The Regionalisation of Peace Operations in Africa

Advantages, challenges and the way ahead

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Sammanfattning

Sedan Afrikanska unionen (AU) bildades 2002 och den s.k. Afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen lanserades har en ny norm för regionala insatser på den afrikanska kontinenten skapats. Denna rapport analyserar dessa insatser och identifierar en rad fördelar, utmaningar och trender. Bland annat lyfter rapporten fram att det idag finns en tydlig internationell arbetsfördelning vad gäller fredsfrämjande insatser i Afrika, där afrikanska organisationer främst tillhandahåller initiala militära stabiliseringsoperationer. Dessa sätts in i miljöer där säkerhetsläget ännu inte tillåter FN att upprätta en insats, eller fungerar som en förstyrka under tiden FN mobiliserar en bredare insats.

Regionala insatser har utgjort ett viktigt verktyg för att fördela bördan av genomförandet av fredsfrämjande insatser. Samtidigt har insatserna lidit av en avsaknad av förutsägbar och hållbar finansiering. Beroendet av extern finansiering är en av de största utmaningar afrikanska insatser står inför, vilket också kan påverka hur insatserna utformas i framtiden. Även den framtida roll- och ansvarsfördelningen mellan AU och FN, samt mellan AU, där beslut tas, och de regionala organisationerna, som har förmågan att agera, spelar en avgörande roll. Dessa tre frågor analyseras i rapporten.

Föreliggande rapport lyfter även fram en rad frågor för partners att överväga. Däribland konsekvenserna av bristande neutralitet hos truppbidragarländer för långsiktig stabilitet och fredsbyggande; att stödet till uppbyggnad av AU:s multidimensionella förmåga till insats kan ifrågasättas givet att den internationella arbetsfördelningen främst föreskriver AU en militär roll; samt att det nuvarande givarstödet till AU, vilket prioriterat just insatsförmågan, lett till en obalans mellan AU:s freds- och säkerhetsskapande instrument och dess konfliktförebyggande förmågor.

Nyckelord: regionalisering, fredsfrämjande, regionala insatser, Afrikanska unionen, AU, Förenta nationerna, FN, afrikanska freds- och säkerhetsarkitekturen, APSA, Afrika, afrikansk säkerhet

Summary

Since the inauguration of the African Union (AU) in 2002 and the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a new norm of regional peace operations on the African continent has been set. This report analyses regional peace operations launched by the AU and sub-regional organisations, identifying advantages, challenges and trends. It argues that there is currently an international division of peacekeeping, whereby African operations have come to act as a first responder, providing initial stabilisation missions in operational environments where the UN cannot yet go, or to allow the UN time to mobilise a broader operation.

While regional missions have been an important tool for burden sharing, they suffer from a lack of predictable and sustainable funding. The dependency on external funding is one of the main challenges facing regional peace operations and will most likely affect how these develop in the future. Other issues of great contention include the division of roles and responsibilities between the AU and the UN, as well as between the AU, which holds the formal decision making rights, and the sub-regional organisation, which has the capacity to act. These three issues are analysed in this report.

The report also highlights some considerations for partners. These include taking the consequences of impartiality on longer-term stability and peace-building into account when choosing which troop contributors to support; reviewing the necessity of the support provided to the building of AU multidimensional peacekeeping capacities, given that the AU has come to play largely a military role in the current division of labour; and considering evening out the balance of support provided to AU peacekeeping operations capacity and to its pre-emptive conflict resolution capacity. This balance is currently significantly distorted towards the former.

Keywords: regionalisation, peace operations, regional operations, African Union, AU, United Nations, UN, African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA, Africa, African security

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AULMEE	AU Liaison Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea
AU RCI-LRA	Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army
AU RTF	AU Regional Task Force
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN–SAD	Community of Sahel–Saharan States
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CoW	Coalition of Willing
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (AU)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOFORCE	ECOWAS Force
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FOMUC	Multinational Force in Central African Republic
ICGLR	International Conference of the Great Lakes Region
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IMU	International Monitoring Unit
JMC	Joint Military Commission
M23	The March 23 Movement
MAES	AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros/ Mission d'assistance electorale aux Comores
MICEMA	ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic
MINUCI	UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINURCA	UN Mission in CAR
MINURCAT	UN Mission in CAR and Chad
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic

MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MIOC	AU Observer Mission in the Comoros
MISAB	Inter-African Force in Central African Republic
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOT	Military Observer Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLMEE	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMIC	OAU Mission in the Comoros
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi
ONUCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
PSC	Peace and Security Council (AU)
PSD	Peace and Security Department (AU)
PSOD	Peace and Security Operations Division (AU)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Detachment
TCC	Troop-contributing Country/ies
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force in Abyei

UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSOA	UN Support Office for AMISOM
VIP	Very Important Person

1 Introduction

When the decision was made in 2001 to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the African Union (AU), the need for a new organisation with greater emphasis on peace and security cooperation was a primary motivating factor. The OAU had been formed in 1963 with the main aim of fighting apartheid and ending colonialism. Other main goals of the organisation were to improve living standards for Africa's population, organise the promotion of economic development and promote solidarity and unity among African states. Since the fight against colonialism was inherently tied to defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states, the OAU proved ill-equipped to manage one of the most important challenges affecting Africa by the 1990s, namely civil armed conflict. While several African states felt abandoned by the international community after the peace operation failures in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s and the subsequent, although only temporary, disengagement from peace operations in Africa, the OAU principle of not intervening in the internal affairs of individual countries proved problematic for addressing these issues at the continental African level.[1]

The establishment of the AU significantly challenged the non-interventionist principle of the OAU. The Constitutive Act of the AU ascribed the Union the right to intervene in any Member State, pursuant to a decision by the AU Assembly, with regard to grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity.[2] The establishment of the AU occurred in the context of an 'African renaissance', with increased focus on finding African solutions to the peace and security-related problems facing the continent.

Only one year after its inauguration in mid-2002, the AU launched its first peace operation, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). Since then, a number of peace operations have been undertaken by the AU and by African sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The establishment of the AU also entailed the conception and institutionalisation of the so-called African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)[3], which includes, amongst other support structures, the African Standby Force (ASF): a structure of five regional brigades envisioned to be ready to launch peace operations across the African continent in 2015.

[1] Bogland, K et al. 2008, p. 12-13.
[2] AU Constitutive Act, Article 4 (h).
[3] The structures that make-up the African Peace and Security Architecture include the AU Peace and Security Council, a non-permanent 15-member body otherwise similar to the United Nations Security Council; the AU Commission Chairperson; the Panel of the wise (a mediation tool); the Continental Early Warning System; the Military Staff Committee; the Peace Fund, (to finance operations); and the African Standby Force. Not all these instruments are fully operational as yet.

While regional peace interventions, conducted by sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), had taken place in parallel to those by the OAU, these were deemed an exception rather than a rule.[4] The construction of APSA came to set a new norm for engaging in regional peace operations. This development has been welcomed by external actors and encouraged by many African leaders for a number of reasons. The main argument has been the need for 'African solutions to African problems'. Although other international and non-African actors continue to be engaged in peace operations ventures in Africa, regional actors have come to play a vital role in managing some of the largest conflict clusters on the continent, shifting more of the responsibility for peace and security in Africa to African actors.

Regional peace operations in Africa have nevertheless also faced significant challenges. This has led noted scholar Alex de Waal to argue that AU-led operations may have been more significant to peace and security in Africa in terms of their symbolic weight than their concrete achievements.[5] While the regionalisation of peace operations in Africa provides a number of opportunities, its challenges need to be understood to better support the efforts of the AU and the sub-regions to conduct peace operations on the continent. This report seeks to identify current trends and challenges to regionalisation of peace operations in Africa today.

1.1 Aim of the Report

The study on which this report is based was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. The report was written as part of the *FOI Studies in African Security Programme*. The FOI has been studying APSA systematically since 2008. The development of APSA is one of the main research areas of the *FOI Studies in African Security Programme* and includes studies of AU operations, Regional Economic Community (REC) capabilities and cooperation between the AU and partners.[6] The aim of the present report is to explore and explain the dynamics of regionalisation of peace operations in Africa (specified as peace operations in Africa by African organisations) in the period since establishment of the AU, and to identify and explore the main factors which may affect regionalisation in the near future. The report is guided by three main research questions:

1) What are the advantages and challenges to undertaking peace operations in a regional context in Africa (in contrast to e.g. UN operations)?

[4] Martyns Okeke, J. 2014, p. 39.
[5] De Waal, A. 2012, pp. 1-16.
[6] For an overview of previous FOI publications on APSA please see Annex 2.

2) What, if any, trends can be identified as to the roles regional organisations have taken on in relation to peace operations in Africa?

3) What are the main institutional factors of importance to the future of regionalisation of peace operations in Africa?

1.2 Scope, Delimitations and Definitions

The report does not set out to assess the operationalisation of APSA or the ASF. However, it does aim to identify current dynamics and trends with regard to the role of African regional organisations in peace operations on the continent. Particular attention is paid to operations undertaken by, or alongside, the AU since its establishment in 2002, although the report also provides a brief background to regionalisation of peace operations in Africa.

A number of factors may impact on the future development of peace operations in Africa, but it was beyond the scope of this study to take into account all such factors. The main focus is therefore on institutional factors within and between African regional organisations and between these and the UN.

Even though there is a long history of collective conflict management in Africa through a range of means, this report is only concerned with the task of peace operations. The report uses the Bellamy & Williams definition of peace operations as operations which:

"Involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorisation, with a mandate or programme to:

1) Assist the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process.

2) Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements.

3) Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace".[7]

In this report, the term 'peace operations' is used to refer to both *peace support operations* and more traditional *peacekeeping* missions.

Regionalisation occurs in Africa beyond the area of peace operations. When the term regionalisation is used in this report, it refers to the *regionalisation of peace operations* unless otherwise specified.

[7] Bellamy &Williams. 2010, p.18. Those authors further subdivide peace operations into seven types, differentiated by their main purpose: preventative deployments; traditional peace operations; wider peace operations; peace enforcement; assisting transitions; transitional administrations; and peace support operations.

1.3 Method and Sources

In order to answer the research questions, data were collected and analysed through qualitative text analysis and semi-structured interviews. A combination of primary and secondary sources were utilised, including previous FOI reports, academic articles, reports from research institutes and policy documents from the UN and the AU. To complement the research based on scholarly articles and reviews of official documents, fifteen interviews were conducted with AU staff, regional organisations, think tanks and institutes, and donor representatives in Addis Ababa in September 2014. A full list of interviewees is presented at the end of this report. For reasons of anonymity, references to specific interviewees are not made in the report.

The interviewees were selected based on their professional affiliation and experience in working with matters related to peace operations in Africa. Representatives from the AU, sub-regional organisations, the UN and the main donors were interviewed. One aim was to discuss the perceived challenges and advantages of regionalisation of peace operations from the perspectives of practitioners. Obtaining the subjective views of practitioners also served to identify potential tensions and outstanding issues with implications for the way forward. Another objective was to obtain input from researchers based in the region in order to better understand recent challenges, advantages and trends with regard to undertaking peace operations in a regional context in Africa. The rationale is that while much of the literature on regionalisation of peace operations focuses on Africa, the development of regional peace operations in Africa over the past five years, particularly within the APSA structure, has been less well studied.

1.4 Outline

Chapter 2 provides a background to regionalisation of peace operations. An overview of the legal and institutional framework regulating regional peace operations in Africa is followed by a summary of previous research on the advantages and challenges of regionalisation. The challenges and advantages identified serve as a theoretical back-drop for the analysis in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 explores the conduct of regional peace operations in Africa since 2002. A brief background to regional peace operations in Africa is followed by an analysis of the evolving role of the AU and the sub-regional organisations.

Chapter 4 analyses the pros and cons relating to conducting peace operations in a regional context, with the focus on practical experiences of advantages and challenges associated with regional peace operations in Africa.

Chapter 5 identifies a number of trends as regards the practical reality of regional peace operations in Africa today and seeks to highlight and analyse these trends, as well as their implications on peace operations in Africa.

Chapter 6 highlights some outstanding issues and dilemmas which will most likely affect the future development and evolution of African peace operations. These include the relationship between the AU and the UN, the dependency of African-led operations on external support and funding, and the relationship between the AU and the sub-regional organisations.

Chapter 7 concludes the report by presenting some considerations for partners in supporting the construction of APSA.

2 Understanding Regionalisation

The regionalisation of peace operations is a phenomenon occurring not only in Africa, but also globally. While it would be too strong to say that there has been a dramatic transition towards regionalisation of peace operations,[8] regional organisations have come to play an increasingly important role in peace operations for more than 25 years.

2.1 Regionalisation in the UN Charter

In international law, peace operations are regulated by three particular chapters of the UN Charter. Chapter VI manages the *pacific settlement of disputes*, and is used to authorise traditional peace operations and observer missions. Chapter VII considers actions with respect to any *threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression* and regulates the authorisation of peace enforcement missions and collective defence actions. Chapter VIII regulates *regional arrangements*. Although peace operations are only authorised under Chapter VI or VII, Chapter VIII enables the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to task regional organisations with carrying out such missions. Regional peace operations are thus not authorised under Chapter VIII, but enabled by it.

Although the UN Charter mandates that the UNSC carries the overall responsibility for international peace and security, Chapter VIII states that regional arrangements are appropriate for dealing with matters relating to international peace and security as long as their action is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. While regional arrangements may manage pacific settlements of local disputes without the involvement of the UNSC, no enforcement action may be undertaken by a regional arrangement without UNSC authorisation. Where the UNSC considers enforcement action appropriate, it may appoint a regional arrangement to carry out such actions. Chapter VIII also obliges regional arrangements to keep the UNSC informed of any activities relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.[9] Even though the legal basis for the relationship between the UN and regional organisations is made clear by the UN Charter, the principles and practices of the AU and the sub-regional organisations with regard to the requirement of a UN mandate for the use of force are not clear.[10] There have been several examples of regional operations carried out without prior UNSC authorisation (see Chapter 3).

[8] Heldt & Wallensteen. 2014, p. 23.
[9] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, article 52-54.
[10] Lamont, C. 2012.

