Stop for START

START, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, between USA and the Soviet Union entered into force December 5, 1994 when it was rati ed by USA and Russia together with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The latter three parts entered the treaty as non-nuclear members of NPT, in accord with the Lisbon Protocol. The treaty is due to expire on December 5, 2009 after its stipulated 15 year lifetime. The treaty has its root in the rapid expansion of the strategies arsenals which occurred during the 1970´s and 80´s in conjuncture with technical development. The treaty contains a phase of arms reduction which occurred between 1994 and 2001, when the parties, USA and Russia, reduced their strategic arsenals in three steps towards the number of warheads set by the treaty. The main goal of the treaty is strategic stability. The treaty works to mitigate changes in the size of arsenals. In START the term warhead is an abstract concept corresponding to a number associated to a given delivery vehicle. For arms reduction purposes the delivery vehicle and the launcher needs to be destroyed together with the warheads. This mechanism restricts rapid changes of the size of the arsenals. The protocols for noti cations and over all conduct in the treaty, together with a regime for veri cations and inspections has given START the character of a social norm for the parties, as far as strategic arms are concerned. The openness and transparency that come with the treaty have also been bene ting to states that are not parties to the treaty. The expectations for a follow-on treaty to START, with the same impact on strategic stability, are rather low due to a number of reasons. The global strategic situation is di erent today from that of the 1970´s. Some of the stumbling-blocks are Flexibility: military demands for more xibility in the arsenals in both con- guration and number of warheads limit the possibilities to reach a state of strategic stability. Scope in terms of relevant parties to a treaty and the type of arms treated therein. Veri cation, inspections and information exchange are vital to strategic stability among the parties. A working veri cation regime will, at the same time, demand that rigorous and often time consuming care is taken in formulating the treaty text.