Searching for synergies in conflict-torn Mali
Several international military missions are currently in Mali, seeking to improve the country’s severely deteriorating security situation. These multinational missions have different mandates, resources, and cultures. FOI has studied the prospects for creating synergies between the various engagements.
A Swedish rifle company with the Swedish version of OMC RG32 during a patrol in Mali. Photo: Oscar Larsson/Swedish Armed Forces.
In 2012, the Tuareg guerrilla group, MNLA (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), declared independence in northern Mali. This led to a series of conflicts that persist today, involving numerous actors, interests and conflict levels. The situation has become even more complicated since the coup d’état in August this year.
Mali’s government has invited a number of external actors to operate within the country’s territory.
Today there are four large military missions in the country (also see Facts: Missions in Mali):
- the UN’s MINUSMA;
- EU’s EUTM;
- France’s Barkhane;
- the regional joint force, FC-G5S.
The formation of a fifth mission, Takuba, is underway. This is a French-led coalition of European special forces that will be part of Barkhane and support the operations of Malian forces.
Between 20,000-30,000, foreign troops are involved in the missions, in addition to a number of support functions. In Synergies Between Military Missions in Mali, a report by FOI researchers Elin Hellquist and Tua Sandman, the authors use various means, including interviews of Swedish participants in MINUSMA and EUTM, to study how synergies can be seen emerging between the groups.
“With the aim that one plus one will be at least a little more than two,” says Elin Hellquist.
Difficult to institutionalise
The researchers state that the missions in Mali have numerous challenges. There are considerable risks, the terrain as well as the climate are difficult to handle and the situation is so unstable that the assignments of the missions change over time. All of this makes it almost impossible to conduct institutionalised cooperation.
Instead, synergies have to be grasped whenever opportunities arise.
“Points of contact most often arise spontaneously, when something is needed in a specific place, if a group needs help. It can involve sharing information, helping with transportation, or offering protection or medical assistance,” says Elin Hellquist.
It is important for cooperation that all organisations have a clear, well-defined mandate.
“The division of labour between the missions is what sets the contours and boundaries for what contacts are possible. The focus is on one’s own mission, and then one helps with for example logistics or protection as needed,” says Elin Hellquist.
The FOI researchers note that solutions adapted to specific situations are often facilitated through personal relations. But in international military missions this is an unending challenge.
“In Mali, as in most assignments, military personnel are usually only stationed for six months. Then they are replaced.”
Swede to Swede
This is why personal acquaintanceship can sometimes be facilitated by other ties.
“Nationality can also be a way to do this: in other words, a Swede in one organisation contacts a Swede in another,” says Elin Hellquist.
The report may be helpful for Swedish troops when the Swedish Armed Forces receives new tasks within MINUSMA. The Swedish intelligence unit in Timbuktu has been replaced by a Swedish rifle company that is part of a mobile task force in the German camp in Gao. Swedish special forces will also participate in Takuba. That the Armed Forces receives new assignments in Mali can also be useful for Sweden’s national defence.
“Since the missions are developing in a direction where Armed Forces personnel may be gaining experience that exercises at home cannot come close to replicating,” says Elin Hellquist.
The report has been submitted to the Swedish Armed Forces.