National Defence and International Military Missions

The Swedish Armed Forces at home and abroad 1958–2020

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Sammanfattning

Vilka idéer om relationen mellan nationellt försvar och internationella militära insatser har präglat utvecklingen av svensk försvarspolitik? Den här studien av samtliga fjorton försvarsbeslut mellan 1958 och 2020 visar på både kontinuitet och betydande anpassning till den säkerhetspolitiska utvecklingen i hur relationen uppfattas. Under det kalla kriget följde svenskt insatsdeltagande huvudsakligen en *utrikespolitisk* logik och utfördes mestadels under FN-flagg. Det utrikespolitiska begreppet var dock starkt förknippat med nationella säkerhetshänsyn. Efter det kalla krigets slut började nationella och internationella militära uppgifter alltmer förstås som *två sidor av samma mynt*. Idén att hantera säkerhetshot där de uppstår sammanföll med en nedgång i traditionella militära hot, en uppgång i terrorism, samt nedskärningar i nationellt försvar. I den nuvarande multipolära eran samexisterar flera sätt att se på relationen. Den viktigaste trenden är att svensk försvarspolitik betonar försvarssamarbeten, vilka är potentiella bryggor mellan de nationella och internationella sfärerna. Deltagande i internationella militära insatser är en arena för att uppnå ökad interoperabilitet med samarbetsländer, vilket anses vara av *instrumentellt värde* för nationellt försvar. Mantrat att bygga säkerhet tillsammans med andra öppnar också upp för en koppling mellan deltagande i insatser utanför närområdet och förväntningar på framtida stöd från insatspartners i händelse av en säkerhetskris på hemmaplan (*ge-och-ta*).

Nyckelord: Nationellt försvar, internationella militära insatser, Sverige, försvarspolitik, försvarsbeslut

Summary

This report investigates ideas about the relationship between national and international military tasks as articulated in all fourteen Swedish defence bills between 1958 and 2020. The analysis reveals patterns of change and continuity, which indicate that the relationship is neither dichotomous nor static. During the Cold War, a *foreign policy* logic underpinned Swedish participation in international military missions. The foreign policy concept was, however, closely tied to national security concerns. In the Post-Cold War era, national and international tasks became seen as *two sides of the same coin*. The rationale of dealing with security threats at their origins went together with the decline of traditional military threats, the rise of terrorism, and cuts in national defence budgets. In the emerging Multipolar era (2014- continued), several understandings of the relationship co-exist. Crucially, defence cooperation has become a pillar of Swedish defence policy, bridging the national and international arenas. International mission participation is recognised as a setting for building interoperability with partners, which is considered to be of *instrumental value* to national defence. The commitment to building security together with others opens up for a *give-and-take* logic, in which a country would contribute to out-of-area missions expecting support from partners in case of a security crisis at home.

Keywords: National defence, international military missions, Sweden, defence policy, defence bills

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Abbreviations

CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	Economic Communities
EU	European Union
EUFOR Althea	European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUFOR Concordia	European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
Operation Atlanta	European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta
Operation Irini	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSGAP	Office of the Secretary General in Afghanistan
PfP	Partnership for Peace
R2P	Responsibility to Protect

RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SEK	Swedish krona
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Observer Mission
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNTEA/UNSF	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority/United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

1 Introduction

Throughout history, national armed forces have been engaged in activities both at home and abroad.[1] At home, the core task has typically been to defend the territory and the sovereignty of the nation. Abroad, activities have ranged from war to military assistance of foreign troops, collective defence measures, and various forms of peacekeeping. These activities typically include the (potential) use of violence for political purposes, which is one of the core characteristics of the military profession.

Understandings of how national and international military tasks relate to one another vary between countries and over time. For much of history, international military activity has been the prolongation of national agendas, used by rulers to – for example – expand national territory by force, increase spheres of influence, or colonise foreign territory. The arms race during the Cold War made global military expenditure hit unprecedented levels (see Omitoogun and Sköns 2006). The rival superpowers increased military spending to strengthen domestic defence *and* carry out extensive international military engagements, with repercussions for the entire international system. Meanwhile, small states were often inclined to prioritise territorial defence, though their strategies for doing so differed. Some entered formal alliances for collective defence, others claimed to be neutral and built a self-sufficient total defence to render that claim credible. At the end of the Cold War, defence spending in the former Soviet republics plummeted. Consequentially, many countries that had oriented national defence policy around the threat of Soviet aggression decreased their defence budgets (see Forss and Holopainen 2015). During the 1990s and early 2000s, optimistic liberal internationalism brought international peace support missions to an all-time high. In the current security landscape, characterised by uncertainty, rising superpower friction and occasional outbursts of open provocation, security threats have amplified and diversified across the globe. Rebuilding national defence is again a priority for many countries. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that global defence spending increased by 3.6 per cent between 2018 and 2019, representing the largest annual growth since 2010 (SIPRI 2020a).

With the post-Cold War world order under renegotiation, the balance between national and international military engagements is prone to change. If military spending is generally on the rise, as noted above, the situation for international

military engagements is more ambiguous. At first glance, it appears reasonable to expect international military activities to decline as a result of the tide's turning back to the national arena. Indeed, in the last decade, the United Nations (UN) has only initiated seven new peacekeeping missions, to be compared with 35 during the 1990s and eleven during the 2000s (United Nations 2020). No new UN peacekeeping operation has been formed since 2017 (MINUJUSTH in Haiti). However, although UN peacekeeping operations are less numerous than at their peak, international military missions are not in decline across the board. In 2019, 64 missions from the UN, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or ad hoc coalitions were ongoing, which is three more than in 2018 (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung 2020). Recent years have seen both a regionalisation of international missions and a shift in substance from traditional peacekeeping to robust peacekeeping, peace enforcement and partner-oriented capacity building (Jetschke and Schlipphak 2020; Karlsrud 2015; Tull 2018; Bueger and Tholens 2020; Jonsson and Eriksson 2014). These developments indicate that the relationship between national defence and international military missions is far from static.

This report seeks to illuminate how national and international military priorities have played out over time for Sweden, a small state with long – and for its size disproportionate – experience of international military missions, and a vast territory geographically exposed to the changing security environment. It asks:

> *Which ideas about the relationship between national defence and international military missions have guided defence policy in Sweden between 1958 and 2020?*

To answer this question, the report conducts a structured analysis of all Swedish defence bills between 1958 and 2020. The analysis reveals how perceptions of the national/international nexus evolved in Swedish defence policy through three distinct security epochs: the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and the Multipolar era that is presently taking shape.

After the end of the Cold War, defence spending generally declined, particularly in countries situated close to Russia. Sweden made a decidedly sweeping turn away from national defence to international peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities (see Pallin *et al.* 2018).The next big transformation of Swedish defence is currently under way: in October 2020, the Government announced what was presented as the largest investment in national defence since the 1950s. This setting provides an excellent laboratory for capturing ideas about the relationship between national and international military tasks, knowledge that is useful both scholarly and practically.

This report shows that whereas the Swedish Armed Forces were engaged in international military missions throughout the period, in very different security contexts, the relationship between the national and international arenas has varied

greatly over time. Neutrality and non-alignment did not restrain the Swedish Armed Forces from being active in the international arena. On the contrary, a security-oriented notion of foreign policy linked the national and international spheres. When the Cold War ended, the threat of military aggression against Sweden decreased and was for many years perceived as negligible. Accordingly, the Swedish Armed Forces downsized and professionalised, focusing on participation in missions abroad under different organisational umbrellas (UN, EU, NATO, *ad hoc*). The report demonstrates that an understanding of national and international activities as 'two sides of the same coin' underpinned the prioritisation of participation in international military missions, alongside the dismantling of traditional national defence. Whereas the precise contours of the 'Multipolar era' are not yet fully discernible, the findings herein indicate that the era harbours multiple perceptions of the national/international nexus. The major innovation in Swedish defence policy, though, is the leap taken when it comes to the assertion of "building security with others". International missions are already explicitly acknowledged as relevant arenas in this context. If the distinction between defence cooperation and international missions is further blurred, arguments of compatibility between the spheres will be favoured.

All in all, this report concludes that, judging from the patterns of argumentation in defence bills between 1958 and 2020, Swedish participation in international military missions is likely to remain; though its shapes and forms will continue to adapt to the security environment.

1.1   Methodology

This study has been carried out within the Swedish Defence Research Agency's project on International Military Missions (Swedish: *Insatsprojektet*), which is commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. It is a first step in a long-term endeavour to better grasp the linkages between the national and international spheres of military activities. This theme is particularly relevant in the Swedish context, where defence policy shifted away from prioritising total defence of the national territory to extensive participation in international military missions, after the end of the Cold War. As Swedish defence policy has turned its attention back to territorial defence, the role of international missions is also under renegotiation. The report seeks to provide insights of relevance to this process.

What follows is an investigation into how conceptions of the relationship between national defence and international military activities have evolved in the context of Swedish defence policy from 1958 to 2020. The details of Swedish defence transformation are already well understood (see Dalsjö 2019 and Christiansson 2020 for good summaries). Likewise, rationales for participating in international military missions have been discussed at length in previous research (examples include Kathman and Melin 2017, Bove and Elia 2011; Sotomayor Velázquez 2010; Ångström 2015).Whereas the topic relates to these two prominent research

fields and others (e.g., small states in International Relations, international cooperation, national strategy), the report breaks new ground by pinpointing the national/international nexus. To advance the understanding of this specific aspect requires a methodological approach that captures ideational change and continuity in a fine-grained manner. For this purpose, the authors have developed a novel set of ideal-typical categories, which capture theoretically conceivable understandings of the relationship between the national and international spheres of military activities.

Ideal types are typically constructed by surveying extensive sources and clustering core features recurrent in these (see Balzacq 2015, 104; Timasheff 1957, 178). For this report, the ideal types were built inductively around five putative core mechanisms formulated by the authors beforehand (resource scarcity, learning, effectiveness, solidarity, and norm promotion; see Chapter 2). With the aim of arriving at what Weber (1949, 90) called "internally consistent" "thought-image[s]", the authors proceeded by clustering insights from a broad spectrum of previous research, including literature on military interventions, scholarship on alliances and coalitions, international relations theory and policy-oriented reports (see Chapter 2). In addition, the ideal types were informed by established knowledge about how different countries employ their armed forces at home and abroad. This preunderstanding served as a relevance check for the categories.

The report employs the analytical framework to study patterns of ideas in Swedish defence policy. The ideal types help to clarify how specific notions of the relationship between national and international tasks emerge, overlap and fade out in different security contexts. Hence, the ideal types are not hypotheses to be tested, but analytical tools aimed at ordering features in the empirical world (see Nefzger 1965, 171).

The qualitative content analysis proceeded in three steps. Firstly, the defence bills were identified (see Section 1.1.1) and collected from the web pages of the Swedish Government, Parliament, and National Library. Computer-assisted textual analysis was contemplated, but ruled out since many of the earlier defence bills are only accessible in a non-searchable scanned format, or in html, with many errors. In the second step, both authors read the defence bills in their totality. All sections or individual statements found to be of potential relevance to the theme were taken out for further analysis. Thirdly, this material was analysed in detail during three full-day authors' workshops. These discussions served to ensure the reliability of the study, as well as the validity of the ideal types and issues of demarcation between them. All five ideal types were developed prior to the actual content analysis of the defence bills. Throughout the analysis, the prospect of detecting unforeseen logics of argument that would call for alternative ideal types was recognised. However, no such patterns were to be found.

The analysis in this report concentrates on the period 1958–2020, which displays deep and broad transformation of Swedish defence policy, both at home and

abroad. As a small state located in the vicinity of the Soviet bloc, during the Cold War Sweden combined a popularly anchored 'total defence' concept with participation in UN missions. In the subsequent era, which this report labels as 'post-Cold War', traditional national defence was dismantled, to the benefit of more frequent and ambitious international missions. The 'Multipolar era' that is currently taking form has traits reminiscent of the old Cold War logic, but this time the rebuilding of national defence co-exists with a broader palette of international military engagements. The report recognises these developments and seeks to clarify which ideas underpin processes of change and continuity in Swedish defence policy.

1.1.1 Material

For the purposes of this study, all fourteen Swedish defence bills (*Försvarsbeslut*) produced between 1958 and 2020 have been analysed.[2] In these central guiding documents, the Swedish Government – sometimes together with parties outside of the Government – assesses the contemporary security environment, sets out its political priorities for the coming five-year period, and assigns to the Swedish Armed Forces their main tasks. Such bills are normally based on the conclusions of a broad parliamentary commission (*Försvarsberedningen*), as well as on input from the Armed Forces. Notably, this arrangement (of 5-year plans preceded by reoccurring parliamentary commissions) is unique in Sweden to the field of defence policy.

The documents that are analysed in this report are the government *proposals*, which may have undergone minor changes in the parliamentary approval process. The authors studied the original Swedish versions of the bills. All translations into English are by the authors.

For three main reasons, defence bills are a suitable material to address the research problem at hand. *First*, they are the most important formal documents representing Swedish defence policy. The only other source of comparable weight would be the reports of the parliamentary defence policy commissions. These reports, however, are freer in character and lack the direct link to policy that is desirable for the purposes of the present study. Often, the lines of argument developed in the commission reports undergo ample revision before and if they make their way into defence bills. *Second*, the bills offer an umbrella perspective on Swedish defence policy, in which both national and international activities appear. Official documents focusing exclusively on international missions, for instance government bills on individual missions or policy strategies (e.g., Government of

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[2] The bills covered have the following document numbers: 1958:110, 1963:108, 1968:110, 1972:75, 1976/77:74, 1981/82:102, 1986/87:95, 1991/92:102, 1995/96:12, 1996/97:4, 1999/2000:30, 2004/05:5, 2008/09:140, 2014/15:109, 2020/21:30. Documents 1995/96:12 and 1996/97:4 are two volumes of the same defence bill.

