



Nigeria – An Overview of Challenges to Peace and Security

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Sammanfattning

Denna rapport ger en introduktion och översikt till de viktigaste hot mot fred och säkerhet som Nigeria för närvarande står inför.

Inledningsvis beskrivs ett antal övergripande utmaningar: fattigdom och ojämlikhet, korruption, bristande säkerhet samt politisk splittring och maktkamp. Dessa faktorer är i hög grad sammankopplade, och ger en bakgrund till följande kapitel:

- Norra Nigeria: Boko Haram, Ansaru och regionala kopplingar
- Centrala Nigeria: Krisen i Jos
- Södra Nigeria: Nigerdeltat – olja och marginalisering
- Sjöroveri i Guineabukten

I dessa avsnitt ges en kort beskrivning av situationen, huvudsakliga orsaker samt de åtgärder som tagits.

Nigeria är ett land som, med sin stora befolkning, ekonomi och sitt politiska inflytande, har stor betydelse inte bara i närområdet utan också vidare i västra Afrika och Afrika söder om Sahara i allmänhet. Regionala hot mot fred och säkerhet såsom militant islamism och maritim osäkerhet väcker allt större internationell uppmärksamhet och är nära kopplat till situationen i norra Nigeria och Nigerdeltat. Det ligger därför i internationella aktörers intresse att hålla sig informerade och engagerade i Nigerias framtida utveckling. I detta sammanhang är den politiska utvecklingen relaterat till nästa presidentval 2015, identifierat som särskilt betydelsefullt.

Nyckelord: Nigeria, afrikansk säkerhet, Afrika, Guineabukten, Boko Haram, Ansaru, MEND, Västafrika, Jos, Nigerdeltat, sjöroveri

Summary

This report introduces and provides an overview of some of the security challenges that Nigeria is currently facing.

First, a number of overarching challenges are briefly presented; poverty and inequality, corruption, lack of security, and divisive political competition. These issues should be seen as highly interlinked, and form a background to subsequent sections of the report:

- North: Boko Haram, Ansaru and regional connections
- Central: The Jos Crisis
- South: The Niger Delta – oil and marginalisation
- Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

For each of these areas the situation is briefly described, core explanations presented and current responses detailed.


Nigeria, with its large population, economy and political influence, is a country which has a large impact not only in its immediate neighbourhood, but also more widely in West Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Security challenges in the region, such as militant Islamism and maritime insecurity, are gaining international attention and have strong connections to Northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta. It is thus of interest for international actors to be informed and engaged in the development of Nigeria. The political development surrounding and leading up to the presidential elections of 2015 are identified here as being of specific importance.

Keywords: Nigeria, Africa, African security, Gulf of Guinea, Boko Haram, Ansaru, MEND, West Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Jos, Niger Delta, piracy

Abbreviations

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AI	Amnesty International
APC	All Progressive Congress
APS	African Partnership Station (of AFRICOM)
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BAA	Berom, Anaguta and Afizere groups
CAR	Central African Republic
CRIMGO	Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme
DFID	Department For International Development (United Kingdom)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EU	European Union
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
JAES	Joint Africa-Europe Strategy
LGA	Local Government Area
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force (Chad, Niger, Nigeria)

MOWCA	Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
NDPVF	Nigerian Delta People's Volunteer Force
NN	Nigerian Navy
nPDP	New People's Democratic Party (PDP)/ real PDP
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
PDP	People's Democratic Party
SSS	State Security Service
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime



Map of the Gulf of Guinea region.



Map of Nigeria – geographical regions, states and locations of specific relevance to this report.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations	5
Table of Contents	9
1 Introduction	11
1.1 Background	11
1.2 Aim and scope.....	13
1.3 Method and sources	13
2 Overarching challenges	15
2.1 Poverty and inequality	15
2.2 Corruption.....	17
2.3 Security and security forces	18
2.4 Divisive political competition.....	19
3 North: Boko Haram, Ansaru and regional connections	23
3.1 Response of the security forces	26
4 Central Nigeria: The Jos Crisis	29
4.1 Actors and patterns of violence	30
4.2 Response by government and the security forces	31
5 South: The Niger Delta – oil and marginalisation	33
5.1 Actors and patterns of violence	34
5.2 Response of government, oil companies and the security forces.....	36
6 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea	39
6.1 Response by Nigeria and the surrounding region.....	40
6.2 International dimensions	42

7	Concluding remarks	45
8	Bibliography	49
8.1	Books and publications	49
8.2	News and online sources	58
8.3	Websites and databases.....	65

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

In November 2013, the Nigerian groups Boko Haram and Ansaru were classified by the United States as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” and as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists”.¹ This listing is one aspect of the increased international attention being paid to Nigeria and its relationship to regional security threats, especially concerning maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and militant Islamism in the form of Boko Haram and Ansaru. While these security threats, along with oil thefts in the Niger Delta and widespread corruption, form a large part of the country’s image internationally, Nigeria is also a significant part of the “Africa Rising” discourse.² With a strong and growing economy, where more than 70% of all adults own a mobile phone, and a vibrant culture scene, Nigeria comprises more than the security challenges which are the focus of this report.³

At the same time, in the Afrobarometer survey of 2012, 70% of respondents were of the opinion that Nigeria was heading in the wrong direction.⁴ In the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Nigeria is ranked 41st of 52 countries, below countries such as Mali (27th) where international intervention was deemed necessary to maintain order.⁵ Furthermore, developments in Nigeria have a great impact on surrounding states, the broader region and internationally. It is thus of great importance to pay attention to the way in which Nigeria’s challenges are tackled.

Nigeria’s central role in ECOWAS, its large population and strong economy make it a key actor in West Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa more generally. This, coupled with its political and economic influence, make Nigeria an important security actor in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa. It has the largest navy in the Gulf, the best funded and best equipped armed forces in West Africa and also ranks as the fifth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.⁶ Future developments in Nigeria will thus not only affect the country, but will have regional and international impacts.

¹ US Department of State (2013), *Briefing on Designation of Nigerian Terrorist Groups*.

² While not without criticism, the Africa Rising concept incorporates a discourse where Africa is described in very hopeful terms, where lives have greatly improved over the past decade and will continue improving. Growing economy, greater access to education, raised life expectancy etc. are important components.

³ Ross (November 20, 2013), “Nigeria’s thriving art and music scene”; Akwagyiram (June 18, 2013), “Africa rising – but who benefits?”.

⁴ Afrobarometer (2012), p. 8.

⁵ IIAG, Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

⁶ IISS (2013), *The Military Balance 2013*, p. 524.

Nigeria is the second largest economy in Africa, predicted to overtake South Africa within two years, and home to almost one fifth of sub-Saharan Africa's population. Nigeria is also the largest oil producer in Africa, and its economy is highly dependent on the oil industry.⁷ However, while oil constitutes 75% of government revenue, the recent rapid economic growth (over 7% per year since 2009) has occurred mostly in the non-oil economy.⁸ The main trading partners include the EU, the US, India, Brazil and China (in order of exports from Nigeria).⁹ Nigeria is also an important trading partner for Sweden, as it is its second largest (after South Africa) trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. During the period January-October 2013, Sweden exported goods worth 1.819 billion Swedish crowns to Nigeria, while imports reached 8.982 billion Swedish crowns.¹⁰ This makes Nigeria the 19th largest importer to Sweden.¹¹ Ericsson is the largest Swedish company active in Nigeria, but ABB, Atlas Copco, Tetra Pak, Oriflame and Sandvik are also present, among others.¹²

Nigeria became independent from Great Britain in 1960, and in 1961 the northern part of British Cameroon was also added to the republic. Following a military takeover in 1966, three eastern states broke out of Nigeria under the name Biafra, declaring independence in 1967. Civil war broke out and continued until 1970, when Biafra surrendered. After a return to civilian leadership in 1979, the military seized power again in 1983. After a delayed transition from military rule, Nigeria has now been under civilian rule since 1999.¹³

A long-standing border dispute with Cameroon escalated to a brief interstate conflict in 1996, and the disputed Bakassi peninsula was given to Cameroon by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002. Nigerian troops left the area in 2006. Since 1999, inter-ethnic tensions have escalated in Nigeria and a large number of non-state conflicts have erupted.¹⁴ In 2004, both the Niger Delta and Northern Nigeria became the scene of intrastate conflict as Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa (Followers of the Prophet) fought to establish an independent Islamic state in the north and NDPVF (Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force) strove for greater autonomy and resource control in the Niger Delta.¹⁵ These regions are still suffering from insecurity today, although the two groups mentioned are no longer among the most important actors.

⁷ EIA (2012), *Nigeria*.

⁸ IMF (2013), *Nigeria: Financial Sector Stability Assessment*, p. 8, Litwack (2013), *Nigeria economic report*, p. 2.

⁹ WTO International Trade and Market Access Data.

¹⁰ SCB, *Export and import of goods sorted by country*.

¹¹ SCB, *Imports from our 30 largest trade partners*.

¹² Business Sweden: Nigeria.

¹³ UCDP Database.

¹⁴ UCDP Database.

¹⁵ UCDP Database.

1.2 Aim and scope

This report was produced for the Swedish Defence Research Agency to provide an overview of the most severe challenges to peace and security in Nigeria, in order to lay the foundations for further studies. Due to the focus on providing an overview and introduction of the security situation, this report does not contribute a significant re-analysis or interpretation of data. Instead, it aims to provide an easily accessible introduction to the subject. For each of the challenges identified, the report attempts to answer the following overarching questions:

- What are the main actors, dynamics and patterns?
- What are the main causes of the particular challenge?
- What efforts are being made to handle the particular challenge?

Regarding efforts to handle the challenges, the report concentrates on the role of the security forces and state-based initiatives. In the context of the cases chosen here, this is deemed to be a warranted restriction since while the narrative and the attention to actions taken by other actors is limited, the use and actions of the security forces have a central role in all cases examined.

It should be kept in mind that this focus by necessity resulted in a negative picture, as attention was paid only to security challenges. Thus the report should be seen as providing an introduction to security challenges rather than a comprehensive account or general description of Nigeria.

In order to limit the scope of the report, it concentrated on large-scale security challenges. However, this resulted in an approach whereby only the most visible and internationally recognised issues were included. Efforts were made to problematise and go beyond the “standard” description of the cases in order to counter this tendency somewhat.

