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Foreign military bases and installations in Africa

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FOI-R--4658--SE

Contents

Summary

The main purpose of this report is to increase the understanding of the renewed military interest by foreign state actors in Africa. To achieve this, a systematic analysis was conducted, based on case studies that mapped the military bases and installations of 12 foreign state actors and the strategic interests behind their presence. The mapping showed a higher accumulation of foreign military facilities in the Horn of Africa and West Africa, and the strategic interests varied depending on the region. Broader strategic interests were also identified, namely to protect economic interests, power competition, projecting power, and maintaining historical ties.

Keywords: Africa, military bases, military installations, United States, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, India, China, Japan

Sammanfattning

Huvudsyftet med denna rapport är att öka förståelsen för utländska staters militära intressen i Afrika. För att uppnå detta genomfördes en systematisk analys av 12 icke-afrikanska statliga aktörer. Analysen identifierar aktörernas militära anläggningar på kontinenten och de strategiska motiven för deras närvaro. Kartläggningen visade en högre närvaro av militära anläggningar i Afrikas horn och i Västafrika, där de strategiska intressena varierade beroende på region. Även bredare strategiska intressen identifierades. Dessa var kopplade till att skydda ekonomiska intressen, maktkamp, militär styrkeprojicering och att upprätthålla historiska band.

Nyckelord: Afrika, militära anläggningar, USA, Storbritannien, Spanien, Frankrike, Tyskland, Italien, Ryssland, Turkiet, Förenta Arabemiraten, Indien, Kina, Japan

FOI-R--4658--SE
Project No: A11904
ISSN: 1650-1942

Date: August 2019
Customer: Ministry of Defence
FoT-area: None

Research area: Security Policy
Department: Defence Analysis
Approved by: Lars Höstbeck

Preface

This report was produced as part of the Studies in African Security at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). It was commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence in order to analyse recent developments in Africa, where new foreign state actors are establishing military facilities across the continent.

Nine security policy experts have collected and analysed a large body of open source material to identify the military bases and installations of twelve non-African state actors. Building on this, they further analyse the strategic interests behind the state actors' presence. The authors are very grateful to Dr Elisabeth Sköns for reviewing this report and extend a special thanks to Dr Richard Langlais for editing the text.

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Stockholm, June 2019

Introduction

The African continent has a long history of foreign military presence. Foreign powers, in particular, were present in Africa during the colonial and Cold War periods. Following the end of the Cold War, foreign interest in the continent seemed to decline.[1] Yet, since the early 2000s, there has been a renewed interest in Africa. The United States has established a major military presence on the continent and new entrants such as China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have established military bases and installations, and traditional actors such as France and Italy are increasing their military presence there. These developments indicate that Africa is gaining in strategic importance.

The presence of foreign military bases and installations is not without controversy. For the countries that host them on their territories, they may be associated with a number of undesirable outcomes, from interference in their sovereignty and the escalation of conflict as disputes are militarised, to encouragement of a prostitution industry and environmental degradation.[2] For foreign state actors, on the other hand, military engagement abroad is risky: soldiers' lives may be lost and defence costs increase, while outcomes are uncertain and public opinion at home or abroad may be mobilised against the military presence.[3]

Despite these challenges, foreign state actors are increasingly establishing new military bases in Africa. The main purpose of this report is to increase our understanding of the renewed military interest by non-African state actors in the continent. More concretely, the report achieves this purpose by undertaking two tasks. The first is to identify the main military bases and installations of foreign state actors in Africa. The second is to perform analyses of the strategic interests underlying their presence.

This report contributes a systematic overview and analysis based on case studies of 12 state actors with a documented presence of military bases and installations on the continent. These states are: the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), India, China, and Japan.

The original intention was to select state actors that met the criterion of having a presence on the continent through military bases and installations. That selection was based on analysis of open sources, such as media reports, analyses produced by think tanks, and academic research. However, not all of the state actors that were selected fulfilled this criterion. In the case of Russia, there have been media reports claiming that Moscow is establishing an airbase in Burundi and speculation about the potential for establishing military bases. Given this potential and plans for a base, combined with its being a global player, it was decided to include Russia in the report.

There is also a grey zone in defining what actually constitutes military installations and other forms of military presence. For example, it is debatable whether India's establishment of a radar surveillance network in the western Indian Ocean should be regarded as a military base or as an installation. This is discussed in further detail in the next section.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Israel have also been mentioned in connection to media reporting on bases in Africa. Limited information has been found on these state actors and therefore they are only briefly discussed in this report.

While the establishment of military bases and installations currently receives a great deal of attention in the media, the actual reports and published literature are nevertheless often limited to a discussion of only one state actor, or, at best, a small number of them. In contrast, the present report contributes a systematic overview and analysis of 12 state actors that have been identified here, with particular effort expended to support the analysis with illustrative maps that indicate the locations of military facilities of almost all of the foreign state actors.

The report is divided into five parts. The first covers the introduction and methodological aspects of identifying foreign military bases and the underlying strategic interests. The second part provides a brief overview of the main findings of the case studies of the 12 state actors covered in this report. The third part presents a chapter for each case study. The order of presentation of the state actors starts with the most westerly country, the US, and continues eastwards. The fourth discusses the trends in strategic interests that have been identified, on the basis of the findings from the country case studies. The last part contains final remarks.

Foreign military bases and installations

Since the first task of this report is to identify the main military bases and installations that foreign state actors have in Africa, it is important to consider what

The American forward operating site Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, 2010.

is meant by 'military bases' and 'military installations'. In principle, a military base is a form of military installation, usually with some degree of permanency. However, state actors have their own categorisations and terms for military installations, depending on size, permanence, purpose, location, and so on.[4] Because the distinctions from country to country are fluid and used inconsistently, it emerged that this report should not only identify bases, but also include other types of military installations.

Foreign military installations in Africa vary significantly in size and scope. Some amount to nothing more than a few small buildings used for storage; others comprise large barracks for hundreds of troops, sizeable naval stations, or even full-scale aerodromes. Rather than differentiating between different *types* of military installations, this report aims to identify the *presence* of a foreign state actor's military facility. Hence, the report applies the term – whether base, installation, or otherwise – that officials of the concerned foreign state actor itself use. In some cases, such as the UAE, it has been impossible to identify the official term. In such cases, the report uses the same term as the source itself uses.

The intention of the report is to identify, in host countries, those military bases and installations that are under the operational command of the military establishments of foreign state actors – for example, the British military training facility in Kenya – and not those under the auspices of an international organisation – for example, the United Nations, or NATO. However, there is yet another grey zone. For example, it is difficult to verify the operational command of the radar surveillance network that India has established, or when the US is co-locating military installations with those of host countries. Even though there are some deviations, these cases have been included in order to illustrate the presence of the foreign state actor.

Some military bases and installations in overseas territories are not foreign as they are based on the country's own national territory. This is the case for Spain that has bases on the Canary Islands, which are part of the Spanish territory. The report has chosen to include them, as they are under the operational command of a non-African state actor on the continent.

Finally, even though the focus here is on military bases and installations, the report has also included some cases where other types of military presence have been identified as having more prominence for a specific state actor. This is particularly the case for Russia, which has signed military cooperation agreements with several African countries.

Information sources

The report presents the result of extensive work to collect, map, and analyse an extensive array and variety of information sources. The effort to map the bases and installations builds primarily on open sources, in the form of government publications and statements given by officials. For the analytical work, open primary sources such as articles in the press, academic publications, and the websites of a variety of non-governmental organisations have also been examined.

The information about military installations is to a great extent inaccessible and even confidential or secret. Identifying them is challenging, as the military constantly shifts its units and resources. An additional hinder is that foreign state actors may hide their military presence through extensive use of private military contractors.[5]

Large permanent bases are often easier to identify than other installations, which are often much smaller. Smaller installations are more difficult to verify, particularly if they are used by special operations forces; they are often scalable, and temporary in character. With regard to the case studies, there may be some heterogeneity in their coverage, because of the great variety in the characteristics of the foreign military bases and installations, and the difficulties in accessing comprehensive official information about them. For the same reason, it cannot be claimed that the report provides a complete picture of all foreign military bases and installations, although there is a high degree of certainty that all major installations have been identified.

Strategic interests

The second task of this report is to analyse the strategic interests that currently underlie the presence of military bases and installations. These interests can vary depending on the needs and priorities of the foreign state actor, which may change over time. For example, during the fifteenth century, expansionist powers established overseas bases to defend new lands for exploration. Some centuries later, during the Cold War, the states of the two competing blocs developed global networks of military facilities in client states, as part of strategies that aimed at confronting, encircling, or intimidating, the other side.[6]

Broadly speaking, foreign military installations serve a variety of strategic interests, which can be categorised as economic, political, security-oriented, and cultural.

Economic interests

Establishing or maintaining foreign military bases and installations may serve numerous underlying strategic interests of a state, including the protection and promotion of economic interests. The facilities may be used in support of operations that aim to minimize disruptions to the supply of resources. This could in turn encompass the promotion of stability, the protection of overseas national enterprises and investments, and the safeguarding of goods transportation by land or sea.[7]

Its security commitments to a host country may also increase a foreign state actor's opportunities to influence the partner's trade policy.[8] For example, the presence of a foreign state actor's military bases may enable it to conduct arms sales.[9] The bases may also entail links to desirable infrastructure projects, such as commercial port deals.[10]

Political interests

A foreign state actor's underlying strategic interests may also motivate it to use its foreign military bases and installations to facilitate its political interests. The presence of the bases may secure its position as a global or regional power, as well as positioning itself among rivals.[11] Foreign bases have also been used to maintain historical, ideological, and personal alliances with the host country.[12] In addition, overseas bases can be used to sustain coalitions with allies, by providing support to other foreign state actors present in the region.[13]

Security interests

A state's underlying strategic interests can include countering, or defending itself against, direct and indirect security threats, for example through countermeasures to fight transnational terrorism and efforts to prevent the spread of instability and conflict.[14] These interests may be well served through the establishment of military bases and installations in a foreign country.

For state actors with a large number of nationals abroad, overseas bases may also ensure the security of their nationals.[15] Foreign military facilities may also address other national security issues, such as the protection of oil and gas supply.[16]

Moreover, foreign military bases provide state actors with an important means for projecting power.[17] Power projection can be defined as the ability of a state to apply all or some of its elements of national power – political, economic, informational, or military – to

rapidly deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations, to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.[18] Foreign bases can help to sustain power projection, by deterring adversaries and enabling military forces to respond quickly in different geographic regions.[19] The ability of a state to project its forces into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other states' behaviour.[20]

Cultural interests

Maintaining cultural and historical ties, which can contribute to the strengthening of a state's influence in a host country, may be another way of serving the state's underlying strategic interests, and provide a rationale for establishing foreign military bases and installations.[21]

Sources used to identify strategic interests

The strategic interests of states can be identified through an analysis of official sources, for example national strategies and policies, government websites, or public announcements made by officials. A limitation of this type of source is that state actors are not always explicit about their strategic interests; different actors make different material available. Some states have adopted specific policies on Africa, while others have neither official nor declared policies. In some cases, identifying their polices has had to rely on general statements of policy that can nevertheless be interpreted as having implications for Africa, while other documents may state strategic interests in terms of economic, political, security, or cultural interests. For some of the case studies, open sources and interviews with officials and experts were relied on. ■

Overview of Key Findings

This report has a twofold purpose: first, to identify the main foreign military bases and installations in Africa – by examining a selection of non-African state actors – and, second, to analyse the strategic interests that underlie their presence. The following chapter is an overview of the findings regarding the twelve actors selected. It provides brief descriptions of their specific strategic interests and of their main military facilities.

The entries in this overview are extracts of the case studies. The extracts provide lists of only those specific interests that have been identified for each state actor. This means that the strategic interest 'projecting power', even if that is often at the heart of a foreign military presence, might not be included if the analysis was unable to identify it. In addition, the lists of the strategic interests of the actors make no distinction between primary and secondary interests (where some of the secondary interests can be the means for achieving a primary interest).

It is also important to note that there is a difference in the kind of information relied on in the case studies. For Western countries, the analyses have a tendency to use official information in identifying the underlying strategic interests, while the studies of some of the other countries referred extensively to unofficial information and, in some cases, such as Russia, to unconfirmed and speculative, unofficial information.

Overview of military bases and installations, and of und

USA

The US has one permanent base, one forward operating site in Djibouti, and several non-permanent military facilities, mainly concentrated in West Africa and the Horn of Africa. Its main strategic interests include:

- Countering terrorism,
- Projecting power,
- Power competition with China and Russia,
- Promoting regional security and stability,
- Safeguarding market opportunities
- Protecting US personnel and facilities,
- Safeguarding maritime security.

United Kingdom

The UK has a military training unit in its former colony, Kenya. The UK also operates bases with the US, on two British overseas territories near Africa: Ascension Island, in the South Atlantic Ocean, and Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. Its main strategic interests include:

- Maintaining historical ties with Kenya,
- Nurturing relationships with allies.

Spain

Spain has maintained military bases in the Spanish territories of Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands. Its main strategic interests include:

- Territorial defence
- Maintaining historical ties,
- Protecting maritime routes for trading and transportation,
- Preventing illegal migration.

France

France has maintained, or in recent years established, bases and military points of support in several of its former colonies: Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Djibouti, and the islands Réunion and Mayotte, in the Indian Ocean. Its main strategic interests include:

- Protecting French assets and citizens in Africa,
- Defending France from transnational terrorism,
- Maintaining historical and cultural links,
- Ensuring access to strategic raw materials,
- Safeguarding maritime trade routes,
- Specific strategic interests regarding the French overseas territories of Réunion and Mayotte: territorial defence, maritime security, and illegal migration.

Germany

In 2018, Germany established an air transport base in Niger. Germany also has a small military presence in Djibouti, where it operates out of the French naval air base. Its main strategic interests include:

- Fighting terrorism and preventing illegal migration in the Sahel,
- Securing shipping lines in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean,
- Sustaining relationships with European partners.

Italy

In 2014, in Djibouti, Italy opened its first external inter-service military support base since World War II. Italy also has a military camp hospital in Libya. Its main strategic interests include:

- Securing maritime trade flows in the Horn of Africa,
- Promoting stability in an area where an instability might spill over to the Mediterranean region,
- Preventing illegal migration and energy security in Libya.

erlying strategic interests

Sources: See References to maps, page 91.

Russia

Russia has no confirmed base in Africa, but recent news reports claim that Moscow is establishing an airbase in Burundi. Russia has signed numerous new military cooperation agreements with several African countries. Its main strategic interests include:

- Expanding arms exports, energy deals, and railway projects,
- Ensuring imports of natural resources,
- Projecting power.

Japan

In 2011, in Djibouti, Japan opened its first overseas military base since World War II. Its main strategic interests include:

- Protecting major shipping lines,
- Securing energy supply,
- Enabling access to the African market,
- Balancing China.

China

China opened a naval outpost in Djibouti, its first overseas military base, in 2017. Its main strategic interests include:

- Safeguarding strategic maritime trade routes, including through counter-piracy activities,
- Ensuring supply of natural resources,
- Protecting their local investments and Chinese enterprises, nationals and assets,
- Projecting power,
- Countering terrorism.

India

India currently has no military bases in Africa, but has built a listening post on Madagascar and another in the Seychelles, and a radar post on Mauritius. India has signed agreements with the Seychelles and Mauritius to develop, among others, berthing facilities and runways. Both the Seychelles and Mauritius have encountered local resistance and whether the agreements will be implemented are yet to be seen. Its main strategic interests include:

- Securing sea lines of communications,
- Projecting power in the Western Indian Ocean,
- Balancing the influence of China in the Indo-Pacific,
- Protecting the Indian diaspora.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates has reportedly established bases in Libya and Eritrea, and is currently constructing another in Somaliland. Its main strategic interests include:

- Opposing the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood,
- Containing Iran's regional power,
- Securing economic interests (sea lines of communication, ports, and access to resources and markets),
- Participating in the ongoing wars in Libya and Yemen.

Turkey

In 2017, Turkey inaugurated a military training facility in Somalia. According to media reports, Turkey may build a naval dock in Sudan, for military use. Its main strategic interests include:

- Promoting its version of political Islam,
- Positioning itself against its rivals, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia,
- Facilitating access to markets and resources,
- Enabling the control of ports that Turkey has invested in.

The United States
From Counter-terrorism to Great Power Competition in Africa?

Madelene Lindström

The overseas posture of the United States in Africa is characterised by a network of 'lily pads', low-profile and highly secret non-permanent military facilities. Their key logistical node and the only permanent American military base on the continent is Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti. The main aim of America's presence is to fight terrorism; special forces operations and the use of drones have increased over the years. However, as the focus is changing towards great power economic competition with China and Russia, a reduction of American special forces in Africa is foreseen.

