



Georgia

A Defence Sector Reform Assessment

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Sammanfattning

Utvecklingen inom den georgiska försvarsreformen går snabbt. Georgien är mottagare av betydande stöd i flera reformrelaterade områden inom försvarssektorn, men landet är angeläget om att utöka detta samarbete för att kunna modernisera och reformera försvarssektorn fullt ut. Denna motivering är förståelig givet säkerhetssituationen i landet, vilken troligtvis inte kommer att förbättras inom den närmaste framtiden. Internationella givare som vill hjälpa Georgien med reform av försvarssektorn kan göra det på olika sätt.

Analysen avser att ge Försvarsmakten en överblick över reformbehoven inom den georgiska försvarssektorn. Denna kan i sin tur fungera som ett underlag för att vägleda Försvarsmakten i beslut om vilken sorts reformstöd man vill ge till den georgiska försvarsmakten framöver.

I denna rapport analyseras fem specifika områden inom den georgiska försvarssektorn, nämligen förvaltning, träning, militärtekniskt samarbete, logistik och professionell utveckling. Vi finner att förvaltning och logistik är de två områden som är i störst behov av reform.

Rapporten avslutas med ett appendix innehållande särskilda förfrågningar om svenskt stöd som kommunicerats till författarna av Georgiens försvarsministerium.

Nyckelord: Georgien, försvarsmakt, försvarssektor, försvarsreform, Ryssland, NATO.

Summary

Georgian defence reform appears to be proceeding rapidly. The country is receiving substantial assistance in numerous important defence reform-related fields, but appears to be very eager to enhance cooperation and fully modernize and transform its defence sector. This is very understandable given the country's national security context and is a feature that is unlikely to change any time soon. International donors wishing to assist Georgia in this endeavour can do so in various ways.

This report seeks to provide insights that will allow the Swedish Armed Forces to attain a better understanding of the reform needs within the broader defence sector. This information can make it easier to determine within which specific areas to provide assistance to the Georgian defence sector.

The report analyses five specific areas of the defence sector, namely management, combat training, technical military cooperation, logistics and professional development. It finds two areas in particular need of reform assistance, namely management and logistics.

The report ends with an appendix with specific reform assistance requests for Sweden communicated to the authors by the Georgian Ministry of Defense.

Keywords: Georgia, armed forces, defence sector, defence reform, Russia, NATO.

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Abbreviations

ANP	Annual National Programme
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCFTA	Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DEEP	Defence Education Enhancement Programme
DIBS	Defence Institution Building School
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
GAF	Georgian Armed Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GS	General Staff
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
JTEC	Joint Training and Evaluation Centre
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MBT	Main Battle Tanks
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBI	Nordic Baltic Initiative
NDA	National Defence Academy
NGC	NATO-Georgia Commission
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SDR	Strategic Defence Review
SNGP	Substantial NATO Georgia Package
TMEC	Training and Military Education Command
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

Foreword

This report on Georgian defence reform is the second in a series of three that seeks to assess and map international support to defence reform. The authors have previously written a similar report on Ukrainian defence reform needs.¹ A third and final report on defence sector reform needs in Moldova is forthcoming in late 2016.

The authors are very grateful to the Georgian Ministry of Defence, LTC Malkhaz Jamureli the Georgian defence attaché to Sweden, the NATO Liaison office and the NATO Defence Capacity Building Core Team as well as other individuals interviewed in the process of making this report.


We are especially grateful to our anonymous reviewer, who provided invaluable input on an earlier version of the report.

Finally, we would like to thank the Swedish defence attaché Staffan Sjöberg and the Swedish embassy in Tbilisi for their kind help in assisting us in the preparations for our visit to Tbilisi.

Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Project Manager

Stockholm September 27, 2016

¹ Lins de Albuquerque, Adriana and Hedenskog, Jakob (2015) *Ukraine: A Defence Sector Reform Assessment*, FOI-R--415--SE, December.



1 Introduction

The Swedish government has been supporting the Georgian government in its defence sector reform efforts since 2009. In this capacity, the Swedish Armed Forces have sought to contribute to Georgian defence reform through information sharing/advising, education and financial contributions, working both bilaterally and through the Nordic Baltic Initiative (NBI) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) projects. In a desire to assist with the continued promotion of future transformation of the Georgian defence sector, the Swedish Armed Forces tasked the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) with conducting an analysis of the Georgian defence sector.

Purpose of Report

This report is intended to provide an overview of the Georgian defence sector, with the aim of identifying future reform needs for the purposes of long-term and needs-based reform objectives with regard to military capacity building. The primary objective of the report is to serve as a source of information that the Swedish Armed Forces can use in planning their future assistance to Georgian defence reform. As such, the report looks at a number of key areas within the Georgian defence sector and surveys whether there are related reform projects supported by international donors affiliated with these. In addition to mapping international donor assistance to Georgian defence reform, the report also discusses the extent to which Georgia is coordinating these reform efforts with international donors, as well as whether international donors are coordinating their support amongst themselves. Finally, the report presents specific reform assistance requests that the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD) would be especially interested in submitting to Sweden.

Scope Conditions

This report focuses exclusively on military capacity reform needs within the Georgian defence sector, defined as the MoD and the Georgian Armed Forces. This means that it does not assess reform needs from a security sector reform perspective.² Although there are a multitude of aspects relevant to military capacity building, due to the open nature of this report and the scarcity of

² For more details of what a security sector reform perspective entails, see Lins de Albuquerque, Adriana and Hedenskog, Jakob (2015) *Ukraine: A Defence Sector Reform Assessment*, FOI-R--415--SE, December, p.23.

information available, reform needs with regard to military hardware and intelligence were deemed to be beyond the scope of the analysis. Instead, the analysis is limited to management, combat training, technical military cooperation, logistics and professional development. Given the scarcity of information regarding some of these areas, the space devoted to these in the report varies. Finally, it is important to be aware that defence reform priorities and the structure of the MoD may be subject to change pending political developments in Georgia. In anticipation of such changes, we seek to provide as comprehensive an overview as possible in this report, but without necessarily accounting for specific details that may change in the near future. We are nevertheless confident that the report can serve as a comprehensive resource that will enable the Swedish Armed Forces to better plan for future assistance to the Georgian defence reform.

Method and Sources

The information used to complete the research task was obtained through secondary sources and field interviews conducted by phone or in person while in Tbilisi, Georgia, during 13-17 June 2016. To ensure that we obtained a wide diversity of perspectives, we conducted numerous interviews with various diplomats and civilian experts on Georgian defence reform as well as with representatives of the Georgian MoD and General Staff. In order to protect the anonymity of these sources, no names are listed in the report.

We analyze reform needs within five specific areas of the defence sector. In order to do so, we assess the extent to which the current organization and capabilities within each area is capable of achieving its purpose effectively.

Finally, the assessment of the reform aid from Sweden prioritized by Georgia (see Appendix) is based on direct input from Georgian MoD representatives, and should not be considered representative of Georgian public opinion, or of our own.

Outline of Report

The report consists of seven chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 give a brief introduction to Georgia and the national security context in which the country operates, while Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the Georgian Armed Forces and provide a brief overview of defence reform to date. Chapter 6 then gives a more detailed overview of five specific areas of military capacity, namely: management, combat training, technical military cooperation, logistics and professional development. In doing so, it describes the reform status and needs of each area, as well as ongoing related reform projects supported by international donors. Chapter 6 concludes by discussing coordination of international support for defence reform, with particular

focus on military capacity building, by addressing two questions: 1) To what extent is the Georgian government coordinating defence reform relating to military capacity building with international donors?; and 2) To what extent are international donors coordinating their support to Georgian defence reform amongst themselves? Chapter 7 provides a brief summary of the current state of defence reform in the areas discussed in Chapter 6 and presents some concluding remarks. Specific Georgian assistance requests for Sweden, communicated by Georgian MoD interviewees, are outlined in the Appendix.

2 Brief Country Background

Georgia is a European country located in the South Caucasus region. It borders Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Black Sea. It has an area of 69 700 km³ and a population of approximately 3.8 million (as of 1 January 2015).⁴ According to the latest official census figures (from 2002), the population consists of 83.8 per cent Georgians, 6.5 per cent Azeri, 5.7 per cent Armenians, 1.5 per cent Russians and 2.5 per cent other ethnic backgrounds.⁵ Ossetians and Abkhazians are included within the “other” category.

During the early 19th century, Georgia was absorbed by the Russian Empire. The country enjoyed a brief period of independence (1918-1921) following the Russian Revolution, only to be incorporated into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) against its will in 1921. Georgia remained a Soviet Republic until the fall of the USSR in 1991, upon which it gained independence.

The first years of independence were traumatic for Georgia. The nationalist and populist policy of the first democratically elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, caused protests among Georgia’s minority groups and was met with counteractions, especially among Ossetians in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and Abkhazians in the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic (ASSR). Tensions soon escalated to civil war, first in South Ossetia (1991-92) and later in Abkhazia (1992-93), in which the separatists received overt military support from Russia. Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power in January 1992 during a brief civil war between competing paramilitary forces in Tbilisi. A temporarily established Military Council invited the former foreign minister of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze, to assume leadership in Georgia.⁶

Although a more stable period in Georgia’s independent history appeared after the brief wars over the secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the increasingly corrupt regime of Shevardnadze also generated public discontent. The “Rose Revolution”, brought about by widespread protests over disputed parliamentary elections, culminated in the ousting of the president in November 2003. In the subsequent presidential elections in early 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili,

³ C.I.A. World Factbook (n.d), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html> (accessed 1 September 2016).