1.3 Method and sources

This report was produced as a desk study, which imposed a number of limitations. A large number of academic, policy, international and local news and other sources was examined to provide as varied a picture of the situation as possible, in an attempt to partly tackle this issue. As the areas studied are highly politically charged, care was taken to triangulate information using a variety of sources so as to avoid bias. However, it is still useful to bear in mind that the interests of the various sources can have affected their perception of events, both when reading this report and in any further readings.

Throughout the report, it should also be borne in mind that statistics often vary between sources and actors, depending on both the methods used for gathering data and the definition of core concepts. The data for this report were mostly

taken from the UN, the World Bank and other internationally recognised organisations. Furthermore, statistics often have a political value, for example concerning poverty, education and other fundamental measures. Thus attention should be paid to the source of specific data and possible interests that actors could have in its presentation. One such example concerns education, where rates are often given as being much lower in Northern Nigeria. Such figures are likely to be influenced by the extent of the *almajiri* system of Islamic education in this region, which might not be captured by standard measures of education.

2 Overarching challenges

In this chapter, overarching issues that challenge peace and security in Nigeria are presented and briefly described. It also lays the foundations for the remainder of the report and provides a context in which to place the specific cases presented later: the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, the Jos sectarian violence in central Nigeria, the Niger Delta youth militancy and the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The overarching challenges described below are important parts of the dynamics in all these cases.

2.1 Poverty and inequality

Despite its vast natural resources, Nigeria suffers from substantial social challenges, of which poverty remains one of the most significant. According to the World Bank, in 2013-2014 the proportion the Nigerian population living in poverty was 64.2%, or 48.3% using the adult equivalent approach.¹⁶ In itself problematic, poverty presents additional challenges to security because it is perceived to be distributed along regional and social group lines. The perception of inequalities along social identity lines has been identified by some scholars as an important factor in explaining outbreaks of violence, and forms the core of the concept of horizontal inequalities.¹⁷

In Nigeria, marginalisation is frequently used in the political discourse and it is commonly stated that there is a significant divide regarding socio-economic development between the North and the South. While there are also other major differences within these regions, the underdevelopment of the largely Muslim Northern Nigeria is commonly seen as one of the root causes of militant Islamism in the area. The difference between regions can be seen in the poverty rates (see table below), where the overall average is 48.3% (adult equivalent approach).¹⁸

¹⁶ World Bank (2013), *Nigeria Economic Report*, p. 8-9.

The adult equivalent approach consists of weighting children less than adults, since the measure used here is based on a poverty line of 3000 calories a day (plus other essential non-food items).

¹⁷ Langer et al. (2007), "Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria", p.7.

For more literature on horizontal inequalities, see Stewart (ed.) (2008), "Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies".

¹⁸ Table of data from World Bank (2013), *Nigeria Economic Report*, p. 9.

Region of Nigeria	Poverty rate (adult equivalent approach)
North East	59.7%
North West	58%
North Central	48.8%
South East	39%
South South	37.6%
South West	30.6%

The differences can also be seen in many other indicators, such as maternal mortality rate, where the national statistic is 630 deaths per 100,000 live births.¹⁹ In the North East, this figure rises to 1,549, compared with 165 in the South East.²⁰ For reference, the corresponding number in Sweden was four deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010.²¹ Food insecurity is also an important problem in Northern Nigeria, further accentuated by the security situation and displacement of population related to Boko Haram.²²

The differences between North and South Nigeria are often pointed out and are of significant importance. However, the differences *within* these regions, each roughly the size of Sweden, should not be forgotten. The Niger Delta, in the South South region where the vast majority of Nigeria's oil is found, has among Nigeria's highest rates of unemployment and is one of the five most polluted places on earth.²³ The underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment in this region are closely connected to the security challenges described later in this report, in the sections on the Niger Delta and on piracy. On the other hand, Lagos state (in the South West) has made great progress in reducing poverty, going from 43.8% in 2003-2004 to 22.9% in 2009-2010.²⁴

Underdevelopment, lack of education and health services and malfunctioning service delivery in general are closely interconnected with the widespread corruption in Nigeria. This problem is further explored below.

¹⁹ UNDP (2013), *World Development Report 2013*, p. 158.

²⁰ British Council (2012), *Gender in Nigeria*, p. 39.

²¹ World Bank Country Data.

²² FAO (September 4, 2013), *Food security situation in the Sahel remains dire*.

²³ Francis et al. (2011), "Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta", p. 2, Hill (2012), *Nigeria Since Independence*, p. 85.

²⁴ World Bank (2013), *Nigeria Economic Report*, p. 9. Adult equivalent approach.

2.2 Corruption

Corruption is another factor behind the endemic social challenges in Nigeria. In fact, Nigeria is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranked 144 of 177 countries with a score of 25 out of 100 by Transparency International.²⁵ Due to corruption, large parts of the oil revenue disappear and corruption is commonly seen as the main reason why the national poverty rate has gone up despite the oil income, from 36% in 1970 to 64.2% today.²⁶

Corruption is widespread in Nigeria and can be seen in many parts of society, including the security forces.²⁷ In the Afrobarometer survey of Nigeria in 2012, 59% of respondents stated that they believed most or all government officials were involved in corruption, while 77% believed that most or all of the police were involved in corruption too.²⁸ In an earlier survey in 2001, the police and the political parties were also ranked as those perceived to be most corrupt.²⁹

Corrupt practices are thus prevalent throughout Nigeria, from the highest political level to local government officials. The police force, Africa's largest, is one of the institutions most frequently associated with corruption in Nigeria.³⁰ This corruption extends from the highest level (as when the Inspector General of Police Tafa Adebayo Balogun was charged and convicted for having stolen more than \$121 million in 2005) to the ordinary policeman.³¹ The police lack resources and their wages are generally very low or non-existent.³² For the ordinary policeman, corruption is thus often a way to earn a living and civilians often have to pay for every service provided by the police. Extortion and threats by the police are common and superior officers occasionally set monetary targets for subordinates assigned to the most lucrative posts.³³ Police officers are often hired by politicians as personal guards; in 2009 the Inspector General estimated that over 100,000 police officers were involved in such activities.³⁴

However, some anti-corruption action is taking place. An Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was founded in 2002 and has challenged the former impunity of politicians. The EFCC has arraigned 30 prominent politicians, including 15 former state governors, but there has been little legal

²⁵ Transparency International: Nigeria.

²⁶ McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), *Nigerian Unity*, p. 31; Agbibo (2013), "Corruption and economic crime in Nigeria", p. 55.

²⁷ WARN (2013), *Is the African Giant Drowning?*, p. 2 and 5.

²⁸ Afrobarometer (2012), p. 32.

²⁹ Adetula (2008), "Money and Politics in Nigeria: An overview", p.xxvii.

³⁰ HRW (2010), *Everyone's in on the Game*, p. 12.

³¹ HRW (2010), *Everyone's in on the Game*, p. 4; Oluwaniyi (2011), "Police and the institution of corruption in Nigeria", p. 75; Langer et al, (2007), *Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria*, p.14.

³² Oluwaniyi (2011), "Police and the institution of corruption in Nigeria", p. 75-76.

³³ HRW(2010), *Everyone's in on the Game*, p. 4.

³⁴ HRW (2010), *Everyone's in on the Game*, p. 3.

progress in these cases.³⁵ While \$11 billion have been recovered (according to the EFCC), only four convictions have been made, with very short or no prison sentences.³⁶ In mid-September 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan called for renewed actions against corruption, but it remains to be seen what concrete measures will be taken.³⁷

Corruption is an important challenge for Nigeria, with impacts throughout the government and state structures. Importantly, it has severe negative consequences for service delivery in the country. This is a major source of discontent, as funds that could have been allocated to the provision of public goods end up enriching the political elite. Overall, corruption reduces the government's ability to implement policy and tackle the existing challenges. With a political elite dependent on the distribution of oil revenue rather than taxation for funding, it also has less incentive to provide and care for its constituents.³⁸

2.3 Security and security forces

Nigeria faces several security challenges. The country is the scene of widespread violence, criminality and outright insurgency, such as Boko Haram in the North East. The spread of illegal small and light weapons is substantial.³⁹ Border control, especially along the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, is severely lacking and makes smuggling of weapons and other goods relatively easy.⁴⁰ In this context it can be noted that it is suspected that Libyan weapons have ended up, via Niger, with Boko Haram.⁴¹

Nigeria's security apparatus consists most importantly of the Nigeria Police Force, the State Security Service (SSS – the intelligence services) and the military, all of which are federal institutions. Both the police and the military play an important role in the maintenance of public order and safety. Overall, it can be said that the security forces have taken a more military approach to the task of maintaining public security, which in some cases has resulted in

³⁵ HRW (2011), *Corruption on Trial*, p. 1.

³⁶ HRW (2011), *Corruption on Trial*, p. 1.

³⁷ Udo (September 17, 2013), "Jonathan calls for concerted onslaught against corruption", *Premium Times*.

³⁸ The theory that reliance on taxation for state-income promotes democracy and state-building has recently been incorporated into policy, by among others DFID and OECD-DAC. See DFID (2009) and OECD-DAC (2008). For further discussion and research on this issue see (among others): Herb (2005), Moore (2004), Ross (2004) and Prichard & Leonard (2010).

³⁹ WARN (2013), *Is the African Giant Drowning?*, p.4.

⁴⁰ WARN (2013), *Is the African Giant Drowning?*, p.4; Ebohon and Ifeadi (2012), "Managing the Problems", p. 12.

