Deterrence by reinforcement - The strengths and weaknesses of NATO's evolving defence strategy

In 2014, NATO began a transformation from out-of-area crisis management operations to deterrence and defence at home. NATO's current force posture of a limited forward presence on the eastern flank puts a premium on the capability for rapid reinforcement if credible deterrence is to be achieved. However, the practical, legal-bureaucratic and infrastructural obstacles to rapid reinforcements are many. Within NATO, the many initiatives launched to facilitate reinforcements have created ambiguities and overlapping mandates in the command and force structure. While capabilities have improved, greater access to national forces available at high readiness, early decision-making, enhanced mandates for NATO's commanders, and large-scale deployment exercises seem important to strengthen NATO's evolving defence strategy. At the national level, regular rotations of US forces to the eastern flank have enhanced the US logistic support machinery. European NATO members could invest more in infrastructure and logistical support capabilities. Fundamentally, NATO's posture and defence strategy are products of its member states' diverse threat perceptions and priorities. Thus, compromises and work-around solutions to maintain Alliance cohesion have created a mix of symbolism and real capabilities. The heart of the issue is whether NATO should aim for deterrence or also prepare for defence, which is more costly.