Apostles of Violence: The Russian-Orthodox Church's Role in Russian Militarism

Why does the Russian regime use the Russian Orthodox Church as a militaristic propaganda tool when so few Russian soldiers are deeply religious? In this report, I explain the puzzle as a function of the fact that religious propaganda (via the military clergy) may contribute to unit cohesion (i.e. soldier morale) in the Russian Armed Forces. Several agreements between the Russian state and the church since the 1990s state that the role of military priests is to support the morale of soldiers. Although the impact on soldier morale may be helpful for the Russian war machine in principle, in practice there seems to be limited historical evidence of its impact on the outcome of military operations. In the end, the reason why it is rational for the Russian state to invest in the spiritual factor via the institution of military clergy is the notion of the pervasive "ambient faith" in Russia. This is a condition that means that even people of weak religious faith may feel overwhelmed by Russian Orthodox symbolism through media and society. In fact, although a majority of Russians self-identify as Russian Orthodox, only a minority can be called devout believers; but through the "ambient faith" (i.e. ample Russian Orthodox symbolism promulgated by the Russian state and its media outlets) those who hold weak religious beliefs are convinced that everyone is a believer. And, since the Armed Forces mirrors the society, similar conditions apply there. In particular, the "ambient faith" in the Armed Forces, produced by the military clergy, raises the threshold for voicing antiwar sentiments among the soldiers. Thus, it is likely that the undersized military clergy does have a (limited) positive effect on unit cohesion, that is, on soldier morale.