How suitable are maneuver thinking and mission tactics, two cornerstones of Swedish military command philosophy, for contemporary peace operations? This report aims to provide some answers for that question. This report identifies five circumstances that are typical of contemporary peace operations: the character of the conflicts, multinationality; organizational framework; non-military participation and statebuilding; and increasing use of force under legal restrictions. These general circumstances are discussed with particular reference to three recent operations with Swedish participation, namely Kosovo, Liberia and Afghanistan. The analysis is partly based on a series of interviews with former commanders of Swedish contingents in these operations. Each of the five circumstances affects the possibilities for employing manuever thinking and mission tactics. The changed character of the conflicts where peace operations are deployed - increasingly intra-state conflict with little resemblance of traditional European wars - gives reason to question some of the fundamental assumptions behind maneuver thinking. For instance, it might be that the opponent does not possess sufficient unity or cohesion for a center of gravity to be identified. Multinationality means increased friction through cultural and language barriers. Moreover, in multinational operations, Swedish units will have to adapt to the command philosophy of the dominant troop contributors. These two factors may limit the potential for using mission tactics. The organizational framework, referring to the international or regional security organization that is sponsoring a particular operation, is important since that organization´s structure for political decision-making will influence how command is exercised, at least at the operational level. This means that it might be difficult to exercise mission command in UN and EU operations, since those organizations are eager to maintain political control over operations. Contemporary peace operations are characterized by increasing non-military participation and involvement in statebuilding. One consequence of that change is that military units, even at tactical levels, might have to be able to receive tasking from civilians and transform such tasking into realizable military orders. Also, liaison is likely to become more important as a mechanism for coordination, and military units must be able to cooperate well with organizations outside the military hierarchy. _Finally, increased use of force, with legal restrictions such as Rules of Engagement, constitutes an impediment for far-reaching delegation of authority, since the legal responsibility of the individual exercising force is unclear in Swedish legislation. This analysis yields the conclusion that maneuver thinking is not the optimal command philosophy for peace operations, since some fundamental assumptions can be questioned. However, some of the concepts associated with maneuver thinking are seen as highly useful by the former contingent commanders. There are reasons to believe that some of the prescriptions of maneuver thinking, such as trying to seize the initiative, remain valid in peace operations. It should be noted that the role of maneuver thinking in the defence of Swedish territory is not addressed in the report. All in all, tjhe findings of this report do not justify abandoning maneuver thinking in peace operqations. Still, it is worth underlining some if its limitations in future doctrine. With regards to mission tactics, the overall conclusion is slightly different. While several factors restricting the use of mission tactics in Swedish units participating in peace operations can be identified, no justification can be found against employing mission tactics when appropriate and possible. The research has been conducted within the FOI project Cammand and Control in Multifunctional Operations, which is funded by the R&D program of the Swedish Armed Forces.