Countering terrorism

Before Africa's decolonisation in the early 1960s, the United States (US) ran its diplomatic relations with most of the countries on the continent through European colonial powers. During the Cold War, the US perceived Africa as a place for countering the Soviet Union and making the continent's political orientation 'pro-West'.[22] Shortly after the Cold War, it seemed the US had lost its strategic interest in Africa. US disengagement was reinforced by the 'Black Hawk Down' incident, in Somalia in 1993, when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during a mission. The incident was a part of the Battle of Mogadishu, killing 18 American soldiers. It had a tremendous impact on both policymakers and public opinion in America and led to a period of many years when US forces were nearly absent in Africa.[23]

The reorientation of US policies on Africa was short-lived. The 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania highlighted Africa as a source of terrorist threats. Following the '9/11' attacks on US soil in 2001, which among other things strengthened concerns that terrorist organisations from Africa had escalated their activities and were now exporting terror

to Europe and America, terrorism was designated as the number one threat to US security.[24]

In 2007, the US government created United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, as the combatant command responsible for all US military activities in Africa.[25] AFRICOM includes a forward-deployed naval component, the US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), with headquarters in Naples, Italy.[26] NAVAF has been active off Africa's west coast for more than a decade.[27]

AFRICOM prioritises five objectives: (1) African partners contribute to regional security; (2) threats from violent-extremist organisations (VEOs) and transnational criminal organisations are reduced to a level manageable by internal security forces; (3) US access and influence are ensured; (4) AFRICOM sets the theatre by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, and agreements; and (5) US personnel and facilities are protected.[28]

In 2019, AFRICOM revised its campaign plan. To achieve its objectives, it emphasizes six approaches: (1) to strengthen partner networks; (2) to enhance partner capability; (3) to develop security in Somalia; (4) to contain instability in Libya; (5) to support partners in Sahel and the Lake Chad region; and (6) to set the theatre to facilitate AFRICOM's day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.[29]

"The 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania highlighted Africa as a source of terrorist threats."

Camp Lemonnier

The US government, with its primary focus on the conduct and support of counter-terrorism missions, has been leasing the site of Camp Lemonnier from the Djiboutian government since 2001.[30] The Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), established in 2002 as a part of the global war against terrorism, is still the main US military body tasked with conducting operations and training in East Africa.[31]

Camp Lemonnier is the key logistical node for AFRICOM's missions in Africa. As the only permanent US base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier has undergone a series of upgrades; infrastructure has been improved and the base area has been expanded.[32]

The CJTF-HOA comprises 2,000 primarily military personnel. Together with approximately 2,100 permanent personnel stationed in Djibouti, AFRICOM has no other forces of its own. Additional personnel are 'borrowed' by negotiating with and receiving them from the US European Command (EUCOM).[33]

From Camp Lemonnier, the US has access to Djibouti's international airport, from where it can launch manned surveillance aircraft, transport planes, helicopters, and fighter jets. Following a number of accidents, the US moved in 2013 its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flights to the more remote location of Chabelley Airfield, about 10 kilometres from Camp Lemonnier. [34]

The 'lily pad' network

When the US returned to Africa at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, its approach was to have a light footprint on the continent. In addition to Camp Lemonnier, the US armed forces have access to a number of 'lily pads', as they are euphemistically called, across the continent. These military installations, referred to by the Pentagon as cooperative security locations (CSLs), can range from relatively small 'military Shurgards' – stocked with pre-positioned materiel such as tents, satellite equipment, and water – to sites that may have access to an airstrip, launch drones, and in many other aspects resemble a military base. In other words, there are both 'permanent' locations for contingency operations and 'cold' supply depots that are activated in the event of an emergency or in connection with shorter training activities conducted nearby.[35]

The lily pads have little or no permanent US personnel and are often co-located with a host country facility, which means that costly security upgrades are not needed, as the CSLs are already located within restricted facilities.[36] The lily pad strategy is considered both cost-effective and less politically sensitive (both for the host country and the state actor), compared to other alternatives.[37] The network of lily pads also enables faster evacuation of personnel.[38]

The main activities conducted from Camp Lemonnier and the lily pads are short-term special forces deployments and training of African forces.[39] The US is engaged in training activities with 'nearly every country on the African continent'.[40]

Seaborne lily pads and outposts outside the African continent

In addition to the lily pads on land, US warships operating around the coast of Africa can serve as

'seaborne lily pads' for helicopters and patrol craft and participate in at-sea exercises and operations. A clear advantage of using bases outside of Africa is that it avoids reliance on the continent's uneven infrastructure.[41] The US military also has a range of bilateral agreements on the use of twenty-nine international airports in Africa as refuelling centres.[42]

The US has a significant maritime security programme in Africa. For example, the US leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a 33-nation naval partnership that conducts maritime security operations in, among other places, the Gulf of Aden.[43] The US conducts annual exercises, such as Phoenix Express, an annual exercise to promote national and regional security in northeastern Africa,[44] and Obangame Express, an at-sea exercise to increase maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea and the region around it.[45]

Safeguarding maritime security is an underlying strategic interest for the seaborne lily pads and at-sea exercises and operations.[46] An example of such an interest is ensuring the oil trade from the Gulf of Guinea. Until a few years ago, the US was one of the African oil industry's primary export markets. Even though US imports from the African oil industry have fallen in recent years as domestic supply has increased,[47] West African oil remains strategically important for US policymakers. The Gulf of Guinea crude is of high quality and provides an alternative to Persian Gulf oil. West Africa is also geographically closer, making transportation less costly than from the Middle East.[48]

Although not geographically African territories, the UK's islands of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, and Ascension Island, off the west coast of Africa, serve as US forward operating locations. It is unclear, however, whether these bases are used for missions in Africa. Open sources primarily mention that Diego Garcia has been important for the Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the war in Afghanistan and, most recently, the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.[49]

Growing numbers

Following the Department of Defence's update of the overseas basing structure, in 2004, the number of lily pads has risen. This is the case, especially in Africa, after the US ambassador and three other Americans were killed in the attack on the US mission in Benghazi, Libya.[50] Important flexibility is considered to be generated by having many lily pads; for example, they can provide a 'backup alternative' in the event that one site is forced to close.

It is difficult to obtain information about the exact number and location of the lily pads. According to a briefing prepared in 2018 by AFRICOM scientific advisor Peter E. Teil, the list of military detachments includes 34 sites spread across the continent.[51] Other sources estimate that in 2015 the actual number had already reached around 60.[52] To underline exactly how low a profile many of the lily pads actually have, an interviewee playfully hinted, 'If you blink, you'll miss them'.[53]

The exact number of potentially available locations is of less importance, since it indicates neither US combat capability in Africa, nor its commitment to being there. Compared to Europe, where the US military presence is about 65,000 (about half of those are based in Germany) – the US presence in Africa is relatively small. On the African continent – an area bigger than China, India, the contiguous US and most of Europe combined[54] – the US has 7,200 military personnel on any given day, according to the commander of AFRICOM, General Thomas Waldhauser.[55] The highest concentrations are in Djibouti (roughly 4,000), Niger (roughly 800), and Somalia (roughly 500).[56]

Drones gaining ground in the US fight against terrorism

Lately, the US has increased its use of UAVs on the African continent.[57] In addition to the surveillance drones launched from Niger and, since 2007, from Djibouti,[58] open sources point to Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya, Tunisia (Bizerte Airbase, in Sidi Ahmed), and Uganda as possible drone sites .[59]

Kinetic drones – in other words, drones that can undertake armed attacks – are operated from two African countries: Djibouti[60] (Chabelley Airfield) and Niger (Niamey and Agadez Air Base 201).[61] Drones launched from Djibouti target VEOs in Yemen and Somalia.[62] The Agadez drone base, which is expected to become operational in 2019, will target VEOs in Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Nigeria.[63] Libya and Somalia are the only two countries in Africa where the US has authorised the launch of deadly kinetic drone strikes.[64] The strikes against targets in northern Libya are conducted from Sicily (from where they cannot reach southern Libya).[65]

Assessment of US military bases and installations in Africa



Sources: FOI, based on a 2018 briefing, 'Strategic Posture,' by a US AFRICOM science advisor, Peter E. Teil, published in The Intercept (2018)[51]; Global Terrorism Database (2018)[500].

Power projection

For decades, the US could generally deploy its forces when and where it wanted.[66] Its military bases and installations around the world, including Africa, have helped to sustain a capability for global reach and power projection.[67] That this continues to be its aim is indicated by a summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. To achieve the aim, allies and security partners from around the world are sought, since they provide access to critical regions. This in turn supports the widespread basing and logistics system that reinforces US global reach. Although Africa is less prominent in strategic planning compared to Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, it is nevertheless a part of this capability, one that has the projection of power as its main underlying rationale.[68]

From counter-terrorism to great power economic competition

In December 2018, President Trump signed the US strategy toward Africa. The main tenets of the strategy are to advance commerce with nations in the region, counter the threat of violent extremism, and ensure that US aid to Africa is efficient and effective. Safeguarding economic opportunities on the continent

has a national security aspect, because of the increasing economic influence of China and Russia.[69] According to the US National Security Advisor, John Bolton: '[China and Russia] are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States'.[70]

The US strategy towards Africa is in line with the priorities outlined in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, which emphasize the rise of China and Russia as key competitors.[71]

AFRICOM's 2019 posture statement raised concerns that African countries, which can access financing through China's state-owned banks, often commit to contracts that can lead to debt-equity swap arrangements when debt obligations are unfulfilled.[72] For example, there is a fear that the Djibouti government's 1.2 billion USD debt to the Chinese may eventually force them to hand over the running of the port to the Chinese, which in turn could restrict US access both to the African continent and to the Middle East.[73]

Russia is also seen as a growing challenge. By employing oligarch-funded, quasi-mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders seek unchallenged autocratic rule, Russian interests gain access to natural resources on favourable terms. Russia also garners additional support at the United Nations and gains more customers for its military arms sales.[74]

"By employing oligarch-funded, quasi-mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders seek unchallenged autocratic rule, Russian interests gain access to natural resources on favourable terms."

In national security advisor Bolton's opinion, '. . . the predatory practices pursued by China and Russia stunt economic growth in Africa; threaten the financial independence of African nations; inhibit opportunities for US investment; interfere with US military operations; and pose a significant threat to US national security interests'.[75]

In addition, AFRICOM has observed the increased engagement of non-traditional security actors, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, seeing both challenges and opportunities to its mission. [76]

In sum, both of the recently updated US strategies demonstrate a shift from counter-terrorism back to great power competition.

A future drawdown

The death of four US servicemen in the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger – the largest number of US military losses in Africa since the 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Somalia, in 1993 – spurred a major political debate over US military activities on the continent and placed the Trump administration at a critical crossroads.[77] The debate made it clear that the American public would not accept casualties on African soil, not even for the fight against terrorism.[78]

Following this debate, in November 2018, the Pentagon announced a drawdown in the forces deployed in Africa, about 7,200 in number, which would be reduced by approximately 10 per cent over the next few years. The cut would leave activities in several countries (Somalia, Djibouti, and Libya), largely untouched. In other parts of the region, including West Africa, the emphasis will shift from tactical assistance to advising, assisting, liaising, and intelligence-sharing.[79] Drones will increasingly replace US boots on the ground, while those troops who do remain will instead be used to support the Pentagon's increased focus on countering threats from China and Russia.[80]

Africa has always been a region with a low priority for US foreign policy, regardless of the administration in power.[81] The plans for a drawdown are also in line with the Trump administration's 2018 National Defense Strategy,[82] which focuses on great-power economic competition with China and Russia, rather than fighting terrorists. However, the Pentagon's move comes as China and Russia look to increase their influence in Africa. ■

The United Kingdom
Training Troops and Maintaining Influence

Emma Sjökvist

The United Kingdom (UK) has largely avoided a permanent military presence in Africa since the de-colonisation period that began in the 1950s, with the notable exception of the British training units in Kenya. Instead, the UK has favoured 'soft' approaches to projecting military power, such as bilateral capacity-building and peace support. This approach serves the UK's broader goals of projecting its global reach and military strength, while securing influence with and access to allies and former colonies.

Training British troops in Kenya

Kenya is of great strategic importance to the UK. This is partly because it is home to a permanent British military installation, a training facility operated by the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) under a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with the Kenyan Government.[83]

Located 200 km north of Nairobi, BATUK is comprised of a relatively small number of permanent staff who provide logistical support for exercises carried out by as many as 10,000 British troops on the ground annually.[84] The training conducted in Kenya is seen as vital to preparing British troops for deployment on expeditionary operations in hot and arid climates and terrains, such as Afghanistan. BATUK is also used for forward operating bases and other tasks.[85]

This valuable training unit is an illustration of British colonial heritage in the region. The UK's military presence in Kenya dates back to British colonial rule, when thousands of British troops were stationed in the country.[86] Early plans for a military base were first drawn up after World War II, in recognition of Kenya's strategic position near key shipping lanes and the need for British capabilities 'east of Suez'.[87] At the

time, it was argued that a permanent base in Kenya would speed up the acclimatisation process for British troops and provide a launching pad for those bound for the Middle East.[88]

Over the years, BATUK has occasionally emerged as a point of tension between the UK and Kenya. Diplomatic spats have been reported concerning land use, as well as jurisdiction over British military personnel accused of committing crimes in Kenya, among other issues.[89] Nonetheless, the UK and Kenya secured a new agreement on defence cooperation in 2015, ensuring the smooth continuation of BATUK.[90]

As part of the defence relationship between the two countries, Britain also holds joint military exercises with Kenyan forces and offers training in the UK for members of the Kenya Defence Forces.[91] The UK has recently invested 20 million GBP in a seven-year project to rebuild the premises that will assemble all of its training assets onto a central site in Nanyuki, signalling BATUK's continuing importance.[92]

British military assistance to African partners

In addition to training British troops, the UK operates a vast network of military assistance programmes aimed at training African troops. This typically involves deploying short-term advisory, training, and peace support teams that focus on capacity-building of the host country's local personnel in, for example, tackling terrorism.[93]

As part of this effort, the UK has been leading a security training centre in Baidoa, Somalia, since January 2017. Approximately 85 British personnel train the Somali National Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[94] The UK has also had resident military training teams in Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, in addition to short-term training teams deployed in several other countries.[95]

The British Army has recently established specialised infantry battalions trained in cultural and linguistic skills and with a focus on capacity-building of UK partners.[96] By educating and training the national forces of other African countries in the British military tradition, the UK purports to contribute to stability and good governance, as well as to the interoperability of its own security structures with each of theirs.[97]

Building and maintaining security links with African states also addresses issues – such as terrorism and violent extremism – that are increasingly perceived by British policymakers as threats to the UK's domestic security.[98] In 2017, for example, the British Peace Support Team handed over an Asymmetrical Warfare Battle Camp to the Kenya Defence Forces, for the use of both Kenyan and British troops.[99]

British soldiers training at BATUK, Kenya, 2011.

At the same time, providing military assistance allows the UK to cultivate strategically bilateral relationships and build influence; in other words, it uses defence networks for the purpose of exerting 'soft power'.[100] This focus on relationships is central to the current strategy of making British defence policy 'International by Design', and fits into the government's broader 'Global Britain' vision that aims to maintain the UK's status as a global player on the world stage.[101]

An important component of this approach is defence engagement, defined as 'non-combat activities with international partners, which contribute to stability, security and prosperity'.[102] Since the release of the latest national security review (the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, hereafter the British National Security Strategy), defence engagement has become a funded, core task of the British Ministry of Defence.[103] The further creation of a regional British Defence Staff, in Abuja, Nigeria, intended to oversee a growing program of military advisory and capacity-building activities on the continent, signals a continuing focus on this 'soft' arm of the UK's military.[104]

Nurturing key relationships

Other British military efforts in the region can similarly be viewed as part of an emphasis on maintaining relationships, and relevance, in an evolving geopolitical arena. The recent deployment of a British contingent to aid French counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel, for example, indicates a growing British focus on the Anglo-French defence partnership.[105]

Observers have described this shift as being part of a perceived need to cement the UK's position as a reliable security partner to European countries in the context of Brexit.[106] Others have predicted that the UK may find it difficult to maintain its influence in places where EU member states will likely take advantage of Brexit for their own benefit, such as in North Africa.[107]

Also noteworthy is the UK's relationship with the United States (US) concerning security in the region. According to media reports, British military personnel have been stationed at the large US Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti.[108] The UK and the US also jointly operate bases in two British overseas territories near Africa: Ascension Island, in the South Atlantic Ocean, and Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean.[109]

A continuing 'soft' presence?

It appears unlikely that the UK will completely shift its focus away from the African continent, given their historical ties, in the near future. Moreover, the current British National Security Strategy specifically identifies that instability in northern Africa poses a Tier One (highest level) risk for the UK.[110] Accordingly, it is in the UK's interest to support peace and stability in the region, and to prevent 'ungoverned spaces' that can be exploited by terrorist groups.[111]

In the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, with British public opinion seeming to weigh against direct military intervention, the UK's 'muscular soft power' approach in Africa appears likely to endure.[112] It remains to be seen, however, once the effects of Brexit crystallise, whether a military presence in Africa will become prioritised. ■

Spain
Defending Overseas Territory and Interests

Carina Gunnarson

Spain has had a long presence in Africa that dates back to the 15th century. Still today, Spain maintains military bases in Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands. An overriding motive for their presence is territorial defence. In addition to maintaining historical links, they have strategic importance for ensuring maritime security and preventing illegal migration. For the Canary Islands, the protection of maritime routes is crucial, not only for trade, but also for energy supply and communication through undersea cables. There are currently no indications that Spain plans to establish additional bases or military installations in Africa.

