



Still a long way to go

A review of the implementation of UNSCR 1325
by United Nations peacekeepers in Mali

Eva Hagström Frisell and Helené Lackenbauer

Eva Hagström Frisell and Helené Lackenbauer

Still a long way to go

A review of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by United Nations peacekeepers in Mali

Bild/Cover: Försvarsmakten

Title	Still a long way to go
Rapportnr/Report no	FOI-R--4573--SE
Month	February
Utgivningsår/Year	2018
Antal sidor/Pages	55
ISSN	1650-1942
Customer	Swedish Ministry of Defence
Forskningsområde	8. Säkerhetspolitik
Project no	A17105
Approved by	Lars Höstbeck
Ansvarig avdelning	Defence Analysis

Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse.

This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI.

Sammanfattning

I denna studie utvärderas MINUSMA:s genomförande av FN:s säkerhetsrådsresolution 1325 om kvinnor, fred och säkerhet. Studien visar att det är en lång väg kvar innan alla delar av resolutionen är implementerad. Även om de grundläggande förutsättningarna finns behöver mycket förbättras för ett framgångsrikt genomförande.

Studien visar att MINUSMA behöver förbättra balansen mellan antalet män och kvinnor i den militära personalen och öka personalens medvetenhet om säkerhetsrådsresolution 1325 i den maliska kontexten. MINUSMA behöver också integrera resolutionens målsättningar om skydd av kvinnor och flickor, samt kvinnors deltagande i planeringen och genomförandet, vid militära operationer.

Det försämrade säkerhetsläget utgör vidare ett hot mot genomförandet av resolutionen, eftersom det finns en risk att terroristbekämpning blir MINUSMA:s huvuduppgift. Detta skulle innebära att andra målsättningar, som skydd av kvinnor och flickor, blir sekundära. MINUSMA har även en rad militära utmaningar som påverkar implementeringen av resolutionen, bland annat det begränsade antalet soldater i operationsområdet, bristen på stödresurser och den låga kompetensnivån inom vissa staters militära förband. Därtill behöver den militära komponentens behov av transport, eskort och logistik prioriteras. För att MINUSMA ska kunna uppfylla målen i säkerhetsrådsresolution 1325 är det nödvändigt att den militära komponentens grundläggande förmåga stärks och att resolutionen - tillsammans med skyddet för civila - behåller sin centrala ställning i MINUSMA:s mandat.

Nyckelord: MINUSMA, Mali, FN:s säkerhetsrådsresolution 1325, kvinnor, fred och säkerhet, FN, DPKO, genus, väpnad konflikt, jämställdhet.

Summary

This study assesses the implementation by MINUSMA of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace, and security. Although several preconditions for a successful implementation exist, there is still a long way to go to ensure the full implementation of the resolution.

MINUSMA needs to improve the gender balance among its military staff, increase troop awareness of UNSCR 1325 in the Malian context, and include the provisions of protection and participation of women in the planning and conduct of military operations.

MINUSMA also suffers the risk of becoming a mission where the counter-terrorism effort is taking precedence over all other provisions – e.g. protection of women and girls – in the mandate. This is exacerbated by the limited number of troops, lack of enabling resources, and untrained personnel deployed by some nations, as well as the military component's need to prioritise transport, escorts, and logistics. In order for MINUSMA to fulfil the provisions of UNSCR 1325, there is a need to strengthen the basic military capability of the mission and ensure that the resolution maintains its central position – together with protection of civilians – in MINUSMA's mandate.

Keywords: MINUSMA, Mali, UNSCR 1325, women, peace and security, UN, DPKO, gender, armed conflict, gender equality.

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations	7
1 Introduction	9
1.1 Aim	10
1.2 Scope and delimitations	10
1.3 Sources and data collection	11
1.4 Outline of the study	11
2 UNSCR 1325 and methodological considerations	13
2.1 Background	13
2.2 UNSCR 1325 – fundamental principles	14
2.3 Key components of an analytical framework.....	15
2.3.1 Concepts – Prevention, Protection, Representation, and Gender Mainstreaming.....	15
2.4 Framework for assessing the implementation of UNSCR 1325.....	18
2.4.1 The framework	19
3 The Malian context	23
3.1 The conflict	23
3.1.1 The role of women and men	24
3.2 MINUSMA	25
4 Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in MINUSMA	27
4.1 Prerequisites for gender mainstreaming	27
4.1.1 MINUSMA's mandate.....	27
4.1.2 Thematic policies.....	28
4.1.3 Leadership and accountability.....	30
4.1.4 Institutional structures and resources	31
4.2 Gender balance	35
4.2.1 Analysis of gender balance among UN staff and TCCs.....	36
4.2.2 Efforts to improve the gender balance	36

4.3	Fundamental understanding	37
4.3.1	Awareness and knowledge	37
4.3.2	Training	39
4.4	Planning and conduct of operations.....	39
4.4.1	Planning	40
4.4.2	Protection activities	42
4.4.3	Liaison activities	43
5	Conclusions and recommendations	45
5.1	Prerequisites	46
5.2	Gender balance.....	47
5.3	Fundamental understanding	47
5.4	Planning and conduct of operations.....	48
	References	51
	Interviews	53
	Seminars	55

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU	European Union
EUTM	EU Training Mission
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency
GFP	Gender Focal Point
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HQ	Headquarters
ISR TF	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force
MDSF	Malian Defence and Security Forces
MGA	Military Gender Advisor
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
OpOrder	Operational Order
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SRSg	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWHQ	Sector West Headquarters

TCC	Troop-contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

1 Introduction

The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has conducted a series of assessments and reviews of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on women, peace, and security in military operations and missions. These include the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia and Mali, NATO missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as the Swedish Armed Force's contribution to peace operations.¹ These reviews have revealed that although UNSCR 1325 has been transformed into various policies and action plans by nations and organisations, it has not necessarily been converted into actions on the ground. This was also the main finding of the global study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, conducted by UNWOMEN in 2015.² In 2017, this conclusion was once again brought forward in the Security Council Report entitled, *“Women, Peace and Security: Closing the Security Council’s Implementation Gap”*.³

The present study assesses the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by United Nations (UN) peacekeepers serving in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, (known by its French acronym, MINUSMA).⁴ MINUSMA is different from other military efforts reviewed by FOI, since its mandate is aligned with the UNSCR 1325 principles, i.e. protection of civilians, especially women and children, and women’s meaningful participation in peace and stabilization efforts. The previous reviews assessed military missions that had to integrate UNSCR 1325 into operations that had other objectives (e.g. counter insurgency) than those of the resolution. Thus, it is of interest to assess whether the integration of UNSCR 1325 in the actual mandate of a military mission contributes to closing the implementation gap.

This assessment has been commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, with the aim of contributing to a deeper understanding of the barriers to successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 in a military context. Its purpose is to provide guidance to policy-makers by identifying both good practices and impediments to the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325.

¹ See Lackenbauer and Langlais (eds.), *Review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions*; Lackenbauer and Jonsson, *Implementing UNSCR 1325 in capacity building missions*; and Lackenbauer and Marklund, *Implementering av genderperspektivet i operationer*.

² UNWOMEN, *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace: A global study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325*.

³ Security Council Report, *Women, peace and security: Closing the Security Council’s implementation gap*.

⁴ Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali.

1.1 Aim

This assessment seeks to contribute to the progress of UNSCR 1325 through a holistic review of the elements with relevance to peacekeeping forces in the field. This includes disentangling some of the theories on UNSCR 1325, and identifying the elements and methods needed to plan and execute a meaningful assessment of the implementation of the resolution. The study thus aims to contribute to the understanding of how the UN and the Troop-contributing Countries (TCCs), as well as other multilateral organisations, can find new solutions for closing the gap between their intentions and their actions on the ground.

The overarching aim of this study is two-pronged:

- to develop an assessment method that encompasses the main intention of UNSCR 1325; and,
- to assess MINUSMA's implementation of UNSCR 1325, through the application of the developed assessment method.

The study is guided by the following research questions:

- Which elements of UNSCR 1325 are necessary to examine in order to make a relevant assessment of the advancement of the resolution?
- Which method is relevant for assessing the principles of UNSCR 1325?
- How has the practical implementation of the provisions of UNSCR 1325 been taken forward in MINUSMA?
- What have been the main challenges, both in terms of MINUSMA's internal work within the mission, and externally, in operations?
- What lessons can be drawn from MINUSMA's implementation of UNSCR 1325 that could improve both current and future peacekeeping efforts?

1.2 Scope and delimitations

MINUSMA was selected as a case study on the basis of it being a newly-established mission with a clear mandate on UNSCR 1325. The UNSC has also paid special attention to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in MINUSMA during 2017. In addition, Sweden has a military contingent deployed to MINUSMA.

MINUSMA is an integrated mission, with both a civilian and a military component, headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). There is a panoply of programs, projects, and activities that both directly and indirectly contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. However, this

study does not attempt to cover all these achievements, nor does it address all of the challenges faced by the mission.

This study's scope is limited to the assessment of the military component. The study seeks to provide an overview of the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and to assess activities crucial for any military force, i.e. mandate, planning, training, and operations, with the aim of providing forward-looking recommendations. However, due to the constraints faced by the UN troops, e.g. the limited number of personnel, deteriorating security, and the limited military training of some troops, it was at times a challenge for this study to find evidence of any implementation of UNSCR 1325. This makes it difficult to assess the planning and conduct of operations. The study has thus sought to analyse to what extent UNSCR 1325 has been considered and integrated overall.

The study takes its starting point at the political-strategic level, at the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), located at UN headquarters (UNHQ), in New York, and follows the chain of command down to the tactical level, through MINUSMA's force headquarters (FHQ), in Bamako, Mali, and the Sector West headquarters (SWHQ), in Timbuktu. Due to the severity of the security situation in Mali, the study had to limit the number of visits to the sectors to one. Thus, Sector West, and the Swedish Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force (ISR TF), were selected to serve as a case study.

1.3 Sources and data collection

The primary data was gathered through semi-structured interviews with a variety of UN staff and peacekeepers. Three field trips – to the United States, Mali, and southern Sweden – were conducted between April and June 2017.

In total, 46 interviews, distributed between military and civilian personnel, were conducted with representatives from DPKO, MINUSMA, the Swedish ISR TF and other TCCs based in Timbuktu, the civil population and Swedish government officials.

In addition to primary data collection in the United States, Mali, and Sweden, the study relies on evidence provided through a review of the literature and other secondary sources.

1.4 Outline of the study

Chapter 2 discusses the content, fundamental principles, and intention of UNSCR 1325, as well as the methodological considerations required for an assessment of the resolution's implementation.

Chapter 3 outlines the context of MINUSMA's deployment. It gives a short overview of the conflict's history, its gendered dimensions, and MINUSMA's tasks.

Chapter 4 analyses MINUSMA's implementation of UNSCR 1325, by employing the analytical framework developed for this study.

Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of the assessment and makes recommendations on how to strengthen MINUSMA's implementation of UNSCR 1325.