Sweden 2008; Government of Sweden 2017), fall outside of this report's scope; this is due to our interest in the relationship *between* the spheres. *Third*, defence bills have a fairly similar format throughout the period, which facilitates comparisons over time. They all include the elements mentioned in the first lines of this section (security environment, political priorities, allocation of tasks).

However, it should be noted that the notion of a 'defence bill' is not a formal document label. In collecting material for this report, the authors encountered a few government proposals that were broadly deferred to as defence bills even though they do not fulfil the above criteria. These bills (e.g. 1983/84:112, 1977/78:65, 1988/89:80, 1990/91:102) deal with purely organisational, staff-related, technical issues, or short-term allocation of finances, and were excluded from the corpus after careful consideration.

This report aims to identify the broad strokes of ideational change and continuity, as concerns the conceptual pair comprised of the "national" and the "inter-national". It does not aspire to explain each detail in Swedish defence policy development. The report is therefore not concerned with the party politics of Swedish defence policy, and likewise leaves the imprint of individual governments by the wayside.

In sum, the focus on defence bills has the advantage of enabling a structured analysis over time of a rather broad topic. However, no source can be expected to offer a complete picture of how the relationship between national and international military tasks is understood. The most important limitation is that defence bills are blue-pencilled documents in which considerations that are politically contentious are likely to be avoided. Moreover, foreign policy concerns related to international military missions likely feature more strongly in documents originating from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, than in defence bills. Had specific ideal types proved irrelevant throughout the eras, this could very well be a false finding reflecting the character of the material. However, the analysis reveals that traces of all ideal types appear in Swedish defence policy discourse, but to varying degrees in different eras. These fluctuations over time are highly relevant on their own, as they showcase that the relationship between the domains is not pregiven.

Figures 2 and 3 build on data from the Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs, which was shared with the authors upon request. The dataset includes the number of personnel returning home from international deployments per mission-year. The data also categorises missions according to framework: UN, EU, NATO, or other.

1.1.2 Outline

The report is structured as follows. The next section (1.2) introduces the case of Sweden. Thereafter, Section 1.3 delineates conceptually the study object. Chapter 2 builds on previous research to develop five ideal-typical ways of perceiving the

relationship between national defence and international missions. Thereafter, Chapter 3 analyses how ideational linkages between national defence and international missions have evolved in Swedish defence bills from 1958 to 2020. The concluding chapter (4) discusses the implications of the analysis for the development of Swedish defence policy ahead.

1.2 The case of Sweden

FOI's research program on international military missions is tasked by the Swedish Ministry of Defence to deliver studies of relevance to ongoing and future military deployments abroad. The report therefore focuses on Swedish circumstances.

In addition, for at least two reasons the case of Sweden is a suitable empirical setting for exploring possible linkages between national and international military tasks. First, its defence policy displays a mix of change and continuity that merits being disentangled. The Swedish Armed Forces have participated in international military missions continuously since the 1950s, but the role of these engagements in relation to national defence has varied over time. Nationally, after the Second World War, Sweden built a comprehensive 'total defence', based on conscription and mass-mobilisation. After the Cold War, defence policy took a U-turn to prioritise the international sphere. Since 2014, the national sphere has again become the focus of Swedish defence policy. International engagements are decreasing in volume, but are at the same time diversifying in mandate and scope. This report sets out to understand the sets of ideas that underpin this variation.

Secondly, the Swedish case has the potential to yield insights of relevance to other small states. Despite considerable within-group variation, small states share certain traits in how they navigate international politics, whether seen through the prism of anarchy or cooperation. Since small states cannot control the external security environment, they "seek to position themselves as advantageously as possible in the system" (Rickli 2008, 322). In doing so, small states have traditionally been understood to face a choice between alignment/bandwagoning, on the one hand, and neutrality, on the other (Noreen, Sjöstedt and Ångström 2017, 147; see Keohane 1969). With the evolution of the international system, from bipolarity to unipolarity to emerging multipolarity, small states have partially re-evaluated their approaches. This report joins emerging scholarship seeking to illuminate these processes.

1.3 Definitions

This report starts from a straightforward distinction between military tasks on the nation's sovereign territory and territorial waters, and military tasks outside of this territory. This simple distinction carries profound meaning, since armed forces are defined by their right – even duty – to use violence to protect the nation. Any

activity beyond one's own territory requires justification, if not legal then at the very least political (see Perkins and Neumayer 2008, 898).[3]

In the following analysis, national defence is taken to include any activity pertaining to the defence of the territory and of national values and interests, including surveillance and alert in the immediate region. In peacetime, such activities include exercises and patrolling/surveillance of borders, collection and analysis of intelligence, as well as protection against infiltration/espionage. In some countries, armed forces can be mandated to act in situations of national disorder, without an external antagonist. In addition, armed forces may contribute to crisis management in situations of civilian crisis – for instance pandemics or natural catastrophes.

The international sphere, likewise, contains a broad universe of possible tasks. If war is the international task that has most strongly shaped human history, countries nowadays engage in a selection of the following tasks outside of their own territories:

- Carrying out international military missions (see below)
- Participating in war and warlike activities
- Undertaking undercover operations (often special forces)
- Providing military assistance
- Gathering and analysing intelligence to evaluate foreign threats
- Conducting joint exercises with partners
- [Air and marine surveillance within the economic zone]

Since the end of the World Wars, major inter-state wars have become less frequent, but other types of military intervention abroad – often in intra-state conflicts - have become more common (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). Despite expectations of the contrary, even today international interventions are not in general decline (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung 2020). According to a recent data set, the subcategory of ongoing humanitarian military interventions, for instance, is still historically high (Gromes and Dembinski 2019, 1041). Military assistance and capacity building likewise show little sign of fading, branching out, rather, to new actors (see examples in Gasinska et al, 2019).

For reasons of analytical feasibility, data availability and relevance to the empirical context, when discussing tasks within the international sphere, the case study in this report focuses on international military missions. In this text, the concept of international military missions refers to an institutionalised set of military operations that a coalition of nations carries out on foreign territory, normally under a designated name, with official attributes created for the purpose (emblems,

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[3] The main sources of legitimation for international military missions are United Nations Security Council resolutions and invitations from the concerned governments. Whereas the legal status of the former is widely accepted, in some situations the latter may be judged insufficient, insofar as the government in question has weak legitimacy (see Kenny and Butler 2018).

flags, headquarters, official channels of communication, etc.). Surveillance in the immediate neighbourhood is considered the extension of national defence, and is therefore excluded from the international sphere. Other tasks are brought up in the text if fruitful to a better understanding of how perceptions of the relationship between the national and international spheres evolve.

International military missions have diversified both conceptually and practically during the last decades. Figure 1 below depicts a rather diverse set of engagements on foreign land that fall under the label.

Figure 1. International military missions.

Figure 1 does not aim at fully representing all existing types of international military missions. Instead, its purpose is to illustrate that the term is an umbrella that includes altruistically framed sub-terms (e.g. R2P, humanitarian, observer), sub-terms signifying more war-like actions (e.g. expeditionary operations, peace enforcement), as well as a number of in-between variants (e.g. training and advisory in a capacity building context). Yet, these engagements all have in common that they include military staff acting in their official role, in a uniform, and – with some exceptions – authorised to carry weapons.

2 Five ideas about a contested relationship

This chapter presents five ideal-typical views on the relationship between national defence and international missions. This typology stylises a universe of possible understandings of the international/national nexus, whose empirical relevance will be tried out for the case of Swedish defence policy. The categories are conceptually distinct, but they are not expected to be mutually exclusive or to match perfectly with clear instances in the empirical world (Hempel 1965). Instead, they are purposely exaggerated, constituting extreme outcomes against which empirical reality may be assessed.

The framework is not designed specifically for the Swedish case. It is mainly relevant to high-income, democratic countries that confront similar choices in how to allocate material resources and prioritise political goals between the national and international arenas. Low-income, non-democratic countries also face such choices, but the parameters at play tend to be different. It would be worthwhile for future research to analyse how economically disadvantaged countries that contribute to international missions despite domestic instability perceive the relationship between national and international military tasks. This is, however, outside of the scope of the present study.

2.1 Trade-off

In a first view, there is a trade-off between national and international military tasks. In terms of defence policy, this view assumes that there is a principled choice to be made between activities aimed at defending one's own territory, and extra-territorial activities with other purposes. Since the trade-off argument is premised on resource scarcity, it can be assumed to be particularly present in slimmed defence structures. [4] In practical terms, if crucial military staff are busy in international missions or other activities abroad, their absence will leave a gap in the national defence structure. Although the share of staff in international service is normally small in comparison to the armed forces as a whole, even small deployments can together create a shortage nationally, especially if specialised competences are required (Jonsson and Eriksson 2014). Likewise, material resources required for missions are not only unavailable for domestic use, but their potential future value for national defence might be reduced through wear and tear. In addition, a long-term trade-off may occur if human or material resources are

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[4] In the ideal type's pure state, there are no trade-offs without resource scarcity, since all available options can then be fulfilled simultaneously. However, that trade-offs are premised on resource scarcity does not mean that resource scarcity always produces trade-offs, since an actor can be satisfied with a selective allocation of resources.

strongly adapted to international tasks, at the future expense of national applicability.

Much has been written on how trade-offs influence policymaking. The literature proposes that, under trade-off premises, small states will be reluctant to deploy armed forces abroad, since they have fewer resources at their disposal than larger states. If international military action has macro-level benefits, non-contributors may free-ride on this public good (Bove and Elia 2011, 700), allowing less resourceful states to focus on the domestic domain. Furthermore, abstentions from foreign deployment will be amplified if there are security challenges at home that "require a state to mobilize its capabilities for immediate defense and thus decrease its capacity to send armed forces abroad" (Tago 2007, 185). In the context of stable liberal democracies, such security challenges have mostly been associated with external threats. Whereas that factor certainly remains decisive, a trade-off between national and international performative tasks may arise even without an aggression from a foreign actor. Assistance from armed forces may be called for during civil crises such as pandemics and natural catastrophes. As the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated, with such crises affecting society at home, engagements abroad may be called into question. Moreover, although in most democracies riots or other types of domestic turmoil are matters for the police to handle, escalating, state-challenging protests may activate exceptional measures that include the involvement of parts of the armed forces. History is full of examples of such operations (see Engdahl 1971; Mendel 1996). The extreme case of an internally active and externally passive military is military dictatorships, whose peacefulness on the international arena has been associated with internal repression (Andreski 1980, 8).

Psychological research has shown that when politicians pick the less morally high-standing of two goods that belong in different domains, for instance economic interests over human rights, trade-off aversion increases (see Fiske and Tetlock 1997). Whereas national and international military activities clearly belong in different geographical spheres, whether they also belong in different moral spheres is a different question. Classical realists like Morgenthau (1967, see Williams 2004) would argue that ensuring national existence or survival is the highest moral principle, which would place the national military pillar at the forefront by any estimate. Cosmopolitan liberals, by contrast, would rather see national defence as the expression of less morally high-standing state interest, to be compared with the presumed altruism of the international community's peace support missions (see Woodhouse and Ramsbham 2005; Paris 2010). Critical security studies, on the 'third' hand, have accused international interventions of hypocrisy, imperialism, marketisation and generally harmful consequences (e.g., Cunliffe 2012). The takeaway from this for the following analysis is that, although trade-offs in the allocation of resources are a de facto aspect of political life, the extent to which they are recognised is premised on other considerations. If international military missions are positively connoted with global solidarity and the promotion of

universal values, policymakers may be disinclined to engage in open prioritisation between the spheres. For the following analysis, this implies that the *foreign policy* ideal type (see section 2.5 below) is expected to circumvent trade-off discussions, since the national and international tasks are located in distinct spheres that respond to different political rationales.

The trade-off ideal type pinpoints an "intrinsic incompatibility" between national and international military tasks (see Andreski 1980). The tasks may co-exist, but need to be allocated within the available scope of resources. You can't have your cake and eat it too, in other words. By contrast, the ideal types *instrumental value*, *the same coin*, and *give-and-take* all assume – albeit in different ways – that there are potential synergies between the spheres. The cake, as it were, can be made bigger. All other things (e.g., budget) being equal, synergies will therefore temper trade-offs.

Indicators of trade-off in defence bills

- Mentions of re-allocation between budget posts
- Acknowledgement of a need to *balance, prioritise, choose* between tasks or *cease* with some tasks
- Explicit comparisons between the spheres, ranking of tasks, either/or-reasoning

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2.2 Instrumental value

The second ideal type posits that international activities may have an instrumental value for national defence. Experiences from international missions may improve the professional skills of participants and organisations, especially if they are exposed to situations that cannot be fully captured during exercises. Three types of learning effects, which the national arena cannot deliver in peacetime, may arise from partaking in international military missions.

First, by conducting operations in an environment of actual conflict, crisis, or post-conflict tensions, individual soldiers and officers receive practice that can be of decisive value in a future situation of defending their own nation. Missions enable military staff to practice their professional skills in situations that cannot be straightforwardly replicated during exercises in peacetime (see FOI 2016, 110). Under enduring budget cuts and when national defence has low priority, international missions have also enabled "hibernation or rebirth" of skills and knowledge that would otherwise have been lost (FOI 2016, 4). This is important since, as reminded by Roosberg and Weibull (2014, 88), practice makes perfect, and lack of practice leads to lost capacity.