Furthermore, the UN Charter does not specify for which arrangements or organisations Chapter VIII is applicable. No definition of 'regional' is made. Some regional organisations are observers at the UN General Assembly, but not all; and not all observers are regional organisations.[11] The UNSC resolutions authorising AU missions are formulated as authorising the "member states of the AU" rather than the AU itself. Thus, it is not clear whether the UNSC authorises the AU as a regional organisation or its member states as a coalition of the willing.[12]

2.2 Why Regionalise?

A review of previous studies and documentation on the benefits and disadvantages of regionalisation of peace operations has identified a range of themes most commonly used in the arguments for and against regionalisation. These themes are presented below.[13] While much of the literature on regionalisation of peace operations focuses on Africa, the development of regional peace operations in Africa over the past five years, particularly within the APSA structure, has been less well studied. Hence, many of the current arguments for and against regionalisation omit the recent developments in regionalisation of peace operations in Africa. In Chapter 4, practical experiences of regional peace operations in Africa over the past decade, including recent experiences, are therefore used to either challenge or confirm the validity of these arguments in the African context.

2.2.1 Possible advantages

Burden sharing

Among the primary motives for regionalising peace operations is the need to meet an increasing demand for UN peacekeeping, resulting in over-stretching of UN resources. Regional organisations are essential in dealing with the range of potential and actual conflicts in the world, in view of the scarcity of UN resources.[14] A few years after the end of the Cold War, the UN was reportedly so over-stretched that burden sharing with regional organisations, as well as ad hoc coalitions of the willing, was inevitable. Furthermore, the peacekeeping failures of the UN in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia in the early 1990s led to a growing

[11] Graham, K. 2005, p. 17; United Nations. 1992.
[12] Hussein, M. 2012.
[13] This section is primarily based on Bures, O. 2006, pp. 92-98; Franke, B. 2006, pp. 2-12; Griffin, M. 1999, pp. 20-24; Diehl, P. 1993, pp. 4-9; Heldt, B. 2004, pp. 119-123; Hentz, J.J et al. 2009, pp. 211-213
[14] Franke, B. 2006, p 2.

feeling that regional organisations needed to take on greater responsibilities in their own regions.[15]

However, regionalising certain responsibilities for peace and security is not only motivated by a lack of UN resources. There are also advantages of regional actors preventing, containing and resolving conflicts.[16] In regionalisation theory, this comparative advantage is commonly described as resulting from the following factors: *geographical proximity*; *cultural affinity*; *greater consensus*; and *greater legitimacy.*

Geographical proximity
The argument of geographical proximity is based on the idea that member states of a regional organisation may be more compelled to act in resolving a conflict in their own neighbourhood than would the international community, since the conflict risks spilling across their borders. In addition, geographically proximate states are more likely to be aware of escalating tensions in a neighbouring state at an earlier stage. This may both facilitate a decision to act and result in an intervention being more successful due to advantages in information gathering and fact-finding during a peace operation. Finally, geographical proximity enables both swift deployment and effective supply of personnel and resources to peace operations.[17]

Cultural affinity
The social, cultural and historical affinity that comes from geographical proximity is also presented as a possible advantage to regional peace operations, since affinity is assumed to increase the chances of creating trust and legitimacy. Regional peacekeepers are also often presumed to have a better chance of connecting with local populations. Furthermore, such affinity implies familiarity with the problems at hand, including root causes of conflict and essential actors – enabling conflict resolution – as well as a greater interest in resolving the conflict peacefully and swiftly.[18] Economic interdependence in the region is another factor producing the same results.[19]

Greater consensus
The common culture, homogeneity and similar political outlook found in some regional organisations may also advance consensus in decision making, making the authorisation of peace operations significantly easier than when done by the UNSC, where a single veto can block action. The inability of the UN to reach consensus around peace operations deployments is often cited as the main failure of the organisation. Hence, regional organisations are frequently argued to have a

[15] Griffin, M. 1999, p 22.
[16] United Nations. 1995.
[17] Bures, O. 2006, p. 92.
[18] Franke, B. 2006, 3; Bures, O. 2006, p 93.
[19] Bures, O. 2006, p. 92.

comparative advantage in that they have a smaller, if not necessarily more homogeneous, membership, thus making the chances of a regional veto smaller.[20] (An issue here is of course the differing views on whether UNSC authorisation is required for regional action).

Greater legitimacy
Regional organisations are also argued to feel greater 'ownership' over conflict resolution processes in their neighbourhood, which imparts a greater sense of legitimacy to actions taken by the organisation.[21] Similarly, due to affinity and perceived greater legitimacy, an intervention by a regional organisation may seem less intrusive than, for example, an operation including the former colonial power, and is thus less likely to meet resistance.[22]

2.2.2 Possible Challenges

Even though regionalisation of peace operations certainly has its advantages, several of the motives for regional peace operations remain contested. Both theory and practical experiences indicate unintended consequences of regionalisation. Among the primary disadvantages of regional peace operations are *lack of authoritative legitimacy*; *lack of impartiality*; *regional power dynamics*; *resource and capacity constraints*; *uneven coverage;* and *institutional weakening of the UN and its norms.*

Lack of authoritative legitimacy
Even though regional organisations may find it easier to reach consensus on potential peace operations, international law designates the UN as the sole authority on authorising such missions. The advantage that regional organisations may have by means of a more homogeneous membership is thus partly undone by the need to reach consensus in the UNSC to provide endorsement for the mission, as mentioned above. Even though regional peace operations are known to have been carried out without the consent of the UN, without much objection, the legitimacy of non-UN sanctioned missions can, and will, always be questioned.[23]

Lack of impartiality
In contrast to the argument that social, cultural and historical affinity, geographical proximity and economic and political interdependence generate trust and legitimacy, direct regional links to a conflict may result in perceived vested interests and partiality.[24] Neighbouring countries may be partial in a conflict, which risks having negative consequences on its resolution. It is often

[20] Diehl,P. 1993, p 4; Bures, O. 2006, p. 93-94; Encalde, L.E. 2008
[21] Bures, O. 2006, p. 92
[22] Griffin, M. 1999, p. 22; Bures, O. 2006, p. 92.
[23] Bures, O. 2006, pp. 92-97; Franke, B. 2006, 3.
[24] Franke, B. 2006, 2-3.

argued that an essential element of UN peace operations is its multi-regional composition, which results in UN peacekeepers being perceived as more neutral and trustworthy.[25]

Regional power dynamics

It has been argued that many regional peace operations have in fact been interventions by single states seeking to be viewed as legitimate under a cloak of regionalisation.[26] Several of Africa's regional organisations are dominated by a major regional power or hegemon. In each case, the dynamics of the particular organisation are heavily influenced by the presence of such a hegemon. Regional peace operations are unlikely to be authorised in conflicts that directly involve a major regional power. Similarly, since the regional hegemon is also most commonly the most militarily advanced member state, the regional organisation is usually dependent on it to provide resources to undertake a peace operation. For this reason, it has been argued that no regional organisation can mount "an operation opposed, or not actively supported, by the most powerful member(s)".[27]

Resource and capacity constraints

The general lack of resources and capacity constraints of regional organisations can be considered the largest impediment to regional peace operations.[28] Most regional organisations in Africa, including the AU, operate with relatively small budgets and lack the administrative, logistical and command-and-control structures to manage large peace operations.[29] Studies of the peace operations undertaken by the AU also show that these missions have been characterised by major ambitions, but deficient resources. Limited capacity to plan and manage operations, difficulty in generating troops and a lack of resources and logistical capacity to deploy and sustain deployment have had severe consequences on the effectiveness of most AU missions.[30]

Uneven coverage

A case against the regionalisation of peace operations is often made by highlighting that the global spread of regional organisations capable of engaging in peace operations is incomplete and highly uneven – many areas of the world lack effective regional structures for maintaining peace and security, including

[25],Heldt, B. 2014, p. 120.
[26] This has for example been argued with respect to the supposedly SADC interventions Operation Sovereign Legitimacy in the DRC and Operation Boleas in Lesotho. See for example Coleman, K.P. 2007.
[27] Bures, O. 2006, p. 96.
[28] Diehl, P. 1993, 6; Griffin, M. 1999, p. 22.
[29] Bures, O. 2006, p. 95.
[30] See for example, Hull, C & Svensson, E. 2008, chapter 5; Svensson, E. 2008 and Ekengaard, A. 2008.

Asia and the Americas.[31] Even inside Africa, the capacity of regional organisations to undertake peace operations varies greatly. The resource and capacity constraints described above are not evenly distributed across the continent. Some sub-regional organisations, in particular ECOWAS, have significantly more experience of conducting peace operations and some have managed to generate relatively stable support from international partners in building capacity to undertake such operations (e.g. the East African Standby Force, EASF). In this sense, there is a strong ethical argument against the regionalisation of peace operations: while the UN is a universal organisation whose services are intended to be available to all members, the regionalisation of peace operations suggests that member states should only receive the level of peace operations their own region can provide.[32]

Institutional weakening of the UN and its norms

Some arguments against the regionalisation of peace operations state that increased burden sharing risks marginalising the UN. This marginalisation may take several forms, including greater competition over funds and political support for peace operation; the withering of UNSC authority to authorise enforcement missions; and/or a growing tolerance of the peace operations concept being hijacked to legitimise external intervention with less altruistic motives.[33] Part of the fear of institutional weakening of the UN is that the UN's established principles, norms and standards for peace operations will be less strongly applied when regional organisations decide when a peace operation is appropriate. Allowing regional organisations to undertake politically driven interventions in the name of peace may risk withering the peace operations concept and blurring the line between aggressive and defensive action.[34] The motives of the actors that participate in peace operations are complex and often ambiguous, and are likely to have both national self-interest and humanitarian catalysts. For many regional organisations, the protection of state security remains a priority over supporting human security.[35] Regional operations may thus be undertaken with purposes not necessarily consistent with UN goals such as protection of civilians, for example a desire to boost sovereignty.[36]

[31] In Asia and Latin America, regional organisations are reported to have acted as norm builders in the field of peace and security rather than as peacekeepers. See Williams, P.D. 2005, p. 172.
[32] Williams, P.D. 2005, p. 174; Bures, O. 2006, p. 98.
[33] Osmançavuşoğlu, E. 1999.
[34] For example, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was termed peacekeeping by Russia, an argument not adhered to by the UNSC.
[35] Hentz, J.J., et al. 2009, p. 213.
[36] Ibid, pp. 211-213.

3 The Evolution of Regional Peace Operations in Africa

In the 1990s the predecessor to the AU, the OAU, decided to take on a more active role in peace and security in Africa, with the focus on the prevention and anticipation of conflicts.[37] While the OAU undertook a number of peace operations during this period, these were all small-scale missions of an observer type. A range of missions was carried out by other African actors during the 1990s, within the framework of a regional organisation, bilaterally or as a coalition of willing states (see Table 3 in Annex 1).

Among African actors conducting peace operations in Africa before the launch of the AU, the West African regional organisation ECOWAS was of particular importance. ECOWAS intervened in Liberia 1990-99 with its ECOMOG 1 force. As the UN launched its observer mission UNOMIL to Liberia in 1994 simultaneously with the ECOMOG presence, ECOMOG broke ground by becoming the first regional military force with which the UN deployed simultaneously.[38] Following this, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. In Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, the ECOWAS missions were re-hatted as UN missions. ECOWAS has in many ways set the precedent for the regionalisation of peace operations in Africa in the 21st century. By the time of establishment of the AU, ECOWAS was by far the most experienced organisation on the continent and the one with the most developed capacity to manage peace operations.

During the 1990s, the UN was the largest conductor of peace operations in Africa, but the latter part of that decade saw a rise in regional peace operations. This coincided with growing unwillingness by the UN and the international community to intervene actively in conflicts in Africa.[39] In the absence of UN peacekeeping forces or an effective response from the OAU, the task of addressing some of the most volatile wars in Africa fell to sub-regional organisations.[40]

The sub-regional engagements often differed greatly from peacekeeping as understood by the UN. Williams, for example, argues that they are better understood as "solidarity deployments": enforcement operations "designed to

[37] De Coning, C. 1996.
[38] Encalade, L.E. 2008, pp.39-40.
[39] This 'intervention fatigue' has been ascribed a consequence e.g. of the Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica 'failures of peacekeeping'; a new focus within the international community on developments in Asia and Eastern Europe; and a significant change in France's Africa Policy. See Meyer. A. 2011.
[40] Williams, P.D. 2005, p. 173.

help out friendly regimes which faced various insurgent forces."[41] The fact that most sub-regional missions were conducted with only a small number of member states contributing, and often one member state in a clearly driving role, also raised the question of whether these missions would not be better categorised as e.g. Nigerian, South African or Zimbabwean deployments, rather than those of a multilateral organisation.[42] For example, the SADC intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was mainly driven by the economic and geopolitical interests of the participating countries, while that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the same year was driven by the support of the participating countries for the incumbent government.[43]

During the 2000s, the UN has remained a major actor in peace operations. Since its establishment in 2002, the AU has also taken on an important role as a provider of peace operations. The creation of the AU opened up a new era of African-led peace operations on that continent.[44] The replacement of the OAU with the AU has considerably changed the political landscape in Africa and significantly increased the number of peace operations conducted at continent level. This is partly explained by the fact that the AU project opened the way for external military support, e.g. through bilateral 'train-and-equip' programmes, which significantly increased the ability of African states to field considerable numbers of peacekeepers to both UN and regional missions.[45] However, a majority of African peacekeepers are still deployed from less than 20 per cent of AU member states.[46] While some operations have taken place within a sub-regional context, the number of sub-regional missions has significantly decreased since the establishment of the AU, in comparison with the post-Cold War period.[47]

The peacekeeping landscape in Africa since the establishment of the AU has also been greatly influenced by two other factors: the increased presence of the EU in peace operations in Africa, including both deployed EU missions and EU financial support – through the African Peace Facility (APF) – of African-led operations; and a substantial increase in the number of UN peacekeeping missions in that continent.[48]

[41] Williams, P.D. 2014, p 68-69.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Tavares, R. 2011.
[44] Williams, P.D. 2014, p.10.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Boutellis, A & Williams, P.D. 2013, p. 10.
[47] Williams, P.D. 2014, p. 71.
[48] Ibid.

3.1 AU Missions 2002-2014

Since the creation of the AU in 2002 and its first peace operation in Burundi in 2003, the AU has deployed eleven peace operations within the African continent in addition to the UN/AU hybrid mission in Darfur. These range from observation missions to peace enforcement operations.