2 UNSCR 1325 and methodological considerations

This chapter outlines the content and intention of UNSCR 1325. Based on the necessary requirements laid down in the resolution, the methodological considerations are discussed and the assessment framework is developed.

2.1 Background

When UNSCR 1325, on women, peace and security, was adopted in 2002, it was the first time a Security Council resolution sought to address the protection needs of women during armed conflict and their right to participate in all phases of conflict prevention and conflict management. UNSCR 1325 was born out of an increasing awareness that men and women are affected differently by an armed conflict and that women's needs and grievances were often overlooked, both during the conflict and in the peace process.

Since then, the women, peace, and security agenda has become a rhetorical priority in many states and multilateral organisations. A host of nations and multilateral organisations, e.g. the European Union (EU), UN, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adhere to the provisions of UNSCR 1325 and have adopted action plans for the conduct of military operations and missions.

One of the challenges to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is the panoply of interpretations of the resolution's intentions. Today there is no single understanding or definition of the main principles of UNSCR 1325 regarding military operations. Instead, different institutions and nations have adapted the resolution to their specific mandate, context, and approach.⁵ The interpretations of the resolution have become a field of study in its own right. However, a main line of divergence can be seen between a rights-based approach, stressing women's equal right to participate in all aspects of society, and a utilitarian approach, emphasizing the positive effects the resolution can have on peace and security efforts.⁶ The different schools of interpretation are a challenge to any assessment of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. In the long run, this can be an impediment to women's participation, protection, and improved gender equality, since the objectives of UNSCR 1325 can be diluted through adapted interpretations of the resolution's principles.

⁵ UNWOMEN, *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace*.

⁶ Olsson and Gizelis, *An introduction to UNSCR 1325*, p. 426.

2.2 UNSCR 1325 – fundamental principles

At the core of UNSCR 1325 are three provisions, commonly named the “3 Ps.” The first two of the 3 Ps are *prevention of the conflict* and *protection* of women and their rights during and after an armed conflict.⁷ The resolution calls on all parties to a conflict, including states, to take special measures to protect women and children from gender-based violence.⁸ These measures include ensuring respect for international law, protecting women and girls from sexual abuse, ending impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence and rape, and excluding crimes of sexual violence from amnesty agreements.⁹ Women’s contribution to peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes are underlined, and the necessity of understanding that needs and gender relations change during different conflict phases is also stressed. Article 6 of the resolution expects that states will provide training guidelines and material on women’s rights and on the particular needs of women, as measures of prevention and protection.

The third of the 3 Ps, *participation*, refers to increasing the numbers and involvement of women in decision-making at all levels, in all mechanisms, for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.¹⁰ The resolution, since it also stresses the need to increase women’s participation at the national, regional, international, and local levels, visibly addresses a broad range of stakeholders, while imposing obligations on, among others, governments and the UN as a whole. It also provides a political framework for governments and international institutions to take action by involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures.¹¹

In addition to the 3 Ps, gender mainstreaming is another central provision of the resolution, which strives to have an impact on how international and regional organisations design, plan, and implement peace and security strategies, and other measures. The resolution calls on all actors to adopt a gender perspective, so as to better understand the special needs of women and girls and ensure their protection.¹² To achieve this, the resolution envisions gender-sensitive training for mission personnel (military and civilian); the incorporation of a gender perspective in processes of negotiating and implementing peace agreements; the carrying out of more research; and the improvement of gender-specific reporting on issues related to gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping missions.¹³

⁷ UNSC, *Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security* (2000), Articles 9-15.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Articles 1-6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Article 6.

¹² *Ibid.*, Article 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Articles 5-7, 8 and 16-17.

In 2008, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence against civilians. This resolution reinforces the clauses on sexual violence in UNSCR 1325, and establishes sexual violence both as a tactic and weapon of war, and as a security issue that exacerbates conflict and impedes the restoration of peace.¹⁴ It further demands the adoption of concrete protection and prevention measures to end sexual violence.¹⁵ These include disciplinary action against security forces that are guilty of misconduct, rape, or sexual violence, and training for military forces on the prohibition of all forms of sexual violence. The resolution also recognizes that sexual violence may continue even after the cessation of an armed conflict.¹⁶ Several additional UN resolutions have further developed the intentions of UNSCR 1325 and 1820.

As seen above, the multifaceted nature of UNSCR 1325 is demonstrated by the whole range of crosscutting issues involved and the stakeholders addressed. Nevertheless, the resolution is essentially conceived to serve the dual purpose of 1) protecting women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations and 2) of empowering women in prevention of conflict and as a strategy for attaining sustainable peace.

2.3 Key components of an analytical framework

This section discusses and defines the key elements that need to be incorporated in an assessment of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by military forces.

2.3.1 Concepts – Prevention, Protection, Representation, and Gender Mainstreaming

Any assessment or review of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions needs to address the 3 Ps; *Prevention of conflict*, *Protection of women*, and *Participation of women*, in combination with *gender mainstreaming* efforts, or, in other words, the incorporation of a gender perspective. As mentioned above, there is no universally-accepted interpretation of the 3 Ps. Thus, for the purposes of this assessment, the understanding of the 3 Ps is discussed and defined below. The aim is to determine which aspects are necessary to incorporate in the analytical framework used for assessing the implementation of UNSCR by military actors.

Prevention of the conflict

UNSCR 1325 underscores women's right to participate in the prevention of conflict. In peace-support and peace-building operations, the political and civilian

¹⁴ UNSC, *Resolution 1820* (2008), Article 1.

¹⁵ UNSC, *5916th meeting, Press release*.

¹⁶ Barrow, "UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: Constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law," p. 232.

leadership are in charge of conflict prevention and/or formal peace processes at the macro-level. Armed forces often have a limited or secondary responsibility. Nevertheless, armed forces might in some cases have to prevent or mediate at the micro-level in local conflicts in their area of operations. In addition, they support peace processes through reinforcement of agreements, such as on disarmament and cantonment of armed forces, etc. In a peace-support context, the sheer presence of armed forces could also be understood as a preventive measure, since it may contribute to the de-escalation of a conflict. Therefore, for the purposes of this assessment, prevention and resolution of conflict and peace-building are understood more broadly than just being the formal peace process between warring parties. The definition includes all the measures taken to ensure a secure and safe environment, one that forms the foundation for a peaceful society, both locally and nationally.

Protection

UNSCR 1325 was born out of the experience that women's security concerns in times of armed conflict were not being taken into consideration, since they were often different from those of men. However, there is no universally-agreed definition of the concept of protection. For example, international humanitarian organisations have adopted a definition that defines protection as "*... all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law)*".¹⁷ The UN DPKO limits the definition of protection of civilians to protection from threats of physical violence, which "*encompass all hostile acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury, including sexual violence, regardless of the source or the threat*".¹⁸ This means that peacekeeping forces have the mandate to prevent and intervene against an aggressor even if it is not a warring party, for example the host nation. In the event that civilians are threatened, the peacekeeping forces have the authority to afford direct physical protection, including the use of force.¹⁹

UNSCR 1325 highlights respect for international law, and protecting women and girls from sexual abuse: "*... ending impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence and rape, and excluding crimes of sexual violence from amnesty agreements*".²⁰ An additional step was taken through UNSCR 1820, which affirms that sexual violence against civilians is a crime of war. This resolution reinforces the clauses

¹⁷ Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), *Inter-Agency Standing Committee policy on protection in humanitarian action*, p. 2.

¹⁸ UN DPKO/DFS, *The protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping*, p. 5.

¹⁹ UN DPKO/DFS, *The protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping*.

²⁰ UNSC, *Resolution 1325*.

on sexual violence in UNSCR 1325, and establishes sexual violence both as a tactic and weapon of war, and as a security issue that exacerbates conflict and impedes the restoration of peace. It also calls on nations to take disciplinary action against security forces that are guilty of misconduct, rape, or sexual violence, and to conduct training for military forces, on the prohibition of all forms of sexual violence. UNSCR 1820 also envisions gender-sensitive training for mission personnel (military and civilian).

For the purposes of this study, the definition of protection is aligned with that of UN DPKO, which limits protection to hostile acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury, including sexual violence.

Participation

Women's right to participate in decision-making at all levels, in all mechanisms, for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict is the main intention of UNSCR 1325 and is to be mainstreamed throughout all the other principles. In essence, each of the 3 Ps are about women's right to participate. As mentioned above, prevention is about women's right to participate in prevention of conflict. Protection has a two-pronged intention, which encompasses women's right to be represented and consulted on protection-related matters and to be protected from violence, want and fear.

The principle of participation provides a political framework for governments and international institutions to take action by involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures. The aim of UNSCR 1325 is to ensure that women from rival sides in a conflict, and other female stakeholders affected, are included in the entire peace-building effort.

The principle of participation is two-dimensional, since it makes a distinction between internal representation, for example the staffing policies of international organisations, or gender balance in field missions, and external representation, for example how military personnel interact with the civil population and local partners.²¹

In addition, participation encompasses both quantitative and qualitative goals, which makes it not merely about the number of women, but also about their possibilities to influence and have power in an institution or process.

Gender mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming, or the integration of a gender perspective in all areas and at all levels, is the principle that defines which method should be used to achieve gender equality and implement UNSCR 1325.

²¹ Solhjell and Donadio, *Turning UNSCR 1325 into operational practice: A cross-country study on implementing Resolution 1325 in peacekeeping and military operations*.

In previous reviews conducted by FOI,²² factors essential for successful gender mainstreaming were identified. These factors have also been corroborated by experience of mainstreaming gender into complex organisations, such as governmental ministries and public agencies.²³ The three crucial aspects identified are:

- the *demonstrated willingness of the highest leadership* to implement UNSCR 1325 within the organisation and its activities. This may be reflected in the provision of policy objectives, leadership, available resources, reporting and structural adjustments, together with how the potential benefits of mainstreaming gender are described and how its objectives and usefulness are communicated;
- the *need for facts and figures*. In order to understand the gender balance in an organisation and the relationship between quantitative and qualitative gender equality, there is a need for facts and figures that substantiate them. This demands sex-disaggregated data and information on women's influence and power, and about men's and women's possibilities for combining professional and family life;
- the *personnel's awareness and knowledge* of the 3 Ps and the understanding of basic concepts – such as gender mainstreaming – and methods for implementing them. These are pivotal. To achieve them, an essential requirement is that personnel are given the opportunity to participate in relevant gender training, something that is also suggested by UNSCR 1325, and mentioned above.

2.4 Framework for assessing the implementation of UNSCR 1325

The analytical framework developed for this assessment incorporates the aforementioned principles, concepts, and dimensions. In addition, it has been informed by various analytical methods, such as the *Procedure for sustainable gender mainstreaming* (also known as *the ladder*), developed by the Swedish government; and the *assessment framework* used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), to accommodate the dimensions and specific aspects identified as crucial for an assessment of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The framework consists of four steps, and makes a division between two of the 3 Ps: protection and participation.

