Espionage is ever present in society and often unfolds in our immediate surroundings. It involves not only classified information, such as military capabilities and defence planning, but also other forms of sensitive information, for example details about organisations, personnel, technical systems, and suppliers. A new research report from the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, shows that intelligence activity is occurring here and now, and that espionage has becomeis an integral part of Europe’s security landscape.

The report was commissioned by the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST). FOI’s researchers analysed open cases of individuals convicted of espionage in Europe between 2008 and 2024. They relied on open sources on convicted persons and conducted interviews with prosecutors, journalists, and researchers in several countries. In total, 70 cases were identified across 20 countries.

“We examined which states tasked the spies, how they were recruited, their methods, motives, and the information they targeted. We identified ten different types of spies and analysed their motivations. It should be remembered that these seventy cases probably represent only the tip of the iceberg; we have reason to believe that many cases go undetected or are handled in ways other than through a public trial,” said Elina Elveborg Lindskog, researcher and project leader for the study.

The report concludes that most of the spies carried out assignments in the Baltic states, particularly in Estonia, on behalf of Russia. In two-thirds of the cases in the study, Russia was the commissioning state. The second-most frequent instigator was China, with six assignments. The spies were almost exclusively men. Among the few women convicted of espionage, most were married to or in relationships with men who had also spied. There was greater variation in the spies’ ages: the youngest was 21 and the oldest 82 at the time of conviction.

“The most common form of espionage in our material is using photography to collect information. It can involve anything from parliamentary buildings to transporting defence materiel, as well as information about military activity, politics, critical infrastructure, and new technology. The information is then passed on in various ways, with traditional handovers still used alongside modern digital channels of communication,” said analyst and co-author Anna Lioufas.

The researchers’ report builds on FOI’s 2022 study Espionage by Europeans 2010–2021, which defined five spy typologies. The new report extends this framework, identifying five further types. The ten typologies are presented in the fact box below.

Spies rarely volunteer—Most are recruited

Those who end up spying often do so after being approached by a handler, who in many cases offers payment. About one in five had family in the country they spied for or other personal ties to that nation. In some cases, recruitment takes place through social media.

Although several of the report’s findings can be linked to today’s shifting security environment, they show that the motivations behind those convicted of espionage remain largely the same as during the Cold War. Financial gain, ideological conviction, pressure, and personal motives continue to be the dominant factors.

“Some are threatened and take on assignments out of fear. However, we found no cases where anyone struggling with alcohol, drug, or gambling addiction had been coerced into espionage. There are also strikingly many convicted individuals who began spying after feeling wronged or overlooked by their employer, a form of revenge or self-assertion,” said researcher and co-author Anna Wagman Kåring.

Greater variety in espionage calls for vigilance

According to the researchers, several new trends have emerged in recent years.

“Complexity is growing. While handlers once relied primarily on long-term insider relationships, for example within military organisations, recruitment today also includes one-time agents. Bluntly put, these are people who the handler won’t care about if they get caught,” said Elina Elveborg Lindskog.

The report challenges previous assumptions that spies typically operate alone.

“The traditional image of a spy is of a man who keeps his activities completely secret and works hard to ensure they stay that way. But, in our material, one-third of those we examined had worked with someone else, for example a partner, relative, or colleague,” said Anna Lioufas.

This growing complexity requires Europe’s intelligence services to adapt to a new reality.

“Several issues merit closer study: for example, how Russia cooperates with ‘ordinary’ criminals in Poland whom it asks to spy on equipment the West supplies to Ukraine; how network-based spy groups operate; and whether the methods used by intelligence services overlook women engaged in, or supporting, espionage,” said Anna Wagman Kåring.