AU missions 2002-2014

Mission and duration	Funded by	Key TCCs	Type	Partner missions
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 2003-2004	TCCs+donors	South Africa	Peacebuilding	SAPSD (re-hatted from) ONUB (re-hatted to)
AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) 2004	TCCs	South Africa	Observation	
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 2004-2007	TCCs+EU+UN	Nigeria Rwanda South Africa Senegal Ghana	Peacekeeping, protection of civilians	EU Support to AMIS II UNAMID (re-hatted to) UNMIS (parallel)
Special Task Force Burundi 2006-2009	TCC	South Africa	VIP protection	ONUB
AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) 2006	TCC+EU	South Africa	Election monitoring	
UNAMID (AU/UN hybrid mission) 2007-	UN+AU+TCCs	Ethiopia Rwanda Tanzania South Africa Senegal Nigeria Burkina Faso	Peacekeeping, protection of civilians	AMIS (re-hatted from), UNMIS/UNMISS (parallel)
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 2007-	TCC+EU+UN +donors	Uganda Burundi Djibouti Kenya Ethiopia	Protection of government, counterinsurgency	EUTM Somalia (parallel)
AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros (MAES) 2007-2008	TCCs+EU+ Arab League	South Africa Tanzania	Election support	Operation Democracy (parallel)
Operation Democracy in the Comoros 2008	TCCs+ donors	Tanzania Sudan	Enforcement	MAES (parallel)
AU Regional Cooperation Initiative Against the Lord's Resistance Army (AU RCI-LRA) 2011-	TCC+AU+ EU+US	Uganda South Sudan DRC CAR	Collective Self Defence	MONUSCO UNMISS UNAMID (parallel)

African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) 2013	TCCs+AU+ donors	Nigeria Benin Togo Senegal Burkina Faso Chad Niger	Enforcement	Operation Serval (parallel) EUTM Mali (parallel) MINUSMA (re-hatted to)
African-led International Support Mission for the Central African Republic (MISCA) 2013-2014	TCCs+donors	Chad Republic of Congo Cameroon Gabon Rwanda Burundi	Enforcement	MICOPAX (re-hatted from) Operation Sangaris EUFOR CAR (parallel) MINUSCA (re-hatted to)

Table 1 Adapted from Boutellis & Williams. 2013, p. 11 and Williams. 2013.

AMIB, in Burundi, was the first peace operation deployed by the AU. Its mandate was originally focused on overseeing a ceasefire and supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former troops, but as the ceasefire did not hold the mission took on more of a stabilising role. Since the AU lacked the finances to support the mission, it was decided that the troop contributors would need to be self-sustaining. This was a pragmatic response to the limited resources of the AU, but resulted in a delay in full deployment of the mission, since some troop contributors could only be brought into the mission once the US and UK had offered financial support.[49] The mission managed to stabilise the situation in Burundi and was largely considered a success.[50] Nevertheless, the issue of lack of funding and resources for conducting AU missions, both at the AU institutional level and among troop contributors, has been a recurring theme in all subsequent AU deployments.[51]

The second major AU mission, **AMIS**, was launched to Sudan. Like AMIB, the original mandate of AMIS focused on ceasefire monitoring. The mission nevertheless came to be adapted to contribute to securing the delivery of humanitarian relief and to protecting civilians. A few years into the mission, it was replaced by a joint UN/AU mission, **UNAMID**. The establishment of the UN/AU hybrid was preceded by extraordinary cooperation between the two organisations, including joint technical missions to assess the situation on the ground, joint reports to the UNSC and AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and establishment of a UN assistance mission to the AU in Addis Ababa.[52] In the intervening period between the decision to launch UNAMID and its deployment, the UN also provided assistance packages to help AMIS with planning functions

[49] Svensson, E. 2008, p.13.
[50] Ibid, p.14.
[51] Ibid, p.13.
[52] Boutellis, A & Williams, P.D. 2013, p. 12.

and logistics, so as to enable the hybrid mission to absorb AMIS more easily upon its deployment.[53] The UN/AU hybrid was an improvisation born out of necessity and not necessarily what either organisation would have preferred. While UNAMID still operates, no other similar joint UN/AU mission has been launched and another hybrid seems unlikely to be established in the future.[54] The AMIS/UNAMID experience nevertheless started an unprecedented relationship between the UN and a regional organisation; a partnership that came to greatly influence the AU's expectations on the UN in its decision to launch the AU operation in Somalia.

In 2007, after several years of the international community discussing potential options for launching an operation to help support the transitional government in Somalia, the AU deployed **AMISOM** to Somalia. The mission's primary task was to assist the government in stabilising the country. The role of AMISOM has since come to focus on the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in a significantly volatile environment. Over the past few years, AMISOM has focused on defensive and offensive operations aimed at averting and defeating the Islamist group al-Shabaab.

AMISOM was deployed by the AU with the intention that the mission would only be a short-term deployment to be taken over by the UN within six months. However, since the UN did not, and still does not, regard the situation in Somalia as appropriate for a UN peacekeeping mission, AMISOM has remained deployed. Subsequently, during its first few years of existence the mission nevertheless remained too underfunded and under-resourced, with a troop strength significantly less than that authorised, to make much difference to the security situation in the country.

The lack of AU resources to beef up AMISOM and the unwillingness of the UN to launch a mission of its own has resulted in AMISOM generating a somewhat tense dynamic in the relationship between the UN and AU. When it first became evident that AMISOM would not be replaced by a UN mission, the AU stated, and has repeatedly reiterated, that the UN carried the ultimate responsibility for international peace and security and was therefore obliged to provide increased support to AMISOM. The AU argued that if the UN was not willing to undertake a peace operation in Somalia itself, it should enable AMISOM to carry out its tasks by providing the mission with funding and a range of other resources.[55] While the UNSC authorised AMISOM, it did not agree with the AU's argument that the UN had an obligation to sustain the mission.

Over the years, the UN and the AU have developed a very special partnership in Somalia, amongst the most notable aspects being the creation of a special UN

[53] Ibid.
[54] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[55] Hull, C & Svensson, E. 2008, p. 9.

office within AMISOM, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), in 2009, to provide a logistical support package to AMISOM similar to that supplied to the UN's own operations. The support package is funded using the UN assessed budget and an AMISOM trust fund.[56] The use of the UN's own resources for a regional operation has been controversial and the decision was only made after extensive debate in the UNSC.[57]

AMISOM today involves more institutional partnerships than any other peace operation in the post-Cold War era and is thus a very interesting case in the study of regionalisation of peace operations, particularly as regards the role of the UN in supporting such operations in Africa. There is nevertheless great disagreement between the AU and the UN on what precedent this partnership has set, the extent of which was revealed by expectations of the AU on the UN not being met in Mali or the Central African Republic (CAR) (see below). How the relationship between AMISOM and the UN peacebuilding presence in Somalia will develop in the future is of high interest when studying possibilities and limitations of regionalisation of peace operations in Africa.

In 2008, the AU launched **Operation Democracy**, an enforcement mission to restore state authority on all islands in the three island states of the Comoros. The operation followed a series of electoral monitoring types of missions to the Comoros: **MIOC**, **AMISEC** and **MAES**. Operation Democracy was considered a breakthrough for the AU, since it managed to avoid some of the major flaws of AMIS, namely an unachievable mandate and poor strategic planning. Operation Democracy is unique in that it shares few similarities with previous and subsequent AU engagements. Rather, the mission can be considered to have more in common with EU deployments in Africa, which have tended to be similar in terms of limited scope, set time and clear objectives.[58] Operation Democracy was able to deploy swiftly and with relatively little support from non-African partners in comparison with other AU missions. The operation was facilitated by the fact that the mandate was much narrower and the conflict environment far less complicated than e.g. Darfur and Somalia.[59] At the time of the operation, questions were raised as to whether the operation forecast the organisation's future ambitions, particularly given the challenges and overstretching the AU faced in Darfur and Somalia. It would take until 2011 for the AU to deploy a new mission again. The AU has not yet revised the concepts of either Operation Democracy or the electoral monitoring missions deployed to the Comoros. For this reason, the experiences gained from the Comoros missions have been less relevant for concurrent and subsequent operations, which have a significantly different scope.

[56] Fahlen, M. 2014.
[57] Hull Wiklund, 2013, p.28.
[58] Svensson, E. 2008.
[59] Ibid.

In 2011, the AU launched yet another new type of mission – a mission addressing a cross-border threat covering more than one country, the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (**AU RCI-LRA**), whose military arm is referred to as the AU Regional Task Force (AU RTF). The mission, which is focused on offensive military operations, is deployed in three countries – CAR, DRC and South Sudan – to counter cross-border threats from the Ugandan rebel group LRA. The troop contributors consist of a coalition of the willing comprising all LRA-affected states. For this reason, the mission could be seen as a collective self-defence operation rather than a peace operation. The decision to launch the mission as an AU peace operation facilitated coordination between the LRA-affected states, and opened the way for additional funding.[60]

Just like the LRA, the Nigerian terrorist-labelled group Boko Haram operates in several countries and is active in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad.[61] In the beginning of 2015 the AU PSC decided to authorise a 7,500 troop strong Multinational Joint Task Force (**MNJTF**) to counter the threat from Boko Haram.[62] While experience from AU RCI-LRA could feed into the regional strategy to counter Boko Haram, AMISOM may be more suitable as a model for the actual peace operation given the similarities in the type of warfare that Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab engage in.

While AMISOM has often come to form the basis of analysis of the status and nature of current AU operations, the two most recent AU missions – launched in 2012 and 2013 – also provide important perspectives on the dynamics and trends of AU peace operations.

In 2012, ECOWAS decided to launch a mission to Mali in order to ensure the territorial integrity of its member state and address the crisis in the country.[63] Both the AU and the UN supported the establishment of an ECOWAS operation.[64] However, difficulties in planning and launching the mission, alongside a need to rely on additional troops and resources from outside the ECOWAS region, eventually led to the establishment of an African-led operation, **AFISMA**.[65] Similarly to AMISOM, AFISMA had an offensive mandate to conduct stabilisation operations in support of the government to help neutralise the threat from armed Islamists and rebels and recapture areas of the country held by these.

[60] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[61] Ingerstad G. 2014a.
[62] AU
[63] In Mali, stability was threatened by three separate, yet interlinked, events: Touareg separatists launched a new rebellion in the north, the army took power and ousted the government in the capital Bamako, and armed Islamists took control of significant parts of northern Mali.
[64] Security Council Report. 2012.
[65] Théroux-Bénoni, L.A. 2014.

The AU and ECOWAS had initially advocated for AFISMA to be a short-term mission which could hopefully soon be replaced by a UN operation. Nevertheless, a UNSC decision to launch a UN mission to Mali before AFIMSA was fully operational caused some friction between the UN on the one hand and AU/ECOWAS on the other. The African stakeholders did not feel sufficiently consulted in the process leading up to the authorisation of the UN mission. In particular, the AU and ECOWAS were frustrated about the UN's unwillingness to provide logistical and financial support to AFISMA to facilitate upgrading of the standards of the mission in preparation for the re-hatting. Furthermore, the two organisations were disappointed with the discontinuity of AFISMA's leadership in the UN mission; the Nigerian force commander was replaced with a Rwandan and a non-African was appointed Head of Mission.[66]

In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, the President of ECOWAS and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security stated that the current 'division of labour' between the AU and UN might result in restricting the effectiveness of the African component of the UN mission and therefore did not sufficiently reflect the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage.[67] While AMISOM had established an unprecedented partnership between the AU and the UN, the AFISMA experience provided a backlash against the expectations that the AU had on the partnership.

MISCA was launched to the Central African Republic in late 2013. Like the most previous AU missions, MISCA had an enforcement mandate aimed at neutralising armed groups in the country and protecting civilians. MISCA was preceded by MICOPAX, a peace operation led by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established already in 2008. ECCAS handed over the responsibility for peacekeeping in CAR to the AU after the situation in the country significantly deteriorated in 2012 and a much larger force was required. Subsequently, the UN began investigating the option of transferring MISCA to a UN mission. The AU supported the idea in principle, but – building on the Mali experience – resisted granting an immediate authorisation of such a mission on the basis that MISCA should first be given time to manage the situation on its own.[68]

The AU soon came to agree to the establishment of a UN mission, on the condition that the UNSC acknowledged and continued to support the leading role of the region and the AU in the post-MISCA phase. Specifically, the AU requested the UN to learn from the experience of Mali and better coordinate with the AU on e.g. drafting the resolution establishing the UN mission. The AU also

[66] Security Council Report. 2013. The UNSC on its past noted how the request for ECOWAS and the AU to report every 60 days on the activities of AFISMA had not been respected.
[67] United Nations. 2013.
[68] Security Council Report. 2014.

requested to be consulted on the appointment of the leadership of the UN mission, recommending that the SRSG, force commander and police commissioner be Africans[69] – a request adhered to. A UN mission to CAR was authorised only months after the launch of MISCA. The process leading up to the establishment of the mission, and the re-hatting of MISCA troops to the UN Mission (MINUSCA) in September 2014, is largely considered to have mended at least some of the hard feelings towards the UN that had developed within the AU in relation to Mali.[70]

3.2 Sub-regional Missions since the Launch of the AU

Even though the AU has been the primary body carrying out peace operations in Africa in the past eleven years, African sub-regional organisations, now and then, continue to launch, or discuss a possible launch of, peace operations below the AU level. The role that the sub-regions have played is particularly relevant given the work towards operationalising the ASF, the five multinational regional brigades equipped and ready for rapid deployment on the African continent. The ASF is envisioned to be capable of conducting operations ranging from observation missions to peace enforcement assignments by the end of 2015.