²² See Lackenbauer and Jonsson, *Implementing UNSCR 1325 in capacity building missions*; and Lackenbauer and Langlais (eds.), *Review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325*.

²³ SOU 2007:15, *Jämstötöds praktika – Metodbok för jämstötödsintegrering*.

The first three steps in the framework mainly address the internal work required to successfully implement UNSCR 1325. Step four assesses external activities and operations. The assessment of activities is based on the three criteria, *relevance*, *effectiveness*, and *sustainability*, drawn from OECD/DAC's framework for evaluating peace-building operations.²⁴ In the present assessment, this was achieved through a case study of MINUSMA's Sector West.

2.4.1 The framework

1) Examining the prerequisites for gender mainstreaming

The first step in the framework examines whether the will and the conditions for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 are present. It considers the factors that are essential for successful gender mainstreaming. The policy objectives, leadership, available resources, reporting, and organisational structure are analysed, together with how the potential benefits of mainstreaming gender are described, and how the objectives and usefulness are communicated.

The following questions are asked:

- Are *protection* and *participation* included in the provisions of the mandate and subsequent planning documents?
- Are relevant organisational structures and sufficient resources provided for the implementation of UNSCR 1325?
- Does the senior leadership support and manage the implementation of UNSCR 1325?
- Does the leadership regularly and routinely communicate the usefulness of UNSCR 1325?
- Is the leadership held accountable for implementation of UNSCR 1325?

2) Mapping and analysis of the gender balance in the organisation

At this stage, the gender balance in the organisation is analysed. This involves assessing sex-disaggregated data; women's influence and power; and men's and women's possibilities for combining professional and family life.

The following questions are asked:

- What is the ratio between male and female personnel?

²⁴ OECD, *Evaluating peacebuilding activities in settings of conflict and fragility – Improving learning for results*.

- Are women represented in the senior leadership?
- Is there sex-disaggregated data?
- What has been done to increase gender equality within the organisation?
- What are the main obstacles to women's inclusion?

3) Fundamental understanding

The third step examines the personnel's knowledge and awareness about the 3 Ps, and their understanding of related basic concepts, such as gender mainstreaming and the gender perspective. During this step, the staff's opportunities for participating in gender training, along with the training's relevance, are examined.

The following questions are asked:

- Does the staff understand the importance of UNSCR 1325 in the context of the conflict they are deployed in?
- Do they know how to integrate the principles of participation, protection, and gender mainstreaming?
- Have the leadership and their staff participated in gender training?

4) Mapping operations/interventions

At this stage, the evaluation considers the concrete activities designed to meet the objectives, and the tangible and intangible products that result from the operations and activities; the benefits that the intervention is designed to deliver; and the higher-level end-state the intervention is supposed to contribute to. Special attention is given to planning, training, operations, and reporting, all crucial components of any military mission. As mentioned above, three criteria are used; relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.

Relevance is used to assess whether an activity is applicable to the situation. The discussion of relevance hinges on the analysis of the activities that are part of the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

Questions asked are:

- Is the mission based on a gender-aware analysis of the overall conflict?
- Has the mission analysed the security threats and risks to women?
- What human rights and gender analyses have been conducted in order to support the military operations?

- Which stakeholders do the mission interact with on issues of human rights and gender?
- Is the mission working on the right issues in this context at this time?

Effectiveness is used to assess whether the activities have met their *intended* objectives.

Questions asked are:

- What has been done to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the military operations and in the daily activity of the troops?
- What has been done to ensure the meaningful participation of female peacekeepers and a gender-balanced force?
- What steps have been taken to identify women as actors in the area of operations?
- What has been done to protect women and girls from security threats and risks?
- What steps have been taken to address sexual violence in the area of operations?

Sustainability is used to assess the potential for the continuation of benefits after the termination of the program of assistance. The notion of sustainability speaks to whether the benefits that have been achieved by the peacekeeping forces are likely to remain when the assistance has come to an end. In other words, it can be asked whether all of the work of a peacekeeping mission has any potential for continuing to play a positive role in the future transformation of the host country.

- What has been done to ensure a lasting operational effect in the area of operations?
- Which steps have been taken, or are planned, to create long-term processes and/or structures to ensure women's meaningful participation in the mission?
- What has been done to ensure that female actors are consulted regularly and become long-term 'partners' to the peacekeepers in the area of operations and?
- What has been done in order to ensure that security measures taken to guarantee the security and safety of women and girls remain when the peacekeepers are withdrawn from the area of operations?

- Will the results of peacekeeper activities (other than protection and participation) aimed at benefiting women and girls remain when the peacekeepers are gone?

3 The Malian context

3.1 The conflict

Mali's transition to democracy was considered one of the most successful in Africa. However, the events of 2012 revealed how the government had failed to address long-standing societal tensions. One of the most important sources of recurring violence in Mali is the struggle for influence or independence by rebel groups in the north. Since Mali's independence, in 1960, the north has been increasingly marginalised, creating a deep sense of political exclusion, inequality, and marginalisation among its population.²⁵

Launching a fourth rebellion, in January 2012, armed Tuareg groups pushed the Malian army south, taking control over two-thirds of Malian territory. While such armed uprisings have occurred several times since Mali's independence from France, the return to northern Mali of well-trained and equipped fighters, soldiers who had served Gaddafi in Libya until his fall in 2011, gave the separatist groups an unprecedented opportunity to contest the government.²⁶

The inadequate response of the government to the Tuareg uprisings, in combination with the army's insufficient resources, led to a demonstration of discontent by a group of army officers who, by the end of March the same year, took power in a military coup. The Tuareg groups benefited from the chaos that followed the unconstitutional change of power in the capital, and the main separatist Tuareg group proclaimed an independent state in April 2012.²⁷

Soon after the separatist groups had proclaimed an independent state, the north fell into the hands of armed Islamist movements, which effectively side-lined the secular Tuareg groups, both politically and militarily, and assumed control of northern Mali.²⁸

With the armed Islamists advancing towards the south, France launched *Operation Serval*, in January 2013, following a request from Mali's government. Together with troops from Chad and Niger, the French pushed back the armed Islamists and took control over most of the larger population centres. In April 2013, the UN Security Council decided to establish the stabilisation mission, MINUSMA.²⁹

In addition, a peace process was initiated that led to the signing of the so-called Algiers peace agreement, between the Government of Mali and two coalitions of

²⁵ Lackenbauer, Tham Lindell and Ingerstad, "*If our men won't fight, we will*" p. 22.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

armed groups – the CMA and the Platform – in the summer of 2015. However, little progress has been made in implementing its provisions. Part of the problem lies with the peace agreement itself. It was signed under significant international pressure to “close the deal,” and neglected to fully address the intercommunal tensions that exist in the north of Mali; these tensions are a major factor in the ceasefire violations, and in the ideological conflict that has generated the many armed and radical Islamist groups and prevented the advancement of security in the northern regions.³⁰

The security situation remains unstable. There has been an increase in insecurity in the north as a result of more frequent clashes between the armed groups, which are probably trying to position themselves in view of the ongoing peace process. The conflict has spread to the central region around Mopti, which is a development detrimental to peace and stability in Mali. A complicating fact is that MINUSMA’s military presence in this region is weak, due to the limited number of peacekeepers deployed to the mission.³¹

Security is also threatened by widespread banditry that particularly targets vehicles and convoys, and by high levels of activity from armed Islamist groups, which continue to conduct operations. In addition, attacks against MINUSMA and the French forces of the anti-terrorist operation *Barkhane* are increasing in number.³² In cooperation with the *Group of Five for Sahel* – made up of the neighbouring countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – MINUSMA seeks to prevent transnational violent extremism.³³

3.1.1 The role of women and men

The role of women in the armed conflict in Mali is as complex as that of men. Women who support or join an armed group do so in the context of supporting their sons, husbands, brothers, or fathers, in line with their ethnic group or class. While women and children have suffered enormously during and after the armed conflict, the role of women is much more than being victims of violence, or a force for peace. Women in the north are also a driving force as mobilisers, encouraging men to take up arms and providing support to the armed cause in different forms. Masculinity, and what it means to be a man, has also had an impact on the dynamics of the armed conflict, since armed groups offer opportunities to fulfil expectations linked to the male identity.³⁴

³⁰ Hull Wiklund and Nilsson, *Peace in Mali? An analysis of the 2015 Algiers agreement and its implementation*, p. 4.

³¹ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

³² Operation *Barkhane* was launched in July 2014, and is the successor to Operation *Serval*. The operation covers Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.

³³ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, 26 December 2017.

³⁴ Lackenbauer, Tham Lindell and Ingerstad, “*If our men won’t fight, we will*” p. 22.

In 2015, FOI conducted a gender-based conflict analysis in northern Mali. It revealed that the local population in the north perceives the Islamists as being groups that have exploited, through their provision of services such as health care and employment, the vacuum left behind by the absent government. They have also used the stratification of social classes to gain the support of impoverished communities and offer some sort of social mobility to both poor women and men.³⁵

3.2 MINUSMA

MINUSMA was established by the UN Security Council in April 2013, with the aim of supporting the political processes in Mali and conducting security-related tasks. A major duty is to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and the implementation of the peace process.³⁶

In June 2014, UNSC passed an additional resolution determining that MINUSMA should also focus on duties such as: ensuring the security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting in the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.³⁷

After the signing of the Algiers peace agreement in 2015, MINUSMA's mandate was reviewed. According to the mandate from June 2016, MINUSMA's main tasks are to support the implementation of the peace agreement, including support of the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) in the Centre and North of Mali. The new mandate also enhanced MINUSMA's tasks related to protection of civilians and the UN troops. MINUSMA was further tasked with anticipating and deterring threats, and with taking robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks. The authorized troop levels were raised to 13,289 military personnel, including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country when required, and 1,440 police officers.³⁸ In 2018, the UN will carry out a strategic review, with a view to once again revise MINUSMA's mandate.

MINUSMA is an integrated mission, or, in other words, a civil-military mission, led by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG). It is organized in four sectors, i.e. East, West, North, and South. The military component is headed by a force commander who is under the authority of the SRSG.³⁹

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ MINUSMA web page.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ UNSC, *Resolution 2295* (2016).

³⁹ Ibid.



Figure 1: MINUSMA's sectors in Mali

4 Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in MINUSMA

This chapter employs the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 to analyse MINUSMA's implementation of UNSCR 1325.

4.1 Prerequisites for gender mainstreaming

The first step in applying the analytical framework is to examine whether there is the will to implement UNSCR 1325, as well as the conditions for its implementation. This section thus considers: the integration of provisions relating to the protection and participation of women in MINUSMA's mandate and mission concept; the guidance provided by UN thematic policies; the mission leadership's support and accountability for implementation; and the organisational structures and resources available to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

4.1.1 MINUSMA's mandate

The women, peace, and security agenda is included in the mandate of individual UN peacekeeping operations in various ways. In the case of MINUSMA, the mandate from June 2017 includes both general references to UNSCR 1325 as well as specific tasks related to the situation of women. The mandate stresses the need to take gender considerations into account as a cross-cutting issue, and to ensure the participation of women in the implementation of the peace agreement. It also requests full compliance with the UN zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. It specifically acknowledges that the situation of women needs to be taken into account in the implementation of tasks relating to cantonment and "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration" (DDR), reconciliation, protection of civilians, and the promotion and protection of human rights.⁴⁰ MINUSMA's mandate is thus aligned with the main UNSCR 1325 principles: participation and protection.