⁴ National Statistics Office of Georgia (n.d), <http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=0&lang=eng> (accessed 1 September 2016).

⁵ C.I.A. World Factbook (n.d).

⁶ Nilsson, Niklas (2014) “Georgia’s Conflicts: Abkhazia and South Ossetia” in Svante Cornell and Michael Jonsson (eds) *Conflict, Crime and the State in Post-Communist Eurasia*, University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 104-105.

a former minister of justice and the indisputable leader of the Rose Revolution, won with 96 per cent of the vote.

Saakashvili's presidency was marked by rapid and radical reform of the Georgian state institutions and society. However, a failed attempt in August 2008, after Russian military provocation, to re-capture South Ossetia militarily and re-incorporate it into Georgia led to *de facto* loss of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the Russian-Georgian 'Five-Day War', Moscow recognized the Georgian territories "independencies", in reality starting a gradual process of incorporating them into the Russian Federation. Growing authoritarian tendencies under Saakashvili also contributed to the victory of the oppositionist "Georgian Dream" coalition in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

In 2012-13, Georgia was ruled according to a power-sharing arrangement with Saakashvili as president and the Georgian Dream leader, billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, as prime minister. In 2013, however, constitutional amendments, driven by Saakashvili in 2010, transformed Georgia from a presidential to a parliamentary republic.⁷ The current president of the country is Giorgi Margvelashvili (since 17 November 2013) and the prime minister is Giorgi Kvirikashvili (since 30 December 2015). Both are affiliated to the Georgian Dream and to Ivanishvili, who, despite having officially left politics in 2013 and since then not having conducted any formal state functions, continues to have a decisive influence over Georgian politics.

Georgia is rated as "partly free" by the democracy-ranking research institution Freedom House (2015).⁸ The president is directly elected by an absolute majority popular vote and can serve no more than two five-year terms.⁹ The president appoints the prime minister, who appoints the other members of the government. Of the 150 members of the unicameral parliament, 77 are elected by proportional party lists voting and the remaining 73 by a majoritarian voting system.¹⁰

Georgia's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2015 was \$4,010, compared with e.g. a figure of \$54,988 per capita for Sweden.¹¹ The country imports almost all the natural gas and oil it needs, but has substantial domestic hydropower capacity that allows it to supply most of its energy needs. Georgia has sought to replace its former energy dependence on Russia by importing natural gas from Azerbaijan instead. The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil

⁷ C.I.A. World Factbook (n.d)

⁸ Freedom House (2015) "Freedom in the World: Georgia", <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/georgia> (accessed 1 Sept. 2016).

⁹ C.I.A. World Factbook (n.d)

¹⁰ Constitution of Georgia, Civil Service Bureau, Georgia, <http://csb.gov.ge/uploads/2081806.pdf>, (accessed 1 Sept. 2016).

¹¹ World Bank (n.d) "World Development Indicators", <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed 13 October 2016).

pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline has had a significant impact in lessening the country's dependence on Russian energy and has increased stability in the region.

Georgia has aspirations to join both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). It joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. At a NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the Alliance's leaders agreed that Georgia will become a NATO member in the indefinite future, once it has met all the requirements.¹² In September 2008, shortly after the Five-Day War, NATO and Georgia established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to serve as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia achieve its goal of membership in NATO.¹³ However, the Georgian timeline for making this reality suffered a set-back in December 2015, when NATO announced that it expects Georgia to pass through a step in the process towards membership that the country believed it could skip, namely the Membership Action Plan (MAP).¹⁴

At the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the Alliance again reiterated the point from the Bucharest declaration that Georgia "will become a NATO member", but only through the MAP as an integral part of the accession process. The summit declaration also praised Georgia's progress in military reform since 2008 and contributions to the missions in Afghanistan.¹⁵

The US and Georgia also signed a bilateral defence memorandum in July 2016 that will entail additional US support for defence acquisition and further information sharing between the two countries. Implementation of the memorandum is expected to start by the end of 2016.¹⁶

Georgia's relations with the EU are channeled through the Eastern Partnership (EaP) under the European Neighbourhood Policy. An Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Georgia and the EU, was adopted in 2014. Even though this agreement was a significant step towards Georgia reaching economic and harmonization with the EU's

¹² NATO (2016) "Relations with Georgia," http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_1607-backgroundunder_georgia_en.pdf, (accessed 30 August 2016).

¹³ NATO (n.d) "NATO-Georgia Commission," http://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/topics_52131.htm (accessed 15 August 2016).

¹⁴ Kucera, Joshua (2015), *The Bug Pit*, December 2, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76381> (accessed 1 August 2016).

¹⁵ NATO (2016) Warsaw Summit Communique, 9 July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en, (accessed 30 July 2016).

¹⁶ Civil.ge (2016), "Georgia, U.S. Sign Memorandum to Expand Defence Cooperation," 6 July, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=29282>, (accessed 15 July 2016).

legislation, membership of Georgia in the EU is not on the agenda for Brussels.¹⁷ In June 2016, a promised visa liberalization scheme for Georgians visiting the EU was postponed after opposition from Germany, France and Italy.¹⁸

¹⁷ European External Action Service (n.d.), "EU-Georgia relations"

http://eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/news/eu-georgia_factsheet_en.htm (accessed 10 June 2016).

¹⁸ Baczynska, Gabriela (2016) "EU puts brake on visa liberalization for now amid immigrant fears", *Reuters*, 1 June; <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-visas-idUSKCN0YN56F>; Dempsey, Judy (2016) "NATO and the E.U. desert Georgia", *The Washington Post*, 16 June 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nato-and-the-eu-desert-georgia/2016/06/16/20f2c7dc-33be-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html?utm_term=.5d099b36654b, (accessed June 20 2016).

3 The National Security Context

The main characteristics of Georgia's strategic environment are linked to its weakness and small size; the asymmetrical nature of its relationship with Russia, and the internal political instability with complicated relations with its ethnic minorities. In addition, the national security context is influenced by the unsettled nature of the region, with the unstable Russian North Caucasus and conflicts in the South Caucasus (primarily Nagorno-Karabakh).

Legislative and Conceptual Framework

The *Constitution of Georgia*, approved by the parliament in 1995, provides main principles and mechanisms according to which defence planning and management is performed. As of today, Georgia's defence and its planning are regulated by the following laws:

- *Law of Georgia on the Defence of Georgia* (1997), which defines the fundamentals and organisation of Georgia's defence, rights and duties of the government bodies, enterprises, establishments, organisation, officials and citizens in the sphere of defence;¹⁹
- *Law of Georgia on Defence Planning* (2006), which determines the organisation of the defence of Georgia and the essence and role of its planning in the implementation of defence policy. It also envisages the developments and periodic review of defence planning legislation at both the strategic and intra-agency level;²⁰ and
- *Law of Georgia on National Security Policy Planning and Coordination* (2013), which determines the area of the national security policy, the process of planning and coordination of the policy and the authority of the agencies that coordinate the policy planning process.²¹

In 2009, the *National Security Council* of Georgia initiated a national security review process which included the development of conceptual and strategic documents. The two fundamental strategic documents at the national level are:

- *National Security Concept of Georgia* (2012), which is developed by the government of Georgia and ratified by the parliament, defines

¹⁹ DCAF (n.d) "The Law of Georgia: On the Defence of Georgia"
www.dcaf.ch/content/download/36277/527771/file/Defencelaw.pdf, (accessed 15 May 2016).

²⁰ Legislative Herald of Georgia (2006) "Law of Georgia: On Defence Planning".

²¹ Legislative Herald of Georgia (2015) "On National Security Policy Planning and Coordination".

fundamental national values and interests, threats, risks and challenges and the main directions of the national security policy concerning foreign, social and economic priorities; and

- *Threat Assessment Document of Georgia* (2010), which defines political, economic, military and transnational threats to the country, risks of their materialisation and expected outcome.²² The latest threat assessment addresses the period 2010-2013 and identifies military threats, foreign political threats, transnational threats, socio-economic threats and natural and industrial threats and risks.

Within the *Ministry of Defence* (MoD), several intra-agency documents are published or updated regularly to plan, coordinate and integrate defence management activities. The most important are:

- *National Military Strategy* (2014), a key military-political document based on the National Security Concept and the Threat Assessment Document, which addresses the national security environment, national interests and major priorities for security policy. It also identifies strategic military objectives, missions and capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF);²³ and
- *Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016*, which is the guideline document for the MoD of Georgia that identifies main directions for the development of the MoD and the GAF through 2016 and aims to enhance GAF capabilities and NATO interoperability.²⁴

Other important documents include the *Defence Planning Guidance*, a medium-term planning document to provide MoD structural units with necessary directions, recommendations and resources guidance to elaborate GAF development programmes on the basis of analysing current strategic documents and available sources, and the [Defence] *Minister's Vision*, an informal paper that reflects main directions of the MoD and the GAF for a short-term period.²⁵

²² Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book", p. 9.