Ceuta and Melilla

Ceuta and Melilla are autonomous Spanish cities that share borders with Morocco. The territories are the two smallest autonomous regions in Spain, despite their location on the African continent. Because of the cities, Spain has been the only European country, since Algeria's independence in 1962, to have a territorial presence in North Africa.[113] The territory of Ceuta (19.48 km^2) is located on the African coast along the Strait of Gibraltar, some 30 kilometres south of Gibraltar. The territory of Melilla (12.3 km2) is 200 kilometres southeast of Ceuta, about 185 kilometres south of the Spanish port city of Malaga.[114]

Both Ceuta and Melilla have a high density of soldiers, around 3,000 each. Both military structures have training facilities, but owing to Melilla's limited size, the military units depend on the Spanish mainland for training that includes heavy weapons fire and larger exercises involving different units. In both cities, the military units are scattered in a number of locations. In order to concentrate Ceuta's various military structures into a single base, the Ministry of Defence has allocated major funding for 2019-2024.[115]

Melilla hosts the most modern military construction in the city, Base Alfonso XIII.[116]

Maintaining historical ties

Spain seized Melilla by force in 1497, and Portugal conquered Ceuta in 1415. Following Portugal's unification with Spain in 1580, Ceuta passed to Spain, and was formally assigned to it in 1668 via the Treaty of Lisbon. Spain's expansion into North Africa was part of the *Riconquista*, which refers to a series of campaigns by the Christian states of Portugal and Spain, during the 15th to 17th centuries, to recapture territory from the Moors, who had occupied most of the Iberian Peninsula in the early 8th century. Between 1912 and 1956, Morocco's Mediterranean coast, including Ceuta and Melilla, were part of the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.[117]

The Spanish army has strong links to Ceuta and Melilla. The General Command of Melilla is one of the oldest in the Spanish army. For centuries, the military in Ceuta and Melilla defended the Spanish mainland from invasion by the Moors. Both cities were subject to several Muslim sieges and attacks during the 18th century. Melilla became an important military base and served as a major bridgehead during the colonial war, particularly between 1908 and 1923.[118] During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the African Army (mainly local Moroccans) supported General Franco in the rebellion against the legitimate government.[119] About 12,000 military personnel lay at rest in the cemetery of Melilla.[120] Maintaining historical ties with Ceuta and Melilla is thus important for Spain.

Protecting sovereignty and trade

A main strategic interest is to protect sovereignty. As Spanish territories, the main task of the military installations in Ceuta and Melilla is 'to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity'.[121]

An underlying strategic interest is to protect maritime commercial activities. Historically, Ceuta and Melilla were important geopolitical centres of trade and commerce, connecting North Africa and West Africa, via the Saharan trade routes, with Europe.[122] For decades, Ceuta and Melilla were the main commercial harbours that supplied northern Morocco. In recent years, the importance of the harbours has decreased, as Morocco has constructed a large harbour in Tangiers and in 2018 decided to close its commercial border with Melilla.[123] The Ceuta and Melilla harbours are still attractive, due to their geographical situation in the Strait of Gibraltar and their free trade agreement with EU.[124] Both cities also have fishing and tourism businesses.[125]

Preventing illegal migration?

The two Spanish enclaves represent Europe's only direct border with Africa and are attractive, therefore, as entry points for migration to Europe. Between 2016 and 2017, migration through Spain almost tripled, according to a report from the International Organization for Migration, from about 8,000 arrivals in 2016, to almost 22,000 in 2017.[126] More than 22,000 migrants entered through Spain during the first seven months of 2018, making it the primary point of entry for migrants to Europe.[127]

> "More than 22,000 migrants entered through Spain during the first seven months of 2018, making it the primary point of entry for migrants to Europe."

So far, the role of the military forces is limited to border patrols. Yet, one of the tasks of the military forces includes 'support and collaboration with civil authorities', in cases of serious risk, catastrophe, or calamity, or in addressing other needs of the public.[128] This collaboration includes the Civil Guard, which is responsible for Spanish border control.[129] The Civil Guard is under increased pressure from migrants, who try to enter the enclaves by force. On different occasions, migrants have entered the enclaves by dashing through the border controls in large groups and by climbing the barbed wired fences surrounding the cities.[130] In February 2014, the Spanish minister of interior acknowledged that the Civil Guard had used riot-control materials (rubber bullets) to stop several hundred people from a entering the city, a response that led to the death of fourteen African migrants.[131] The upshot of this is that an underlying strategic interest for maintaining military bases in Ceuta and Melilla could be to prevent illegal migration.

Assessment of Spanish military bases and installations in Africa



Source: FOI, based on information from the Spanish Ministry of Defence[116, 120, 134, 135], and Andersson (2016)[503], Encyclopaedia Britannica[117].

The Canary Islands

The Canary Islands consist of an archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean, the nearest island being 108 kilometres off the northwest African mainland.[132] Columbus' four expeditions across the Atlantic opened sea routes for European exploration, exploitation, and colonisation of the Americas; the position of the Canaries on some of these routes made them indispensable as Spanish bases. The Treaty of Alcáçovas (1479) recognised Spanish sovereignty over the islands, which became an autonomous community of Spain in 1982.[133]

The Canary Islands currently host three military bases: the General Aleman Ramirez base, the Arsenal of Las Palmas – the naval base – and the Gando airbase.[134] The brigade in Las Palmas, the capital of Grand Canaria, consists of combat, combat support, and logistics units. One of its main tasks is national defence of Spanish territory. The facilities and military presence on the Canary Islands permit operational activities in other geographical areas: units from the brigade have participated in international operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.[135]

Ensuring maritime security

Important tasks of the military installations on the Canary Islands include national defence and the protection of major shipping lanes. As a maritime state, Spain is heavily dependent on transportation by sea. The protection of maritime routes is crucial for trading, transportation, and energy supply, as well as for communication through undersea cables.[136] General traffic is heavily concentrated in relatively few of Spain's many ports, among them Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerifa on the Canary Islands.[137] Public officials describe the naval base in Las Palmas as one of the Spanish navy's most important facilities.[138]

The Canary Islands are well located on the maritime route between Spain and the Gulf of Guinea, where Spain has important economic interests. Spain retains important economic exchange with its former colony,

Equatorial Guinea, which is among the top ten largest oil producers in Africa.[139]

The fishing waters in the eastern Central Atlantic, stretching from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Guinea, represent almost 15 % of Spain's total catch in 2017.[140] Spain holds the largest fishing fleet capacity in the EU, about 14,400 vessels. Half are registered in Galician ports; around 1,100 vessels are registered in the Canary Islands.[141]

The facilities on the Canary Islands provide support not only to the Spanish Navy and other armed ships, but also to other types of vessels, such as customs surveillance ships, or vessels involved in rescue operations. The activities include provision of logistical support to: vessels that are located in the community of the Canary Islands; vessels that are in transit; or that carry out operations in the area. For example, the base supports law enforcement agencies in their anti-drug-trafficking activities.[142]

In addition to maritime patrol and rescue units, the Gando Air Base in Las Palmas includes combat and transport units. The military airfield of Lanzarote allows a permanent deployment of air force units.[143] In addition, eight civilian airports are accessible for military purposes.

As is the case for Ceuta and Melilla, the Canaries have experienced migration flows. In 2006, the number of arrivals peaked, reaching 32,000 migrants. Spain reversed the trend by establishing regional cooperation through the Seahorse project, which is a network linking European and African border police forces and involving training, deployments, and satellite surveillance.[144]

Continued presence

According to the Spanish national security strategy, North Africa is one of four regions in Africa that Spain has prioritised, due to a shared history and geographic proximity, as well as its political, cultural, and economic importance.[145] Aside from the Canary Islands, North Africa is currently the only area where Spain officially has military postures. The other three prioritised African regions are the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Horn of Africa. The Sahel represents a new security threat, with its proximity to Spain and the presence of armed groups and jihadist terrorists. The Gulf of Guinea is an important region for the Spanish economy, but presents threats that include armed robbery and piracy on the high seas, illegal fishing, and illicit trafficking of people, narcotics, and weapons. The waters next to the Horn of Africa concentrate an important share of the trade between Asia and Europe, and oil traffic from the Middle East; the Spanish Government describes it as being 'essential for Spain to participate in protecting the maritime routes criss-crossing this region'.[146]

There are no indications that Spain plans to establish other bases or military installations in Africa in addition to Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands. Instead, Spain seems to prefer engagement in international operations or cooperation with France, in West Africa.

The Spanish military presence is controversial. Local actors on the Canary Islands oppose the presence of the Spanish naval base, which covers over 15,000 square meters and are of interest for Las Palmas' economic and commercial development.[147] Spain's defence minister said, in November 2017, that the government is considering moving the naval base. Yet, at the same time, she described the base as 'indispensable for the needs of national and EU defence'.[148]

Since the 1960s, Morocco has claimed the territories of Ceuta and Melilla. There are no indications, however, that the territories will cease to be officially under Spanish control in future. ■

France
A Continuing Military Presence

Anna Sundberg

In the decades following the 1960s, when the colonial period ended, France continued to regard its former colonies in Africa as an exclusive sphere of influence. Even today, France has several thousand soldiers deployed across the continent in permanent bases and in external operations. Besides strong historical and cultural links, security is currently the overriding motive for France's engagement in Africa. However, the development and future of France's military presence and engagement are not solely dependent on its own will.

A tradition of maintaining a military footprint

Africa is France's most important theatre of operations, to the point that during the Cold War France was called 'Africa's gendarme', as its military was continually deployed in response to crises or emergencies. From 1945–2005, France conducted more than 130 military interventions in Africa, many of them in its former colonies. The interventions ranged from quick counter-insurgency missions and non-combat evacuations to longer operations, including peacekeeping, among others.[149]

During the post-colonial period, France and its former African colonies maintained exceptionally close relations. This allowed it to retain its influence in the United Nations General Assembly and maintain its claim to great power status.[150]

France relied on its army to preserve its sphere of influence in Africa, as if the continent was its *pré carré,* or 'backyard'.[151] It actualised its engagement through numerous measures, including defence agreements, which created a legal basis for both its military presence, training, equipment, and interventions. It was thus inevitable that the security sectors of the countries involved were modelled on the French system and that

its regular involvement in African security issues was normalised.[152]

In the 1990s, France's Africa policy gradually changed. The turning point was 1994, with the genocide in Rwanda, when France's much-criticised involvement in the country led it to gradually reduce its permanent presence. This trend prevailed as recently as 2012, when François Hollande became president; his expressed vision was to continue in this direction. However, as security in sub-Saharan Africa deteriorated, and with the repeated terror attacks in France, Hollande resurrected France's permanent military presence and launched military operations in both Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).[153]

Today, France has a military presence in francophone areas of eastern, central, and western Africa.[154] All branches of defence, as well as its special forces, are represented, a commitment of 8,700 troops, half of which are permanently stationed.[155] The pre-existing defence agreements (which were all reworded in 2008 by then president Nicolas Sarkozy) remain as the formal underpinnings of this presence. In all, France has bilateral military agreements, mostly covering military cooperation in training and peacekeeping, with some 40 states in Africa. Its agreement with Djibouti is the last wherein France reaffirms its commitment to the territorial integrity of a former colony.[156]

"Today, France has a military presence in francophone areas of eastern, central, and western Africa."

Permanent presence

France has pre-positioned forces in Djibouti and in four other countries in Africa. Its base in Djibouti, with a permanent force of 1,450 troops, is its largest overseas military base and the biggest permanent foreign establishment in Africa. It is also one of France's two forward operating bases (BOA, *Bases Opérationnelles Avancées);* the other is in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Both have rotational and permanent personnel, a logistics hub, an armoured vehicle park, and fighting units that not only reinforce ongoing operations in the region but may also be used for operational surges.[157]

In Dakar, Senegal, and Libreville, Gabon, France has regional cooperation bases (POC, *Pôle Opérationnel de Coopération)* that provide special support to their host countries and neighbours. The bases are home to only a few fighting units – to provide protection, but not logistics support – while most of the troops are permanently stationed and deployed for training and exercises.[158]

France also has a territorial defence base on the island of Réunion and a naval base on Mayotte, both French overseas territories in the Indian Ocean. Their missions are operational, to represent and protect the French Republic, and focused on maritime security and illegal migration. Together the armed forces in the Southern Indian Ocean zone comprise 1700 personnel.[159]

Current operations – capacity-building and cooperation

Emmanuel Macron, president of France since 2017, inherited two external operations in Africa and on several occasions has expressed the ambition, like Hollande, to continue them.[160]

The first, Mission Corymbe, was originally aimed at preserving French oil exploitation and other economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea, but nowadays is intended to reduce maritime insecurity and contribute to capacity-building in fighting piracy and illicit trafficking, for example by hosting naval exercises for navies in the region.[161] It is often referred to as a permanent maritime operation, since it has been underway since the 1990s. The mission evolves over time, as the need arises, from a single patrol vessel carrying 50 troops to bigger amphibious assault ships with up to several hundred soldiers.[162]

The second is Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorist operation in the Sahel region. It was launched by Hollande in 2014, with a contingent of 4,000 French troops positioned in cooperation with the five countries concerned, all former French colonies: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, and Chad, a partnership known as the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5S). The G5S cooperation includes border control and counter-terrorist operations, with France assisting in coordination and in overcoming substantial capability gaps.

Its operational headquarters is at its main base, in N'Djamena, Chad, and has troops based elsewhere in the area of operations: in Faya-Largeau and Abéché, in Chad, and at Niamey airport, in Niger.[163] The latter has been called an

intelligence air base, strategically important since it hosts drones that gather intelligence across the entire Sahel region.

Since the mid-1990s, French policy has been to provide security sector assistance to African countries to increase the capacity of their armed forces and assist their taking charge of their own peace and stability.[164] In light of the growing terrorist threat, capacity-building in counter-terrorism, as in Operation Barkhane, is inherent to that policy.[165] Even though France is said to perceive the G5S as an 'exit strategy from the Sahel', the force remains dependent on French support.[166] While French official sources continuously underline that France will continue to support this struggle, they add that the time will come when Africa itself must assume responsibility; as President Macron put it, 'the solutions won't come from outside'.[167]

Network of operational support, logistics hubs, and points of departure

Reinforcing Operation Barkhane is an important role for France's permanent bases in Africa. For instance, the base in the Ivory Coast has strengthened the operation and been its logistics hub, receiving equipment from the naval base in Toulon, France. The French Special Forces assigned to Operation Barkhane are based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which, along with other installations, serves as a point of departure for tracking jihadist fighters and illegal transports in the wider sub-Saharan area.[168] In Mali, France has troops in Kidal and Tessalit and at a regional base in Gao; and, in Mauretania, in Atar.[169] The bases also provide facilities for the training required by an environment and climate different from metropolitan France.

France perceives its network of installations in Africa as providing support for operational deployments and improved responsiveness when a new operation, reinforcements, or a rotation within an ongoing operation, are needed. Many of its bases reflect this perception: the Djibouti base is an operational forward base for missions in East Africa and the Horn; the one in Gabon covers Central Africa; the Ivory Coast base is tasked with covering all of West Africa, but in practice is mainly dedicated to the Sahel region; while the Senegal base covers West Africa and maritime operations in the Atlantic.[170] The regional cooperation bases in Senegal and Gabon also contribute to military capacity-building, both training and mentoring.

Protection of French assets and citizens

France's 2017 Strategic Review highlighted Africa as a region of strategic importance,[171] and indicated that its permanent bases are to provide defence and security for French assets and citizens, tasks that can also be linked to ongoing external operations.[172]

Protecting assets

Many analysts connect French security policy in Africa to economic interests. Numerous small- and global-scale French companies have long been based there, although their number has declined since 2000. The common currency zone, CFA *(Communauté Financière Africaine),* established by France in its African colonies after World War II, lives on. Even though its current economic value to France is disputed, it remains as another link to 15 of its former colonies.[173]

Today, France is only Africa's fifth-largest exporter, arms trade included. France has a substantial defence industry and used to be a major, and sometimes the only, arms supplier to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Although no longer Africa's principal trade partner, France's overseas interests have been key terrorist targets since the early 1990s.[174]

France also wishes to ensure access to strategic raw materials, maritime security, and trade routes; these roles are linked to both the base in Djibouti, near the Suez Canal, and to Mission Corymbe.[175] Oil from Gabon is essential, while French troops are deployed in Niger to secure uranium mines – run by the French state-owned company Areva and important for nuclear power plants and weapons – from terrorists.[176]

Counter-terrorism

France links its domestic security to that of parts of Sahel. When in 2018 President Macron addressed troops in Mali, he underlined that local and regional security threats in Africa could have direct implications for France: 'A threat that emerges only a few kilometres away from here in Mali will quickly strike women and children in France unless we intervene resolutely and powerfully'.[177] This has led France to focus on francophone sub-Saharan Africa. Trafficking, of humans, drugs, and arms, is a well-known method for financing terrorism and Sahel is a central migration route. Surveillance and intelligence drones are such an integral part of the counter-terrorism effort that in 2017 France decided to arm the drones based in Niger.[178]

Assessment of French bases and installations in Africa



Sources: French General Staff of Armed Forces (2019)[159], French Ministry of Armed Forces (2019)[163], Global Terrorism Database (2018)[500], Oceans Beyond Piracy (2018)[502]. Note: In Atar, Mauritania, the French have an operational military detachment.

Evacuation capability and hostage operations

There is an important human link between Africa and France. Approximately 2.3 million francophone African immigrants, as well as numerous bi-nationals, live in France, while some 270,000 French citizens live on the African continent.[179] Terrorist attacks in Sahel, such as those at a resort in Grand-Bassam, Ivory Coast, in 2016, and against the embassy in Burkina Faso, in 2018,[180] have led to the killing and kidnapping of French nationals, and interventions by French Special Forces.[181]

All French troops stationed at the permanent French bases are ready for non-combat evacuation missions. With the deterioration of the internal security situation in Ivory Coast in 2002, France airlifted 20,000 people out of the country. Since 2015, France has also been obligated to evacuate EU citizens.[182]

Continuity rather than rupture

There is a broad consensus in France about the advantages of a continued permanent military presence in Africa and, simultaneously, an awareness that counter-terrorism and capacity-building are long-term commitments. It is sometimes stated, in relation to Operation Barkhane, that France's engagement may last another decade. Thus, there is little appetite for new interventions and France is likely to consolidate rather than expand its presence.[183]

French and Chad military participate in a flag ceremony to commemorate the launch of Operation Barkhane in 2014.