⁴¹ IISS (2013), *The Military Balance 2013*, p. 481.

casualties in response to riots and other disturbances.⁴² During many of the incidents in Jos, in Plateau state, more people are reported to have died as a result of the efforts to restore order than during the initial riots.⁴³ Extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses are also commonly reported, not least in the regions most affected by insurgency and militia violence.⁴⁴

There are also incidents where the security forces have been perceived to take sides in the violence between groups and cases of detained individuals being killed for revenge or other reasons.⁴⁵ The security forces are often unable to identify those behind riots and other violent incidents, and speculation concerning political involvement, bribery and corruption is common.⁴⁶ 74% of the respondents in the Afrobarometer survey of Nigeria claimed they feared becoming a victim of political violence or intimidation.⁴⁷

However, it is also important to recognise the role that the security forces play in maintaining security in Nigeria. While parallel security structures, such as militias, have emerged in some areas,⁴⁸ the military has been identified as one of the key components in Nigerian unity.⁴⁹ Apart from their role in upholding security, the military have been running a range of initiatives over the last 40 years aiming to strengthen national identity and social cohesion and to create contact between different ethnic and religious groups.⁵⁰

2.4 Divisive political competition

The corrupt nature of the Nigerian state gives the political competition a distinctly winner-takes-all nature, as those in power have access to the revenue streams.⁵¹ Political patronage is common, as is financial backing of political parties by various economic interests.⁵² The prevalence of political patronage and its ties to economic interests contribute to making political appointments one of the most accessible pathways to economic success.

⁴² Ebohon and Ifeadi (2012), "Managing the Problems", p. 12.

⁴³ Hill (2012), *Nigeria Since Independence*, p. 109.

⁴⁴ See HRW (2012), *Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Forces Abuse in Nigeria*; AI (2012), *Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence*; HRW (2009), *Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces*; Iduh (2011), "The key challenges to peace in Nigeria", p. 122-123; Campbell (2013), *Escaping Nigeria's Cycle of Violence*, among others.

⁴⁵ Adesoji (2010), "Restoring peace or waging war", p. 6-7.

⁴⁶ Adesoji (2010), "Restoring peace or waging war", p. 6-7.

⁴⁷ Afrobarometer (2012), p. 27.

⁴⁸ Ebohon and Ifeadi (2012), "Managing the Problems", p. 15.

⁴⁹ Hill (2012), *Nigeria Since Independence*.

⁵⁰ Hill (2012), *Nigeria Since Independence*, p. 115-116.

⁵¹ Lewis, (2011), *Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability*, p. 1.

⁵² Adetula (2008), "Money and Politics in Nigeria: An overview", p. xxxii-xxxiii.

As a result, political competition is associated with the buying and selling of posts, violence and threats.⁵³ Politicians have been known to sponsor violent groups, and clashes between groups associated with or supporting different parties or individuals are not uncommon.⁵⁴ There have even been suspicions of political involvement with, and support of, Boko Haram.⁵⁵

The intense competition for political power and the use of political power to access wealth serves to accentuate inequalities, both between groups and, importantly, between the elite and the general population. This dimension comprises both the manipulation of the population and groups for political purposes, and the vast differences in wealth and access to services between the political elite and the general populace.

While regional dimensions of Nigeria are often discussed in politics, especially the North-South division, the federal system aims to prevent mobilisation based on religion, ethnicity or narrow regionalism. This is done both through the system of federal states, but also through the requirements for political parties and elections. Any candidate seeking to be elected president, in addition to having the highest number of votes, must also have no less than 25% of the votes in at least two-thirds of all states.⁵⁶

In the elections upcoming in 2015, the dominant party since the shift to civilian leadership in 1999, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), seems to be seriously challenged. A broad coalition opposing the PDP, the All Progressive Congress (APC), was formed in February 2013.⁵⁷ Furthermore, a crisis has developed within the PDP, which split in the beginning of September 2013 as a number of members walked out of a party meeting and proclaimed themselves the real PDP (or new PDP, nPDP).⁵⁸

One of the central issues behind this crisis within the PDP is whether Goodluck Jonathan should run for another term as president. He first gained the presidency when the previous president, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, passed away in 2010, and Jonathan then went on to win the elections in 2011. While there is no clear legal impediment to Jonathan's running for another term, the established pattern within the PDP is to rotate the selection of presidents between those who come from the north and those from the south, and that they sit for two terms. Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was from the north, and his replacement during his first term by

⁵³ Hill (2012), *Nigeria Since Independence*, p. 70-72.

⁵⁴ For example clashes between youth militias supporting President Jonathan and the governor of Rivers state in Port Harcourt in July 2013; Africa Confidential (2013), "The Delta catches fire again".

⁵⁵ Lacey (2012), *The Emergence of Boko Haram*, p. 18, Adesoji (2010), "Restoring peace or waging war", p. 6.

⁵⁶ Hill (2012), *Nigeria Since Independence*, p. 45-46, 62-66.

⁵⁷ Paden (2013), *Midterm Challenges in Nigeria*, p.3ff.

⁵⁸ News 24 (September 3, 2013), "Nigeria's ruling party tested by dissent".

Jonathan, a southerner, left northern politicians feeling that the period 2011-2015 should have been under a northern president.⁵⁹ The nPDP favours a northern presidential candidate for 2015, while Jonathan seems to be determined to run.⁶⁰

It is still largely unclear how the situation will play out until the election, but there have already been threats of violence from groups in the South-South if Jonathan is not allowed to run, or even if he loses.⁶¹ The situation also presents the opportunity for other actors throughout the country to use the political tension to scale up violent action in pursuit of their respective agenda.

As the PDP is now being seriously challenged for the first time by an opposition party, the unity of which can be questioned after its rapid formation and growth, the competition within the elite can be expected to escalate. With changes in the informal and formal power structures, the struggle for power risks leading to violence in connection with the elections. The elections in 2011 were seen as both the best run and most violent of Nigeria's elections, with a high quality of polling but high levels of related violence, presenting a worrying vision for 2015.⁶² The elections in 2015 will be an important milestone for Nigeria, and violence connected to these elections is a real and troubling possibility.

⁵⁹ McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), *Nigerian Unity*, p. 18.

⁶⁰ Paden (2013), *Midterm Challenges in Nigeria*, p.3ff.

⁶¹ Okocha et al. (September 9, 2013), "2015: Niger Delta Youths Threaten War", *This Day Live*;

Udo (September 9, 2013), "There will be bloodshed if Jonathan loses in 2015, says Asari-Dokubo", *Premium Times*.

⁶² Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 9.

3 North: Boko Haram, Ansaru and regional connections

*Boko Haram, once an obscure, radical Islamic cult in the North, is evolving into an insurrection with support among the impoverished and alienated population of Northern Nigeria.*⁶³

The growth of militant Islamism, primarily in Northern Nigeria, has received much attention internationally. The focus has been on the group *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lid'dawa'ati Wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), more commonly known as Boko Haram (most often translated as: "Western Education is Forbidden"). It should be noted that the name Boko Haram did not originate from the group itself, but was coined by others, possibly dismissive neighbours, in the beginning of its existence.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the religious establishment in Northern Nigeria argues that Boko Haram lacks Islamic foundations and it can be questioned whether it should be labelled an Islamic movement.⁶⁵

Another organisation of interest is what is seen as a splinter group from Boko Haram, *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan* (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru.

Boko Haram was probably formed during the 1990s, but did not emerge as a significant security threat until after the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and a large number of members were killed by security forces in 2009.⁶⁶ Following this, the group re-emerged in 2010 and has since been involved in a large number of attacks. At least 3000 people have been killed in these incidents, with the UN claiming that more than 1200 were killed in the period May-December 2013 alone.⁶⁷ The Nigerian security forces have been blamed for upwards of half the deaths since 2009.⁶⁸ It should be noted that these figures are difficult to verify, and it can be suspected that many of the incidents are in fact not related to Boko Haram. The attacks attributed to Boko Haram range from suicide bombings to

⁶³ Carpenter (June 24, 2011), "Nigeria's Challenge".

⁶⁴ Walker, (2012), *What Is Boko Haram*, p. 7.

⁶⁵ Higazi (December 1, 2013), "Boko Haram's evolving terror".

⁶⁶ Lacey (2012), *The Emergence of Boko Haram*, p. 17.

⁶⁷ BBC News (December 16, 2013), *Nigeria Boko Haram emergency*.

⁶⁸ LeVan (2013), "Sectarian Rebellions", p. 336.

attacks on civilians by gunmen (sometimes wearing army uniforms) to coordinated attacks on military targets.⁶⁹

Boko Haram commonly states its motivation to be revenge for the killings in 2009 and for other injustices against Muslims in Nigeria.⁷⁰ While its specific goals are somewhat unclear, many observers are of the opinion that it seeks the overthrow of the Nigerian government and the establishment of an Islamic state.⁷¹ The group is viewed as having an anti-Western agenda, with Western culture and influence being blamed for many of the weaknesses and failures of the Nigerian state.⁷² While initially it mainly focused on the Nigerian security forces, it now also includes political and traditional leaders as well as civilians among its targets.⁷³ In a video in which he claims responsibility for the attack in Maiduguri on December 2, 2013 (see below), the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, threatened to extend attacks to the US, seemingly as a response to the group's classification as a terrorist organisation.⁷⁴

It is difficult to accurately describe the Boko Haram organisation or its regional/international connections. Most observers agree that while it has connections with both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the group's agenda is foremost domestic to Nigeria.⁷⁵ It is important to note, however, that Boko Haram members are widely believed to have trained with AQIM-related groups in Mali and other areas in the Sahel.⁷⁶ Nigeria partly motivated its participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with such links to its national security.⁷⁷ It subsequently also quoted the security situation related to Boko Haram as the reason for pulling out of the mission, although it has been speculated that the reason might have been a disagreement over leadership.⁷⁸

The picture is further complicated by the decentralised and fragmented nature of Boko Haram. While Abubakar Shekau is recognised as the current leader, the various cells and factions have different ways of operating and are to varying

⁶⁹ IRIN News (December 12, 2013), *Updated timeline of Boko Haram attacks*.

⁷⁰ Onapajo et al. (2012), "Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: The international dimension", p. 342.

⁷¹ Lacey (2012), *The Emergence of Boko Haram*, p. 17; Alao (2013), "Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria", p. 136.

⁷² Agbiboa (2013), "Living in Fear", p. 159-160.

⁷³ ACLED (2013), *Country Report: Nigeria*, April 2013, p.3.

⁷⁴ Idris (December 12, 2013), "Breaking News: Shekau claims Maiduguri attacks".

⁷⁵ LeVan (2013), "Sectarian Rebellions", p. 344; Campbell (2013), *Escaping Nigeria's Cycle of Violence* among others.

