programmes have become too partnership-driven, and the organisation is caught between different systems, meaning that the AU's own objectives are losing focus.¹⁴³

An AUC sub-committee on partnerships has been put in place to examine what specific areas a particular partner can support.¹⁴⁴ The AU summits of January 2013 and May 2013 also decided to put new partnerships between the AU and external actors on hold, in order to evaluate ongoing partnerships to see if they are aligned with AU priorities.¹⁴⁵ These developments indicate that the

¹³⁹ OECD library.

¹⁴⁰ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-official.

¹⁴¹ FOCAC. February 2013.

¹⁴² Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials.

¹⁴³ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society, AU-officials.

¹⁴⁴ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials.

¹⁴⁵ It is unclear to what extent this decision will have consequences for the Africa-EU relations, however one AU official interviewed claims that there should be no impact as the partnership with the EU is already in place.

implication of ownership is becoming increasingly apparent to Africans and show that there is commitment within the AU to confronting problems head-on. The term “African solutions” is no longer just jargon but a real agenda which Africa and the AU are trying to realise.¹⁴⁶

4.5 Commitment to seeking alternative sources of funding for the AU

The South African proposal of 2003 to have a financial coalition of the willing – which became the Big Five:¹⁴⁷ South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt and Algeria – to each supply 15% of African funding to the AU has proven to be untenable. With the dramatic developments in North Africa, Libya and Egypt are no longer able to pay and are increasingly out of the picture as funders.¹⁴⁸

With the new AUC, there has been a renewed focus on finding African funding. At the same time, the African partner is starting to show some apprehension regarding the EU’s indication of the need for the AU to find other sources than EU funding. With these factors at play, there could potentially be scope for more buy-in among the member states into the discussion on the financial issues.¹⁴⁹

Triggered by the failure of the financial coalition of the willing, an AU High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding, chaired by former Nigerian President Obasanjo, was set up in 2011. The Panel’s task has been to engage with member states and come up with proposals which would enable Africa to take ownership of its strategies. Suggestions have included taxes on air tickets and hotel accommodation to be implemented across Africa as a way raising funds for the AU.¹⁵⁰

The report of the High Level Panel, called the ‘Obasanjo Report’, was adopted in principle during the May 2013 summit. The report was referred to the Conference of Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning for further scrutiny, including consideration on implementation modalities of different options proposed. The resolutions of the Panel are expected to be tabled at the next AU Summit in January 2014.¹⁵¹

However, even if the Obasanjo Report was well received during the summit, certain observers warn that this proposal is not likely to be realised in the near

¹⁴⁶ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society.

¹⁴⁷ The Big Five currently finances 75% of the AU’s administrative budget (Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state).

¹⁴⁸ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials, EU-Delegation.

¹⁴⁹ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials.

¹⁵⁰ Chimpinde. 28 May 2013, NEPAD July 2011.

¹⁵¹ Chimpinde 2013. Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-official., AU, May 2013 and ISS, June 2013.

future because of challenges in terms of member state commitment. The debate among member states now is on what concrete impact the proposal will have on what states. Some countries have more tourism, some more airlines, and hence indirectly will pay more. There are also disagreements on what kind of arrangement should be applied to manage the money, with one suggestion being a trust fund.¹⁵² Even if the member states agree on a decision at the next summit, it is not likely to be quickly implemented. Furthermore, the Obasanjo Report is not specifically addressed in the strategic plan for 2014-2017, which reduces the likelihood of it being implemented during this period

As noted previously, economic growth in Africa has been strong and has given rise to optimism. Nevertheless, there is little political will among the African member states to support the AU, and only small symbolic funding has been given to the organisation. Another recurring explanation as to why African countries tend not to invest in the AU is that even if the economy is growing rapidly in Africa, it is not an African economy – but wealth limited to a number of privileged people in Africa. One tendency is for African wealth-holders to put money abroad, outside Africa. Another problematic issue is the mismanagement of money, with investments made in arms and military capacity. The need for a debate about this situation appears urgent.¹⁵³ Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the AUC will initiate such a debate, as this would be a risky move for the commissioners, who seek to be re-elected. Another issue from an AU perspective is that some African states pay more to RECs than to the AU. This indicates a need to revisit the underlying format.

Positive developments concerning alternative sources of funding for the AU can also be observed, however. During the May 2013 summit, it was decided to establish an AU Foundation for voluntary contributions towards funding the AU. The Foundation is to accommodate the private sector, individuals and any other donations or contributions. On a related note, commitment was expressed during the summit to increase substantially the contributions to the Peace Fund.¹⁵⁴ A concrete event, showing that Africans are taking initiatives in the spirit of the Obasanjo Report, is the African Solidarity Initiative, which is a pledging AU conference to be held in November 2013, inviting the private sector, non-government organisations (NGOs), member states and RECs to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction. Another positive development is that the AU raised African contributions for AFISMA.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials, EU member state.

¹⁵³ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials, REC-official.

¹⁵⁴ AU, May 2013.

¹⁵⁵ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-officials.