Missions involving combat will obviously pose higher risks to participants, and fatalities can undermine support for participation. However, combat is the quintessential military task, and experiences from live operations may have a considerable instrumental value for national defence in the future. If those deployed have little prior experience of combat, this may, on the other hand, constitute a credibility and competence problem vis-à-vis the local armed forces they are there to support (Jonsson and Eriksson 2014). Non-combat missions can be estimated to reconnect with the national sphere in other ways. Non-executive capacity-building missions, for instance, should not involve combat (other than in self-defence), but may give extensive experience of cross-cultural interaction and leadership, and put didactic skills to the test. As discussed by FOI (2016, 39, 88), international mission participation may build a diversity of capacities, with varying relevance for national defence and future international engagements, respectively. Clearly, not all in-field experiences abroad are fully applicable to national conditions. Laugen Haaland (2010), for instance, found that "experiences from overseas operations were perceived as without relevance for national defence" in the Norwegian context. Yet, in the absence of alternatives – most countries, luckily, do not initiate war so that their armed forces can practice – international missions have learning potential as proxies for 'the real thing'.

Second, working closely together in the mission area can help to build interoperability with organisations and countries of strategic importance. Interoperability matters within the international sphere, to facilitate repeated joint mission engagement. For national defence, interoperability is crucial in combination with the fourth ideal type, *give-and-take* (see 2.4), which posits that mission participation may be a way to achieve security commitments for the future from other coalition members. Exposure to how other countries – especially leading ones – operate has been judged of considerable long-term value, "also in the national context" (FOI 2016, 34). Such learning opportunities include both the "hardware" of military planning methods, command and control, and principles for operational performance and the "software" of better understanding of different professional cultures and approaches (FOI 2016, 34). Learning to "understand and respond to the intentions and actions of a multinational partner" – that is, "perceptive interoperability" – proved crucial, for example, for cooperation between the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Navy, and the United States Navy under Operation Iraqi Freedom, in 2003 (Paget 2020, 66). The challenge, though, is that the promotion of "horizontal interoperability" between mission members may require some prior harmonisation of organisational cultures and practices (Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger 2008, 551).

Third, previous studies have highlighted the effects of mission participation at the personal level (see Tillberg *et al.* 2016). This factor plays out both in terms of personal development and enhanced professional skills, and in terms of individuals returning home in possession of expanded international networks of personal contacts. Especially for a country outside of formal alliances, such informal

contacts may prove highly helpful in times of crisis (FOI 2016, 34). Furthermore, if regular units from the national armed forces are deployed together, international service may also strengthen group cohesion within the armed forces.

Apart from the three types of learning effects, the prospect of taking part in a mission far away can also make a military career more attractive to (some) potential candidates. As argued by Laugen Haaland (2010), "Foreign deployments, particularly the most demanding ones, offer prestige, access to funding for new and modern equipment, training opportunities and the fastest track to promotion for professional officers." Moreover, surveys indicate that international service and national crisis management feature more prominently than "the more abstract role of preparing national defence" in citizens' perceptions of the Swedish Armed Forces (FOI 2016, 20). "To make a difference" has become central to the branding of the military career, which might speak to the benefit of international service (see, though, discussion in FOI 2016, 20). There are also indications, however, that international service does not have a universally positive effect on career prospects. According to Ydén (2008, in Ångström 2015, 255), the normal national tasks have been favoured in the Swedish military career.

Hence, it is uncertain whether international missions actually make a military career more attractive, just as it is uncertain whether armed forces learn much of relevance to national defence from international experiences. In its ideal state, however, the second ideal type captures the perception that an active presence in both the national and international spheres brings such instrumental synergies.

Indicators of instrumental value in defence bills

- Mentions of expected organisational or individual learning from international military missions
- Mentions of international military missions and recruitment
- Expressions regarding interoperability in the context of participation in international military missions

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2.3 The same coin

According to the third ideal type, national and international military activities are 'two sides of the same coin'. The boundaries between the national and international spheres are dissolved. The basic premise here is that international military activities are a way to defuse existing or potential national security threats on foreign territory. The spirit of this approach is that security problems should be dealt with at their origins, before they become dangers to the nation. Inherent to

this view is a belief in the effectiveness of external intervention in terms of contributing to the resolution of the security problem at hand. This distinguishes same coin from foreign policy, instrumental value, and give-and-take, which do not require that missions 'work' in this sense to be fulfilled. In the trade-off category, effectiveness on the ground is but one item – among many – that may influence balancing between spheres.

Same-coin arguments are facilitated by a broad concept of security, which may include non-military threats. The trans-border character of a range of issues – terrorism, organised crime, illicit flows, and irregular migration are a few examples – can be taken to justify the involvement of armed forces in distant conflicts. As argued by Gleditsch (2007, 294), "participants and processes outside the boundaries of each individual state where conflict takes place can influence the risk of conflict". Accordingly, instability outside of one's own territory may be perceived as directly relevant to national security. Partly due to the risk of instability spreading across borders, spatial proximity has been found to be a motivating factor for participation in international peacekeeping missions (Perkins and Neumayer 2008). The same coin ideal type extends this logic to include situations in which the mission area is far away from the contributing nation.

The same coin-logic assumes that, especially under premises of global interdependence, security threats may travel way beyond their origins. Given the ideal-type's association to transnational threats other than traditional military ones, it is no surprise that same-coin arguments rose to prominence in the context of the global war on terror. The September 11 attacks in 2001 punctured the earlier dominant perception that "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead" (Jenkins 1975, 15, in Hoffman 2002, 306). The scale and level of coordination of the attacks showcased that al-Qaida could perform operations reminiscent of advanced military units. Yet, with terrorism becoming the major global security issue, "[t]he cardinal rule of warfare, 'know your enemy,' was also violated" (Hoffman 2002, 306). The United States (US) post-9/11 strategy went for the "physical sanctuaries" of terrorists, in the name of national security. The conviction that the front line for national defence was located in Afghanistan trickled down to US allies. To take one well-known example from 2004, then German defence minister Peter Struck declared that Germany was also being defended in the Hindu Kush (Afghanistan).

However, variants of this way of reasoning have also existed in other contexts. During the Cold War, numerous proxy wars were fought between the superpowers. These alluded to a same-coin logic by making countries adhering to the opposing ideology – whether capitalism or communism – legitimate targets in the name of national security goals. On a related note, Skeppström, Hull Wiklund och Jonsson (2015) have discussed the EU's military training missions (EUTM) as "counter-insurgency by proxy". In this interpretation, the EU trains local soldiers to fight terrorists that could pose a threat to European countries.

Just as the other ideal types, same coin pinpoints a way of reasoning about the national/international nexus. Here again it must be underlined that the question of whether it is possible to prevent aggression at home by taking action abroad is outside of the scope of the analysis. Security crises far away are oftentimes not threats to national security. A 2000-page Danish independent investigation did, for instance, not find indications that the situations in either Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan constituted a direct threat to Denmark (Mariager and Wivel 2019). Moreover, although it is impossible to establish counterfactually, the severe situations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Sahel – to name a few examples – indicate that it is extremely hard for external military intervention to resolve security problems at their origins. The opposite effect may materialise, namely that terrorist groups increase their activities in countries that contribute to external military missions. In addition, research has found that international intervention makes conflict contagion more likely (see Young *et al* 2014, and their references). Although geographically confined conflict spread might not affect countries in mission coalitions directly, it would multiply rather than eliminate alleged sources of security threats. Reservations such as these do not make potential same-coin arguments any less relevant to the analysis. This report seeks to detect which ideas shape defence policy at home and abroad. Whether these ideas are empirically valid or not certainly impacts on policy assessments. However, this is beyond the scope of the present study.

Beyond the specifics of the mission, participation in operations on foreign soil has often been seen to signal allegiance to a certain type of world order, which in turn and by extension benefits the home country. Such macro-level arguments are considered, in this report, to fall within the foreign policy ideal type. Same-coin arguments are distinguished by seeing mission participation *as* national defence in action. To the extent that foreign policy *is* security policy (which, as Chapter 3 will show, varies over time), the connection rather runs at the level of the international system and national security.

Indicators of same coin in defence bills

- Descriptions of crises and conflicts in mission areas as national security threats
- References to conflict spill-over
- Expectation of effectiveness of international military missions

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2.4   Give-and-take

The fourth ideal type proposes that the act of joining a mission coalition led by someone else constitutes a potential link back to the national arena. By participating in a mission coalition, a country may expect to draw security benefits at home. The logic at hand here is that if a country A supports a country B's military efforts in a country C, country B might come to country A's assistance if a country D violates country A's territorial integrity. The give-and-take perspective bridges solidarity and self-interest. Through a mission engagement, a country joins someone else's struggle in the present (solidarity), anticipating a security gain for itself in the future (self-interest).

In the literature on coalitions, foreign deployments are often argued to follow from security commitments made in formal alliances (see discussion in Henke 2017). The fourth ideal type shifts the chronology, arguing that informal security commitments can also be the *result* of joint participation in an international military mission. For countries standing outside of formal military alliances, international missions could offer an attractive alternative strategy to obtain something close to a security guarantee, albeit informally so.

This ideal type pinpoints the circumstance that, in modern times, military activities outside of the homeland territory have rarely been solo ventures. Even in the case of unilateral action, the initiator will normally seek political – if not material – support from other actors. In a notable example, since the intervention in Panama 1998, US forces have only conducted (open) foreign operations in the company of partners (Henke 2017, 410). Countries contribute soldiers and officers from their national armed forces to international military missions in different frameworks; important examples are the UN, EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and ad hoc 'coalitions of the willing'. Hence, military missions are a form of coalition that is limited in time and space to a set of tasks and goals on foreign territory. Moreover, they are normally on foreign territory upon invitation of the local government and act within the premises of a mandate. These coalitions are not formal alliances in and of themselves, since they do not specify general security commitments expected to last over time. This does not hinder that members of a formal alliance may face an obligation or expectation to join mission coalitions.

Whereas there is a vast literature on formal alliances, informal commitments of the kind presumed in this ideal type are less well understood in previous research. Scholars have pointed out, however, that coalitions form under conditions of hierarchy (Lake 2009), in the post-world war order typically with the US exercising its power capabilities to convince other countries to join. The fourth ideal type zooms in on the contributor's perspective, specifying how it may expect capability asymmetry to work to its benefit in the long-run. In doing so, it connects with explanations in the literature on why (small) countries join international military missions: Ångström (e.g., 2015) develops the reassurance mechanism

(*återförsäkringsmekanism*) of mission participation; and Oma and Petersson (2019) discuss "loyalty reputation" towards the patron as a mechanism explaining mission participation. Other examples are Jakobsen, Ringsmose and Saxi (2018), who argue that small states have become "prestige seeking", whereas Graeger (2015) and Pedersen (2018) both label small states as military-status-seekers. Along similar lines, a Norwegian government report on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) concluded that "Norway's military effort may be termed 'contribution warfare'" with no "long-term strategy other than the established national security policy principle that Norway should be a good ally" (Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan 2016). Likewise, the Danish independent war investigation found that bonds to the US and NATO had underpinned decisions to deploy troops to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (Mariager and Wivel 2019). The investigation presents considerable evidence that participation in these missions was a way for Denmark to prove that it was a trustworthy partner in possession of appropriate military capabilities for the purposes in question. Notably, Norway and Denmark are both members of NATO. Given its continuous formal non-alignment, the Swedish case is a hard test for the give-and-take ideal type.

Give-and-take would most typically emerge in situations where there is a clear coalition leader who has the capacity to assist partners in a future scenario of armed attack. Throughout the post-World War period, this actor has first and foremost been the US. It is not unthinkable, however, that traits of give-and-take could emerge also in the context of UN missions. Although, as found by Tago (2007, 195-196), "the collective legitimization at the United Nations increases the number of coalition partners", even UN missions tend to be associated with specific countries. So, for instance, was France decisive in pushing for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Although, *ceteris paribus*, UN missions tend to be affined to foreign policy goals (see next section), elements of give-and-take may appear by extension, as contributors express loyalty to the lead nation.

Just as for the other ideal types, give-and-take pinpoints a logic of arguing, without presuming that this logic would hold in political practice. Whether or not mission participation actually works as a 'security guarantee light' for contributors outside of formal alliances is a matter separate from whether this view exists and informs policymaking. Given that even formal alliances are widely thought to *rarely* work as blanket security guarantees (to read more on the 'fear of abandonment', see Snyder 1984; cf. Leeds, Long and Mitchell 2000), informal security commitments derived from joint mission participation are unlikely to solve countries' security equations once and for all. To give one example, although Georgia fought with the US in Iraq, neither the US nor NATO came to Georgia's military assistance when it was invaded by Russia in 2008 (Nilsson 2015). However, in most cases the idea of exchanging services in the domain of security is never put to the test. Instead, mission participation is one item in actors' efforts to build international relations favouring national security.

Indicators of 'give-and-take' in defence bills
• Mentions of strategic relationships in mission coalitions
• Solidarity declarations in the context of international military missions
• Linkages between defence cooperation and participation in international military missions

2.5   Foreign Policy

In contrast to the first four categories, the fifth ideal type regards national and international military activities as parts of different policy areas. In this under-standing, participation in international military missions belongs to foreign policy, whereas defence policy is concerned with military activities within the national security sphere (which includes activities in the immediate neighbourhood). The international is not expected to feed back in any concrete way to the national military arena, and vice versa. The strategies of and rationales behind international military engagements are, in this ideal type, delineated to foreign policy concerns. Here, deploying armed forces abroad is a means of communicating loyalty to inter-national norms (e.g., peacekeeping, R2P, Security Sector Reform (SSR)) and institutions (for example the UN and the EU), or allies. In this perspective, international mission participation is an example of "norm entrepreneurship as a foreign-policy strategy", as extensively researched by Björkdahl (e.g., 2013, 333).

Even as instruments of foreign policy, military missions may connect to national security in a holistic manner – as instruments considered to uphold a world order in which an armed attack on one's own territory is unlikely. However, foreign policy differs from the other ideal types in that any such influence is derivative in character. Under the foreign policy umbrella, military missions are but one item sharing space with other measures (for instance trade, development, foreign direct investments and sanctions) that, policymakers argue, together make the world a safer place (next to other goals). Institutionalised expressions of this type of thinking are comprehensive/integrated approaches, or SSR agendas. These tend to expect synergies between different favoured policy areas, including between civilian and military measures. The inclination to presume that 'all good things go together' (see Huntington 1968, Ullman 1983) is the opposite of trade-off awareness. In a thought model where civilian and military initiatives go smoothly together, development aid can be presented as security policy, and a military mission as a development project.