⁷⁶ McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), "Nigerian Unity", p. 10; Zenn (2013), "Boko Haram's International Connections", p. 7-8, among others.

⁷⁷ WARN (2013), *Is the African Giant Drowning*, p.5.

⁷⁸ Kane (2013), "Nigeria pulls out of MINUSMA".

degrees autonomous.⁷⁹ Factions have also allegedly separately attempted negotiations with the Nigerian government, both in Saudi Arabia and in Senegal.⁸⁰

Ansaru seems to have been one such faction, which split from Boko Haram in opposition to the killing of civilians.⁸¹ Boko Haram has engaged in more violence against civilians than both Al-Shabaab and AQIM, with this comprising over 50% of its violent activity.⁸² In this context, it should also be noted that it is difficult to separate Boko Haram activity from that of groups with other motivations, including criminal groups taking advantage of the situation and sometimes using the Boko Haram name.⁸³

Ansaru announced its split from Boko Haram on January 26, 2012, by spreading flyers in the city of Kano, but the group may have been behind the kidnapping of a Briton and an Italian in May 2011 and several other incidents before its official formation.⁸⁴ Ansaru is viewed as having close ties to AQIM, and is identified as being of particular concern for US interests.⁸⁵ One of its leaders is believed to be Khalid al-Barnawi, who together with Abubakar Shekau and the recently killed Abubakar Adam Kamar, also a Boko Haram leader, were listed by the US as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists”.⁸⁶

Focusing on kidnappings, in which Boko Haram seldom engages, Ansaru concentrates its attacks almost exclusively on foreign, foremost Western, targets.⁸⁷ It is also attributed a more international jihadist agenda, citing the international intervention in Mali as motivation for kidnappings of French and other Western nationals and for the ambush of a convoy of Nigerian soldiers on their way to Mali.⁸⁸ Compared with Boko Haram, which is also seen as part of an insurgency in North East Nigeria, Ansaru has a wider motivation. It has stated

⁷⁹ Solomon (2012), “Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria”, p. 8; Agbiboa (2013), “Living in Fear”, p. 162-163; US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism (2013), *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012*, p. 6, among others.

⁸⁰ Zenn (2013), “Boko Haram’s International Connections”, p. 10.

⁸¹ Zenn (2013), “Boko Haram’s International Connections”, p. 12.

⁸² Dowd (2013), *Tracking Islamist Militia and Rebel Groups*, p. 6.

⁸³ LeVan (2013), “Sectarian Rebellions”, p. 343.

⁸⁴ Zenn (2013), “Cooperation or Competition”, p. 2-3.

⁸⁵ Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism (2013), *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012*, p. 27.

⁸⁶ US Department of State (June 21, 2012), *Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram Commander Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kamar*.

⁸⁷ Zenn (2013), “Cooperation or Competition”, p. 2-3.

⁸⁸ IRIN News (February 22, 2013), *Analysis: Truce remains elusive in violence-torn Nigeria*, Zenn (2013), “Cooperation or Competition”, p. 4.

that it is fighting for the dignity of Muslims and for the creation of a caliphate in the region, and thus more closely aligns with AQIM.⁸⁹

It is largely unclear how Boko Haram and Ansaru are funded. Individual sponsors, both in Nigeria and possibly in Saudi Arabia and the UK, together with bank robberies most likely constitute an important part.⁹⁰ There is also speculation that Nigerian politicians have used or even sponsored Boko Haram, or other groups using the Boko Haram name, for political purposes.⁹¹

3.1 Response of the security forces

Efforts to handle the security challenge resulting from Boko Haram have been largely concentrated to a military response, together with the declaration of a state of emergency in several areas, foremost in North East Nigeria. Thus in May 2013 a state of emergency was declared in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, and it was subsequently extended for six months at the beginning of November 2013.⁹² While counter-insurgency efforts were earlier led by the Joint Task Force (JTF), including both military and civilian security forces, in 2013 the Nigerian army established a new division with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno state, to assume responsibility for the fight against Boko Haram in Adamawa, Bauchi and Borno states.⁹³ A state of emergency has also been declared in Niger and Plateau states, and attempts have been made to close the borders between Northern Nigeria and Chad, Cameroon and Niger.⁹⁴ The army has also supported the formation of, and trained, vigilante/volunteer groups known as Civilian JTF to help fight Boko Haram, which in turn has begun targeting these volunteers and their families.⁹⁵

The security forces have been accused of taking a heavy-handed military approach to these operations, including claims of extrajudicial killings, detentions and extortion of civilians. According to many observers, such claims

⁸⁹ Chotia (March 11, 2013), "Profile: Who are Nigeria's Ansaru Islamists?"; Campbell (March 11, 2013), "Meet the Ruthless New Islamist Group Terrorizing Nigeria".

⁹⁰ LeVan (2013), "Sectarian Rebellions", p. 344; Agbiboa (2013), "Living in Fear", p. 162; Solomon (2012), "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria", p. 8.

⁹¹ Lacey (2012), *The Emergence of Boko Haram*, p. 18; Murdock (September 23, 2013), "Nigerians Fear Boko Haram Violence Only to Escalate".

⁹² Sodipo (2013), *Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria*, p. 1; Reuters (November 20, 2013), *Nigeria extends emergency rule in violence-hit states*.

⁹³ Binnie (August 19, 2013), *Nigerian Army establishes new division in troubled northeast*.

⁹⁴ Solomon (2012), "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria", p. 7.

⁹⁵ Al Jazeera (September 2, 2013), "Nigeria: Turning the Tide of Violence?"; Haruna (November 19, 2013), "Borno Trains Another 1,000 'Civilian JTF' For Community Policing".

have made it easier for Boko Haram to recruit and solicit support.⁹⁶ Amnesty International (AI) has called for an investigation into “hundreds” of suspected Boko Haram members who allegedly died in custody.⁹⁷ Other reports say that Amnesty’s figure of 950 dead in military custody during the first six months of 2013 only scratches the surface, the real number stretching into the thousands.⁹⁸ Overall, these allegations require further investigation and verification.

While the security forces maintain that the campaign against Boko Haram has been pushing the organisation back, a large-scale attack in Maiduguri on December 2, 2013 calls this claim into question. According to reports, hundreds of militants attacked a number of military targets, including air force and army bases, resulting in a several hour long firefight and the destruction of aircraft, armoured vehicles and buildings.⁹⁹

There have been calls by civil society, local leaders, senior security officials, think-tanks and others for a shift from this counter-insurgency approach.¹⁰⁰ These calls seem to have had little impact so far, however. The alternative approaches suggested typically focus on socio-economic development of the marginalised North (see section 2, Overarching challenges) to lessen the support for insurgents and tackle the poverty, unemployment, poor governance and lack of economic opportunity often identified as core underlying drivers of radicalisation.¹⁰¹

Internationally, Nigeria cooperates with the US on counter-terrorism issues and both Britain and Israel have offered assistance.¹⁰² As mentioned earlier, in November 2013 Boko Haram and Ansaru were classified by the US as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, but it is still too early to say what substantial consequences this will have.¹⁰³ Regionally, Nigeria is cooperating with Niger and Chad regarding counter-terrorism and has recently hosted a number of joint military operations within Nigeria.¹⁰⁴ These

⁹⁶ LeVan (2013), “Sectarian Rebellions”, p. 342; Solomon (2012), “Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria”, p. 9; Walker. (2012), *What Is Boko Haram*; IRIN News (July 16, 2013), *Call for ICC probe into Nigerian military* among others.

⁹⁷ AI (2013), *Nigeria: Authorities must investigate deaths of Boko Haram suspects in military custody*.

⁹⁸ IRIN News (November 15, 2013) *Detainee abuses "monumental" in northern Nigeria*.

⁹⁹ Jane’s Intelligence Weekly (December 3, 2013), *Aviation assets on the ground in northern Nigeria face high risk of damage from Boko Haram attacks*; Allison (December 3, 2013), “Analysis: Has Nigeria’s ‘major offensive’ against Boko Haram been a failure?”; BBC News (December 2, 2013), *Nigeria crisis: Boko Haram attack Maiduguri airbase*.

¹⁰⁰ LeVan (2013), “Sectarian Rebellions”, p. 342.

¹⁰¹ Sodipo (2013), *Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria*, p. 4; Lacey (2012), *The Emergence of Boko Haram*, p. 17-18, among others.

¹⁰² Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism (2013), *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012*, p. 27; Solomon (2012), “Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria”, p. 10.

¹⁰³ US Department of State (2013), *Briefing on Designation of Nigerian Terrorist Groups*.

¹⁰⁴ Massalatchi (May 21, 2013), “Nigeria seeks Niger’s military support against Boko Haram”.

countries, as well as Cameroon where cooperation concerning Boko Haram has been more limited, are concerned that Boko Haram and the situation in Nigeria could trigger problems within their own territory.¹⁰⁵ These fears have been reinforced by abductions carried out within Cameroon by Boko Haram, and during the last weeks of 2013 military security and border controls in Cameroon were increased.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ IRIN News (April 29, 2013), *Boko Haram threat chokes trade with Cameroon*.

¹⁰⁶ IRIN News (November 20, 2013), *With cross-border attacks, Boko Haram threat widens*, IRIN News (December 27, 2013), *Cameroon takes steps against Boko Haram*.

4 Central Nigeria: The Jos Crisis

*In many respects, the spiralling insecurity in Jos is anything but a local communal conflict. Its root causes and impacts encapsulate many of Nigeria's greatest political challenges.*¹⁰⁷

Jos, the state capital in Plateau state, Central Nigeria, has been the scene of widespread violence since 2001. Clashes along ethnic and religious lines, mainly between the Christian Berom, Anaguta and Afizere groups (BAA) and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani have resulted in thousands, the numbers being unclear, of deaths and significant displacement.¹⁰⁸ In a recent report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) states that the sectarian violence in Plateau and Kaduna states has left over 3000 dead since 2010, with little response from the government.¹⁰⁹ While the focus in this report is on the situation in Jos, similar dynamics make up a large part of the wider violence. Most observers agree that while often presented as an ethnic or religious conflict, the situation has its roots in political competition and socio-economic factors.