4.6 The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises

As noted earlier, the AU is facing problems in the operationalisation of the APSA and the ASF, most recently demonstrated in Mali. The current regime APSA/ASF and its Rapid Deployment Capability are increasingly felt to be unrealistic by the AU. In April 2013, the AUC published a state of play report on the ASF and proposed an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) to be set up by 2014/2015. The proposal came from South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda, and was (at least initially) supported by Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra and Wane, the Head of the PSD. It was based on the results of a questionnaire sent to the RECs on why they could not react to the crisis in Mali.¹⁵⁶

The decision on the establishment of the ACIRC was taken during the 21st AU Summit in May 2013. This emergency force is to consist of three battle groups and amount to 5000 soldiers. The ACIRC will be established pending the full operationalisation of the ASF. Hence, efforts to complete the work with the ASF will continue, and the current regime ASF is to be kept for Amani Africa.¹⁵⁷

The ACIRC can partly be interpreted as a face-saving reaction for having to rely on French intervention during the Mali crisis. Declaring the set-up of this new resource shows the AU's concern about these developments and manifests African dignity, particularly in relation to the French. It remains to be seen whether the announcement of the ACIRC is a political show of force, and to what extent it will evolve beyond the policy declaration.¹⁵⁸ The AUC has been requested to work out and submit practical modalities for the operationalisation of the ACIRC to a meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS) scheduled to take place during the last quarter of 2013.¹⁵⁹

For an ACIRC of 5000 troops to be operational, only one to two countries would have to put troops at the AU's disposal. Hence, the new AU decision may indicate a preference of the AU to turn to larger member states than to the RECs.¹⁶⁰ However, even if the ACIRC could materialise in terms of numbers, many observers point to major obstacles preventing this initiative from being realised. These mainly concern the problem of logistics, with the difficulty in

¹⁵⁶ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society. Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU-officials. AU, May 2013 and ISS, June 2013.

¹⁵⁷ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society. Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU-officials. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 21st press statement.

¹⁵⁸ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society. Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society.

¹⁵⁹ AU, 29 July 2013.

¹⁶⁰ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU-officials, civil society.

moving troops, in particular air transport capacity. Another factor is political sensitivities, which would prevent the ACIRC from deploying in a different region than that from which its troops originate. Practical difficulties for key African military powers such as Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria in deploying alongside each other, in terms of different cultures, languages and military practices, would be another obstacle. A further issue is the number of troops considered (5000), which is seen by some observers as being too small to be sufficiently effective.¹⁶¹

Concerning Nigeria, one of Africa's strongest military powers, it remains unlikely that it would provide troops for ACIRC, as it regards the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as already ready for the ASF. South Africa initially supported the ACIRC initiative, but this appears more and more to have been a hasty move by President Zuma. Lately, it has been unclear to what extent South Africa supports the project. The most advanced RECs within APSA, ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are both strongly negative towards the ACIRC, feeling that it is a duplication of the ASF.¹⁶²

The ACIRC is still being debated but all in all, the enthusiasm among the African community for this initiative appears relatively limited. Some observers have also expressed concerns that the work on the ASF will inevitably slow down if the ACIRC becomes the centre of attention. Until the next summit in January 2014, those member states that initially showed interest in the ACIRC (Uganda, South Africa, Rwanda), should get back to the AU about how they intend to proceed.¹⁶³

4.7 Remaining challenges

The AU and its peace and security architecture continue to face considerable challenges in terms of inadequate human resources and capacity problems, while lack of financial and logistical resources and of standardised training undermine its ability to lead PSOs. African civil society struggles to implement peace and security initiatives aligned to the APSA and the PS Partnership, suffering from an insufficient information flow from the AU. Furthermore, there is inadequate capacity to deal with the PS Partnership, and the Peace and Security cluster of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC) has so far never organised any initiatives.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society, REC-official, EU member states.

¹⁶² Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society, REC-official.

¹⁶³ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: Civil society, EU member state, AU-official.

¹⁶⁴ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society. Hengari, 2013.

Political cooperation within Africa has proven complicated. With the continental, regional and national levels being components of the AU and the APSA, this makes for a complex organisation. The multiple levels mean overlaps and demanding relations within which to coordinate, making it difficult for Africa to speak with one voice.¹⁶⁵ At times, the AU's actions vis-à-vis sub-regional initiatives have been contradictory. The AU's responses to peace and security challenges on the continent have also been inconsistent, such as its approach to Libya in 2011 and more recently to the crisis in Mali.¹⁶⁶ During the events in North Africa, the AU lost some of its momentum as a growing actor in the field of peace and security. A real problem for the AU is the organisation's overemphasis on adopting policies. The fact that a high number of decisions are taken means that the AU stakeholders devote most of their time to preparing decisions ahead of the summits, instead of implementing those policies recently agreed on. Generally, implementation and follow-up mechanisms are lacking within the AU.¹⁶⁷

4.7.1 Relations amongst African stakeholders

The long-time struggle of the AU to act on behalf of Africa persists. Relations amongst African stakeholders will remain problematic over the next few years. Competition for authority between the AUC and the member states, as well as the AU and the RECs, continues to create tensions and has consequences for the way in which the PS Partnership proceeds.¹⁶⁸

African officials note that non-harmonised positions between the AU and the RECs are a major obstacle to advancing on key issues during the EU-Africa summit. A meeting on the African side ahead of the summit will focus on AU-REC coordination as concerns peace and security.¹⁶⁹ According to EU officials, the AUC was ready to attend the Las Palmas meeting with the EU in June 2013, and the cancellation of the meeting was due to the AU member states being insufficiently prepared and the lack of coordination between them and the AU.¹⁷⁰ Generally, there is limited commitment for the JAES and the PS Partnership among the member states; the African countries mostly refer to the AU for ongoing work in this area.¹⁷¹

AU and REC officials point out that a difficulty – especially in times of acute crises – is the possibility to interpret documents governing the hierarchy between

¹⁶⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU-officials.

¹⁶⁶ Hengari, 2013.

¹⁶⁷ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU-official, civil society. ISS, June 2013.

¹⁶⁸ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: REC official, EU member state.

¹⁶⁹ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU officials.