Exactly how France's military presence and engagements may evolve is not dependent on its will alone. Some analysts see France's influence in Africa diminishing. With the emergence of a new generation of leaders in many African countries, it remains to be seen how political support for French involvement might evolve over time.[184]

Strained resources, in both equipment and soldiers, are another limiting factor for France's military engagements, both nationally and abroad. The French troops in Operation Barkhane are already dependent on support from allies, mostly the US.[185]

Since the 1990s, France has increasingly emphasized multilateralisation, meaning an aspiration for deepened European commitment to African security.[186] Besides much-needed financial burden-sharing, multilateralisation serves France's interest in legitimising its presence. Due to its legacy, its image in Africa and among its occidental allies is complicated.[187]

On the other hand, the fact that more foreign countries have a military presence in Africa means that France faces a new context. While US support in providing strategic resources to France's troop operations is welcomed, the arrival of China could eventually lead to undesirable competition. The latter is not likely to lead to diminishing France's interest, but, if anything, the opposite.[188]

To conclude, it remains to be seen how France's policy on Africa will evolve. For the time being, counter-terrorism will continue as both the driver and the objective. However, the cultural, linguistic, economic, and historical ties, as well as the human links, are also decisive.[189] After all, President Macron is only one successor in a long line of presidents who have seen a need for a continued presence in Africa. ■

Germany
Linking Military Deployments to National Security

Eva Hagström Frisell

Germany's military presence in Africa is linked to its increasing military engagement in multinational operations there. In Niamey, the capital of Niger, Germany has established an air transport base, which provides operations and logistics support to its contingents in international missions in Mali. In addition, Germany has a small military presence in Djibouti, which provides operations and logistics support to the EU anti-piracy mission along the Somalian coast. The German contingent in Djibouti operates out of the French naval air base. The main reasons behind the engagement in Sahel are fighting terrorism and preventing illegal migration. The purpose of the military engagement in Djibouti is to secure shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, a mission that conforms to Germany's national security interests.

Sahel – Fighting terrorism and preventing illegal migration

Having previously focused on development cooperation in its relations with African countries, Germany's increasing political and military engagement in Sahel since 2014 has been labelled a 'turn to Africa'. This new level of engagement can be explained by the willingness of Angela Merkel's third coalition government, which entered into office in December 2013, to assume increased international responsibility. This coincided with the eruption in Mali of a complex crisis on Europe's doorstep.[190] In early 2014, the German government developed new federal guidelines on Africa, linking development to security and promoting a whole-of-government approach to its engagement there.[191]

The major shift in Germany's Africa policy was a result of the refugee crisis in 2015. Although the majority of refugees came from Syria and Iraq, the

German government argued that African migration was a challenge that required Germany to pay more attention to the continent. During a visit to Niger in October 2016, Merkel promised economic support, as well as military advice and vehicles, to help Niger fight militant Islamists and human trafficking.[192] In 2017, in launching a comprehensive strategy on Africa – A Marshall Plan with Africa – the German development minister said that fighting poverty in Africa is not only a moral obligation, but also in the self-interest of wealthy countries such as Germany.[193] The need to prevent illegal migration remains high on the political agenda in Germany. The updated federal guidelines on Africa, launched in March 2019 by Merkel's fourth coalition government, state that managing and shaping migration is one of five core objectives of Germany's engagement on the continent.[194]

An air transport base with a focus on logistics support

Germany has provided logistics support to international missions in Mali since 2013. Its transport aircraft operated out of the French air base in Dakar, Senegal; they originally supported the African Union and subsequently the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[195] In 2016, apace with the growth in Germany's contribution to MINUSMA, it established its own air transport base (in German, *Lufttransportstützpunktes*) at a French air base closer to Mali, and adjacent to the international airport in Niamey, Niger.[196]

> "Germany and Europe have an interest to save people's lives, to limit the effects of climate change and avoid 'climate refugees', to prevent mass migration and to help create a future for Africa's youth."
>
> German development minister Gerd Müller, 2018

Support to international missions in Mali

Today, Germany's air transport base in Niamey continues to support its military presence in Mali, serving as a hub for material and personnel transport and for medical evacuations for the German contingents to the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) and MINUSMA.[197] According to the latter's mandate, Germany can also perform air-to-air refuelling in support of the international missions in Mali.[198]

MINUSMA's main tasks are to support the implementation of the Algiers peace agreement: this includes the restoration of state authority and the rule of law in the centre and north of Mali, and the protection of civilians and stabilisation of key population centres.[199] In the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks, Germany expanded its role in MINUSMA. In 2016, it decided to support the Dutch contingent on the ground in northern Mali, focusing on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). In March 2017, German NH-90 transport helicopters and Tiger attack helicopters replaced the Dutch helicopters based in Gao, and in December of the same year, Germany took over the management of the UN camp in Gao.[200] In 2018, the ceiling for the number of German troops in MINUSMA was raised to 1,100. More staff were said to be needed to maintain and repair the vehicle pool, manage the camp in Gao, and man the air transport base in Niger. However, in the summer of 2018, Germany's helicopters were replaced by those of other troop-contributing countries.[201]

EUTM Mali, located in Bamako and Koulikoro, in the southern part of the country, is tasked to advise the Malian Ministry of Defence and train both the Malian Armed Forces and the G5 Sahel Joint Force.[202] Germany has contributed to EUTM since its launch in February 2013. While the German contingent focuses on military training in the fields of engineering, logistics, and infantry, it also contributes a field hospital for the mission and regularly provides the EUTM mission leadership. In 2018, the ceiling for the number of German troops in EUTM was raised to 350. This was due to the fact that in November 2018 Germany took over the leadership of EUTM and that, as the training was expanded to include soldiers of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and would be carried out in several locations in Mali, more force protection was needed. [203]

The German contribution to the missions in Mali totalled 1,053 soldiers in December 2018, which, at the time, made it Germany's second largest international deployment, outranked only by the number of its soldiers in Afghanistan.[204] In April 2019, the

Assessment of German military presence in Africa



Sources: Bundeswehr (2018)[203, 204], Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2018)[198], German Federal Foreign Office (2019)[196].

mandates for the contribution of the German Armed Forces to these missions were renewed for another year, maintaining the same ceilings of German troop numbers.[205]

Bilateral support

The air transport base in Niamey also plays a role in Germany's bilateral military support in the region, which includes the appointment of bilateral defence attachés to an increasing number of countries in the Sahel. Germany has also increased its bilateral support to Mali and Niger through the German Enable and Enhance Initiative, launched in 2014 and managed jointly by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Through this initiative, Germany is supporting projects that aim to strengthen local security services in Mali and Niger. This includes improving facilities at local military installations, such as airports, and providing military advice and vehicles to the armed forces of Niger.[206]

Support to European partners

Another reason behind Germany's engagement in Sahel has been to support its key European partners, France and the Netherlands. As described above, the German contingent in MINUSMA has over time relieved the Dutch Armed Forces and taken over their tasks. The German deployment to Sahel has also been a way to enhance its relationship with France. The German air transport base in Niamey also provides logistics support to France's Operation Barkhane. The two countries, furthermore, coordinate the military capacity-building support to the regional G5 Sahel Joint Force. In addition, elements of the Franco-German brigade are regularly deployed to Mali. However, the German elements mainly engage in capacity-building, reconnaissance, and logistics support within the framework of MINUSMA, while the French elements are assigned to Barkhane and to conducting direct military operations.[207] Even though these contributions may be seen as complementary, they underline the difference between the French and German approaches to international operations.

Djibouti – Securing shipping lanes in the Horn of Africa

In addition to Sahel, Germany has established a military presence at the French naval airbase in Djibouti. Since 2008, Germany has engaged in the EU Naval Force ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR), with the aim of protecting shipping traffic from piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Germany has been one of the main European contributors and has during some periods provided the mission leadership. Ensuring prosperity through a strong

P-3 Orion (German Navy).

German economy and free and unimpeded world trade is, according to the 2016 defence white paper, in Germany's national interest.[208]

Since August 2016, Germany has not deployed any naval ships to EU NAVFOR. However, two times a year, between monsoon periods, Germany deploys a P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. The German aircraft operates out of the French naval air base in Djibouti. In addition, Germany staffs the EU NAVFOR's support element, which provides logistics support to the mission. In December 2018, the German contribution to EU NAVFOR amounted to 72 soldiers.[209] In April 2019, amidst the return of piracy and the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and the Gulf States, the German Armed Forces' mandate for EU NAVFOR was prolonged, at the same level of engagement, for another year.[210] According to German officials, it is also desirable to maintain a footprint in Djibouti between deployments, in order to facilitate new rotations. Djibouti is also considered to be a location of increasingly strategic importance.[211]

Germany likely to remain in Africa in the long run

Germany does not have a comprehensive strategy for its military engagement in Africa. Considering the shift of focus towards territorial and collective defence and the frequent reports of materiel and personnel shortcomings in the German Armed Forces, the prospects for substantially increasing the German footprint in Africa are limited. However, there are no defined time limits for the ongoing German contributions to multinational operations on the continent and they tend to last longer than originally planned. The German armed forces have a tradition of taking a larger responsibility for stabilisation operations once those engaged in direct warfighting have left. As one German defence journalist noted, 'Mali could well turn out to be the next Afghanistan mission'.[212] The migration issue is also likely to remain high on the German government's agenda, which may motivate a continued military engagement in Africa. ■

Italy
Refocusing on Africa to Control Migration Flows

Karolina Gasinska

In 2014, Italy opened its first external inter-service military installation since World War II, in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa. This region is of strategic importance for Italy as a crossroads of maritime trade flows to and from the Mediterranean region. The stability of this region is also significant, even if indirectly, for the security of Italy and its neighbourhood. Recently, however, Italy's focus has shifted towards North Africa and the Sahel. With a strategic interest in Libya, revolving around migration and energy security, the parliament has approved an increase in Italy's military presence there, where it currently has a military hospital. It has also decided to send troops to Niger and Tunisia to prevent illegal trafficking and deal with threats to security. Whether the expanded focus on Africa will translate into additional Italian bases is yet to be seen.

The Horn of Africa

According to the 2015 Italian white paper on international security and defence, the Horn of Africa has traditionally been an area of Italian presence, facilitated by the local population's cultural proximity with Italy.[213] This originates from Italy's colonial history. It ruled Eritrea and Somalia as colonies from the 1880s to 1940s, and occupied Ethiopia from 1935 to 1941.[214]

The 2015 white paper states that the area is of strategic importance, as it is a crossroads for maritime trade flows to and from the Mediterranean region. Even if only indirectly, political and social stability in the Horn of Africa are significant for the security of the Mediterranean region. Stability there can contribute to preventing the resurgence of piracy, reducing emigration to Europe, and averting the area from becoming fertile ground for the expansion of extremist religious terrorist groups.[215]

The Italian military support base in Djibouti

In 2011, Italy concluded that it needed a logistics base in the Horn of Africa, to support the two bilateral missions that it had established there. Djibouti's central location and sufficient stability led to its selection

as the site for Italy's military support base (Italian: Base Militare Italiana di Supporto, BMIS). This base was inaugurated in 2013, and was Italy's first external inter-service military installation since World War II.[216] Although the anti-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean (Italian: Nuclei Militari di Protezione) ended in 2015, the Italian Mission of Assistance in Somalia (MIADIT) has continued, and is now focusing on training Somali police forces.[217]

Today, the BMIS hosts 90 soldiers and provides operational and logistics support to military and civil defence operations such as the EU NAVFOR Atalanta (European Naval Force Somalia, Operation Atalanta), EUCAP Somalia (European Union Capacity-building Mission in Somalia), mobile training teams, and special operations.[218] Djibouti's strategic location has also been important for evacuation of Italian nationals from the region (Yemen in 2015 and South Sudan in 2016).[219]

Libya – preventing illegal migration and ensuring energy security

The Italian island of Lampedusa is only 225 kilometres from the Libyan shore. Libya's proximity and the historical ties ensuing from its period as an Italian colony (from 1911 to 1943) provide context to the current security situation.[220] Today, Italy's strategic interests in Libya mainly revolve around migration and energy security.[221]

From January 2015 to November 2018, Italy received 476,814 migrants; most of them had crossed the Mediterranean from Libya. Even though the migration flows from Libya decreased by 80 per cent during the first seven months of 2018, as compared to the same period the previous year, the new Italian government that took office in June 2018 has made reducing illegal migration its top priority.[222]

Libya is a major supplier of Italy's oil and natural gas; in a hearing before the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies' Committees, the Italian defence minister, Elisabetta Trenta, stated that a stable Libya is fundamental for Italy's energy security.[223] The Italian partly state-owned oil company, ENI, conducts production activities in the Mediterranean Sea, near Tripoli and the Libyan Desert. The gas produced from the operational fields is then distributed through sub-sea pipelines from Libya to Sicily and onwards through Italy's national network.[224]

The Bilateral Mission of Assistance and Support in Libya

In March 2015, the Italian parliament launched Operation Safe Sea (Operazione Mare Sicur). Its air and naval components operate off the Libyan coast, in the central Mediterranean, both to protect national interests, including the security of maritime activities and strategic energy sources, and to conduct surveillance of possible movements of jihadist formations.[225]

Rome considered a military option in Libya between 2015 and the beginning of 2016, but this was set aside due to the lack of a series of conditions.[226] Instead, Italy deployed Operation Hippocrates (Operazione Ippocrate), an inter-service military camp hospital in Misratah, in September 2016.[227] Operation Hippocrates comprises 300 military personnel, divided among a military hospital, a command and control and logistics operation component, and a unit assigned to protecting all the components of the medical structure.[228] In August 2017, the tasks of the mission expanded and now include building up the capacity of Libya's coast guard and the Libyan navy. The aim is to strengthen their ability to control and combat illegal immigration, trafficking, and threats to security.[229] The training is conducted in both Libya and Italy.[230]

In January 2018, Italy's parliament approved the combining of the two missions, Safe Sea and Hippocrates, into the Bilateral Mission of Assistance and Support in Libya (MIASIT), and the deployment of up to 400 military staff.[231]

Niger

Before leaving Libya's shores for Italy, many migrants pass through Niger.[232] In January 2018, Italy's parliament approved a mission, the Bilateral Support Mission in Niger (Missione bilaterale di supporto nella Repubblica del Niger, MISIN). Its geographical area of intervention was also extended to Mauritania, Nigeria, and Benin. The objective of the mission is to increase the ability of the Republic of Niger to prevent illegal trafficking and protect against security threats.[233] The Italian parliament approved the deployment of up to 470 troops, but the mission was stalled for months, due to opposition by the local government. During this period, about 40 Italian soldiers camped at the US base at Niamey airport.[234] It was not until September 2018 that the Nigerien government indicated that the

Assessment of Italian military bases and installations in Africa



Sources: Italian Ministry of Defence (2018)[229], Italian Senate & Italian Chamber of Deputies (2018)[218] , Ben-Ghiat & Fuller (2005)[504], ENI (2018)[224], IOM (2018)[232].

Italian parliament could officially proceed with the mission.[235] In October 2018, MISIN carried out the first training course.[236]

Unclear future presence

On 1 June 2018, Italy's new government took office. The two new coalition partners, the Movimento Cinque Stelle and the Lega Nord, have no previous government experience and barely mentioned defence in their coalition agreement.[237] This makes it more difficult to perceive Italy's ambitions concerning its bilateral military presence in Africa.

One major factor that will influence Italy's overseas commitments is the economic difficulties it has experienced in recent years. The 2019 budget proposal foresees that Italy's military expenses during the period 2019-2031 will be reduced by about 500 million EUR.[238] Italy is currently engaged in 32 out-of-area operations in 22 countries.[239] With the budget cuts, the government will have to prioritise among the missions. North Africa and the Sahel should be high on their list of prioritised areas, since the government has given priority to stemming migrant flows towards Italy and to protecting maritime activities and strategic energy sources.

The renewed focus on Africa is already noteworthy. In January 2018, the Italian parliament approved the relocation of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq to North Africa and the Sahel; later that year, Trenta decided to start downsizing in Iraq.[240] Consequently, of the total for all foreign missions, the amount allocated to the African continent has increased, from 9 per cent in 2017 to 17 per cent in 2018.[241] In addition to MIADIT and MISIN, Italy and Tunisia have agreed to conduct 60 joint defence activities in 2019.[242]

According to the Italian news magazine *Panorama,* a tiny settlement, Madama, on the border of southern Libya, has been chosen as the location for an eventual operational base for the Nigerien mission.[243] Considering the difficulties in receiving authorisation for MISIN from the Nigerien government, the establishment of a military base in Niger nevertheless appears to be far off. In 2018, the then Italian ambassador to Libya, Giuseppe Perrone, denied that Italy was planning to establish a military base in southern Libya. Together with the high costs associated with military bases, it is uncertain whether Italy's increased military presence in Africa will translate into any military bases in addition to the BMIS, in Djibouti. ■

Russia
Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa

Jakob Hedenskog

Since 2000, and the coming to power of Vladimir Putin, Russia has taken concrete steps to develop ties with African states in order to advance its geopolitical goals and economic interests. Although Russia currently does not have any military bases or installation in Africa, media reports claim that Moscow has been having discussions with a number of countries about establishing a base of its own and has signed numerous new military cooperation agreements with several African countries. Russia's main interests in its military relations with Africa are arms exports, imports of natural resources, and projection of power.

