Despite a decade of threat reduction and conversion efforts, Russia still has a considerable biological weapons (BW) legacy left. As a substantial increase in EU funding is anticipated under the EU Joint Action on Non-proliferation and Disarmament (to be renewed in 2003), this report has studied the BW threat reduction/non-proliferation programmes and their progress as a basis for policy recommendations. First, the context in which these activities take place, Russia´s current security policy and conversion of military-industrial capabilities in the 1990s are reviewed. Then, ongoing BW threat reduction and cooperation programmes in Russia are described. A major concern is that these have not reached the Ministry of Defence microbiological facilities. The civilian BW facilities have been opened to foreign aid step-by-step, but tranparency remains incomplete. Support has mainly been given to redirect scientists to peaceful purposes, with less attention focused on the former large-scale BW production facilities. In contrast, the positive progress regarding destruction of Russian chemical weapons is outlined. The third part briefly describes the Soviet BW programme and its key organization Biopreparat. Some prominent persons of the former BW programme and their current biodefence positions are presented. A general discussion with recommendations concludes the report. Threat reduction and countering BW proliferation from the former Soviet Union should be placed high on the EU security policy agenda. Russia must acknowledge that the biological area is of concern, and increased support, whatever its form, must be linked to demands on increased transparency regarding the former BW sphere.