This study assesses the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) between 1998 and 2001. It argues that the key fault-lines of the negotiation process for the ESDP rested on three core issues. firstly, the dichotomy between Atlanticist and Europeanist preferences; secondly, the shifting preferences for the balance between military and civilian crisis management tools and thirdly (to a lesser extent) the shifting preferences between intergovernmental and federal approaches to the implementation of the ESDP. The study, furthermore, test the validity of the theoretical framework Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) in reference to the ESDP process. It cast doupts on LI´s core assumptions of "unitary actor behaviour" and "rationality" since they underestimates factors such as historical points of reference, norms and values. The empirical findings indicate that these factors seem decisvely, albeit not exclusively, have influenced the preferences in the field of European security and defence co-operation.