²³ Ministry of Defence (n.d) "National Military Strategy", p. 2.

²⁴ Ministry of Defence (2013) "Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016", p. 4.

²⁵ Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book", p. 9.

Strategic Planning Framework



Source: MoD of Georgia

Threat Assessment

According to the National Security Concept of Georgia (hereafter ‘the Concept’) and the National Threat Assessment Document, the most urgent threats to Georgia relate to the Russian Federation and its occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) after the war in August 2008. According to the Concept, the three most urgent threats, all related to the Russian Federation, are: 1) Occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation and terrorist acts organised by the Russian Federation from the occupied territories; 2) the risk of renewed military aggression from Russia; and 3) violation of the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees from the occupied territories.

The Concept goes back in history and points out that Georgia was a victim of Russian aggression already in the early 20th century, which led to 70 years of Soviet occupation. In 1991, when Georgia regained independence, this was followed by political and economic instability caused by the Russian Federation. During the 1990s, Russia fuelled and supported aggressive separatist movements and triggered an armed confrontation in which Russian military forces participated directly, together with criminal groups. This confrontation resulted in ethnic

cleansing of Georgians, a fact recognised by the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Parliament.

However, the Concept does not mention the grievances that the Ossetians and Abkhazians had against the Georgian government under the leadership of Gamsakhurdia, the ill-considered Georgian decision to attack Abkhazia in 1992 or the widespread criminal behaviour and human rights abuses by Georgian irregular fighters in the conflicts in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Concept characterises the 2008 war as a further act of military aggression against Georgia on the part of Russia, accompanied by a new wave of ethnic cleansing and, again, unlawful occupation of Georgian territories. Russia also ignored the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 when declaring the occupied territories independent states and deploying military forces and infrastructure there. The Concept sees Russia's aim as being to turn Georgia into a failed state, to hinder the realisation of Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic choice and to forcibly return Georgia to the Russian political orbit.²⁶

Second in importance after Russia's aggressive behaviour, the Concept lists the possible spillover of conflicts from neighbouring countries in the Caucasus as a major threat to Georgian security.²⁷ The complex relations of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are undermining the stability of the region. The 'Four-Day War' in April 2016 was a reminder of that.²⁸ A regional conflict centred on Nagorno-Karabakh could inflict significant damage on the Georgian economy, jeopardize energy security, destabilise minority areas in Georgia and provoke further conflict with Russia.

The Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016 (hereafter 'SDR 2013-2016') mentions that a spillover of conflict into Georgia may also come from the North Caucasus.²⁹ Georgia borders all republics in this volatile region of the Russian Federation, particularly Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The region has been riven by the two Chechen separatist wars and terrorist acts from militant Islamist groups. Although the involvement of North Caucasus fighters in the war in Syria and Iraq has reduced the immediate level of violence in the North Caucasus, it has also raised the fear in Russia of returning fighters coming home to fight for the same cause in their own homeland.³⁰

²⁶ Ministry of Defence (n.d) "National Security Concept of Georgia", pp 7-8.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 8.

²⁸ Hedenskog, Jakob & Korkmaz, Kaan (2016) "The Interests of Russia and Turkey in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", *RUFS Briefing*, No 35, May.

²⁹ Ministry of Defence (2014) "Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016", p. 17.

³⁰ Hedenskog Jakob & Holmquist, Erika (2015) "The threat of the Islamic State to Russia's North Caucasus and Central Asia", *RUFS Briefing*, No 28, August.

The North Caucasus has had direct security implications for Georgia since the country first gained its independence in 1991. Abkhaz rebels were joined in their 1992-93 war by sizeable numbers of Chechens and North Caucasus fighters. At the end of the 1990s, the Pankisi Gorge in eastern Georgia, an area largely inhabited by Kists (an ethnic group with Chechen roots), was used as a sanctuary for Chechen fighters in the second Chechen war. This in turn provoked Russian pressure on Georgia for joint border security provision and for the right of *hot pursuit*. On several occasions, Russian aircraft breached the Georgian border to attack targets in the area. It is possible that Russian pressure on Georgia, as well as insurgent efforts to use Georgian territory, will recur, with attendant risks for Georgia and Georgian-Russian relations.³¹

Moving beyond the immediate neighbourhood, Georgia is also close enough to the ever unstable Middle East (Syria) and the Kurdish part of eastern Turkey. If the war in Syria, for instance, were to expand to a larger regional war, it would risk spilling over into the Caucasus, as these regions and their conflicts are increasingly intertwined.³² This is something that will have to be updated in future Georgian strategic documents.

Georgia's security situation is further weakened by the fact that there is a gap between how the Georgians perceive the strategic significance of their country and the Caucasus and how the region is perceived in the West. This leads to a discrepancy between what the Georgian government wants from the West and what Western states and their institutions are willing to give Georgia. For instance, despite the Caucasus region being a significant energy producer, its place in the global energy equation is still modest. Caspian oil transiting Georgia makes up only around 1 per cent of supply in the global market. Therefore, Georgia is peripheral to the vital interests of major European and Euro-Atlantic states and their institutions. Furthermore, the sensitivity of some Western states to Russia limits Georgia's capacity to use cooperation with the West to balance against Russia.³³ The recent events in Ukraine and Syria, the migration crisis and turbulence around Brexit in Europe have made it even more difficult for the Georgians to agree a list of urgent priorities with the West.

³¹ MacFarlane (2016), pp. 13-14.

³² Hedenskog & Korkmaz (2016).

³³ MacFarlane (2012), p. 24.

4 The Georgian Armed Forces

The Georgian Armed Forces (GAF), like all other armed forces in the post-Soviet countries, were created in the period of chaos resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Georgian case, this process was even more chaotic since the country was also suffering a threefold civil war, for power in Tbilisi and for the retention of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.³⁴

The GAF today consist of the Land Forces, the National Guard, Special Operation Forces and units of central subordination. The Land Forces is the only branch of forces designed for conducting war actions by itself or together with the National Guard or Special Operation Forces. It consists of five regular infantry brigades, two artillery brigades, one engineer brigade, one air-defence brigade, one signal battalion, one technical reconnaissance battalion, one medical battalion, two separate anti-tank battalions and one light infantry battalion. There are also non-regular formations of special-forces.³⁵

In 2010, the Georgian air force was incorporated into the Land Forces. According to the Military Balance 2016, the total strength of the Land Forces is 19 050 men, among them 4 050 conscripts. The bulk of the hardware is still Soviet, with some 120 T-55 and T-72 main battle tanks (MBT) and 120 BTR-70 and BTR-80 armoured personal carriers (APCs).³⁶ However, with the help of Israel and Poland, a large proportion of the T-72 MBTs have been upgraded with modern electronics.³⁷ During Saakashvili's term, Georgia also acquired infantry weapons, rockets and "night-vision communications", and drones (Skylark and Hermes 450) from Israel.³⁸

During the 2008 Five-Day War, the Georgian military suffered numerous material losses, including newly updated tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that were left behind. One expert pointed out that the lack of a clear acquisition and contract

³⁴ Khranchikhin, Aleksandr (2013) "Armiya Gruzii: do i posle voyny" [The Georgian Army: before and after the war], *Voennoe obozrenie*, 15 November, <https://topwar.ru/36014-armiya-gruzii-do-i-posle-voyny.html> (accessed 2 June 2016); Jones, Stephen (2015) *Georgia: A political history since independence* (I.B. Tauris: London), pp. 239-268.

³⁵ Vertov, A. (2012) "Vooruzhennyye sily Gruzii" [The Georgian Armed Forces], *Sovremennaya Armiya*, 12 June, <http://www.modernarmy.ru/article/171> (accessed 3 June 2016).

³⁶ Military Balance (2016) International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, England, pp. 183-184.

³⁷ Boval, Valery (2012) "Gruzinskaya armiya snova boesposobna?" [The Georgian Army again Combat Effective?], *Voенно-Промысленный Курер*, 3 July, http://vpk.name/news/71527_gruzinskaya_armiya_snova_boesposobna.html (accessed 3 June 2016).

³⁸ Perelman, Marc (2008) "Israel's Military on Display in Georgia", *Forward.com*, 11 September, <http://forward.com/news/14193/israel-s-military-on-display-in-georgia-02514/> (accessed 29 August 2016).

management policy at the time also contributed to materiel simply being “lost” or fraudulently sold.³⁹

After the war, Georgia started filling these gaps with renewed agreements and increased its efforts to enhance the country’s defence capabilities. Some efforts were also made to develop a national arms industry, in order to reduce dependency on foreign supplies. In 2011 the country unveiled its first locally produced APC, the *Didgori*, followed a year later by the new locally produced combat vehicle, the *Lazika* Infantry Fighting Vehicle.⁴⁰

The Special Operation Forces branch of the GAF is based around a special forces brigade (intelligence, counterterrorist operations) directly subordinated to the General Staff. The National Guard, with 1 600 active reservists, is used as reserve for the GAF. After the Five-Day War, the Georgian navy, which suffered great losses in the war, was incorporated into the Coast Guard, which is part of the Border Guard Department and subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁴¹

The Ministry of Defence

Within the authority granted by Georgian legislation, the MoD ensures the implementation of state policy in the defence sphere. The MoD is led by the Minister of Defence, who is accountable to the prime minister and President – as the commander-in-chief of the GAF. The goal of the MoD is to manage the development and transformation of the GAF, ensure constant combat and mobilisation readiness, strengthen combat effectiveness and maintain capability for repulsing any aggression or encroachment on Georgia’s independence.⁴² The current Minister of Defence is Levan Izoria (since 1 August 2016), who became the fourth holder of the post since the Georgian Dream coalition came into government in late 2012. The former minister, Tinatin Khidasheli (2015-16), was the first woman in the post in the history of Georgia.