¹⁷⁰ Interview Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

¹⁷¹ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state.

the AU and RECs in different ways.¹⁷² EU officials also underline that the AU and RECs/member states have a problematic relationship, characterised by a power balance. The AU seeks to control the RECs, but continues to need the agreement of the regions for the implementation of the PS Partnership.¹⁷³ Meanwhile, certain RECs feel that aligning their policies to those of the AU is adapting realistic work to unrealistic work.¹⁷⁴ The new AUC chairperson, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, is also requesting the lead role of the AU over advanced RECs such as SADC and ECOWAS in a stronger way than Jean Ping, her predecessor, which can give rise to more conflictual dynamics.¹⁷⁵ The Mali case illustrates the difficulties that still exist.

Nevertheless, observers within the EU, the AU and the RECs claim that a positive dialogue between these organisations has developed, and suggest that the relationship between the RECs and the AU is “possibly” or “little by little” improving – opinions vary. With the establishment of the REC liaison offices at the AU (initiated in 2008-2009), the RECs now have a day-to-day working relationship with the AU, as well as amongst themselves. There are institutionalised meetings, increased interaction and information-sharing, joint missions and common positions developed between these stakeholders. Since the liaison offices have been put in place, the AU and the RECs support each other and use each other’s models, for instance in terms of mediation and early warning. Another positive development is the recent establishment of AU liaison offices in conflict and post-conflict countries. A consequence of these initiatives is increased learning by both parties on how to implement work in the area of peace and security.¹⁷⁶

However, certain AU officials report that the relations with the REC liaison officers have not been straight-forward, claiming that their role needs to be further defined. It is currently unclear what the REC liaison officers are meant to deal with, whether they should act at a strategic level, with the AU PSC, or a tactical level. It is also vague who exactly they are meant to interact with.¹⁷⁷ The RECs sometimes stand in for the AU at certain meetings, and the liaison offices have in a sense “become part of the AU”.¹⁷⁸ While this could be a positive development, it also calls for a clear definition of roles and responsibilities.

When seeking an answer to the question of whether the AU-REC relationship has improved, it should be taken into account that relationships are not constant. The

¹⁷² Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU official, REC officials.

¹⁷³ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

¹⁷⁴ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: REC official.

¹⁷⁵ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: EU member state.

¹⁷⁶ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU official, REC officials. Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU-officials.

¹⁷⁷ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: AU official.

¹⁷⁸ Interview Addis Ababa, September 2013: REC official.

level of association between the AU and the RECs varies over time, as well as depending on the specific REC. Observers point out that relations between these stakeholders are very person-based and dependent on personal agendas, chemistries and contacts.¹⁷⁹

For now, the AU generally has a somewhat better relationship with SADC, as policies are better aligned with Dr. Dlamini-Zuma being the AUC chairperson. The connection between the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU also has certain strength, as the AU is prominent on the Horn; the IGAD states also prefer the AU to Ethiopia's influence in the region. After the Mali experience, where ECOWAS was manifestly not able to deploy efficiently, the motivation among ECOWAS member states to have a functioning ECOWAS has increased, and hence the REC is not very much in favour of a strong AU. Moreover, Nigeria does not wish to have a South African presence in West Africa. As concerns the North African Regional Capability (NARC) member states, these are heavily occupied by domestic priorities for now and not focused on AU relations. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which is developing more slowly than the other RECs, is largely characterised by personal relationships; the REC is diverse in character and has no common line, and there is not much interest in the AU.¹⁸⁰

Summing up, and as the above description of the dynamics illustrates, developments on the AU side are likely to make for a more assertive African partner from now on. Dialogue at the 2014 summit will take place against this backdrop. If the new African position is played constructively by the African side and received with openness by the EU, it could increase the potential for a more equal partnership between Africa and the EU. Business as usual between the continents is not, and should no longer be, an option.

¹⁷⁹ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

¹⁸⁰ Interview Brussels, June 2013: Civil society.

5 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: How can it be revitalised?

The JAES represents a long-term ambition to fundamentally change relations between Africa and the EU. The continental actors recognise the need for a paradigm shift: away from colonial and aid patterns of interaction and towards a mutually defined agenda for change between equals. The results so far, however, have to be regarded as a disappointment. While the PS Partnership overall is performing better than the other seven partnerships within the JAES, there is still much room for improvement. Stakeholders have manifested less commitment to the JAES in the last few years. Many have therefore come to view the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Strategy as a shell that exists only because the APSA and the APF have been in existence since 2003 – well before the adoption of the JAES in late 2007. Some actors, on both the EU and African side, believe it is more suitable to regard the APF as the main European instrument to support African peace and security. Others argue that the JAES is indeed the ambitious approach needed in order to get beyond the donor-recipient relationship. In this latter view, it is important to have a joint framework in place on which to continue to build a mutual and multidimensional relationship – including a peace and security partnership. Ultimately the question is: What is the scope for ensuring that the envisaged paradigm shift in Africa-EU relations is not lost entirely?

Before addressing this overall question on the future of the JAES, a brief reminder of the process leading up to the April 2014 summit adds to the challenges ahead. What immediate issues need to be addressed to ensure that the summit is not another opportunity lost?

5.1 Planning ahead of the 2014 summit

The Africa-EU summit in April 2014 is arguably the most critical juncture in continent-to-continent relations in recent years and a real opportunity to reframe the JAES and to find new and realistic ways forward. With less than four months to go before the summit, what remains to be put in place so that the revitalisation of the collaboration stands a chance come April 2014?

The preparations ahead of the Africa-EU summit are not entirely decided upon. The cancelled “brainstorming meeting” in June 2013 indicated the desire, but also complications, for starting mutually acceptable forms of negotiations. As discussed in previous chapters, the lack of engagement with the planning process for the summit can partly be attributed to the low frequency and quality of the political level dialogue since 2009.

Some preparations are underway in a unilateral sense, with the African partner having had an internal meeting on the PS Partnership and the JAES in June 2013. On the EU side, the EU Council Cross-Pillar Working Group on Africa (COAFR), in coordination with the EEAS, is in charge of organising meetings up to the summit. The EU has an upcoming Council meeting in December 2013 focusing on defence and security, where the JAES is likely to be on the agenda.