Of central importance is the concept of indigeneity. In Nigeria, those seen as indigenous to an area often gain preferential access to land, education, public infrastructure and government employment.¹¹⁰ In Jos, the BAA are currently viewed as indigenous and the Hausa-Fulani as settlers, despite the fact that most have lived in Plateau state for several generations.¹¹¹ Local political competition is also closely connected to the question of indigeneity.¹¹² The combination of the state and local government controlling a large part of the country's resources and local governments and politics being influenced by the notion of indigeneity has given rise to fierce competition in parts of the country.¹¹³ It has even been put as "in practice, one is a Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin."¹¹⁴ At the same time, it should be noted that this is not included in the constitution, which guarantees freedom from discrimination and freedom of movement.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁷ Kwaja (2011), *Nigeria's Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ ICG (2012), *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*, p. i-ii.

¹⁰⁹ HRW (2013), *Leave Everything to God*.

¹¹⁰ Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Adesoji and Aloa (2009), "Indigeneship and Citizenship in Nigeria", p. 155; ICC (2013), *Situation in Nigeria*, p. 5.

¹¹² ICG (2012), *Curbing Violence in Nigeria*, p. 4.

¹¹³ Aapengnuo (2010), *Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa*, p. 3; Alozieuwa (2010), "Beyond the Ethno-Religious Theory of the Jos Conflict", p. 30.

¹¹⁴ Ojukwu and Onifade (2010), "Social capital, indigeneity and identity politics", p. 176.

¹¹⁵ McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), *Nigerian Unity*, p. 37.

While these circumstances have led to violence in several other states and local government areas (LGA) in Nigeria, Jos is perhaps the most extreme case.¹¹⁶ The city was known for relatively good relations between communities before the 1990s.¹¹⁷ The change seems to be connected to an increasing restriction during the 1990s in the distribution of indigene certificates, originally intended to ensure the rights of minority groups.¹¹⁸ It can also be connected to changing economic conditions. Jos was an important mining town from the beginning of the 1900s, with mostly Hausa being employed in the tin mines.¹¹⁹ However, these are now closed, and Plateau state's economy has become reliant on agriculture.¹²⁰ With limited economic opportunities, the importance of indigeneity has increased.

4.1 Actors and patterns of violence

The city of Jos has been a centre of violence, but attacks and killings have also spread throughout Plateau state, where competition for land is another important source of tension.¹²¹ Although there are no clear groups that can be identified as primary actors in these clashes, organised groups have carried out a number of attacks, primarily on the outskirts of Jos and in rural areas.¹²² One example that can be mentioned is Yelwa, where 75 Christians were killed by armed Muslims in 2004, following which Christians surrounded the town and killed some 700 Muslims a few months later. This incident also inspired revenge attacks on Christians in Kano, Kano state, calling attention to the wider implications and prevalence of the tensions between ethnic and religious groups.¹²³

Violence in Jos to date has been closely associated with local elections and matters concerning the local administration, with the violence in 2001, 2004 and 2008 as the primary examples.¹²⁴ In 2008 the first local elections since 2002 were held in Jos and more than 700 were killed as the tension escalated into violence and mobs, mostly of young men, started killings members of the opposing side and destroying property.¹²⁵

On Christmas Eve 2010, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings targeting Christian communities in Jos.¹²⁶ Several other bomb attacks have taken place

¹¹⁶ Osaretin (2013), "Ethno-Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria", p. 351.

¹¹⁷ Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 16.

¹¹⁸ Kwaja (2011), *Nigeria's Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict*, p. 2-4.

¹¹⁹ Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 19-20.

¹²⁰ Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 23; Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria's Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 4.

¹²¹ Langer et al. (2007), *Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria*, p. 11 .

¹²² Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 43.

¹²³ HRW (2005), *Revenge in the Name of Religion*, p. 1.

¹²⁴ Osaretin (2013), "Ethno-Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria", p. 353-354.

¹²⁵ HRW (2009), *Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces*, p. 1; ICC (2013), *Situation in Nigeria*, p. 15.

¹²⁶ ICC (2013), *Situation in Nigeria*, p. 15.

since, and several hundred people have been killed in these attacks and related violence.¹²⁷ Since the beginning of 2010, killings of people who have strayed into the ‘wrong’ part of the city have also grown more common.¹²⁸ Smaller-scale violence continues, with both sides accusing each other of collecting weapons and mobilising for new attacks.¹²⁹

While ethno-religious identity is not among the foremost causes of the violence in the area, its importance should not be dismissed. Identification through ethnicity is common throughout Nigeria and both ethnicity and religion play an important part in politics.¹³⁰ Furthermore, ethnic and religious identity has been used as a basis for mobilisation, violence, stereotyping and rhetoric throughout this conflict and have thus become strongly polarised.¹³¹ The use of ethnic and religious identity in this way has served to accentuate the tensions between these groups, leading in turn to increased religious rhetoric.

4.2 Response by government and the security forces

Actions taken to control violence in the Jos area have mostly been ineffective. A large number of commissions, at least 16, have been tasked with examining the conflict, but they have had little impact in practice.¹³² It appears that local politicians may have used the tensions for personal gain, causing the heads of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs to issue a joint protest.¹³³ The fact that almost no charges have been brought against the perpetrators or instigators of the violence is also seen as a sign of the involvement of politicians and other influential individuals.¹³⁴

The security forces have consistently either overreacted or underreacted to the incidents, by cracking down harshly in some cases while being entirely absent in others.¹³⁵ During the crisis in 2008, which primarily took place on November 28 and 29, the police force was largely inactive on the first day.¹³⁶ On the second day, security forces were involved in over 130 arbitrary killings and were

¹²⁷ ICC (2013), *Situation in Nigeria*, p. 15; Osaretin (2013), “Ethno-Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria”, p. 354.

¹²⁸ Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 43.

¹²⁹ Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 44-45.

¹³⁰ Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 6.

¹³¹ Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 6; Krause (2011), *A Deadly Cycle*, p. 10.

¹³² Kwaja (2011), *Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict*, p. 2.

¹³³ Kwaja (2011), *Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict*, p. 4.

¹³⁴ Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 7-8; Kwaja (2011), *Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict*, p. 6.

¹³⁵ Sayne (2012), *Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigene-Settler Conflicts*, p. 8.

¹³⁶ HRW (2009), *Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces*, p. 8.

suspected to be involved many more, according to HRW.¹³⁷ The governor of Plateau state at the time, Jonah Jang, imposed a strict curfew and has been accused of issuing orders to “shoot-on-sight” to the security forces.¹³⁸ The International Criminal Court is investigating this and other incidents in Nigeria.¹³⁹

The perception that the security forces are not capable of keeping the peace also results in many communities maintaining vigilante or militia groups for security.¹⁴⁰ However, it should be pointed out that in the context of the 2008 crisis, HRW reported that some witnesses also credited the military with restoring the peace and protecting civilians.¹⁴¹

While the focus in the above was on the situation and violence in and immediately around Jos, recurring violence is also taking place in the rest of Plateau state and in the neighbouring state of Kaduna, as well as in large areas of Central Nigeria. One example is the reported killing of 37 people when four villages were attacked simultaneously in the middle of the night on November 26, 2013.¹⁴² Incidents such as this rarely receive international attention, which is currently concentrated on the situation in the North East, concerning Boko Haram, and the Niger Delta (including piracy – see the following sections).

¹³⁷ HRW (2009), *Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces*.

¹³⁸ ICC (2013), *Situation in Nigeria*, p. 19.

¹³⁹ See ICC (2013), *Situation in Nigeria*.

¹⁴⁰ Rakodi (2012), “Inter-Religious Violence and its Aftermath”, p. 13.

¹⁴¹ HRW (2009), *Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces*, p. 9.

¹⁴² Reuters (November 26, 2013), *Gunmen kill 37 in central Nigeria village raids*.

5 South: The Niger Delta – oil and marginalisation

The long instability in the Niger Delta came to a head in an insurgency lasting from 2006 to 2009, when a presidential amnesty was accepted by most of the rebels.¹⁴³ Crime, insecurity and tensions have persisted, however, as the underlying causes of conflict and insecurity in the region have not been tackled effectively. The Delta is home to the vast majority of Nigerian oil, making it critical for the economy of Nigeria and important also for international energy interests.¹⁴⁴ The rising problem of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which is closely connected to the Niger Delta (see next section), adds to the importance of this area.

Conflict in the Delta has a long history and even back in 1958, before independence, the case was made that the region was marginalised and needed to be developed.¹⁴⁵ Violence in the area has many dimensions, and the actors, motives and patterns vary widely.¹⁴⁶ Thus the summary provided here presents only a general picture.

While the Delta is not the poorest region in Nigeria, it does have the highest rate of youth unemployment, estimated at 40% (approaching 50% in some areas) and high income inequality.¹⁴⁷ The lack of education, healthcare, employment opportunities and government service delivery in general in an area which at the same time is a source of the vast majority of official Nigerian revenue is at the core of the conflict. Perceived injustice and marginalisation are often seen as root causes.¹⁴⁸

Demand for resource control is a central issue regarding violence in the Delta, both now and historically.¹⁴⁹ At present the 13% derivation, meaning that the oil-producing states in Nigeria keep 13% of oil income, results in the Niger Delta states¹⁵⁰ receiving far more money than the other states, with the core oil-producing states Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers getting around one third

¹⁴³ Obi et al. (2011), *Oil and insurgency in the Niger Delta*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁴ Soremekun (2011), "Nigeria's oil diplomacy", p. 108-109.

¹⁴⁵ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 63; Ifedi (2011), "Blood Oil", p. 82.

¹⁴⁶ Newsom (2011), *Conflict in the Niger Delta*, p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 2, 10; Ukiwo, "The Nigerian state, oil, and the Niger Delta crisis", p. 24.

¹⁴⁸ Ibaba (2011), "The Ijaw National Congress", p. 72, among others.

¹⁴⁹ Oluwaniyi (2010), "Oil and Youth Militancy", p. 317; Ako (2011), "The struggle for resource control", p. 42.