³⁹ Interviews Tbilisi 13-16 June 2016.

⁴⁰ army-technology.com (n.d.) “Didgori Armoured Personnel Carrier, Georgia”, <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/didgori-apc/>; “Lazika Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Georgia”, <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/lazika-infantry-fighting-vehicle/> (accessed 10 June 2016)

⁴¹ Hedenskog, Jakob (2010) *Naval Strategies in the Black Sea Region*, FOI-R—2881—SE, August, p. 65.

⁴² Ministry of Defence (2014) “The White Book”, p. 4.

The Structure of the Ministry of Defence of Georgia⁴³



Source: Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book"


The General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces

The General Staff (GS) is responsible for the strategic-operational command and control of the GAF. Its main functions are: to ensure the combat readiness of the GAF, execute political decisions made by the Georgian authorities, within its own competence determine military threats in light of existing military-political realities, ensure structural optimisation of the GAF and engage in military co-operation in accordance within international treaties and agreements. The chief of the GS leads the GAF and reports to the Defence Minister. The president appoints and dismisses the chief of the GS based on the Minister's recommendation and in agreement with the government. The chief of the GS serves as the senior military advisor in agreement with government.⁴⁴ The individual serves as the senior military advisor to the president and is appointed for three years. The current chief of the GS is Major-General Vakhtang Kapanadze (since 22 November 2013).

⁴³ The structure of the MoD is under frequent change. An expert told us that by September 2016, the responsibilities of the current minister, Levan Izoria, are – except for Internal Audit Department and Inspector General – the Human Resources Department, the Military-Technical Affairs Department, the Wounded Warriors Supporting Department and the LEPL Cyber Security Bureau. Further changes in the structure of the MoD are expected to follow after the parliamentary elections in October 2016.

⁴⁴ Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book", p. 4.

The Structure of the General Staff



Source: Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book"


The main objective of the MoD is to establish professional, properly equipped armed forces. During the defence transformation process, special attention is being paid not only to gradual strengthening of defence capabilities, but first and foremost to creating the necessary conditions for military personnel. Taking into consideration the security environment and country’s interests, the main objectives of the GAF as defined in the White Book (2014) are:

- Deterrence and defence;
- Contribution to strengthening regional and international security; and
- Support to civil authorities during natural and manmade disasters.

In accordance with recommendations in SDR 2013-2016, the process of disestablishing the Land Forces Command and instead establishing the East and West Operational Commands is underway and will be completed upon adopting relevant amendments in the legislation.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Ministry of Defence (2014) “The White Book”, p. 7.

The Structure of the Georgian Armed Forces



Source: Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book"


For more than a decade, the Georgian defence budget has reached a level of at least two per cent of GDP, which is the recommended level within NATO. This tendency will continue according to SDR 2013-2016, with 2.1 per cent in 2015 and 2.2 per cent in 2016.⁴⁶ Although the White Book (2014) envisages a small decrease in relation to GDP to a level of 1.9 per cent for 2017, this still represents an increase in the actual funding received by the MoD in actual millions of Georgian lari (GEL) (from 663.8 million GEL in 2016 to 705.8 million GEL in 2017), due to the predicted increase in GDP.⁴⁷ For the level of the Georgian defence budget over time and as a percentage of GDP, see the diagrams below.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ministry of Defence (2014) "Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016", pp. 27-29.

⁴⁷ Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book", pp. 38-40.

⁴⁸ The United States also supports Georgia through its Foreign Military Financial Account. For more on this, see US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm> (accessed 20 September 2016).

Defence Budget of Georgia 2004-2017 (millions of USD) ⁴⁹



Source: Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book"

Defence Budget of Georgia as a Percentage of GDP 2004-2017



Source: Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book"

⁴⁹ Recalculated from Georgian lari using exchange rates from the International Monetary Fund.

The GAF participates in Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan with an infantry battalion of 885 men. This deployment is second in numbers to the United States and the largest of all missions taking into consideration the population of Georgia. Georgia plans to continue providing financial support for the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. Georgia is currently also participating with small deployments in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) and Mali (EUTM Mali).⁵⁰ In addition, Georgia is participating in the NATO counterterrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean, named Operation Active Endeavour. Previous missions include Kosovo (KFOR) in 1999-2008, Iraq (OIF) in 2003-2008 and Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2004-2014. Georgia was one of the largest non-NATO troop contributors to ISAF,⁵¹ with infantry battalions serving with American forces in the volatile province of Helmand.⁵²

In the final communique from the Warsaw summit, the Alliance's leaders highly "appreciates Georgia's significant and continuous contributions to the NATO Response Force and the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan and recognises the sacrifices and contributions the Georgian people have made to our shared security."⁵³

⁵⁰ Military Balance (2016).

⁵¹ NATO (n.d) "Relations with Georgia", http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm (accessed September 1 2016).

⁵² NATO (2013) "Georgia: now the top non-NATO troop contributor in Afghanistan," 26 June, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_101633.htm (accessed 15 August 2016).

⁵³ NATO (2016) Warsaw Summit Communique, 9 July, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed 13 October 2016)

5 Defence Reform

The construction of an independent Georgian national security sector started from scratch following independence. Yet, for various reasons, not least economic, the decade immediately following independence saw little military reform.⁵⁴ Instead, it was Georgia's participation in NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999 that proved instrumental in initiating reform of the defence sector. Not only has it sought to increase interoperability of Georgian defence forces with NATO units, but it has also provided planning targets for various kinds of defence reforms.⁵⁵ The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), on the other hand, has been one of the requirements outlined in the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), a process which began in 2002 when Georgia announced that it wanted to join NATO.⁵⁶ Progress in Georgian defence reform considered crucial to eventual NATO membership is assessed by NATO in the Annual National Programme (ANP).

In addition to NATO, Georgia has received substantial bilateral defence reform assistance from international partners, especially from the US. The US has been supporting Georgian defence reform since 2004, with five advisors (referred to as the CUBIC Advisory Team) working with the GS and MoD on various defence reform-related sectors.⁵⁷ The *European Reassurance Initiative*, launched in 2014 by President Obama, has also resulted in a substantial increase in US foreign military funding to enhance GAF professional military education and develop defence capabilities.⁵⁸

After the Rose Revolution in 2003, substantial numbers of MoD staff and military commanders with foreign military education were asked to leave.⁵⁹ Following the 2008 war with Russia, which experts suggest exposed a lack of sufficient military capacity within the GAF,⁶⁰ the focus for military reform has been to transform the armed forces from a conscription system to that of a professional, volunteer force that operates according to Western standards.⁶¹ This reform has yet to be implemented, however, and the matter of how to actually achieve it is still very

⁵⁴ Atlantic Council of Georgia (2014) "Georgia's Security Sector Review Project, Final Review 2014", http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K6SB.pdf (accessed September 22 2016).

⁵⁵ NATO (2015) "Substantial NATO-Georgia Package", December, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_06/20160614_1606-georgia-sngp-factsheet-en.pdf (accessed September 21 2016).

⁵⁶ DefenceTransparency International (2007) "Reform of Georgia's Defence Sector", January.

⁵⁷ Interview Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book", p.52.

⁵⁹ DefenceTransparency International (2007) Reform of Georgia's Defence Sector," January.

⁶⁰ Menabde, Giorgi (2014) "Georgia Reviews Results of Its Military Reform," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume 11, Issue 21, February 3.

⁶¹ Cecire, Michael (2014) "The Georgian Defence", *Foreign Policy*, March.

much up for debate, as discussed in more detail below. In June 2016, a few weeks before she resigned, the former minister of defence, Tinatin Khidasheli, signed a decree annulling conscription by the MoD. The decree only applied to the MoD and not to other ministries and state agencies such as the Ministry of Interior, state security and others in charge of the penitentiary system. Nevertheless, the decree drew criticism from the prime minister, the president and law-makers from the Georgian Dream coalition, who argued that it should not have been taken by a single official, but should have been discussed by government session and in the National Security Council in advance.⁶²

According to a major report by the think tank Atlantic Council of Georgia published in 2014, many reform challenges remain. The report highlights “insufficient institutionalization of the defence policy planning and management practices” and “the limited efficiency of the military education and training system” as major problems.⁶³ The same report summarises the reform process and its current status as follows: “Georgia already has a functional security system capable of reacting to the changing security environment and adjusting within its capability limits to efficiently respond to both old and emerging security threats and challenges”.