Sub-regional peace operations in Africa 2002-2014

Mission	Organisation	Location	Duration	Size (approx. max)	Status
ECOFORCE/ECOMICI	ECOWAS	Côte d'Ivoire	2002-2004	c.1,500	UN authorised
FOMUC	CEMAC	CAR	2002-2008	380	UN 'recognised'
ECOMIL	ECOWAS	Liberia	2003	3,500	UN authorised
MICOPAX	ECCAS	CAR	2008-2013	2,000	UN 'recognised'
ECOMIB	ECOWAS	Guinea-Bissau	2012-	629	UN 'recognised'

Table 2 Adapted from Williams. 2013 and Bellamy & Williams. 2010b

As Table 2 shows, ECOWAS has continued to be the most active sub-regional organisation in African peace operations even after the establishment of the AU. Around the time the AU was established, ECOWAS was yet again carrying out missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. By the end of 2002, ECOWAS decided to deploy a force to Côte d'Ivoire as a rebellion broke out in the country. The operation **ECOFORCE** was soon transformed into an ECOWAS mission in Côte d'Ivoire (**ECOMICI**), mandated to facilitate the implementation of the

[69] Permanent Mission of the African Union to the United Nation. 2014.
[70] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

peace agreement signed by the rebels and the government.[71] In the beginning of 2004 the UN launched a peace operation and the ECOWAS mission was subsumed under the UNSC mandate.[72]

In 2003, ECOWAS sent a peacekeeping force to Liberia as the civil war intensified and reached the capital Monrovia. The ECOWAS mission in Liberia (**ECOMIL**) was re-hatted and integrated into the UN operation UNMIL later in the same year. ECOWAS acted as a vanguard force before the UN mobilised a broader mission with ECOWAS troops re-hatted into that UN operation. This formula of African regional organisations deploying to stabilise before the UN takes over was reproduced in Mali and CAR ten years later, then with the transfer of authority from the AU to the UN. Clearly, ECOWAS has in several ways set the precedent for regional peace operations in Africa.

In 2012, ECOWAS sent troops to Guinea-Bissau to secure the electoral process following the military coup in the same year, to support the reform of the country's armed forces and to replace Angolan forces that had been deployed there under the umbrella of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.[73] The decision to launch the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (**ECOMIB**) has been interpreted by some analysts as a Nigerian reaction to the presence of rival powers, in this case Angola, in its back yard.[74] Nigeria is the de facto strong power of ECOWAS, having taken a lead role in the establishment of all ECOWAS missions and contributed the bulk of its deployed troops.[75] The presence of Nigeria in ECOWAS has allowed the organisation to maintain a leading role in the management of peace and security in West Africa vis-à-vis the AU, whereby the AU is largely guided by ECOWAS on issues pertaining to West Africa. ECOWAS is thus a particularly strong actor in the African peace and security architecture and one of the sub-regional organisations most likely to be able to meet the 2015 ASF deadline for full operational capability of the regional brigades.[76]

Although with much more limited capabilities at hand, ECCAS, the central African counterpart to ECOWAS, has also played a role in regional peacekeeping in CAR through the operation **MICOPAX**, which in turn was the successor of **FOMUC**, an operation led by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) between 2002 and 2008. FOMUC was initially mandated to assure the security of the incumbent president Ange-Félix Patassé and to support the reconstruction of the security forces, a task in which it failed

[71] ROP, 2014a.
[72] ROP, 2014a.
[73] Ambrosetti, D & Esmenjaud, R. 2014.
[74] Ambrosetti, D & Esmenjaud, R. 2014.
[75] Elowson, C & MacDermott, J. 2010, p. 33, 45.
[76] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

as former chief of army staff Francois Bozizé took power by force in 2003.[77] The operational responsibilities were transferred to ECCAS in 2008 following the signing of a number of peace agreements between the rebel groups and the government.

By 2012 MICOPAX comprised almost 700 troops and police, and was mandated to protect civilians; secure the territory; contribute to the national reconciliation process; and facilitate political dialogue. However, the number of troops was insufficient to provide security in the vast country and its impact was limited.[78] With the rebel group Séléka taking power in 2013, ECCAS decided to strengthen MICOPAX with an additional 1,300 troops. Despite the increase in troop strength, the operation was understaffed and underfunded.[79] Furthermore, Chadian peacekeepers were accused of committing atrocities against civilians resulting in the withdrawal of the Chadian contingent.[80] Only when the AU took over the mission by the end of 2013, and with additional troop deployment from non-ECCAS countries such as Rwanda, could the peace operation contribute to stabilising the situation in the capital Bangui and protect at least some parts of the population.[81] This demonstrates that despite funding and logistical support from the EU and France over several years, ECCAS did not have the capabilities to undertake a peace operation on its own.

3.3 Regional Operations that Never Were

Another issue of importance to understanding the regionalisation of peace operations in Africa is the dynamics of proposed regional operations that were never realised, or occasions when regional organisations did not act.

When the crisis in **Libya** began in 2011, it was hoped that the AU would deal with it, but the organisation was paralysed and failed to decide on appropriate action as the situation deteriorated.[82] Internal divisions among AU member states, insufficient capacity to intervene (when consensus had been reached) and the lack of a strong sub-regional organisation in North Africa, with which the AU could have partnered, contributed to the marginalisation of the AU in the Libyan crisis.[83] Instead, the UNSC took the initiative by rapidly passing resolution 1970, allowing for military action. The AU felt bypassed by the international community which, according to the chairperson of the AU commission at the time, Jean Ping, totally ignored consulting the AU, thereby creating strong

[77] Ingerstad G. 2012a; ROP, 2014b.
[78] Ingerstad, G. 2014b, pp.32-33.
[79] Ibid, p.38.
[80] New York Times. 2014.
[81] Ingerstad, G. 2014b, p.50.
[82] Kasaija Apuuli, P. 2013.
[83] Ibid.

tensions between the two organisations.[84] The Libyan crisis demonstrates that AU action can be hindered by lack of consensus among member states, just as is the case in the UNSC at times.

As the security situation deteriorated in **South Sudan** in 2014, discussions arose on whether to launch a regional force with a more robust mandate to help the UN mission, UNMISS, which was already present in the country, manage the situation.[85] The AU subordinated the regional East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), of which South Sudan is a member state, to lead the conflict resolution process in South Sudan. As part of its mediatory role, IGAD sent a monitoring and verification mission to South Sudan. The organisation also decided to launch a deterrent force to provide protection to its forces and key installations. IGAD nevertheless lacks treaties and institutions of its own that determine how to deploy, manage and fund a peace operation.[86] Several major donors thus felt that if they, or the UN, needed to pay for and support such a force, it might as well be constituted within the framework of the UN mission.[87] As the mandate of UNMISS was strengthened by the UNSC to better meet the changed circumstances, it was therefore decided that both the monitors and the force protectors would be brought in under UN command.[88]

It was initially intended that IGAD would launch a mission in **Somalia**, **IGASOM**, which was established in 2005 and given a UNSC mandate in 2006. Capacity issues and disagreement as to whether the deployment should include the frontline states of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya delayed the deployment. Another issue was the reluctance of the UN to lift the 1992 arms embargo. As a decision to exclude those states was eventually taken, the need to draw troops from a wider range of member states led to an AU mission being favoured, leading to the establishment of AMISOM.[89]

In 2012, the **DRC** faced a new rebellion by the M23 in eastern parts of the country. The regional African organisation International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), with a history of engaging in the DRC conflict, launched the idea of designing a neutral international military force to fight and eradicate the M23 and other negative forces in eastern DRC. The initiative was supported by ICGLR member states Rwanda and Uganda, but the DRC government was sceptical and preferred that such a mission be launched by the southern African regional organisation SADC.[90] The history of unauthorised Rwandan and Ugandan military interventions in eastern DRC was probably behind the

[84] Ibid, p.127.
[85] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[86] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[87] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[88] Whats In Blue. 2014.
[89] Hull, C & Svensson, E. (2008).
[90] Lamont, C & Skeppström, E. 2013, p. 9.

reluctance of the government to allow its neighbours' troops onto its territory. SADC member states Tanzania and South Africa also responded favourably to the proposal put forward by the ICGLR and offered to contribute troops and logistical support to such a mission. In late 2012, SADC nevertheless decided to deploy its Standby Force rather than to operate in partnership with the ICGLR. This was allegedly done to reduce Rwandan and Ugandan influence over such a force.[91] However, questions of who should pay for a regional operation and concerns about coordinating it with the existing UN operation MONUSCO resulted in the force ending up being constituted within the UN framework.[92] The UNSC authorised the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), consisting of 3,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, within MONUSCO.[93] The FIB has an explicit offensive mandate, including the right to neutralise armed groups, the first of its kind in the history of the UN.[94]

Although ECOWAS has had long experience of peace operations in West Africa, the organisation's decision to deploy a stabilisation mission to **Mali** in 2012 never went beyond the planning phase.[95] Three main obstacles halted the deployment of the envisaged ECOWAS operation **MICEMA**. First of all, the junta that had taken power was hostile to any military deployment in Bamako and ECOWAS had as its main focus for Mali to return to constitutional order. Second, there was no consensus within ECOWAS or any agreement between ECOWAS and two non-ECOWAS members central in finding a solution to the crisis, namely Algeria and Mauritania. Finally, in the absence of international support the mission was obstructed by logistical and financial constraints.[96]

[91] Ibid, p. 10.
[92] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[93] United Nations. 2013b.
[94] Lamont, C & Skeppström, E. 2013, p. 9.
[95] Théroux-Bénoni, L.A. 2014.
[96] Ibid.

4 Advantages and Challenges to Regionalisation

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight and analyse the pros and cons relating to conducting peace operations in a regional context. The point of departure is the overview of possible advantages and challenges presented in Chapter 2. The aim is to assess the empirical validity of these theoretical arguments. Based on the analysis of African peace operations provided in Chapter 3, evidence that validates or contradicts the theoretical arguments from previous research is presented. Some of the cases from Chapter 3 serve to exemplify experienced advantages and challenges in regionalisation of peace operations in Africa. However, it was beyond the scope of the study to provide a full assessment of advantages and challenges in all cases cited in Chapter 3.

4.1 Advantages Experienced

The theoretical advantages to regional peace operations found in previous research, and outlined in Chapter 2, were *burden sharing* and the comparative advantage that regional organisations have over the UN, including *geographical proximity*; *cultural affinity*; *greater consensus*; and *greater legitimacy*.

Burden sharing
Looking at the context and experiences of the missions carried out by the AU and the sub-regional organisations, burden sharing certainly seems to be both a great driver and major advantage of regional peace operations.

The UN is currently running sixteen peacekeeping operations, comprising 98,755 uniformed personnel at a cost of 7.83 billion USD annually.[97] When faced with the recent deterioration in the security situation in South Sudan, the demand for additional peacekeepers clashed with UNSC reluctance to increase the UN's peacekeeping budget. The peacekeepers required were therefore transferred from other UN missions in Africa instead. Similarly, before authorising the new UN mission to CAR in 2014, the economic burden of adding yet another mission was thoroughly debated in the UNSC.[98] The deployment of African-led operations to Mali and CAR in 2013 demonstrates how the AU is increasingly contributing to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, sharing the burden of responsibilities for peacekeeping with the UN.

The prime example of an African mission established to share the burden of the UN's peacekeeping responsibilities is the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM. Peacekeeping failures in Somalia by the UN and other countries in the 1990s had

[97] United Nations, 2014.
[98] Security Council Report. 2014.

made the international community highly reluctant to engage in the armed conflict in Somalia. When the transitional government of Somalia requested the deployment of a multinational peacemaking force, a regional peace operation was thus the only option. Furthermore, the AMISOM experience revealed a fundamental difference between the AU and UN in their view of the basic role, purpose and potential of peace operations, and in their willingness to accept risk and casualties.[99] In the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and thus 'a peace to keep', the UN did not consider a UN peace operation deployment viable. AMISOM, on the other hand, has been able to significantly contribute to stabilising Somalia. The recent establishment of a broader international presence in Mogadishu, including a UN political mission, an EU training mission of Somalia's security forces and several diplomatic missions, would probably not have been possible without the security provided by AMISOM.

Greater consensus

As the UN is still not willing to transfer AMISOM into a UN mission, the regionalisation of peacekeeping in Somalia is as much a consequence of lack of other options today as it was in 2004. This applies not only to burden sharing, but also to the principle of greater consensus. While the UNSC was unable to generate support for a UN intervention in Somalia, the AU PSC found agreement on such action. However, the Libyan case, described in the previous chapter, demonstrates how the opposite could also be true. The strong influence of the Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi paralysed the AU PSC.[100] In the latter case, the UNSC managed to reach consensus, while the AU failed to come to an agreement on how to act.

The suggestion put forward by the ICGLR and SADC that a more offensive force be launched to eastern DRC was also made in a context where it was not clear that the UN, due to its peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, could in fact even mount such an intervention within the context of the UN mission present in the country. Had the members of the UNSC not been able to find consensus on deploying such a force, a regional brigade might have been the only viable option to fight the hostile forces, including the M23.

Similarly, the AU mission to Burundi was launched to help monitor compliance with a ceasefire agreement. The mission followed on a South African deployment which had been launched partly due to the fact that the UN, blocked by several members of the Security Council, had signalled that it would not provide military assistance to Burundi. The South African mission was launched without UNSC authorisation, but was endorsed by the UNSC only days after its deployment, signalling potential gratitude for helping the UN deflect criticism

[99] Hull, C & Svensson, E. 2008, p. 9.
[100] Kasaija Apuuli, P. 2013.

that it was ignoring the Burundian conflict.[101] As AMIB was launched, the South African troops already in Burundi were integrated into the AU mission alongside newly incoming South African forces and troops from Ethiopia and Mozambique. The ceasefire did not hold and AMIB got caught up in the civil war. The mission nevertheless managed to help stabilise the situation sufficiently for the UN to feel comfortable enough to deploy the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in mid-2004, to which the AU troops were subsequently re-hatted.[102]

Greater legitimacy and cultural affinity

With the AU mission to Sudan, AMIS, the government of Sudan had strictly opposed any deployment which did not have a predominantly African character. As such, a regional operation was the only viable option. As the UN pushed for the deployment of a UN mission, the establishment of a hybrid AU-UN force (UNAMID) to replace AMIS was the only means of establishing a more robust international presence in Darfur. AMIS and UNAMID are thus examples of the comparative advantage of regional peacekeeping that comes from a perceived legitimacy of providing African solutions to African problems, and from a perception of trust as a result of supposedly culturally affinitive peacekeepers. However, geographical proximity and deployment of troops from neighbouring states do not necessarily mean that those troops are perceived as legitimate. In fact the reverse is often the case, as discussed further in the next section.

