The Swedish Liaison Teams have in many ways followed the concept papers regarding LMT and LOT. However, there is room for some improvement. There are also differences between the teams depending on the contributing countries. This means that the type and quality of the gathered information varies which makes the material difficult to handle. Also, the interests of the contributing countries have sometimes been more important than the interest of the operation. Since this applies also to Sweden, the Ministry of Defence needs to make clear which interests should guide a Swedish contribution. Sweden should also consider initiating a longer and overlapping rotation, since this would enhance the quality and continuity of the work of teams. Further education regarding verbal and written communication is also necessary.When it comes to NATO, there seems to be s need for a uniformed organisation, purpose and method regarding the use of liaison teams. Another shortcoming is the lack of an analysis capasity within the teams themselves since they might be best suited to decide whether the gathered information is true or false. The teams make a clear distinction between their own work and intelligence, and CIMIC. However, since their work can be seen as a combination of the other two this is not obvious. An enhanced knowledge about the different concepts is therefore needed. A long-term Swedish engagement in KFOR can in the long run mean that a contribution to the LMTs becomes necessary. Sweden should therefore consider once more contributing with teams. In Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand, it is civilian rather than military personnel that is needed.