SDR 2013-2016, on the other hand, notes that the most urgent reform need within the Georgian defence sector is to “enhance [the GAF’s] defensive capabilities by modernizing and fully professionalizing the Armed Forces”. It also states that “in order to optimize the capabilities of the [GAF], the focus should be to “develop more effective resource management and force planning systems”, since these systems are “critical in providing a balanced and affordable set of critical military capabilities”.⁶⁴

The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package

The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) was approved by NATO heads of state at the 2014 summit in Wales and is a programme intended to help Georgia in its efforts to improve its defence capability, increase NATO interoperability and make additional progress towards NATO membership. The main idea behind the programme is that NATO allies contribute expert advisors in 13 different defence sector areas (see table below), while Georgia is responsible for all implementation of reform. As opposed to a package of financial or material resources, the SNGP is more appropriately characterised as “jointly developed advice tailored for [the

⁶² Civil Georgia (2016) “Minister Scraps Conscription for MoD, Drawing GDDG’s Criticism”, *Civil Georgia*, 27 June, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=29256> (accessed 19 August 2016).

⁶³ Atlantic Council (2014) p. 10-11.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Defence (2014) “Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016,” p.7.

Georgian] context and ownership”. Georgia is intended to define the vision and end states of defence reform in these different areas, while NATO experts at hand are meant to review the state of affairs and provide a hard analysis of the feasibility of achieving these reform goals given the resources available and timeline proposed. In sum, NATO experts work together with Georgia to identify final reform goals and develop a road map on how to achieve defence transformation.⁶⁵

Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP)

Package initiatives	Lead nation	Other contributors
Acquisition	Latvia	
Air Defence	France	
Aviation	Turkey	Netherlands
Cyber Defence	Estonia	
Defence Institution Building School (DIBS)	Germany	Slovakia
Intelligence Sharing and Secure Communication	Czech Republic	Bulgaria
Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC)	Norway	Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, UK, USA
Logistics Capability	USA	Belgium, Hungary
Maritime Security	Latvia	Turkey, Greece
Military Police	Poland	Turkey
Special Operations Forces	Poland	
Strategic and Operational Planning	Albania	Belgium
Strategic Communications	UK	

Source: NATO DCB Core Team.

As of June 2016, all initiatives have lead nations assigned, but the extent to which they are up and running differs. The Defence Institution Building School (DIBS), the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC) and the Logistics Facility are most developed at this stage (more on this below).⁶⁶

Georgia is intended to provide the funding for implementation of these initiatives itself, something that may prove difficult. In acknowledgement of this, there are currently discussions within NATO on whether it would be possible to create so-

⁶⁵ NATO DCB Core Team (2016) “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP): An Overview, Tbilisi”.

⁶⁶ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

called Trust Funds for the different SNGP initiatives, which would alleviate problems with funding.⁶⁷ Certain SNGP lead countries have also taken upon themselves to provide a certain amount of funding. According to representatives in the GS, the Americans typically fund their projects for five years, making planning of future reform easier.

One challenge to the SNGP is ongoing political developments that distract from the work outlined in the respective package initiatives. The Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2016 mean that the focus may be diverted elsewhere, resulting in less political will or attention to making progress on SNGP initiatives.⁶⁸ Another problem with the SNGP is that it does not include a comprehensive list of areas that are arguably in need of reform. The area which is most conspicuous in its absence from the SNGP list of initiatives is management, an area this analysis finds as being in most need of reform, as expanded on below.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ NATO DCB Core Team (2016) "Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP): An Overview, Tbilisi".

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

6 Assessing Defence Reform Needs within Specific Areas

In this report, we focus exclusively on military capacity reform needs within the Georgian defence sector, defined as the MoD and the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF). This means we do not assess reform needs from a security sector reform perspective.⁷⁰ Although there are a multitude of aspects relevant to military capacity building, due to the open nature of this report and the information available, reform needs with regard to military hardware and intelligence were determined to be beyond the scope of the analysis. Instead, we limit our analysis to management, combat training, technical military cooperation, logistics and professional development. Given the scarcity of information regarding some of these areas, the space devoted to these in sections of the report varies.

We analyze reform needs within five specific areas of the defence sector. In order to do so, we assess the extent to which the current organization and capabilities within each area is capable of achieving its purpose effectively.

Management

Of the defence reform areas discussed in this report, the general consensus among people interviewed with insights into the Georgian defence reform process is that management constitutes the greatest challenge. This section discusses these problems as they relate to the MoD and to the GAF.

Ministry of Defence

Several experts noted that structural or systemic obstacles within the MoD make it difficult to build up a civilian cadre of experts, something that jeopardizes knowledge build-up and makes it difficult to uphold an institutional memory. The main reason for this is that the majority of senior positions within the MoD are political appointments, causing personnel to rotate every time the minister of defence changes. Upon the appointment of a new minister, senior staff are either fired or moved to whatever government ministry the former minister is next assigned. Since the MoD has changed frequently in the last couple of years (there have been four defence ministers since 2012), this constitutes a serious management problem.⁷¹

⁷⁰ For more on what a security sector reform perspective entails, see Lins de Albuquerque, Adriana and Hedenskog, Jakob (2015), "Ukraine: A Defence Sector Reform Assessment", FOI-R-4157—SE, December.

⁷¹ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

Another complicating factor making knowledge building difficult is that the individuals appointed minister of defence and their respective nearest staff usually have limited insights into security policy. As an example, the former defence minister and her deputies were all lawyers and had worked in civil society.⁷² This resulted in a time-consuming process for them to acquire the knowledge necessary to conduct their job effectively. Consequently, by the time ministers and their senior staff have come up to speed, it is often time for a new minister to be appointed, at which point the process starts all over again.⁷³

What makes matters worse is that the system is very top-down driven, meaning that civil service personnel at lower levels, who in many ways represent the only continuity in place at the ministry, are not empowered to make very many decisions on their own in their day-to-day work. Consequently, work at the MoD more or less stops in its tracks every time a new minister is assigned, since it takes time for this individual to assign all the senior-level staff who need to be in place in order to give the lower-level employees their work orders.⁷⁴

Since senior positions within the MoD are appointed by the incoming minister and often go to party members, there is little possibility for lower-level personnel without personal or political connections to have a strong career trajectory within the MoD.⁷⁵ This, in combination with poor job security – it is very easy to fire government employees at the lower levels – means the MoD has a retention problem not only at the higher levels, but also at the lower echelons of the organisation.⁷⁶

Although the government is very much aware of the management problems within the MoD, it is difficult to see how it can solve this problem, since incoming ministers of defence see it as their prerogative to bring with them their own group of trusted co-workers. The problem could potentially be solved over time if the system were to become less top-down driven, but how this would occur without a decision from senior government officials – who currently benefit from the system – is difficult to imagine.

Previous administrations have sought to overcome the problem by trying to implement more of a paper trail (strategic plans) that allows incoming personnel to come up to speed with current projects more quickly. However, newly appointed ministers of defence usually wish to make a personal mark and push for trademark

⁷² Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ One expert noted that the new Law on Civil Service that is ready for implementation in January may perpetuate bad hiring and firing practices by allowing people to become hired on a less permanent contract basis.

⁷⁶ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

policies. This means that they are often not as enthusiastic about, or regard it as a priority, to merely proceed with policies left in place by their predecessor.⁷⁷ Indeed, one expert allegedly overheard the former minister of defence saying that she disagreed with 90 per cent of the policies outlined in the [previous] *Minister's Vision* document. Consequently, there are several impediments to the MoD being able to function efficiently. Having said that, Georgia has taken some steps to address these issues. For example, a new civil service law that is intended to prevent promotion through nepotism will come into effect in 2017.⁷⁸

Georgian Armed Forces

Just like the MoD, the GAF has some management problems, especially concerning human resources. In addition, the country has sought to transition from a conscription army to a professional army, in order to be more in line with Euro-Atlantic standards. However, how exactly to do this and whether it is economically and practically feasible continues to be debated. The following sections discuss these two issues in turn.

The first problem with GAF human resources is recruitment and retention. Although the military on average is well regarded by the population, a military career is generally not considered attractive. Even individuals who would like to pursue such a career have problems advancing without personal connections. This means that positions within the GAF have often been criticised for being filled through nepotism rather than merit. In addition, experts reported that military officials who have received valuable international training or education abroad often fail to be incorporated into the system in a manner that allows them to draw on these skills and contribute.⁷⁹

Relatively recent reforms have sought to address this issue. Starting in 2014, military salaries will be set by rank, rather than position.⁸⁰ The new system is standard among Western militaries. The transition from a pay-by-position to a pay-by-rank system is a reform that NATO deemed obligatory for Georgia to fulfil in order to proceed with the membership process.⁸¹

A second key reform objective for the GAF is to end conscription and develop into a professional army. The advantage of transitioning to a professional army is that it is more in line with Western standards and allows for the development of a more skilled army. The disadvantage is of course that a professional army would result in a decrease in the size of the army, as well as being much more expensive than a conscription army. Yet several issues with the current conscription system suggest

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ministry of Defence (2014), "The White Book", p. 18.