Geographical proximity

As regards the comparative advantage of geographical proximity in facilitating both swift deployment and a better understanding of the conflict, thus enabling more positive outcomes, several of the AU missions provide such examples. Many of the missions, including but not limited to AMIB in Burundi, Operation Democracy in the Comoros and the AU mission MISCA in CAR, have occurred in a context of previous African engagements. This has facilitated swift deployment of the AU mission either by re-hatting previous bilateral or sub-regional missions or because a strong and active member state has been previously engaged in e.g. conflict resolution or mediation processes in the host state and has thus considered itself a natural troop contributor. The latter has nevertheless only resulted in swift deployment in those instances where the interested member state has had the material and financial resources for deployment (more on this in the following section). In the case of MISCA, international interest in engaging in CAR was initially very low. The previous presence of a sub-regional force, MICOPAX, which was re-hatted to an AU mission, was therefore a crucial component in order to deploy any troops at all to intervene in the conflict.

[101] Bellamy, A & Williams P.D.2005, p. 190.
[102] Svensson, E. 2008, p.14.

4.2 Challenges Experienced

The theoretical disadvantages to conducting peace operations in a regional context previously presented included *lack of authoritative legitimacy*; *lack of impartiality*; *regional power dynamics*; *resource and capacity constraints*; *uneven coverage*; and the *institutional weakening of the UN and its norms.*

Lack of authoritative legitimacy
As regards lack of authoritative legitimacy, the AU and sub-regional organisations are formally bound by the UN Charter to require authorisation from the UNSC to legally launch any peace operation. Four of the AU's missions have received authorisation by the UNSC: MISCA, AFISMA, AMISOM and the UN/AU hybrid UNAMID. Five missions – the four relating to AU engagement on the Comoros Islands and the Special task Force to Burundi – have been undertaken without the consent of the UNSC. The AU RTF does not operate under a UNSC mandate, but was endorsed by the UNSC in 2012 as a result of a collaborative approach that included joint UN-AU assessment missions.[103] However, since the operation consists of a coalition of the willing comprising all affected states, the mission falls under the category of collective self-defence, rather than a peace operation, and thus does not require a UNSC mandate from a legal point of view.

AMIS in Sudan and AMIB in Burundi have received post-deployment endorsement from the UN, but never formal authorisation. African regional organisations have acted without a UNSC mandate but are not unique; there are several non-African examples of regional organisations or coalitions of the willing deploying formally 'illegal' operations, without significant repercussions.[104] While the AU and several of the sub-regional organisations have stated a preference for conducting missions with a UNSC mandate, they have also clearly indicated that they do not see themselves bound by the necessity to obtain UNSC authorisation.[105] Continued action without the consent of the UNSC may risk reducing the importance and authority of the international body. However, most recent African missions have been reliant on institutional support from the UN to the degree that any major mission seems unlikely to be launched without overall consensus between the AU and the UN on the appropriateness of the mission. Nevertheless, there is a risk of weakening of UN norms for peace operations, as demonstrated below.

Regional power dynamics
While the launch of an African mission was the only way of deploying a peace operation to Darfur, the AMIS experience also came to suffer from a major

[103] Boutellis, A & Williams. P.D. 2013, p. 2-3; United Nations. 2012.
[104] NATO in Serbia, the US-led coalition of the willing in Iraq.
[105] Lamont, C. 2012.

disadvantage with being a regional operation: the risk of being hijacked by regional power dynamics. The Sudanese government had been hesitant to accept not only a non-African peace operation, but any operation at all on Sudanese soil. It thus came to accept the deployment of AMIS only with great restrictions on the mission. As one of the most powerful members of the AU and, at the time, a member of the AU PSC, Sudan exerted great influence over the drafting of the terms of AMIS and over how AU reports on the situation in Darfur were formulated.[106] As a result of this, AMIS was not sufficiently robust and resourced to cope with the severe security conditions it faced.

The process of launching a regional operation to Somalia was severely delayed by disagreement over the appropriateness of allowing neighbouring states with a vested interest in the conflict to contribute troops. The transitional government of Somalia had requested deployment of a multinational peacemaking force already in 2004, three years before the launch of AMISOM. As previously mentioned, IGAD planned to launch a mission, IGASOM, but capacity constraints and disagreement as to whether the deployment should include the frontline states of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya delayed matters. The transitional president favoured the inclusion of those states due to their geographical and political proximity to the conflict. The inclusion of the frontline states was nevertheless controversial and was heavily criticised by the domestic opposition, which regarded them as partial to the conflict.[107]

Weakening of UN norms and lack of impartiality

By the time AMISOM was eventually deployed, the situation in Somalia had significantly worsened and Ethiopia had been asked by the Somali transitional government to establish a presence to help combat the deterioration. Eventually, AMISOM also came to work alongside bilateral deployments by both Ethiopia and Kenya, whose operations had a significant effect on the stabilisation of Somalia in 2011/12. The troops from both Kenya and Ethiopia were eventually incorporated into AMISOM in 2012 and 2014, respectively, but are reported to still largely act autonomously. The AMISOM experience provides an example of how UN norms and principles for peace operations may be weakened by regionalisation of peace operations. Such operations not only pose a potential challenge to the principle of impartiality, but may also blur the lines between aggressive and defensive action. Analysis of the Kenyan contribution to AMISOM indicates that the decision to incorporate the Kenyan forces inside Somalia into AMISOM was made to ensure that Kenya could maintain a military presence, reflecting national interest, in Somalia, while at the same time externalising funding for such a mission.[108]

[106] Chaizy, G. 2011, pp. 33-34.
[107] Hull, C. & Svensson, E. 2008.
[108] Ambrosetti, D & Esmenjaud, R. 2014.

Using the example of Chadian troops in the ECCAS operation in CAR, the same analysts argue that participation in a peace operation has often been used to obtain funding and legitimacy for action already undertaken in a given country.[109] While any peace operations deployment is driven by a national interest determining such a contribution to be worthwhile, these examples are inherently problematic, since the troop-contributing country is a party to the conflict. The Chadian troops in CAR were never considered neutral. When the AU operation MISCA took over from MICOPAX in 2013, the bulk of the mission was re-hatted from the previous deployment. As such, the AU mission inherited a neutrality problem and lacked legitimacy among the population.[110] Hence, MISCA also provides an example of weakening of UN principles for peace operations, as well as lack of impartiality.

The challenge to regional operations posed by regional power dynamics, the interests of troop contributors and the historical relationship between troop contributors and host governments is also made evident by the AU RTF in a number of ways. For example, the DRC government has accused Ugandan troops participating in the mission of exploiting natural resources in the DRC and has thus been reluctant to let the Ugandan army operate on Congolese territory.[111] There are many such examples of how regional peace operations have allowed neighbouring countries to "keep a foot in the door to preserve their own interests and spheres of influence",[112] exposing a neutrality problem in the regionalisation of peace operations which may contribute to the weakening of UN norms of impartiality.

Resource and capacity constraints

The greatest challenge to conducting peace operations in a regional context in Africa nonetheless seems to be the resource and capacity constraints of African organisations and their member states. As briefly mentioned in the previous section, a general lack of capacity among African troop-contributing states (to both AU and sub-regional missions) to deploy and sustain its forces has often neutralised African advantages such as greater consensus and geographical proximity.

Even though the stabilisation of Burundi resulted in AMIB being labelled a success, AMIB faced severe challenges, particularly due to lack of funding and logistics, which resulted in failure of the mission e.g. to deliver on its DDR[113] mandate. Assistance from international donors, including ground transport and tactical air mobility, was necessary to keep AMIS mobile throughout the lifespan of the mission. In June 2005, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

[109] Ibid, pp. 81-82.
[110] Ingerstad, G. 2014b, p. 45.
[111] Ingerstad, G. 2012b, pp. 26-28.
[112] Vorrath, J. 2014, p. 151.
[113] Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

decided to launch its first operation on African soil: an operation to airlift AU troops into Sudan. The operation also included training and mentoring of AU officers and lasted until AMIS closed down.[114] Moreover, the financial situation of AMIS was so acute that the mission could not have been realised without support from the outside world. Financial support came mostly from the EU[115] and from EU member states bilaterally.[116] Of the envisaged 5,000 troops committed to the AU RTF, only 2,147 had been deployed as of May 2014, more than two years into the mission, and the operation still suffered from logistical constraints and lack of equipment.[117]

The AMISOM mission to Somalia was originally intended to be a short-term, intermediate mission pending a handover of responsibility for conducting peace operations in Somalia to the UN within six months, a view clearly expressed in the AU PSC resolution establishing the mission.[118] When this did not happen, the AU proved to lack the resources and capacity to appropriately sustain the mission. The size and scope of AMISOM did not match the situation on the ground. Because the AU lacked resources, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) were expected to be financially and logistically self-sustaining. Given the limited resources of the prospective TCCs, force generation to AMISOM proved an absolute failure for several years; two years into the mission's deployment, the force strength was not yet half the authorised number. Only those TCCs which could secure assistance from external partners, including airlifts, equipment, logistics support and sustenance, could in fact deploy.[119]

As the AU's largest and most complex operation, AMISOM has starkly exposed the limits of AU material, financial and bureaucratic capabilities to manage peace operations.[120] As years went by, the AU was able to find partners, such as the UN, EU and individual countries, to help build an extensive international support structure to sustain AMISOM. The AU's dependency on external support to manage operations is nevertheless symptomatic of a general challenge to the regionalisation of peacekeeping in Africa.

The deployment of AFISMA to Mali would require the same support from partners and donors as previous AU missions. The mission was initially planned with a late launch date that would allow the AU and TCCs to seek out partners.[121] A change in the strategic situation nevertheless prompted an

[114] Ekengard, A. 2008, pp. 22-23.
[115] The EU covered most of AMIS's costs at a sum of 300 million Euro, taken partly from the EU program *African Peace Facility* which had been established in 2004 as a mechanism to support peace operations led, operated and staffed by African countries on the African continent
[116] Ekengard, A. 2008, pp. 36
[117] United Nations. 2014b.
[118] African Union. 2007 ; Ekengard, A. 2008, p. 43.
[119] Hull Wiklund, C. 2013.
[120] Fahlen, M. 2014.
[121] Boutellis, A & Williams, P.D. 2013, pp. 12-13.

acceleration of the timetable. Rather than providing the support needed to fully deploy and sustain AFISMA, the UN decided to launch its own mission, believing that a UN mission would be more predictably funded and sustainably resourced, and could thus better meet Mali's need for a peace operation than AFISMA.[122]

Like previous AU missions, MISCA to CAR required great support from outside partners, including strategic airlifts, in order to deploy. Similarly to AFISMA in Mali, the AU requested that the UNSC authorise a logistical support package to enable MISCA to effectively carry out its mandate. The request was not granted.[123] As MISCA was unable to provide the kind of peace operation necessary in CAR, pressure from a number of actors was put on the UNSC to launch a UN mission to replace MISCA in order to address the complexity of the conflict.

Uneven coverage

The argument of uneven coverage is also applicable to African peacekeeping. The capabilities of the five regions that form part of APSA to conduct regional peacekeeping are disproportionally distributed. Furthermore, practical experience demonstrates that the regional organisations are willing to intervene in their own region, but not beyond. As a consequence, the potential for launching regional missions to address conflict and instability in Africa is greatly dependent on where on the continent they occur.

The relative strength of the regional organisations in the different regions also affects how situations are addressed. One example of this is the conflict in Mali, in which ECOWAS came to be a major stakeholder. Given its geographical location right between eastern and northern Africa, the situation in Mali also came to greatly affect its neighbours, Algeria and Mauretania, which are not members of ECOWAS. There was not much consensus between northern and western Africa on how to deal with the issue and the absence of a strong regional organisation in northern Africa to play a counterpart to ECOWAS is reported to have hampered the prospects of reaching a cross-regional solution.[124] The transformation of the suggested ECOWAS operation into a joint African-led mission was motivated by economic factors, but also an attempt to reframe the solution within a broader APSA context, with the AU acting as a coordinator of all core countries.[125] Théroux-Bénoni argues that the Mali crisis casts doubts on the theoretical discourse of the advantages of regionalisation, providing evidence to reject the argument that regional actors are better positioned to react to crises in their backyards.[126] Nevertheless, the ECOWAS engagement contributed to the

[122] Security Council Report. 2013b; Security Council Report. 2013c.
[123] Secruity Council Report. 2014b.
[124] Théroux-Bénoni, L.A. 2014, p. 174; Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[125] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[126] Théroux-Bénoni, L.A. 2014, p. 174; Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

eventual return to constitutional order, advanced mediation efforts and laid the ground for subsequent initiatives, thus proving the overall value of a regional effort.[127]

4.3 Summary

In sum, practical experiences seem to strongly support regionalisation as an important tool for *sharing the burden* of conducting peace operations, as well as providing an opportunity to find organisational *consensus* for conducting some types of missions for which the UN, for example, might find difficult to muster support amongst its leading member states. Nevertheless, the Libyan case demonstrates that in certain cases, the UNSC may be better situated to reach political consensus on how and when to act.

There seems to be some support for the argument that regional operations may be considered more *legitimate*, at least by the host government. However, as the Sudan experience indicates, the legitimacy argument risks being hijacked by leaders who would simply prefer a weaker, and possibly more biased, deployment than a neutral and robust international presence.

Furthermore, while many African operations have been able to deploy swiftly due to *geographical proximity* enabling easier logistics, the argument that regional solutions enable rapid deployment seems to be misguided. In fact, many if not most AU and sub-regional operations have been slow to deploy, due to factors related to *resource and capacity constraints*. In those instances where deployment has occurred swiftly, rapid deployment is almost exclusively a result of the fact that the troop contributor already has a formal or informal military presence in the host nation. In many cases, this presence indicates an involvement in the given conflict, which may be considered unhealthy for the overall peace process.

There certainly seems to be a number of observable cases where regional peacekeeping has suffered from a *lack of impartiality*, being subject instead to *regional power dynamics*. UN missions may suffer from similar problems, not least because all recent UN missions have been built on regional deployments and the regional troop contributors often remain within the mission. However, regional operations, for better and worse, also provide greater strategic and political influence to neighbouring countries, which may exacerbate neutrality problems as they occur. The *uneven coverage* of regional actors able to undertake peace operations across Africa also makes regional operations particularly vulnerable to regional power dynamics.

[127] Ibid.