¹⁵⁰ Here including: Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Imo, Abia, Akwa-Ibom and Cross River states.

of all official revenues.¹⁵¹ Corruption ensures that little of these funds reach the population and, while there are calls for increased derivation, it is unlikely that it would result in an increase in resources at the local level.¹⁵²

Environmental degradation is also a major problem in the Niger Delta, which is one of the most polluted areas on the planet, an estimated 1.5 million tons of oil having been spilled over 50 years.¹⁵³ Gas flaring is another great concern, both economically and because of the major environmental consequences.¹⁵⁴ Oil theft and illegal refining of crude oil are also important sources of pollution, especially as illegal refining seems to have increased since 2009.¹⁵⁵

5.1 Actors and patterns of violence

The amnesty introduced in 2009 covered over 20 000 former fighters from various armed groups, and the programmes incorporated training, reintegration and stipends. These programmes are scheduled to end in 2015, the same year as the next presidential election.¹⁵⁶ While some success can be attributed to the amnesty, core causes of conflict have not been tackled and the foot-soldiers have expressed complaints over lack of training, difficulties in finding jobs and other issues.¹⁵⁷ Today criminality, specifically oil theft, kidnappings, politically motivated violence and protests and abuse by security forces, is among the foremost sources of violence in the Delta.¹⁵⁸

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was, and continues to be, one of the main armed groups in the Delta. The Nigerian Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) is another, although both are currently largely inactive.¹⁵⁹ MEND in particular cannot be said to be a united organisation, consisting more of a network of groups and leaders forming a "brand" rather than a cohesive force.¹⁶⁰ In September 2013, MEND threatened to attack the Chevron Escravos terminal if it was not evacuated, while a few weeks

¹⁵¹ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 72-73.

¹⁵² Ako (2011), "The struggle for resource control", p. 48-49; Ibaba (2011), "The Ijaw National Congress", p. 80-81; Ezeh (October 11, 2013), "New revenue formula: Niger Delta demands 50% derivation", *Daily Trust*.

¹⁵³ Ifedi (2011), "Blood Oil", p. 80.

¹⁵⁴ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 42.

¹⁵⁵ Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria's Criminal Crude*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁶ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 16.

¹⁵⁷ Obi et al. (2011), *Oil and insurgency in the Niger Delta*, p. 204-205; WARN (2013), *Is the African Giant Drowning?*, p.4-5.

¹⁵⁸ The Fund for Peace (2013), *Conflict Bulletin: Delta State*; The Fund for Peace (2013), *Conflict Bulletin: Ondo State*; The Fund for Peace (2013), *Conflict Bulletin: Bayelsa State*; The Fund for Peace (2013), *Conflict Bulletin: Rivers State*.

¹⁵⁹ McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), "Nigerian Unity", p. 47.

¹⁶⁰ Ikelegbe (2011), "Popular and criminal violence", p. 130; Bøås, "'Mend Me', p. 121; Oriola et al. (2013), "Car Bombing 'With Due Respect'", p. 75.

later stating that it would be willing to help work against oil theft if the government would tackle the socio-economic challenges of the region.¹⁶¹ While not currently fully active, MEND is thus still present.

Political competition has played a large role in violence, with the political elite hiring and arming groups for support, to intimidate opponents and to generally influence elections.¹⁶² This pattern has resulted in an increased spread of weapons and the creation of armed groups that are usually abandoned by politicians after the elections are over.¹⁶³ There have even been violent confrontations between armed groups over government patronage.¹⁶⁴ In July 2013, there were clashes in Port Harcourt between militias supporting the President and the governor of Rivers state.¹⁶⁵ Some speculate that the current stability in the Niger Delta is partly because of President Johnson being from the Niger Delta himself. Threats have been made about renewed fighting if he is not allowed to run or if he loses in 2015.¹⁶⁶ This, together with the end of the amnesty programme, means that 2015 will most likely prove to be a critical year for future developments in the region.¹⁶⁷

The theft of oil, both on land and via piracy, is a substantial problem. While estimates vary widely, from 70 000 barrels per day (bpd) to 400 000 bpd (and as high as 680 000 bpd in 2009),¹⁶⁸ it is clear that enormous amounts of oil are being stolen.¹⁶⁹ Chatham House estimates that 100 000 bpd for the first quarter of 2013 is a plausible average, at an annual cost of \$3-8 billion.¹⁷⁰ It should be noted that while theft from pipelines etc. is receiving the most focus, “official” theft at export terminals is also substantial, though more difficult to verify.¹⁷¹ The illegal oil trade is also an important component in the large proliferation of

¹⁶¹ Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report (September 5, 2013), *Nigerian militants issue threat against Chevron’s Escravos terminal*; Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report (September 11, 2013), *Nigerian MEND militants make conditional offer to reduce oil theft*.

¹⁶² Newsom (2011), *Conflict in the Niger Delta*, p. 3; Oriola et al. (2013), “Car Bombing ‘With Due Respect’”, p. 69-70; Isumonah (2013), “Armed Society in the Niger Delta”, p. 350.

¹⁶³ Ikelegbe (2011), “Popular and criminal violence”, p. 131.

¹⁶⁴ Boås, “‘Mend Me’”, p. 122.

¹⁶⁵ Africa Confidential (2013), “The Delta catches fire again”, p. 9.

¹⁶⁶ Gienger (May 23, 2013), *Nigeria’s State of Emergency May Spread Amid Violence, Politics*; Okocha et al. (September 9, 2013), “2015: Niger Delta Youths Threaten War”, *This Day Live*; Udo (September 9, 2013), “There will be bloodshed if Jonathan loses in 2015, says Asari-Dokubo”, *Premium Times*.

¹⁶⁷ Sayne (2013), *What’s Next for Security in the Niger Delta?*

¹⁶⁸ Isumonah (2013), “Armed Society in the Niger Delta”, p. 350.

¹⁶⁹ McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), “Nigerian Unity”, p. 33-34; Africa Confidential (July 19, 2013), “The Delta catches fire again”, p. 10; IRIN News (June 4, 2013), *Rising Niger Delta oil theft threatens security*; Igwe (October 17, 2012), “Nigeria: Stolen Oil, Stolen Revenue”; The Economist (April 11, 2012), “Still an oily dangerous mess”, among others.

¹⁷⁰ Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria’s Criminal Crude*, p. 15-17, 25.

¹⁷¹ Zalek (2011), “Labelling oil, contesting governance”, p. 188; Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria’s Criminal Crude*, p. 4-5.

weapons in the area.¹⁷² Overall, there is a lack of clear and reliable intelligence regarding oil theft and illegal refining.

The complex situation in the Niger Delta results in it being problematic to distinguish between criminal, rebel and other politically motivated groups. While some can be placed clearly into one category or another, many fall within several, or move between categories over time. Attempting to apply these distinctions can to some extent be said to be counter-productive, as it obscures the situation at hand.

5.2 Response of government, oil companies and the security forces

The response of the federal government to the situation in the Niger Delta can be described as heavy deployment of security forces, combined with renegotiations of oil revenue derivation and the creation of institutions and projects for the development of the region.¹⁷³

The oil revenue, whether channelled through the state budgets or development projects and institutions, largely disappears due to corruption and projects in which the cost is disproportionate to the utility, such as luxurious hotels, shopping malls and airports.¹⁷⁴ Development initiatives can often be viewed as a way of distributing patronage, and generally yield little benefit for the broader population.¹⁷⁵ Both the political will and the capacity of the state to promote development in the area have been questioned.¹⁷⁶

Responses generally comprise a military crackdown on what is often seen as a threat to national security.¹⁷⁷ With a lack of police capacity, the Joint Task Force (consisting of army, navy and air force personnel) is responsible for most security operations and a hard-handed, military approach is dominant.¹⁷⁸ The security forces are also accused of having a vested interest in continued instability, allegedly being involved in oil theft and fuelling the conflict to

¹⁷² Duquet (2011), “Swamped with weapons”.

¹⁷³ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*.

¹⁷⁴ Ebiede (2011), “Conflict Drivers”, p. 146. So called “white elephants”.

¹⁷⁵ Soremekun (2011), “Nigeria’s oil diplomacy”, p. 106-107.

¹⁷⁶ Ahonsi (2011), “Capacity and governance deficits”, p. 35; Oluwaniyi (2010), “Oil and Youth Militancy”, p. 322.

¹⁷⁷ Ukeje (2011), “Changing the paradigm of pacification”, p. 89.

¹⁷⁸ Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 32-33; Allen et al. (2010), “Oil, Politics, and Conflict in the Niger Delta”, p. 39, among others.

remain in the area.¹⁷⁹ Soldiers have been said to sell or hire weapons to armed groups¹⁸⁰ and in some instances to encourage fighting between groups.¹⁸¹

Over time, the oil companies operating in the Delta have used a number of strategies to increase their security. To begin with, many companies have carried out different kinds of development work, usually of limited scope.¹⁸² Companies have also hired local youths to provide security, made use of a large number of private security companies and run their own security forces or had state security detachments to protect their operations.¹⁸³ Payments to local communities or groups in exchange for not being attacked have also been common.¹⁸⁴

Oil companies are important actors when it comes to oil spills and environmental damage. In a recent report, Amnesty looked at how investigations of oil spills have been conducted and concluded that oil companies, mentioning Shell by name, have no legitimate basis for their claim that the majority of spills are caused by sabotage.¹⁸⁵ Instead corrosion and equipment failure are suggested as primary causes of oil spills. Despite claims of extensive sabotage, efforts to protect the pipelines and infrastructure have also been severely limited. In 2012 alone, Shell had 207 spills, while there were 474 in the operations of the Nigerian Agip Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Italian energy company ENI. The majority of these were claimed to be the result of sabotage, but with little evidence to support this claim.¹⁸⁶

The international importance of the Niger Delta and its oil, together with the Nigerian dependence on international companies and the oil market for the majority of its revenue, add another level of complexity to the situation. This gives international actors substantial economic and political influence over the local authorities. While not dealt with further here, it is an aspect that deserves attention and study, not only in the context of the Niger Delta but from a broader perspective.

¹⁷⁹ Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria's Criminal Crude*, p. 5ff; WARN (2013), *Is the African Giant Drowning?*, p.3.

¹⁸⁰ Duquet (2011), "Swamped with weapons", p. 139, 142-144; Oriola et al. (2013), "Car Bombing 'With Due Respect'", p. 82.

¹⁸¹ Isumonah (2013), "Armed Society in the Niger Delta", p. 346.

