Western Military Capability. An Analysis of Northern Europe 2017

Authors:

  • Krister Pallin

Publish date: 2018-02-13

Report number: FOI-R--4563--SE

Pages: 212

Written in: Swedish

Keywords:

  • security and defence policy
  • military expenditures
  • military forces
  • military capability
  • war game
  • Europe
  • Northern Europe
  • EU
  • NATO
  • collective defence
  • Denmark
  • Norway
  • Finland
  • Estonia
  • Latvia
  • Lithuania
  • Poland
  • Germany
  • United Kingdom
  • USA

Abstract

The main military threat against western security in Europe is posed by Russia. This is clear given Russian great power interests, reform and rearmament of its armed forces, and aggressive behaviour towards neighbouring countries over the last years. Other European countries take measures in order to strengthen their defence capabilities and deter Russian attacks. This study contributes to a comprehensive picture of the military strategic situation in Northern Europe. It does so by analysing western military presence and capability in the Baltic region. An analysis of the security and defence policy of the western countries and their armed forces makes it possible to draw conclusions with respect to the quantity, quality and availability of military capability in the West. In order to further assess western military capability, it is necessary to test this capability in different situations. In this study it has been done by war-gaming a serious threat against Baltic states, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian prospects for success with military action are primarily consistent with limited objectives which can be reached quickly. It is therefore particularly important for the West to be able to counter and handle a rapidly emerging threat. Western military capability in the Baltic region will be very limited the first few days and weeks after countermeasures have been initiated. This applies above all to ground forces, but also to maritime and air forces. Within a week the West may have 25-40 maneuver battalions, 25-35 surface combatants and 15-20 combat aircraft divisions available. In addition, lower outcomes are more probable than higher ones and the quality of the units will vary greatly. Growth of available NATO forces will gradually, after some weeks, lead to an advantage in capability over Russia, primarily with respect to sea and air combat. This is not true when it comes to joint or combined arms operations and, in the Baltic region, ground combat. Availability of combat units, and to an even greater degree of command and support units, will be a limiting factor. Furthermore, unfavourable force ratios for the West is not compensated for by better unit quality. On the contrary, at present Russia has an advantage with respect to high-end warfare. The conversion to collective defence has only begun in the West. The direction is clear, but at the same time reform is characterised by ambivalence and varying speed in the countries concerned. Other threats, in particular terrorism, and regional security interests are competing for attention and limited resources. Military expenditures have risen in most western European countries, but significant and consistent increases are confined to Norway, the Baltic states and Poland. As a consequence, the overall room for reform is limited... (see continuation in report).