New military cooperation agreements

Since 2015, Russia has signed over 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African states.[244] There has been much speculation about whether these agreements deal with the possibility of establishing a permanent Russian military base. According to an unverified source, some of the agreements allow Russia the use of airfields or naval access to ports. In certain cases, they have also given Russia access to the decision-making circles of the country. At Sudan's Ministry of Defence, for example, Russia has managed to establish representation by its own defence ministry.[245] In the Central African Republic (CAR), President Faustin-Archange Touadéra even agreed to the appointment of a Russian citizen, Valeriy Zakharov, as his national security advisor.[246]

Speculation about a Russian military base in Africa has focused on several countries where the Soviet Union had a regular military presence. For instance, in 2016, the Russian press reported that Moscow was negotiating with Egypt's al-Sisi regime on terms of access to the Sidi-Barrani base.[247]

The idea of opening a military base in Sudan was discussed during then Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's visit to Moscow in late 2017. Al-Bashir, who was ousted in 2019 in a military coup, was not the most credible partner, however, since he was the first sitting president to be indicted by the International Criminal Court, for allegedly having directed a campaign of mass killing, rape, and pillage against civilians in Darfur.[248]

An alternative to Sudan, if Russia is looking to strengthen its ability to sustain naval deployments in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Western Indian Ocean, could be Eritrea. In September 2018, an Eritrean delegation led by the foreign minister Osman Saleh met with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov in Sochi. The parties signed an agreement that suggests an emerging commercial-military relationship, including the establishment of a logistics centre in the Eritrean port of Assab.[249]

Russia has also had contacts with the breakaway region of Somaliland. According to media reports, in exchange for establishing a small multi-use air and naval facility in the Djibouti-bordering town of Zeila, Russia would formally recognise the region's 'independence' from Somalia.[250]

Another country mentioned as a possible host of a Russian military base is Mozambique. It is known to have an important geostrategic position in the securing of sea lines of communication and there are not many other countries in Africa that have a port that can take deep-hulled vessels.[251]

For some years, Moscow's interest in the resource-rich CAR has raised questions regarding its intentions in the violence-plagued nation. In January 2018, Russia deployed 175 civilian experts and military instructors, mostly under the cover of a private security company, Sewa Security Services, and delivered weapons, such as pistols, artillery, and rocket-launchers, and also trained the CAR army. The Russian troops were also mandated to ensure that the weapons did not fall into the hands of militia groups, which control vast territory and are accused of human rights abuses.[252]

The Russian opposition newspaper, *Novaia Gazeta,* claims that most of the Russian 'experts' in the CAR in fact belong to the private military company, Wagner, associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin, a St. Petersburg businessman close to the Russian president. Wagner has not only been extensively engaged in the armed conflict in Syria, but has also been noticed in Sudan and in the Russian military operation in Eastern Ukraine.[253] According to other Russian opposition media sources, another private military company, Patriot, has been connected to the construction of a Russian air base in Burundi. This work is supposed to have been coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). It still remains for the Russian legislature to legalise the existence of private military companies.[254]

As mentioned above, Russia's main interest in renewing its engagement in Africa involves arms exports, imports of natural resources, and the projection of power.

Arms trading and military training

The Soviet Union was a major supplier of arms and military equipment to African states. With regard to Russia, despite a dramatic decline in the volume of its exports of major conventional weapons to African states during the 1990s, the amount increased again during the 2000s.

> "According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 2014-2018, Russia was the largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 49 per cent of arms exports to the region"

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, from 2014-2018, Russia was the largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 49 per cent of arms exports to the region, followed by the United States (15 per cent), China (10 per cent), and France (7.8 per cent).[255] Arms export is a lucrative area for Russian economic growth, especially in the context of continued Western sanctions and a stagnant economy caused by falling global oil prices.[256] In 2018, exports of Russian-made weapons and military equipment to Africa amount to 4.6 billion USD annually, with a contract portfolio worth over 50 billion USD.[257]

The main importers of Russian arms in Africa are Algeria (helicopters, main battle tanks, submarines), Egypt (combat aircraft, long-range air defence systems, helicopters), Angola (fighter jets, main battle tanks, artillery, arms and ammunition), and Uganda (tanks, air defence systems). Other importers of Russian arms

Russia's military cooperation and strategic interests in Africa



Sources: FOI based on Reuters (2018)[244], Jeune Afrique (2018)[505], Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College (2013)[264], Atlantic Council (2014)[510], Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2019)[511], and Financial Times (2019)[512].

are Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, and Rwanda. Lately, Tanzania and Somalia have also requested Russian military equipment.[258]

In connection with arms transfers and bilateral training programmes, the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in the training of African military personnel, and also offers related opportunities at educational establishments in Russia.[259]

In both military technology and equipment, as well as training, Russia provides an alternative source for African countries. In 2014, for example, when the United Kingdom and the United States were slow to respond to Nigeria's request for help, the government in Abuja turned to Russia to purchase military hardware to fight Boko Haram and for counter-terrorism training for its special forces.[260] In 2019, the Nigerian government not only repeated its request for more lasting Russian assistance in its fight against terrorists, but also called for Russian support for anti-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.[261] Russia has participated in the international anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia since 2008.[262]

With regard to peace operations, several hundred peacekeepers from African countries have been trained at the Advanced Training Centre of the Russian Ministry of Interior since 2006. Since 2000, Russia has contributed troops, expertise, and military observers to different UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.[263] By 2018, however, only the engagement in Western Sahara (MINURSO) remained.

Imports of natural resources and food

In terms of access to natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, Africa represents a strategic interest for Russia. Despite its own huge mineral resources, Russia has a critical shortage of certain raw materials, including chrome, manganese, mercury, and titanium, and faces depletion of reserves of others, including copper, nickel, tin, and zinc.[264] It also needs coltan and rare earth metals for new technologies. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Russia is engaged in the extraction of coltan, cobalt, gold, and diamonds and, in CAR, uranium and diamonds. Moreover, about one-third of its African imports are agricultural: fruit, cocoa, coffee, and potatoes.[265]

Projection of power

During the Cold War, at the height of its military might, the Soviet Union had several military bridgeheads on the African continent. Although it never had a military base of its own, for decades the Soviet Navy made frequent naval visits and had long-term access to bases in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Guinea. Moscow also supported the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), in the civil war in Angola, and as a result its naval, army, and air force troops and advisors had access to the Luanda military base for more than 25 years.[266]

Today, Russia benefits from these ties established decades ago. The fact that Moscow never tried to colonise the African continent, and that the Soviet Union supported the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, gave the country credibility as a reliable partner.[267] Russia today cultivates basically the same countries as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. In Libya, for instance, Russia has been nurturing ties with the military strongman Khalifa Haftar. Intelligence reports indicate that Russia has been helping the former Libyan general in a fight for control of the country's government and vast oil resources. Since 2017, Russia has quietly but steadily entrenched its influence, sending military advisors and intelligence officers to the country's east, and supplying General Haftar's troops with spare parts, repairs, and medical care. Russia seeks a political settlement; it prefers a central government favourable to its economic interests, especially in arms, energy deals, and railway projects.[268]

Still rather low priority but stepping up its actions

The overall goal of President Vladimir Putin's assertive and autonomous foreign policy is that Russia should be recognised as a Great Power.[269] After the largely successful reestablishment of Moscow's intentions in the Middle East, Africa serves as another arena in Russia's challenging of the United States and the Euro-Atlantic international security order. An additional reason for its engagement in Africa is probably of diplomatic character. Like many countries, Russia is seeking to build good relations with African states – notably through military ties and arms sales – to strengthen its position in the United Nations, and to achieve support for particular Russian interests, such as its illegal annexation of Crimea.

Russia's traditional interests in the security sphere in Africa are arms trade and projection of power. Nowadays, private Russian military companies serve as tools for expanding and promoting Russian interests. It is easy to understand that the presence of lucrative gold and diamond reserves make African countries attractive and profitable targets for Moscow and its private mercenaries.

There is heated speculation about the potential for establishing military bases in several countries, with Burundi, Mozambique, Eritrea, Somaliland, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan as the hottest candidates. Whatever the outcome, although Russia is clearly stepping up its actions in Africa, it is nevertheless too early to say whether Russia's policy is strategic and long-term. Many of Moscow's actions appear to be ad hoc and piecemeal, while Africa is still a rather low priority for Russia, overall, at least in comparison to Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. ■

Russia's Miliary Cooperation Agreements in Africa since 2015

Country	Date	Note
Botswana	August 2018	Peace-keeping and military training.
Burkina Faso	August 2018	Cooperation in countering terrorism. Deal not yet in force.
Burundi	August 2018	Cooperation in counter-terrrorism and joint training of troops.
Cameroon	April 2015	Military and technical cooperation.
Central African Republic	August 2018	Training of armed forces.
Chad	August 2017	Anti-terrorism cooperation and joint training exercises.
Egypt	November 2017	Deliveries of equipment and weapons for counter-terrorism operations.
Eswatini (former Swaziland)	February 2017	Supply of weapons, maintenance and other military assistance.
Ethiopia	April 2018	Training and cooperation on peace-keeping, counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy efforts. Deal not yet in force.
Gambia	September 2016	Training of armed forces, deliveries of military equipment.
Ghana	June 2016	Military and technical cooperation. Deal not yet in force.
Guinea	April 2018	Cooperation in peace-keeping, counter-terrorism, search and rescue at sea. Deal not yet in force.
Mozambique	January 2017	Deliveries of military equipment, spare parts and component.
Niger	August 2017	Working meetings of military experts and cooperation in military education.
Nigeria	August 2017	Cooperation in military training, peace-keeping, and efforts to counter terrorism and in anti-piracy.
Rwanda	October 2016	Supply of weapons and other military equipment.
Sierra Leone	August 2018	Supply of weapons and other military equipment as well as the provision of other military technical assistance.
Sudan	February 2018	Develop the Sudanese armed forces.
Tanzania	January 2018	Arms shipments as well as joint training and research and development.
Zambia	April 2017	Provisions for the supply of weapons and delivery of spare parts.
Zimbabwe	October 2015	Supply of weapons and cooperation on producing military products.

Turkey, United Arab Emirates and other Middle Eastern States

Middle Eastern Base Race in North-Eastern Africa

Samuel Bergenwall

Middle Eastern states are increasing their military presence in Africa. Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), two influential Sunni powers with contrary views on regional order and political Islam, are expanding their foothold in north-eastern Africa. Turkey has opened a military training facility in Somalia and may build a naval dock for military use in Sudan. The UAE has established bases in Eritrea and Libya, and is currently constructing a base in Somaliland. However, Turkey and UAE are not the only Middle Eastern countries with a military presence in Africa. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, and Iran, also seem to have military activities on the Horn of Africa.

The on-going base race in Africa reflects the rising ambitions of several Middle Eastern states; their rivalries over the regional security order, political influence, and religious ideology; their need to gain access to markets and resources, and to secure sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and control of ports. The overall security dynamics are affected by the rivalry among leading Sunni states of the Middle East, i.e. between the status-quo bloc led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and an opposing faction headed by Turkey and Qatar. The developments in Africa are also related to the conflict between Iran and its regional foes, i.e. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. These two overarching Middle Eastern conflicts are played out in the wars in Libya and Yemen, and contribute to the base race in Africa.

Turkey – Neo-Ottoman Turkey looks south

Turkey has an interest in strengthening its economic ties, solidifying its political influence, and promoting its version of political Islam in Africa. Ankara applies the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, renewed

The inauguration of Turkey's base for military training of Somali soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia, 2017.

diplomatic efforts, foreign aid and support for the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) – and military presence – to secure its strategic interests in the region. Turkey's political interests are in line with those of Qatar on the question of political Islam and the MB, but clash with the agenda of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The conflict among the Sunni powers has intensified since the Arab Spring in 2010, in particular since the UAE-led blockade against Qatar in 2017.[270] Eastern Africa has thus become an arena for the rivalry between regional powers of the Middle East.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AK[271] party have strengthened the Sunni Muslim identity of the Turkish state, while de facto approving a neo-Ottoman foreign policy that implies a growing focus on the Middle East and northern Africa.[272] Turkey tries to secure its interests by supporting MB-affiliated movements and a deepening of economic ties with Muslim African states, and by pursuing a naval modernization programme.[273] Turkey is constructing a 'light aircraft carrier', which reportedly will be ready in 2021, and could be deployed to African waters, e.g. in the Red Sea region.[274] Thus, military bases in Africa might be perceived as serving Turkey's long-term strategic interests.

As part of the efforts to secure its interests in Africa, Turkey has built a military training facility in Mogadishu (Somalia) and signed an agreement for the development of the port of Suakin (Sudan). Somalia and Sudan have Sunni majorities and influential MB-linked constituencies. They are also markets for Turkish products; are located near key shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, respectively; and in the past had close ties with the Ottoman Empire.

A military training facility in Somalia

Turkey is strengthening its economic, political, religious, and military role in Somalia. Erdogan visited Mogadishu in 2011, when many world leaders avoided the crisis-laden country. Since then, Turkey has invested heavy economic and diplomatic energy in its relations with Somalia. Turkey's largest embassy in Africa is located in Mogadishu, while Somalia has been a major recipient of foreign aid.[275] The strengthening of bilateral economic and political ties has been followed by a deepening of defence relations. During Erdogan's second visit to Mogadishu, in 2015, an agreement to establish a Turkish military training facility was signed.[276] Moreover, in 2014, the Turkish conglomerate Albayrak took over the rights to operate Mogadishu's port for at least 20 years, and promised to raise it to world standards.[277]

In September 2017, Turkey inaugurated its base in Mogadishu; base occupies about 400 hectares and includes a military academy.[278] About 200 Turkish officers will be deployed there.[279] Turkey claims that the purpose of the base is to train the Somali army, so that it becomes more unified and capable of fighting terror organisations such as al-Shabaab.[280] Given Ankara's political and economic interests, the strategic location of Mogadishu near key SLOCs, and the construction of a UAE base in the autonomous region of Somaliland, one might suspect that the Turkish military presence in Somalia will be long-term and not limited to 'the war on terror'.

A historic and strategic port in Sudan

Turkey has also stepped up its diplomatic and economic engagement with Sudan, which could result in the creation of a new defence facility on the Red Sea. Turkey has earned goodwill in Khartoum by supporting the removal of sanctions against the regime of Omar al-Bashir.[281] In December 2017, President Erdogan visited Khartoum and signed an agreement on Suakin, a strategically located island and port in the Red Sea.[282] Suakin was once a major harbour of the Ottoman Empire, located on the opposite shore from Mecca and Medina.

According to media reports, Turkey will not only rebuild and administer Suakin for an undisclosed period of time, but establish tourist facilities for pilgrims on *hajj* and *umrah,*[283] and build naval docks for both commercial and military use.[284] The foreign minister of Sudan has claimed that the agreement with Turkey 'could result in any kind of military cooperation.'[285] Moreover, Erdogan has given instructions to Turkish authorities to assist the Sudanese army and police force.[286] However, reports of possible Turkish military facilities in Sudan, and defence cooperation with Qatar, have stirred up negative reactions in Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.[287] Egypt is in a border conflict with Sudan, while Cairo's close allies in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are concerned about the deepening of military ties between Turkey and Qatar and their support for the MB and political Islam. Turkey consequently denied that it has plans to establish a military base in Suakin.[288] Yet, the future presence of a Turkish naval base situated on the Red Sea, between the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandab, could be perceived as serving Ankara's strategic interests in Africa.

UAE – 'Little Sparta' on a war footing

Strategic interests

The UAE is a rising Middle Eastern power with a growing military footprint in East Africa. Its interests are, seemingly, to bolster the Emirate's political role in the Islamic world; to secure economic interests (SLOCs, ports, resources, and markets); and to contain both political Islam (MB) and its supporters (Qatar and Turkey), as well as the regional role of Iran, another rival. The UAE also wants to strengthen its proxies in the on-going wars in Libya and Yemen. Because of its national interests, the UAE has established a base in eastern Libya and a string of military facilities in Yemen, Eritrea, and Somaliland, i.e. near Bab al-Mandab, and the shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The increasing role of the UAE in African affairs is linked to the assertive foreign policy of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.[289] The forceful Emirati foreign policy is reinforced by the huge incomes from energy exports during the past decade, and large investments in military capabilities.[290]

The UAE has long spent billions of dollars on defence equipment, but until recently has neither been able to translate these acquisitions into actual military power and nor willing to use their armed forces in operations abroad. This reality is changing. James Mattis, the former US defence secretary, has described the UAE as 'Little Sparta', since 'they're not just willing to fight – they are great warriors'.[291] This is likely an exaggeration; the UAE relies largely on foreign soldiers and proxies. Yet, the political role and military assertiveness of the UAE is on the rise – and affects African security, from Egypt and Libya to Somalia and Eritrea. The UAE is thus the key driver of the Middle Eastern base race in Africa.

A base in eastern Libya

As a rising military power hoping to shape the future political order of the Middle East, the UAE participated in the NATO-led military intervention in Libya in 2011. In the subsequent civil war, the UAE supported Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) in the eastern parts of the country, against the government in Tripoli and groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (and Qatar), based in the west.[292] In 2014, the UAE reportedly conducted air

strikes against Islamist militias in Libya in support of the LNA and in coordination with Egypt.[293] In 2016, satellite imagery revealed an Emirati air base, with American aircraft and Chinese drones, in Al Khadim, in eastern Libya, an area controlled by the LNA.[294] The UAE is thus lending support to Haftar as 'the strong man' of post-Gadaffi Libya, in the same way as it has assisted General al-Sisi in Egypt against the government of the MB (and its supporters in Ankara and Doha), in 2013.[295] An airbase in Libya is a useful tool in the Emirati effort to influence the outcome in Libya and to limit the regional role of the MB, Qatar, and Turkey.

