EU’s future energy security in a changing world
Publish date: 2013-02-07
Report number: FOI-R--3627--SE
Pages: 138
Written in: Swedish
Keywords:
- Energy
- security
- EU
- security policy
- geopolitics
- scenarios
- Swedish
- Armed Forces
Abstract
What security and geopolitical challenges might a changing Europe face, in an ever-changing world and given uncertain energy developments, in the next 15-20 years, and what might the implications be for the Swedish Armed Forces? This issue is addressed using a set of composite explorative scenarios, i.e., alternative possible images of the future, with multiple changing variables. The analysis is built upon the following scenarios: 1. A weakened EU, within a poorly functioning energy market, characterised by a balance of power between the U.S. and China 2. A protectionist, security-oriented and electrified EU, with concerns about terrorism and Russia 3. EU as a federal "night watchman" state with new demographics, in an environment marked by the USA's energy revolution 4. A divided neo-Westphalian Europe, with various energy conditions 5. A polycentric EU in a multipolar, market-oriented and globalized energy-sector 6. A stronger EU influenced by climate awareness, in a world characterised by a stronger China Each of the scenarios involves different security and energy challenges for the EU and Sweden, where the possibility to act and impose efficient policies is limited not only by an actor's present situation, geopolitical developments and other external factors, but also by how the intentions and actions of others are perceived and interpreted in the international system. The policy-space (i.e., the possibility to act and manoeuvre) of an actor can be concretized as 'policy tools,' in terms of prevention (e.g., multilateral cooperation, diversification, or energy efficiency); deterrence (e.g., security policies, or sanctions); containment (e.g., domestic energy production); and crisis management (e.g., rationing, strategic reserves, pricing mechanisms). A comprehensive approach that involves several policy tools is to engage in a broader European solidarity, which also includes energy solidarity. Several of the scenarios point to the need for conventional military capability. Energy transportation near Sweden's borders may, in the future, be guaranteed via foreign military presence, which in turn would require that the Armed Forces maintain Sweden's territorial integrity. There is also an international dimension to ensuring a secure flow of energy, which relates to collective security of supply through the enforcement of a global system of interdependence. In order for the Armed Forces to contribute to the upholding of this international energy system, an important aspect would be to ensure durable operative marine and air force capabilities. Another possible role for the Armed Forces is the protection of physical critical infrastructure, an issue where the responsibilities and boundaries between the military and police must be considered. There is also a need to clarify the supporting role that the Armed Forces would have in an energy-related crisis. What is expected of the Armed Forces in supporting civil society and what capabilities would this require?