Krigsavhållande tröskelförmåga – Det svenska försvarets glömda huvuduppgift?


  • Krister Andrén

Publish date: 2014-02-20

Report number: FOI-R--3852--SE

Pages: 73

Written in: Swedish


  • security policy
  • defence policy
  • defence doctrine
  • defence economy
  • defence planning
  • defence bill
  • deterrence
  • defence threshold
  • defence capability
  • the Cold War
  • the Nordic area
  • Norway
  • Finland
  • Europe
  • USA
  • Russia
  • NATO
  • EU
  • CSDP
  • military technology
  • precision weapons
  • cruise missiles
  • vulnerability.


This study focuses on how to further develop the national dimension of the Swedish defence posture. Starting from an analysis of the changes in Swedish defence policy since the Cold War, parallels are found between perceptions of long-term threats today and during the early 1990s. The study underlines the importance of early measures to be able to meet possible challenges in the 2020s. The study points at the decisive changes that have transformed Swedish defence structures since the 1990s. Four factors are emphasized as drivers of this transformation: resource constraints, military-strategic developments in Europe, military-technological developments and the vulnerabilities of modern society. A basic assumption is that the primary task of the Swedish Armed Forces is to deter any potential aggressor who might consider using military force against Sweden. A conclusion is that defensive measures alone will be an insufficient deterrent in the future. Instead, the study makes the case for developing a future deterrent that includes a flexible and sustainable potential to impose strategically significant losses and costs on a broad spectrum of targets. The study highlights that military-technological developments provide increasing possibilities for small states in this respect. It concludes with a conceptual outline of a possible road ahead to strengthen the deterrent capability of the Swedish Armed Forces, in a Swedish as well as in a regional context. Considering the shared geostrategic location and context of Sweden, Norway and Finland, the study emphasises the value of coordinated measures to strengthen the overall deterrent threshold of the region. The present defence structures of Norway and Finland, which already contain relevant threshold capabilities, are highlighted.