The organisational framework, which is central in the give-and-take ideal type, re-emerges as a factor in the foreign policy category. However, this time the assumption is no longer that the coalition leader will provide military assistance in

case of an armed attack or other security crises on the national territory. Rather, what is at stake here is a broader set of relationships, whether of economic, diplomatic or cultural character. To take one example, the emergence of the EU as a mission actor from the mid-1990s onwards was embedded in an ideological narrative about Europe as a special type of global actor (see, e.g., Manners, 2002). Partaking in UN missions has been perceived as a strategy for strengthening one's position in the international community, for instance in the context of a candidature to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Boutellis and Beary 2020, 2).

Furthermore, there is an institutional dimension to the foreign policy aspect of international military engagements. In most countries, both the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of defence are stakeholders when it comes to mission participation. In Finland, soldiers or officers deployed to international military missions are on the foreign ministry's payroll. Politically, the two principals will not always have the same priorities. The scale and type of mission participation favoured from a foreign policy perspective may be different from what follows from the other ideal types. So, for instance, dispersing resources across numerous missions could make sense if participation is given an inherent value in foreign policy terms (see Jonsson and Eriksson 2014).

Indicators of foreign policy in defence bills

- Emphasis on international norms and values when international military missions are discussed
- Remarks about actors' different positions in the international system, in the context of international military missions
- Mentions of expected synergies between military and civilian measures in the mission area

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2.6 Summary

The ideal types outline five alternative understandings of the relationship between national defence and international military missions. Each has its own mechanism for mediating the national/international nexus, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. International military missions in national defence policy.

Ideal Type	Mechanism	Direct feedback
Trade-off	Resource scarcity	No
Instrumental value	Learning	Yes
The same coin	Effectiveness	Yes
Give-and-take	Solidarity/collective defence	Yes (future)
Foreign policy	Norm promotion	No

For the first ideal type, *trade-off*, in Table 1, the mechanism at play is resource scarcity, which requires that choices are made between different policies, engagements, and activities. This ideal type does not theorise a direct feedback between the national and internationals spheres that can compensate for the resource loss in one of the domains.[5]

The next ideal type, *instrumental value,* links the national and international spheres through an expected mechanism of learning. This is an example of direct feedback between the spheres.

The assumptions of the *same coin* ideal type are premised on the potential effectiveness of international military action in handling security problems at their origins. Here, again, there is an expectation of direct feedback, since the international effort is motivated from a national concern.

The *give-and-take* ideal type relies on a mechanism of solidarity/collective defence. There is an expected direct feedback here as well, since the idea is that the 'give' in the short-run – international mission participation – will lock-in a future 'take' – assistance from the coalition partner in case of a security crisis on one's own territory.

Finally, the *foreign policy* ideal type is based on the premise that international military missions are vehicles for promoting cherished norms and, by extension, a norm-based world order. In this ideal type, any connection back to the national is implied rather than direct, and only materialises if and when missions actually work to promote norms that favour macro-level security.

Taken together, the framework constitutes an analytical grid that helps to structure complex argumentative webs. The aim is not to determine a single logic explaining

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[5] In the trade-off ideal type, there is competition between national and international military spheres. This competition is based on an either/or premise, which rules out direct feedback between the spheres.

Swedish defence policy at a given point in time. Rather, this report is interested in which combinations underpin change and continuity. The next chapter takes a first step towards illuminating this picture.

3 The evolution of a relationship

To protect the Swedish nation and its territory against an armed attack has been the main national task of the Swedish Armed Forces throughout the study period. Internationally, the Armed Forces have actively participated in military missions of different types, from classical UN observation missions to EU training missions and NATO missions including combat. Hence, Swedish defence policy has continuously had a national and an international dimension. However, as this chapter will elaborate, the relative weight and qualitative understanding of the respective spheres have fluctuated considerably.

Quick Facts	
1959–1966	• Conscripts: 45–55,000/year • 800,000 could be mobilised • Military expenditure peaked at 3.97%
1966–1980	• Conscripts: 50–52,000/year • Military expenditure (1980): 2.9%
1986	• Conscripts: 45,600 • Military expenditure: 2.6%
1990	• Conscripts: 41,300 • 500,000 could be mobilised • Military expenditure: 2.6%
2000	• Conscripts: 16,700 • Military expenditure: 1.8%
2005	• Conscripts: 10,200 • Military expenditure: 1.4%
2008	• Conscripts: 6800 • Military expenditure: 1.1%
2010	• Conscription put on hold • 4000 personnel supposed to be employed on voluntary basis after a three-month introduction course • Military expenditure: 1.2%
2014–2018	• Partial conscription, to complement voluntary employment • Military expenditure: ca. 1–1.1%
2019	• 4600 conscripts were to be enrolled • Military expenditure: 1.1%

Sources: Swedish Armed Forces (2020f), Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency (2019), Teorell et al. (2020), World Bank (2020), SIPRI (2020b).
Note: Military expenditure as per cent of GDP.

Nationally, Sweden's preparedness for a potential armed attack has varied over time, mirroring defence policy change. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the Swedish Armed Forces were capable of mobilizing 800,000 men in case of an armed attack. The Swedish Air Force was then considered one of the largest in the world and included over 1000 platforms (Swedish Armed Forces 2020f). In the late 1960s, the first budget cuts since the interwar period were made. The number of conscripts, a cornerstone of the invasion defence, remained at a similar level, however, until the 1980s (Swedish Armed Forces 2020f). National defence significantly decreased in numbers following the end of the Cold War. Around the 2000s, the traditional invasion defence was downsized and professionalised. The number of conscripts and personnel fell rapidly, and conscription was put on hold in 2010. The reactivation of conscription in 2017 has come to symbolize the prioritisation of national defence. Statistics from late 2019 indicate that approximately 22,700 individuals are

employed in the Armed Forces on a daily basis, while an additional 32,000 are reserves, work part-time, or are members of the Home Guard (Swedish Armed Forces 2020c). In comparison, roughly 1100 personnel rotated home from international tasks in 2018, and 680 rotated home in 2020 (see Figure 2 below). Despite notable fluctuation in the defence policy priorities over time, the lion's share of personnel has always worked in the national domain.

Internationally, information from the Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs (2021) indicates that the Armed Forces contributed well over 100,000 military personnel to some 100 unique missions between 1958 and 2020.[6] Figure 2 presents the number of Swedish military personnel returning back from international deployment for the entire study period.

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[6] The dataset includes the number of personnel returning home from international deployments per mission-year as registered by the Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs (2021). Special Forces, defence attachés, and Swedish personnel hired by international organisations to work in their organisation or staff are not part of the data. For example, the current Force Commander of MINUSMA, Dennis Gyllensporre, a Swede, will not be included in such data upon return to Sweden, as the Force Commander is hired by the UN. Further, due to the absence of digitalised personnel data, the Veteran Affairs database lacks information for ten missions which are relevant for the time period studied in this report. Information on when Sweden contributed to these missions and with how many personnel has been approximated based on raw data provided by the department of Veteran Affairs. The raw data include: start year of engagement, end year of engagement and total number of deployed personnel during this time period. The ten missions are: ONUCA 1989-1992, OSGAP 1990-1994, UN Office in Georgia 1992-1993, UNGOMAP 1988-1989, UNIIMOG 1988-1991, UNIPOM 1965-1966, UNISFA 2011-2011, UNOMIL 1993-1993, UNOMSIL 1998-1999, and UNTEA/UNSF 1962-1962. Seven of these engagements consisted of less than 10 personnel in total. The largest engagement, UNIIMOG, saw a total deployment of 38 personnel.

Figure 2. Number of Swedish military personnel rotating home from international deployment 1958–2020.

Source: Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs (2021).
Note: The bars indicate the total number of individuals returning to Sweden from international deployment; the lines show the number of personnel returning from UN, NATO, EU and Other (OSCE, mixed, ad-hoc coalitions etc.) engagements. Since most tours last approximately six months, the number of personnel continuously deployed is about half that indicated in the table.

The first peak in Figure 2 captures the, by Swedish measures, large deployments to UN-led missions in Congo, Cyprus, and around Suez and Gaza (1960s). The second peak illustrates the continued deployment to the UN mission in Cyprus and UN-led engagements around Sinai and Egypt (1970s). The third peak reflects Sweden's sizable engagements in the former Yugoslavia (1990s).

Until the mid-1990s, almost all Swedish international activities took place under the UN umbrella. Starting in late 1995, Sweden began to deploy more personnel to NATO-led activities. Mainly driven by contributions to missions in the former Yugoslavia and to ISAF in Afghanistan, NATO remained the dominating framework for Swedish international activities for almost 20 years. As ISAF scaled down in size and transformed to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in late 2014, the absolute number of deployed Swedish personnel decreased rapidly. Thereafter, Sweden's largest deployment has been to the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali.

Figure 3 below illustrates the number of unique Swedish engagements in military missions (left y-axis)[7] as well as the total number of personnel rotating home from international deployment (right y-axis). As the figure shows, the trends partly diverge. During the Cold War era, the number of engagements was consistently around a handful per year, while the number of deployed fluctuated and included two high peaks. During the first half of the post-Cold War era, both the number of unique engagements and involved personnel increased, but the number of engagements peaked later than the number of personnel. This is the result of an increase in relatively small engagements around the turn of the millennium. In the Multipolar era, the number of unique engagements so far remains relatively high, while the number of deployed personnel has been substantially reduced. This reflects a trend where Sweden still participates in many unique missions, but often with rather few deployed staff. Sweden has, for example, taken part in all military missions within the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Fägersten et al. 2018; Wallström 2018), to which most deployments have been small. The development of Swedish mission participation is further discussed in the analysis of the national/international nexus under each era.

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[7] The Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs registers individuals returning to Sweden from international missions. If no one returned from an active mission in a given year, that mission is not included in figure 3. Neither are missions carried out by the Swedish Special Forces, such Operation Artemis (Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003). The information in figure 3 is sufficient for understanding trends in the number of engagements, but the authors urge caution in drawing conclusions for individual years.

Figure 3. Number of Swedish engagements in international military missions and number of Swedish military personnel rotating home from international deployment 1958–2020.
Source: Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs (2021).
Note: Light grey indicates that a specific mission never saw ten or more personnel rotating back to Sweden in one year. The engagement is therefore considered small.

Guided by the ideal types presented in Chapter 2, the remainder of Chapter 3 traces ideas about the relationship between national and international spheres of military activity in Swedish defence policy between 1958 and 2020. As previously mentioned, the empirical analysis is divided into three different time periods. These sub-periods (1958–1989; 1990–2013; 2014–continuing) have been defined to correspond to the three main security policy eras since the end of the World Wars. Separating the period of study in this way enables the analysis to capture the broad strokes of change and continuity, without getting lost in excessive detail. For each time period, the analysis starts by describing the main trends in both the national and international spheres, before summarising the extent and type of Swedish participation in military missions. Thereafter, the national/ international nexus is analysed with the help of the ideal types. For each era, the discussion begins with the ideal type that is found to best capture the defence policy of the time, proceeds with the second most characteristic ideal type, and so forth.

3.1   Cold War (1958–1989)

Superpower bipolarity was the defining background factor for Swedish defence policy from the 1950s until the crumbling of the Soviet bloc from 1989 onwards. The Cold War context shaped not only the threat perception and ensuing military strategies, but also which tasks were assigned to the Swedish Armed Forces at home and abroad. The national task consisted of credibly deterring from any potential aggression and preparing for defence of the territory. The international task amounted to relatively extensive participation in traditional UN peacekeeping. As this section demonstrates, the relationship between the national and international domains was shaped by hierarchy and organisational detachment. Mission participation was, by and large, an instrument of foreign policy. There was no expected direct feedback to national defence, either in terms of an instrumental value, of exchanging security benefits (give-and-take), or of dealing with security threats at their origins (same coin). Instead, a linkage between the spheres exists that is derived from the policy of neutrality and non-alignment.

Defence bill 1958:110 (p. 91) expressed the basic logic structuring Swedish defence as follows:

> [T]o the extent that the great powers have faith in the durability of our intention to not let Swedish territory be used for any preparation of war and to our capacity to stand by this intention, a possible motivation to attack our country vanishes. And, in any case, a – for our circumstances – strong defence should mean that the price of conquering Sweden becomes so high that the one who plans an attack will hesitate.

As indicated by the quote, two notions defined the Swedish efforts to avoid war: *credible neutrality* and *deterrence*. The first notion meant that Sweden needed not only to stay out of formal military alliances, but to render credible that its neutrality would be robust in any future scenario. Deterrence, as the second defining element of national defence policy throughout the period, required signalling that Sweden would be a (too) costly conquest. Hence, from the early post-World War period onward, Sweden was to have "clearly defensive military resources of such strength that our country did not appear as a military void" (1958:110, 91). Deterrence was built not only on strictly military capabilities, but on the involvement of the entire population in a structure of total defence. Accordingly, the Swedish concept of territorial defence was based on conscription.

Were the war avoidance strategies to prove futile, it was planned that the Swedish invasion defence should enter, aiming to "hinder and if possible beat the enemy" (1958:110, 23). A preceding study quoted by the 1958 defence bill (1958:110, 22) noted that quality cannot substitute for quantity, since "the defence has to cover a large geographical area". Yet, it is acknowledged that parts of the country will not be equipped to resist an attack at any given moment. Instead, the idea is to protect crucial areas long enough "that other states' intervention to our benefit has the time to assert itself" (1958:110, 22).

Next to – and clearly subordinated to – the national task, the Armed Forces were also given the international task of participating in UN missions (Sw: *FN-aktioner*; 1968:110). The Swedish Armed Forces have a long, continuous record of participating in such missions, as the next section further describes.

