From tripwire forces aimed at ensuring reinforcement to brigade-sized ground forces focused on deterrence by denial: NATO has raised its ambitions for forward presence along the Alliance’s eastern flank since 2022. Researchers at FOI have examined how this shift is being implemented in practice.

The report A New Generation of Forward Defence: NATO in the Baltic States was commissioned by Sweden’s Ministry of Defence and authored by FOI Deputy Research Director Eva Hagström Frisell and Analyst Jakob Gustafsson.

“Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO decided at the 2022 Madrid Summit to expand its presence along the eastern flank. This marked a new approach to organising the international forces stationed in countries such as the Baltic states,” says Eva Hagström Frisell.

Since 2017, troops from various NATO countries have been present in Poland and the Baltic states. Their primary role was to signal NATO’s determination to defend these countries, and they were intended to function as a tripwire, triggering additional reinforcements in the event of an attack.

“In 2022, NATO’s Forward Land Forces was extended to include Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and is now also being established in Finland. The force has been scaled up from battalion to brigade level, with greater emphasis on deterrence by denial,” says Jakob Gustafsson.

In each country along NATO’s eastern flank, a so-called framework nation is responsible for building up the forward presence. Together with the host nation, it is to determine the structure and composition of the force. Sweden is set to become the framework nation for the force in Finland, and preparations for this are currently under way.

Significant Variation Between Countries

NATO’s concept for the Forward Land Forces is highly flexible, giving framework and host nations considerable influence over how the Alliance’s new generation of forward defence is structured. Most of the forces will continue to be rotational or remain on standby in their home countries.

“NATO member states differ in their assessments of the Russian threat and in how they believe it should be best addressed. That’s why the model is so flexible. Military credibility and alliance solidarity have undoubtedly become more decisive factors since 2022. However, the fact that several countries face resource constraints, wish to retain national control over their units, and hold differing views on what may lead to escalation vis-à-vis Russia remains a significant constraint,” says Eva Hagström Frisell.

One of the report’s conclusions is that defence reforms and increased defence spending are necessary to counter a deteriorating balance of forces in relation to Russia—a Russia that has currently tied down its resources in Ukraine, but which may rearm along NATO’s eastern flank in the future.

“It is important to remember that the forward presence is only one component of NATO’s overall deterrence and defence strategy. This presence is supported by a reinforcement capability that must be provided by the Allies, in addition to their air and naval forces,” says Jakob Gustafsson.