Joint preparations between the continents have so far included the recent “brainstorming meeting” that took place in Brussels on 18 September 2013 and with broad participation from the AU and EU, co-chaired by EEAS Head of Africa Department Nick Wescott and the AUC Chairperson’s Chief of Staff, Jean-Baptiste Natama. There was agreement that the PS Partnership is an exception in the sense that it is delivering results, although still falling short of the (over-)ambitious Action Plan. However, there was disagreement on the political dialogue process, with African partners calling for more, formal and better political dialogue at ministerial level, while the EU wants to focus more on mechanisms for improved implementation and results.¹⁸¹

Following the meeting on 18 September 2013, working groups are to be set up between the AU and EU to prepare for the summit, and a list of issues of critical importance will be discussed to prepare the agenda for the summit. It is likely that the present controversies over how to handle e.g. the ICC and EPAs will continue to affect the dialogue climate and the summit, whether or not they make it onto the final agenda for the meeting. The journey ahead to 2-3 April 2014 is therefore almost certain to be a bumpy ride.

Some resistance to change is due to vested interests. On the EU side, this can be traced to the EEAS and the EC, which to a large extent are the owners of the process on the European side and therefore wants to protect the existing structure. Within the AU, there is a specific interest in maintaining at least the present outline and funding mechanisms of the PS Partnership, in order to protect progress for PSOs and capacity already built up within the AU PSD.

Within (mainly African) civil society, there is a feeling of having done a lot of work for nothing if the PS Partnership comes to an end. The frustration stems from the fact that civil society has engaged in the PS Partnership for several years. A specific concern is how to ensure that civil society gets an entry point and a role in the new JAES structure, where Africa-EU working relations are likely to be maintained through the Joint Coordination Committee. Even if civil society cannot be part of this forum, some alternative way in for this sector would need to be set up. For instance, civil society actors could play a greater role during evaluation of the PS Partnership. On the European side, valuable civil society input for the 2014 summit is being generated and should be absorbed by

¹⁸¹ Interview Stockholm, October 2013.

the EU and African partners. A recent example is the 28 October conference, arranged by the *European Think-Tanks Group*, on “Looking Beyond 2013: Are Africa-EU Relations Still Fit for Purpose?”¹⁸² – with participation by African and European policy makers. The emphasis on the highly political character of the JAES, not merely a question of technical implementation, should be taken forward by policy makers. The conference document also raises an issue that the present report highlighted in Chapter 2 under Priority Action 1: that the PS Partnership should address the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus. More focus needs to be placed on issues relating to an inclusive approach for improving peace and security – a perspective currently neglected in the JAES implementation process.

In addition to JAES summit preparations, the planning for the 3rd APF has recently started, and an EC concept paper was discussed with EU member states in June 2013. The new APF does not involve major changes compared with the current APF, but is rather a gradual improvement, building on lessons learned. The APF will focus on sustainability and increased African funding, and will also be more active in the pre-crisis phase, e.g. in mediation.¹⁸³

Another important event ahead of April 2014 is the France-Africa summit, which is set for December 2013 and which will focus on peace and security. The meeting will shed some light on France’s future approach to African peace and Security: will France embrace the centralisation efforts of the JAES, or will the approach favour a more bilateral strategy instead? So far, neither the EU nor EU member states have been invited to take part or observe the meeting.

5.2 Conclusion: What way forward?

Returning to the broad question about whether a paradigm shift can still be achieved, in this study we found that overall, there have been unrealistic expectations on the delivery of the JAES in terms of its principles and main objectives. If instead we look to the PS Partnership and its achievements over the six-year period 2008-13, the cumulative progress is still considerable. Good working relations between the EU and AU PSCs are now in place, the development and strengthening of AU’s PSD has been considerable, and there is substantial improvement of African led PSOs in general. As we have seen, the same does not hold true for the strategic political dialogue of the partnership – an area where the EU needs to rethink its approach to Africa. These are some findings that should be points of departure for the next stage of Africa-EU relations, where the joint formulation and agreement on realistic and concrete principles, objectives and action plans should take centre stage – and where

¹⁸² European Think-Tank Group 2013.

¹⁸³ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

political dialogue is seen as an integral part of the JAES, not an inconvenient add-on.

Moving forward, how can political dialogue between Africa and the EU be improved, and what specific measures are needed to improve the delivery of results? It should also be noted that the summit in April 2014 may result in a substantially revised Action Plan for the PS Partnership, possibly even a merger with other partnerships within the strategy. It will therefore be necessary to revisit the strategy document after the summit for a more detailed and specific discussion on how member states and the EU can contribute to improved capacity building, more reliable funding mechanisms, and improved political dialogue and partnership culture.

Support centralisation and the long-term vision

Africa as one, a key principle of the JAES, is a long-term vision. For example, EU officials believe that making APSA a reality is likely to take a generation. EU member states have realised that this vision is a very ambitious and difficult undertaking, and some member states are therefore increasingly reverting back to using their own individual channels for collaboration on peace and security. Observers note that one way forward for Africa-EU peace and security collaboration could be to focus the support on big African states, which could serve as building blocks for the APSA.¹⁸⁴ A trade-off then becomes apparent: either stay true to the JAES ambition of treating Africa as one and thereby support the long-term vision but possibly miss out on opportunities in the short-term perspective of achieving concrete results; or use individual channels of support which result in a more fragmented approach, in direct conflict with the JAES vision, but which may result in more short-term gains. The recommendation in this report is to maintain the focus on continent-to-continent relations and support the process towards more centralised capacity building of the AU.