Following from the mandate, the Mission Concept, developed at the mission-strategic level, translates the mandate into a desired end-state and core mission objectives. MINUSMA's Mission Concept was last updated in November 2016. The mission's desired end-state includes reformed Malian institutions and restored state authority throughout Mali's territory, on the basis of the peace agreement and an inclusive peace. The three core objectives are:

- a sustainable, credible, and inclusive peace process;

⁴⁰ UNSC, *Resolution 2364* (2017), para 20 (a) (ii), 20 (b), 20 (c) (iii), 20 (f) (ii), 27 and 28.

- security and the redeployment of the Malian security and defence forces; and
- full operational capacity of the mission.

Women are specifically mentioned under the core objective related to the implementation of the peace process. According to the document, the mission should enhance the inclusivity of the peace process by bringing in women and youth. The mission should also, in collaboration with the UN country team, restore and expand basic social services, including the protection of women and children. Women are also mentioned under the implementation of the principle protection of civilians. The mission, according to the document, should work to identify and analyse threats, and prevent, pre-empt, and respond to violence against civilians, while bearing in mind the specific protection needs of women and children affected by armed conflict (see also the section on protection of civilians, below).⁴¹

4.1.2 Thematic policies

In addition, UN peacekeeping operations are guided by thematic policies and guidelines related to gender, protection of civilians, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). As a result of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which met in 2015, there is a general trend toward viewing these issues as part of a common agenda.⁴²

The DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) policy on gender equality in UN peacekeeping operations, as well as the specific guidelines for integrating a gender perspective into the work of the military in peacekeeping operations, were adopted in 2010. This gender policy focuses on requirements for ensuring the equal participation of women, men, girls, and boys in peacekeeping activities, and views gender mainstreaming as a strategy to promote gender equality in post-conflict societies.⁴³

The military guidelines are intended to support the practical translation of UNSCR 1325 for UN military personnel and provide guidance directed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the tactical level, the guidelines specify a number of activities and tasks where a gender perspective should be taken into account. The guidelines also include generic Terms of Reference for Military Gender Advisors and Gender Focal Points.⁴⁴

⁴¹ MINUSMA, *Mission concept*, pp. 15, 18 and 28.

⁴² Interview, DPKO.

⁴³ UN DPKO/DFS, *Gender equality in UN peacekeeping operations*.

⁴⁴ UN DPKO/DFS, *Integrating a gender perspective into the work of the United Nations military in peacekeeping operations*.

Protection of civilians has become an increasingly important part of UN mandates in the last ten years. In 2015, DPKO/DFS adopted a policy on protection of civilians and guidelines on how to implement for the military component of UN missions. DPKO/DFS policy defines the mandate on protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping as, “*all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government.*” Threats of physical violence include all hostile acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury, including sexual violence.⁴⁵

The policy further divides the instruments and tasks related to protection of civilians into three tiers, in which different components of the mission and other UN actors have a role to play: protection through dialogue and engagement; provision of physical protection; and establishment of a protective environment. The UN shall also work in all operational phases of protection: prevention, pre-emption, response, and consolidation. UN missions are furthermore required to carry out regular threat and risk assessments, in order to determine the order of priority for addressing threats.⁴⁶

The implementation guidelines for the military component of UN peacekeeping missions seek to define the roles and responsibilities of the military component and are directed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The guidelines stress that peacekeepers must take gender dynamics into account when carrying out the mandate on protection of civilians, as well as protect civilians against sexual violence, where women and girls are often particularly targeted as a tactic of war (see below). The guidelines stress that although the military component should support all three tiers of work, its main focus should be on the second tier: provision of physical protection. At the tactical level, sectors and units need to ensure protection of civilians by taking action in all the four phases: prevention, pre-emption, response, and consolidation.⁴⁷

In 2008, CRSV was highlighted as an important area with a strong mandate. The need to protect civilians, especially including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence was emphasized in Resolution 1820, and female protection advisors were subsequently appointed in several missions.⁴⁸ As a result of the HIPPO recommendations, however, this area of responsibility has been consolidated into the human rights agenda.⁴⁹ According to staff working with

⁴⁵ UN DPKO/DFS, *The protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping*, p. 5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-17.

⁴⁷ UN DPKO/DFS, *Protection of civilians: Implementing guidelines for military components of United Nations peacekeeping missions*.

⁴⁸ UNSC, *Resolution 1820* (2008).

⁴⁹ UNSC, *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operation, Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 15.

CRSV, this may be problematic, and might hamper the adoption of a holistic approach to preventing CRSV.⁵⁰

The UN zero-tolerance policy on SEA is part of the UN standards of conduct covering all personnel in field missions. The topic has come under the limelight in recent years following allegations of SEA committed by UN military personnel. In February 2016, the Secretary General appointed a Special Coordinator to improve the United Nations response to sexual exploitation and abuse and, in September 2017, established the position of a UN Victims' Right Advocate, in order to enhance the complaint-filing process for victims and witnesses.⁵¹ Furthermore, in 2016 the UN Security Council mandated the Secretary-General to repatriate military units engaged in widespread or systematic abuse, and to replace units subject to such allegations, if the TCC has not taken the appropriate steps to investigate them.⁵²

4.1.3 Leadership and accountability

One way for the mission leadership to signal the importance of the women, peace, and security agenda is to include these issues in the mission's quarterly reporting to the UNSC. However, the reporting on the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda is often affected by the strict limitations on the scope of the reports, the so-called word count. There is no specific section on gender and, since June 2017, the reporting on CRSV has been integrated into the human rights section.⁵³

In the 2017 reporting on Mali, several references were made to the representation of women in relation to the implementation of the peace agreement. In June 2017, the SG particularly stressed the limited representation of women in the new government and interim authorities, in spite of the substantial participation of women in the *conférence d'entente nationale* and the mission's efforts to advocate for increased representation.⁵⁴

In the section on protection of civilians, however, there was no regular reporting on the situation of women. In September 2017, two instances where women were directly targeted by violent extremists were reported.⁵⁵ In the other reports, references to the protection of women were made in the human rights section, in connection with the reporting of cases on CRSV, and in the conduct and discipline section, in connection with reporting on SEA in the mission. In June 2017, one

⁵⁰ Interview, DPKO.

⁵¹ UN News Centre, *World leaders pledge to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse; UN chief outlines course of action*.

⁵² UNSC, *Resolution 2272* (2016).

⁵³ Interview, DPKO.

⁵⁴ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation Mali*, 21 June 2017, p. 12.

⁵⁵ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, 28 September 2017, p. 8.

case of CRSV was detailed in the report and, in September 2017, one new case of SEA was reported.⁵⁶

The reports also include measures undertaken in relation to training on gender mainstreaming. For example, the national committees on DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) received training, while the electoral management bodies, media, civil society organisations, and political party leaders received more specific training, on gender in elections.⁵⁷

This study has not been able to assess whether there are, or have been, other ways in which the leadership communicates the usefulness of UNSCR 1325 in the implementation of MINUSMA's mandate.

One step in enhancing the accountability of the mission leadership in the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda is to include these aspects in the regular performance measurement. In recent years, the implementation of gender policies has become part of the monitoring, and the mission leadership is supposed to deliver results related to gender parity and gender mainstreaming.⁵⁸ DPKO is also developing a new policy on accountability for the protection of civilians. The policy focuses on two strands of accountability. Firstly, protection of civilians should be included as a monitoring issue that is regularly assessed together with the mission leadership. Secondly, the failure to protect civilians may become subject to disciplinary action and even criminal investigation.⁵⁹

4.1.4 Institutional structures and resources

In MINUSMA, several institutional structures are involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. In 2015, HIPPO recommended the strengthening and mainstreaming of the work related to gender, CRSV, and SEA, which has led to several organisational changes within the mission.⁶⁰ In addition, structures, and strategies in the field of protection of civilians have a direct bearing on the protection of women (see below).

Gender

The HIPPO report suggested a relocation of and change in the reporting lines for gender advisors. At the political-strategic level, the DPKO gender unit has moved to the Office of the Chief of Staff and reports directly to the DPKO leadership. The

⁵⁶ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation Mali*, 21 June 2017, p. 7, and 28 September 2017, p. 14.

⁵⁷ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, 28 September 2017, pp. 4-6.

⁵⁸ Interview, DPKO.

⁵⁹ Interview, DPKO.

⁶⁰ UNSC, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, pp. 78-82.

unit comprises 3-4 advisors responsible for developing policies and capacity building, and for providing advice to the senior leadership. As a result of the HIPPO recommendations, it has also become compulsory to perform a gender analysis as part of any strategic review of peacekeeping operations and technical assistance missions.⁶¹

Since 2016, in addition to the gender unit at DPKO, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) has had a dedicated Military Gender Adviser (MGA). The MGA primarily advises the planning, force generation, and policy and doctrine departments at the OMA. The MGA is also involved in reviewing the military guidelines on gender and providing training to the MGAs positioned in missions.⁶²

At the mission-strategic level, from September 2017 the gender unit in MINUSMA has been part of the Office of the SRSG. The gender unit is comprised of seven staff, but the position as Senior Gender Advisor has been vacant for several years. All Gender Advisors and Gender Focal Points within the mission are expected to report annually on activities undertaken to implement the women, peace, and security agenda. The reporting is discussed with the senior mission leadership, the UN Country Team, and Malian women's civil society organisations, which agree on recommendations for implementation during the coming year. The central-level conference is preceded by consultations in the regions.⁶³

Within the military component, MINUSMA has had an MGA at the operational level since 2015. The MGA serves with other advisors under the Force Commander and reports directly to him and the Chief of Staff. The central placement increases the opportunity for the MGA to advise all sections of the FHQ.⁶⁴ According to the military concept of operations (CONOPS), the MGA should be part of the planning cycle and contribute to orders, in particular by taking into account how UN operations will impact on women. The MGA should also be a bridge to the UN civilian actors working in the fields of human rights, gender, child protection, protection of civilians, DDR, and SSR.⁶⁵

Since early 2017, Military Gender Advisors have also been deployed at the sector level. The Gender Advisors at the sector level are placed under the Chief of Operations, which ensures their influence over the planning of operations. However, a more central placement under the Chief of Staff would ensure influence within all branches of the sector headquarters. When this study

⁶¹ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on women peace and security*, 29 September 2016, pp. 8, 22; and interview, DPKO.

⁶² UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on women peace and security*, 29 September 2016, p. 7; and interview, OMA.