3.1.1 Mission participation

Sweden deployed personnel to some 20 international missions between 1958 and 1989 (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021). About half of these contributions were small in size, with up to a dozen personnel deployed per year. However, as illustrated in figure 2 above, Sweden also carried out some significant large deployments during this era. Swedish military observers were already deployed to South Korea in 1953 as a part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC).[8] Three years later, Sweden's first armed participation in a UN mission occurred, with well over 10,000 soldiers joining in the UN mission in Israel/Gaza 1956–1967. Between 1960 and 1964, 6000 Swedish soldiers were active in Congo (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021), where 19 of them died on duty. Another large engagement took place between 1973 and 1980, when approximately 8000 Swedes were deployed to the UN's Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), in Egypt (initially along the Suez Canal and later also in the Sinai), to monitor the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021; Swedish Armed Forces 2020b). At the time of the 1981/82 defence bill, the Swedish Armed Forces had large contingents deployed to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In Lebanon, Sweden was in charge of the mission hospital, and had staff in the international military police unit as well as in the headquarters (Swedish Armed Forces 2020b). The engagement was further extended in 1986 and continued until 1994, when it ceased due to increased Swedish engagement in the former Yugoslavia (Swedish Armed Forces 2020b). In Cyprus, during this period, the Swedish Armed Forces were represented with an infantry battalion, as well as headquarter staff and police (Swedish Armed Forces 2020b). Over 25,000 Swedish military personnel were deployed to UNFICYP 1964–1993, making it Sweden's, by far, largest single engagement (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021).

During the Cold War, UN missions largely sought to maintain ceasefires and support peaceful political solutions through stabilising operations. This traditional model of peacekeeping, around the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force (except in self-defence), contrasts with the robust mandates given to UN missions in recent years. However, already during the Cold War some of the UN missions went far beyond the traditional model. In

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[8] As of late 2020, this observation mission is still ongoing. Sweden contributes about five staff per year.

particular, as discussed by Sandman (2019, 52), the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (1960–1964) "turned into something unexpected – a true crisis – where Swedish soldiers found themselves in combat for the first time in 146 years". Not only in Congo, but also in Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan and Syria, Swedish soldiers and officers passed away on duty during the Cold War period (Swedish Armed Forces 2020a). As is developed in the next section, international missions received only superficial attention in the defence bills at the time.

3.1.2   National/international nexus

Despite the considerable scale and intensity of deployments, international mission activities received few explicit mentions in the first defence bills studied in this report (1958:110, 1963:108). Missions were briefly treated as a package phenomenon expressing loyalty to a rules-based world order under UN lead. Hence, the attributes, purposes and risks of individual engagements were not discussed. Most notably, the high stakes involved in some of the missions were not acknowledged in the defence bills. Although this silence may partially stem from the logic of the defence bill as a policy document, it is in line with Sandman's (2019) finding that Swedish involvement in violence during international military missions has been rendered invisible or beyond Sweden's own control.

In terms of the relationship of interest in this report, the lack of elaboration on international activities reflects that national defence of the territory had the uncontested upper hand over international peacekeeping. When the international sphere of military activities surfaces, it does so as the extension of Sweden's 'foreign policy' at the time: non-alignment and neutrality. Participating in UN peacekeeping fit well with the doctrine of neutrality, but there was no direct linkage between the national and international spheres at the level of activities.

Foreign Policy

Throughout the era, the relationship between national defence and participation in international missions was prominently guided by an understanding of the latter in line with the *foreign policy* ideal type. Strategic culture at the time distinguished strictly between 'the national' and 'the international' (Ångström 2015, 252). The 1963 defence bill states that "the Armed Forces [Swe: *Krigsmakten*, literally "the War Powers"] must be organised so that they, in every imaginable situation, can give the greatest possible support to Swedish foreign policy" (1963:108, 12). Non-alignment and neutrality were pillars of both national defence policy and foreign policy, thus coalescing the national and international spheres.

In Foreign Minister Undén's neutrality doctrine, UN peacekeeping was the idealistic exception in a Swedish policy openly based on realism (see Undén 1962, 163). Rather than claiming that international tasks strengthen home defence, the home defence doctrine was argued as promoting peace. The surrounding world, it was also argued, benefited from Swedish non-alignment (1981/82:102). With the

arrival of 'active foreign policy' (*aktiv utrikespolitik*) in the late 1960s, mission participation took on a higher profile alongside defence budget savings due to weak state finances. In the 1968 defence bill, a new section on peacekeeping was added, specifying that the Armed Forces shall "be prepared to assign resources" for participation in UN missions, "with the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security" (1968:110, 37). By 1981, participation in and support of the UN's work was described as "a cornerstone in Swedish foreign policy" (1981/82: 102, 4).

To understand the relationship between the national and international spheres of military activity at the time, one has to keep in mind that the foreign policy concept was clearly security-oriented. Although mission activities were a separate domain from national defence, foreign policy was tied to national security through non-alignment. Thereby, mission participation constituted a bridge between 'the national' and 'the international'. Non-alignment made Sweden a credible contributor to international missions, and mission participation in turn showcased non-alignment in practice to the world. Hence, the connection enabled the specific sub-instance of UN peacekeeping or missions clearly compatible with non-alignment (e.g. NNSC), not *any* international activity whatsoever.

The defence bills of the period systematically underlined Sweden's allegiance to the UN, including its peace-supporting activities. The Government's assessment of Sweden's role in the international system was, however, unassuming: "The possibilities of small states to influence the international system are very limited . . . We must mainly restrict ourselves to taking advantage of the possibilities there are to preserve self-determination" (1972:75, 48). Participation in UN missions and disarmament were described as rare avenues for Sweden to pursue international influence, enabled by non-alignment (Head of MoD, in 1972:75).

Same Coin

The goal that fused defence policy and foreign policy was to keep Sweden out of "the War". Judging from context, this singular War meant the Cold War between the two superpowers as well as any would-be conflict derived from it. Defence bill 1958:110 reasons about the prospect that "international tensions and disputes develop into world war" (1958:110, 16). Small states need to be aware of the risk of local wars in this context, and therefore have "their own strong means of defence" (1958:110, 16). Almost two decades later, (1976/77:74, 27), the Government reasoned about how "the development in the world has led to an ever larger interdependence between states and peoples". The subsequent defence bill (1981/82:102) specified that the "security policy aims to hinder Sweden from being drawn into international conflicts, and to protect our democratic rights and freedoms in an independent state. It aims to alleviate effects of crises and war in other parts of the world on our country" (1981/82:102, 4). Hence, distant conflicts were relevant to Swedish national security. However, the implication thereof was

not to 'counter security threats at their origins', but to keep a sufficient level of national defence, combined with non-alignment and neutrality.

Trade-off

Given the clear superiority of the national domain, there was little discussion alluding to a trade-off between international commitments and national defence. Yet, the 1958 defence bill acknowledged the "correlation between defence costs and the foreign policy of non-alignment", noting that whereas half of the Swedish defence budget goes to equipment, NATO members Denmark and Norway only spent 10–20% (1958:110, 91). In other words, there was a costly premium to non-alignment. The bill clarified, "The Swedish defence problem cannot be seen as an isolated foreign and military policy issue. It is in the nature of things that also socio-economic and budgetary considerations must be taken into account" (1958:110, 55).

In the early period, the supremacy of the national was taken for granted. From 1968 onwards, the Government engaged in explicit prioritisation: "[D]efence against invasion shall be the primary task of the Armed Forces (1968:110; also 1976/77:74; 1986/87:95). The 1972 defence bill reasons about how "the resources that we can devote to ensure our safety are very limited in comparison to the surrounding world" (1972:75, 61, also 101). Whereas statements like these signal an awareness of resource constraints, and a need to balance between policy areas, they do not include any explicit weighing between national and international tasks of the Armed Forces. The international tasks rather belonged in the foreign policy vessel, operating according to foreign policy priorities.

Give-and-take

Likewise, any idea that mission participation would create direct security benefits through exchanges with other actors was missing in the Cold War defence bills. The official line throughout these decades was that Sweden would only accept support from the Western powers if first attacked by the Soviet Union. As expressed in the 1958 defence bill, in the post-World War context the Armed Forces were to "hinder an attack long enough so that we could get support from outside before considerable parts of the country were annexed or the resistance had had to be abandoned" (1958:110, 22). In 2002, it became known that the Kennedy administration had in 1962 unilaterally committed to coming to Sweden's assistance in case of a Soviet invasion (SOU 2002:108, Ch. 4). The secrecy of this agreement suggests that any open statement in line with the give-and-take logic would have been taboo at the time. Hence, the material studied in this report does not give any hint of whether participation in international missions played any role in facilitating informal security guarantees.

Moreover, early post-World War hopes that the UN would become a reliable pro-vider of collective defence – a utopian give-and-take scenario, where national defence would eventually be superfluous – were quickly dissolved. The 1958

defence bill took note of prevailing superpower tensions in the UNSC, concluding that the UN "has not, as intended in its Charter, been able to function as an international collective security system" (1958:110, 90). Likewise, the 1968 bill dismissed "an effective and generally applicable security system as still distant" (1968:110, 6). Four years later the Government stood by the same assessment: "Efforts towards international peace and security, especially within the framework of the United Nations, are judged as not leading to an effectively functioning system of collective security during the period" (1972:75, 10). Hence, it is because of the UN's failure to live up to expectations that individual countries must take own responsibility of their security (e.g. 1976/77:74, 10, 36).

Instrumental Value

That international missions would have an instrumental value for national defence was not discussed at this time. Neither does international service appear to have been a strategy for recruiting staff. This fits with the fact that Swedish defence at the time was organised as a so-called 'people's defence' [Sw: *Folkförsvar*], built around universal (male) conscription and mass mobilisation. According to Ångström, the national had precedence not only politically, but also in staff matters. The Armed Forces distinguished between those having "fallen for the homeland" versus those having "fallen for peace" (Ångström 2015, 253). Those deployed needed to apply for leave of absence from the Armed Forces and veterans received little consideration upon return (Ångström 2015, 253-254).

3.1.3   Summary

During the Cold War period, the relationship between national and international military activities was characterised by hierarchy and a corresponding detachment. Participation in international military missions was only marginally and by extension a matter for Swedish defence policy, at least as expressed in the defence bills. The ideal type that matches best with this empirical setting is foreign policy, which locates international missions in a domain guided by premises related to Sweden's international role. This role is associated with an assumption of security benefits at home, but only in a derived manner.

3.2   Post-Cold War (1990–2013)

The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the USSR, along with its satellite states, put an end to the Cold War. The assumptions that had guided international affairs, whether from a great state or small state perspective, became invalid almost overnight. The paradigm shift in the international security environment was the starting point for a gradual rethinking of Swedish defence policy, which eventually gave unprecedented standing to participation in international military missions.

The transformation trailed the perceived ideological triumph of liberalism. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama famously declared "the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama 1989). In the Swedish context, the future security perspectives were characterised as "more hopeful but also more uncertain" in the direct aftermath of the Cold War (1991/92:102, 13). It took a few years for Swedish governments to gain confidence that there were no threats of importance to Swedish territorial integrity hidden in this uncertainty. As put by Dalsjö (2015, 169), "the 1990s were in many ways a lost decade as regards reforms of Sweden's security- and defence policy". By 1999, the security environment was judged so friendly that the threat of an occupation of Sweden was dismissed from a ten-year perspective (1999/2000:30, 12). Similar assessments were made throughout the era (2004/05:5, 12; 2008/09:140, 9).

As it seemed that peace was there to stay, Swedish national defence appeared outdated: unnecessarily voluminous, stuck with old equipment and obsolete strategies. The radical deconstruction of traditional national defence in three subsequent defence bills (1999/2000:30, 2004/05:5, 2008/09:140) opened up for an equally radical recalibration of the Armed Forces' international tasks. After the hesitant 1990s, a full make-over of Swedish defence both in terms of policy and organisation followed in the 2000s. During the so-called 'strategic time-out' at the beginning of the millennium, Swedish total defence planning was put on hold, as organisational reform took precedence (Jonsson *et al* 2019, 15). Participation in international military missions became a highly prioritised task. The ability of the Armed Forces to contribute to international missions was to be increased "in terms of numbers, availability, and perseverance" (2004/05:5, 69).

Contingents were created to protect territorial integrity, contribute to international crisis prevention and management, and to be able to handle threats in a deteriorating security situation (2004/05:5, 46). By the end of the era, traditional territorial defence against invasion had been wholly replaced with a slimmed operational defence structure [Swe: *Insatsförsvar*]. The 2008/09 defence bill called for the Armed Forces to be permeated by an approach where national and international operations are both regular activities (2008/09:140, 51). The same bill introduced a reorganisation of the Armed Forces where, from now on, all contingents were intended for both national and international tasks (2008/09:140, 10). The positive outlook on the security situation motivated the abandoning of a full-scale conscription-based territorial defence. Instead, staff would now, in times of peace, be voluntarily contracted. On December 30, 2012, a year and three months before the Russian annexation of Crimea, then Swedish commander-in-chief Sverker Göranson famously stated that under the current budget premises, the Armed Forces would not be able to defend the territory for more than one week (Holmström 2012). Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt replied that there was no threat to Sweden justifying a comprehensive territorial defence, and labelled the Armed Forces a "special interest" (Sw: *särintresse*) (*Dagens Nyheter* 2013-01-29).