⁸¹ Ibid.

that it is not only not an inferior option for ensuring national defence, but also that it is unfair. Although the current system requires men aged 18-27 years to serve for 18 months, various exemption clauses make it easy for certain groups to avoid conscription. According to Eric Livny, president of Tbilisi's School of Economics, this means that the "only people unfortunate enough to serve in the Georgian military are under-educated village boys who are not quick enough to reproduce".⁸² The majority of conscripts also do not appear to be used for tasks vital to national security. The current minister has said that only 10 per cent of conscripts receive military training, and that 90 per cent only perform menial tasks such as guarding prisons, government buildings and military bases.⁸³

The process of phasing out conscription has been on the agenda since 2014 and is meant to be completed by the end of 2017. Whether this is possible remains to be seen, but what appears clear is that further progress will not depend on a lack of political will. In addition to uncertainty about whether Georgia can afford a professional army, one serious impediment to implementing this reform is how to handle the reserves system once conscription is ended, making the transition problematic. The reserve force is intended to provide additional military manpower beyond the small professional force during times of mobilisation. Yet, without conscription it is unclear how Georgia can maintain a large enough reserve force for this to be possible.⁸⁴ Much work within the GS is currently being devoted to how to construct a feasible reserves system that allows Georgia to manage the transition from a conscript to a professional army in a way that does not jeopardise military readiness.⁸⁵

Ongoing related reform projects supported by international donors

As far as we could discern, there are no official internationally supported reform projects specifically devoted to management. Having said that, the American CUBIC advisory team is most likely assisting the Georgians in some capacity on this matter. In addition, representatives of the GS noted that they have been getting input from Norway on how to develop a new reserves system.⁸⁶

⁸² Livny, Eric (2016) "On Education and the Sacred Duty of Defending One's Motherland," *Georgia Today*, 29 February, <http://georgiatoday.ge/news/3123/On-Education-and-the-Sacred-Duty-of-Defending-One%E2%80%99s-Motherland> (accessed 22 September 2016).

⁸³ Aladashvili, Irakli (2015) "Does Georgia Need Military Conscription," *Georgian Journal*, 7 August, <http://www.georgianjournal.ge/military/31192-does-georgia-need-military-conscription.html> (accessed 22 September 2016).

⁸⁴ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

⁸⁵ Colonel Shalva Chubimidze, Head of Reserves and Mobilization Planning Department is the author of the latest draft of the "Georgian Armed Forces Mobilization and Reserve Concept," 2016.

⁸⁶ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

Combat Training

Combat training is a reform priority by Georgia, as mentioned in SDR 2013-16.⁸⁷ A major 2014 report written by the Georgian Atlantic Council noted that one of the key areas that needed developing was the Georgian military training system, which the report describes as being of “limited efficiency”.⁸⁸ This appears to be still partly true, at least with regard to training of conscripts, with one foreign military expert claiming that these do not even go through basic training.⁸⁹

As indicated above, NATO has been a key donor with regard to providing aid related to training since 1999, not least through the Partnership for Peace programme. The US-sponsored International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, which Georgia joined in 1994, has also been important.⁹⁰ Starting in 2002, Georgia has also been a participant in the US-funded military capacity development assistance programme “Train and Equip,” which some experts suggest “laid down the foundation for construction of the modern Georgian army and defence institutions”.⁹¹

Ongoing related reform projects supported by international donors

Georgian military personnel deployed for international missions generally receive quite a lot of training, primarily as part of pre-deployment training led by international partners. For example, the US and Germany have provided such training to Georgian troops deployed to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Such training is especially valuable to Georgia given that it is working to enhance interoperability with NATO forces. Nevertheless, numerous military experts we consulted pointed out that the experiences acquired in Afghanistan do not necessarily translate to the Georgian national setting, given the differences in the nature of the threat, geography and topography.⁹² In addition, the tasks in these two theatres are very different: in Afghanistan there is a focus on counter-insurgency, whereas the military objective in Georgia is territorial defence.

More recently, this assistance has been expanded to including JTEC, the SNGP initiative established in August 2015. JTEC will offer opportunities for Georgian defence forces to train and exercise in a multi-national setting, starting in 2016.⁹³

⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence (2013) “Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016”, p. 7.

⁸⁸ Atlantic Council of Georgia (2014) pp. 10-11.

⁸⁵ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016

⁹⁰ Atlantic Council of Georgia (2014) p.10.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ NATO (2015) “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package,”

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_06/20160614_1606-georgia-sngp-factsheet-en.pdf (accessed September 21 2016).

JTEC is a joint NATO-Georgian project, currently led by eight Georgian military officers and six NATO officers from Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway. Norway is the JTEC lead country and Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the UK and the US are currently programme contributors. A Swedish military officer will also be joining the team at some time during 2016. The JTEC headquarters are co-located with Georgia's national training facility, the Training and Military Education Command (TMEC), in Krtsanisi. In the future, the plan is to have a number of JTEC training facilities around the country.

JTEC will serve several purposes. First, the Combat Training Centre seeks to enhance the capabilities of the GAF through training based on threat scenarios. The Combat Training Centre will evaluate training and provide feedback and evaluation to the Tactical, Operational, Strategic and Training Commands in the GAF, but also to the GS and the MoD. The tactical training provided will be in line with Georgian national security concepts,⁹⁴ and therefore focused completely on defensive operations.⁹⁵ Second, this training will also allow GAF to improve understanding of NATO doctrines and training standards, thus allowing it to enhance NATO interoperability. JTEC will also facilitate joint exercises between Georgia, NATO and Partner Nations.⁹⁶ In addition, JTEC is intended to function as a "regional hub for best practice in military training and evaluation" and to invite military personnel from the Caucasus and Black Sea region to participate in regional exercises.⁹⁷

According to one military expert with insights into JTEC, the initial training of Georgian military, which started in 2016, is going very well and access to equipment is not an issue.⁹⁸

The US and the UK are also supporting the GAF bilaterally with training. For example, since 2010 the US has been providing the GAF with the opportunity to train using a simulation centre, which it now does partly through JTEC. This is a cost-effective way to train commanders and staff using a system employed by most Western militaries.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ NATO (2015) "NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), Fact sheet," 27 August, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20150827_150827-jtec-georgia.pdf (accessed 22 September 2016).

⁹⁵ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

⁹⁶ NATO (2015) "NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), Fact sheet," 27 August, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20150827_150827-jtec-georgia.pdf (accessed 22 September 2016).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Interviews Tbilisi 13-16 June 2016.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Finally, Poland is the lead country and contributor to a SNGP initiative aimed at training special operations forces.¹⁰⁰

Technical Military Cooperation

SDR 2013-2016 notes the crucial importance of modernising Georgian defensive military capabilities, and states that one step towards doing so is by “improv[ing] the capacity of Georgia’s national defence industry and enhanc[ing] the existing framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation”.¹⁰¹ Although this status report is somewhat dated, it suggests that Georgia would be interested in looking into enhancing its current technical military cooperation with donor countries.

Given the open nature of this report, we were unable to obtain information about bilateral programmes related to sensitive technical military cooperation to the extent desired. The only internationally supported aid related to technical military cooperation discussed here in detail is therefore assistance with humanitarian demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), as well as provision of equipment and training to the Georgian Military Explosive Disposal Company.

The Georgian problem of areas contaminated with hazardous weapons materials stems from the Soviet era, but there has also been contamination from the 2008 war with Russia.¹⁰²

Ongoing related reform projects supported by international donors

The primary internationally supported aid related to technical military cooperation is assistance with humanitarian demining and EOD and provision of equipment and training to the Georgian Military Explosive Disposal Company. This aid has been provided primarily through various NATO PfP Trust Funds.

The current NATO Support Agency Trust Fund (IV) focuses on providing assistance for clearing mines and unexploded munitions, with particular focus on the Georgian Military Ammunition Depot at Skra, west of the town of Gori. The project also provides specialist training to the Georgian Army Engineer Brigade. The Czech Republic and Lithuania are lead nations for the project, which is also supported by Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the US. The Swedish and Luxembourgian Armed Forces have both provided EOD training and mentoring to personnel from the Georgian Army Engineer Brigade.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ NATO DCB Core Team (2016) “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP): An Overview, Tbilisi”.

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Defence (2013) “Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016”, p.7.

¹⁰² Phone interview, Stockholm, May 2016.

¹⁰³ NATO (2016) “Georgia IV Nato PfP Trust Fund”, February.

More generally, since 1994 Georgia has been engaged within NATO's Science for Peace and Security (SPS) framework. The SPS focuses on collaboration between NATO and Georgia and other partner countries with the goal of enhancing cooperation in this sphere in order to enhance security, for example in energy security and cyber defence. In 2015, Georgia hosted a SPS training course on the topic of "cooperative solutions to critical security issues in the Black Sea region".¹⁰⁴

Logistics

According to SDR 2013-16, the Georgian defence logistics system – a key component of maintaining military readiness – is not yet up to modern standards.¹⁰⁵ The reason for this is largely insufficient funds to purchase the equipment needed to modernise the system. More specifically, the report states that the "development of modern automation tools to improve routine management functions has been slow to mature".¹⁰⁶

One international expert with insights into Georgian military logistics system describes it as one of the reform areas that is most wanting. According this expert, there is almost no capability at the tactical level, resulting in nothing being available on the battlefield. One concrete example of how the logistics system is lacking is the limited availability of replacement parts. This results in the brigades being unable to function effectively.¹⁰⁷

Although one expert with insights into this matter considers that the country has come a long way with the reform process with regards to logistics, others directly involved in the reform process disagree.¹⁰⁸ The latter note that they have not seen any doctrine with regards to logistics, suggesting there is no clear process by which the ordering of parts etc. is conducted. Given the importance of doctrine to a functional logistics system, these experts suggest that this will be a central part of reform going forward.¹⁰⁹

Representatives of the Georgia Reforms Coordination Division (a very small unit organised under the MoD) seemed to echo the notion that there is still a lot to be done within the area of logistics. Logistics is particularly important to Georgia for

¹⁰⁴ NATO (2016) "Relations with Georgia".