⁶³ Interview, MINUSMA.

⁶⁴ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁶⁵ DPKO/OMA, *Military concept of operations for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*.

conducted interviews in Mali, in May 2017, the Military Gender Advisors in Sectors North and East had not yet been deployed.⁶⁶

In addition, all battalions at the sector level as well as the units reporting directly to the Force Commander (e.g. the ISR TF and special operations units) are supposed to appoint a Gender Focal Point (GFP). However, far from all have done so. In May 2017, in the Swedish ISR TF, the Commanding Officer served as the GFP.

Protection of civilians

MINUSMA's strategy for the protection of civilians was updated in March 2017. The strategy is divided into three tiers emanating from the DPKO/DFS policy: protection through dialogue and engagement; provision of physical protection; and establishment of a protective environment. The need to promote the participation of women is included in the first tier, while the need to ensure the protection of women is included in the third tier. In addition, the strategy stresses that integrating a gender perspective should be one of the guiding principles of implementation and that actions should be tailored to meet the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men. Addressing the specific concerns of women is also highlighted as a particular challenge for MINUSMA in the period 2017-2018.⁶⁷

However, there is no specific mention of women in the second tier, linked to the provision of physical protection, which, according to the strategy, is the main area of responsibility for the military component. The only task relating to the situation of women given specifically to the military component is the inclusion of women in foot patrols. The military component should also support data-gathering and analysis. The strategy, furthermore, tasks the regional Protection of Civilians working group, where the military component is one of the members, to analyse the role of women in strengthening the social fabric of local communities, and explicitly support these initiatives as well as recognize the role of women as drivers of the conflict, and therefore sources of conflict resolution.⁶⁸

At the mission-strategic level, the Protection of Civilians unit is placed in the Office of the SRSG, in accordance with the recommendations of the HIPPO report.⁶⁹ The Protection of Civilians strategy is reviewed every two months, based on threat assessments made at the regional level. At mission level, the Protection of Civilians Working Group is chaired by the Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, and consists of the Senior Protection of Civilians Advisor, Chiefs of Departments, and Heads of Offices. At the regional level, the Deputy Sector Commander chairs

⁶⁶ Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ, and SWHQ.

⁶⁷ MINUSMA, *Strategy for the protection of civilians in Mali*, pp. 6-12, 19.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 53.

⁶⁹ UNSC, *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operation, Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 15.

the Protection of Civilians Working Group, which consists of the regional Protection of Civilians Advisor, the Heads of Office of all sections in MINUSMA, the humanitarian protection cluster (see below), and the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

Within the humanitarian field, UN works with the protection of civilians through the Protection of Civilians cluster, which is chaired by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A sub-cluster focusing on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is chaired by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and is mainly engaged in advocacy, mapping of ongoing activities, and establishing minimum standards of service for victims of SGBV. The Protection of Civilians cluster is also in place at the regional level, which gives it an advantage over for example the Gender Advisor and the Women Protection Advisor, who are mainly represented at the central level.⁷⁰

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

As a result of the HIPPO-report, the Women Protection Advisors at the mission-strategic level have been incorporated into the Human Rights Section. However, the different UN missions have developed different organisational models for this merger, which is supposed to be a consolidation rather than an integration. The organisational change, together with financial restraints, have resulted in a reduction of the number of Senior Women Protection Advisors. Currently, only five UN missions have dedicated Women Protection Advisors.⁷¹

In MINUSMA, the women protection unit is comprised of five staff. The responsibility for protection of women shifted to the Human Rights Section in September 2016. According to the staff, this organisational change represents both an opportunity and a challenge. Being in a larger unit increases the possibility to achieve synergies and draw on shared resources, but also risks diluting the significance and the influence of the women protection advisors. The Senior Women Protection Advisor focuses on advocacy to influence legislation that ensures the protection of women, e.g. the new legislation on SGBV, and to alter legislative proposals that are detrimental to women. Another major concern is the lack of participation of women in the peace negotiations, and the lack of representation in the committees implementing the peace agreement. However, women in the armed groups increasingly request representation in these committees.⁷² A conflict analysis conducted by FOI in 2015 revealed that women have significant possibilities to influence the outcome of the peace process and have a history of mobilizing young men against their communities' foes.⁷³ This

⁷⁰ Interview, MINUSMA.

⁷¹ UN Peacekeeping, *Conflict-related sexual violence*.

⁷² Interview, MINUSMA.

⁷³ Lackenbauer, Tham Lindell and Ingerstad, "*If our men won't fight, we will*".

not only makes women's claims for representation and influence in the peace process valid, but indispensable, for sustainable peace and stability.

Although women have not been particularly targeted by armed groups and terrorist groups, sexual violence has been documented during the conflict. Both jihadist groups and other armed groups have been included in the SG's annual reports on CRSV. However, there is a serious impunity problem relating to CRSV. In Malian courts, there have not as yet been any prosecutions that relate to the reported cases of sexual violence. This was also a problematic issue during the peace negotiations, as some perpetrators from the armed groups had been released due to confidence-building measures. However, the crimes were not prescribed.⁷⁴

Sexual exploitation and abuse

Any suspected cases of SEA within the military component are supposed to be reported to the FHQ's conduct and disciplinary team. Although it is possible to make an anonymous report, very few cases are reported.⁷⁵ In 2016 and 2017, three cases of SEA were reported and are pending investigation by the relevant TCCs.⁷⁶

One explanation for the low level of reporting is that the soldiers in the battalions are to a large extent confined to their camps and have limited possibilities to engage with the local population. There are rumours, however, that prostitutes have been taken into the camps, but so far there is no evidence of systematic abuse.⁷⁷

4.2 Gender balance

The second step in the analytical framework consists of an analysis of the gender balance within MINUSMA, focusing on quantitative and qualitative aspects and the obstacles to women's inclusion, as well as efforts to enhance gender equality.

The UN has set ambitious goals for improving the gender balance in missions. UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015) included the target of doubling the number of women in military contingents over five years, from the level of 3 per cent in 2015.⁷⁸ In September 2016, the UN peacekeeping ministerial conference in London set a 15 per cent target, to be reached by December 2017, for the proportion of women among military staff officers and military observers.⁷⁹ This target was reiterated at the ministerial conference in Vancouver in November 2017, which stressed a range of ways to ensure the full involvement of women in

⁷⁴ Interview, MINUSMA.

⁷⁵ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁷⁶ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, 26 December 2017, p. 13.

⁷⁷ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁷⁸ UNSC, *Resolution 2242* (2015), p. 5.

⁷⁹ Gov.UK, *UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial: London Communiqué*.

national militaries and UN peacekeeping, as well as their equal access to senior leadership positions.⁸⁰

4.2.1 Analysis of gender balance among UN staff and TCCs

The SG's quarterly reports continuously include figures on the percentage of women among the military, police, and civilian staff of the mission. However, when it comes to the military staff, no distinction is made between the number of women among military staff officers and national contingents. Furthermore, the reports do not contain any statistics on the number of women at different levels of seniority.

At the mission level, MINUSMA has a relatively low ratio of female peacekeepers, particularly among the military personnel. In September 2017, the share of women among the military staff was 2.2 per cent. Among the individual police officers, 17 per cent were women, and among police unit personnel, 4 per cent were women. The share of women among the international civilian staff was 26 per cent.⁸¹

The low representation of women makes it difficult for the UN to lead by example. There is reportedly a larger share of women in the Malian armed forces than in the military component of MINUSMA.⁸² The mission finds that it is difficult to recruit women to high-risk positions in Northern Mali.⁸³ In addition, in May 2017, there were reportedly constraints relating to the lack of separate accommodation for women in Sector North. It was also reported that some sector commanders were against the deployment of women soldiers to their area of operations.⁸⁴ Another problem is that women tend to be deployed in less influential positions in the mission, an issue that needs to be further examined and addressed.⁸⁵

At the tactical level, women constituted 11 per cent of the Swedish ISR TF in May 2017. However, according to the leadership, more women were needed in the reconnaissance patrols, which would have improved the ability to liaise with local women. The experience of having female liaison officers and interpreters was positive, especially in interactions with female interlocutors.⁸⁶

4.2.2 Efforts to improve the gender balance

At the political-strategic level, the Force Generation Service in the Office of Military Affairs raises the issue of deploying more women in the dialogue with all

⁸⁰ UNFICYP, *Note to correspondents: UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Communiqué*.

⁸¹ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*, 28 September 2017, pp. 12, 13.

⁸² Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁸³ Interview, DPKO.

⁸⁴ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁸⁵ Interview, DPKO.

⁸⁶ Interview, Swedish ISR Task Force.

TCCs. The Military Gender Advisor in OMA plays an active role in this dialogue. According to the Secretary-General's report on the women, peace, and security agenda, the OMA has also set aside 300 posts only for women.⁸⁷ In addition, the UN offers support through pre-deployment training on gender. However, the requirement to deploy women is not yet included in UN's Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR), and there are no sanctions towards nations that do not comply with the stated target.⁸⁸

According to OMA, there are large differences between the will of TCCs and their capacity to reach the target of doubling the number of women in military contingents. Some TCCs have women, whom they may or may not deploy, in their armed forces, while others do not have any women in their armed forces, but either want to deploy more, or do not want to deploy any at all. In general, Western TCCs do not have a good track record when it comes to deploying women, in spite of the fact that many of them score high on gender equality indexes. Another dilemma is that some of the TCCs do not allow women in all positions. In some countries, women are not allowed in combat positions, and they tend to work in supporting roles or within all-female units.⁸⁹

One problem with only focusing on the quantitative target of increasing the number of female peacekeepers is that TCCs do not understand why the deployment of women might improve the performance of the force. There needs to be a greater emphasis on the benefits of deploying contingents with both female and male soldiers, something that could improve the mission's operational effectiveness, for example when it comes to networking with both men and women in the local communities.⁹⁰

4.3 Fundamental understanding

The third step in the analytical framework involves an assessment of the awareness and knowledge about UNSCR 1325 among staff working with planning at the UN HQ and in MINUSMA, as well as in the training conducted on UNSCR 1325.

4.3.1 Awareness and knowledge

The Integrated Operations Team in DPKO/DFS is responsible for planning and for the drafting of key documents relating to the mission. In the case of MINUSMA, the IOT does not have an appointed gender adviser and gender issues do not feature

⁸⁷ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*, 16 October 2017, pp. 8-9.

⁸⁸ Interview, OMA.

⁸⁹ Interviews, OMA.