3.2.1 Mission participation

In the years immediately following the Cold War, the Armed Forces mainly deployed military observers (e.g., in Korea, the Middle East, and Kashmir) and contributed with field hospitals (Lebanon and Iraq/Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia). Later, the tasks and responsibilities of Swedish military personnel carried out in the missions expanded, and the Armed Forces joined other frameworks than the UN. Swedish military staff were deployed to over 80 different missions between 1990 and 2013 (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021). Whereas the majority of contributions were small in size, with only a handful or a dozen personnel deployed per year, Sweden also had large contingents deployed in several locations (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021). Over 21,700 Swedish soldiers were deployed to the former Yugoslavia during this era (Swedish Armed Forces 2013) (e.g., UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP, UNMIK, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, EUFOR Concordia, EUFOR Althea). Other large contributions include those to Afghanistan (ISAF), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNMIL) and Somalia (UNSOM II and Operation Atalanta off the Somali coast) (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021). These deployments not only posed new demands on the Armed Forces; they also fed into new ways of perceiving the relationship between national and international tasks.

The number of Swedish engagements increased rapidly following the end of the Cold War and peaked around the turn of the millennium (see figure 3 in section 3). Parallel to an increase in number of UN engagements, Sweden also increased participation in missions led by other organisations and coalitions of nations (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021). Up until the mid-1990s, the absolute majority of Swedish personnel had been deployed to UN missions. However, as EU, NATO and the OSCE became more willing and able to carry out international missions (of various kinds), Swedish participation shifted to new frameworks. In fact, during two-thirds of this era, the majority of deployed Swedish personnel were deployed to NATO-led operations (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021).[9]

3.2.2 National/international nexus

Already in the first two defence bills of this era (1991/92:102; 1995/96:12 & 1996/97:4), significant steps were taken to upgrade international tasks in the Swedish defence organisation. However, in these bills, defence of the territory remained the declared primary task of the Armed Forces. Despite far-reaching organisational changes then under way, the Armed Forces were supposed to still be able to handle the unlikely scenario of an armed attack. With the 1999/2000

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[9] Missions include IFOR, ISAF, KFOR, OUP, SFOR.

defence bill, the security threat was further downplayed, placing the international domain on equal footing with the national one.

This section displays how the international tasks gained unprecedented standing, as the boundaries between the national and the international sphere of defence policy were gradually dissolved. Three interlinked developments underpinned this process. First, the leitmotif of the post-Cold War is that international mission participation and national defence are two sides of the same coin. This idea goes well together with two other tendencies: the embedding of international military missions in a foreign policy concept emphasising civilian-military synergies, as well as an increased attention to instrumental value in both directions (national – international, international – national).

Same Coin

The paramount narrative of Swedish defence policy in the Post-Cold War era was that national and international tasks are two sides of the same coin. This rhetoric emerged gradually, and came to permeate the transformation of Swedish defence that occurred towards the end of the period.

By launching a "widened security concept", which "includes everything that can influence our national security" – that is, also "non-military threats and distresses" – defence bill 1995/96 and onwards opened for this generous interpretation of synergies between the national and international spheres (see below on foreign policy). Consequently, the first three bills of the period featured general statements on how participation in missions "strengthen[s] also Sweden's own security" (1995/96:12). A recurrent expression in the 1999/2000 bill was: "nationally as well as internationally" (1999/2000:30). With the outbreak of the war on terror, mission participation started to be presented as a direct way to counter security threats at their origins. The first defence bill following the attacks on September 11, 2001, explicitly stated that: "The national and international tasks are two sides of the same coin" (2004/05:5, 32). Adaptation to the dual tasks of international missions and maintenance of territorial integrity was justified as making the most of the Armed Forces' competence and resources for Swedish security (2004/05:5, 12). The conflict patterns after 9/11 were judged to have clarified the connection between Swedish participation in international missions and national security (2004/05:5, 12). It was therefore considered important for Sweden to "act together with other states in peace-support missions" (2004/05:5, 12). The 2004/2005 defence bill holds that early actions to dampen and prevent security threats or armed conflict contribute to security, also for countries that do not border the conflict area (2004/05:5, 14). From the Government's perspective, Sweden's contribution to international crisis management within the frameworks of UN, EU, the OSCE and NATO "greatly contributes to Sweden's security" (2004/05:5, 69). Similar assessments are made in the 2008/09 defence bill, which guided the final years of this era. The Government believes that Sweden's military contributions to international missions under the leadership of EU, UN and NATO *inter alia*

lead to increased security, prevent conflict, and contribute to defeating terrorism and organised crime (2008/09:140, 16). In sum, there are multiple expressions indicating that defence policy during this era, especially in the later half, was guided by a same-coin view on the relationship between national defence and participation in international military missions.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy concerns continued to shape descriptions of participation in international military missions during the post-Cold War period. However, the types of linkages made between military extraterritorial activities and foreign policy adapted to the new security climate. First, in the absence of an imminent territorial security threat, national security became perceived as the extension of international security broadly understood. Second, and interrelated, arguments about missions as tools of democracy and human rights promotion became more prominent, reflecting a widened, holistic notion of security where military and civilian action co-reside seamlessly.

During the Cold War, participation in international peacekeeping constituted an indirect link back to national security, through a security-oriented foreign policy concept. Foreign policy was, primarily and expressly, at the service of national security. During the post-Cold War period, by contrast, national security became almost equated with international security, especially European security. This was in line with the widened security concept touched upon in the discussion on 'same coin' above. The Government had already bluntly stated in 1995 that "[t]o consider security in a purely military perspective is, at the border of the third millennium, an obsolete approach" (1995/96:12, 8). In the domain of military missions, the stretched notion of security added non-military aims to international military missions (see Jonsson and Eriksson, 2014). To give one example, Defence Bill 2004/05 highlighted "strengthened capacity of multifunctional missions (including the domains of rule of law and Security Sector Reform) and questions of gender equality" as having particular importance (2004/05:5, 27).

In the absence of a pronounced traditional threat to security, there was a general conviction that the spread of democracy, human rights and economic growth would be a recipe for a safer world and, by extension, a safe Sweden, both in the present and in the future. Defence Bill 2008/09:140 (p. 35) reasoned that, ultimately, participation in international missions embodies the Swedish will to find "stable and durable solutions" to crisis and conflict, where "democracy, rule of law and human rights can be guaranteed". By joining missions in different frameworks, including those other than the UN, Sweden contributes to creating conditions for poverty reduction and development in crisis-affected areas (2008/09:140, 16). This is relevant for the national context, since distant conflict and war can have "serious repercussions for Sweden and Swedish society" (2008/09:140, 35). Participation in EU missions was presented as an expression of support for the EU's security and defence policy (2008/09:140, 31), which

strengthens "common security" between member states, and promotes peace and democracy in the world (2008/09:140, 15-16). By loosening the distinction between civilian and military assignments, international military activities took on a dimension of developmental projects. Moreover, mission participation was seen as a way to improve Swedish (and European) credibility and influence in international politics (2008/09:140, 15-16; 2004/05:5, 26).

In sum, the post-Cold War defence bills international military missions are presented as one item in a diversified foreign policy toolbox, which operated on the assumption that both national and international security are results of human and economic development, democracy and human rights.

Instrumental Value

A third tendency in defence bills during the Post-Cold War era is that statements about an instrumental value arising between the national and international spheres become more frequent. In the scenario described in the ideal type, national defence is assumed to be enriched by lessons learned in the setting of international missions. However, during the first half of the era, defence bills give the impression that national military capacity was primarily oriented at enabling the international task of participation in peacekeeping missions, rather than the other way around. One example is Defence Bill 1999/2000:30, which outlined how "the military means of the country" must be developed and adapted to the task of international mission participation – "a highly prioritised task for the Armed Forces" (p. 35). On a similar note, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was presented as creating "opportunities for cooperating with other states in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions"; and "contribut[ing] to strengthening our ability to take part in international missions" (1996/97:4). Strengthening the Swedish contribution to the EU's emerging crisis management operations was "the most important outcome of the previous year's international development for Swedish defence policy" (1999/2000:30, 31). Possible benefits for national security were also mentioned during the period, but the immediate emphasis at the time was on improving the Swedish offering on the international arena.

Later in the era, when some of the early strategies had been implemented, discussions of instrumental value broadened to include learning effects for national defence, as well as for future international missions (2008/09:140, 16). At this point, Sweden had a large troop contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan, making NATO the dominant framework for Swedish mission participation. Cooperation was perceived as "central to develop and strengthen the ability of the Armed Forces, not least regarding international crisis management" (2008/09:140, 15-16). Participation in international missions, as well as in exercises abroad, was understood to help the development of Swedish operational capability for both domestic and international tasks (2004/05:5, 25; 2008/09:140, 44).

The final defence bill introduced a line of thinking that would be important in the Multipolar era: participation in international missions offers operational experiences that enable Sweden to promote its security goals, individually and together with others (2008/09:140, 16). The 2008/2009 bill highlighted NATO partnership as central for developing and strengthening capacity to conduct operations and cooperate with others, nationally as well as in the neighbourhood and in more distant locations (2008/09:140, 30). Likewise, joint exercises were to help in developing and implementing concepts, doctrines and standards, which would enable interoperability between actors both in the present and in a future live scenario (2008/09:140, 30).

Give-and-take

As just discussed, to work with other states and organisations in an international mission may be a way for the own organisation to learn. However, cooperation can also be a security strategy of its own. A fourth tendency in the Post-Cold War era is a changed approach to military cooperation, in which arguments coming closer to the give-and-take ideal type slowly gain ground. The gradual stepping-up of military cooperation, not only within the EU, but also with NATO[10] and in other multi- and bilateral formats (2004/05:5, 23-24), with time brought Swedish official defence policy into unchartered territory.[11]

Yet, the first defence bill of the post-Cold War period (1991/92:102) declared that "nobody else defends Sweden, and we defend only Sweden" (1991/92:102, 34). Hence, the prospect that international missions would be an arena for gaining security commitments from coalition partners (give-and-take) at first appeared alien. Instead, non-alignment and neutrality remained cornerstones of Swedish defence policy, as it began to be reinvented after the end of the Cold War. UN peacekeeping was still the most important international task, carried out by a stand-by force recruited specifically for this purpose (see Government of Sweden 1984). With great-power paralysis gone, the Swedish Government even raised hopes that the UN would come closer to its initially envisaged role as a collective security provider engaged in more complex operations (1991/92:102). This embryo to a potential give-and-take through UN mission participation did, however, not mature beyond rhetoric.

Instead, Swedish mission participation expanded to other fora during the period. Already the 1991/92 bill opened up for Swedish participation in missions from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Economic

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[10] Swedish cooperation with NATO Cooperation began in 1994, when Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In 1997, Sweden also joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2020).

[11] Sweden has certainly cooperated in defence matters earlier, but EU membership and approximation to NATO represented a considerable change in the official approach.

Communities (EC), or the Western European Union (WEU) (see also Government of Sweden 1992, 2). By the next defence bill (1995/96:12), the notion of "common security" (*gemensam säkerhet*) became central to justify contacts with other states and organisations that would have been unthinkable in the Cold War context. This view of military cooperation continued to develop during the 2000s and early 2010s, as Sweden increased interactions with the EU, NATO, the Nordic countries and with individual states, including the US.

Eventually, multilateral cooperation became a fundamental element in Swedish security policy, while sticking to formal non-alignment (2004/05:5, 23). Threats to both international and Swedish security were to be averted in cooperation with others. Hence, cooperation (for example, in exercises and other institutionalised contacts) within the EU and with NATO was intended to both build bonds of solidarity for the future, and to strengthen operational capacity in the international sphere (2004/05:5, 15-17). The 2004/05 bill states that the EU, next to the UN, is Sweden's most important forum for security policy (2004/05:5, 15). Participation in EU missions thus entered in this context, as a way to contribute to the EU's (military) capability. This was in the national security interest, since "strengthened EU capability is also strengthened Swedish capability" (2004/05: 5, 15, also 24, 27). Special emphasis was given to the development of an EU rapid reaction force, to which Sweden wished to contribute, together with Finland (2004/05:5, 72). The first Nordic Battle Group was on alert between January and June 2008 (Swedish Ministry of Defence 2007).

The ratification of the EU's solidarity and mutual assistance clauses (art. 222 TFEU and art. 42.7 TEU) constituted the institutionalised acceptance of the view that security is built together with others (2008/09:140, 9). The Swedish Parliament famously declared that "Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected" (2008/09:140, 9). In the previous defence bill, the Government had clarified: "There is no incompatibility between military non-alignment and strong solidarity between EU countries" (2004/05:5, 23). The EU is a political alliance, but it does not include mutual defence obligations. It is up to each member to take its responsibility – in a spirit of solidarity – for the security of Europe (2008/09:140, 30, see 27-28). Sweden committed to taking this responsibility by establishing that "neutrality is not a possible option in the event of a conflict in the immediate region" (2008/09:140, 30). Hence, military non-alignment – still in place – no longer aimed at neutrality, but at collective security, building on solidarity in case of future conflict. From then on, Sweden was to have the ability to give and receive military support (2008/09:140, 1, 9, 32).

In sum, in comparison to the Cold War period, a definite opening for cooperation – including in international military missions – as a way to foster Swedish security, occurred between 1990 and 2014. However, notions of self-sufficiency inherited

from the previous period lingered on, especially in the first half of the era, producing a somewhat contradictory picture. By the end of the era, giant steps away from the Cold War's parameters had been taken. However, there were no outright mentions of mission participation as a way to secure support in case of an armed attack on Sweden. Instead, the defence bills elaborated on how cooperation, for instance through exercises, would facilitate operational coordination in mission areas.

Trade-off

Defence reform in Sweden was not only the consequence of a more friendly security environment. It started in the context of severe economic crisis and defence was not the only public sphere hit hard by austerity. Yet, even when national standing units were cut to the bare minimum, during the second half of the era, trade-offs between the national and international spheres barely emerge in the defence bills. The fact that Swedish military personnel was occupied outside of the territory was not identified as a vulnerability of great concern. Rather, the slim, highly technological and quickly adaptable new defence structure was supposed to be equally fit for national and international tasks. Cuts in defence were justified with reference to its being both morally and practically necessary for Sweden to join the international trend of reducing defence expenditure. Even if one day a threat to national security would again arise, the assumption was that it would be preceded by "significant political forewarning" (1996/97:4, 41).