Bases at key SLOCs in Eritrea and Somaliland

The UAE has constructed a military base in Eritrea and is currently building another in Somaliland, partly to conduct operations in Yemen, but also to secure key SLOCs and commercial ports in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

In 2014, the UAE and Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen to defeat the Houthis, a militia with links to Iran that had taken control over Sanaa, the capital, and large parts of the country along the Red Sea and near Bab al-Mandab. The UAE led an amphibious campaign to recapture Aden and retake southern Yemen.[296] For the operations in Yemen, the UAE was allowed to base troops and aircraft in neighbouring Eritrea, on the eastern side of the Bab al-Mandab.[297] Since beginning of the war, in 2014, the UAE has established several bases in Yemen as well as in Eritrea. It has also signed a 30-year leasing agreement for an air and naval base in Assab (Eritrea), begun construction of an airstrip on the island of Perim (Yemen), in the Bab al-Mandab, as well as signed an agreement with Somaliland for the construction of a base in the harbour of Berbera.[298]

The UAE's military bases on the Horn of Africa are not about the war in Yemen alone, but are arguably also expressions of wider Emirati ambitions to shape and secure economic and political developments both in Africa and in the Middle East. Emirati agreements on commercial ports increasingly go hand in hand with the establishment of military bases. In 2016, the state-controlled Dubai Ports (DP) World, '. . . won a 30-year concession with an automatic 10-year extension for the management and development of a multi-purpose port project at Berbera [in Somaliland].'[299] Following a row with Djibouti over the Doraleh port, which led to the expulsion of DP World, the UAE fixed its gaze on the Eritrean port of Assab.[300] Currently, DP World also operates ports on long-term concessions in Maputo (Mozambique), Dakar (Senegal), Sokhna (Egypt), as well as Algiers and Djen-Djen (Algeria).[301]

The UAE's deepening of military ties with Somaliland has heightened tensions with the central government in Mogadishu, while its support for Haftar has contributed to the on-going civil war in Libya.[302] However, the UAE has also used its leverage on the Horn of Africa to push for a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.[303]

Other Middle Eastern states

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Israel also have strategic interests on the Horn of Africa. Reports of past, present, and future military bases or installations in Africa have appeared in media.

Saudi Arabia, which has considerable financial, political, and religious influence in northern Africa, strives together with the UAE to shape the regional order by limiting the influence of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has signed an agreement with the government in Djibouti for the construction of a military base.[304] Yet, the rationale behind a base in Djibouti seems unclear, since Saudi Arabia already has bases on its territory along the Red Sea. So far, Saudi Arabia has not built any bases in Djibouti.

Qatar has long punched above its weight in regional affairs, e.g. by applying media power (Al Jazeera) and backing groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Doha played a key role in the early days of the Arab Spring by supporting Islamist groups in Egypt, Libya and Syria. In 2010, following clashes between Djibouti and Eritrea, Qatar stepped in to mediate and sent about 200 peace-keeping troops to the border between them.[305] The Qatari star has nevertheless faded in recent years in the wake of Saudi and Emirati pushback, the Egyptian counter-revolution, and the failure of the MB in Syria. Following the UAE-led embargo against Qatar in 2017, Doha chose to pull back its troops from the border between Eritrea and Djibouti.[306]

Iran has an interest in increasing its influence and monitoring trade on the Horn of Africa, yet seems to have played only a minor military role in the region.[307] According to a report by Stratfor, an American commercial geopolitical intelligence company, in 2012 Iran had military installations in Assab, Eritrea.[308] Given Eritrea's deepening relationship with the UAE, Israel, and Saudi Arabia,

Assessment of Middle Eastern countries' military bases and installations in northeastern Africa



Sources: FOI, based on The Libya Observer (2016)[294], The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2015)[297], Stratfor (2012[308], 2016[298]), Foreign Affairs (2019)[499], Anadolu Agency (2017)[276], EIA (2017)[416], Lefebvre (2012)[307], Financial Times (2017)[289] Reuters (2017)[284], Al Jazeera (2017)[270].

it seems unlikely that the Iranian installations remain in the country.

Israel has an interest in monitoring the traffic in the Red Sea and on the Horn of Africa in order to track Iranian ships and interdict weapon transfers to Hamas in Gaza. Israeli military intelligence (AMAN) reportedly operates a signal station co-jointly with the NSA[309] in the Dahlak archipelago of Eritrea, in the Red Sea near Bab al-Mandab.[310]

Looking ahead

Primarily due to its location, the Horn of Africa will most likely remain a key strategic region for various Middle Eastern powers. As long as many of the major powers of the Middle East are led by strongmen with great power ambitions and deep pockets, the base race in Africa is likely to continue and result in ripple effects on local politics and regional security. ■

India
A Rising Power in East African Waters

Samuel Bergenwall

India currently has no military bases in Africa but has stepped up its drive to build strategic infrastructure in the Indian Ocean. This includes the construction of a listening post on Madagascar and radar stations on the Seychelles and Mauritius. Due to domestic opposition in the Seychelles and Mauritius, construction of bases or military installations have been halted. Meanwhile, New Delhi has approved and is negotiating a number of basing agreements with foreign state actors present in Africa. As India has risen as a major economic and military power, it seeks to ensure three key strategic interests: (1) reclaiming the maritime security space of the British Raj, (2) securing sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and (3) balancing China's rising influence. The drive to regain India's traditional security role in Africa is reinforced by the fact that an Indian diaspora of about three million is living in the East African countries. Given India's strategic interests and growing capabilities, it may be expected that its security role in Africa will increase, especially in and around East African waters.

Reclaiming the maritime space of the British Raj

The administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants India to become 'a leading power', a state with a seat at the high table of global politics and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.[311] India's great power ambition is underpinned by the fastest gross domestic product (GDP) growth among the major economies, about 7 per cent per year, as well as rising military expenditures, currently the fifth largest in the world (about the same as Russia's).[312]

Since the late 1990s, India has invested large resources in its armed forces and allocated a growing share of its defence budget to the navy. As its economy has globalised, India has been gradually shifting from being primarily a land power to becoming a sea power as well, thus investing heavily in a 'blue-water navy'. It has adopted plans to establish three aircraft carrier groups, including dozens of new warships, submarines, and maritime aircraft. The modernisation effort has been hampered by delays and cost overruns. Nevertheless, its navy has for example inducted a refurbished Russian-made aircraft carrier,

nuclear-powered submarines, large warships, and anti-submarine aircraft.[313] In 2018, India became one of a handful of states with a 'nuclear triad'; that is, air-, land-, and sea-based nuclear weapons forces.[314]

As a part of India's rise, New Delhi has growing ambitions in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, India has begun to employ the old British metaphor 'from Aden to Malacca', and expanded the definition of its neighbourhood to encompass all of the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi has also promulgated ambitious naval strategies in accordance with the British Raj's historical sphere of interest.[315] The British Raj was the British Crown's period of rule – between 1858 and 1947 – on the Indian subcontinent.[316] During British rule, India dominated the Indian Ocean region, largely thanks to sea power; the Indian Ocean contains a maritime space that stretches from the Persian Gulf in the north to Antarctica in the south, from East Africa in the west to South-east Asia in the east.

To proceed with these aims, New Delhi has among other things established a joint military command on the Andaman and Nicobar islands, near the Malacca Strait, as well as gained access to the Changi naval base, in Singapore, and signed agreements related to Duqm, in Oman – both located close to important maritime choke points.[317]

The return of the security perimeters of the British Raj implies that East African islands and littoral states are becoming more important to India's security policy.

Securing Sea Lines of Communications

Since India started to open up its insulated economy in the early 1990s, trade with the outside world has boomed.[318] Trade liberalisation has made India into one of the world's largest economies and at the same time heavily dependent on imports of strategic commodities, such as oil and gas, from abroad. India's foreign trade has increased to over 40 per cent of GDP and is to a large extent transported through the Indian Ocean.[319] The growing dependency on maritime trade has in turn made India vulnerable to disruptions at sea.

A key Indian interest is thus to ensure freedom of navigation; that is, to keep SLOCs and narrow straits open.[320] The Indian navy's strategy defines East Africa and its maritime choke points – the Bab al-Mandab strait, the Mozambique Channel, the Suez Canal, and the Cape of Good Hope – as primary maritime interests.[321] West Africa is defined as an area of secondary interest.[322]

Africa is also an important source of oil, gas, diamonds, and gold, and is a growing market for manufactured goods.[323] India's interest in securing maritime trade between the two continents is thus one key factor pushing India to strengthen its security role in Africa.

Balancing China

As historic and competing rivals, India has an interest in balancing China's growing economic and military influence in the Indo-Pacific and East Africa. Similar to India, China's growing trade with Africa, the Middle East and Europe has made it heavily dependent on the shipping lanes in the Indo-Pacific and through the straits of Malacca, Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz. Partly due to its need to ensure economic security, China is also building a blue-water fleet; deploying its navy in the Indian Ocean more frequently; deepening defence ties with states in the Indo-Pacific region; building ports in strategic locations; and has already opened its first overseas base, in Djibouti, close to Bab al-Mandab.[324]

China's very attempts to solve a trade-related security dilemma are at the same time creating another one for India. Relations between China and India since the war of 1962 have often been conflictual. Their enmity was long centred on the disputed land border and India's support of the Tibetan exile government as well as China's backing och Pakistan.

India's answer to China's growing economic, military, and political roles is thus to reclaim the Indian Ocean as 'India's Ocean'. This is done through the build-up of a modern blue-water fleet and the construction of strategic port infrastructure. India has followed in China's footsteps by building port infrastructure near choke points, for example in Chabahar (Iran), located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and just 70 kilometres from the Chinese port in Gwadar (Pakistan). India has also deepened its defence cooperation with friendly countries, and constructed radar surveillance networks in the Western Indian Ocean.

Military presence

In order to reclaim the strategic space of the British Raj, secure SLOCs, and balance China, India has tried

to deepen its military presence in the Western Indian Ocean. The drive to regain India's traditional security role in Africa is reinforced by the fact that an Indian diaspora of about three million has settled in East African countries.[325] Although it currently does not have any military bases there, it is nevertheless engaged in a number of other activities that are designed to strengthen its military presence. These activities are discussed in further detail below.

A radar surveillance network in the Western Indian Ocean

New Delhi has established a radar surveillance network in the Western Indian Ocean by building stations on African islands and linking them to India.[326] In 2007, India constructed a listening post in northern Madagascar, reportedly its first on foreign soil.[327] Two years later, India reached agreement with Mauritius on installation of eight radars on four islands.[328] By 2011, the radars in Mauritius had been set up and an agreement on data-sharing had been inaugurated.[329] By 2016, India had also built six radar stations on five different islands in the Seychelles.[330]

Through the establishment of the radar network, India has improved its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities regarding crucial SLOCs, especially the Mozambique Channel, in the Western Indian Ocean. Through this effort, India is starting to reclaim the maritime strategic space of the Raj, while improving its surveillance of Chinese maritime movements.

A future base in the Seychelles?

Since Modi became prime minister in 2014, India has stepped up its drive to build strategic infrastructure in the Indian Ocean. In 2015, India and the Seychelles signed an agreement for the development of defence facilities on Assumption, an outlying island, but close to the shipping lanes in the Mozambique Channel.[331] However, environmental concerns and questions related to sovereignty led the Seychellois parliament to halt a ratification of the agreement.

In 2018, the two states adopted, in secret, a revised agreement that was planned to last for twenty years, and which included an option for renewal every ten years.[332] The agreement allows India to construct berthing facilities for ships; a runway; air and maritime control rooms; as well as communications installations.[333] The secret agreement was leaked, however, and caused domestic resistance.[334] The leading Seychellois opposition party, which holds a majority of the seats in the parliament, began to oppose ratification of the agreement.[335] As a result, the possible establishment of an Indian base in the Seychelles is currently on hold.[336]

A future base in Mauritius?

In 2015, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Mauritius to build strategic infrastructure on the Agaléga Islands, northeast of Madagascar.[337] The MoU seems reminiscent of the agreement with the Seychelles about Assumption Island; India reportedly plans to develop a berthing facility and improve a runaway.[338]

In October 2018, the prime minister of Mauritius (as well as Indian analysts) indicated that the process of negotiation regarding an Indian infrastructure on the Agaléga islands was proceeding.[339] Yet, domestic constituencies in Mauritius opposed that foreign powers established bases in the country, and it remains to be seen if India will establish a proper military base in the country, or not.

Base agreements with the US, France, Russia and Japan

In the past few years, the Modi administration has signed base agreements with a number of states in the Indo-Pacific (the US, France, Oman, and Singapore). India is reportedly also negotiating agreements with Russia and Japan.[340]

India has approved defence logistics agreements with the US and France that enable the use of each other's military bases. In 2016, India and the US signed a so-called logistics agreement '. . . that establishes basic terms, conditions, and procedures for reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services'.[341] Through the deal, India's military may get access to US bases such as the one in Djibouti, for example for the resupplying and refurbishing of ships and aircraft during joint exercises, humanitarian relief efforts, and port visits.

In 2018, India and France signed a similar agreement on 'reciprocal logistics support'; Modi described it '. . . as a golden step in the history of our close defence cooperation'.[342] The agreement could enable future Indian access to France's naval bases in the Indian Ocean, including in Africa, for example Réunion and Djibouti.

India is also negotiating a base agreement with Japan.[343] This could allow India to obtain access to the Japanese base in Djibouti.

Assessment of India's military presence and strategic interests in Africa



Sources: Governement of India (2018)[325], The Diplomat (2018)[329], Indian Express (2007)[327], India's Ministry of External Affairs (2017)[315], Indian Navy (2015)[315], Merics (2018)[506], Council on Foreign Relations (2016)[507], Rodrigue (2016)[501], High Commission of India, Port Louis, Mauritius (2009)[328].

Looking ahead

The outcome of India's striving to establish a military bases and installation has so far been rather modest, however, in spite of its great ambitions. Nevertheless, as India rises and turns to the sea, the need for naval bases will likely increase. It aims to use its blue-water fleet to reclaim the maritime strategic space of the British Raj, protect SLOCs and balance China. To do all of these things, the future fleet would probably also require naval bases and berthing rights in the Indian Ocean region, including in East Africa.

India appears to be adopting a strategy reminiscent of and in response to China's, which is to build and attain access to ports and acquire military bases in the Indo-Pacific region.[344] India is preparing for a possible future when Chinese-constructed ports have evolved into de facto military 'pearls', by laying the ground for 'flowers' of its own. Given the changing strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific, India's attempts to build ports, military bases, and other installations in the Western Indian Ocean should not come as a surprise to anyone. ■

China
National Interests Expanding Overseas

Jerker Hellström

China opened a naval outpost in Djibouti, its first overseas military base, in 2017. The large facility forms part of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) efforts to safeguard maritime shipping lanes, which are inextricably linked to China's economic development and energy security. Moreover, access to a permanent base can contribute to the PLA's protection of Chinese national interests overseas, including investments as well as enterprises and their personnel. China's military presence in Djibouti is not, however, without controversy. Indeed, it has fuelled concerns among other world powers that China's military capabilities are bound to grow at the expense of others.

Securing maritime trade routes

In 2013, China surpassed the United States to become the world's largest trading nation.[345] Since then, China's economic security has become increasingly dependent on maritime sea routes, which carry approximately 80 per cent of its total trade by value.[346] As a result, the Chinese government has to a greater extent begun to assert its interests in maritime trade corridors through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the South Pacific, and the Arctic Ocean.[347]

The opening of a base in Djibouti was in part motivated by the PLA Navy's (PLAN) need for logistical support as it began counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008. When the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced plans in November 2015 to establish a base (referring to it as a 'logistical support facility'), it also said that the facility would contribute to supporting Chinese peacekeepers in UN missions and humanitarian efforts.[348]

The base is located near the Chinese-operated commercial port and just west of the Doraleh Multi-

purpose Port, one of the key ports in Africa for China's trade with the continent. A railway financed and built by Chinese state-owned enterprises connects the port – and the base – with Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.[349]

Counter-piracy efforts

Since late 2008, PLAN has deployed counter-piracy escort task groups to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, protecting both Chinese and foreign merchant vessels. The mission has led PLAN to identify a need for logistical support in order to be able to replenish soldiers and resupply fuel and food needed for the mission. [350] Chinese military analysts argue that the PLAN's escort mission in the Gulf of Aden should be regarded as a permanent engagement, and that the mission therefore needs a permanent logistical support base.[351]

The construction in 2018 of a 330-metre-long pier at the base is also motivated by a need to 'better fulfil China's international responsibilities including anti-piracy work,' according to the Chinese Ministry of Defence.[352] Interestingly, Chinese military analysts have suggested that counter-piracy efforts are in fact often merely a pretext used by great powers to control vital energy shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean.[353]

Investment in infrastructure

In recent years, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have made significant investments in port infrastructure in waters from China to Africa and onwards to Europe. This vital component in China's overseas expansion underlines its dependency on stable maritime transport routes. As of September 2017, Chinese companies – mainly SOEs – had confirmed port investments or full ownership of ports in 34 countries globally, and were planning port investments in another eight countries.[354]

Fu Xiaoqiang, director and researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argues that the Chinese government needs to build up a protection system for overseas interests.[355] In such a system, controlling ports will be important, but having access to overseas military bases may be crucial.