¹⁰⁵ Ministry of Defence (2014) "Strategic Defence Review 2013-2016", p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016. It is possible that the GAF have been able to overcome this problem in overseas missions because they work closely with partners such as the US and Germany, who are in charge of logistics for the mission.

¹⁰⁸ Phone interview, Stockholm, June 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

two reasons. First, it is central to being able to maintain military readiness and territorial defence. Second, having the same codification system as NATO allies is a priority requirement for NATO membership. Representatives of the Georgia Reforms Coordination Division were frank about needing support in reforming their logistics system. They describe the current system as old and complex and being in need of expertise that will impart best practices in reforming logistics, as Georgia currently does not have expertise in this field. Having said that, Georgia has taken some initial steps towards reform, the representatives noted. Georgia is in the process of developing an electronic warehouse system and the J4/8 department, which carries out resource planning, has also been involved in this process. Nevertheless, Georgia “needs deep analysis and clear recommendations”, as well as resources from international allies on how to proceed in order to build a good logistics system, according to Georgia Reforms Coordination Division representatives.¹¹⁰

Ongoing related reform projects supported by international donors

NATO is assisting Georgia in reforming its logistics system through a logistics programme within the SNGP. The US is lead country for this programme, which is referred to as the *Logistics Facility*. The main function of this project is to “facilitate the reception and movement of NATO and Partner forces, equipment and supplies during participation in military training and exercises, crisis management operations and NATO-led and other international operations”.¹¹¹ According to an international expert with insights into the SNGP programme, the American scoping mission of the programme is completed and the next phase, which entails American experts and Georgians working together to produce a realistic end-goal and the roadmap of how to achieve it, was scheduled to begin in summer 2016.¹¹²

Professional Development

Professional development is an area in which Georgia is especially eager to receive assistance.¹¹³ Professional development can be understood as intellectual capacity building and entails both military and civilian (MoD) knowledge acquisition of various kinds, as exemplified below.

¹¹⁰ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹¹¹ NATO (2015) “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package.”

¹¹² Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹¹³ Ibid.

With regard to higher military education, the National Defence Academy (NDA) of Georgia is the central institution.¹¹⁴ The first cohort of Bachelors' degree candidates graduated from the school in 2016. It is currently in the process of developing a Masters' programme, which is planned to open for enrolment in September 2016.¹¹⁵ One international expert familiar with Georgian military education opined that doing so is premature, citing the need to further develop the Bachelors' programme instead and claiming that Georgia lacks the funds to pay for the Masters' programme.¹¹⁶ In the view of this expert, focusing exclusively on the Bachelors' programme would be especially prudent given that limitations within the general Georgian school system mean that students enrolling at the NDA are often underprepared for the studies ahead.¹¹⁷

Given the problems with the management system within the MoD and GS and military discussed above, it is also unclear whether personnel receiving academic training are put to good use within the system upon their graduation. Hence, to fully benefit from personnel receiving higher education, it may first be necessary to reform the management system so that such individuals can more easily be placed in positions where their skills can benefit the GAF or MoD. An additional problem closely linked to management is how to ensure that personnel, once placed in a position, are given the resources to continue developing the skills needed to perform their job satisfactorily.¹¹⁸

For the purposes of being able to work jointly with NATO allies or affiliates, or indeed to be able to benefit from professional development courses organised by international donors, knowledge of English is key. Hence, the first frontier of professional development for so-called "train-the-trainer" programmes to be feasible is often English language training. Consequently, assistance with such training is frequently requested by Georgia. However, one international expert suggests that the manner in which this assistance is requested is not always appropriate, resulting in English language training being requested from NATO members and affiliates that are not necessarily fully proficient in English themselves.¹¹⁹

Another request for assistance often voiced when speaking to Georgian General Staff representatives is advice in strategic planning. Two aspects in particular were

¹¹⁴ Cadets are trained at the General George Kvinitadze Military Lyceum of Cadets, founded in 2010. Ministry of Defence (2014) "White Book 2014", p. 27.

¹¹⁵ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹¹⁶ Phone interview, June 2016.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016. A UK Cabinet Office review team will be conducting a study of the effectiveness and targeting of the Professional Development Programme in Georgia in the near future.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

mentioned. First, Georgia would be interested in advice on how to best spend its limited military funds to maximise its defence. Second, Georgia would welcome assistance with strategic planning from Sweden. Although Georgia receives some advice in these matters from NATO and the US, representatives of the GS noted that it would be very helpful to get the perspective of a country like Sweden, which is more similar to Georgia with regard to its size, economy and national security threats.¹²⁰

Ongoing related reform projects supported by international donors

The NATO Professional Development Programme for civilian personnel in the MoD and other security institutions has been operational in Georgia since 2009. It aims to educate civilian officers at the MoD in an effort to enhance democratic control of the armed forces and oversight in the defence sector. Priority areas covered by the programme include English language training, human resources management, defence policy and planning. Countries supporting this particular programme include Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Turkey, the UK, the US and Georgia. Sweden is participating within the framework of the Nordic Baltic Initiative (NBI). Programme leads are the NBI and the UK.¹²¹

The US also sends instructors to the Georgian National Defence Academy's Language Training School to assist in developing the English language study programmes, and to support the programme with education training and provide training opportunities for Georgian instructors in the US.¹²² The US is providing five advisors to the Command and General Staff College, and has been supporting the institution since 2011.¹²³

The UK also provides bilateral assistance for Georgian defence capability building, including English language training.

Georgia has been participating in NATO's *Building Integrity Programme*, which focuses on providing practical assistance and advice in order to lessen corruption by strengthening accountability and transparency in the defence sector,¹²⁴ since 2013.¹²⁵ According to an international expert with insights into this work, Georgia has made much progress in this field. Indeed, the expert fears that there is a sense that the programme has been so successful that no further work is needed. This

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ NATO (2016) "NATO-Georgia Relations", July.

¹²² Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ NATO (2016) "NATO-Georgia Relations", July.

¹²⁵ Ministry of Defence (2014) "The White Book", p. 11

would be a mistake, the expert notes, since monitoring progress is key to achieving long-term results in anti-corruption.¹²⁶

In addition, NATO is supporting the development of the National Defence Academy within the framework of the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP).¹²⁷ The DEEP programme is also supported by the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, institutes formed by the Partnerships Training and Education Centres and allied defence institutions.¹²⁸

One key SNGP project is the Defence Institution Building School (DIBS). The purpose of this institution, for which Germany is lead country, is “to offer professional development programmes and quality training to support institutional reforms and good governance of the security sector, including the civil service”. In doing so, it will build on the work already being conducted by existing institutions and programmes such as the NDA, DEEP and Building Integrity Programme.

Representatives of the GS reported a lack in assistance with strategic planning, but there is actually an existing platform intended to provide such counsel. The Military Committee with Georgia, a NATO institution, is designed to assist Georgia with strategic planning, in addition to defence reform and implementation of the defence-related issues relevant to the ANP.¹²⁹ The US is also providing assistance with developing strategic planning and general defence planning, in addition to doctrine development.¹³⁰ A key part of the SNGP is also to provide more strategic advice to the MoD and GS by having international advisors from NATO and partner countries seconded to work embedded in the MoD. One expert reported that this has yet to happen on a more practical level, however, as these individuals do not work directly alongside the teams they are trying to develop, often having to ask for semi-formal meetings only to work with the people they are meant to advise.¹³¹

¹²⁶ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹²⁷ NATO (2016) “NATO-Georgia Relations”, July.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ NATO (2016) “NATO-Georgia Relations”, July.