The 2004/05 bill includes a, for this era, rare reflection on a potential trade-off, stating that if a contingent participates in an international mission, this can affect national preparedness (2004/05:5, 46). This can be handled, however, by accepting a lower national level of alert, or by raising the preparedness of another contingent (2004/05:5, 46). Hence, there does not seem to be a trade-off issue of concern between national and international tasks. Rather than reasoning in terms of vulnerabilities at home, the focus was on ensuring that the Armed Forces could deliver staff with the necessary profile and skills to the international missions. To be clear, the absence of explicit trade-off reasoning in the defence bills does not mean that there were no trade-offs between the types of activities. Rather, it likely reflects a trade-off aversion that is typical of political guiding documents. By contrast, at the yearly defence conference in 2007, commander-in-chief Håkan Syrén spoke of "the balance between national and international", acknowledging that "national and international priorities cannot with the same automatism as until now be expected to coincide" (Syrén 2007). At the time of Syrén's speech, the relationship between the national and international spheres of military activities was reaching its peak, with the latter at equal standing – if not above – the former. The absence of trade-off discussions in the expected direction hinges on two important premises in the defence policy of the time. First, there are no traditional security threats of enough substance to threaten national peace in the foreseeable future. Second, actions in the international arena are presented as a way to promote

Swedish security, whether generally by promoting norms that are favourable to stability (*foreign policy*), or specifically by hitting security problems at their origins (*same coin*). These premises affect estimations of the costs and benefits of engaging Armed Forces at home or abroad.

3.2.3 Summary

The end of the Cold War brought a true paradigm shift to international relations at large, and also to understandings of the relationship between national and international military tasks within Swedish defence policy. The most characteristic idea of the era was that national and international tasks are two sides of the same coin. The forsaking of traditional territorial defence was justified as an adaptation to changing threats. Foreign policy continued to play a role in defining the relationship in this period, but now in the form of a widened security concept accommodating both civilian and military action. The era furthermore contained a foretaste of the two ideal types that would prove highly important in the subsequent, Multipolar, era: instrumental value and give-and-take.

3.3 The Multipolar era (2014 – continuing)

The Multipolar era is characterised by another distinct shift in the outlook on the world and the security environment. Hopes of 'eternal peace' had already been shaken by the Georgian War in 2008 and collapsed with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. These events, together with the decline of transatlanticism, the uncertainty of US foreign policy, and the rise of a more assertive China, have made global security affairs less predictable and more prone to friction. All in all, the US's status as the only military, ideological and cultural superpower has been challenged by China, Russia, and a number of rising powers to the extent that it is possible to speak of a Multipolar era in the making.

This section shows how the changed threat assessment, arising in particular from Russia's changed behaviour, remodelled the relationship between national and international tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces. Most notably, the priority expressly and explicitly changed back from international to national military tasks (2014/15:109, 46-47, 50; 2020/21:30, 26, 86). In the national sphere, the 2014/15 bill brought back a notion of deterrence similar to that which was decisive during the Cold War. The metaphor of a deterring 'threshold' (Sw: *tröskel*) is used nineteen times in Defence Bill 2014/15:109. The Armed Forces, together with other parts of the total defence, are again expected to offer costly resistance to anyone considering an attack on Sweden (2014/15:109, 8).

Further emphasising the importance of a strengthened national defence, the 2020/21 bill specifies that the total defence should be able to cope with a three-month long period of security crisis in Europe or the immediate region, including

armed conflict on the territory (2020/21:30, 27, 85). This three-month period also recalls standards that were in place for much of the Cold War period.

Despite such familiar traits, the Multipolar era will surely not replicate the Cold War logic in a one to one manner. Both national and international tasks take place under conditions that were alien to the Cold War. Most crucially, the old bridge between the national and international spheres – non-alignment and neutrality – is no longer the main organising principle of Swedish defence policy. The mantra of "non-alignment in peace, aiming for neutrality in times of war" has been replaced with non-alignment in peace, aiming for solidarity and collective defence in times of war.[12] In an era of asymmetric threats, grey zone antagonism, hybrid warfare, and global terrorism, even a defence policy defined wholly from the perspective of the 'national interest' inescapably has an international dimension.

3.3.1   Mission participation

In the Multipolar era, the total number of military personnel engaged in international tasks has been significantly reduced compared to the previous era. Still, the Swedish Armed Forces continue to carry out international tasks and are involved in some 20 missions during this time period (2014-2020) (Swedish Armed Forces Department of Veteran Affairs 2021). In the beginning of the period, ISAF, under NATO's flag, ceased being Sweden's largest engagement. Instead, the UN-led MINUSMA became Sweden's largest international commitment. The contribution to MINUSMA is the first larger Swedish deployment to a UN-led mission since 2006, when Sweden contributed to United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UNIFIL in Lebanon. The engagement in MINUSMA came around the same time as Sweden sought to raise its UN profile, as a candidate for a temporary seat at the UNSC.

Swedish participation in EU missions has continued during this era. Sweden has deployed trainers and officers to the EU training missions in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, and participated in the EU's naval mission off the Somali coast. Moreover, Sweden intends to contribute to Operation Irini, the recently launched mission in the Mediterranean. Sweden continues to participate in NATO's RSM in Afghanistan and joined the US-led ad-hoc coalition of states in Iraq, where it trains forces combating the Islamic State (Daesh). In the spring of 2020, it was further decided that Swedish Special Forces are to be deployed to the French-led mission, Task Force Takuba, in Mali (see Hellquist and Sjökvist 2020). Their deployment was expected by early 2021(Swedish Armed Forces 2020d).

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[12] The authors owe this observation to Magnus Petersson.

3.3.2   National/international nexus

The – still unfolding – Multipolar era displays a multifaceted view on the relationship between national defence and participation in international military missions. The most characteristic expressions of the period fall within *instrumental value*, *give-and-take, same-coin* and *trade-off*. First, mentions of instrumental value emerge strongly in the context of cooperation in mission areas and during exercises. Second, and relatedly, although Sweden still stands outside of mutually binding defence obligations, 'building security together with others' has now become established language. Third, as prioritisation between tasks is truly up for negotiation, trade-off reasoning is becoming prominent, for the first time in the period of study.

Instrumental value

In this era, there is a strong sense of instrumental value guiding the relationship between the two spheres. Participation in international military missions is closely linked to military cooperation. It is perceived that military cooperation with relevant partners enables development of military capabilities, as well as the ability to contribute to international military missions (2014/15:109, 48). Participating in international military missions is understood to help maintain and develop the Armed Forces' ability in several ways (2020/21:30, 79 [with reference to the Defence Committee report]:

- Generating experiences
- Increasing cooperative skills
- Promoting recruitment
- Raising staff competence.

Among these four, the opportunities for cooperation presented by international missions are assigned particular weight for national defence (2014/15:109, 27, 38, 44-45, 54, 58; 2020/21:30, 79). One example is the perception that Sweden's prior engagements in the Balkans and in Afghanistan have been of great importance for the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to act together with others (2014/15:109, 58). Similarly, interoperability between European countries is argued to have been strengthened through joint operational experiences in these settings (2014/15:109, 44-45).

The defence bills in the Multipolar era, furthermore, specify preferred partners who could maximise the instrumental value of international missions. The US and NATO emerge as especially relevant (2014/15:109, 7–8, 27). The 2014/15 defence bill states that: "NATO is the only organisation that has developed a capacity to lead and execute demanding military operations. Sweden's cooperation with NATO is crucial to developing the Swedish Armed Forces, both for the national defence and the ability to carry out operations in and outside of the immediate region" (2014/15:109, 27). When it comes to an expected instrumental value, there is a close link between military exercises and participation in international military

missions. Both types of tasks are part of military cooperation and both can generate instrumental value (other aspects of cooperation are equipment, research and development) (2014/15:109, 27).

The increased weight of defence cooperation not only presents a link between national defence and international mission participation, it also involves rethinking the very contours of what is "national" and what is "international". This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the deepened cooperation with nearby countries, primarily the likewise militarily non-aligned Finland. The 2020/21 bill specifies that, geographically, Sweden's immediate region includes the Baltic Sea region and the inlets to the North Sea, the North Calotte, the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the northern parts of the North Atlantic (Defence Bill 2020/21:30, 33). Operations are defined geographically as "operations on our own territory", "in the immediate region" and "outside the immediate region" (2014/15:109, 11; 2020/21:30, 77-78). Tasks taking place in the "immediate region" are generally seen as part of the national sphere. Even if an exercise or a combined operation (with for example Finland) takes place outside of the Swedish territory, it has another scope and meaning than an international military mission in a distant third country.

Give-and-take

Building on the leap taken following the 2008/09 bill, and in line with the instrumental value just discussed, solidarity-based security policy is at the heart of the Multipolar era. Tasks are to be performed "together with others" in different fora for bi-and multilateral defence and security cooperation. In fact, Swedish defence policy during this era has two pillars (Sw: *två ben*, literally "two legs"): national defence and international defence cooperation (2020/21:30, 27-28). There is a strong belief that the ability to act together with others serves an important security policy purpose (2020/21:30, 27). According to Defence Bill 2020/21, collaboration with neighbours, or with countries involved in the neighbourhood, is of particular importance as such activities contribute to the stability of the immediate region (2020/21:30, 27). Further, according to the bill, Sweden should, as far as possible, develop common operational planning with Finland and coordinate operational planning with Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and NATO (2020/21:30, 28).

The defence bills from this era firmly declare that Sweden is not part of any cooperation or agreement that includes mutually binding defence obligations (2014/15:109, 21; 2020/21:30, 28). The unilateral declaration of solidarity (2014/15:109, 21; 2020/21:30, 68) and the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity, as well as the different forms of bilateral or regional defence cooperation, including the partnership with NATO (2020/21:30, 28) and especially the close cooperation with Finland, push the boundaries of military non-alignment without offering formal security guarantees. It is nowadays seen as "in Sweden's interest to be perceived as a credible, reliable and loyal [Sw: *solidarisk*] partner" (2020/21:30, 68).

The give-and-take logic, in its ideal state, predicts that a state may join someone else's struggle in the present (solidarity), anticipating a future security gain for itself (self-interest). According to this logic, joining international military missions could constitute an attractive strategy for countries standing outside of formal military alliances who seek to establish informal security guarantees. Expressions alluding to acting in solidarity now to potentially achieve security assistance in the future do appear in the defence bills. These expressions, taken together, begin to approximate the ideal type give-and-take. Here are some examples:

> Sweden should continue its active involvement and participation in international missions, civilian and military, in the frameworks of the UN, EU, NATO and OSCE. It contributes to increased security, prevents conflicts, and creates conditions for sustainable poverty reduction and development. Participation in missions is also a way to show solidarity and deepen cooperation with countries and organizations that are important for the security in our immediate region (2014/15:109, 48).

> The Defence Committee (Ds 2019: 8) concludes that participation in international missions strengthens Sweden's bi- and multilateral defence and security policy collaborations. This can, in turn, contribute to increased security in the immediate region and thereby, in the long run, to Sweden's security (2020/21:30, 79).

> Sweden currently participates in missions in the framework of the EU, the UN and NATO, as well as in other formats and coalitions. Sweden's involvement in international military missions should be seen as an integral part of foreign, security and defence policy [….] Cooperation with actors and partners who can actively contribute to security in Sweden's immediate region is a key factor to consider (2020/21:30, 79).

Whereas cooperation in the previous era was largely instrumental to improving international missions, there are now expressions of how participation in international missions can strengthen Sweden's bi- and multilateral defence cooperation, which in turn can contribute to Swedish security. There is no mutually binding obligation or informal guarantee alluded to, and no indication of whether Sweden actually expects something in return for its solidarity. However, the defence bills are not a likely forum for any articulation of such expectations, were they to exist. Nonetheless, they communicate a strategy of showing solidarity and deepening cooperation with actors who are important for the security of the immediate region, including through mission participation.

Trade-off

At the beginning of this epoch, and as a result of the dismantling of traditional territorial defence during the post-Cold War period, the Armed Forces are small in terms of material, personnel and financial resources. Therefore, the Armed Forces are tasked to expand, to be able to meet the goal of strengthened defence capability. Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist has presented the upcoming investment in the Armed Forces (2014-2025) as the largest relative increase in defence spending

since the 1950s (Hultqvist 2020). However, in terms of share of GDP, the envisaged military spending will still be low in comparison to the Cold War period (Alozious 2020). Despite the turning of the monetary tide in Swedish defence policy, resource constraints are by no means an issue of the past. To give one example, the Army, which is today struggling to keep two brigades operative, is set to expand to four brigades. In comparison, the number was approximately 30 at the peak of the Cold War (see, e.g. The National Swedish Museums of Military History 2012 [2019]).

Next to quantitative expansion, the initiated transformation entails a profound qualitative rethinking of the role and tasks of the Armed Forces. In this context, it becomes more common to argue in terms of trade-offs between the national and international military tasks.

We know from descriptive statistics that the number of deployed Swedish personnel is lower than in previous periods (see figures 2 and 3). This is with all certainty a result of the shift in priority, where national defence has regained primacy. The intended expansion of the Armed Forces is justified on national defence grounds. Accordingly, recognition of trade-offs between carrying out national tasks and participating in international missions is more common in the two recent defence bills than in previous ones. As one example, whereas the overall defence budget expanded between 2016 and 2020, 1,3 billion SEK were transferred from the budget post for international missions to national defence (2014/15:109, 9). Expressions of trade-off occur in the 2014/2015 bill, and become more prominent in the subsequent bill (2020/21:30). One such expression is the statement that participation in international military missions should be based on the resources and capabilities needed to defend Sweden against an armed attack (2020/21:30, 79). This perception is in stark contrast to many of the expressions of the Post-Cold War era, when the Armed Forces were to adapt their organisation and capabilities to international missions. Another example is the emphasis on assessing in what constellations the most could be made of more limited Swedish contributions (2020/21:30, 79). It is also stated that, in general, Swedish participation in international missions in the coming years must be carefully considered (2020/21:30, 79):

> In each individual case, careful assessments should be made of costs, including personnel costs, restoration and replacement of materiel, as well as the overall consequences for the Armed Forces' national ability and opportunities to implement planned growth.