In addition to ports, Chinese SOEs are developing transport infrastructure inland and are often engaged in road and railway construction as well as the development of industrial zones linked to port facilities. The Doraleh multi-purpose port in Djibouti is one of a vast range of Chinese-invested infrastructure projects, which are bound to grow further as the Chinese government continues to stress the 'Belt and Road Initiative' as a crucial part of its foreign policy.

In June 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's top economic planner, launched the concept of three 'blue economic passages' (*lanse jingji tongdao*), which will link China with (1) the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Mediterranean Sea; (2) Oceania and the South Pacific; and (3) Europe, via the Arctic Ocean.[356]

Nevertheless, the control of overseas ports can also contribute to meeting China's goal of projecting power far from its shores – in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.[357] It may well improve the Chinese armed forces' ability to deter potential rivals from disrupting its energy supplies in the case of a conflict.[358] While ownership of ports can decrease the risk for interruptions in maritime trade and make China less vulnerable, stakeholders, including the US and India, are concerned that the PLA will utilise the Chinese-owned ports for military engagement that challenges the status quo in the Indo-Pacific.[359]

"Stakeholders, including the US and India, are concerned that the PLA will utilise the Chinese-owned ports for military engagement that challenges the status quo in the Indo-Pacific."

Protection of national interests

In its most recent white paper on the Chinese armed forces, the 2015 China's Military Strategy, the Chinese government asserts that 'the growth of China's national interests' has made it more vulnerable to challenges overseas, including social unrest, terrorism, and piracy. The document explicitly states that it is the PLA's task to safeguard China's interests abroad against such threats, and goes on to name some specific national interests: natural resources and strategic sea lines of communication, as well as enterprises, personnel, and assets.[360] It can be noted that Chinese official estimates put the total number of overseas Chinese[361] in Africa at roughly one million.[362]

Ports involving Chinese investment and/or construction



Sources: Merics (2018)[506], People's Daily (2017)[372].


CHINA
Busan
Gwadar
Abu Dhabi
Karachi
Payra
Kunming
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Beihai
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Vientiane
Laem Chabang
Sihanoukville
Colombo
Malé
Hambantota
Kuala Lumpur
Kuantan
Malacca
Singapore
Jakarta
INDIAN OCEAN
Existing railroad
Planned railroad
Existing port
Planned port
Maritime silk road
Chinese support base

Evacuation missions

China's deployment of the PLAN to protect citizens overseas is a new and rare phenomenon. In February 2011, it dispatched warships to Libya for its first evacuation mission. Under the protection of frigate *Xuzhou*, some 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated, mainly by chartered merchant vessels.[363] Again, in 2014, hundreds of Chinese workers were evacuated from Libya as unrest escalated in the country.[364]

Amid Saudi Arabian air strikes on Yemen in March 2015, the PLAN arranged for the evacuation of hundreds of nationals from Yemen. Of those removed, 122 were taken to Djibouti, from where they were to return to China.[365] Scholars have raised these three cases as evidence that China was still lacking a permanent facility to assist in civilian rescue manoeuvers.[366]

Counter-terrorism

China has until recently refrained from engaging openly abroad in the sphere of counter-terrorism, citing concerns that such engagement would make Chinese assets and overseas Chinese a target for terrorist groups. Nevertheless, one of the stated objectives behind the Djibouti base is to be able to conduct counter-terrorism operations. The PLA troops

US-China counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden in 2013.

at the Djibouti base conducted live-fire counter-terrorism exercises and several live-fire military drills in 2017 and 2018.[367] Nevertheless, Chinese media and authorities consistently assert that the facility is but a logistical hub, and that it should not be characterised as a military foothold.[368]

Support to peacekeeping missions

The Chinese government has stated that one purpose of the base in Djibouti will be as a facility for UN peacekeeping troops.[369] China has contributed substantial contingents to United Nations peacekeeping operations since the early 2000s. As of September 2018, China's contribution amounted to 2,408 troops. The majority of Chinese troops were deployed to Africa, of which 1,020 were to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).[370] Until recently, China's military presence on the continent has, by and large, been limited to its contingents to UN missions. This has changed with the establishment of the naval base in Djibouti.

Basic facts on the Djibouti base

China formally opened its 'support base' (*baozhang jidi*, 保障基地) in Djibouti on 1 August 2017, marking the 90th anniversary of the PLA.[371] It was the fifth country to open a base there, trailing France, the United States, Japan, and Italy.[372] China will pay 20 million USD a year for a 10-year lease on the 36-acre plot, with an option to extend it for a further 10 years.[373] The agreement reportedly does not include any precise limit on Chinese troop numbers. However, according to reports citing Djibouti's foreign minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the outpost cannot house more than 2,000 troops and is likely to have only 300 marines – and neither ground nor air troops.

Nonetheless, Chinese media reports have put the potential troop count at 10,000 – a number that has not been officially confirmed[374] – and suggested that it will in fact comprise troops both from the PLA navy *and* the army.[375] It will have a single berth for ships and possibly a helipad, but reportedly no runway. [376] Thus far, the PLA has neither confirmed the details shared by the Djibouti foreign minister, nor clarified when the base will be fully operational.[377]

In its annual report to Congress on China's military, the US Department of Defense concludes that the base extends the reach of China's armed forces. According to the report, the base includes barracks, an underground facility, a tarmac and eight hangars for helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle operations. However, PLA ships still have to dock at Djibouti's commercial port, as the base currently lacks a dedicated naval berthing space.[378]

Future prospects

The establishment of the Djibouti base is hailed by Chinese military analysts as part of Xi Jinping's concept of China's 'national rejuvenation', which includes the objective of becoming a great sea power. There are, indeed, many signs that the base will serve China's strategic interests in ways far beyond military logistics. For example, Chinese military experts note that the base provides the PLA with an opportunity to dispatch troops to the Arabian Peninsula and countries in sub-Saharan Africa.[379]

China is likely to establish bases elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East in the coming years.[380] During a visit to Djibouti in November 2016, Fan Changlong, then vice chairperson of the Central Military Commission, asserted that China needed to speed up the establishment of overseas military support bases and facilities in order to better support the PLA's missions abroad.[381] The US Department of Defense expects any new Chinese military bases to be established in countries such as Pakistan, with which China has a close bilateral relationship and shared strategic interests.[382]

Nevertheless, China may not rely solely on military bases as a means for pushing its strategic objectives in the future. As suggested by Chinese military scholars, Chinese-owned port facilities overseas could be used for military access, or otherwise strengthen Beijing's ability to wield political influence. The Chinese-invested facilities that have been mentioned for their possible military application include the Gwadar port in Pakistan,[383] the Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar's Rakhine state,[384] the Chittagong port in Bangladesh, the Piraeus port in Greece,[385] and the Hambantota and Colombo ports in Sri Lanka.[386]

As China modernises its navy and develops its expeditionary capabilities, concern among other naval powers is likely to grow. That said, if Chinese authorities and the PLA are able to establish the confidence of international partners, showing at least a willingness to be transparent about China's objectives, some of these concerns could be assuaged. The participation of the Chinese navy in the counter-piracy escort operations off Somalia's coast can be seen as such a precedent. ■

Japan
Towards 'Pro-active Collective Self-defence'

Carina Gunnarson

In June 2011, Japan opened its first military base outside Japan since World War II, in Djibouti. The military mission's major purpose is anti-piracy and the protection of major shipping lanes. For Japan, however, the question of overseas deployment of its Self-Defence Force is one of the most controversial in its foreign policy debate, as such deployment would require a change in the Japanese constitution's Article 9, which renounces the use of force as a foreign policy instrument. A discussion of revising the contested paragraph has been underway for the past decade and continues today.

Protecting major shipping lanes

Japan depends on maritime transportation for 99.6 per cent of its trade volume. The Gulf of Aden is one of Japan's most important shipping lanes, connecting Asia with Europe through the Suez Canal. Approximately 1,300 vessels with ties to Japan passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2017.[387] The safety of merchant vessels is crucial not only for Japan's economy, but also for its energy security.[388] Japan is the third-largest net importer of oil in the world; about 86 per cent of its crude oil comes from the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are its most important suppliers. In comparison with other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Japan is not especially self-sufficient in energy (7.4 per cent in 2015); its dependency on imported fossil fuels increased after the 2011 earthquake, when all of its nuclear power plants were shut down, some of them permanently.[389]

The establishment of the military base in Djibouti should be seen in the light of Japan's growing economic interest in Africa during the past twenty years, as expressed in the organisation of regular Japanese-African summits,[390] intensified political contacts,[391] and steadily growing development assistance coupled with greater efforts to promote Japanese investment and trade.[392] Through its strategic position, Djibouti is not only a focal point for trade with Europe and the Middle East, but also a central port for access to Ethiopia and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).[393]

Anti-piracy activities

Japan's military engagement in Djibouti started as a consequence of a rapidly increasing number of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, and in response to several United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for international cooperation in deterring piracy.[394] Until 2008, Japan had only deployed the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in UN peacekeeping operations, minesweeping, and humanitarian and reconstruction missions.[395] In 2009, Japan joined the multilateral counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of

Aden and off the coast of Somalia, the first long-term mission involving Japanese military forces abroad since 1945.

Today, the Japanese base accommodates about 390 persons[396] from both the JSDF – including air, sea, and ground forces – and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG).[397] A major purpose of the military mission in Djibouti is to conduct anti-piracy operations and protect major shipping lanes. Although the number of reported attacks and hijackings in the affected areas decreased in 2012, the Government of Japan estimates that the underlying causes of piracy remain and that the current decline could be reversed.[398]

Balancing China

Historical rivalry between China and Japan plays a role in Djibouti and elsewhere on the African continent, where both powers are increasingly present, seeking to establish new international roles.[399] The opening of Japan's military base in Djibouti in 2011 was perceived with suspicion by China (which opened its own military base in Djibouti in 2017).[400] Japan is competing with China to be the leading financial sponsor and builder of new infrastructure in Africa. A primary goal of the recently launched Indo-Japanese initiative, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, is to offer African states an alternative to economic reliance on China.[401]

Participation in multilateral operations

The opening of the military base illustrates Japan's policy shift from 'chequebook diplomacy' towards active involvement in multilateral security cooperation.[402] During the 1990s, in response to criticism of its commitment of cash, rather than manpower, to the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq, Japan actively promoted UN-led peacekeeping operations.

Since the opening of the Djibouti military base, the policy has changed, towards a narrative that emphasises the necessity of protecting Japan's national security at home via proactive use of the JSDF abroad.[403] In November 2017, the Japanese and Djibouti governments agreed on a new lease of three additional hectares next to the base.[404] A possible use of the additional land is to develop facilities for the evacuation of Japanese nationals.[405]

The significance of the Djibouti base is not only to facilitate Japan's participation in the counter-piracy mission, but also to serve as a first major outpost for other missions in Africa and the Middle East. The military base is used as a transfer hub for personnel and supplies to the UN mission in South Sudan, where Japan has contributed over 350 personnel since 2012.[406]

2016 Japanese import Counterparts of Fossil Fuels



Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2017). "Japan's energy: 20 questions to understand the current energy situation".

Will the constitution change?

The question of overseas deployment of the JSDF is one of the most controversial issues for Japan's foreign policy. The government is caught between the ambition to contribute to international peace and security and the need to respect the Japanese constitution, which renounces the use of force as a foreign policy instrument and as a means of settling international disputes.[407] The interpretation and revision of Article 9 has been and still is one of Japan's most hotly-debated political issues throughout the post-war years.[408]

The process is complicated and the exact wording of the constitutional change is currently being discussed. The incumbent prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is headed for a third three-year term as leader of the ruling party, and has expressed his commitment to constitutional reform. As Abe said in a televised debate with his only competitor, former defence minister, Shigeru Ishiba, 'I will take on the task of revising the constitution, a post-war challenge that has never been achieved, in order to open a new era'.[409] Revising the 1947 constitution is a decades-old struggle of the Liberal Democratic Party, one that none of Abe's predecessors has been able to resolve. ■

Trends in Strategic Interests

This chapter discusses the trends in strategic interests that have been identified. In the first section, the map of the military bases and installations shows two areas that have a higher accumulation of foreign military facilities: the Horn of Africa and West Africa. The specific regional strategic interests in these two areas are presented in the two subsequent sections. Regarding the Horn of Africa, three main categories of strategic interests have been identified: securing maritime trade; promoting stability in a violent region; and positioning among Middle Eastern rivalries. In West Africa, the focus is on countering terrorism and controlling illegal migration.

The final section of this chapter discusses broader strategic interests for Africa, as linked to international developments. The broader strategic trends identified are various aspects of: protecting economic interests, securing political interests, addressing security challenges, and maintaining historical ties.

Strategic interests in the Greater Horn of Africa

The Greater Horn of Africa consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.[410] The area has seen a dramatic increase in the construction of military bases in the last decade. Djibouti, a small country with a high concentration of military bases, currently hosts the United States, France, Japan, Italy, and China.

The Middle Eastern states are increasing their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The United Arab Emirates has established a base in Eritrea and is currently constructing another in Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia.[411] Turkey has opened a base in Somalia, in the capital, Mogadishu.[412] According to media reports, Turkey is also considering the construction of a naval dock in Sudan, for military use.[413]

There has been speculation on the possibility that Russia will establish a military base, in Somaliland, and a logistics centre, in the Eritrean port of Assab.[414] Russia's idea of opening a military base in Sudan was discussed in talks between the presidents of Sudan and Russia in late 2017.[415]

Each established base has a slightly different mission, depending on its country's requirements. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, three main categories of strategic interests have been identified: securing maritime trade; promoting stability in a violent region; and positioning among Middle Eastern rivals. Each category is discussed in the following sub-sections.

Securing maritime trade

The Bab el-Mandeb strait transects the Horn of Africa, between Djibouti and Yemen. Only 25 km wide, it is one of the primary trading routes for international shipping between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, connecting Asia with Europe. It is also a chokepoint for Middle East oil flows. During 2016, 4.8 million barrels a day of crude and petroleum products were transported through the strait: 2.8 million northwards, to Europe, and 2 million in the opposite direction.[416] The ships along this trading route face a number of challenges, such as Somali piracy and an ongoing war in Yemen. The effect that this location's threat to security could have on global maritime trade routes and sea lines of communication makes the region particularly interesting for foreign military forces.

Fighting piracy

The expansion of Somali piracy in the first decade of the 21st century led to an urgent need to protect shipping and an increased international military presence in the region.[417] In 2011, Japan opened its first overseas military base, in Djibouti, in response to the rapidly increasing number of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden. As the third-largest net importer of oil in the world, the safety of merchant vessels is crucial not only for Japan's economy, but also for its energy security.[418]

Italy inaugurated its support base in 2013, not far from the Japanese base. This base also focuses on anti-piracy activities, by providing operational and logistics support to two European Union anti-piracy missions, the EU NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia.[419] Germany, which is engaged in one of these missions, has been operating out of the French naval air base in Djibouti, instead of having a base of its own.[420]

Assessment of foreign military postures and strategic interests in the Greater Horn of Africa



Sources: See References to maps, page 91.

One of the reasons for the high concentration of military bases in Djibouti is that its ports can receive large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off military cargo ships.

In 2009, the US estimated that there were some 22 deep-water ports in Africa potentially capable of handling the lift ships associated with US afloat prepositioned squadrons. Of these, 12 were located in Egypt and South Africa.[422]

While deep-water ports also exist in Sudan, Somaliland, and Eritrea, Djibouti's developed facilities, political stability, and investment-friendly atmosphere have proven more attractive than anywhere else in the region.[423]

The space for additional military facilities in Djibouti city is limited. Obock, in northern Djibouti, has been mentioned as a possible location for additional military facilities. The small port city is situated in the door of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, making it potentially an even more valuable site than Djibouti city. However, the existing facilities in Obock are rudimentary and considerable investments would be required to realise its potential.[424]

The US is engaged in anti-piracy operations through its leadership of the Combined Maritime Forces, a 33-nation naval partnership that conducts maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden.[424]

The latest addition to the foreign military bases in Djibouti is China's, which it opened in 2017. The base is China's first overseas naval outpost, and was partly motivated by the need for logistical support for counter-piracy patrols.[425]

The number of pirate attacks has declined considerably over the past few years. In Somalia, in 2018, there were two actual and attempted piracy attacks, compared to 237 in 2011.[426] International naval forces have been successful in their counter-piracy efforts, but the root causes of piracy (such as international illegal overfishing of Somali fishing waters) remain to be fully addressed.[427] In addition, in the past few years, Yemen's Houthis have attacked Emirati, Saudi, and American navies and, on occasion, commercial vessels sailing between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[428]

Access to ports

Africa relies heavily on ships and ports to service its intercontinental trade. While one-third of African countries are landlocked, maritime transport remains the main access to the global marketplace. In recent years, trade with China and Asia in general have additionally cut into the EU and US share of African trade.[429] Ports are important for foreign actors, not only for import of natural resources and other goods, but also for accessing Africa's expanding consumer class.

During the past decade, several of the foreign state actors investigated here have invested in various ports in the Horn of Africa; such commercial investments have often been followed by agreements for the construction of military bases nearby.