¹³⁰ Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Coordination of International Support for Defence Reform

To what extent is the Georgian government coordinating defence reform related to military capacity building with international donors? As part of the SNGP, Georgia works closely with experts from lead countries for the various projects. The Georgian defence reform process, as it is linked to areas of relevance for NATO membership, is also monitored annually as part of the ANP intended to prepare the country for eventual membership in the organisation. It is also rather easy for donor countries to find out who the contributing countries to NATO affiliated projects are, but through the NATO website rather than through the Georgian MoD. Information about bilateral donor support is more difficult to obtain, however. This is supposedly because some of these bilateral programmes relate to sensitive areas, such as military hardware, that both donors and Georgia prefer to remain classified. According to one expert with insights into the workings of the MoD, coordination within the ministry is very scarce, something which in turn affects the ability of donors to obtain information. Having said that, this was not evident to us in our interaction with the MoD, representatives of which appeared to be very clear about what specific assistance they would be most interested in receiving from Sweden. Given the specifics of these requests (for a full list see the Appendix), there is nothing to suggest that Sweden was given the same list used in communicating assistance requests to other countries. Hence, we concluded that although the MoD appears to coordinate defence reform to some extent internally, it does not necessarily make all this information readily accessible to international partners automatically.¹³²

Various international experts and diplomats with insights into the Georgian defence reform process point out that the country's solicitation of reform assistance is often untargeted. According to these experts, this results in Georgia asking numerous countries, not all of which necessarily have adequate level of expertise needed, to provide advice related to the specific request. Georgia also does not necessarily see the need to coordinate international donor assistance, since receiving overlapping aid is not necessarily viewed as a problem. The same experts also point out that this behaviour should not be interpreted as nefarious, merely that international donor coordination is not an area to which Georgia considers it should devote resources, given other pressing needs.¹³³

To what extent are international donors coordinating their support to Georgian defence reform amongst themselves? As noted above, NATO member states and affiliates can rather easily obtain information about the countries supporting

¹³² Interviews Tbilisi, 13-16 June 2016.

¹³³ Ibid.

various NATO-sponsored defence reform programmes. Yet, international diplomats with insights into the donor community note that NATO members and affiliates are generally unwilling to share information about the bilateral defence reform-related aid they are providing to Georgia, even within the group.¹³⁴ Tellingly, an attempt to coordinate bilateral aid within the NATO member sphere by the NATO SNGP Core Team allegedly did not proceed further due to this.¹³⁵ The reason may be the same as described above, namely that the information is deemed too sensitive and donor countries are only willing to share such data with a select number of allies. For example, the UK and US appear to have a more well-developed routine for coordinating with each other on their respective defence reform assistance programmes in Georgia.

Poor aid coordination within the donor community could be a problem for ensuring that Georgian defence reform takes place across the board, and not just in certain areas. However, one donor country representative noted that this is not necessarily considered a problem by donor countries, who are often more interested in spending the funds allocated for the budget cycle than actually making sure that the funds are targeted at areas in most need of reform.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

7 Summary and Conclusions

Georgia has an ambitious defence reform agenda and the SNGP is an important programme that allows NATO allies and partner countries to assist directly in some crucial reform areas. Yet, many experts believe that the list of SNGP initiatives is not necessarily well thought out, and that important areas, particularly management, may be missing.

Management within the MoD and GAF remains one of areas most in need of reform. However, although there appears to be good awareness of the shortcomings of management and some measures are being taken to address these, reforming management will be difficult. The reason for this is that the problem is closely linked to political culture and structural impediments, making it difficult to bring about the needed reform in this area. As far as we understand, there are no particular reform programmes devoted to management that are supported by international donors. Georgia appears to be in particular need of assistance with regard to understanding how best to manage the transformation from a conscription to a professional army, especially in terms of how to develop a reserves concept during this transition.

Combat training is very much a reform priority, which is not surprising given its centrality to military readiness. Substantial international assistance is provided in this area, most notably by the US and UK, but also through the relatively new SNGP initiative JTEC. This assistance will most likely be increasingly important as the army transitions to becoming fully professional. This report only analyses one aspect of technical military cooperation, namely humanitarian demining and explosive ordnance disposal. Here, Georgia is receiving assistance through NATO Trust Funds and appears to be making substantial progress.

Logistics is another aspect of the Georgian military that experts agree is very much in need of reform. The US is currently lead for a SNGP initiative targeted at transforming the logistics system and has already committed to funding the programme for several years to come. Hence, although much work remains to be done in this sphere, Georgia has an important partner with substantial funds to finance much of the programme for the next couple of years.

Several initiatives related to professional development are underway, with Georgians seemingly placing specific emphasis on higher military education. Many of these programmes are NATO-affiliated, but Georgia is also receiving bilateral aid on this, particularly from the US and UK. In addition to schooling, representatives of the GAF expressed a need for advice on strategic planning. Although there are currently some institutional platforms which should provide such assistance, the Georgian request for strategic planning advice suggests that the current assistance received in relation to this may not be sufficient.

Overall, Georgian defence reform appears to be proceeding rapidly. The country is receiving substantial assistance in numerous important defence reform-related fields, but appears to be very eager to enhance cooperation and fully modernise and transform the defence sector. This is very understandable given the country's national security context and is a feature that is unlikely to change any time soon. International donors wishing to assist Georgia in this endeavour can do so in various ways. This report hopefully provides some insights that will allow the Swedish Armed Forces to attain a better understanding of the defence reform needs within the broader defence sector, information that may help in decision making on specific areas in which to provide assistance.

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Atlantic Council of Georgia

Defence and Security Committee, Parliament of Georgia

EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)

General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces

Joint Training and Evaluation Centre

Ministry of Defence of Georgia

NATO Defence Capability Building Core Team

NATO Liaison Office

Office of Defence Cooperation

State Security and Crisis Management Council

Swedish Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia

Appendix: Specific Georgian Assistance Requests for Sweden

The Ministry of Defence of Georgia communicated to us on June 16, 2016 that the J5 of the General Staff would be especially interested in assistance with the following reform goals: 1) Developing the Georgian defence education system; 2) improving engineering capabilities within the GAF; 3) developing Georgian Special Operations Forces; and 4) enhancing defence cooperation. The specifics of these particular requests are presented verbatim, below. As these requests were communicated by the MoD, they should not necessarily be interpreted as official requests approved by the Georgian government. Given political developments in Georgia, it is possible that these requests may need to be updated. For clarifications or further enquiries, please contact the Georgian MoD directly.

Assistance request 1: Develop the Georgian defence education system

- ***Establish cooperation between Swedish Defence Academy and NDA of Georgia***
 - Establish a strategic leadership programme in Georgia
 - Establish distance learning programmes (ADL)
- ***Establish cooperation between the Swedish Defence Academy and the NDA of Georgia***
 - Assist in establishing a research centre
 - Establish cooperation with various Swedish research centres and institutes in the field of national security, defence planning and military policy.
- ***Establish retention and reintegration programmes***
 - Facilitate the application process to Swedish Masters' and PhD programmes.

Assistance request 2: Improve engineering capabilities within the GAF

- ***Develop Engineering School of Georgian Armed Forces***
 - Retrain instructors, sergeants and teachers at the Engineering School of Georgian Armed Forces
 - Assist the Engineering School in developing an education system, sharing Swedish educational programmes, curricula etc.
 - Assist the Engineering School with course literature and other study material
 - Establish a cooperation framework with the Swedish Armed Forces regarding issues mentioned above

- ***Develop relations with the Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Demining Centre (SWEDEC)***
 - Establish cooperation with the Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Demining Centre (SWEDEC); organise official meetings for experience sharing
 - Grant Georgian specialists access to an EOD Information System (EOD IS) Section package in cooperation with Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Demining Centre (SWEDEC)
 - Create engineering doctrines with the assistance of Swedish side
 - Establish mutual cooperation between Georgian EOD unit and Swedish ING 2
 - Assign a Swedish consultant to the GEO EOD unit on a permanent basis
 - Cooperate with the Swedish side regarding mobility and counter-mobility capabilities development, conduct joint trainings and exercises in this field
 - Enhance cooperation with Swedish Armed Forces in frames of NATO Support Agency (NSPA Trust fund) and continue clearing process in Skra territory
 - Share Swedish experience with Georgian experts in the field of cynology; discuss procedures for sending explosive detector dogs (EDD) to missions abroad (procedure, documentation etc.)
- ***Enhance cooperation through different activities, in order to familiarise the GAF with Swedish divisions' methods and system***
 - Involve Georgian military personnel in Swedish "Advance Searching Training" with the status of observers.
 - Prepare permanently Georgian groups with five members in Sweden
 - Assist Georgian military personnel in English language study process

Assistance request 3: Develop Georgian Special Operations Forces

- ***Transform Special Operations Forces***
 - Share experience in the field of mountain and Arctic operations through conducting joint exercises and other activities
 - Share experience through the sea diving direction

Assistance request 4: Enhance defence cooperation

- *Share experience and information; elaborate specific agreement and technical protocols in order to regulate different fields of cooperation*
 - Create working group of experts in order to define and elaborate the agreement and various technical protocols.

This analysis is meant to provide an overview of the Georgian defence sector with the purpose of identifying future reform needs with regards to military capacity building. The primary aim of the report is to serve as a source of information for the Swedish Armed Forces when planning the future assistance to Georgian defence reform. The report looks at a number of key areas within the Georgian defence sector and identifies related reform projects and international donors affiliated with these. The report also discusses the extent to which Georgia is coordinating these reform efforts with international donors as well as whether international donors are coordinating their support amongst themselves. Finally, the report presents specific reform assistance requests that the Georgian Ministry of Defence (MoD) would be especially interested in getting assistance with from Sweden.

The report on Georgia is the second in a series of three that seeks to assess defense reform needs as well as map international support to defense reform. The authors have previously written a similar report on Ukrainian defense reform needs. A third, and final, report on defense sector reform needs in Moldova is forthcoming in late 2016.

See also: Lins de Albuquerque, Adriana and Hedenskog, Jakob (2015) Ukraine: A Defence Sector Reform Assessment, FOI--4157--SE, December.