¹⁸² Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 3; Idemudia (2011), "Corporate social responsibility", p. 174-175.

¹⁸³ Ukeje (2011), "Changing the paradigm of pacification", p. 94-95; Isumonah (2013), "Armed Society in the Niger Delta", p. 346.

¹⁸⁴ Ukeje (2011), "Changing the paradigm of pacification", p. 94-95; Francis et al. (2011), *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*, p. 62.

¹⁸⁵ AI (2013), *Bad information*.

¹⁸⁶ AI (2013), *Bad information*, p. 6.

6 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, concentrated in the sea off Nigeria, has begun to be recognised as a growing problem internationally. The US has been voicing its concern, most recently after the kidnapping in 2013 of the crew, including two US citizens, of an oil supply vessel in the area.¹⁸⁷ With the EU currently obtaining 13% of its oil and 6% of its gas through resources in the area, the Gulf of Guinea is also of clear interest from a European perspective.¹⁸⁸ The Gulf is an important transit area for shipping, as well as an important fishing ground, including for European and Asian fleets.¹⁸⁹ Illegal and unregulated fishing is a major concern in the region.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, trafficking and illicit flows of narcotics, people, weapons and other goods are made easier by the lack of maritime security.¹⁹¹

It should be noted that in the discussion concerning maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the term piracy is commonly used to include attacks occurring *within* territorial waters, which constitute the vast majority of attacks. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), however, this is not classified as piracy, as this is only legally the case outside the 12-mile range of territorial waters.¹⁹²

Unlike the piracy off Somalia, the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is characterised by being focused on theft, importantly of petroleum, instead of kidnappings.¹⁹³ From attacks and theft of fishing trawlers to the seizure and siphoning of the contents of entire oil tankers, it is also generally more violent and the perpetrators are better armed than is the case off Somalia.¹⁹⁴ During 2013 (up to 22 October), the International Marine Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre listed 30 reported incidents related to Nigeria, compared with 11 related to Somalia.¹⁹⁵ However, it is estimated that two-thirds of attacks are never reported.¹⁹⁶ The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 100 successful attacks are carried out per year (including attacks on fishing

¹⁸⁷ Reuters (October 24, 2013), “White House concerned by increase in piracy in West Africa”; BBC News (October 24, 2013), “Nigeria pirate attack: US sailors seized”.

¹⁸⁸ Barrios (2013), *Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, p. 2.

¹⁸⁹ Anyimadu (June 21, 2013), *Tackling Insecurity in West Africa's Waters*.

¹⁹⁰ Chatham House (2013), “Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea”, p. 16.

¹⁹¹ Anyimadu (June 21, 2013), *Tackling Insecurity in West Africa's Waters*.

¹⁹² Chatham House (2013), “Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea”, p. 15.

¹⁹³ Chatham House (2013), “Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea”, p. 15-16.

¹⁹⁴ Anyimadu (2013), “Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea”, p. 11.

¹⁹⁵ IMB Piracy Reporting Centre website.

¹⁹⁶ Barrios (2013), “Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea”, p. 2.

trawlers and other vessels).¹⁹⁷ A figure of one attack per day has also been put forward, together with a projected rise to two a day in 2014.¹⁹⁸

Much of the piracy, theft and sales of petroleum are linked to the Niger Delta, thus being a part of the dynamic described in the previous section.¹⁹⁹ The majority of attacks take place within Nigerian waters, but Benin and Togo are also severely affected, while incidents are reported throughout the Gulf of Guinea.²⁰⁰ The smuggling of oil is thought to occur primarily through the Niger Delta, with the large black market for fuel in West Africa being critical for the economics of piracy.²⁰¹ While information is limited and uncertain, there are also indications that smuggled oil is being exchanged for weapons, which could have significant repercussions for the security situation in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea and calls for further investigation.

The situation is linked to governance and corruption, as reports of pirates cooperating with politicians, security forces and government officials are common. This includes tips on suitable targets, lack of response to piracy and bribes to avoid legal action.²⁰²

6.1 Response by Nigeria and the surrounding region

The Nigerian Navy (NN) is the largest in the region, but still has insufficient ability and resources to tackle security in the Gulf of Guinea.²⁰³ With piracy being a cross-border challenge with roots and implications throughout the region, even a strong NN would have only a limited ability to tackle the problems. However, Nigeria is a key actor and its navy is currently planning a significant expansion, acquiring 49 naval vessels and 42 helicopters over the next decade. Vessels have already been delivered, including ex-US navy and coastguard vessels and over a dozen craft built by the Singapore-based company Suncraft International. Offshore patrol vessels are also being built for the NN in China,

¹⁹⁷ UNODC (2013), “Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa”, p. 51.

¹⁹⁸ Defence Web (November 26, 2013), *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea not given the attention it deserves*.

¹⁹⁹ UNODC (2013), “Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa”, p. 47; McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), “Nigerian Unity”, p. 57.

²⁰⁰ UNODC (2013), “Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa”, p. 50.

²⁰¹ UNODC (2013), “Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa”, p. 45; McLoughlin & Bouchat (2013), “Nigerian Unity”, p. 57.

²⁰² Pérouse de Montclos (2012), “Maritime Piracy in Nigeria”, p. 540; Ghosh (2013), *Waiting to Explode*, p. 15.

²⁰³ Katsouris et al.(2013), *Nigeria’s Criminal Crude*, p. 48.

and China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Company has been contracted to upgrade the NN main shipyard in Port Harcourt, Rivers state.²⁰⁴

Furthermore, corruption within the NN (and throughout the armed forces) is a significant problem.²⁰⁵ Corruption and lack of capacity are also evident in the police and other security services, which have a limited ability to investigate and prosecute the illicit organisations.²⁰⁶ Even when arrests are made, however, bribes are common and many suspects released without a legal process, reflecting the problem of high level involvement in piracy.²⁰⁷ A similar level of political manipulation and use of armed groups for political and economic benefit can be seen regarding piracy and regarding groups in the Niger Delta.

One of the greatest concerns for the region is not direct material losses, but the impact on international insurance rates. For instance, during the third quarter of 2011, maritime traffic to Cotonou in Benin decreased by 70% due to the increased cost of insurance. With Benin being very reliant on its maritime trade, this meant a possible 28% loss in government revenue.²⁰⁸

Regionally, counter-piracy responses are not as well developed as in the area around Somalia.²⁰⁹ One important factor in the ability of the shipping industry to protect itself is that the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea mostly happen close to port, and thus within Nigerian waters, where commercial ships are prohibited from arming their vessels.²¹⁰ In fact, crews which have armed themselves have been arrested.²¹¹ Guards can be hired from regional governments, but given the heavy armament of pirates, some guards have been reported to hide during the night to avoid fighting.²¹²

Regionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) adopted the Yaoundé Declaration on the Gulf of Guinea Security on June 25 2013.²¹³ This included the creation of an Inter-regional Coordination Centre on Maritime Safety and Security for Central and West Africa, to be headquartered in Yaoundé, Cameroon, and a Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships,

²⁰⁴ Defence Web (November 14, 2013), *Nigerian Navy contracts Chinese company to upgrade main shipyard*.

²⁰⁵ Pérouse de Montclos (2012), "Maritime Piracy in Nigeria", p. 538.

²⁰⁶ Vircoulon et al. (August 15, 2013), *West Africa: Where Navies Are Not Enough*.

²⁰⁷ Bridger (February 1, 2013), *Re-examining the Gulf of Guinea*; Ghosh (2013), *Waiting to Explode*, p. 22.

²⁰⁸ UNODC (2013), "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa", p. 51.

²⁰⁹ Hurlburt and Seyle [Lead authors] (2012), *The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012*, p. 13.

²¹⁰ Anyimadu (2013), "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", p. 9-11.

²¹¹ Arnold (October 14, 2013), "Shippers Raise Alarm Over Oil Piracy in Gulf of Guinea".

²¹² Hurlburt and Seyle [Lead authors] (2012), *The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012*, p. 14.

²¹³ Zeldin, Wendy (July 9, 2013), "Africa: New Regional Anti-Piracy Agreement".

and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.²¹⁴ This code of conduct builds on an earlier Memorandum of Understanding between the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA).²¹⁵

The declaration has received praise from the UN, but also criticism from parties arguing that it is not binding and thus not sufficient.²¹⁶ In any case, it is still too early to judge the impact of this development. It should be noted that the level of regional cooperation has previously been relatively low.²¹⁷ A recurring problem has been that adopted policy is not implemented to a sufficient degree and thus does not have a substantial impact. An African Union integrated maritime strategy also exists, adopted in 2012, but has not resulted in substantial progress so far.²¹⁸

6.2 International dimensions

International support regarding piracy has so far taken the form of training, equipment, management etc., rather than direct military help.²¹⁹ The US, UK and France have been among the most active contributors, with the US and UK being the main donors in issues concerning hardware and infrastructure.²²⁰ Other European countries and the EU also have a number of programmes dealing with training of personnel, support for ECOWAS and support for other institution-building work.²²¹

Cooperation with the US is mainly done through the African Partnership Station (APS) of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). Numerous exercises and training missions have been carried out with the Gulf of Guinea state militaries on maritime security.²²² However, NATO has expressed caution about future involvement.²²³

In early 2013, the EU launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO), which targets Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo.²²⁴ The programme

²¹⁴ Available from <https://www.prc.cm/files/f7/26/ec/8acea8ec3a597473a76bd03c76140019.pdf>.

²¹⁵ IMO Website: West Africa .

²¹⁶ Zeldin (July 9, 2013), "Africa: New Regional Anti-Piracy Agreement".

²¹⁷ Chatham House (2013), "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", p. 26.

²¹⁸ AU (2012), *2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy)*.

²¹⁹ Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria's Criminal Crude*, p. 48.

²²⁰ Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria's Criminal Crude*, p. 49.

²²¹ Katsouris et al. (2013), *Nigeria's Criminal Crude*, p. 49.

²²² Bizioura (2013), "Piracy, state capacity and root causes", p. 101-102, United States Africa Command.

²²³ Tigner (October 2, 2013), *NATO looks to future naval role*.