⁹⁰ Interview, DPKO.

prominently in their work. However, the members of the team are, according to their own opinion, well sensitized on the women, peace, and security agenda. Furthermore, during the 2016 strategic review of MINUSMA's mandate, the Gender Unit at DPKO carried out a gendered conflict analysis to inform the review. The Military Gender Advisor at the OMA has also been involved in the review of MINUSMA's military planning documents.⁹¹

As mentioned above, the Military Gender Adviser at the Force Headquarters has the task of contributing to orders and reflecting on how UN operations will impact on women. Another important task is to raise the awareness of gender issues at the sector and contingent level. The Gender Advisor at the sector level works primarily through the Sector Commander and the contingent Gender Focal Points.⁹² However, it is important to recognize that there are major cultural differences among TCCs that hamper the understanding of the women, peace, and security agenda. Among some TCCs, there is a tradition that men should only talk to men.⁹³

It is also important to recognize that the role of women in a conflict situation varies from context to context. In MINUSMA, one of the problems encountered is that peacekeepers were overly cautious in approaching local women, due to experience from Afghanistan. However, excluding women will hamper the mission's situational awareness and possibly risk the success of the peace agreement, since women in northern Mali have both a direct and indirect influence over conflict behaviour. Women, for example, have influence over the youth, which are easily mobilized for protests and violent activities. They also have a vast knowledge about social connections, and could thus be a valuable source of information.⁹⁴

One explanation for why, as stated by several respondents, the women, peace, and security agenda does not feature so prominently in MINUSMA, is that CRSV is not a major problem in Mali, compared to other conflicts. It is often claimed that women are not a particular target in the conflict and that the terrorist threat affects the civilian population, regardless of gender.⁹⁵

However, development actors working in Mali report that more than 2000 cases of SGBV have been reported to UN agencies and NGOs since 2015. It is also possible that SGBV and CRSV are underreported, as there is considerable stigma around these issues. Development actors also stress that it is likely that sexual abuse, early marriage, and female genital mutilation increase as an indirect consequence of the conflict, as many women are internally displaced, or are forced

⁹¹ Interviews, DPKO, and OMA.

⁹² Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ, and SWHQ.

⁹³ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁹⁴ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ. See also Lackenbauer, Tham Lindell and Ingerstad, *"If our men won't fight, we will."*

⁹⁵ Interviews, MINUSMA SWHQ, and Swedish ISR TF.

to live with distant relatives, or in new communities. This is an issue that needs further research.⁹⁶

4.3.2 Training

The pre-deployment training is the responsibility of individual TCCs. The training related to gender and protection of women is included in block 3. The UN also sponsors specific pre-deployment training that focuses on the role of gender advisors. Most military staff officers, military observers, and high-ranking officers in the national contingents have received some pre-deployment training on gender and have a basic knowledge of the women, peace, and security agenda.⁹⁷

The mission gender unit is responsible for the induction training related to women, peace, and security that is conducted in Bamako. The training generally takes place at the start of service and is compulsory for all military staff officers, military observers, commanders of national contingents, and civilian staff. It focuses on gender in the Malian context. In order to enhance the value of the training for the military staff, however, it needs to be complemented by a military perspective.⁹⁸

At the force headquarters, the Military Gender Advisor is responsible for training. For example, Gender Focal Points at the different branches of the FHQ receive 5 days of training. At the sector level, the Military Gender Advisor conducts training with the Gender Focal Points of the national contingents.⁹⁹

4.4 Planning and conduct of operations

The fourth step of the analytical framework is to map the activities carried out to meet the mission's objectives and to analyse the expected and unexpected outcomes of activities and operations. This section focuses on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of operations carried out by peacekeepers in Sector West (SW). The assessment focuses on the *relevance*, *effectiveness*, and *sustainability* of the activities.

A major impediment to the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda by the peacekeepers in Mali is that peacekeeping operations are rarely conducted. In SW, the battalions are in general busy with tasks relating to their own logistics, transport of supplies, escorts, and the construction of camps. The deteriorating security situation, in which UN troops and the Malian armed forces are the main targets, further impedes the implementation of UNSCR 1325, since force protection takes presidency over all other tasks. According to commanders

⁹⁶ Interviews, UN agencies.

⁹⁷ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁹⁸ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

⁹⁹ Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ, and SWHQ.

at the SW Headquarters (SWHQ), there are simply not enough peacekeepers and enabling resources to carry out the core tasks. The troops in SW only rarely patrol to ensure a safe and secure environment, protect civilians, or conduct operations that target threats to the local community. Nevertheless, the Swedish ISR TF does conduct regular patrols. However, the primary goal is not to project a safe and secure environment; it is rather to collect information and show a UN presence. A positive consequence of these patrols is enhanced security and a feeling of safety locally.¹⁰⁰

An additional detriment to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the conduct of operations is the difference in training, equipment, and capacity between the different battalions. Some are well-trained, highly-specialized, and well-equipped, while others receive their basic training when deployed in theatre and are poorly equipped. This puts an additional constraint on the militarily-skilled battalions, since they then have to conduct tasks apart from their core assignments.¹⁰¹

4.4.1 Planning

Following from the mission concept, the Office of Military Affairs develops an operational military concept of operations (CONOPS) to define how the military campaign should support the achievement of the political-strategic end-state and the mission's core objectives. MINUSMA's military CONOPS was last updated in 2017. The document points out that the military leadership must support and encourage the Malian government's effort to promote women's participation at all levels, and calls for regular consultations with women's civil society organisations, to enable better protection of civilian strategies. It also stresses that the number of female peacekeepers must increase and that the low representation of women is a constraint, which reduces the military component's interactions with women's groups and its participation in early warning and protection of civilian strategies.¹⁰²

In addition, the military Rules of Engagement (ROE) regulate the use of force by the national contingents assigned to the mission. MINUSMA's ROE were updated in March 2017. The document mentions gender only in connection with search procedures. It stresses that these procedures should be conducted by a person of the same gender as the person being searched.¹⁰³

The Operational Order (OpOrder), which tasks the different sectors and units, was revised in July 2017. There is no specific section on women, peace, and security in the main body of the OpOrder; when a search of the document was conducted

¹⁰⁰ Interviews, SWHQ, and Swedish ISR TF.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² DPKO/OMA, *Military concept of operations for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*.

¹⁰³ DPKO, *Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*.

for this study, none of the keywords – women, gender, nor UNSCR 1325 – were found in the text. However, according to the MGA, a specific gender annex was attached to the OpOrder.¹⁰⁴

According to several respondents, the military planning culture in the UN is tenuous.¹⁰⁵ This, in combination with weak command and control, constitutes a major problem when it comes to implementing tasks related to women, peace, and security, since it is difficult for the military components to translate the mandate into operational tasks. This means that the implementation of objectives related to the representation and protection of women that is mentioned in the mandate and other planning documents is left to the interpretation of individual commanders.¹⁰⁶ Another challenge is that, in the UN, planning lags behind the deployment of troops, which, for an extended period of time, leaves commanders without the proper tools for carrying out their tasks.¹⁰⁷ The absence of a planning culture increases the importance of gender advisors at the mission level. They have to constantly remind commanders to integrate a gender perspective when executing tasks and operations.

Intelligence collection

Intelligence collection forms the basis for all military planning, since it determines the centre of gravity, methods to be used, and actions to be taken. Given the mandate of MINUSMA, there ought to be collection of intelligence that has a particular focus on how women are affected by the conflict; how women impact the conflict; how the insurgency impacts women, and how MINUSMA impacts the situation of women. However, no collection of sex-disaggregated data is being carried out in SW, reportedly, nor has it been requested by the FHQ.¹⁰⁸

One problem is that there is no proper tasking from the mission leadership of intelligence collection on these issues. In general, the battalions perceive the command and control from the operational level as weak and not necessarily connected to the OpOrder. However, the Force Commander has in general terms emphasized the need to talk to women, men, girls, and boys during patrols, to increase the level of understanding of how the conflict affects the population. Improved situational awareness that stems from information from both women and men would probably also benefit the force protection of the mission.¹⁰⁹

At different levels in MINUSMA, staff officers stress that mixed patrols are the major way to improve the collection of information from both women and men. However, the issue of gender rarely figures in the reporting from patrols, although

¹⁰⁴ Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ.

¹⁰⁵ Interviews, OMA, MINUSMA FHQ, and SWHQ.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, OMA.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews, MINUSMA, and Swedish ISR TF.

¹⁰⁸ Interviews SWHQ, Swedish ISR TF, and MINUSMA FHQ.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ, and Swedish ISR TF.

there have been occasional intelligence reports focusing on the role of women in the armed groups.¹¹⁰

One solution to this lack of reporting is to include a dedicated headline relating to gender in the reporting formats. However, this might be counter-productive, as gender is supposed to be mainstreamed throughout operations. Nevertheless, such a specific headline could serve as a reminder to those who write the patrol reports to acknowledge issues relating to women, peace, and security. In current reporting formats, such information should be included under the heading “civilians,” but this section is often left without comment.¹¹¹

Intelligence collection is also hampered by the fact that there are very few reports from patrols conducted by the regular infantry battalions in MINUSMA, due to the low military capacity of many battalions. As the collection of information from the population is very important in Mali, there is a need to build the capacity within all infantry battalions for good report-writing after a patrol.

4.4.2 Protection activities

The military component lacks resources to carry out the task of protecting civilians. The few companies available for manoeuvres are supposed to cover a vast area, even though they lack armoured personnel carriers and airborne assets, a fact that reduces their mobility. The activities related to protection of civilians are thus limited to the vicinity of the UN camps. As the terrorist threat shifted towards central Mali, the ability of the Sector West Headquarters, located in Timbuktu, to provide protection was further limited, until the arrival of additional troops in the sector.¹¹²

The different interpretations of UNSCR 1325 mentioned initially are also reflected in the way military commanders address women’s participation and protection. This assessment found that if and when women are included in operational planning, it is solely to serve military purposes, e.g. as providers of information or as members of different armed groups. Women’s protection needs are rarely – or never – analysed, nor otherwise addressed, in operational planning. Nor is the impact of the peacekeeper’s presence on the security of women and girls assessed.¹¹³ Given the deteriorating security situation in Mali, such an analysis is pivotal in order to avoid unintended consequences for civilian women.

Military officers at all levels point out that many of their activities contribute indirectly to the protection of women. The military’s presence and patrols contribute to the protection of women by limiting the influence from Islamist

¹¹⁰ Interview, MINUSMA.

¹¹¹ Interview, MINUSMA FHQ.

¹¹² Interview, MINUSMA SWHQ.

¹¹³ Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ, SWHQ, Swedish ISR TF.

terrorist groups. They also stress that the military component creates the conditions for civilian and humanitarian actors to carry out their work, which contributes to the protection of women. In addition, the military component can protect civilians, including women, by being cautious in its interactions with local interlocutors, so that, for example, they are not exposed in their communities. Mixed patrols also have an advantage, since female peacekeepers can interact more easily with local women.¹¹⁴

The military component is supposed to report any cases of SGBV and CSRV to the Woman Protection Advisors in the mission. However, it is also important to focus on prevention when it comes to the protection of civilians. The military component should increase the use of existing early warning indicators for threats against civilians and CSRV. In order to increase the protection of women through patrols, the mission needs to make a gendered threat assessment. The force could, for example, increase the community dialogue in order to plan its patrols to areas where women feel insecure.¹¹⁵

Tactical behaviour is essential for peacekeeping troops, since it can both contribute to the security of, and encourage support from, the civil population. In Timbuktu, this was not always taken into consideration by the military troops. An example of this is their patrols in closed cars. Even though UN troops in SW are targeted, it is still possible to patrol and interact with the local population. The ISR TF is one example of this. They regularly patrol areas on foot in order to build relations with the local population, collect atmospherics and information, inspire trust between the UN and the locals, and contribute to security and safety. Their very presence in the neighbourhoods of Timbuktu is reportedly creating a feeling of safety and security among the local population.¹¹⁶

However, an additional challenge to well-planned and -conducted patrols is that some of the troops lack proper military skills. It was reported that some troops received their basic training only after having been deployed in theatre, since some of the TCCs choose to deploy un-trained personnel.¹¹⁷ It is of course difficult to provide protection to civilians if the troops have limited or no military skills.