While it has been argued that regional operations are more *legitimate* because they are perceived as less intrusive, in fact the lack of impartiality experienced often seems to have reduced legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The lack of impartiality in regional peace operations also risks contributing to the *institutional weakening of UN norms*. Although most regional peace operations in Africa are recognised or endorsed by the UNSC, there is a potential risk that UN principles for peace operations are weakened with the lack of impartiality of troop-contributing countries.

As regards the argument that *cultural affinity* and *geographical proximity* place regional organisations in a better position to understand the root causes of conflict, and therefore enable the formulation of more appropriate conflict resolution strategies, it is difficult to find any specific examples to either confirm or deny such a view. While such a correlation might exist, i.e. an early understanding of root causes resulting from geographical proximity and cultural affinity could allow proactive and pre-emptive action, this may be more easily displayed in the field of mediation and diplomacy – which is not explored in this report.[128] Secondly, even if able to formulate such strategies, the lack of resources mentioned above may have prevented regional organisations from appropriately acting upon these.

[128] Noted scholar Alex de Waal has for example argued that the AU's more diplomatic approach to the conflict in Libya (whereby the AU sought to convince the Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi to step down by use of soft power or diplomacy rather than enforcing regime change through military intervention, as was made by NATO with approval from the UNSC) might have avoided some of the problems that emerged during and after the regime transition. De Waal, A. 2012b.

5 Trends and Implications

Based on the research presented in the previous chapters, a number of trends can be identified as regards the practical reality of regional peace operations in Africa today. This chapter seeks to highlight and analyse these trends and assess their implications for peace operations in Africa.

5.1 Division of Labour

The most notable trend in recent peace operations in Africa is a division of labour. Regional organisations conduct initial enforcement and stabilisation, sometimes simultaneously with UN political missions and/or humanitarian relief, before handing over to a broader UN peace operation as the security situation in the host nation improves. A division of labour thus seems to have arisen with regional organisations focusing on initial military stabilisation missions, while the UN mainly engages in multidimensional peace operations once the situation has stabilised.

The logic behind such a division is in part based on peacekeeping doctrine and in part on capacity. The UN has as a principle refused to deploy peacekeepers until after a peace agreement has been signed,[129] making regional peace operations the only realistic option until a sufficient degree of stabilisation has been achieved. In contrast to the UN, the AU has argued instead for the need to address conflict at all stages, including using the peace operations tool as "an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it".[130] While the UN traditionally does not engage in offensive operations, the AU has argued that facing these types of risks is necessary to implement its policy of non-indifference and to help stabilise fragile environments as a first step to long-term peace and to pave the way for UN deployment. The AU approach to peace operations is evidently less risk-averse than the UN approach, as exemplified for example by the AU's ability to tolerate the exceptionally high rates of casualties experienced by AMISOM.[131]

[129] UN peacekeeping is by tradition based on three pillars: impartiality; consent (of the parties, particularly the host government); and minimum use of force (non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate). This can be translated into the UN policy of intervening only in situations where there is a peace to keep, leaving interventions in the absence of a peace agreement to other organisations. While these pillars continue to form the basis of UN peacekeeping there are recent examples of UN missions that have forgone these, in particular MINUSMA, the UN mission in Mali, which operates in an hostile environment lacking a peace agreement and does so in support of one side of the conflict (the Malian government). The Force Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO is another case in point.

[130] African Union. 2012, p. 19.

[131] Ibid, p. 34.

The willingness to hand over to the UN has been founded on an understanding of the organisation's comparative advantage in sustaining long-term peace and state building, for which the AU and the sub-regions lack both the resources and experience. This division of labour, particularly as regards the relationship between the AU and UN, has worked well over several missions. However, tensions arise as the AU aims to develop a multifunctional capability while the UN prefers a status quo. An enhanced multifunctional capacity of the AU and the sub-regional organisations could be a positive development in view of the demand for strengthened African ownership. On the other hand, it might lead to an institutional weakening of the UN and its norms, since the autonomy of the AU to act on its own would increase, which the UN obviously would not support.

The recent experiences of AFISMA and MISCA have shown greater reluctance by the AU to swiftly hand over to the UN. Any desire to expand beyond the stabilisation role into a more multidimensional approach would most likely be constrained by a lack of economic resources, even if the African organisations were to develop the necessary skills, know-how and capacity to carry out such missions.

Developing civilian capabilities to manage a broader spectrum of operations is on the current agenda of the AU and many of the sub-regional organisations. While multidimensional capacities have long been neglected in the development of the regional brigades, and are still are far less developed than the military tool, the conceptualisation of the ASF and its doctrine has been premised on the need for multidimensional peace operations. Given the division of labour that has guided almost all AU operations to date, the role of civilian and police capacities in APSA operations can be questioned. In fact, the issue has been raised of whether support to help the AU build such capacities merely serves to duplicate the role played by the UN and others. If that is in fact the case, perhaps the AU should invest only in developing military peace operations capacity, or at least consider in what multidimensional areas it might be able to develop a comparative advantage in relation to other organisations.[132]

From the AU's side, it is generally argued that there is still a need to develop multidimensional competence. However, this has been met by resistance from other organisations, e.g. the UN's attempt to block the development of a civilian component of AMISOM.[133] Generally, this is a consequence of different views of what the division of labour actually means, with the AU arguing that the UN position on Somalia leaves the UN with all the "good" bits and the African partners with only the dirty work.[134]

[132] The Future of African Peace Operations Seminar. 2014.
[133] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[134] Ibid.

5.2 Partisan Troop Contributors

As made evident in Chapter 4, a lack of impartiality and the risk of being subjected to regional power dynamics has been one of the major challenges to African regional peace operations. While this is to some degree a general problem in peace operations, the involvement of partisan troop contributors in regional operations in Africa can be considered a particular trend given the broad acceptance of this as a necessary fact by nearly all the individuals interviewed for this study. In fact, pragmatism founded on the realisation that it is difficult to muster sufficient interest among troop-contributing countries to engage in a conflict where they do not have a direct national interest has led to the view that the negative effects of involvement of partisan actors need to be weighed against the consequence of not deploying at all.

While a founding idea of APSA and ASF was that regional brigades would, e.g. for neutrality reasons, primarily be applied outside their own region, the approach today is largely the opposite.[135] While the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs does not prohibit the RECs to act in their own region, it stipulates that the RECs may need to make their brigades available for deployment for an operation outside their jurisdiction upon a decision by the AU PSC.[136] Nevertheless, most AU missions to date, and certainly the sub-regional missions, have been made up of troop contributors with a great stake in the conflict.[137] Proximity to the conflict, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, is a possible advantage of regional peacekeeping, e.g. since risk of spill-over of the conflict may lead to greater consensus to intervene and swifter decision making and action. The experience nevertheless shows that those African missions which have been able to become operational swiftly have been facilitated by the main troop contributors already having a partisan military role in the given conflict. While the argument that partisanship might be necessary in order to launch any mission at all is valid, there is a great difference between having a mission set up and having it achieve its objectives. Partisanship might have a negative effect on the impartiality and legitimacy of the operation, which may also have negative consequences for conflict resolution in the long-term.

It would nevertheless be wrong to argue that contributions to African peace operations are solely made by partisan actors. Burundi's participation in AMISOM, over a great number of years and with significant human losses among the Burundian contingent, is a case in point. While self-interest is a

[135] Williams, P.D. 2011, p. 10; Interview Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[136] Akokpari, J. & Ancas, S. 2014, pp. 77-78.
[137] Respondents from within the AU have argued that this is in fact a major challenge of the ASF concept and why the AU has not been able to describe any of its more recent missions as an ASF deployment. Interview Addis Ababa, September 2014.

natural driver in the willingness to contribute to peace operations, Burundi's participation has been reported to be driven by other interests disconnected from a stake in the conflict in Somalia, such as financial opportunities.[138] A primary reason for the general partisanship in African operations is the lack of incentives to attract non-partisan troop contributors. Since the AU has no funds to reimburse troop contributors, which the UN does, e.g. economic drivers are rare.[139] In fact, without external support, participating in regional missions would even be such a highly costly affair that some troop contributors might not be able to afford it. Short of strong financial incentives, the pragmatic approach of generating troops amongst the most affected states may facilitate deployment.

5.3 Re-hatting

The regionalisation of peace operations in Africa has also led to the trend of 're-hatting', meaning that while most African missions have sooner or later been replaced by a UN mission, the bulk of troops have remained the same, with the shift of command indicated by these troops literally re-hatting, i.e. replacing their green AU berets or helmets with UN blue. There are also examples of troops being re-hatted from a sub-regional mission to one led by the AU.

While the dominance of the concept of re-hatting in the discourse of regionalisation could be interpreted as a preference for a peace operation to be conducted under UN rather than AU command when such an operation is possible, the trend of re-hatting also indicates the stance of the AU and RECs in relation to the UN. Even though the UN remains the dominant peacekeeper in Africa, in terms of peacekeepers deployed most of the new UN operations established on the continent since 2003 have been launched with an African regional peace operation already present in the mission area.[140] In those instances, the initial core of the mission consisted of African troops re-hatted from a regional mission into a UN operation.[141] Hence, the trend that most

[138] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

[139] Other incentives for contributing to peace operations reported by scholars include boosting sovereignty; diplomatic approval from Western states; deterring criticism of internal policies from regional or international partners; rehabilitating damaged reputations; and gaining foreign aid, arms transfers or trade relations (Beswick, D. 2010; Victor, J. 2010, p. 219).

[140] The exceptions are MINURCAT in Chad established in 2007 and UNMIS in Sudan, launched in 2005. The UN Missions UNMISS, launched in 2011, and MONUSCO, launched in 2010, were formed out of previous UN missions rather than regional deployments but were thus not 'new' missions as such. Similarly, UNISFA in Abyei, established in 2011, came about to address conflict in a geographical area which had previously been covered by UNMIS, but no longer fell under the full jurisdiction of the UN as the independence of South Sudan from Sudan resulted in the transformation of UNMIS to UNMISS.

[141] This was the case with UNMIL preceded by ECOMIL, UNOCI preceded by ECOMICI, UNAMID preceded by AMIS, MINUSMA preceded by AFISMA, and MINUSCA preceded by MISCA.

regional missions are re-hatted to UN missions should also be juxtaposed to the fact that the majority of the new UN missions in Africa seem to be born out of regional engagements. Thus re-hatting could also be seen as a consequence of African action enabling new missions to be put on the UN agenda.

Re-hatting is an important tool in facilitating swift deployment of new missions. The experiences of re-hatting sub-regional operations to AU missions, as well as AU missions to UN missions, nevertheless show that the trend of re-hatting also has a range of negative implications. In particular, re-hatting entails that any problems related to the troops are necessarily inherited by the following mission. This is not least an issue as regards inheritance of the lack of impartiality, which in the case of UN has significant negative effects on its peacekeeping principles. In addition, UN staff interviewed in this study indicated that bringing re-hatted troops up to UN standards in terms of equipment, training and code of conduct is often more challenging than generating entirely new forces.[142]

Support for establishing standards for AU peacekeepers similar to those applied within the UN may be an important instrument in facilitating successful and effective re-hatting. Interviewees in the present study nonetheless indicated that this would probably increase the cost of regional peace operations. Regional peace operations are today significantly cheaper than UN operations. Were the cost of regional operations to increase, the main advantage of regionalisation from the donor perspective – cost reduction through burden sharing – might be lost.[143]

5.4 Distorted Focus on Peace Operations

In addition to a focus on the military component *within* peace operations as discussed earlier in this chapter, the strong focus on peace operations as such is a trend that has implications on AU capacity to deal with peace and security more broadly.[144] Several interviewees in this study argued that peace operations have become a prioritised tool for the AU to address peace and security issues, distorting the traditional perspective of using peace operations solely as a means of last resort. A frequently propounded argument was that this is a consequence of donor interest and support in developing the peace and security capacities of the AU.[145] First of all, some interviewees argued that the unequal funding provided by donors to the eight commissions of the AU has made the Peace and Security Department (PSD), which receives by far the most external support, a

[142] Author's discussions with UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support staff in New York in February 2014. See also Tham Lindell, M. & Nilsson, C. 2014. pp. 31, 33, 36.
[143] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[144] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[145] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

dominant actor in the AU secretariat.[146] To push for a shift from a one-sided intervention focus to non-military means, one interviewee argued, the AU's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) would need to be strengthened.[147] Secondly, within the PSD, the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has been favoured, resulting in a preference for intervention as the tool of the AU for addressing peace and security-related issues, rather than pre-emptive means such as early warning, good offices and the panel of the wise etc., which is managed by other divisions of the PSD.[148]

5.5 Parallel Deployments

Peace operations in Africa also seem to be characterised by an increasing number of parallel non-African deployments which aim to strengthen, support or take over operations by African organisations. In some conflict zones, peace operations in Africa have become synonymous with co-deployment of AU/UN operations, EU missions and bilateral deployments. This can be exemplified by the presence of the AU, EU and a civilian UN mission in Somalia; the EU, France and the UN (previously ECOWAS and AU) in Mali; and the EU, France and the UN (previously ECCAS and AU) in CAR. The latter case also includes the parallel deployment of the AU-RTF, which has a different mandate, yet with overlapping areas of operation.

The conducting of parallel deployments is also interlinked with a broader, international division of labour in African peacekeeping that is not solely shared between the UN and AU. In fact, the last few years have indicated a task management structure which has involved a plethora of organisations and individual states. EU military operations in Africa have, for example, worked alongside UN missions, but have focused on short-term enforcement operations (Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003, EUFOR operations in DRC 2006, in Chad/CAR 2008-2009 and in CAR 2014). The EU has also, through the EUTM missions in Somalia and Mali, EUSEC DR Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa/DR Congo, EUSSR Guinea Bissau, come to engage in more long-term capacity building of the security sector, for which the UN often provides the overall framework. French bilateral military operations: *Licorne* in Côte d'Ivoire, *Serval* in Mali (in July 2014 replaced by *Barkhane* to the entire Sahel region) and *Sangaris* in CAR, have also worked in tandem with regional and UN operations as an essential security tool to enable broader peace operations. France, with its strong permanent military presence in Africa, is the only bilateral actor that officially

[146] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[147] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014. The size of the DPA is currently approximately 1/15 that of the PSD.
[148] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

undertakes such operations in support of UN or regional peace operations in Africa.[149]

Interestingly, there are also examples from the DRC and South Sudan where the international community has resisted the deployment of parallel operations, instead favouring expansion of the mandate of the previously present UN operation, in view of the risk of coordination problems that might arise from parallel deployments. While parallel deployments demand a high degree of coordination among actors, they also provide an opportunity for division of labour where actors specialise in particular peacekeeping capacities, which may further reduce the cost of peace operations.