²²⁴ European Commission (January 10, 2013) *New EU initiative to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*.

aims to provide training for coastguards and establish information-sharing networks in the region.²²⁵ The EU is also working on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea within the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and through the European Development Fund (EDF).²²⁶ Further discussion is ongoing within the EU concerning a regional strategy for the Gulf of Guinea, especially in preparation for the Africa-EU Summit of 2014.²²⁷ In a so-called *non-paper* presented by the European External Actions Service (EEAS) in September 2013, four general goals for the EU in the Gulf were suggested: building a common understanding of the threat and challenges; strengthening regional and national institutions to ensure security and the rule of law; supporting economic development; and strengthening regional cooperation.²²⁸

While much attention, internationally and regionally, has been given to the issue of counter-piracy operations at sea, it is critical to pay attention to the conditions on shore that give rise to piracy. It is commonly agreed that piracy is most effectively targeted onshore.²²⁹ In the Gulf of Guinea, the issue of maritime security and piracy is closely connected to the situation on shore in general, and that in the Niger Delta in particular. The socio-economic situation plays a key role as a driving force behind piracy. While increased maritime security could plausibly be achieved through other means, only substantial engagement with these issues would ensure a lasting and stable situation.

²²⁵ European Commission (January 10, 2013) *New EU initiative to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*.

²²⁶ Barrios (2013), *Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, p. 3.

²²⁷ Barrios (2013), *Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, p. 1; PM News (August 29, 2013), "EU to join war against sea pirates in West Africa".

²²⁸ EEAS (2013), *Non-paper on the EU's response to the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea*.

²²⁹ Maritime Security Review (October 30, 2013), Piracy Update; Murphy (2012), "Counterpiracy in Historical Context", p. 515.

7 Concluding remarks

The importance of Nigeria as a central actor in the surrounding region is clear, but deserves to receive even further consideration. This report attempted to give a brief overview of the security challenges Nigeria currently faces and to summarise the relevance and importance of these challenges from an international, specifically European, point of view. In North East Nigeria, Boko Haram-related terrorism and insurgency are pressing and potentially growing threats that could well develop even stronger international links. The violence in Jos, and in the states of Plateau and Kaduna states more generally, risks creating even further religious and ethnic tension. The stability of the Niger Delta, the primary source of income for Nigeria through oil production, is precarious and this, in combination with maritime insecurity, can have significant international consequences.

Taking a wider perspective, the unrest in Mali and the more recent crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, together with the ongoing violence in Northern Nigeria, all have implications for the broader sub-Saharan region. Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Niger and Cameroon, all of which are already worried about the spread of Islamist militancy from North East Nigeria, are among the countries affected by the larger patterns of conflict and insecurity. With its powerful position, large economy and leading role in regional organisations, Nigeria plays a key part in the security challenges in West and Central Africa. This role is further accentuated by the centrality of Nigeria to tackle the challenge of piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. The ability of Nigeria to manage its security threats will thus have a great impact on the entire region and will also set the conditions for more effective regional measures. The cross-border nature of these security challenges should not be forgotten, however, nor should the international aspects and dimensions exemplified by the influence of international actors in the Niger Delta. In this context, it is also crucial to keep in mind that these challenges are not limited to traditional security issues. A broader, human security- and governance-centred agenda and associated development are essential for national and regional stability.

International attention is currently concentrated on the issue of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and Boko Haram, so the main focus is on those issues in this concluding section. It is important to be mindful of the complexities and dimensions within these security threats as the international community becomes further involved. The impact of the overarching challenges presented in this report – poverty and inequality, corruption, security and security forces, divisive political competition – on the ability of the Nigerian government to make an effective response should not be underestimated. Similar consideration is needed in the context of international engagement, as these factors will undoubtedly

affect any such efforts. This is not to say that engagement should not be made, but rather that appropriate attention should be paid to the circumstances in which such engagement is made.

In this context it is also important to point out the diversity of Nigeria. The extent and impact of the challenges and security problems detailed in this report vary widely between different regions and areas of the country. Further study and greater attention should thus be devoted to the way in which these challenges have been handled throughout the country. While this report in general presents a negative picture of Nigeria, its aim was limited to presenting the challenges. Through highlighting positive and successful examples of approaching and dealing with these challenges, experience could be gained and lessons learned, but this was regrettably outside the scope of the present report.

Maritime security

An EU strategy regarding the Gulf of Guinea is currently under discussion and, as stated above, a number of regional institutions are being put in place. It is imperative that the different actors, government agencies and structures strengthen their coordination and cooperation, nationally, regionally and internationally. With regard to the EU, it should be emphasised that the effects of the existing joint EU-Africa strategy (Joint Africa-Europe Strategy - JAES) has so far been disappointing.²³⁰ In order to effectively engage with the problem of maritime insecurity, there is a need for good cooperation and coordination between AU, ECCAS, ECOWAS and the new Coordination Centre in Yaoundé. The EU could play an important role in this, but needs to find ways for true engagement and learn from the lack of commitment, dialogue and partnership exhibited in JAES.²³¹ There is also a risk that the policies introduced and institutions created to date will result in little actual action being taken. Making sure that these structures result in practical measures is a key challenge.

Taking into account the significant differences between the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and that off the coast of Somalia, caution is needed when attempting to transplant lessons learned in the latter area. While operations such as the EU's Operation Atalanta are less likely to be carried out in the Gulf of Guinea, experience could instead be gained from EU's capacity building mission for maritime security in the Indian Ocean, EUCAP Nestor.²³² Capacity building targeting national and regional organisations, particularly with regard to cooperation and coordination between and within such organisations and government agencies, would be relevant to the West Africa context. Emphasis should also be placed on the issues of corruption and upholding the rule of law,

²³⁰ See Elowsson and Nordlund (2013), *Paradigm Lost? The Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

²³¹ Elowsson and Nordlund (2013), *Paradigm Lost? The Joint Africa-EU Strategy*.

²³² See Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013), *EUCAP Nestor*.

so as to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement and the judicial system between and within nations.

Boko Haram

With regard to Boko Haram and Ansaru, it is unfortunate that the tendency has been to include these within the broader discussion on Islamist terrorism and the war on terror. Ansaru is arguably more closely related to organisations such as AQIM, while Boko Haram has hitherto lacked the motivation to expand outside Nigeria to any great extent. Those tackling the challenge of Boko Haram and related security threats could possibly benefit from a more localised understanding of its causes. The US classification of Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist groups could have significant consequences. Labelling them together with AQIM, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida might, in fact, encourage the formation of links between Boko Haram and these groups. It might also contribute to further radicalisation within the groups. This is of course a sensitive political question, where the Nigerian government has a clear interest in shaping the discourse to its advantage, both regarding the national and international arena.

Furthermore, it has been argued that an almost exclusive focus on military solutions, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency is misguided. While maintaining security is certainly a necessary task, it should be done in tandem with socio-economic and political approaches to tackle the substantial developmental problems facing the region. The tough approach so far favoured by the Nigerian government has most likely served to increase the radicalisation of Boko Haram. This calls for a clear shift in strategy in order to handle the situation.²³³

2015 elections and future developments

Of central importance to future development in Nigeria are the elections in 2015 and the political competition leading up to these. One of the factors is the prevalence of electoral violence and political manipulation by armed groups often connected with previous elections in the country. With the formation of the opposition coalition APC and internal problems within the ruling PDP party, it seems that the latter is facing a serious challenge for the first time since the return to civilian rule in 1999. It is plausible that the struggle and political competition within the political elite is going to be even fiercer than normal given the circumstances. Partly as a response to the challenge, President Goodluck Jonathan has created a National Dialogue Conference on the future of Nigeria. The response to this has been divided, as some groups have stated their

²³³ See for example Ford (2013), *Counter-terrorism, human rights and the rule of law in Africa*.

willingness to participate and others have called it a ploy aimed only at gaining support for the elections.²³⁴

With state governors leaving the PDP for the APC and the ruling party losing its majority in parliament after further defections, the political situation in Nigeria is volatile. President Jonathan has also been receiving public criticism from former President Olusegun Obasanjo and others, which has resulted in scathing and seemingly furious responses.²³⁵ Observers hope that the challenge from the APC will serve to increase democracy, and possibly lead to much needed reform in the longer term in areas such as anti-corruption and service delivery.²³⁶ Such progress is by no means certain, however, and the opposition has so far not managed to produce much of a programme. Even if there is a change of government, there is no guarantee of a change of policy. It would not be surprising to see the political elite seeking to maintain the status quo, with only minor reforms taking place to give the impression of action. The struggle against corruption is of special importance for the ability of Nigeria to handle current and future security challenges. The importance of corruption in creating grievances, hindering service delivery and impeding the implementation of effective development projects should not be underestimated.

In sum, Nigeria is a country facing several severe security challenges. The majority of these are related to the overarching socio-economic problems in the country, such as poverty, corruption and divisive political competition. With its large economy, large population and dominant position in the region, the way in which these challenges are met will have repercussions both for Nigeria's immediate neighbours and internationally.

²³⁴ Akinlove (November 11, 2013), "Nigeria's National Dialogue Conference: Enhancing the Debate or Killing it?"; Africa Confidential (November 1, 2013), "Jonathan's dialogue plan outflanks the rebels".

²³⁵ Noakes (January 7, 2014), "Nigeria: Is Jonathan Taking an Authoritarian Turn?" *ThinkAfricaPress*.

²³⁶ Akinlove (December 5, 2013), "Nigeria: Welcome To a Two-Party State"; Africa Confidential (November 29, 2013). "Small earthquake, President slightly hurt".

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Import from our 30 largest trade partners

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Nigeria is home to one-fifth of the population of sub-Saharan Africa and is currently the second largest economy and the largest oil producer in Africa, so its importance in the region is clear. It is also currently facing several severe challenges related to peace and security. Overarching issues include poverty, unemployment, corruption and social and economic inequality. More specifically, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and militant Islamism in Nigeria are gaining increasing international attention. Signs of this attention include the United States' classification of the Nigerian groups Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in November 2013, and the ongoing discussions on an EU strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.

With a political crisis developing within the PDP, which has led Nigeria since 1999, and a growing opposition party, the upcoming presidential election in 2015 will be of great significance for the future of Nigeria. In a regional environment which includes Mali and the Central African Republic, the stability and future development of Nigeria are of critical importance for peace and security.