Focus on concrete progress

Another insight about revitalising the partnership is to engage in concrete activities, for the stakeholders to feel that the collaboration is operational. The recent APF evaluation showed that the EU should develop a so-called “smart approach” to capacity building, putting more emphasis on hard capacity building such as communication equipment, command and control systems, strategic transport capacity, as a complement to the funding of soft capacity building, e.g. salary systems, on-the-job training etc.¹⁸⁵ A further way to enhance capacity

¹⁸⁴ Interviews Brussels. June 2013.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews Brussels, June 2013: EU officials.

building is to better link the work that is already underway and working on the ground, and let these experiences inform dialogue at the political level.

Building buy-in from stakeholders

Previous years of implementation have shown that progress can only be achieved when there is dedicated political will on both sides and a reliable financial instrument to support it.¹⁸⁶ A fundamental question for ensuring improved implementation of the JAES is therefore how to deepen the political will and commitment of both the EU and Africa to engage wholeheartedly in the build-up of APSA.

On the African side, a key issue is how to stimulate the will to provide increased African funding, with the Obasanjo Initiative as one example. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma is also pursuing this and other avenues that can contribute to African co-funding and ownership and further reduce the dependency on donors. Several observers note that the AU needs to engage in a frank discussion with rich African countries¹⁸⁷ about African co-funding. In several African countries, funds are more readily available today than was the case only a few years ago.

According to EU officials, the APF has become “a victim of its own success” with 90% of the APF funding directed at African-led PSOs. However, there is no exit strategy in place.¹⁸⁸ In order to further encourage African co-funding and to revitalise buy-in for the PS Partnership, the dialogue at higher levels needs to be strengthened. It has been argued on the EU side that it is not realistic to increase the frequency of ministerial meetings, as the ministers will not have time for this. However, if the goal is to sincerely prioritise the policy dialogue, relying on meetings of the Joint Task Force, AUC-EC, EU PSC-AU PSC and lower level structures is likely to prove insufficient. Joint dialogue on at least a long-term strategy for scaling down EU funding and finding innovative ways of increasing African funding is therefore an essential component of the next JAES phase. For example, in order to secure African funding for the future, the AU Peace Fund would need to be increased so that it could cover capacity building needs for the APSA.

A further complication on the EU side is the lack of political will among EU member states to engage in African peace and security work. Cooperation between the EU member states and the EU institutions to implement the PS Partnership has not worked well, and a feeling among member states of being excluded from, rather than invited to, JAES work of the EEAS and the EC is part

¹⁸⁶ Interviews Brussels, June 2013. Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013. See also Poulton et al 2010.

¹⁸⁷ Such as South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Egypt (although transition currently puts Egypt in a precarious situation).

¹⁸⁸ Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

of the problem. The blame partly falls back on EU member states, which have lacked in engagement with the EEAS and the EC. Now, when member states are waking up to the fact that the Africa-EU summit on the JAES only is a few months away, they want to re-engage with the process but find it difficult to find ways back into the EEAS and EC dialogue. Nevertheless, renewed EU member state engagement remains important in order to obtain a more genuine Africa-EU collaboration.

Invest time and resources in the political dialogue and partnership culture

The need for improved political level dialogue has been stressed throughout this report and is the responsibility of African and EU political leaders alike. Without continuous and earnest strategic political dialogue between committed partners from Africa and the EU alike, a constructive partnership culture will not be established.

At the centre of this process right now is the emerging narrative of Africa Rising, which establishes a more attractive and self-assertive African identity and is strongly promoted by the AU in its 2063 vision. Still, this perspective has not resonated well within the EU sphere, where the donor-recipient framework still persists. The EU and EU member states should instead embrace this opportunity to be part of the dialogue on this new African identity process. African political leaders on their part need to engage in a frank dialogue with their European partners on how Europe should relate to this new narrative. The EU should also be prepared to engage in a similar process to redefine its own identity. Right now, however, Europe is distancing itself from this African narrative and is thereby also missing out on a historic opportunity not only to be a partner in this process, but also to redefine itself accordingly – and in line with the stated ambitions in the JAES.

Another opportunity for stimulating engagement from the European side is to intensify the discussions on what the EU can get out of a stronger AU in terms of peace and security. Several European stakeholders would like to see the EU pronouncing its strategic interest in a clearer way. However, this should not be confused with too much pushing of European ideas concerning what areas the collaboration should cover and how it should be carried out.¹⁸⁹

Integrate JAES with other frameworks and agreements

When considering the future of the JAES, it is inevitable to take the Cotonou Agreement into account. The question of how to reconcile the two implementation frameworks stands open. The Cotonou Agreement is

¹⁸⁹ Some observers note that the EU is trying to direct African priorities to its own security interests, e.g. terrorism and counter-piracy, disregarding a more necessary long-term focus on building capacity. Interviews Brussels, June 2013.

traditionally more familiar to African stakeholders, as it focuses on development cooperation – mainly in a bilateral manner. This is also precisely the reason why giving up the JAES to the benefit of the Cotonou Agreement is not a solution if the aim is an equal partnership. The Cotonou Agreement was concluded for a 20-year period (2000-2020), and discussions on how to revitalise this Agreement and the JAES in a coherent way will be a likely topic on the agenda of the Africa-EU summit in 2017, but should also be addressed at the 2014 summit. The most radical scenario would imply abolishing the Cotonou Agreement and replacing it with a new version of the JAES which has legal aspects added to it. Another, perhaps more feasible, option would be to keep a small EU-African Cotonou hat, separate from an agreement with the Caribbean and Pacific states, and strengthen the JAES with legal dimensions. The separation of EPAs from the JAES continues to be an issue of contention, and the EU needs to enter into a discussion with its African partners on how the JAES and EPAs could be better integrated.