[149] The UK undertook a similar operation, Operation Palliser, in Sierra Leone in 2000, although more limited in time and scope.

6 Outstanding Institutional Factors

This chapter identifies and analyses the main institutional factors of importance for the future development and evolvement of African peace operations. In order to reinforce the positive aspects of regionalisation of peace operations, it was concluded that three particular outstanding issues need to be resolved. These are the financial dependency of the AU and sub-regional organisations on external partnerships; the relationship between the AU PSC and the UNSC; and the lack of clarity as regards the hierarchy between the AU and the sub-regional organisations that form part of APSA.

6.1 The Financial Dependency on Non-regional Actors

While the AU and APSA structure has a high ambition of conducting regional peace operations, the potential to do so is, as described in previous chapters, constrained by a lack of resources and capacity to act in a timely and efficient manner. In a report by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, he acknowledged that the political, structural, financial and planning difficulties relating to African peace operations were the main challenge to regional peace operations in Africa.[150] The lack of funding within the AU and sub-regional organisations to finance operations has transferred responsibility for the costs of deployments to the troop-contributing countries, with severe negative effects on force generation and timely deployment. The funding model has also made the missions highly dependent on support from donors and partners. This has led some analysts to draw the conclusion that "from a funding perspective, the only viable peace operations in Africa are UN operations".[151]

In recent years, the AU has gained institutionalised support from the UN in e.g. planning.[152] The issue of who should fund African peacekeeping is nevertheless still an area of major contention. The AU and other African partners have long argued that the currently practised division of labour in African peacekeeping should also entail a financial partnership. In this perspective, the overall responsibility for international peace and security, which Chapter VIII of the UN Charter assigns to the UNSC, should also mean that when a peace and security task is delegated from the UNSC to a regional organisation, such a transfer of task should be accompanied by the financial resources that allow the regional body to carry out the task in the most appropriate manner.

[150] United Nations. 1998.
[151] Cedric De Coning as quoted in Svensson, E. 2008, p. 17.
[152] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

The inability of the AU to finance and sustain its operations by its own means has been argued, not least by the AU itself, to have made the division of labour on peace operations in Africa unequal.[153] African peacekeeping is highly dependent on support from external partners. Since this support is not institutionalised, it can be withdrawn at any time. This provides donors with considerable leverage on the conduct of operations. The ad hoc approach by which the African operations have received support from partners, e.g. the UN, has resulted in these missions becoming high-risk operations not just as a consequence of the volatile situations into which troops are deployed, but also in terms of the credibility of the AU PSC. Given that the AU and the sub-regional mechanisms have demonstrated a willingness to go where the UN cannot or will not go, the AU argues that any regional mission that has the political support of the UNSC should also receive financial backing.

The current discourse surrounding the regionalisation of peace operations in Africa has thus come to focus on how the burden of peace operations, specifically their funding, is to be shared by the AU and UN.

The need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping under a UNSC mandate has been recognised by the UNSC,[154] and in the 'Report of the AU-UN Panel on modalities for support to African Union operations' (the so-called Prodi report).[155] In the specific case of UN support for regional operations, the UNSC has so far argued that this can only occur on a 'case-by-case' basis, particularly due to the fact that the UN in itself is considerably overstretched and facing economic constraints. The permanent members of the UNSC, in particular the US, have not felt comfortable setting a precedent by agreeing to provide support to AU operations in all situations.[156]

Some of the other UNSC members are reported to be less dogmatic, in particular the UK, which argues that it pays for AU missions either way, given the vast financial support provided to the AU from the EU's African Peace Facility.[157] It has also been pointed out that AU operations tend to be significantly cheaper than UN operations and thus might be a more cost-effective use of the international community's money.[158]

[153] Boutellis, A & Williams, P.D. 2013, p. 13.
[154] United Nations. 2014.
[155] United Naions. 2008.
[156] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014; United Nations. 2012b, p. 15.
[157] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[158] It is nevertheless also recognised that some of the requests of the AU for African peacekeepers to receive the same type of training and equipment as UN peacekeepers might increase costs, making this argument less relevant. Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

While the EU has long been a main funder of African peace operations,[159] the organisation and its member states have also been pushing for African states to seek alternative sources of funding.[160] In particular, the EU would like to see an increase in financial contributions to APSA by the African states themselves, arguing that the lack of willingness among African states to contribute to APSA is an indicator of lack of ownership of the African peace support tool.[161] While the EU has stated that it will continue to support the APSA project, there is a great need to ensure African ownership of the processes and structures being developed. One interviewee reported that the EU is therefore considering imposing a cap on funding, so as to make African states pay at least some 5-10 per cent themselves.[162]

The AU Peace Fund, envisaged as a standing reserve, is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace operations and other operational activities related to peace and security. However, on average only 6 % of AU's regular budget is allocated to the Peace Fund and the assessed contributions to finance peace operations has not been done.[163] The only instance of AU funding to an AU mission was US $50 million provided to AFISMA. This was a small part of the mission's budget, which was assessed to be close to US $1 billion.[164] One of the interviewees in this study expressed the sentiment that troop contributors to AU missions benefit a lot more than those who contribute to UN missions, since donors are expected to cover all costs and provide all resources.[165]

While resource scarcity among African states is often used to explain why international partners need to back up African operations, academics point to the fact that the mobilisation of resources is in the end a result of political will and choices and that there are plenty of examples of where African states have been able to muster financial resources themselves.[166] Examples include unilateral operations such as the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia and the multilateral effort of the AU RTF, an operation in which the troop contributors only had to rely on partners for the supply of force multipliers.[167] However, the dependency on external actors, it is also argued, may be justified given that most regional operations are wanted as much by external actors as Africans themselves.[168]

[159] For an overview of the EU-Africa partnership in peace and security, please see Elowson, C. & Nordlund, P. 2013.
[160] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[161] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[162] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[163] Sarjho Bah, A. et al. 2014. pp.67-66.
[164] Ambrosetti, D and Esmenjaud, R. 2014, p. 77.
[165] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[166] Ambrosetti, D & Esmenjaud, R. 2014, p. 77.
[167] Ibid; Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[168] Ambrosetti, D & Esmenjaud, R. 2014, p. 77.

The limited investment of member states is nevertheless reported to be evident across the AU structures. Given the limited opportunity and willingness of member states to increase contributions to the budget of the AU, the organisation commissioned a high-level panel to explore alternative sources of funding in 2012. Among the suggestions made by the panel was the introduction of a levy on air tickets and a tax on tourism (specifically hotel bookings).[169] Even though the proposals were not well-received by some of the member states most economically dependent on tourism, they were approved by the heads of state of the AU.[170] The measures nevertheless remain to be implemented.

Other than exploring means of internal funding, the AU has also been looking to broaden the base of partnerships in APSA, turning for example to the fast-growing economies of China, India, Brazil and Russia, as well as to Turkey and Japan.[171] Diversifying donors is also a way of dispersing dependency. The need to rely on external partners for the economic viability of African operations has also entailed that the AU and the sub-regions do not themselves decide when 'African solutions to African problems' should be applied. While this lack of autonomy would not be resolved by turning to new partners, new donors may have different conditions attached to their funding.

Given the lack of financial responsibility currently taken by African actors, where, when and how 'African solutions' are applied are strongly influenced by the interests of external actors. While the international community does have a responsibility to contribute to peace and security in Africa, the self-determination of APSA is likely to be constrained in the foreseeable future unless the AU finds new ways of funding operations. It should also be pointed out that a stronger influence by new partners on APSA might lead to a slight shift in the focus, objective and conduct of regional peace operations convergent with the interests of those donors. Although the EU welcomes funding from new sources, the norms and ideals driving some new actors may differ from those of the EU. With reduced funding comes diminished influence. Finally, should the UN continue to count on the AU and sub-regional organisations to do the hard work ahead of the establishment of a UN mission, arrangements for predictable funding, at least when the operation is authorised by the UNSC, are needed. Failure to make such arrangements poses a much higher risk of weakening UN norms, by resulting in ill-equipped and inappropriate troops, than regionalisation of peace operations as such.

[169] Assembly of the African Union. 2012.
[170] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[171] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

6.2 The AU's Position in the UN

Since the mid-1990s, the UN has sought to strengthen its partnership with regional organisations on international peace and security. A series of high-level meetings with regional, sub-regional and other intergovernmental organisations has led to a UNSC resolution expressing the importance of the UN in helping to develop the ability of regional organisations to deploy peace operations in support of UN operations or other UNSC-mandated missions.[172]

The most developed relationship between the UN and any regional organisation is that with the AU. Since 2007, the UNSC and the AU PSC have held annual consultative meetings aimed at strengthening the AU/UN partnership. The AU is the only regional organisation to meet regularly with the UNSC.[173] Over the past few years, this dialogue has come to focus on a request from the AU that the division of responsibility for peace and security in Africa between the UN and AU be more clearly defined. The argument advanced from the AU side focuses on the need for a new and revitalised interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to allow for both UN funding to AU missions and greater influence of AU decision making in the UNSC.

The AU recognises the UNSC as the primary body for maintaining peace and security. The AU has nevertheless argued that since the majority of issues put before the UNSC are African, the AU should hold a privileged position in relation to the UNSC in comparison with other, non-African, regional organisations. Amongst other things, the organisation argues, the AU should be provided with particular leverage vis-à-vis the UNSC when it comes to decision making regarding peace operations in Africa.[174]

While there is general agreement that the AU does in fact have a special position in the UN,[175] there are plenty of examples of situations where the AU has felt ignored by the UNSC. When launching AMISOM, for example, the AU recommended that the UNSC lift the arms embargo against Somalia, deeming this essential to enhancing the effectiveness of the mission. This recommendation was not followed, which was seen by the AU as curtailing its efforts in Somalia.[176] More recently, great friction arose between the AU PSC and UNSC as the UNSC authorised NATO bombings of Libya in 2011 while ignoring the conflict resolution plan the AU had put in place.[177]

[172] Graham, K. 2005, p. 21.
[173] Gleason-Roberts. M & Kugel. A. 2014, p. 28; United Nations. 2013c.
[174] United Nations. 2013c, p. 7.
[175] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[176] United Nations. 2011; African Union. 2012.
[177] For the AU's viewpoint on this, see statement by South African President J. Zuma to the UNSC in United Nations. 2012b; Kasaija Apuuli, P. 2013.

The limited influence of the AU has been a source of tension between the two organisations. With no permanent member in the UNSC, the political sway of the AU is limited. Nevertheless, the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter has been interpreted by the AU PSC as providing the body a decision-making right on conflict resolution in Africa.[178] In many instances, Chapter VIII has been understood as only requiring that the UNSC be kept informed of the activities of the AU, without requiring the AU to await UN approval. The annual consultative meetings are considered to have led to greater acceptance among the African partners of the superiority of the UNSC, although this is not yet fully reflected in AU documents. Furthermore, the AU and the sub-regional organisations have frequently argued that due to geographical proximity, political and cultural familiarity with local conditions and shared experiences, they are better placed to act appropriately to facilitate peace and security in Africa than the UN. For this reason, the AU has requested that its considerations should at least be duly noted by the UNSC.[179] Behind this argument, there is also an expectation that due to regional advantages, once the African member states have reached consensus on an issue, there is no reason for the UNSC to vote on the matter.[180]

The UNSC is well aware of the AU's standpoint but, while respectful of the AU position, continues to argue that the organisations are not equal.[181] The former US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, summarised the overarching response of the UNSC to these requests in a debate in 2012 by stating that:

> "The Security Council has a unique, universal and principal mandate to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council is not subordinate to other bodies, or to the schedules or capacities of regional or subregional groups.... [UN-regional] cooperation, however, needs to be based on the exigencies of the issues at hand, and that cooperation cannot be on the basis that the regional organization independently decides the policy and that the United Nations Member States simply bless it and pay for it. There can be no blank check, either politically or financially."[182]

The UNSC has also indicated that one reason why the AU may feel ignored or disregarded on certain issues is that there is rarely a unified and consistent African view on certain issues. Even if the AU produces a qualified majority view of its 54 member states, this position may not be the same as that of e.g. ECOWAS or IGAD.[183] Given that all regional organisations are considered equal in the UN charter, the UNSC has so far not ascribed any superiority to the AU in relation to the sub-regional organisations, although there are indications that, as

[178] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[179] United Nations 2012b; United Nations. 2013c, p. 7.
[180] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[181] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[182] United Nations. 2012b.
[183] Ibid.

the UN becomes more educated on APSA, it is starting to move towards such a position.[184] It has also been pointed out that, while the accusation that the AU does not speak with one voice may not be factually wrong, the argument needs to be seen in the context in which it is applied: when AU opinion converges with the position of the UNSC, any disagreement with sub-regions or individual member states is rarely highlighted.[185]

In addition, the fact that the AU is dependent on external assistance to undertake peace operations further cements the position of the AU as subordinate to the UNSC, since the AU's dependency on UN support to manage operations requires a good AU/UN relationship.[186] Although the UN has always been, and continues to be, the preferred partner of the AU, it is argued that without progress on finding predictable funding from the UN to AU initiatives, the AU may no longer see the UN as the most attractive partner.[187] Moving away from the UN to other bilateral donors may further alter the political relationship between the UN and AU, as less economic dependency may also be seen as an opportunity to achieve autonomy for African decision making.

The relationship between the AU and UN can be described as both special and complicated. The issue of how to apply the spirit of regionalism expressed in the UN charter without undermining either the efforts of the AU or the superiority of the UNSC is unlikely to be worked out overnight. How regional peace operations develop in the future is nevertheless likely to be a consequence of the development of the overall political position of the AU in the international security system. As the two organisations continue to work together, learning from experience in order to clarify what is the preferred division of labour, it is therefore important that the AU has a strong political voice in matters related to peace and security in Africa. For the AU to gain more influence, it should affirm its position in areas where the UN is not able to act, e.g. peace enforcement operations, and use this to its advantage.[188] Furthermore, the member states of the AU need to accept handing some of their sovereignty over to the organisation, as their continuing failure to do so may currently be the greatest obstacle to a stronger, more influential AU in the UN.