4.4.3 Liaison activities

MINUSMA has funds for conducting Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) projects, and the focus is to support projects in the areas of electricity, water, and energy. The military component tries to establish projects in areas where

¹¹⁴ Interviews, MINUSMA FHQ, SWHQ, Swedish ISR TF.

¹¹⁵ Interviews, MINUSMA, and UN agencies.

¹¹⁶ Interviews, MINUSMA SWHQ, and ISR TF.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

humanitarian actors are not present. However, there are currently no projects with the aim of improving the situation of women.¹¹⁸

The sectoral level is responsible for carrying out several civil-military coordination projects in Timbuktu. Respondents stress that consultation with women's organisations is an important prerequisite for these projects to succeed. Women and youth associations are considered to be very powerful in Timbuktu.¹¹⁹

The Swedish ISR TF, in May 2017, had regular consultations with female interlocutors from women's organisations, in order to improve situational awareness. However, it was an arrangement dependent on female military personnel. The succeeding contingent – deployed in November 2017 – has no female military interlocutors, which means that Malian women did not want to continue the dialogue with the ISR TF.¹²⁰

Other respondents stress that the military component should increase their interaction with their civilian counterparts. One problem from the civilian point of view is that the military staff has very short rotations; just when they have begun to understand the local context, they rotate home. The civilian staff, on the other hand, often stay longer and sometimes speak the local language. Therefore, the military component should cooperate more closely with the civilian component, which also has the trust of Malian counterparts and the local population. However, civilian counterparts sometimes feel that they only provide information to their military counterparts and receive nothing in return.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Interview, MINSUMA FHQ.

¹¹⁹ Interview, MINSUMA SWHQ.

¹²⁰ Interview, Swedish ISR TF.

¹²¹ Interview, DPKO.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

The deteriorating security situation in Mali is a challenge to MINUSMA. The peacekeeping troops have become a major target and are victims of frequent attacks. This constitutes a risk not only to the lives of the UN personnel, it is also a threat to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and its provisions. MINUSMA is suffering the risk of becoming a mission where the counter-terrorism effort is taking precedence over all other provisions – for example the protection of women and girls – in the mandate. This is exacerbated by the limited number of troops, lack of enabling resources and the low level of training of troops deployed by some nations, as well as the military component's need to prioritise transport, escorts, and logistics.

Given the development of the security situation in Mali, it is important to discuss whether the very presence of UN troops is contributing to a deteriorating security environment in some sectors. Today, the UN is viewed by the insurgency as an enemy and is increasingly targeted in lethal attacks. The UN military installations attract the insurgency to areas where the UN troops are deployed. A worsening security situation will affect all aspects of the civil population's lives, both those of men and women, especially their freedom of movement. This stands in contrast to the intention of both MINUSMA's mandate and UNSCR 1325.

As already noted, the lack of peacekeepers on the ground in Mali is an additional challenge. There are not enough troops to carry out operations and core activities that benefit the population. This hampers the implementation of UNSCR 1325, since there are few operations conducted that could be beneficial to women.

Although the military component's implementation of UNSCR 1325 leaves ample room for improvement, it is important to stress that MINUSMA is an integrated mission, with both a civilian and military arm. Even if the civilian component is not assessed in this report, it both has a responsibility and carries out activities related to protection of civilians and women's empowerment and rights.

This study has assessed MINUSMA's implementation of UNSCR 1325 through an analytical framework consisting of four steps, by considering essential components of any successful implementation of the resolution. Step 1 examines the preconditions for gender mainstreaming, focusing on objectives stated in the mandate, the guidance provided by thematic UN policies, leadership and accountability, and institutional structures and resources. Step 2 maps and analyses the gender balance within the mission, the main obstacles to women's inclusion, and the efforts to improve the gender balance. Step 3 assesses the fundamental understanding of the key concepts of UNSCR 1325 and the gender training provided to UN staff and national contingents. Step 4 maps the operations and military activities carried out by the mission and assesses their relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.

5.1 Prerequisites

There is ample strategic guidance in MINUSMA, in both the mandate and thematic policies, for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The UN has also developed implementation guidelines that the military component in MINUSMA can draw from. The mandate and the mission concept allocate priority to the women, peace, and security agenda, both as a cross-cutting issue and in specific tasks. They include provisions relating to both participation and protection of women. The thematic policies on gender, protection of civilians, conflict-related sexual violence, and sexual exploitation and abuse provide further guidance on the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda in MINUSMA, and provide examples of tasks to be carried out at different levels of the mission.

The reports of the mission leadership show that the women, peace, and security agenda is a priority in MINUSMA. However, the primary focus seems to be on the participation of women in the implementation of the peace agreement. Although highlighted and reported, the protection of women does not feature in the same systematic way. Steps taken by DPKO to ensure accountability have primarily focused on gender parity and gender mainstreaming in the regular monitoring of the mission leadership. Thus, more focus by the mission leadership as well as the DPKO on the protection aspects of UNSCR 1325 is needed in future.

The weak command and control within the military component hampers the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This is reflected in the fact that stated objectives and directives related to lines of operations do not trickle down to the tactical level, and are subsequently not transformed into military tasks. Research has proven that it is pivotal that senior leadership provides leadership, support, and guidance if gender mainstreaming is to succeed at all levels. This, in combination with holding both commanders and subordinate personnel accountable, makes a difference in determining whether a policy will be implemented or ignored. The UN needs to ensure that the commanders at all levels provide leadership when it comes to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and that the UN holds them accountable, tentatively by also including protection aspects in the monitoring of the mission leadership. In addition, if needed, the UN should ensure that commanders are being trained on how to implement and lead their troops when implementing the resolution.

MINUSMA has developed organisational structures and appointed advisors in all important fields relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. There are thus sufficient tools for advising the military component on all aspects of the women, peace, and security agenda. Although the Protection of Civilians strategy constitutes an important instrument to guide the work, the role of the military component is not well developed, and there is a need to be more specific about how the military component should contribute to the protection of civilians, including the prevention of and response to conflict-related sexual violence. For

example, the military could increasingly contribute, through its intelligence and monitoring activities, to threat assessments of how women, men, girls, and boys affect and are affected by the conflict.

5.2 Gender balance

MINUSMA provides regular reports on the number of women and men among military peacekeepers. However, more detailed information is required in order to analyse the ratio of women among different categories of staff and at different levels of seniority. In past years, ambitious goals have been set for increasing the number of female peacekeepers, and the Office of Military Affairs works actively with Troop-contributing Countries on this issue. However, a one-sided effort focusing on quantitative targets should not divert attention from the equally important task of ensuring the representation of women in senior-level positions and in all categories of staff, which is pivotal when ensuring qualitative gender equality; that is, power and influence. Efforts to increase the number of female peacekeepers also need to be complemented by efforts to promote the adoption of a gender perspective in the planning and conduct of operations, which also requires female soldiers.

5.3 Fundamental understanding

This study has found that within MINUSMA there is a basic understanding of the women, peace, and security agenda among military staff officers and high-ranking national officers, who most often have received some pre-deployment training on gender. However, misperceptions about the role of women in Mali indicate that training must be increasingly focused on the local context. The lack of understanding of the situation of women in Mali has made training an important task for the Military Gender Advisors at the FHQ and Sector HQ in MINUSMA. There is also a need for the training to provide concrete examples on how to implement a gender perspective in the planning and conduct of military operations. The lack of understanding, among soldiers at lower levels in some national contingents, of the importance of UNSCR 1325 calls, furthermore, for a broader training of soldiers on these issues. This would enhance their capability to report on these issues when conducting regular patrols.

Although MINUSMA is challenged by several dilemmas, the mission also provides ample opportunities to train troops from a large number of nations on UNSCR 1325. In general, UN peacekeeping missions provide an opportunity to disseminate and induce the benefits of gender equality and women's rights into large groups of men and women from the armed forces of different nations. MINUSMA should seize this opportunity and also coordinate with the Malian

security and defence forces when conducting training. In the long term, this could serve as a base for a sustainable UN implementation of UNSCR 1325.

5.4 Planning and conduct of operations

As mentioned above, MINSUMA carries out very few operations with the primary purpose of implementing UNSCR 1325. Although there are provisions relating to participation and protection in the military CONOPS, this seldom translates into military activities. Therefore, this assessment has also looked at the integration of the principles of protection and participation in operations with other objectives.

Relevance

The relevance of the military component's activities relating to UNSCR 1325 is difficult to assess. The planning of military operations is not, to our knowledge, based on a gender-aware analysis of the situation. Intelligence collection and reports from patrols rarely focus on the situation of women. There is, however, regular liaison with women's organisations at the sector level, but it is unclear how that feeds into the situational awareness and the planning of operations. This means that the military operations are not directed at countering the particular threats to women. Instead, military actors tend to stress the indirect relevance of their actions for the protection of civilians, including women.

Given the changing security environment, and in order to improve the relevance of its activities, MINUSMA's military component needs to make an assessment of women's protection needs and analyse its own impact on women's and girls' security. In addition, there is a need to analyse women's and girl's impact on the conflict, the UN troops, and the insurgency, as well as the insurgency's impact on women and girls. As outlined in Chapter Three, women play a pivotal role in the armed conflict in Northern Mali. They are a driving force as mobilisers, encouraging men to take up arms and providing support to the armed cause in different forms. When planning their operations, the military forces need to ask the following questions in order to be able to protect women, contribute to their empowerment, and improve their own force protection:

- How does the conflict impact women, men, girls, and boys, respectively?
- How does the military operation affect women and girls?
- What impact do women and girls have on the UN troops?
- How does the insurgency affect women, men, boys, and girls, respectively?
- What impact do women and girls have on the insurgency?

Furthermore, the military component should become more proactive and use existing early warning indicators to detect threats against civilians and conflict-

related sexual violence. It could, for example, plan patrols into areas where women feel insecure.

Effectiveness

The main deliberate activity of the military component, when it comes to UNSCR 1325, has been the promotion of mixed patrols. Contingents at the sector level report that the use of female peacekeepers in patrols, as liaison officers and interpreters, has increased the access to female interlocutors and thus served its purpose. It is unclear, however, how the information gained has affected the planning and conduct of operations.