It should also be noted that the 2011 aid effectiveness framework *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* is not accommodated in the present shape of the JAES. For the next phase of Africa-EU relations, especially concerning the peace and security nexus, this is not only a requirement but also a good opportunity for adapting the present lofty ambitions to the realities of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

5.2.1 Future trends

Conflict on the African continent has changed dramatically in the post-Cold War period. Inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts have declined and deaths per conflict have been dramatically reduced.¹⁹⁰ As one Director at the AU's PSD articulated this: "*One major change that has affected Africa and the AU since 2004 is the number of major conflicts, which has gone from 24 to 6. The JAES is not adjusted to this more stable situation where the needs now are more infrastructure and socioeconomic factors than peace and security demands*"¹⁹¹. At the same time, we see other security challenges emerging. These include the destabilisation of the Sahel region, where terrorist activities and the illicit flows of small arms, organised crime and trafficking of drugs and contraband constitute an increased threat to African, but also European and global, security.

The quote cited above shows the changing pattern of conflict on the continent, but also the change in approach for how to address the peace and security nexus. Moving in the direction of a more comprehensive approach is in tune with the direction taken by the AU under Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, but is also in line with the

¹⁹⁰ Human Security Report 2012:155f, 206f.

¹⁹¹ Interviews Addis Ababa, September 2013.

EU proposal for three instead of eight partnerships under the JAES, with peace and democracy being merged into one partnership. Our interviews suggest that one concrete way of facilitating this trend would be to seek ways to better integrate the APSA with the corresponding structure within the JAES partnership for Governance and Human Rights: the Africa Governance Architecture (AGA).

Another trend that supports this direction of the JAES is the *New Deal* aid effectiveness initiative, where the focus is on peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile states. The New Deal offers important tools for moving the JAES in the right direction. A more inclusive approach to peace and governance issues is one aspect of this, but the New Deal also offers solutions for how predictable funding can be promoted in fragile situations through simplified, accountable fast-track financial arrangements. The New Deal initiative is being implemented in for example Liberia (with Sweden as a key partner), and there is a *Somali Compact* in place for Somalia where all actors are now implementing the new inclusive peacebuilding and statebuilding framework. A similar compact is being established for South Sudan. This is likely to pose new challenges for more traditional peacebuilding efforts to be better integrated with statebuilding and governance issues. Substantial capacity building needs are likely to emerge, and new skills are needed among the actors involved to facilitate this integration of peace and statebuilding efforts.

Another trend that needs to be supported on both sides is the Africa Rising momentum. For the AU, however, it is critical that increased assertiveness is matched by increased African ownership – ultimately manifested by an increase in African funding for the AU and strategies like the JAES.

The Europeans on their side need to find a new political dialogue modality for engaging in this process at the highest level. This is a greater challenge, as it requires the EU to break with the existing trend of disengagement from the political dialogue, and ultimately also a change in mind-set where the partnership is one between equals, even if this is not yet the case in terms of economic strength. It is alarming that the EU side has not invested enough in ministerial level dialogue during a phase in which Africa is clearly redefining itself and assuming a much more assertive mind-set. This could have been an opportunity for the Europeans to engage in a mutual exercise of finding common ground. Instead, the EU is now on the sidelines, clearly running the risk of being further marginalised and with less ability to properly understand its African partner.

Ultimately, then, a paradigm shift in Africa-EU relations is still a distant future. If African funding for the JAES increases significantly and if the EU's political leaders engage in serious political dialogue with their African partners, this would constitute an important step in the right direction. If this does not happen in the near future, the JAES is likely to remain an ambitious but unfulfilled vision.

References

African Confidential, 7 June 2013. *Paying – and fighting – for unity*. Vol. 54, N. 12.

African Development Bank Group (AfDB). 28 June 2013. *The AfDB and its Partners Reflect on Africa's Future Development Called "Agenda 2063"*. <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/the-afdb-and-its-partners-reflect-on-africas-future-development-called-agenda-2063-12074/> Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. JAES, 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf

African Governance Institute (AGI), 2013. *What Future for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy?* AGI Policy Brief No 3. <http://www.iag-agi.org/spip/IMG/pdf/What-Future-for-the-Joint-Africa-EU-Strategy-Policy-Brief-3.pdf> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

African Governance Institute (AGI), 2013. *Issues of the Africa-Europe Summit on April 2014: A Critical Look at the Africa-Europe Partnership*. AGI Policy Brief No 6. <http://www.westafricagateway.org/files/Policy-Brief-N-6-Issue-Summit-Africa-Europe.pdf> Retrieved 23 September 2013.

African Peace Facility (APF). 2012. *Annual Report 2012*. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/documents/apf_annual_report_2012_en.pdf Retrieved 11 November 2013.

African Union (AU) Peace and Security Department. 2012. *Joint Narrative Report to International Partners for the Period 1 January to 30 June 2012*.

African Union (AU). 27 May 2013. *Final Press Release of the 21st Ordinary Session of the Summit of the African Union*. May 27, 2013 <http://summits.au.int/en/21stsummit/events/final-press-release-21st-ordinary-session-summit-african-union> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

African Union (AU). 29 July 2013. Press statement on the Peace and Security Council 387th meeting at ministerial level (PSC/MIN/BR.1 (CCCLXXXVII).

African Union (AU). August 2013. *Agenda 2063: A Shared Strategic Framework for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development*. Background Note. <http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents> Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Akwagyiram, Alexis. 18 June 2013. "Africa rising – but who benefits?", *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22847118> Retrieved 25 November 2013.

BOND and ECDPM. 2010. *The EU and Africa The policy context for development.*

[http://www.ECDPM.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/A04695C18AF9439DC12577EC0034D133/\\$FILE/EU%20and%20Africa%20policy%20context%20for%20development_BOND&ECDPM.pdf](http://www.ECDPM.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/A04695C18AF9439DC12577EC0034D133/$FILE/EU%20and%20Africa%20policy%20context%20for%20development_BOND&ECDPM.pdf) Retrieved 11 November 2013.