6.3 The AU-REC Hierarchy

As mentioned above, one of the essential challenges in AU-UN relations is the lack of defined hierarchy between the AU and the sub-regional organisations in the international security system. In the AU, eight sub-regional organisations are

[184] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[185] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[188] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

recognised as part of APSA[189] and these are usually referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In addition, APSA includes two special Regional Mechanisms (RMs).[190] Nevertheless, there is no clear definition of the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs.

The 'PSC Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding' between the AU and the RECs states that the AU PSC (like the UNSC globally) carries the primary responsibility in maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.[191] The memorandum also calls for the AU to coordinate efforts and harmonise the views of African actors when dealing with the UN. Legally, the superiority of the AU in relation to the RECs is as clear as that of the UNSC vis-à-vis the AU.[192] In principle, this means that if the UNSC coordinated its positions with those of the AU, it would by default also be coordinated with relevant RECs. Since Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does not distinguish between the regional and sub-regional organisations, however, there is no practical hierarchical relationship between the RECs and the AU in relation to the UN. Much like Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, AU documents also leave room for interpretation. The memorandum states that that the relationship between the AU and the RECs should adhere to the principles of *subsidiarity, complementarity* and *comparative advantage*. This has been viewed by some as watering down AU leadership in relation to the sub-regional organisations.[193]

While AU documents clearly ascribe the AU a leadership role in APSA, many of the sub-regional organisations, as well as donors and staff within the AU itself, have come to see the AU rather as playing a coordinating role: managing issues that need to be addressed across regions, or stepping in where regional organisations are too weak to lead.[194] There is also a difference in opinion as to whether the AU is the primary political authority, subordinating implementation to the regional agents, or whether RECs should always have the first go at both decision making and implementation, with the option of deferring tasks to the

[189] UMA, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.

[190] East African Standby Force Command (EASFCOM) and the North African Regional Capability (NARC). Unlike the RECs, these organisations did not exist prior to APSA and were set up only for the management of the ASF. While EASFCOM and NARC were originally developed only as an instrument for increasing the capacity of the regional standby force, EASFCOM is increasingly taking on more of a political role, developing tools and methods for organisational decision making. While not formally a REC, EASFCOM is thus included in the REC terminology in this section. NARC has, nevertheless, not yet come to form a relevant organisation for APSA as there has been little progress on the Northern African brigade.

[191] The UN Charter states that any obligation entered into by the UN member states that comes in conflict with obligations under the UN Charter becomes void. Thus, the AU's assertion of primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa is only relevant in the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the AU and the RECs, and not between the AU and UN.

[192] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

[193] Boutellis, A & Williams, P.D. 2013, p. 7.

[194] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

AU in cases where they identify the solution as lying beyond the region.[195] An argument for the latter position is that the sheer size of Africa makes it challenging for the AU to adopt policies appropriate across the continent. Rather, the particularities of each region are better understood by the regions themselves. For example, while both ECOWAS and IGAD are greatly concerned with the management of extremism, the peculiarities of each region have led them to differ on how this is best done. For this reason, the AU should not dictate the actions of the sub-regions.[196]

The AU (and the OAU before it) was established much on the basis of a pan-African ideology envisioning the construct of a strong African supra-national organisation. Since the AU is modelled on the UN, its frameworks only regard the relationship between the AU and the member states. RECs are mentioned nowhere other than in relation to APSA, and even then primarily only as hosts to the ASF and the regional early warning system[197], for both of which the AU is clearly perceived as holding the political leadership.

A major issue is, however, that the OAU and AU have evolved in parallel to the RECs, some of which have come to develop decision-making processes and institutional mechanisms for implementing decisions on their own. The AU is thus in the exact same position in relation to the RECs as the UN is in relation to the AU: claiming legal authority but facing a formally subordinate organisation arguing regional self-determination. A difference is, however, that any argument used by the AU to assert its authority over the sub-regions may be turned back on the organisation and used also by the UNSC. It may be for this reason that several staff members within the AU seemed to argue that there is no contradiction in any REC acting without an AU PSC mandate, as long as it keeps the AU and the UN briefed on the matter.[198]

Whether or not the AU carries the political authority to guide action, the regions have, as previously mentioned, been the primary implementing agents. Even if most African operations over the past decade have taken place under the AU umbrella, these have been facilitated by the regions acting as building blocks of the missions. This development is described by the AU, RECs and several donors as natural, since experience shows that countries not directly affected are less likely to be willing to partake. The sub-regional approach is thus driven by practical realities of self-interest on the ground, rather than actual complementarity or comparative advantage.[199]

[195] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[196] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[197] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[198] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[199] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

It is not difficult to conceive of a situation where a REC bypasses AU decision making. For example, even the East African regional mechanism EASFCOM, which was created originally without a political agenda to manage the building of the East African chapter of the ASF, has come to develop its own decision-making structures and is reportedly seeking to create an EASF Peace Fund to support autonomous deployment.[200] The AU's relationship with the sub-regions is further complicated by the fact that AU member states, but not sub-regional organisations, are required to follow AU decision making. The AU recently launched the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). ACIRC is a centrally managed standby force based on contributions from voluntary member states, intended to enable the AU to conduct short-term, rapid-deployment military operations. The concept is argued by the AU to be a temporary means, enabling African rapid reaction until the ASF is operationalised. Several member states and RECs have nevertheless come to see it as an attempt by the AU to move away from the REC-controlled ASF brigades, indicating a willingness of the AU to depart from the sub-regional logic that shapes APSA.[201] The operationalisation of ACIRC would provide the AU with a military tool independent of the RECs. How the establishment of ACIRC will affect the development of the ASFs, and the relationship between the AU and RECs, remains to be seen.

The fact that some RECs have proclaimed a willingness to act without a mandate from the AU PSC, and some more or less explicitly also without a UNSC mandate, may also be considered problematic in the eyes of donors. Investment in APSA by e.g. the EU and its member states has so far, even when guided towards RECs or RMs, been made from the point of view that the AU is the main partner.[202] Some partners see no danger in building REC capability, arguing that the division of labour in APSA is complementary rather than contradictory.[203] Others argue that donors need to keep a clear perspective on which organisation they consider prominent, to avoid creating a political imbalance between the AU and the RECs. APSA requires external support for both the AU and the sub-regions. If the AU is considered the prominent organisation, support provided to the RECs may thus need to be funnelled through the AU.[204]

Several of the people interviewed for this study pointed to a lack of clarity in the AU/REC hierarchy as the most important issue regarding the future of regionalisation, given that the current contradiction between the regions and continent could block a lot of interesting ventures, even operations.[205] The

[200] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[201] Ambrosetti, D & Esmenjaud, R. 2014.
[202] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[203] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[204] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[205] Interviews, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

sustainability of regionalisation of peacekeeping in Africa is considered to be dependent on developing institutional and political frameworks that better interlock the AU and the RECs.[206]

While several of the donors interviewed argued that this is an African issue to address and that donors can do little to facilitate advances on the issue,[207] some of the African analysts and civil servants interviewed argued that donors can play a positive role in interlocking the regions with the continent. One way of doing so could be by the use of donor conditionality to make the parties work on addressing the current contradiction between the region and the continent.[208] However, there is little agreement on whether this conditionality should be used to advance the superiority of the AU, or make the AU concede a greater right to self-determination to the RECs. What is clear is that there is an urgent need to resolve the disconnect between the decision makers (the AU PSC) and the implementers (the RECs) in order to improve and sustain AU capacity to undertake peace support operations.[209]

[206] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[207] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[208] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.
[209] Ibid.

7 Conclusions and Considerations

The previous chapters served to explain the dynamics of regionalisation of peace operations in Africa in order to identify and explore the main factors which may affect regional peace operations, as well as peace operations in general, in the near future. The challenges, advantages and trends described highlight that regionalisation is seen, and used, as an important tool for sharing the burden of conducting peace operations in Africa. In particular, regional missions have been seen as filling a gap in peace operations otherwise filled only by unilateral deployments.

The development of APSA has led to a particular dynamic with regard to the division of labour in peace operations in Africa whereby African actors have come to act as a first responder, providing initial stabilisation missions launched either into operational environments where the UN cannot yet go or functioning as a vanguard force conducting initial operations until a UN mission can be mobilised to manage a broader operation. Regional operations are also seen as a way of reducing the economic burden of peace operations, given that due e.g. to lower costs for logistics and personnel, they are considerably cheaper than UN missions. Thus there are strong incentives for donors to continue to work with African partners in order to further improve the capacities of regional actors to face future security challenges on the African continent.

The analysis also highlights some of the challenges to regionalisation of peace operations in Africa. One crucial issue that must be resolved is that of predictable and sustainable funding. Many, if not most, African missions over the past decade have been slow to deploy due to a lack of resources, funding and logistical enablers. Political will is a prerequisite and those African missions which have been able to become operational swiftly have been facilitated by the main troop contributors already having a military presence in the host nation.

7.1 Considerations for Partners

In view of the above, this concluding section aims to highlight some aspects that partners should take into consideration in their deliberations on future support to APSA and the regional capacity to undertake peace operations in Africa.

First, the involvement of partisan actors in regional peace operations and its impact on the legitimacy and impartiality of the operation should be considered. Ideally, respondents from the AU's PSOD argue, frontline states should never be included in a mission.[210] Self-interest is a natural driver in the willingness to contribute to peace operations, but does not need to specifically include a stake in

[210] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

the conflict. It may therefore be in the interest of both the AU and its partners to seek to find and apply other forms of incentives that may be less counter-productive to the broader peacebuilding agenda. While self-interest drives all states that contribute troops to peace operations, an analysis of the interests that drive TCCs, on a case-by-case basis, could be useful for partners in order to better understand how their support may play out and affect the conflict dynamics.[211] With such an understanding, donors could avoid contributing to increased tensions and violence.

Second, in providing support for increased multifunctional capacity of the AU and the sub-regional organisations, partners need to consider the appropriateness of supporting the construction of functions that may already exist within other organisations. There is currently no shared strategy for how peace operations-related tasks should be divided between e.g. the AU and the UN in the future. Given that the UN has indicated a fear of competition as regards the development of AU multifunctional capacities, donors need to adopt a clear stance on how they would like the international peacekeeping labour to be divided between the two organisations before choosing to pledge their support.

Third, in order for 'African solutions' to be more than the sum of the will of the strongest AU member states, donors should consider reinforcing the political role of the AU in multilateral settings. Amongst other things, the AU's permanent representation to the UN in New York needs to be strengthened in order to support the political role of the AU vis-à-vis the UN, as well as providing an opportunity for reinforcing and presenting common African views on international issues.

Fourth, in order to avoid unintended competition between the AU and the sub-regional organisations, partners should develop a clear stance on whether they consider the AU or the sub-regions to be the prominent actor on peace and security and ensure that the support provided to the continent or the RECs is consistent with this view. Donors should also seek to help consolidate the outstanding issues in the AU-REC relationships, including development of institutional and political frameworks for decision making.

Fifth, when pushing for funding for the development of APSA from new sources, current donors need to be aware of the increased influence of potential new partners on the focus, conduct and development of APSA.

Finally, partners should take into consideration how lop-sided support to African peace and security initiatives, specifically peace operations, affects the development of other pre-emptive and conflict-resolving mechanisms, to ensure that the current focus of APSA on peace operations is in fact the outcome intended.

[211] Interview, Addis Ababa, September 2014.

Annex 1 - Regional peace operations in Africa 1990-2002

Mission	Organisation	Location	Duration	Size (approx. max)	Status
ECOMOG I	ECOWAS	Liberia	1990-1991	12,040	UN 'recognised'
OAU MOT	OAU	Rwanda	1991	15	Non-UN
OAU NMOG I	OAU	Rwanda	1991	57	Non-UN
OAU NMOG II	OAU	Rwanda	1993	70	UN 'recognised'
OMIB	OAU	Burundi	1993-1996	47	UN 'recognised'
MISAB	CoW (African states)	Central African Republic	1997-1998	c.3,000	UN authorised
ECOMOG II	ECOWAS	Sierra Leone	1997-2000	1,100	UN 'recognised'
OMIC I	OAU	Comoros	1997-1998	20	Non-UN
Operation Sovereign Legitimacy	SADC	Democratic Republic of Congo	1998-2002	15,500	Non-UN
Operation Boleas	SADC	Lesotho	1998-1999	3, 850	Non-UN
ECOMOG III	ECOWAS	Guinea Bissau	1998-1999	750	UN 'recognised'
OAU JMC	OAU	Democratic Republic of Congo	1999-2000	43	UN 'recognised'
OLMEE/AULMEE	OAU/AU	Ethiopia, Eritrea	2000-2008	43	UN 'recognised'
SAPSD	South Africa	Burundi	2001-2003	750	UN 'recognised'
OMIC II	OAU	Comoros	2001-2002	14	Non-UN
CEN-SAD Force	CEN-SAD	Central African Republic	2001-2002	300	Non-UN
OMIC III	OAU	Comoros	2001-2002	39	Non-UN
ECOFORCE/ECOMICI	ECOWAS	Côte d'Ivoire	2002-2004	c.1,500	UN authorised
FOMUC	CEMAC	Central African republic	2002-2008	380	UN 'recognised'

Table 3 Based on Bellamy & Williams 2010b.

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The Future of African Peace Operations: Strategic Options 2015-2025 *Charting the Way Forward After One Decade of AU Peace Operations* Seminar and author's workshop Cape Town, 17-18 December 2014

Interviews

Lena Schildt, Deputy Head Regional Co-operation, Peace and Security, & Karin Wallensteen, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Sweden in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, 22 September 2014

Jean-Francois Hasperue, First Counsellor, Peace and Security Section, Delegation of the European Union to the African Union. Addis Ababa 22 September 2014

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Col. Frederick Houghton, AU Peace Support Operations Division. Addis Ababa, 26 September 2014

Since the inauguration of the African Union in 2002 and the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture, a new norm of regional peace operations on the African continent has been set. This report analyses regional peace operations launched by the AU and sub-regional organisations, identifying advantages, challenges and trends. It argues that there is currently an international division of peacekeeping, whereby African operations have come to act as a first responder, providing initial stabilisation missions in operational environments where the UN cannot yet go.

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