The Swedish Liaison Teams have generally adhered to the concepts devised within NATO and EUFOR respectively. There is, room for improvement. The Liaison Teams come from various contributing nations, and their work varies, which means that the type of collected information and the quality vary.This makes the material difficult to process. In certain cases, national interests have taken priority over the mission. This is also the case for Sweden, and the Swedish Ministry of defence should therefore make it clear to the Swedish Armed Forces what interests will determine a Swedish operation. Sweden should also consider introducing a longer and overlapping rotation since this would enhance the quality and continuity of the work of the Liaison Teams. There is also a need for lenghtening the training of berbal and written communication. With regard to NATO , there seems to be a need to review the use of Liaison Teams since there is no unified organisation, aim or method for this kind of work. another shortcoming is that the Liaison Teams do not have their own analysis function, even though they probably are the ones most suitable to determine the degree of veracity of the collected material. In the Liaison Teams a clear distinction is made between their own work, intelligence and CIMIC. This is , however, not entirely, self-evident as the work of the Liaison Teams can be seen as a combination of the other two. Therefore, an increased knowledge of what the concepts mean is needed. Long-term involvement in KFOR may in the future mean that participation in Liaison Teams will be necessary, and that is why Sweden should consider participating once again. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, it is civilians who are needed rather than military personnel.