These perceptions and expressions reflect a level of *trade-off* awareness that has not been seen in previous defence bills.

Same Coin

Traces of the same-coin logic, which were highly present in the previous era, exist also in the Multipolar era, especially as concerns missions with a counter-terrorist profile. The 2020/21 bill presents a quite detailed narrative of how international

engagement can increase security at home. It describes how Islamist-motivated terrorism is likely to continue to pose a threat to Sweden, and that Sweden, since 2014, is a member of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State (Daesh) (2020/21:30, 66). As contributors to Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), in Iraq, and to the EU's mission in Iraq, Sweden is participating in the effort to defeat the Islamic State (Daesh) (2020/21:30, 66). Similarly, Sweden's planned contribution to the French-led Task Force Takuba is about defeating terrorist groups in southeast Mali (2020/21:30, 66). In the same bill, the Government judges that Sweden's national security is being increased through the activities carried out in the mission area (2020/21:30, 78). This perception and reasoning is closely in line with the same-coin ideal type and the idea that security problems can be dealt with more efficiently at their origins, before they become dangers to the nation.

Foreign Policy

As the previous sections have shown, the striking tendency in the Multipolar era is how ideas relating to instrumental value, give-and-take, and trade-off deepen and broaden. However, next to these novelties, the basic conception that military intervention by the international community is required in situations of systematic violations of fundamental values or collapse of societal functions due to armed conflict is still around (see 2014/15: 109, 58). The recent defence bills continue to express Sweden's loyalty to, and interest in, a strong UN (2014/15:109, 33-34; 2020/21:30, 57). Moreover, participation in missions is still seen as contributing to a peaceful world order based on the UN Charter (2014/15:109, 20; 2020/21:30, 78, 82). Given that UN-allegiance is a longstanding pillar of Swedish foreign policy, it would have been highly surprising to not see any such statements. However, the 2014/15 bill also features discussion of how asymmetric conflicts require more "robust [UN] mandates and positioning instead of impartiality in relation to the fighting parties" (2014/15:109, 34). UN reforms are judged "insufficient" to meet the evermore complex mission contexts (2014/15:109, 34-35). In the 2020/21 bill, the UN is only devoted one paragraph.

All in all, in relative terms arguments elaborating on missions' connection to foreign policy are clearly less important in this period than in the previous ones. Although goals such as poverty reduction and development are still considered as feasible outcomes of international missions, these are nowadays complemented with mentions of mission participation as acts of solidarity and cooperation of benefit to security in the immediate region (see 2014/15:109, 48; 2020/21:30, 78). The EU's military missions are considered arenas for strengthening a common European security policy, whose relevance is justified with reference to "Russian aggression against Ukraine" (2014/15:109, 35). Tasks conducted in the international sphere are expected to not only serve the standard macro-aims, but also to feed back in different ways to the national military arena. Consequently, the 2020/21 defence bill spells out that, next to the ultimate goal of preserving international peace and security, "Swedish participation in peace-supporting

missions are by extension also about promoting national security and Swedish interests" (2020/21:30, 82).

3.3.3 Summary

With only two defence bills produced so far during the emerging Multipolar era, the results indicate preliminary tendencies whose long-term significance remains to be confirmed. Most strikingly, military cooperation has become an explicit pillar of Swedish defence policy. Cooperation feeds into the two ideal types that most strongly shape understandings of the period's national/international nexus: instrumental value and give-and-take. First and foremost, international cooperation – including in mission areas – is ascribed an instrumental value to national defence. Second, there are indications of expected security benefits arising from strategically selecting frameworks and partners for international mission participation. Furthermore, despite increasing defence spending, threats to national security are considered to be of a calibre that necessitates careful balancing between national and international tasks, to the favour of the former. In sum, the Multipolar era displays a more complex view on the relationship between national defence and participation in international missions. Taken together, these tendencies suggests that future Swedish mission participation will be determined to a larger extent than previously by considerations within the national domain.

3.4 Summary of findings

The Cold War era is characterised by an absence of direct feedback from participation in international missions to national defence, whether in terms of an instrumental value, of exchanging security benefits (give-and-take), or of dealing with security threats at their origins (same coin). Overall, little attention is paid to the international sphere of military activities. The connection that exists between the spheres reflects macro-level ideas of a national defence policy structured around non-alignment, which makes Sweden a credible contributor to UN missions.

In the Post-Cold War era, the boundaries between national and international tasks were gradually dissolved, as Swedish defence policy adopted a view on international mission participation and national defence as two sides of the same coin (see Noreen, Sjöstedt and Ångström 2017, 154). This understanding was complemented with a conception of international military activities as serving broad foreign policy goals, which were linked to national security interests only by extension. Moreover, in the beginning of the period, there was a strong focus on how the national sphere should adapt to strengthen Sweden's contributions to international missions. Later, international experiences were considered as having an instrumental value for national defence, but also for future missions in the international sphere. In view of the large reduction of the Swedish Armed Forces

during the Post-Cold War era, there is surprisingly little recognition of trade-offs during this era. When the balancing of needs is occasionally discussed, it is the national domain that is seen as having to adjust in order to enable international activities. The transformation of the Armed Forces unfolded for most of the Post-Cold War period, from invasion defence at home, with elements of UN peacekeeping abroad, to an allegedly 'slimmer and smarter' defence, ready to be deployed both at home and abroad. By the time defence transformation was completed, in 2014, the security environment had again grown increasingly hostile.

The patterns of reasoning found in the Multipolar era build on the developments during the Post-Cold War era. The feedback link between international participation and national defence becomes considerably strengthened. Defence discourse aligns closely with the instrumental value ideal type, with cooperation as key to producing national learning. Expressions in line with give-and-take have begun appearing. Participation in international missions is understood as strengthening Sweden's bi-and multilateral defence cooperation, which in turn can contribute to Swedish security. Same coin is also present, especially in references to individual missions with a counterterrorism profile. Yet, given the relative increase in other logics, same coin appears to be less important than in the Post-Cold War setting. Finally, the Multipolar era includes open reflection over trade-offs, which was absent in previous defence bills. Table 2 offers an overview of the ideal types identified in the different eras.

Table 2. Summary of findings.

Tendency	COLD WAR	POST-COLD WAR	MULTIPOLAR ERA
Primary	**Foreign Policy**	**Same Coin**	**Instrumental Value**
Secondary		Foreign Policy	Give-and-take
Tertiary		*Instrumental Value*	*Trade-off*
Quaternary		*(Give-and-take)*	*(Same coin)*

As the table indicates, ideas of how the national and international spheres of military activities relate to one another have broadened and changed emphasis over time. It has been possible to identify a clearly dominating tendency in the defence bills of each era. These core tendencies are complemented by other lines of reasoning for the Post-Cold War and Multipolar eras. The combinations reflect chronological developments within each era. To take one example, instrumental value – closely tied to intensified defence cooperation – becomes more prominent towards the end of the Post-Cold War period, to then become the overarching theme of the early Multipolar era.

The above schematic presentation harbours nuances that merit further exploration. Not least, it would be worthwhile to consider in more detail how combinations of ideas emerge and come to affect policy. Moreover, it should be recalled that the

table summarises tendencies identified in the specific universe of fourteen Swedish defence bills produced between 1958 and 2020. Complementing this analysis with other sources, for instance parliamentary debates, media analysis or interviews, might unveil pertinent logics of argument for the Swedish case that the present research design did not capture. Another prioritised avenue for future research would be to extend the analysis to other settings, comparing how different countries conceive of the relationship between national and international military tasks. This would help to clarify contextual factors shaping defence policy choices more generally, thus contributing to conceptual refinement and theorising of the phenomenon at hand. Finally, putting the ideal types' core premises to empirical scrutiny – is there, for instance, a learning mechanism between national and international tasks? – would offer a useful reality-check of both the theory and practice of defence policy.

4   Conclusions

After the devastating World Wars, Cold War bipolarity shaped half a century of international politics. The fall of Communism resolved persistent deadlocks in international politics, leading to a briefer era of liberal internationalism, with increasing elements of asymmetric warfare. Although the debate on the state of the rules-based world order is still ongoing, there is no doubt that the world is already in an era very different from that of the Post-Cold War. The present era combines territorial threats, superpower antagonism and grey zone intimidation, with the crumbling of old alliances and embryos to new ones. Some already label the time we live in as a new or second Cold War (e.g., Haass 2018; Kaplan 2019). As a result of profound changes in the security environment, convictions from the preceding decades about the relationship between national defence and inter-national military tasks are being put to the test. How the geographic scope of military activities will play out in the near future is thus a truly open question. Normative and resource conflicts certainly exist between national and interna-tional military commitments, but they are not law-bound. On the contrary, this report highlights that the relationship between the national and international spheres is multifaceted, with several ideational patterns of argument both politi-cally and practically possible. Accordingly, the most central question ahead for policymakers is not *whether* to continue deploying military staff abroad, but *how to* tailor mission participation to fit national capacity and needs.

Hence, as Sweden commits to reinvesting in national defence, the question of how to balance between national and international engagements is high on the agenda. Although the government has clearly stated that "Sweden should keep an active engagement and participation in international military missions, in the framework of international organisations and, as applicable, other coalitions" (2020/21:30, 78), the overall impression in the defence sector is that the international pillar as we know it is in decline. In comparison with the peak of activities during the Post-Cold War era, this would appear to be true. However, it must be taken into consideration that the reduction of international activities starts from a high level, just as the build-up of national defence starts from a very low level. In other words, whereas the transformation is far-reaching, it is the starting points that are extreme, rather, and not the aimed destination. The envisaged outcome of the current policy shift would be a more 'normal' distribution of priorities between the national and international spheres, rather than a dismantling of the latter, compared to the Post-Cold War years.

This implies that the question of which international activities are meaningful to national defence is likely to rise in prominence in the coming years. Not only the most recent defence bill (2020/21:30), but also recent government bills on the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali pay more attention than before to defining the goals of the missions.

A novelty in the present era is the open consideration of a give-and-take mechanism in Swedish defence policy. Defence cooperation has, step by step, replaced neutrality and strict non-alignment in Sweden's overarching national security strategy. It is worthwhile to keep an eye on whether and how the European defence cooperation initiatives will evolve beyond activities in the shared geographical area to include deepened cooperation in the domain of international military missions. The amplified scale and intensity presented by multilateral exercises and common operational planning might just as well come to partially replace the instrumental value of mission activities for national forces. Moreover, as noted by Aronsson and Ottosson (2020, 10), not only mission participation but also exercises strengthen bonds between friends and allies and may deter antagonists. Exercises with the level of commitment and degree of refinement recently proven have the advantage of tailoring the experience to more relevant physical conditions and strategic circumstances. Even so, international missions will keep the potential learning advantage of an authentic environment with all its uncertainties.

The importance of international service as a strategy for recruitment may increase during the coming years. This indicator was mentioned in the Multipolar era but otherwise did not strongly appear in the material studied. With a 40 per cent budget increase and six new regiments, it will be a challenge for the Armed Forces to recruit and train sufficient staff at sufficient speed. Most of the current cadre have only worked under conditions of budgetary austerity, which means that familiarity with how to run a bigger machinery – while keeping the insights and lessons learned from the operational defence – may take some time to build. If the prospect of international service is to boost the supply of qualified staff to the Armed Forces, conditions for deployment need to be attractive. An expansive defence will need to broaden its recruitment base to attract currently underrepresented groups, such as women or persons with a migration background. Strategies for this are already in place but should be continuously reviewed and updated. Moreover, there needs to be a strategy for how to accommodate returning staff, in terms of both their personal and professional experiences. A return to the hierarchy between national and international tasks – to the benefit of the former – that scholars describe for the Cold War (e.g., Ångström 2015) could be detrimental to recruitment.

Next to the concern for strengthening the instrumental value of mission participation, international missions can be expected to have a foreign policy dimension even in the future. It is central for a small state like Sweden to support the 'rules-based world order' that the UN embodies. The foreign policy connotations of a mission such as Task Force Takuba, a coalition of special forces led by France, are however very different from traditional UN peacekeeping or even the EU's training missions. And, even in the UN context, Sweden nowadays partakes in a Mobile Task Force within MINUSMA, which is tasked to rapidly and robustly prevent and halt outbreaks of violence.

That explicit trade-off considerations are rather uncommon in the defence bills likely reflects a general trade-off aversion in these types of documents. Moreover, the era encompassing the most budgetary austerity – Post-Cold War – combined cuts with the rhetorical and organisational dissolution of the national and international spheres; thereby avoiding acknowledgement of trade-offs. In the future, trade-off discussions may arise more often, but will likely be to the benefit of the national sphere. High uncertainty not only characterises security, but also the economy. Increased defence spending has already been put into question, as a consequence of the pandemic (see, e.g., *Dagens Nyheter* 2020-05-14).

Finally, a striking – if not surprising – outcome of this analysis is that structural change of national defence takes time. Whereas paradigms may shift with astonishing speed, political awakening is often gradual and organisational adaptation slow. The horizon of the current investments is set to 2030, to be confirmed in the next defence bill, expected in 2025. There is no indication that the pervasive tensions and uncertainty will evaporate in the foreseeable future. However, international security has proven its unpredictability throughout history. By the time Sweden had completed the transformation from invasion defence to operational defence, in 2014, the friendly security environment that the U-turn had been premised on was no longer there. Likewise, it cannot be excluded that some of the current threats will have become less pressing once (and if) the current plan is fully implemented.

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