Bossuyt, Jean and Andrew Sherriff. 2010. *What Next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy? Perspectives on revitalising an innovative framework.* European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Discussion Paper No. 94, March 2010.

[http://www.ECDPM.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/32ACD4ACDBD40C76C12576E3003BDC84/\\$FILE/ECDPM%20What%20future%20for%20the%20JAES_scoping%20paper_DP%2094.pdf](http://www.ECDPM.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/32ACD4ACDBD40C76C12576E3003BDC84/$FILE/ECDPM%20What%20future%20for%20the%20JAES_scoping%20paper_DP%2094.pdf) Retrieved 11 November 2013.

Chiminde, Kombe. 28 May 2013. "African leaders sign Vision 2063". *The Post Online*. http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=33323 Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Cilliers, Jakkie and Julia Schünemann. 2013. *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?* Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 246, May 2013. <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper246.pdf> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

Cotonou Agreement. <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/>

Council of the European Union, 9 December 2007, *The Africa- EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa – EU Strategy*. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Directorate General Development and Cooperation EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) Website. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm

Early Response Mechanism, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/early-response-mechanism_en.htm

Elowson, Camilla. 2009. *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy. A Study of the Peace and Security Partnership*. FOI-R--2736--SE Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm March 2009).

Eriksson, Mikael & Kristina Zetterlund. 2013. *Dealing with Change. EU and AU Responses to the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya*. FOI-R--3589--SE, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Stockholm.

Europe Africa Policy Research Network (EARN). 2010. *Beyond Development Aid. EU-Africa Political Dialogue on Global Issues of Common Concern*. EARN

2010: Portugal.) <http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/beyond-development-aid.pdf> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), 26 April 2013. *Post 2015 and Beyond 2020: What new perspectives for Africa-EU and ACP-EU relations?*, Report, Informal High-level Seminar. ECDPM: Brussels.

European Commission. 2009. *Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008-2010) Input into the mid-term progress-report*. Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2009) 1064, 20 July 2009, Brussels. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st12/st12320.en09.pdf> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

European External Action Services, July 2013. *EEAS Review*. http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf Retrieved 28 September 2013. EEAS: Brussels.

European External Action Service (EEAS). 2013. *EEAS Review 2013*. http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf Retrieved 25 November 2013.

European Parliament. *Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013*. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dpap/dv/jeas_action_plan/jeas_action_plan_en.pdf Retrieved 25 November 2013.

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). 2010. *Recommendations for the Second Action Plan for the Peace & Security Partnership of the Joint Africa -EU Strategy*. September 2010. http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/Africa/EPLO_WG_Africa_Recommendations_EUImplementationTeam_Annex.pdf Retrieved 11 November 2013

European Think-Tank Group, October 2013. *Looking Beyond 2013: Are Africa-EU Relations Still Fit for Purpose?* [http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/69F5B0C8C510B7F8C1257C0B002D6770/\\$FILE/ETTg%20Background%20note%20final%20draft%2020102013.pdf](http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/69F5B0C8C510B7F8C1257C0B002D6770/$FILE/ETTg%20Background%20note%20final%20draft%2020102013.pdf) Retrieved 15 November 2013.

Fabricius, Peter. 3 October 2013. "Dlamini-Zuma brings a refreshing note of self-reliance to the AU, but it's premature to declare UDI". *ISS Today*. <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/dlamini-zuma-brings-a-refreshing-note-of-self-reliance-to-the-au-but-its-premature-to-declare-udi>

Farrell, Mary. 2009. "EU policy towards other regions; policy learning in the external promotion of regional integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16:8, 1165-1184.

Ferreira-Pereira, Laura. 2008. "Portugal and the EU Presidency: A Case of Constructive Bridge-Building", in *JCMS*, Vol 46, Annual Review pp 61-70.

Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). February 2013. *South Africa to push African Agenda at BRICS summit*.

<http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t1016088.htm> Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Hauck, Volker. October 18 2013. "Drawing Lessons from Conflict Relapse in Africa: What scope to do things differently?" *Africa-Europe Relations – Looking Beyond 2014*. Blog coordinated by ECDPM.

<http://africaeu2014.blogspot.se/2013/10/drawing-lessons-from-conflict-relapse.html> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

Hengari, Alfredo Tjiurimo. July 2013. *The African Union and Security*. Council on Foreign Relations Expert Brief. <http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/african-union-security/p31142> Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Hofmeyr, Jan 2013. *Africa Rising? Popular Dissatisfaction with economic Management Despite a Decade of Growth*. Afrobarometer:

http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno2.pdf?utm Published October 2013, retrieved 20 October 2013.

Human Security Report Project. *Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative*. Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2012.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 27 June 2013. *Outcome of the 21st Summit of the African Union*. Published online 27 June 2013.

<http://www.issafrica.org/events/outcome-of-the-21st-summit-of-the-african-union> Retrieved 11 November 2013.

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS). *A New Deal for engagement in fragile states*.

<http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/49151944.pdf>. Retrieved 25 November 2013.

International IDEA homepage, Africa section.

<http://www.idea.int/africa/index.cfm> Retrieved 25 November 2013.

Jakobsson, Oskar and Mikael Eriksson, 2012. *Sahel. En säkerhetspolitisk mosaik*. [The Sahel Region: A Mosaic] no FOI-R--3446--SE (Kista: Swedish Defence Research Agency, Defence Analysis, June 2012).

Kraetke, Florian. 2012. "Facing up to realities: DG DEVCO introduces new organigram for 2013." <http://www.ecdpmECDPM-talkingpoints.org/facing-up-to-realities-the-new-devco-organigram-for-2013/> ECDPM, posted November 30 2012, retrieved 14 October 2013.

