Subdivision of Unexploded Ordnance on Military Firing Ranges and Training Areas
Publish date: 2017-03-23
Report number: FOI-R--4410--SE
Pages: 24
Written in: English
Keywords:
- Unexploded ordnance
- UXO
- military training area closure
- risk reducing measures.
Abstract
Present report constitutes one part in continued work to support the Swedish Fortifications Agency in producing a national basis, with the aim of creating a process facilitating transfer of areas earlier comprising parts of the Swedish Armed Forces' military firing ranges and training areas back for use in civilian society. One part in this continued work is to address the UXO related problems, concerning risk assessments and risk analyses for the surroundings. Subdivision of UXO aims to concretize the UXO problems in Sweden by subdividing UXO into a number of sub categories. The purpose of this is to illustrate which data is of interest and to provide the presumptions for generating correct data input to the continued work of producing an effective risk assessment methodology. The objective with the final risk assessment methodology is to reach the ability to evaluate remaining risk after risk reduction measures have been performed on areas adjacent to and surrounding target areas, risk zones, at former military firing ranges and military training areas, where the Swedish Armed Forces have operated. A subdivision of UXO into to sub categories, practice UXO and live UXO, is proposed in this report and could generate socioeconomic savings in connection with transfer of risk zones of former military firing ranges and military training areas used by the Swedish Armed Forces. The subdivision also provides an improved description of the remaining risk after risk reducing measures have been performed. Two parallel and simultaneous approaches are proposed for an effective UXO subdivision, on the one part UXO characteristics, but also a connection to the situation prevailing with transfer of former military training areas. Subdivision of UXO into sub categories, based on presented risk factors, is possible. This could simplify the assessment of remaining risks, when transferring military training areas at a specific site, after risk reducing measures have been performed. By the use of presented risk factors, the presumptions are provided in a "worst-case" scenario context. Present report constitutes a part of the framework for continued efforts to produce a risk assessment methodology for calculating remaining risk after performed risk reducing measures by transfer of military training areas.