It is also reported that patrolling in different neighbourhoods creates a feeling of safety and security for the entire population, both men and women, which could be considered as an effect related to protection. However, tactical behaviour is crucial for achieving this effect, and the use of foot patrols is a good way to build relations and inspire trust between the UN and the local population. On the other hand, given the fact that the deteriorating security situation has forced the peacekeeping troops to prioritize their own force protection, in combination with transportation and escorts of their own supplies and personnel, it is reasonable to assume that the effectiveness with regard to women's participation and/or protection is negligible.

An additional challenge is that some troops have limited military training, which is a serious impediment not only to their own force protection, but also to the execution of operations, respect for international law and, subsequently, to the protection of civilians, including the implementation of UNSCR 1325. If a soldier does not know or understand how to behave, he/she faces the risk of harming both civilians and his/her own troop. There is an urgent need to find solutions to this impediment. This is of course a delicate task, since it requires that the UN address TCCs that have poorly-trained military personnel. One solution is to provide military training through mentors and instructors before these nations' troops deploy.

As mentioned above, it is worth reflecting on the fact that the presence of UN troops in Sector West attracts the insurgency and contributes to a deteriorating security situation in the region, which in turn also affects the population. This is of course an unintended consequence, but it is nevertheless an impediment to a secure environment for the local community, and subsequently also to the effectiveness of women's protection and participation.

Furthermore, since the UN troops are being attacked, there is a serious risk that MINUSMA is turning into a counter-insurgency operation. This may mean that the terrorists – or the so-called enemy – are becoming the main target and neutralizing them, the main objective. Although it is evident that MINUSMA needs to protect its own personnel, it is important for an effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 that the protection of civilians maintains its central position in

the mandate, and that it continues to be included as a strategic objective in the CONOPS and transformed into a clearly-defined task for the military forces at the tactical level.

Sustainability

Given the deteriorating security situation, there is little evidence of a sustainable, secure, and safe environment for women in Sector West. However, a few CIMIC projects, developed in dialogue with women's organisations, have a chance to have a positive effect on the situation of women that lasts after the troops have gone. On the other hand, the lack of continuity in the deployment of female liaison officers between rotations risks the sustainability of established dialogue with female interlocutors.

One way to foster sustainability is to regularly stress the importance of the women, peace, and security agenda in dialogue with local interlocutors and the Malian defence and security forces. The UN could also try to raise the awareness of UNSCR 1325 in their interactions with TCCs in the mission, as a form of capacity-building that could have a lasting effect on those TCCs.

This assessment has focused on four steps necessary for the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325. Although several important preconditions for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Mali exist, there is still a long way to go to ensure the full implementation of the resolution. MINUSMA needs to improve the gender balance among its military staff, increase troop awareness of UNSCR 1325 in the Malian context, and integrate the provisions of women's protection and participation in all the planning and conduct of military operations. This is especially important in a context with a deteriorating security environment, where UN troops have themselves become a target for the insurgency, and where there is a risk that UNSCR 1325 is deemed secondary, or irrelevant, to counter-terrorism efforts.

References

Barrow, Amy. UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: Constructing gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 877, 2010.

Gov.UK. *UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial: London Communiqué*, 8 September 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/un-peacekeeping-defence-ministerial-london-communication> (Accessed 2017-12-07).

Hull Wiklund, Cecilia and Nilsson, Claes. *Peace in Mali? An analysis of the 2015 Algiers agreement and its implementation*, FOI-R--4311—SE, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). *Inter-Agency Standing Committee policy on protection in humanitarian action*, Genève, 2016.

Lackenbauer, Helené and Jonsson, Mikael. *Implementing UNSCR 1325 in capacity building missions*, FOI-R--3925—SE, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2014.

Lackenbauer, Helené and Langlais, Richard (eds.). *Review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions*, Stockholm/Brussels: FOI/NCGM/NATO, 2013.

Lackenbauer, Helené and Marklund, Jenny. *Implementering av genderperspektivet i operationer*, Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2014.

Lackenbauer, Helené, Tham Lindell, Magdalena and Ingerstad, Gabriella. *"If our men won't fight, we will": A gendered conflict analysis of the conflict in Mali*, FOI-R--4121—SE, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2015.

MINUSMA. *Mission concept*. November 2016.

MINUSMA. *Strategy for the protection of civilians in Mali*. 22 March 2017.

MINUSMA web page. <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/leadership> (Accessed 2017-12-21).

OECD. *Evaluating peacebuilding activities in settings of conflict and fragility—Improving learning for results*. DAC Guidelines and References Series. OECD Publishing, 2012.

Olsson, Louise and Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene. *An introduction to UNSCR 1325*. International Interactions, Vol. 39, Issue 4, 2013.

Solhjell, Randi and Donadio, Marcela. *Turning UNSCR 1325 into operational practice: A cross-country study on implementing Resolution 1325 in peacekeeping and military operations*. Security in Practice 11. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2012.

Security Council Report. *Women, peace and security: Closing the Security Council's implementation gap*. No 2, 2017.

SOU 2007:15. JämStöds praktika – Metodbok för jämställdhetsintegrering. Stockholm, 2007.

UNWOMEN. *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace: A global study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325*. 2015.

UNDPKO. *Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*. March 2017.

UNDPKO/DFS. *The protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping*. 1 April 2015.

UNDPKO/DFS. *Gender equality in UN peacekeeping operations*. 26 July 2010.

UNDPKO/DFS. *Integrating a gender perspective into the work of the United Nations military in peacekeeping operations*. March 2010.

UNDPKO/DFS. *Protection of civilians: Implementing guidelines for military components of United Nations peacekeeping missions*. February 2015.

UNDPKO/DFS. *Military concept of operations for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*. April 2017.

United Nations News Centre. *World leaders pledge to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse: UN chief outlines course of action*. 18 September 2017.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). *Note to correspondents: UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Communiqué*. 16 November 2017.

United Nations Peacekeeping. *Conflict-related sexual violence*. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/conflict-related-sexual-violence> (Accessed 2017-12-07).

UNSC. 5916th meeting, Press release, 19 June 2008, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm> (Accessed 2018-01-25).

UNSC. *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*. S/2015/446, 17 June 2015.

UNSC. *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*. S/2017/428, 21 June 2017.

UNSC. *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*. S/2017/811, 28 September 2017.

UNSC. *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali*. S/2017/1105, 26 December 2017.

UNSC. *Report of the Secretary-General on women peace and security*. S/2016/822, 29 September 2016.

UNSC. *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*. S/2017/861, 16 October 2017.

UNSC. *Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security* (2000).

UNSC. *Resolution 1820* (2008).

UNSC. *Resolution 2242* (2015).

UNSC. *Resolution 2272* (2016).

UNSC. *Resolution 2295* (2016).

UNSC. *Resolution 2364* (2017).

UNSC. *The future of United Nations peace operations: Implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operation, Report of the Secretary-General*. S/2015/682, 2 September 2015.

Interviews

UNDPKO, Gender Adviser and Political Affairs Officer, Policy and Best Practices Service, New York, 21 April 2017.

UNDPKO, Legal Advisor, New York, 21 April 2017.

UNDPKO, OMA, Chief of Policy and Doctrine Team, New York, 20 April 2017.

UNDPKO, OMA, Force Generation Service, Planning Officer, New York, 19 April 2017.

UNDPKO, OMA, Military Planning Service, MINUSMA Focal Point, New York, 19 April 2017.

UNDPKO, OMA, Assessment Officer, New York, 21 April 2017.

UNDPKO, Office of Operations, Senior Political Affairs Officer and Senior Military Liaison Officer, Integrated Operational Team MINUSMA, New York, 20 April 2017.

UNDPKO, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Evaluation Officer, New York, 21 April 2017.

Embassy of Sweden, Head of Development Cooperation, Programme Officer and Second Secretary, Bamako, 10 May 2017.

Folke Bernadotte Academy, Head of Programme on SSR, Stockholm, 14 March 2017.

Ghana Engineering Company, Timbuktu, 7 May 2017.

International Peace Institute, New York, 19 April 2017.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Coordinator Women, Peace and Security, Stockholm, 20 March 2017.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Africa Department, Stockholm, 13 March 2017.

MINUSMA, Deputy SRSG, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, Bamako, 10 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Senior Women Protection Adviser and Gender Affairs Officer, Bamako, 11 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Senior Protection of Civilians Officer, Bamako, 12 May 2017.

MINUSMA FHQ, Chief of Intelligence, Bamako, 11 May 2017.

MINUSMA FHQ, Deputy Chiefs of Intelligence, Bamako, 11 May 2017.

MINUSMA FHQ, Chief of CIMIC, Bamako, 9 May 2017.

MINUSMA FHQ, Military Gender Advisor 1, telephone interview, 3 April 2017.

MINUSMA FHQ, Military Gender Advisor 2, Bamako, 10 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Sector West HQ, Commander, Timbuktu, 5 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Sector West HQ, Deputy Commander, Timbuktu, 7 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Sector West HQ, Chief of Operations, Timbuktu 5 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Sector West HQ, Acting Chief of Planning, Timbuktu, 5 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Sector West HQ, Chief of CIMIC, Timbuktu, 5 May 2017.

MINUSMA, Sector West HQ, Military Gender Advisor, Timbuktu, 5 May 2017.

Office of Internal Oversight Services, Inspection and Evaluation Division, Chief of Peacekeeping Evaluation Section, New York, 20 April 2017.

Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN, Military Advisor and Police Advisor, New York, 19 April 2017.

Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN, Deputy Military Advisor, New York, 19 April 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Commanding Officer, briefing, Timbuktu, 2 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff and Legal Advisor, Timbuktu, 3 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Chief of Intelligence, Timbuktu, 3 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Chief of Operations, Timbuktu, 3 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Chief of Liaison, Timbuktu 5 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Chief of Reconnaissance Company, briefing, Timbuktu, 6 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Chief of Reconnaissance Company and Chief of Headquarters and Supply Company, Timbuktu, 6 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Chief of Reconnaissance Platoon and Chief of Supply Platoon, Timbuktu, 6 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Medical Component, Timbuktu, 4 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, Soldiers, Supply Platoon, Timbuktu, 6 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, locally employed staff member 1, Timbuktu, 7 May 2017.

Swedish ISR TF, locally employed staff member 2, Timbuktu, 7 May 2017.

UNWOMEN, Deputy Chief of Independent Evaluation Office, New York, 20 April 2017.

UNFPA, Coordinator sub-cluster on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, Bamako, 12 May 2017.

Unicef, Interagency Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Specialist, Bamako, 11 May 2017.

Seminars

Lessons Learned Mali 05, Revingehed, 14-15 June 2017.

Gender in Military Operations, Swedish Armed Forces HQ, Stockholm, 10 November 2017.

This study assesses the implementation by MINUSMA of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace, and security. Although several preconditions for a successful implementation exist, there is still a long way to go to ensure the full implementation of the resolution.

MINUSMA needs to improve the gender balance among its military staff, increase troop awareness of UNSCR 1325 in the Malian context, and include the provisions of protection and participation of women in the planning and conduct of military operations.