Laporte, Geert and Gemma Piñol Puig. 2013. *Reinventing Pacific-EU relations: with or without the ACP?* European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Briefing Note No. 56, October 2013.

http://www.ECDPM.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/DD962E2

8DD87E26FC1257C0F004D8ECC/\$FILE/BN56%20final.pdf Retrieved 11 November 2013.

Lindberg, Staffan. (ed.) 2009. *Democratization by Elections. A new Mode of Transition?* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mackie, J., Rosengren, A., de Roquefeuil, Q., and Tissi, N. 2012. *The road to the 2014 Summit: Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2013* (Policy and Management Insights 4). Maastricht: ECDPM. - See more at: http://www.ecdpmECDPM.org/Web_ECDPMECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/B808B48FA8B2AABDC1257AD300334618?OpenDocument#sthash.l6KT09s1.dpuf

Maru, Mehari Taddele. 2012. *The First Ten Years of AU and Its Performance in Peace and Security*. Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (ISPI) Policy Brief No. 218, May 2012. http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_218_2012.pdf Retrieved 11 November 2013.

New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. 2012. <http://www.pbsdialogue.org//documentupload/49151944.pdf>

New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). July 2011. *Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union*. <http://www.nepad.org/nepad/news/2399/alternative-sources-financing-african-union>. Retrieved 25 November 2013.

OECD library. <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/>

Pereira, Costa J. 2013. "Peace and security: The head and shoulders of EU-Africa relationship." *GREAT Insights*, Volume 2, Issue 6. September 2013.

Poulton, R., E. Trillo and L. Kukuk. 2010. *African Peace Facility Evaluation, Part 1: Renewing the Procedures of the APF and Possibilities of Alternative Future Sources of Funding*. IBF International Consulting, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/documents/evaluation_apf_i_final_report_en.pdf Retrieved 15 October 2013.

UN General Assembly. 31 December 2008. *Report of African Union United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Operations*, UN Doc. A/63/666-S/2008/813. www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/813 Retrieved 11 November 2013.

Vines, Alex. 2010. "Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa", *International Affairs*, 86:5 1091-1108.

Interviews

European External Action Service, Africa Department, Brussels, 26 June 2013.

European Commission, DEVCO, Brussels, 25 June 2013.

European Union Military Staff, Brussels, 26 June 2013.

The French EU-representation, Brussels, 25 June 2013.

The German EU-representation, Brussels, 26 June 2013.

European Peace Building Liaison Office, Brussels, 27 June 2013.

European Center for Development and Policy Management, Brussels, 2 July 2013.

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 15 October 2013.

The EU Delegation, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013.

AU Commission, Peace and Security Department, Peace Support Operations Division, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013.

AU Commission, Peace and Security Department, Project Management Team, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013.

AU Commission, Peace and Security Council Secretariat, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013.

AU Peace and Security Council Secretariat, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013.

AU Commission, Peace and Security Department, Partnerships, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2013.

The Swedish Embassy, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2013.

The German Embassy, Addis Ababa, 17 September 2013.

The British Embassy, Addis Ababa, 10 October 2013.

COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), Addis Ababa, 18 September 2013.

SADC (Southern African Development Community), Addis Ababa, 19 September 2013.

Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2013.


Independent consultant, Addis Ababa, 19 September 2013.

Acronyms


ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AMIB	African Mission In Burundi
AMISOM	African Union Mission In Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
COAFR	EU Council Cross-Pillar Working Group on Africa
CPX	Command Post Exercise
DG DEVCO	Directorate General Development and Cooperation EuropeAid
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EEAS	European External Action Service
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement

EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EU PSC	European Union Political and Security Committee
FOCAC	Forum On China-Africa Cooperation
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency
FTX	Final Training Exercise
GSC	General Secretariat of the Council
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)
IJEG	Informal Joint Expert Group
JAES	Joint Africa- EU Strategy
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Program
PS Partnership	Peace and Security Partnership
PSD	Peace and Security Department
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
RBM	Results Based Management
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
STCDSS	Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security
UN	United Nations
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General


Appendix 1: AU PSD Organisation



Appendix 2: EEAS Organisation



Appendix 3: EC Organisation, JAES



The 4th Africa-EU Summit will take place in April 2014. The period after the last summit in 2010 has involved new developments and dynamics in Africa and the EU: economic progress in Africa and the Eurozone crisis in Europe, political transitions in North Africa and new security challenges in the Sahel region. These and other developments have far-reaching implications for the continent-to-continent relations between Africa and the EU.

This report examines the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The report provides a background to the partnership and the strategy, and an overview of progress since the adoption of the JAES in December 2007. Developments on the African and the EU side are discussed, and conclusions and recommendations are presented in preparation for the summit in 2014, but also for the journey ahead.

The JAES represents a long-term ambition to fundamentally change relations between Africa and the EU. The continental actors recognise the need for a paradigm shift: away from colonial and aid patterns of interaction and towards a mutually defined agenda for change between equals. The results so far, however, have to be regarded as a disappointment, and stakeholders have manifested less commitment to the JAES in the last few years. While the Peace and Security Partnership overall is performing better than the other seven partnerships within the JAES, there is still much room for improvement.

Ultimately the question is: What is the scope for ensuring that the envisaged paradigm shift in Africa-EU relations is not lost entirely? The report finds that a significant shift in Africa-EU relations is still a distant future. A substantial increase of African funding for the JAES and APSA, and a strong commitment of the EU's political leaders to engage in a serious political dialogue with their African partners are of crucial importance for the realisation of the strategy. If this does not happen in the near future, the JAES is likely to remain an ambitious but unfulfilled vision.