Djibouti is a sub-regional loading centre and its deep-water ports allow container shipping that enables exports of large quantities.[430] The opening of China's support base in Djibouti succeeded investments in a Chinese-operated commercial port, located near the base and just west of the Doraleh Multi-purpose Port, one of the key ports in Africa for China's trade with the continent. A railway financed and built by Chinese state-owned enterprises connects the port – and the base – with Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital.[431] Djibouti is also a central port for gaining access to Ethiopia and COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.[432]

The UAE has become active in ports and military bases in Eritrea and in Berbera, Somaliland.[433] In addition to having a deep-water port, Berbera is situated in a strategic location for monitoring the sea traffic in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa.[434] Turkey's agreement to build a military training school in Mogadishu was preceded by a 2013 agreement that allowed a Turkish firm to take over the management of the Port of Mogadishu, as well as to assume responsibility for the modernization of the port.[435]

India has also shown interest in investing in ports and constructing defence facilities in East African waters, but India's main interest lies further south, in the Seychelles and Mauritius.[436] However, the

Assessment of foreign military bases in Djibouti (main locations)



Sources: Graphic News (2017)[508], Lo (2017)[432], The Intercept, 2018)[51], the French Ministry of Armed Forces (2016)[509], FOI image interpretation of Google Earth data (2019).

agreements are currently on hold due to domestic resistance in both states.[437]

Promoting stability in a violent region

Conflicts have greatly affected the Greater Horn of Africa over the past 50 years. Still today, there are a number of ongoing wars and clashes in the region, such as the Somali civil war and continued violence in South Sudan and Sudan. Djibouti, host to numerous foreign military bases, is not an exception. A Djiboutian-Eritrean border dispute occurred in 2008, when Eritrean forces seized territory from Djibouti, but later withdrew, in 2010.[438] After Qatar withdrew its peacekeepers in 2017, Djibouti accused Eritrea of occupying the disputed territory.[439] The dispute has still not been resolved and the UN has been urging the two countries to continue their efforts to settle their border dispute peacefully.[440]

Foreign state actors from different parts of the world seek, through different security engagements, to promote stability in the region, as the Horn of Africa hosts a corridor between east, west, north, and south. Its geostrategic importance is increased by its proximity to the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula.

Since Djibouti's independence in 1977, France has rented a military outpost in its former colony.[441] Of all France's bilateral military agreements with African states, the agreement with Djibouti is the last wherein France reaffirms its commitment to the territorial integrity of its former colony,[442] an indication of its importance. The French presence in Djibouti is linked to ensuring access to strategic raw materials, maritime security, and trade routes.[443]

After 9/11, the US was concerned that terrorist organisations from Africa were exporting terror to Europe and America. The US Government has

Assessment of foreign military postures and their strategic interests in West Africa



Sources: See References to maps, page 91.

been leasing the site of Camp Lemonnier from the Djiboutian Government since 2001.[444] Camp Lemonnier is the Americans' hub in East Africa and is considered a vital link to building stability in the region.[445]

Even if indirectly, Italy links stability in the Horn of Africa as being significant for the security of the Mediterranean region.[446] Italy is using its Djibouti base for operations in the region.[447]

Lastly, Djibouti's strategic location has also been important for evacuation from conflict-affected areas in the region. Based at Camp Lemonnier, the US has a rapid-response force, which in 2013 evacuated US citizens and foreign diplomats from South Sudan to Kenya.[448] In 2015, Italy evacuated its nationals from Yemen and South Sudan through Djibouti.[449] China also evacuated nationals from Yemen to Djibouti in 2015, before they were to return to China.[450]

Positioning among Middle Eastern rivals

The Horn of Africa is of interest not only to Western and key Asian powers, but has recently also drawn the attention of Middle Eastern countries. The Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea, especially, have been subject to heightened militarisation due to a complex game of regional rivalries, involving the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. Reports of past, present, and future military bases or installations in Africa have appeared in the media.

Immediately across the Bab el-Mandeb strait are the shores of Yemen, where a proxy war is ongoing, in one of the world's most devastating conflicts. In 2014, the UAE and Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen to defeat the Houthis, a militia with links to Iran that had taken control over large parts of the country. For operations in Yemen, the UAE has established a base in Eritrea and is currently constructing a base in Somaliland.[451]

Turkey is also expanding its foothold in northeastern Africa. The country has opened a base for military training of Somali soldiers in Somalia and may build a naval dock for military use in Sudan.[452]

The ongoing base race between Middle Eastern states in Africa reflects: rising ambitions; rivalries for influence over the regional security order, politics and ideology; and the need to gain access to markets and resources, and to secure sea lines of communications.

Strategic interests in West Africa

Similar to the Greater Horn of Africa, the results of the West Africa mapping show that larger bases and installations are located in connection to port cities. The African continent is known for the tyranny of distance, characterised by vast spaces and limited infrastructure. When ports are not available, air transportation is central for logistics support, and the mapping demonstrates a higher concentration of foreign postures around international airports. For example, France, the US, and Germany have military postures next to the airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The US and France are present alongside the airport in N'Djamena, capital of Chad.

In contrast to the Greater Horn of Africa, other strategic interests are influencing the decision for having military bases and installations in West Africa. The focus in this region is on countering terrorism and controlling illegal migration.

Countering terrorism

In recent years, West Africa has faced a wave of terrorism, especially in the Sahel. The number of reported violent events related to militant Islamic group activity in the Sahel has been doubling every year since 2016 (from 90 in 2016, to 194 in 2017, and 465 in 2018).[453]

The mapping shows that France and the US are the two state actors with the highest number of military installations in West Africa. France's President Macron has drawn a direct link between threats in Mali and Africa and security implications for France.[454] France maintained a number of military bases during the post-colonial period for training, equipment, and interventions.[455] After a gradual reduction of the permanent military presence in Africa at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, France resurrected its presence in 2013, with the launch of a military operation against the occupation of northern Mali by violent extremist groups.[456] As security in sub-Saharan Africa deteriorated, and with the repeated terror attacks in France, the French launched Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorist operation in the Sahel region, in 2014.[457] There have recently also been terrorist attacks on French citizens and assets in West Africa.[458] Consequently, France has increased the number of its active ground troops and military installations in the region.

Following the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001, which among other things strengthened concerns that terrorist organisations from Africa were exporting terror to Europe and America, terrorism has until recently been designated the number one threat to US security.[459] The US is engaged in counterterrorism activities in the region.[460] US armed forces have access to a number of 'lily pads', i.e. military installations of various sizes.[461] The US is currently constructing Nigerien Airbase 201 in Agadez, Niger. This base will serve as a US cooperative security location (CSL), from which drones will be launched to target violent extremist organisations in neighbouring countries.[462]

Controlling illegal migration

In West Africa, the Italian and German military presences are guided by the motive of controlling illegal migration.[463] In recent years, hundreds of thousands of mainly African migrants reached Italy from Libya.[464] In 2016, Italy established Operation Hippocrate, an inter-service military camp hospital in Misratah.[465] The tasks of the mission expanded the following year and now include activities to build the capacity of Libya's coast guard and the Libyan navy. The aim is to strengthen their ability to control and combat illegal immigration, trafficking, and threats to security.[466] Before leaving the shores of Libya for Italy, many migrants pass through Niger.[467] In 2018, Italy's parliament approved a mission, in Niger, with the objective of increasing the ability of Niger to counter illegal trafficking and security threats.[468] Currently, Italy does not have a base of its own; instead, its personnel stay at the US base at Niamey airport.[469]

Germany is also present in Niger. In 2016, Germany established an air transport base in Niamey, the capital of Niger, providing operations and logistics support to the German contingents in international missions in Mali. In addition, Germany provides bilateral support to the Nigerien armed forces in order to strengthen their capability to fight illegal migration.[470]

Controlling illegal migration is also an underlying strategic interest for Spain. The Spanish autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla, sharing borders with

Morocco on the Mediterranean coast, are Europe's only direct land border with Africa and they are currently the primary entry point for migrants to Europe.[471] As Spanish territories, the main task of the military installations in the enclaves is to defend its territorial integrity and their role is limited to border patrols.[472] However, their tasks also include providing support, in cases of serious risk, to civil authorities such as the Civil Guard, which is responsible for Spanish border controls.[473]

Broader strategic interests

Based on the findings from the case studies, a number of broader strategic interests associated with having foreign military bases and installations have been identified. These are linked to protecting economic interests, projecting power, power competition, and maintaining historical ties.

Protecting economic interests

The most common strategic interest identified among the case studies was to protect economic interests. Doing so includes the protection of maritime trade flows, competing for natural resources, and enabling access to the expanding market of Africa.

Protecting maritime trade flows

Maritime transport is essential to the world's economy, as over 90 per cent of the world's trade is carried by sea and it is the most cost-effective way to move goods and raw materials around the world, en masse.[474] For maritime trading states, the security of merchant vessels might be crucial for their economy. For energy-importing states, securing the transport of petroleum products, gas, and solid fuels could be a matter of national security. These state actors will seek to protect merchant vessels where there are risks of piracy or other types of disruptions, where overseas military bases and installations provide support for operations at sea.

Supporting counter-piracy activities in order to protect maritime trade flows has partly been the motive for Japan, Italy, and China to establish their respective bases in Djibouti.[475] Piracy is not limited to the Horn of Africa, but is also present on the West African coast, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, where France's Mission Corymbe and the US regularly conduct capacity-building activities to increase maritime security.[476]

The Gulf of Guinea continues to be increasingly unsafe for seafarers. Reports of piracy attacks in waters between the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo more than doubled in 2018, accounting for all of the six hijackings worldwide. Although no ships were hijacked in 2018 in the Gulf of Aden, pirates fired upon two tankers and capsized a bulk carrier.[477] With a continued risk of attacks, foreign state actors with a high dependence on maritime trade and/or energy import are likely to maintain their military bases and installations in these two regions. Depending on their sea lines of communication, military presence at other critical areas might also be considered. For example, India is trying to establish a military presence in the Seychelles, close to the Mozambique Channel, another key transit and trade hub. This could also mean that other states with similar needs that currently do not have military bases and installations might be seeking to establish military presence next to their key maritime trading routes.

Competing for natural resources

As the global economy continues to grow and natural resources remain fixed, there is a long-term imperative for industrial and industrialising countries to find new sources of raw material supply. The sub-Saharan region has vast deposits of natural resources, such as minerals, needed for sustained industrial production.[478] Securing access to African natural resources can be vital for economic growth of large manufacturing countries, such as China and India.[479] Russia is another country that, despite large mineral resources, has some critical shortages of important raw materials needed for new technologies and other industrial production.[480]

For some of the state actors, ensuring supply of natural resources is also a matter of energy security. For example, the presence of French troops in Niger is to secure uranium mines, which provide the majority of the uranium used in French nuclear power plants. France has a POC (*Pôle Opérationnel de Coopération*), a 'regional cooperation base', in Gabon, which is an important oil producer for France.[481] For Italy, Libya is a major supplier of Italy's oil and natural gas; a stable Libya is therefore fundamental for Italy's energy security.[482]

Foreign military bases and installations have been used to ensure access to natural resources by protecting the state actor's investments as well as their

enterprises and personnel.[483] It is likely that state actors that are highly dependent on African natural resources will strive to maintain their military bases and installation and seek to establish new military presence, when needed, to secure the supply. As the global demand for natural resources intensifies and the competition increases, the military presence of new foreign state actors could also be expected.

Accessing the expanding market of Africa

Although trade with Africa remains low, it is becoming a more important market, for Asian products in particular.[484] The interest in exporting to Africa is growing and state actors are interested in creating a market for their products. This is the case not only for Asian countries such as China, India, and Japan, but also for Russia, Turkey, and the UAE.

China, Turkey, and the UAE have invested in port construction, followed by the establishment of military installations nearby. Controlling ports enables state actors to ensure the supply of natural resources, to protect maritime trade flows, and to export their products. As exports to Africa are growing and the demand for natural resources intensifies, the interest in establishing military bases and installations in connection to ports is expected to grow, especially for deep-water ports.

Controlling ports could potentially also have an impact on the access that other state actors have to the ports. For example, the US fears that China will force the Djiboutian government to hand over the running of the port to China if Djibouti fails to pay the large debts incurred; this could in turn restrict US access both to the African continent and to the Middle East.[485]

Power competition

There is a rising power competition among major powers. For the US, Japan, and India, a strategic interest in having military bases and installations in Africa is to balance China.[486] In addition to international power competition, the play of regional rivalries is a reason for the on-going base race of Middle Eastern state actors in the Greater Horn of Africa.[487] Using foreign military bases and installations is a way for state actors to project themselves as global powers. Foreign state actors with ambitions of power might therefore be seeking to establish a military presence to strengthen their position in relation to their competitors.

Moreover, Africa's 54 nations make up more than a quarter of the UN General Assembly; by custom, African states occupy three of the ten non-permanent seats in the Security Council.[488] Military ties could also strengthen a foreign state actor's position and support in the UN, by extending an additional outreach to the host country that is more than just diplomatic relations. Through notably military ties and arm sales, Russia has achieved support for its illegal annexation of Crimea; 28 African states abstained from voting on a General Assembly motion that condemned the annexation.

Projecting power

The competition for power is also reflected in the foreign state actors' striving for power projection capabilities, in other words, to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations. The most prominent example is the US network of 'lily pads', which are low-profile and highly secret non-permanent military facilities across Africa.[489] Currently, China only has a support base in Djibouti, but it is likely to establish bases elsewhere in Africa.[490] In addition, Chinese scholars have raised the control of overseas ports as having a potential strategic value, since it may contribute to meeting China's goal of projecting power far from its shores.[491]

"There is a rising power competition among major powers. For the US, Japan, and India, a strategic interest in having military bases and installations in Africa is to balance China."

Power projection could also be achieved through military cooperation agreements, if access to infrastructure is included in the agreement. This is an alternative to having military bases of their own yet maintaining the ability to quickly responding to an area distant from its own territory. For example, India has approved defence logistics agreements with the US and France that enable the use of each other's military bases.[492] India is also in discussions with Japan concerning Indian usage of Japanese military facilities in Djibouti.[493] Since 2015, Russia has signed over 20 bilateral military cooperation

agreements with African states.[494] According to an unverified source, some of the agreements allow Russia the use of airfields or naval access to ports.[495]

With access agreements, no or little permanent presence is needed, but deployments are enabled when required. For the foreign state actors, this could potentially be more cost-effective than having a military installation of their own. It could also be politically less sensitive, as public opinion at home or locally could be against the military presence.

As power competition rises, state actors with power ambitions are likely to strive to increase their power projection capabilities, either through foreign military bases and installations or different military cooperation agreements.

Maintaining historical ties

The current presence of French, Spanish, and British military facilities is partly a result of its colonial history. France and Spain have overseas territories in Africa and the UK has two British overseas territories near the continent. The focus of military bases on the French islands of Réunion and Mayotte, and the Spanish territories of Ceuta, Melilla, and Canary Islands is territorial defence.[496] However, maintaining not only historical but also cultural and linguistic ties is of strategic interest, as these ties could be an asset when discussing other economic, political, and security interests. For example, France's bases have contributed to preserving its sphere of influence in its former African colonies.[497]

There are currently no indications that these state actors wish to close down their military bases and installations. However, local actors on the Canary Islands are opposed to the presence of the Spanish naval base, and Morocco claims the territories of Ceuta and Melilla; meanwhile, the International Court of Justice has rejected the UK's claim of sovereignty over Diego Garcia.[498] ■

Final remarks

As global demand and competition for natural resources intensifies, state actors dependent on these resources for the growth of their economies or for energy security are likely to take measures to ensure supply. This may mean that both current foreign state actors and new actors are seeking to establish military bases and installations in Africa in order to protect their sea lines of communication, investment, enterprises, and personnel. There is also rising competition for power. The power struggle in the Middle East is spilling over into the Horn of Africa, while power competition in the Indo-Pacific region risks increasing the extent of military presence further south along the eastern cost of Africa.

These developments and others, such as efforts by some state actors to combat transnational terrorism and to prevent illegal migration, indicate that foreign state actors are continuing to strive to establish a military presence in Africa. Continuous analysis of these developments is important, since there are clear signs that Africa is gaining in strategic importance.

With the growing number of foreign state actors that have a military presence, there is a risk of mounting tensions among them, which may create a destabilising environment in the host countries. Regardless of future developments, there is a need for further analysis of the consequences for the host countries of allowing foreign military bases and installations, and of how these same countries can retake charge of local security challenges. ■

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Abbreviations

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMAN	Israeli military intelligence
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BATUK	British Army Training Unit Kenya
BMIS	Base Militare Italiana di Supporto (military sup-port base)
BOA	Base Opérationnelle Avancée (forward operating site)
CAR	Central African Republic
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine (West African franc)
CICIR	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSL	Cooperative Security Location
DP	Dubai Ports
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
EUCAP Somalia	EU Capacity-building Mission in Somalia
EU NAVFOR	EU Naval Force
EUTM Mali	EU Training Mission in Mali
FSB	Russian Federal Security Service
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G5S	Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCG	Jaoan Coast Guard
JSDF	Japan Self-Defence Forces
NA	Libyan National Army
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MIADIT	Italian Mission of Assistance in Somalia
MIASIT	Bilateral Mission of Assistance and Support in Libya
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Saha-ra
MINUSMA	UN mission in Mali
MISIN	Italian Bilateral Support Mission in Niger
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission (China)
NAVAF	US Naval Forces Africa
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-velopment
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
POC	Pôle Opérationnel de Coopération (regional cooperation base)
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SOE	State-Owned Enterprises
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
US	United States
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
VEO	Violent-extremist organisations
VKS	Russian Aerospace Forces

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Since the early 2000s, Africa has experienced an increase in foreign military presence, with new entrants such as China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates establishing military bases and installations on the continent. To increase our understanding of the renewed military interest by foreign state actors in Africa, this report maps the military bases and installations of 12 foreign state actors and analyses the strategic interests behind their presence.

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